Bhavna Singh
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post-
Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of
the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to
become-energy independent and hence cares little about the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War. However, this domination ended after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where
the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
13 Sept 2014
OF INQUILAB AND THE INQUILABIS
Salma Malik
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market? The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in
addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market? The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in
addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
CHANGING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER: OBAMA'S RESPONSE
Chintamani Mahapatra
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
INDIA-AUSTRALIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: BESPEAKING OF A NEW AGE
Sheel Kant Sharma
The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia last week is indeed a landmark achievement for their bilateral relations. Before leaving for his India visit, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was confident of reaching an agreement with India as he stated in Canberra that “We ought to be prepared to provide uranium to India under suitable
safeguards.” Considering the chasm that separated their positions twenty years ago on the main issues in the global nuclear mainstream, Abbot’s statement bespeaks
of a coming of age. He declared in India that “…there is a very high level of trust between us, and that is why we are signing this agreement.” Australia has provided
full assurance that it will be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India. Australia also supports India’s joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a member. The agreement will also cover other key areas in nuclear technology such as supply of isotopes and cooperation in regard to nuclear safety. Although Australia does not run nuclear power plants, it has an extensive nuclear enterprise comprising not only mining but also research in diverse areas including, for example, on making the
safeguards system more effective. It is to the credit of India’s nuclear program that it receives recognition from Australia in unequivocal terms, like “trust” and
scrupulous adherence to international laws “regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi.” This level of understanding and confluence of mutual interest takes the relationship to a truly strategic scale of cooperation; energy being central to it.
Looking at Australia’s immense natural resources and the vast unpolluted continent that lies at its disposal, Canberra’s role and profile in international arena in the coming decades will certainly grow much bigger. So far, it has played a modest role in the Asia Pacific compared to its potential albeit as a dependable and steadfast US ally and a robust economic partner for ASEAN and
China. India and Australia, as the Joint Statement issued after the prime minister’s visit demonstrates, are set to do a whole lot of things together for mutual benefit. The nuclear accord encapsulates and symbolises that coming together just as the seminal agreement between India and the US did in 2006. In recent years, a definitive sense has emerged in the Australian worldview that a strong and prosperous India will be a factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.
Coming to the uranium metal, its fortunes fluctuate wildly depending on the temperamental swings of the mass psychosis about “radiation” on the one hand and the inexorable push of nuclear power as a relatively cleaner and sustainable energy option for the energy
hungry planet. From its highs in the short years of nuclear renaissance in the middle of last decade, uranium prices have come down to nearly half that peak post the Fukushima disaster and subsequent sharp
retardation in nuclear power prospect – not only in Japan and Germany but also in liability-obsessed India. India’s vacillation on nuclear power projects is particularly shocking since its power needs today exceed its production by figures that approach a 100000 Megawatt and even coal fired thermal plant capacity languishing in shortfalls as big as 90000 Megawatt due
to fuel crunch, according to some estimates. It is significant that Australia has come forward as a reliable supplier not only for nuclear fuel but also for coal. An uninterrupted supply of uranium and its
augmentation to meet the requirements in Indian nuclear power plants will also raise their capacity factors to record highs.
As it is the global openings since the US deal have brought enormous improvements in fuel situation and the Rawatbhata nuclear power plant units today can boast of achieving a global peak in continuous,
unbroken running of a plant. Australia has, along with its neighbour, New Zealand,
considerable moral clout in the realm of global nuclear and advanced technology. India should benefit from the Australian leverage for its entry in the NSG – Australia
has kept the nuclear option out for meeting its power needs despite its vast uranium resources.
So, its support may hopefully carry greater clout with conscientious objectors of nuclear power like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland that are not easily persuaded to relax the rules for India. The commercial
factor in uranium deals, while important for the Australian mining industry, is hardly so big as to be accused of driving its government’s stance in the energy debate. The environmentalists, as Prime Minister Abbott has stated, are a highly significant lobby in Australia – that constantly oversees the mining industry to ensure that the green standards are observed to the utmost
level of satisfaction. It now remains for the company representatives from both sides to thrash out the details of contract terms for
supply of uranium. India’s Nuclear Power Cooperation Limited has been keen to build lifetime inventories for suitably safeguarded nuclear plants and would naturally want to obtain long-term supply guarantees. This should not pose a problem to arrive at, given the India’s record commitment to its safeguards obligations.
The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia last week is indeed a landmark achievement for their bilateral relations. Before leaving for his India visit, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was confident of reaching an agreement with India as he stated in Canberra that “We ought to be prepared to provide uranium to India under suitable
safeguards.” Considering the chasm that separated their positions twenty years ago on the main issues in the global nuclear mainstream, Abbot’s statement bespeaks
of a coming of age. He declared in India that “…there is a very high level of trust between us, and that is why we are signing this agreement.” Australia has provided
full assurance that it will be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India. Australia also supports India’s joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a member. The agreement will also cover other key areas in nuclear technology such as supply of isotopes and cooperation in regard to nuclear safety. Although Australia does not run nuclear power plants, it has an extensive nuclear enterprise comprising not only mining but also research in diverse areas including, for example, on making the
safeguards system more effective. It is to the credit of India’s nuclear program that it receives recognition from Australia in unequivocal terms, like “trust” and
scrupulous adherence to international laws “regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi.” This level of understanding and confluence of mutual interest takes the relationship to a truly strategic scale of cooperation; energy being central to it.
Looking at Australia’s immense natural resources and the vast unpolluted continent that lies at its disposal, Canberra’s role and profile in international arena in the coming decades will certainly grow much bigger. So far, it has played a modest role in the Asia Pacific compared to its potential albeit as a dependable and steadfast US ally and a robust economic partner for ASEAN and
China. India and Australia, as the Joint Statement issued after the prime minister’s visit demonstrates, are set to do a whole lot of things together for mutual benefit. The nuclear accord encapsulates and symbolises that coming together just as the seminal agreement between India and the US did in 2006. In recent years, a definitive sense has emerged in the Australian worldview that a strong and prosperous India will be a factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.
Coming to the uranium metal, its fortunes fluctuate wildly depending on the temperamental swings of the mass psychosis about “radiation” on the one hand and the inexorable push of nuclear power as a relatively cleaner and sustainable energy option for the energy
hungry planet. From its highs in the short years of nuclear renaissance in the middle of last decade, uranium prices have come down to nearly half that peak post the Fukushima disaster and subsequent sharp
retardation in nuclear power prospect – not only in Japan and Germany but also in liability-obsessed India. India’s vacillation on nuclear power projects is particularly shocking since its power needs today exceed its production by figures that approach a 100000 Megawatt and even coal fired thermal plant capacity languishing in shortfalls as big as 90000 Megawatt due
to fuel crunch, according to some estimates. It is significant that Australia has come forward as a reliable supplier not only for nuclear fuel but also for coal. An uninterrupted supply of uranium and its
augmentation to meet the requirements in Indian nuclear power plants will also raise their capacity factors to record highs.
As it is the global openings since the US deal have brought enormous improvements in fuel situation and the Rawatbhata nuclear power plant units today can boast of achieving a global peak in continuous,
unbroken running of a plant. Australia has, along with its neighbour, New Zealand,
considerable moral clout in the realm of global nuclear and advanced technology. India should benefit from the Australian leverage for its entry in the NSG – Australia
has kept the nuclear option out for meeting its power needs despite its vast uranium resources.
So, its support may hopefully carry greater clout with conscientious objectors of nuclear power like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland that are not easily persuaded to relax the rules for India. The commercial
factor in uranium deals, while important for the Australian mining industry, is hardly so big as to be accused of driving its government’s stance in the energy debate. The environmentalists, as Prime Minister Abbott has stated, are a highly significant lobby in Australia – that constantly oversees the mining industry to ensure that the green standards are observed to the utmost
level of satisfaction. It now remains for the company representatives from both sides to thrash out the details of contract terms for
supply of uranium. India’s Nuclear Power Cooperation Limited has been keen to build lifetime inventories for suitably safeguarded nuclear plants and would naturally want to obtain long-term supply guarantees. This should not pose a problem to arrive at, given the India’s record commitment to its safeguards obligations.
MYANMAR'S POLITICAL TRANSITION:CHALLENGES OF THE 2015 ELECTION
Shankari Sundararaman
Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-Ã -vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.
Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-Ã -vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.
INDIA-NEPAL HYDROELECTRICITY DEAL: MAKING IT COUNT
Pramod Jaiswal
With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.
With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.
DRUG SMUGGLING ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN: IMPACT OF INCREASING INTERCEPTION
Vijay Sakhuja
Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.
Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.
AL QAEDA IN SOUTH ASIA: ZAWAHIRI WILL FAIL IN INDIA
San
Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.
Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.
30 Aug 2014
DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA
Ellen Bork
At this writing, it seems that the hundreds of trucks sent by Moscow with supplies for the residents of Eastern Ukraine will be delivered without further incident. For over a week, the long convoy wended its way toward the Ukrainian border, carrying with it the prospect for a spike in tensions between Moscow and Kiev. Concerns over the trucks’ contents—were they humanitarian supplies, or was the convoy a Trojan Horse, filled with weapons and munitions?—have been resolved. Even so, the drama over the convoy is unlikely
to be the last in Moscow’s months-long campaign to sow instability in Ukraine. After all, the Russian president’s main objective is to prevent the consolidation of a modern, democratic state in Ukraine, with economic prospects and political freedoms exceeding those he allows his own people. For him, hiving off Crimea in March to redeem a revanchist Russian claim wasn’t enough. By destabilizing Ukraine, Putin hopes to prevent its newly elected government from providing an attractive model for Russia’s citizens. It wasn’t so long ago that Putin faced a similar challenge from within his own country. Just a few years back, stunning demonstrations in Moscow and other cities prompted predictions that Putin would soon leave power. Despite government control of television and the electoral administration, and obvious signs of fraud, Putin’s ruling United Russia party failed to clear the 50
percent mark in the December 2011 Duma elections that ignited the protests. Exit polls and independent monitors suggest that the real result might have been considerably lower.
Putin, however, was determined to stay in power. In March 2012 he reclaimed the presidency in elections also tainted by fraud, and set about using vindictive
prosecutions and repressive laws to destroy the political opposition and civil society.
This has continued, even while the Kremlin sponsors subversion in Ukraine. In April, with the world’s attention focused on Ukraine, the Duma paved the way for the
abolition of direct elections for mayors and legislative councils in dozens of cities. Prohibitive requirements for ballot access have effectively sidelined a leading,
registered opposition party, the Republican Party of Russia–People’s Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS, by its Russian acronym). Among other things, the party’s legal status enabled Alexei Navalny, an anticorruption
campaigner who shot to prominence during the protest movement, to make a strong showing in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. For the upcoming Moscow Duma (city council) election this September, the
authorities have used signature requirements to disqualify a number of popular independent candidates.
