The Af-Pak Entity: Seduction to Armageddon?

Vijay Shankar

Armageddon is the mythical site of gathering of armies for battle that will end all. Its geographical location is shrouded in biblical lore and considerable controversy
exists of its mercatorial coordinates, but its implications of the eventual catastrophic destiny of mankind (as revealed) are becoming less indistinct. Our study is far
removed from eschatology; it is however keenly concerned with the settings and geography of an impending geopolitical upheaval caused by the withdrawal of American forces from the Af-Pak region.
Inconclusive American abdication leaves in its wake a weak, nuclearised and failing Pakistan unable to reconcile a will to modernity with Jihadi aspirations; an
Afghanistan whose writ does not prevail beyond the edgings of Kabul; a resurgent Iran that seeks domination over west and northern Afghanistan; Central Asian Republics whose civilisational, ethnic and cultural roots in northern Afghanistan exert fissiparous pressures; and an incensed and isolated Russia that sees in the region an opportunity to impel its own influence as a limiting factor to that of the US and the
Saudis. Such competing external dynamics and interferences will work against central control from Kabul rather than in support of it, leaving bare a ‘gathering of armies’ driven by motivators in persistent friction with each other.
Warring Worlds
When states involve themselves for years on end in irregular, decentralised warfare such as the Afghan- Pakistan situation which has been in a state of violent chaos since 1979, the idea of central control is
anaemic. The breakdown of the region into several ‘Tolkienesque’ warring worlds for causes that can only be termed antediluvian has opened the geography of the expanse to historical fractures that the politics of the last century failed to reconcile. Today, a simmering Baluchistan finds little mutuality in a Punjab-dominated
Pakistan; Pakthunwa and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ferociously cling to religio-ethnic links with eastern Afghanistan that refute the modern
idea of statehood within Pakistan; inside the rest of Pakistan is a smouldering Jihadist sentiment against India and the West; and finally, Afghan resistance to US
occupation in the post-al Qaeda defeat has left an insurgency engorged with modern weapons and enabling technologies.
Iran’s Intriguing Inclination
In understanding Iran’s contemporary posture towards Afghanistan, it is long forgotten that it was an early supporter of the 2001 invasion, played a key role in the
‘Bonn’ process that gave a constitution to the latter and has been historically wary of the radical militant ways of the Taliban and the manner in which it has been sponsored, fuelled and given sanctuary by Pakistan. While the seemingly endless supply of
narcotics across the porous Baluchistan border and through the Nimruz and Herat sectors, along with linked violence, remains an abiding source of societal distress,