In July, several respected organizations dedicated to human rights and rule of law were formally labeled “foreign agents,” making it difficult if not impossible for
them to continue their work. Even so, Putin has reason to worry. Aside from revealing
significant dissatisfaction with him and his clique, the protests unleashed sentiments common to democracy movements everywhere, regardless of culture or history. Protesters described themselves as motivated by a hunger for “decency,” “honesty,” and “conscience.”
Tracking Navalny’s campaign for mayor, the British writer Peter Pomerantsev observed that campaign workers cared “less about the man himself and more about a desire for personal dignity and clear rules of the game. ‘I don’t want to live in lies’ was a common phrase, as was ‘There must be an alternative to this system.’ ”
Such values are inimical to the exclusive Russian culture, hostile to individual rights and universal values, that Putin promotes to stoke tensions with the West and
distract attention from his misrule. It also puts him at odds with the liberal opposition, says Max Trudolyubov, opinion editor at the business daily Vedomosti , who
dismisses Putin’s cultural determinism as “wrong science.” “Rules and institutions change culture,” he says, not the other way around.
In recent years, Putin hasn’t had to worry that the West feels the same way. Writing about the West’s policies of “reset” and “partnership” with the Kremlin in the
American Interest in 2012, Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian political scientist, asked why the West no longer emphasizes liberal principles in its approach to Russia.
Perhaps, she ventured, it is because of the
disappearance of the Soviet Union as an ideological competitor, a backlash against the Bush era, or even the lure of “sweet deals.” “I can tell you how it looks from
the outside,” Shevtsova wrote. “It looks, first and foremost, like doubt that liberal democracy could appeal to the nondemocratic world, and secondly, like a
condescending attitude toward nations supposedly unable to accept liberal democratic principles.”
Leaders of Russia’s democratic opposition see the connection between Putin’s aggression abroad and his domestic agenda. They reject as “flimsy” the pretext—
protecting ethnic Russians—on which the Ukraine aggression is based. “The main reason” for the aggression in Ukraine, said Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov, co-chairmen of PARNAS at the outset of
Putin’s assault on Ukraine, “is the reluctance of the Russian authorities to recognize the Ukrainian people’s
sovereign right to its own fate. . . . Putin is trying to stifle freedom not only in Russia, but also in a neighboring country.”
Western governments have yet to appreciate this. Announcing new U.S. sanctions against Russia’s banking, energy, and arms industries on July 29, President Obama cast the measures as addressing only the “very specific issue of Ukraine.”
The West should seek more than just an “off-ramp” for Putin in Ukraine. Russia is already committed to free elections and human rights through its membership in
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Restoring these principles to
a central role would begin to address the link between Putin’s domestic agenda and his foreign adventurism, now on display in Ukraine, later perhaps elsewhere.
Neglecting them will allow Putin to exempt Russia from universal values and make the work of Russia’s democrats much harder. Until the West takes these principles—and the Russians who want to live under them—seriously, it will treat only the symptoms rather than the cause of Putin’s aggression.
At this writing, it seems that the hundreds of trucks sent by Moscow with supplies for the residents of Eastern Ukraine will be delivered without further incident. For over a week, the long convoy wended its way toward the Ukrainian border, carrying with it the prospect for a spike in tensions between Moscow and Kiev. Concerns over the trucks’ contents—were they humanitarian supplies, or was the convoy a Trojan Horse, filled with weapons and munitions?—have been resolved. Even so, the drama over the convoy is unlikely
to be the last in Moscow’s months-long campaign to sow instability in Ukraine. After all, the Russian president’s main objective is to prevent the consolidation of a modern, democratic state in Ukraine, with economic prospects and political freedoms exceeding those he allows his own people. For him, hiving off Crimea in March to redeem a revanchist Russian claim wasn’t enough. By destabilizing Ukraine, Putin hopes to prevent its newly elected government from providing an attractive model for Russia’s citizens. It wasn’t so long ago that Putin faced a similar challenge from within his own country. Just a few years back, stunning demonstrations in Moscow and other cities prompted predictions that Putin would soon leave power. Despite government control of television and the electoral administration, and obvious signs of fraud, Putin’s ruling United Russia party failed to clear the 50
percent mark in the December 2011 Duma elections that ignited the protests. Exit polls and independent monitors suggest that the real result might have been considerably lower.
Putin, however, was determined to stay in power. In March 2012 he reclaimed the presidency in elections also tainted by fraud, and set about using vindictive
prosecutions and repressive laws to destroy the political opposition and civil society.
This has continued, even while the Kremlin sponsors subversion in Ukraine. In April, with the world’s attention focused on Ukraine, the Duma paved the way for the
abolition of direct elections for mayors and legislative councils in dozens of cities. Prohibitive requirements for ballot access have effectively sidelined a leading,
registered opposition party, the Republican Party of Russia–People’s Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS, by its Russian acronym). Among other things, the party’s legal status enabled Alexei Navalny, an anticorruption
campaigner who shot to prominence during the protest movement, to make a strong showing in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. For the upcoming Moscow Duma (city council) election this September, the
authorities have used signature requirements to disqualify a number of popular independent candidates.
In July, several respected organizations dedicated to human rights and rule of law were formally labeled “foreign agents,” making it difficult if not impossible for
them to continue their work. Even so, Putin has reason to worry. Aside from revealing
significant dissatisfaction with him and his clique, the protests unleashed sentiments common to democracy movements everywhere, regardless of culture or history. Protesters described themselves as motivated by a hunger for “decency,” “honesty,” and “conscience.”
Tracking Navalny’s campaign for mayor, the British writer Peter Pomerantsev observed that campaign workers cared “less about the man himself and more about a desire for personal dignity and clear rules of the game. ‘I don’t want to live in lies’ was a common phrase, as was ‘There must be an alternative to this system.’ ”
Such values are inimical to the exclusive Russian culture, hostile to individual rights and universal values, that Putin promotes to stoke tensions with the West and
distract attention from his misrule. It also puts him at odds with the liberal opposition, says Max Trudolyubov, opinion editor at the business daily Vedomosti , who
dismisses Putin’s cultural determinism as “wrong science.” “Rules and institutions change culture,” he says, not the other way around.
In recent years, Putin hasn’t had to worry that the West feels the same way. Writing about the West’s policies of “reset” and “partnership” with the Kremlin in the
American Interest in 2012, Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian political scientist, asked why the West no longer emphasizes liberal principles in its approach to Russia.
Perhaps, she ventured, it is because of the
disappearance of the Soviet Union as an ideological competitor, a backlash against the Bush era, or even the lure of “sweet deals.” “I can tell you how it looks from
the outside,” Shevtsova wrote. “It looks, first and foremost, like doubt that liberal democracy could appeal to the nondemocratic world, and secondly, like a
condescending attitude toward nations supposedly unable to accept liberal democratic principles.”
Leaders of Russia’s democratic opposition see the connection between Putin’s aggression abroad and his domestic agenda. They reject as “flimsy” the pretext—
protecting ethnic Russians—on which the Ukraine aggression is based. “The main reason” for the aggression in Ukraine, said Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov, co-chairmen of PARNAS at the outset of
Putin’s assault on Ukraine, “is the reluctance of the Russian authorities to recognize the Ukrainian people’s
sovereign right to its own fate. . . . Putin is trying to stifle freedom not only in Russia, but also in a neighboring country.”
Western governments have yet to appreciate this. Announcing new U.S. sanctions against Russia’s banking, energy, and arms industries on July 29, President Obama cast the measures as addressing only the “very specific issue of Ukraine.”
The West should seek more than just an “off-ramp” for Putin in Ukraine. Russia is already committed to free elections and human rights through its membership in
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Restoring these principles to
a central role would begin to address the link between Putin’s domestic agenda and his foreign adventurism, now on display in Ukraine, later perhaps elsewhere.
Neglecting them will allow Putin to exempt Russia from universal values and make the work of Russia’s democrats much harder. Until the West takes these principles—and the Russians who want to live under them—seriously, it will treat only the symptoms rather than the cause of Putin’s aggression.
JAMES FOLEY (1973-2014)
David Devoss
In the end, Jim Foley died just as he wanted to live, pursuing a story that mattered on the front line of hard news journalism. In Afghanistan, Libya, and finally Syria he recorded the horror, chaos, and occasional
compassion that define the war on terror. But it was his gruesome killing on the barren sands of a foreign land that truly conveys the evil that envelops the Islamic
Caliphate’s hooded assassins.
I got to know Jim Foley in 2009 when both of us worked on USAID-funded development projects in Baghdad. A former Teach for America instructor, Foley helped organize conferences and training seminars for a program designed to rebuild Iraq’s civil service, crippled by decades of isolation and autocratic administration.
We lived in a Red Zone compound guarded by African mercenaries and surrounded by concrete T-walls topped with razor wire. It was possible to see the surrounding Mansour neighborhood by climbing to the roof of a bombed-out building once used by Saddam’s intelligence service. But for the most part Jim Foley’s Iraq was an aural experience punctuated by nightly small arms fire, daily calls to prayer, and nearby car bombs that would blow out office windows and leave his apartment carpeted with glass.
Foley’s job took him “outside the wire,” but his glimpses of Baghdad came through the thick windows of an armored car that would drive as fast as possible directly to a government ministry. Put in place in early
2004 after al Qaeda beheaded several Westerners involved in the rebuilding effort, the tight security prevented further kidnappings. But the restrictions also
made it difficult for private contractors hired to implement development programs to really get to know Iraq.
Foley chafed under these restrictions. He wanted to understand the passions driving the conflict and meet the people whose lives had been upended by war. So in 2010 he left Iraq and moved to Afghanistan to become a freelance journalist.
Foley had been in Afghanistan for about six months when I called him on Skype. The company I worked for had an opening in Kabul for a communications director.
Would he be interested in the job? “I know it will pay more than you’re earning as a freelance journalist,” I hinted. “Try it for six months.” Foley laughingly said no thanks. “I’m finally doing what I want,” he said. “Yeah, the money’s not great, but I think I’m making a difference. Somebody needs to
report what’s going on here.”
In 2011, Foley moved to Libya, where he was captured and held along with two other journalists for 44 days. Following his release he briefly returned to the United
States and visited Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism. There he tried to explain to students the attraction of war zones. “The honest fact
is that when you see something really violent, it does a strange thing to you,” he confided. “It doesn’t always repel you; it draws you closer. Feeling like you’ve
survived something—it’s a strange sort of force that you are drawn back to. I think that’s the absolute reality.”
In the end, Jim Foley died just as he wanted to live, pursuing a story that mattered on the front line of hard news journalism. In Afghanistan, Libya, and finally Syria he recorded the horror, chaos, and occasional
compassion that define the war on terror. But it was his gruesome killing on the barren sands of a foreign land that truly conveys the evil that envelops the Islamic
Caliphate’s hooded assassins.
I got to know Jim Foley in 2009 when both of us worked on USAID-funded development projects in Baghdad. A former Teach for America instructor, Foley helped organize conferences and training seminars for a program designed to rebuild Iraq’s civil service, crippled by decades of isolation and autocratic administration.
We lived in a Red Zone compound guarded by African mercenaries and surrounded by concrete T-walls topped with razor wire. It was possible to see the surrounding Mansour neighborhood by climbing to the roof of a bombed-out building once used by Saddam’s intelligence service. But for the most part Jim Foley’s Iraq was an aural experience punctuated by nightly small arms fire, daily calls to prayer, and nearby car bombs that would blow out office windows and leave his apartment carpeted with glass.
Foley’s job took him “outside the wire,” but his glimpses of Baghdad came through the thick windows of an armored car that would drive as fast as possible directly to a government ministry. Put in place in early
2004 after al Qaeda beheaded several Westerners involved in the rebuilding effort, the tight security prevented further kidnappings. But the restrictions also
made it difficult for private contractors hired to implement development programs to really get to know Iraq.
Foley chafed under these restrictions. He wanted to understand the passions driving the conflict and meet the people whose lives had been upended by war. So in 2010 he left Iraq and moved to Afghanistan to become a freelance journalist.
Foley had been in Afghanistan for about six months when I called him on Skype. The company I worked for had an opening in Kabul for a communications director.
Would he be interested in the job? “I know it will pay more than you’re earning as a freelance journalist,” I hinted. “Try it for six months.” Foley laughingly said no thanks. “I’m finally doing what I want,” he said. “Yeah, the money’s not great, but I think I’m making a difference. Somebody needs to
report what’s going on here.”
In 2011, Foley moved to Libya, where he was captured and held along with two other journalists for 44 days. Following his release he briefly returned to the United
States and visited Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism. There he tried to explain to students the attraction of war zones. “The honest fact
is that when you see something really violent, it does a strange thing to you,” he confided. “It doesn’t always repel you; it draws you closer. Feeling like you’ve
survived something—it’s a strange sort of force that you are drawn back to. I think that’s the absolute reality.”
DERANGEMENT IN MOSCOW
Cathy Young
"Maybe it’s all a matrix and we’re all like programs written by somebody else. . . . And none of us really exists, just the matrix. The program works, you live your life and think everything’s fine. Here you are drinking coffee right now. But there is no coffee—it doesn’t exist.” So mused Fyodor Berezin, the middle-aged sci-fi writer turned “deputy defense minister” of the Donetsk People’s Republic—the self-proclaimed state of the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern Ukraine—in an
August interview with a reporter for the still-surviving independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta . “The matrix,” the concept from the 1999 cult film of the
same name in which reality turns out to be an illusion generated by human-enslaving computers, was a recurring theme in Berezin’s conversation with Novaya Gazeta’s Pavel Kanygin. Berezin even deflected queries on the whereabouts of suddenly elusive rebel commander Igor Strelkov-Girkin with the deadpan suggestion that Strelkov-Girkin might not actually exist —though he grew testy when Kanygin countered by asking whether the Donetsk Republic might not exist, either.
This bizarre exchange encapsulates the surreal quality of the war in eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s undeclared involvement is the world’s biggest open
secret. Russian soldiers are already getting killed in what official reports describe as accidents during military training. But the local separatist insurgents have been led mostly by Russian citizens—notably a
battle-reenactment hobbyist (Strelkov-Girkin) and a political spin doctor (former Donetsk Republic prime minister Alexander Borodai). The theater of the absurd has even spread to Russia itself, where “the matrix” is a rather apt metaphor for the virtual reality propounded by the official media and uncritically absorbed by much
of the population.
"Maybe it’s all a matrix and we’re all like programs written by somebody else. . . . And none of us really exists, just the matrix. The program works, you live your life and think everything’s fine. Here you are drinking coffee right now. But there is no coffee—it doesn’t exist.” So mused Fyodor Berezin, the middle-aged sci-fi writer turned “deputy defense minister” of the Donetsk People’s Republic—the self-proclaimed state of the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern Ukraine—in an
August interview with a reporter for the still-surviving independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta . “The matrix,” the concept from the 1999 cult film of the
same name in which reality turns out to be an illusion generated by human-enslaving computers, was a recurring theme in Berezin’s conversation with Novaya Gazeta’s Pavel Kanygin. Berezin even deflected queries on the whereabouts of suddenly elusive rebel commander Igor Strelkov-Girkin with the deadpan suggestion that Strelkov-Girkin might not actually exist —though he grew testy when Kanygin countered by asking whether the Donetsk Republic might not exist, either.
This bizarre exchange encapsulates the surreal quality of the war in eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s undeclared involvement is the world’s biggest open
secret. Russian soldiers are already getting killed in what official reports describe as accidents during military training. But the local separatist insurgents have been led mostly by Russian citizens—notably a
battle-reenactment hobbyist (Strelkov-Girkin) and a political spin doctor (former Donetsk Republic prime minister Alexander Borodai). The theater of the absurd has even spread to Russia itself, where “the matrix” is a rather apt metaphor for the virtual reality propounded by the official media and uncritically absorbed by much
of the population.
The Russian media landscape in the last six months has been dominated by nearly wall-to-wall coverage of Ukraine—or, rather, lurid propaganda masquerading as
coverage. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru , Moscow journalist Anton Orekh noted with amazement that a major subway accident in Moscow in mid-July—a train derailment that killed 24 people and injured dozens more—did not rate a single mention in the weekly news wrap-up on Rossiya, the country’s
leading news television channel, just days later: Once again, it was all Ukraine.
The grotesque pseudo-journalism that has become the norm in the official Russian media was starkly illustrated by the sensational story of the crucified boy.
On July 12, a week after the previously rebel-controlled city of Slavyansk was taken by Ukrainian troops, Russia’s TV-1 aired an interview with a refugee named Galina Pyshnyak, who told a bloodcurdling tale about the execution of an insurgent’s child before a crowd of Luhansk residents in the city’s main square. “They took a little boy, 3 years old . . . and nailed him to a billboard like Jesus,” Pyshnyak told the reporter; the
child’s mother, she said, was forced to watch and listen to his screams until she fainted, then was herself tied to a tank and dragged unconscious around the square. The story was widely ridiculed by Russian bloggers and debunked by Novaya Gazeta reporter Evgeny Feldman, who interviewed Slavyansk locals and found that no one
had heard of this horrific deed. Pyshnyak was later identified as the wife of an ex-member of Berkut, the special security squad of the deposed pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych. TV-1 never
retracted the story. Even token dissenters are now gone from Russian TV, where the spectrum of opinion ranges from patriotic
fervor to patriotic derangement. The latter is reliably represented by member of parliament Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, in a recent appearance on the popular TV-1 talk show Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, capped a rant about the world’s eternal war on Russia with the declaration that “Hitler only killed Russians.”
On another Sunday Evening , Solovyov himself not only lobbed the standard charge of “genocide” at the Ukrainian government but claimed that Ukrain-ian
president Petro Poroshenko had “frankly declared that he is under the direct control of the USA.” One of the guests, political analyst Semyon Bagdasarov, stressed that helping the separatists in Ukraine was a
life-and-death priority for Russia: “After all, [Kiev’s] goal is very specific—it’s not just to crush Donbass [the Donetsk region], it’s to destroy the Russian Federation by bringing down its government and dragging us into
civil war. That’s what’s at stake!” The other panelists nodded approval, while the studio audience burst into applause.
The derangement extends beyond current events. EJ.ru ’s media watch columnist Igor Yakovenko notes that TV commentary on the World War I anniversary was so heavy on rhetoric blaming the war on American
machinations that the uninformed viewer could easily assume that the United States was Russia’s main adversary in that conflict. TV-1 also aired a “documentary” exploring the “alternative” theory that
Archduke Ferdinand was actually killed by a British sniper acting at the behest of an international conspiracy of Freemasons bent on world domination, which later also engineered the Russian Revolution to
prevent Russia from emerging as one of the war’s victors.
In this toxic climate, the free media live on as small and embattled enclaves. Chief among these is the radio station Ekho Moskvy, which remains an outlet for
dissenting viewpoints and censored news despite being owned by Gazprom Media, an arm of the state- controlled natural gas giant. In case Ekho’s editors were not aware of their precarious position, they got a recent reminder from Gazprom Media chairman Mikhail Lesin.
In an interview with the Russian edition of Forbes , Lesin complained about the “rude” and “snarky” tone of Ekho’s liberal commentators but allowed that, at least
for now, he did not regard the station as a “problem asset.” If that changed, he concluded, “it would be overhauled tomorrow, and there would be a music
station called Ekho Moskvy. They’d sing, and that’s it— what’s the problem?”
Open calls to shut down the Russia-haters are now part of the mainstream. In early August, Izvestia columnist Sergey Roganov wrote that Russia was getting fed up
with “all the empty chatter in the social networks and the mass media” and generously offered to sacrifice his
own freedom of speech for a strong hand that would put an end to this “Russophobic babble.” The very next day, the paper ran a guest column by writer Vladimir Lowenthal, who opined that Russia’s “Maidan-type” dissenters were clearly impervious to reason and should
therefore be treated like sick people or members of dangerous cults—that is, stopped from preaching or spreading the virus to others.
So far, the Kremlin hasn’t acted on these threats; but while Ekho and other islands of dissent are allowed to exist, they are regularly and openly assailed as traitors.
In late June, a news program on the NTV channel aired an interview with a masked, armed insurgent in Donetsk who said that the insurgency was setting up a “chapter”
in Moscow in order to fight the “fifth column,” particularly Ekho Moskvy, which was spreading “lies” about eastern Ukraine. In comments liberally peppered with bleeps and accompanied by menacing gestures, the insurgent told Ekho’s staffers that their days were numbered and that they would soon be looking death in the face. More recently, NTV aired a program titled 13
Friends of the Junta, in which prominent Kremlin critics including novelist Dmitry Bykov, satirist Victor Shenderovich, and singer Andrei Makarevich were depicted as Judases ready to sell their souls for
Ukrainian or American money.
From such rhetoric, it is a short step to physical intimidation. In late August, an Ekho Moskvy reporter was assaulted while covering a pro-Ukraine rally in St.
Petersburg; a few days later, journalists from Novaya Gazeta and the struggling independent news channel TV Rain were attacked and threatened while covering the
funeral of two Russian soldiers apparently killed in Ukraine.
Today, polls by the independent Levada Center find that 70 percent of the Russian population gets all of its news from television and trusts the official media. Vladimir Putin’s approval rating, meanwhile, stands at 84 percent. Will this change if Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions start causing real pain to the population—and if more Russian draftees start dying in mysterious accidents? Or will the “zombie box,” as
Russian dissenters call state television, persuade them to blame the perfidious West and the domestic “fifth column”?
While many dissenters cautiously hope that Putin’s support is not as widespread or as deep as the polls suggest, one would be hardpressed to find optimists among them. In a verse commentary in Novaya Gazeta
inspired by Berezin’s interview, Bykov wondered with bitter sarcasm if the post-Communist “Russian spring” had ever been real. For Russians who greeted the fall of
the Soviet Union almost a quarter-century ago, the free country they welcomed is now gone, replaced by a bizarre would-be hybrid of a smaller Soviet Union and the czarist Russian empire. Virtual reality, indeed.
THE NEED FOR INDIA-AUSTRALIA MARITIME COOPERATION
Teshu Singh
Though India and Australia have a long history of interactions and cooperation at various international fora, the potential for cooperation in the Indian Ocean is yet to materialise. What can New Delhi and Canberra do to actualise the potential of the bilateral vis-Ã -vis matters pertaining to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?
Indian Ocean: The Australian Push
Australia has been an active player in the IOR in the past two years. Australia hosted two extremely important meetings, the Indian Ocean Region- Association (IORA) Summit in November 2013 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), titled
‘Protecting the ability to trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy’, in March 2014.
The 2009 Australian defence white paper assessed that the Indian Ocean will assume strategic significance in the forthcoming years, and would be as important as the Pacific. Furthermore, their most recent defence white paper, released in 2013, stated that “the cooperation with Indian as crucial.” This was followed by the release
of a strategy document on India thereby indicating the orientation of the Australian maritime policy. Notably, these developments have come at a time when the concept of the Indo-Pacific is gaining traction in the strategic circle. Primarily, the Indo-Pacific concept unites the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean
and is premised on the idea of stronger security cooperation among regional powers.
Australia and the Indian Ocean: Indian Responses So Far
Australia forms the part of India’s extended
neighbourhood, and has become important for the success of New Delhi’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP). India and Australia have together already participated in several multilateral maritime exercises, namely Malabar (2007) and Milan (2012). Additionally, to enhance defence cooperation, both countries have agreed to hold a joint naval exercise in 2015. Retrospectively, both countries have been working together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Ade, and during the
international fleet review INS Sahyadri, had taken part and are members of IORA, IONS, and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port Sate Control.
Additionally, the foreign ministers of both countries, along with their Indonesian counterpart, have, under the IORA banner, published a joint Op Ed. This clearly
indicates that the interest for the revival of maritime cooperation still exists in the region. However, the aforementioned endeavours are miniscule and there is
not much bilateral maritime cooperation between the two countries. Despite, Australia having second-largest navy after India, there have not been many interactions between the two navies.
The MH370 flight incident has proved that all the IOR countries can cooperate well if there is a direction and a common agenda. During the rescue operations, Australia was quite proactive as compared to other
countries; India was equally involved. India has immense maritime presence in the IOR and is looked upon as a regional ‘net security provider’. For that reason, India needs to foster regional connectivity. The
IORA, IONS and other Indian Ocean initiatives should be seen along with the India’s LEP.
Perhaps India can use Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s India visit, scheduled for September, as a platform to discuss the India- Australia maritime
cooperation. Today, the IOR has transformed from a ‘passageway’ to a ‘theatre’. Keeping the evolving regional geopolitics in mind, it is not possible for a
single power to take the responsibility for the security of the region. Therefore, it is imperative for India to cooperate with Australia to set the agenda for improving
overall security in the region. The two countries should devise a long-term proposal so that external powers have minimum role to play in the region.
Australia has already factored India’ importance in its defence white paper but New Delhi has not reciprocated to it. India still does not have a political doctrine
wherein it has given emphasis to Australia vis-a-vis the IOR. In a recently held conference at the Australia-India Institute, David Brewster, an expert on the subject
emphasised that India should develop closer relations with countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Africa.
From the Australian side, although 90 per cent of their own trade passes through the region, its policies in the IOR are greatly influenced by the framework of its
alliance with the US. Needless to mention, there is plethora of opportunities for the two countries vi-a-vis the IOR. There should be more people-to-people contact, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments in the IOR. Now the onus is on India and
Australia to lead the maritime cooperation in the IOR.
Though India and Australia have a long history of interactions and cooperation at various international fora, the potential for cooperation in the Indian Ocean is yet to materialise. What can New Delhi and Canberra do to actualise the potential of the bilateral vis-Ã -vis matters pertaining to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?
Indian Ocean: The Australian Push
Australia has been an active player in the IOR in the past two years. Australia hosted two extremely important meetings, the Indian Ocean Region- Association (IORA) Summit in November 2013 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), titled
‘Protecting the ability to trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy’, in March 2014.
The 2009 Australian defence white paper assessed that the Indian Ocean will assume strategic significance in the forthcoming years, and would be as important as the Pacific. Furthermore, their most recent defence white paper, released in 2013, stated that “the cooperation with Indian as crucial.” This was followed by the release
of a strategy document on India thereby indicating the orientation of the Australian maritime policy. Notably, these developments have come at a time when the concept of the Indo-Pacific is gaining traction in the strategic circle. Primarily, the Indo-Pacific concept unites the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean
and is premised on the idea of stronger security cooperation among regional powers.
Australia and the Indian Ocean: Indian Responses So Far
Australia forms the part of India’s extended
neighbourhood, and has become important for the success of New Delhi’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP). India and Australia have together already participated in several multilateral maritime exercises, namely Malabar (2007) and Milan (2012). Additionally, to enhance defence cooperation, both countries have agreed to hold a joint naval exercise in 2015. Retrospectively, both countries have been working together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Ade, and during the
international fleet review INS Sahyadri, had taken part and are members of IORA, IONS, and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port Sate Control.
Additionally, the foreign ministers of both countries, along with their Indonesian counterpart, have, under the IORA banner, published a joint Op Ed. This clearly
indicates that the interest for the revival of maritime cooperation still exists in the region. However, the aforementioned endeavours are miniscule and there is
not much bilateral maritime cooperation between the two countries. Despite, Australia having second-largest navy after India, there have not been many interactions between the two navies.
The MH370 flight incident has proved that all the IOR countries can cooperate well if there is a direction and a common agenda. During the rescue operations, Australia was quite proactive as compared to other
countries; India was equally involved. India has immense maritime presence in the IOR and is looked upon as a regional ‘net security provider’. For that reason, India needs to foster regional connectivity. The
IORA, IONS and other Indian Ocean initiatives should be seen along with the India’s LEP.
Perhaps India can use Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s India visit, scheduled for September, as a platform to discuss the India- Australia maritime
cooperation. Today, the IOR has transformed from a ‘passageway’ to a ‘theatre’. Keeping the evolving regional geopolitics in mind, it is not possible for a
single power to take the responsibility for the security of the region. Therefore, it is imperative for India to cooperate with Australia to set the agenda for improving
overall security in the region. The two countries should devise a long-term proposal so that external powers have minimum role to play in the region.
Australia has already factored India’ importance in its defence white paper but New Delhi has not reciprocated to it. India still does not have a political doctrine
wherein it has given emphasis to Australia vis-a-vis the IOR. In a recently held conference at the Australia-India Institute, David Brewster, an expert on the subject
emphasised that India should develop closer relations with countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Africa.
From the Australian side, although 90 per cent of their own trade passes through the region, its policies in the IOR are greatly influenced by the framework of its
alliance with the US. Needless to mention, there is plethora of opportunities for the two countries vi-a-vis the IOR. There should be more people-to-people contact, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments in the IOR. Now the onus is on India and
Australia to lead the maritime cooperation in the IOR.
J & K: BACK TO SQUARE ONE
Shujaat Bukhari
After New Delhi unilaterally called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad, following the meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit, the cross-border shelling has again started with a bang. Few more lives have been lost and if seen technically, the 2003 ceasefire along the
borders has virtually come to an end.
New Delhi’s move to call off the talks is seen as an attempt to send a terse message to both Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led government in Delhi has surely started
“fulfilling” its electoral promises and this surprising move seems to be the beginning of a new rather tough bilateral journey.
“Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi had repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a pleasant surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something quite unexpected of the tough-talking Modi.
If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the grand swearing in ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger
outreach to all SAARC nations. It was during the brief meeting between Modi and
Nawaz the decision to hold the Foreign Secretary-level talks was taken. And the expectations were raised for a wider scope to formally renew the dialogue process
between the two sides. It had raised hopes that both leaders could meet in New York in September on the sidelines of UN General Assembly.
It is very difficult to read the mind of the new government in Delhi. Even the senior journalists and analysts in Delhi fail to assess any critical issue including that of foreign affairs. But will the tough line the new government has taken bear any fruit for lasting peace in the region. The reason New Delhi gave for calling off the talks was also not provocative enough to take an extreme step to say categorical no to
engagement with Pakistan.
In the past over six years including these three months of Modi government, Government of India’s major concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan and the dialogue have remained confined to issues related to terrorism, Mumbai trial and Hafiz Saeed et al. Whatever the progress on Mumbai and other issues, New Delhi had still shown willingness to engage with Pakistan.
The timing of this extreme step is also something one cannot easily ignore. Pakistan has been grappling with
more than one challenge to save the country from complete destabilization. From terrorism shaking its foundations to the new calls for reformation targeted at
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan has been going through one of the toughest tests in the recent past. Prime Minister Modi told Nawaz during his meeting in Delhi that his country should put break on aiding and
abetting terrorism, but three months was too less a time to see the results. And the reason to call off the talks as admitted by keen watchers of India and Pakistan affairs was not tenable. Pakistani leaders and envoys have been meeting Hurriyat leaders since 1994 and it has not changed the dynamics of the political engagement either between India or Pakistan or Delhi and Srinagar. The meetings between Hurriyat leaders and the Pakistani High Commissioner were publicized much in advance. If at all GoI had objection to these
interactions they could have barred them from flying down to Delhi. Putting them under house arrest is a routine in Srinagar.
It is interesting to note that Syed Ali Geelani, the octogenarian separatist leader has been under house arrest for over six months now and he was not allowed to offer a single congregational prayer on Friday. But he was not stopped from flying to Delhi. This uncovers the intentions of government to let these meetings happen
and then use them for calling off the FS level talks. In case Delhi would have stressed on terrorism, cross- border skirmishes and the prolonged delay in Mumbai trial, one could understand the essence of the decision to call off the talks and take the situation back to era of
hostility.
Many analysts are linking the decision to the forthcoming assembly elections in four states. Since BJP took a tough line during the election campaign for Lok Sabha elections, it will have to show the results on
ground. The four states including Jammu and Kashmir that are going to polls by the end of the year have already started witnessing heated campaigns revolving
the issues related to borders and Pakistan. This is surely going to help the BJP to polarize the voters and get the lion’s share. The lines are clearly drawn particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Since the BJP bagged two seats in Jammu in parliamentary elections they are now eyeing on most of the assembly segments.
BJP president Amit Shah’s warning to Pakistan on Monday that in case shelling continues the forces will give befitting reply also indicates how the party is going to up the ante on this front. With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this
renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003
and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and
vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders.
Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade. While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region. Unlike Vajpayee who did not enjoy majority for his party, Modi is strong and can over-rule any other leader. He has more advantages on delivering better than what Vajpayee did. In case Modi stops flexing muscle and starts peace mission, he will be remembered more than Vajpayee, who had earned goodwill in both Kashmir and Pakistan for his statesmanship, vision and delivering something different in last 60 years. Votes will come and go but the lives lost in the wake of tension will not come back and will further the distances.
After New Delhi unilaterally called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad, following the meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit, the cross-border shelling has again started with a bang. Few more lives have been lost and if seen technically, the 2003 ceasefire along the
borders has virtually come to an end.
New Delhi’s move to call off the talks is seen as an attempt to send a terse message to both Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led government in Delhi has surely started
“fulfilling” its electoral promises and this surprising move seems to be the beginning of a new rather tough bilateral journey.
“Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi had repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a pleasant surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something quite unexpected of the tough-talking Modi.
If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the grand swearing in ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger
outreach to all SAARC nations. It was during the brief meeting between Modi and
Nawaz the decision to hold the Foreign Secretary-level talks was taken. And the expectations were raised for a wider scope to formally renew the dialogue process
between the two sides. It had raised hopes that both leaders could meet in New York in September on the sidelines of UN General Assembly.
It is very difficult to read the mind of the new government in Delhi. Even the senior journalists and analysts in Delhi fail to assess any critical issue including that of foreign affairs. But will the tough line the new government has taken bear any fruit for lasting peace in the region. The reason New Delhi gave for calling off the talks was also not provocative enough to take an extreme step to say categorical no to
engagement with Pakistan.
In the past over six years including these three months of Modi government, Government of India’s major concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan and the dialogue have remained confined to issues related to terrorism, Mumbai trial and Hafiz Saeed et al. Whatever the progress on Mumbai and other issues, New Delhi had still shown willingness to engage with Pakistan.
The timing of this extreme step is also something one cannot easily ignore. Pakistan has been grappling with
more than one challenge to save the country from complete destabilization. From terrorism shaking its foundations to the new calls for reformation targeted at
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan has been going through one of the toughest tests in the recent past. Prime Minister Modi told Nawaz during his meeting in Delhi that his country should put break on aiding and
abetting terrorism, but three months was too less a time to see the results. And the reason to call off the talks as admitted by keen watchers of India and Pakistan affairs was not tenable. Pakistani leaders and envoys have been meeting Hurriyat leaders since 1994 and it has not changed the dynamics of the political engagement either between India or Pakistan or Delhi and Srinagar. The meetings between Hurriyat leaders and the Pakistani High Commissioner were publicized much in advance. If at all GoI had objection to these
interactions they could have barred them from flying down to Delhi. Putting them under house arrest is a routine in Srinagar.
It is interesting to note that Syed Ali Geelani, the octogenarian separatist leader has been under house arrest for over six months now and he was not allowed to offer a single congregational prayer on Friday. But he was not stopped from flying to Delhi. This uncovers the intentions of government to let these meetings happen
and then use them for calling off the FS level talks. In case Delhi would have stressed on terrorism, cross- border skirmishes and the prolonged delay in Mumbai trial, one could understand the essence of the decision to call off the talks and take the situation back to era of
hostility.
Many analysts are linking the decision to the forthcoming assembly elections in four states. Since BJP took a tough line during the election campaign for Lok Sabha elections, it will have to show the results on
ground. The four states including Jammu and Kashmir that are going to polls by the end of the year have already started witnessing heated campaigns revolving
the issues related to borders and Pakistan. This is surely going to help the BJP to polarize the voters and get the lion’s share. The lines are clearly drawn particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Since the BJP bagged two seats in Jammu in parliamentary elections they are now eyeing on most of the assembly segments.
BJP president Amit Shah’s warning to Pakistan on Monday that in case shelling continues the forces will give befitting reply also indicates how the party is going to up the ante on this front. With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this
renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003
and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and
vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders.
Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade. While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region. Unlike Vajpayee who did not enjoy majority for his party, Modi is strong and can over-rule any other leader. He has more advantages on delivering better than what Vajpayee did. In case Modi stops flexing muscle and starts peace mission, he will be remembered more than Vajpayee, who had earned goodwill in both Kashmir and Pakistan for his statesmanship, vision and delivering something different in last 60 years. Votes will come and go but the lives lost in the wake of tension will not come back and will further the distances.
ISLAMIC STATE AND SOUTH ASIA: HOW REAL IS THE THREAT?
Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is a game-changer in international affairs today. Their unprecedented rise and ability to fight in two countries simultaneously without suffering serious losses - while attracting more recruits - is disquieting. Today, approximately 50,000 men (and boys as young as 11) from several countries fight under the IS banner, and
more are pouring in. West Asia and South Asia share strong linkages; any turbulence in West Asia has immediate direct and/or indirect repercussions in South Asia. Employing brutality that puts the al Qaeda to shame, what does the rise of the IS mean for South Asia?
Sectarian Schism: Susceptibility to Misuse
South Asia has a culturally diverse yet close-knit character with a complex political geography and history. While there are several common historical experiences, the divides are also many. The foremost,
apart from inter-religious differences, is that of sectarian issues. The IS will find exploiting this schism in Pakistan to be the most potent and ‘foolproof’ way to get a foothold in the region. South Asia is rife with ethno-religious and sectarian differences, especially among the region’s Muslim community. A significant number of people in the region belong to the Islamic
faith, and the Shia-Sunni divide, although primarily historical and ideological, has taken on a sinister form - especially in Pakistan. The key to evading and/or even
delaying the spread of the IS into South Asia would be to address these religious and sectarian divides.
Pakistan’s leadership continues to comply and/or turn a blind eye towards the forced Sunni-sation of the country and radical Sunni jihadists continue their pogrom
against religious minorities, especially the Shias, Ahmadiyyas and the Barelvis. The IS’ self-portrayal as the saviours of Sunnis in a Shia-dominated land could have grave implications for Pakistan - the sectarian
divide will only get worse if the IS co-opts even one Pakistan-based Wahabi jihadist group. Further, Shia- Sunni clashes will only intensify the Iran-Saudi Arabia
proxy war in Western and South-western Pakistan. While other regional countries have significant Muslim populations with common religious divides, sectarian
divides are not as strong. For instance, Muslims are the largest minority in India, and despite the considerable numbers belonging to various sects and sub-sects, the
divide is mostly limited only to ideological differences. Violent clashes between rival sects seldom take place.
In fact, although a couple of Indian citizens have joined the IS, for the most part, Indian society does not face a direct threat from the IS. Almost all Indian Muslims -
including activists, intellectuals and religious leaders - have denounced the IS. Adversity will befall only if Pakistan’s terrorist groups are co-opted by the IS, and
it will not be societal in nature; and whenever the IS moves forward with its South Asian agenda, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is where they will begin.
Fuel for Religious Radicalism
Already, many have taken a hard-line stance against the rising religious intolerance against Muslims in Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and Myanmar. The House of Saud feels threatened by the IS, and is likely to fund more madrassas and radical Islamist factions in order to rev up its defences against al-Baghdadi’s advance. The several Saudi-funded madrassas in western Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are already trouble-makers.
Additionally, the treatment of Muslims (such as that of Myanmar’s Rohingyas by both the clergy and the government, and the intolerance practised by Buddhist
radicals in Sri Lanka) pushes impressionable youth to seek solutions via al-Baghdadi’s means - that might reflect in the rising numbers of the Arakan Mujahideen in Myanmar, and other radicals in Sri Lanka. Although the recruits’ original motivations have localised origins, they get institutionalised in the idea of a global Muslim identity to fight for, after their ‘training’.
Turf War between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
The South Asian region could become the battleground for the turf war for influence and control between erstwhile allies, the IS and al Qaeda. The region is the epicentre of jihadist activities and the idea of reclaiming
the historical ‘Greater Khurasan’ (that includes parts of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Pakistan) is picking up pace. Both al-Baghdadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Mullah Fazullah have set their eyes on the region. Until now, many disillusioned youth joined the al Qaeda
as a means to achieve their goals - that were usually retribution and/or radical change. However, after Osama bin Laden’s death, the group’s core leadership shrunk in
size and the organisation became more franchisee-like. While bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as a weak leader who has failed to maintain the al Qaeda’s footing, the IS has managed to gain control
and administer territories like a government.
Prospects
In South Asia, Mullah Fazlullah, the relatively unknown Jaish-e-Khurasan group, and other factions snubbed by
Rawalpindi’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, are ripe for harvesting by the IS. The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. Given how South Asia was under Muslim rulers for a significant portion of history, the IS’s threat is very real, if not immediate.
The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is a game-changer in international affairs today. Their unprecedented rise and ability to fight in two countries simultaneously without suffering serious losses - while attracting more recruits - is disquieting. Today, approximately 50,000 men (and boys as young as 11) from several countries fight under the IS banner, and
more are pouring in. West Asia and South Asia share strong linkages; any turbulence in West Asia has immediate direct and/or indirect repercussions in South Asia. Employing brutality that puts the al Qaeda to shame, what does the rise of the IS mean for South Asia?
Sectarian Schism: Susceptibility to Misuse
South Asia has a culturally diverse yet close-knit character with a complex political geography and history. While there are several common historical experiences, the divides are also many. The foremost,
apart from inter-religious differences, is that of sectarian issues. The IS will find exploiting this schism in Pakistan to be the most potent and ‘foolproof’ way to get a foothold in the region. South Asia is rife with ethno-religious and sectarian differences, especially among the region’s Muslim community. A significant number of people in the region belong to the Islamic
faith, and the Shia-Sunni divide, although primarily historical and ideological, has taken on a sinister form - especially in Pakistan. The key to evading and/or even
delaying the spread of the IS into South Asia would be to address these religious and sectarian divides.
Pakistan’s leadership continues to comply and/or turn a blind eye towards the forced Sunni-sation of the country and radical Sunni jihadists continue their pogrom
against religious minorities, especially the Shias, Ahmadiyyas and the Barelvis. The IS’ self-portrayal as the saviours of Sunnis in a Shia-dominated land could have grave implications for Pakistan - the sectarian
divide will only get worse if the IS co-opts even one Pakistan-based Wahabi jihadist group. Further, Shia- Sunni clashes will only intensify the Iran-Saudi Arabia
proxy war in Western and South-western Pakistan. While other regional countries have significant Muslim populations with common religious divides, sectarian
divides are not as strong. For instance, Muslims are the largest minority in India, and despite the considerable numbers belonging to various sects and sub-sects, the
divide is mostly limited only to ideological differences. Violent clashes between rival sects seldom take place.
In fact, although a couple of Indian citizens have joined the IS, for the most part, Indian society does not face a direct threat from the IS. Almost all Indian Muslims -
including activists, intellectuals and religious leaders - have denounced the IS. Adversity will befall only if Pakistan’s terrorist groups are co-opted by the IS, and
it will not be societal in nature; and whenever the IS moves forward with its South Asian agenda, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is where they will begin.
Fuel for Religious Radicalism
Already, many have taken a hard-line stance against the rising religious intolerance against Muslims in Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and Myanmar. The House of Saud feels threatened by the IS, and is likely to fund more madrassas and radical Islamist factions in order to rev up its defences against al-Baghdadi’s advance. The several Saudi-funded madrassas in western Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are already trouble-makers.
Additionally, the treatment of Muslims (such as that of Myanmar’s Rohingyas by both the clergy and the government, and the intolerance practised by Buddhist
radicals in Sri Lanka) pushes impressionable youth to seek solutions via al-Baghdadi’s means - that might reflect in the rising numbers of the Arakan Mujahideen in Myanmar, and other radicals in Sri Lanka. Although the recruits’ original motivations have localised origins, they get institutionalised in the idea of a global Muslim identity to fight for, after their ‘training’.
Turf War between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
The South Asian region could become the battleground for the turf war for influence and control between erstwhile allies, the IS and al Qaeda. The region is the epicentre of jihadist activities and the idea of reclaiming
the historical ‘Greater Khurasan’ (that includes parts of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Pakistan) is picking up pace. Both al-Baghdadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Mullah Fazullah have set their eyes on the region. Until now, many disillusioned youth joined the al Qaeda
as a means to achieve their goals - that were usually retribution and/or radical change. However, after Osama bin Laden’s death, the group’s core leadership shrunk in
size and the organisation became more franchisee-like. While bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as a weak leader who has failed to maintain the al Qaeda’s footing, the IS has managed to gain control
and administer territories like a government.
Prospects
In South Asia, Mullah Fazlullah, the relatively unknown Jaish-e-Khurasan group, and other factions snubbed by
Rawalpindi’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, are ripe for harvesting by the IS. The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. Given how South Asia was under Muslim rulers for a significant portion of history, the IS’s threat is very real, if not immediate.
COST OF PEACE
Suba Chandran
While there have been enormous emphasis in studying the cost of war and the evil effects of conflict, in the recent period, there have been an emphasis on the cost
of peace in terms of economic and political investments and its fallouts.
Can there be a cost to peace? In the public and political debates in countries such as the US and Israel, there have been questions and emphasis on “peace at what
cost”, “peace, but with honour” and “peace with justice”. The above inputs are based on an understanding that peace is desirable, but not to be fought with a high political or economic cost.
Efforts to arrive at peace in Afghanistan and Iraq have been questioned by a section in the US and elsewhere, in terms of cost involved. The human, material and economic cost for the US to ensure that peace prevails ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq has been high so far.
In fact, this argument has been effectively used not only in the US, but also in many European countries to cut the costs and get out of Afghanistan, irrespective of achieving the original goal. The general argument – “peace at what cost” in this
case primarily involves human, material and economic cost in fighting the war, with an ultimate objective to win it. Equally compelling arguments on similar lines
have been on “peace with honour” which could be seen in Israel’s approach towards Palestine. A section within Israel would prefer peace, but only on certain conditions. “Peace with honour” and the “high cost of peace” arguments have an inherent hawkish approach, which is negative in nature and essentially aims at
scuttling the peace process. The Iraqi example today would prove the fallacy of the above argument. If the cost – economic and political becomes a primary factor not to follow a peace process today and pursue the war/conflict to its ultimate end, we will have to pay a higher price tomorrow. If only the US had stayed the course in establishing peace in Iraq, and not aimed only at overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, the ISIL would not have become a
factor today. Iraq would not be this violent today, had there been enough emphasis on the process yesterday.
The US and the international community is repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan today. Israel has been seen pursuing a similar approach. Returning to a conflict mode to arrive at “peace with honour” is fraught with dangers. This would only
strengthen the hands of the hawks, who are waiting to push their own agenda. Peace cannot be achieved with the complete annihilation of the other party; it has to be
proactively fought and achieved. There has to be something for everyone; else, it would only be a matter of time before a section recuperates itself to spoil the larger process.
The above argument brings to the larger issue of complexities in fighting peace.
Waging War is easier than fighting peace. Waging Peace is complicated for it involves different actors and intricate issues. The political and economic costs in waging peace may definitely be higher; however,
irrespective of the cost involved, it has to be fought and achieved ultimately. Like engaging in developmental activities and building the basic infrastructure – if we
are worried and unhappy about the cost today and not engage in the same, we will have to undertake the same in the future, but with a higher price. No cost is high
enough to achieve peace.
One of the biggest complications in waging peace, especially in a post conflict society is the number of actors involved. The number of actors during a conflict phase, or during waging war is small and limited; the
opposing sides are clear and easy to identify, hence it is easy to fight a war or conflict. But waging peace involves multiple actors. Once the violence comes to an end in a protracted conflict, there emerge multiple groups and actors, as has been the
case in Sri Lanka, Nepal, J&K and India’s Northeast. Their demands are varied from strengthening panchayats and local institutions of governance to improving the business environment. From rehabilitating
the displaced to integrating the former combatants, suddenly there are multiple actors in the scene, each with a long list of demands.
At times, there is also a competition amongst the multiple groups to ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation packages. Groups that were never a party
to the conflict, and demands that were either muted or kept under the surface, come to the fore during the post-conflict period. The multiple demands are not only
clearly articulated, but also are loud, in terms of being projected. There are rallies and protests, at times even violent, with an objective to be a part of the political process and reap the peace dividend. Worse, in some cases, a peace process or solution in
one region, results in creating a domino effect in other regions. An example is the separation of Andhra Pradesh and creation of new Telengana state; today, there are multiple demands for creating new states in
India’s Northeast, by dividing, for example Assam and Nagaland.
While the demands are high in a post conflict situation, the capacity of the State and its institutions are limited in South Asia. Thanks to the prolonged nature of
conflict, in many parts of the conflict regions the State institutions and delivery mechanisms – from schools and hospitals have been affected. More than building
the infrastructure, the State is also handicapped with declining work culture in its institutions. It is extremely unfortunate and ironic, that in most of the post conflict
regions, which have been earlier known for hard work and honesty, today there is a casualness and corruption set in. On the one hand, in the post conflict societies
there are ever increasing demands, while on the other hand the ability and efficiency of the State and its institutions to deliver is declining. Not only the demands are increasing, but also the criticisms of the civil society against the State and its ability to deliver in a post conflict situation. Thanks to the vibrant media and the expanding reach of Social Media, the problems of governance are discussed in
public and in real time. For the State, which was primarily fighting the militants and separatists until now, it is suddenly in a new territory with numerous actors
with varying demands. Added to the problem, is also an increasing urge to
make use of the armed forces and the para military to engage in civilian functions. For example in Sri Lanka, where the war against the LTTE has come to an end,
there is not only huge manpower available to the State, but also seen as highly organised and efficient to implement projects. Such a process, though found
attractive and even useful, in the long run it would be counterproductive. The civilian institutions need to be strengthened and made accountable to deliver the goods.
Finally, the issue of trust between the Centre and the provincial units in post conflict situation in devolving power and responsibilities. In many parts of South Asia, the Centre is apprehensive of the State actors and are conservative in devolving powers to the units; even if there is devolution, certain areas or portfolios continue to remain with the Centre. More than financial and administrative issues, the “trust” factor, play a crucial role in this process.
Waging peace is a complex process only if we perceive it from a prism of economic, political and security costs. Once a conscious decision is made, that whatever may be the cost, the peace process should be continued to its logical conclusion, many pieces will fall in its place. No cost is high enough to wage peace.
While there have been enormous emphasis in studying the cost of war and the evil effects of conflict, in the recent period, there have been an emphasis on the cost
of peace in terms of economic and political investments and its fallouts.
Can there be a cost to peace? In the public and political debates in countries such as the US and Israel, there have been questions and emphasis on “peace at what
cost”, “peace, but with honour” and “peace with justice”. The above inputs are based on an understanding that peace is desirable, but not to be fought with a high political or economic cost.
Efforts to arrive at peace in Afghanistan and Iraq have been questioned by a section in the US and elsewhere, in terms of cost involved. The human, material and economic cost for the US to ensure that peace prevails ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq has been high so far.
In fact, this argument has been effectively used not only in the US, but also in many European countries to cut the costs and get out of Afghanistan, irrespective of achieving the original goal. The general argument – “peace at what cost” in this
case primarily involves human, material and economic cost in fighting the war, with an ultimate objective to win it. Equally compelling arguments on similar lines
have been on “peace with honour” which could be seen in Israel’s approach towards Palestine. A section within Israel would prefer peace, but only on certain conditions. “Peace with honour” and the “high cost of peace” arguments have an inherent hawkish approach, which is negative in nature and essentially aims at
scuttling the peace process. The Iraqi example today would prove the fallacy of the above argument. If the cost – economic and political becomes a primary factor not to follow a peace process today and pursue the war/conflict to its ultimate end, we will have to pay a higher price tomorrow. If only the US had stayed the course in establishing peace in Iraq, and not aimed only at overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, the ISIL would not have become a
factor today. Iraq would not be this violent today, had there been enough emphasis on the process yesterday.
The US and the international community is repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan today. Israel has been seen pursuing a similar approach. Returning to a conflict mode to arrive at “peace with honour” is fraught with dangers. This would only
strengthen the hands of the hawks, who are waiting to push their own agenda. Peace cannot be achieved with the complete annihilation of the other party; it has to be
proactively fought and achieved. There has to be something for everyone; else, it would only be a matter of time before a section recuperates itself to spoil the larger process.
The above argument brings to the larger issue of complexities in fighting peace.
Waging War is easier than fighting peace. Waging Peace is complicated for it involves different actors and intricate issues. The political and economic costs in waging peace may definitely be higher; however,
irrespective of the cost involved, it has to be fought and achieved ultimately. Like engaging in developmental activities and building the basic infrastructure – if we
are worried and unhappy about the cost today and not engage in the same, we will have to undertake the same in the future, but with a higher price. No cost is high
enough to achieve peace.
One of the biggest complications in waging peace, especially in a post conflict society is the number of actors involved. The number of actors during a conflict phase, or during waging war is small and limited; the
opposing sides are clear and easy to identify, hence it is easy to fight a war or conflict. But waging peace involves multiple actors. Once the violence comes to an end in a protracted conflict, there emerge multiple groups and actors, as has been the
case in Sri Lanka, Nepal, J&K and India’s Northeast. Their demands are varied from strengthening panchayats and local institutions of governance to improving the business environment. From rehabilitating
the displaced to integrating the former combatants, suddenly there are multiple actors in the scene, each with a long list of demands.
At times, there is also a competition amongst the multiple groups to ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation packages. Groups that were never a party
to the conflict, and demands that were either muted or kept under the surface, come to the fore during the post-conflict period. The multiple demands are not only
clearly articulated, but also are loud, in terms of being projected. There are rallies and protests, at times even violent, with an objective to be a part of the political process and reap the peace dividend. Worse, in some cases, a peace process or solution in
one region, results in creating a domino effect in other regions. An example is the separation of Andhra Pradesh and creation of new Telengana state; today, there are multiple demands for creating new states in
India’s Northeast, by dividing, for example Assam and Nagaland.
While the demands are high in a post conflict situation, the capacity of the State and its institutions are limited in South Asia. Thanks to the prolonged nature of
conflict, in many parts of the conflict regions the State institutions and delivery mechanisms – from schools and hospitals have been affected. More than building
the infrastructure, the State is also handicapped with declining work culture in its institutions. It is extremely unfortunate and ironic, that in most of the post conflict
regions, which have been earlier known for hard work and honesty, today there is a casualness and corruption set in. On the one hand, in the post conflict societies
there are ever increasing demands, while on the other hand the ability and efficiency of the State and its institutions to deliver is declining. Not only the demands are increasing, but also the criticisms of the civil society against the State and its ability to deliver in a post conflict situation. Thanks to the vibrant media and the expanding reach of Social Media, the problems of governance are discussed in
public and in real time. For the State, which was primarily fighting the militants and separatists until now, it is suddenly in a new territory with numerous actors
with varying demands. Added to the problem, is also an increasing urge to
make use of the armed forces and the para military to engage in civilian functions. For example in Sri Lanka, where the war against the LTTE has come to an end,
there is not only huge manpower available to the State, but also seen as highly organised and efficient to implement projects. Such a process, though found
attractive and even useful, in the long run it would be counterproductive. The civilian institutions need to be strengthened and made accountable to deliver the goods.
Finally, the issue of trust between the Centre and the provincial units in post conflict situation in devolving power and responsibilities. In many parts of South Asia, the Centre is apprehensive of the State actors and are conservative in devolving powers to the units; even if there is devolution, certain areas or portfolios continue to remain with the Centre. More than financial and administrative issues, the “trust” factor, play a crucial role in this process.
Waging peace is a complex process only if we perceive it from a prism of economic, political and security costs. Once a conscious decision is made, that whatever may be the cost, the peace process should be continued to its logical conclusion, many pieces will fall in its place. No cost is high enough to wage peace.
21 Aug 2014
MARCHES OF AZADI AND REVOLUTION
Suba Chandran
As expected, two marches – the “Azadi” march of Imran Khan and the “Revolution” march of Tahirul Qadri have merged to create a perfect storm for Pakistan on 14
August, its independence day. The situation in Islamabad, as on 13 August is tensed, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the twin cities of Pakistan waiting for the inevitable.
How would 14 August turn out? Will it be chaotic, but will remain relatively peaceful, as Tahirul Qadri’s march two years ago? Or will it turn violent, leaving larger scars, all in the name of azadi and revolution?
With Section 144 being imposed already in Islamabad, the people of the twin cities are extremely unhappy and annoyed with the two self-proclaimed revolutionaries and reformers. They are also equally unhappy with the Prime Minister for his ineffective handling of the situation, leading to this situation.
To be fair to Nawaz Sharif, even if he had wanted to take serious steps to diffuse the situation, neither Tahirul Qadri nor Imran Khan would have listened to it. Both the leaders seem to be determined to achieve their objectives. Imran Khan wants to topple this government and be made as the next Prime Minister. He simply could not accept that he does not have the mandate to
rule, as the majority have voted for the PML-N. In terms of number of votes and seats – though Imran Khan and his PTI have fared much better than the previous elections, still the 2013 election was not in favour of Imran. Only Imran Khan should understand the reason behind his undemocratic way to establish democracy and azadi. Had there been any election irregularities, he should have filed the complaints immediately after the elections to the Election Commission. Or atleast, should have refused to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa immediately after the election results and
should have followed up in the Parliament, Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Instead, he kept silent almost for a year and then suddenly decided to pull down the system, in which he is a part.
Given the lack of reasoning for Imran Khan’s sudden change, there could be only few explanations. Perhaps, after a year, Imran Khan today realizes that the PML-N
has lost its popular appeal in the last year, and the time is ripe to force the government to dissolve the Parliament and organise a general election. The PML-N may not have performed well during the last year, but
certainly it has not become unpopular to that level, that the people will be voting Imran Khan to become the next Prime Minister, if there is an election shortly. If the Sharif brothers have come down in the popularity chart due to their failure to provide better governance, Imran Khan and his party have not performed better to reap
any major benefit.
Another reason could be a larger conspiracy, led by the military and its intelligence agencies to effectively
intervene and change Nawaz Sharif, without going through another election. Why should the military and the ISI be unhappy with the new Prime Minister? Three reasons in particular; first the handling of Musharraf trial, which a section within the military consider it
unacceptable to try a former Chief of Army Staff.
Second, the decision of the government to establish a political dialogue with the TTP. And third, the Hamid Mir and Geo episode, in which Sharif was seen as joining hands with the former. Sharif could have avoided the Musharraf trial and found an excuse to allow him to leave the country under one
pretext or another. Unfortunately, neither the exile, nor the political experience during the last decade seems to have made more mature. True, the entire legal community also wanted to go after Musharraf, but Sharif could have avoided a show down. He deliberately let it happen. In terms of talking to the TTP, he could
have consulted more with the military and should have had them on board completely. On Hamid Mir, there were too many actors and factors, Sharif could not have done any better than what he did. Perhaps, the military and its ISI is pushing Imran Khan
and silently backing his un-democratic intervention to establish democracy. In the long run, it would only strengthen their case in terms of creating an impression
that the political elites and the parties in Pakistan are unfit to rule.
As far as Tahirul Qadri is concerned, as explained in earlier commentaries in this paper, he perhaps believe in himself as a messiah and saviour. He neither has the
numbers nor the support to get elected. Neither him nor his party would be able to secure considerable votes in any free and fair elections. He can get few people from
the rural areas to Islamabad for few days to block the roads. There have been complaints that the last time he camped, many of those marchers ransacked local shops and looted goods. Perhaps, more than democracy, it is the loot and “see Islamabad” attracts the crowd to move in along with Qadri. Otherwise neither Qadri nor his party has support at the grass root level to sustain an organised protest. He is
blackmailing the system. But the primary blame should go to the Sharif brothers.
In retrospect, it appears, despite all his drawbacks, Zardari dealt with Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in a much better way, that too politically. Zardari allowed to
Qadri and his supporters to camp in Islamabad, had a dialogue and let him go back without changing the electoral system, the primary objective of latter at that
time. People in Pakistan made fun of his effort and he became a political joke. Today, Sharif has elevated Qadri’s political standing, due to his immature political
handling and the use of force.
But the larger question is, what would happen on 14 August, and what would be the fallouts of it? If the State decides to use violence against the marchers of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, it would turn them into martyrs. If the State decides to do nothing and hope that better sense would prevail, it would be seen as politically weak and ineffective. If there is violence and a standoff in Islamabad, leading to a closure of the capital, the biggest victim would be
the democratic process and the net gainer would be the radical elements. For the military and its ISI, such a process would even give them a leverage to intervene
further. It would only increase their legitimacy to intervene, and expand the popular dissatisfaction against their elected leadership and democratic process.
As expected, two marches – the “Azadi” march of Imran Khan and the “Revolution” march of Tahirul Qadri have merged to create a perfect storm for Pakistan on 14
August, its independence day. The situation in Islamabad, as on 13 August is tensed, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the twin cities of Pakistan waiting for the inevitable.
How would 14 August turn out? Will it be chaotic, but will remain relatively peaceful, as Tahirul Qadri’s march two years ago? Or will it turn violent, leaving larger scars, all in the name of azadi and revolution?
With Section 144 being imposed already in Islamabad, the people of the twin cities are extremely unhappy and annoyed with the two self-proclaimed revolutionaries and reformers. They are also equally unhappy with the Prime Minister for his ineffective handling of the situation, leading to this situation.
To be fair to Nawaz Sharif, even if he had wanted to take serious steps to diffuse the situation, neither Tahirul Qadri nor Imran Khan would have listened to it. Both the leaders seem to be determined to achieve their objectives. Imran Khan wants to topple this government and be made as the next Prime Minister. He simply could not accept that he does not have the mandate to
rule, as the majority have voted for the PML-N. In terms of number of votes and seats – though Imran Khan and his PTI have fared much better than the previous elections, still the 2013 election was not in favour of Imran. Only Imran Khan should understand the reason behind his undemocratic way to establish democracy and azadi. Had there been any election irregularities, he should have filed the complaints immediately after the elections to the Election Commission. Or atleast, should have refused to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa immediately after the election results and
should have followed up in the Parliament, Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Instead, he kept silent almost for a year and then suddenly decided to pull down the system, in which he is a part.
Given the lack of reasoning for Imran Khan’s sudden change, there could be only few explanations. Perhaps, after a year, Imran Khan today realizes that the PML-N
has lost its popular appeal in the last year, and the time is ripe to force the government to dissolve the Parliament and organise a general election. The PML-N may not have performed well during the last year, but
certainly it has not become unpopular to that level, that the people will be voting Imran Khan to become the next Prime Minister, if there is an election shortly. If the Sharif brothers have come down in the popularity chart due to their failure to provide better governance, Imran Khan and his party have not performed better to reap
any major benefit.
Another reason could be a larger conspiracy, led by the military and its intelligence agencies to effectively
intervene and change Nawaz Sharif, without going through another election. Why should the military and the ISI be unhappy with the new Prime Minister? Three reasons in particular; first the handling of Musharraf trial, which a section within the military consider it
unacceptable to try a former Chief of Army Staff.
Second, the decision of the government to establish a political dialogue with the TTP. And third, the Hamid Mir and Geo episode, in which Sharif was seen as joining hands with the former. Sharif could have avoided the Musharraf trial and found an excuse to allow him to leave the country under one
pretext or another. Unfortunately, neither the exile, nor the political experience during the last decade seems to have made more mature. True, the entire legal community also wanted to go after Musharraf, but Sharif could have avoided a show down. He deliberately let it happen. In terms of talking to the TTP, he could
have consulted more with the military and should have had them on board completely. On Hamid Mir, there were too many actors and factors, Sharif could not have done any better than what he did. Perhaps, the military and its ISI is pushing Imran Khan
and silently backing his un-democratic intervention to establish democracy. In the long run, it would only strengthen their case in terms of creating an impression
that the political elites and the parties in Pakistan are unfit to rule.
As far as Tahirul Qadri is concerned, as explained in earlier commentaries in this paper, he perhaps believe in himself as a messiah and saviour. He neither has the
numbers nor the support to get elected. Neither him nor his party would be able to secure considerable votes in any free and fair elections. He can get few people from
the rural areas to Islamabad for few days to block the roads. There have been complaints that the last time he camped, many of those marchers ransacked local shops and looted goods. Perhaps, more than democracy, it is the loot and “see Islamabad” attracts the crowd to move in along with Qadri. Otherwise neither Qadri nor his party has support at the grass root level to sustain an organised protest. He is
blackmailing the system. But the primary blame should go to the Sharif brothers.
In retrospect, it appears, despite all his drawbacks, Zardari dealt with Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in a much better way, that too politically. Zardari allowed to
Qadri and his supporters to camp in Islamabad, had a dialogue and let him go back without changing the electoral system, the primary objective of latter at that
time. People in Pakistan made fun of his effort and he became a political joke. Today, Sharif has elevated Qadri’s political standing, due to his immature political
handling and the use of force.
But the larger question is, what would happen on 14 August, and what would be the fallouts of it? If the State decides to use violence against the marchers of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, it would turn them into martyrs. If the State decides to do nothing and hope that better sense would prevail, it would be seen as politically weak and ineffective. If there is violence and a standoff in Islamabad, leading to a closure of the capital, the biggest victim would be
the democratic process and the net gainer would be the radical elements. For the military and its ISI, such a process would even give them a leverage to intervene
further. It would only increase their legitimacy to intervene, and expand the popular dissatisfaction against their elected leadership and democratic process.
DENIGRATING KASHMIRI MUSLIMS
Shujaat Bukhari
For the past few months Rahul Pandita, a journalist with ‘The Hindu’ has unleashed his “creativity” to project the Kashmiri Muslims as a community that has nothing to be proud of their past. Using ‘The Hindu’, widely read and respected newspaper of India known for its unbiased treatment of news and views, he has not lost any opportunity to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as intolerant religious bigots who have no respect for religious independence. So far it has remained a one- sided affair as he continues to thrust his opinion on the minds of millions of readers.
Pandita has every right to have a view and articulate that. But his tone and tenor only shows his intentions to denigrate the Kashmiri Muslims, who unfortunately
are in figurative majority in Kashmir. He blames the Kashmiri society for everything without going into the genesis of the wrongs that have been done during past
66 years. Kashmiri Pandits have played a significant role in shaping up the situation we are in right now.
As part of his diatribe, he earlier tried to project Kashmiri Muslims as “Shawl walas” (Shawl sellers) who would often dupe the Indian customers. He was perhaps the inspiration for the cellular company ‘Idea’ that had made a commercial on similar lines. It was later removed as people lodged a strong protest.
The latest piece Pandita has written in ‘The Hindu’ is about the controversy over Kousar Nag yatra. He focuses on the yatra through the octogenarian separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani, who was one among
many to “oppose” it. Politicization of issues like this in contemporary Kashmir is not new. This helps the vested interests from all sides. But the reality in this case is that the opposition to the conduct of yatra is not merely political. People in the area besides the civil society reacted with a measured response. Since the institutionalization of such pilgrimage has more than one message to be conveyed to the people, it ought to raise concerns.
In case of Amarnath, the number of pilgrims went up from a few thousand to five lakhs in the past two decades. What is perceived in Kashmir is that the yatra was institutionalized with an objective to convey that “Kashmir had been re-conquered”. It may not be true but the perception is so deep that the mistrust that
exists between state and people makes it a strong belief.
Not that the Kashmiri Muslims, who according to Pandita are all communal and have an Islamist agenda, are opposed to any such religious activity, but the way the yatras have been conducted in past 20 years have not helped to strike a chord with them. With political firmament laden with competing narratives and the contradictions in facilitating one religious activity and thwarting other, the sense of disempowerment has further deepened. There is no discounting the fact that some Kashmiri Pandits had been visiting Kousar Nag as a matter of respect for being the abode of Vishnu. But it has never been seen as a full-fledged yatra spread over a calendar. Usually whosoever would visit Kousar Nag would do so as an adventure since the area is a known trekking destination. Notwithstanding the fact that there are traces of such spots of religious significance in Nilimut Purana and Rajtrangni, the oldest testimonies to
Kashmir history, but all of them have not been popular destinations for pilgrimage. Many Kashmiri Pandits would authenticate that Kousar Nag was not a yatra
destination the way the newly formed Pandit body is projecting it. Pandits are also not known to go for Amarnath pilgrimage in large numbers.
In an interview with this newspaper, senior National Conference leader and Member of Legislative Council (MLC), Vijay Bakaya said Kousar Nag was never a pilgrim destination and that some groups were blowing the issue out of proportion.
“As far as I know, Kousar Naag has never been a pilgrimage destination and people have been going for trekking to this beautiful lake,” Bakaya said in the
interview. The former chief secretary said the environmental concerns of the people of Kashmir were legitimate and needed to be taken care of. With Pandita’s inherent hate for Kashmiri Muslims purring off and on, his bid is to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as an intolerant lot. Kashmiri Pandits surely
have lost their place due to the adversities of time. The armed rebellion in Kashmir is responsible for that and the killings which took place also cannot be condoned.
But the way the situation has shaped for Muslims in Kashmir for last 20 years is also not one of comfort and to blame the entire society for the miseries of the community is unfair. If Kashmiri Pandits blame Kashmiri
Muslims for not showing any concern over their displacement and killing of 219 Pandits, but as an “emancipated” community that has been elite for
centuries also failed in showing even a shred of solidarity with the latter in last two decades.
According to Mike Quigley, “Protection of religious freedom means considering the faiths and beliefs of everyone involved”.
Such freedoms cannot be enjoyed selectively and in isolation but can only be cherished by treating all the faiths on equal terms. In past 20 years the state
government has banned the Milad procession in Kashmir so is the case with the Muharram procession. Similarly
the religious leaders are not allowed to offer prayers in the mosques. Ideological differences apart, Geelani has been under house arrest for six months and he has not
been allowed to fulfill his religious duties. Law and order is an excuse that government uses to justify its actions.
But state has responsibility to maintain that with huge apparatus at its disposal. It cannot be done by putting every other person under house arrest. This amply
makes the distinction in according the religious freedom clear.
Coming back to Kousar Nag, the argument put in contrast is that how other water bodies have suffered in Kashmir and why the opponents are only concerned about this yatra. One may agree on this point that we need to talk about the decay of Dal, Wular and Anchar lake. But the moot question is why to pollute a clean water source then? It is state’s responsibility to ensure that the money spent on these bodies is utilized for retrieving them and the Kashmiri civil society has been
voicing its concerns all the time.
We as a society might not have done enough to protect these bodies but that does not mean that if a purevwater source is still away from human intervention it should in coming years replicate the Dal. Visits to
places of religious significance are welcome but the way the institutionalization is taking place through the state is not in the interest of the people. Politicization of
every issue has ruined Kashmir and to deal with it in compartments and with a clamour of victimhood does not augur well for a peaceful and safe Kashmir.
For the past few months Rahul Pandita, a journalist with ‘The Hindu’ has unleashed his “creativity” to project the Kashmiri Muslims as a community that has nothing to be proud of their past. Using ‘The Hindu’, widely read and respected newspaper of India known for its unbiased treatment of news and views, he has not lost any opportunity to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as intolerant religious bigots who have no respect for religious independence. So far it has remained a one- sided affair as he continues to thrust his opinion on the minds of millions of readers.
Pandita has every right to have a view and articulate that. But his tone and tenor only shows his intentions to denigrate the Kashmiri Muslims, who unfortunately
are in figurative majority in Kashmir. He blames the Kashmiri society for everything without going into the genesis of the wrongs that have been done during past
66 years. Kashmiri Pandits have played a significant role in shaping up the situation we are in right now.
As part of his diatribe, he earlier tried to project Kashmiri Muslims as “Shawl walas” (Shawl sellers) who would often dupe the Indian customers. He was perhaps the inspiration for the cellular company ‘Idea’ that had made a commercial on similar lines. It was later removed as people lodged a strong protest.
The latest piece Pandita has written in ‘The Hindu’ is about the controversy over Kousar Nag yatra. He focuses on the yatra through the octogenarian separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani, who was one among
many to “oppose” it. Politicization of issues like this in contemporary Kashmir is not new. This helps the vested interests from all sides. But the reality in this case is that the opposition to the conduct of yatra is not merely political. People in the area besides the civil society reacted with a measured response. Since the institutionalization of such pilgrimage has more than one message to be conveyed to the people, it ought to raise concerns.
In case of Amarnath, the number of pilgrims went up from a few thousand to five lakhs in the past two decades. What is perceived in Kashmir is that the yatra was institutionalized with an objective to convey that “Kashmir had been re-conquered”. It may not be true but the perception is so deep that the mistrust that
exists between state and people makes it a strong belief.
Not that the Kashmiri Muslims, who according to Pandita are all communal and have an Islamist agenda, are opposed to any such religious activity, but the way the yatras have been conducted in past 20 years have not helped to strike a chord with them. With political firmament laden with competing narratives and the contradictions in facilitating one religious activity and thwarting other, the sense of disempowerment has further deepened. There is no discounting the fact that some Kashmiri Pandits had been visiting Kousar Nag as a matter of respect for being the abode of Vishnu. But it has never been seen as a full-fledged yatra spread over a calendar. Usually whosoever would visit Kousar Nag would do so as an adventure since the area is a known trekking destination. Notwithstanding the fact that there are traces of such spots of religious significance in Nilimut Purana and Rajtrangni, the oldest testimonies to
Kashmir history, but all of them have not been popular destinations for pilgrimage. Many Kashmiri Pandits would authenticate that Kousar Nag was not a yatra
destination the way the newly formed Pandit body is projecting it. Pandits are also not known to go for Amarnath pilgrimage in large numbers.
In an interview with this newspaper, senior National Conference leader and Member of Legislative Council (MLC), Vijay Bakaya said Kousar Nag was never a pilgrim destination and that some groups were blowing the issue out of proportion.
“As far as I know, Kousar Naag has never been a pilgrimage destination and people have been going for trekking to this beautiful lake,” Bakaya said in the
interview. The former chief secretary said the environmental concerns of the people of Kashmir were legitimate and needed to be taken care of. With Pandita’s inherent hate for Kashmiri Muslims purring off and on, his bid is to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as an intolerant lot. Kashmiri Pandits surely
have lost their place due to the adversities of time. The armed rebellion in Kashmir is responsible for that and the killings which took place also cannot be condoned.
But the way the situation has shaped for Muslims in Kashmir for last 20 years is also not one of comfort and to blame the entire society for the miseries of the community is unfair. If Kashmiri Pandits blame Kashmiri
Muslims for not showing any concern over their displacement and killing of 219 Pandits, but as an “emancipated” community that has been elite for
centuries also failed in showing even a shred of solidarity with the latter in last two decades.
According to Mike Quigley, “Protection of religious freedom means considering the faiths and beliefs of everyone involved”.
Such freedoms cannot be enjoyed selectively and in isolation but can only be cherished by treating all the faiths on equal terms. In past 20 years the state
government has banned the Milad procession in Kashmir so is the case with the Muharram procession. Similarly
the religious leaders are not allowed to offer prayers in the mosques. Ideological differences apart, Geelani has been under house arrest for six months and he has not
been allowed to fulfill his religious duties. Law and order is an excuse that government uses to justify its actions.
But state has responsibility to maintain that with huge apparatus at its disposal. It cannot be done by putting every other person under house arrest. This amply
makes the distinction in according the religious freedom clear.
Coming back to Kousar Nag, the argument put in contrast is that how other water bodies have suffered in Kashmir and why the opponents are only concerned about this yatra. One may agree on this point that we need to talk about the decay of Dal, Wular and Anchar lake. But the moot question is why to pollute a clean water source then? It is state’s responsibility to ensure that the money spent on these bodies is utilized for retrieving them and the Kashmiri civil society has been
voicing its concerns all the time.
We as a society might not have done enough to protect these bodies but that does not mean that if a purevwater source is still away from human intervention it should in coming years replicate the Dal. Visits to
places of religious significance are welcome but the way the institutionalization is taking place through the state is not in the interest of the people. Politicization of
every issue has ruined Kashmir and to deal with it in compartments and with a clamour of victimhood does not augur well for a peaceful and safe Kashmir.
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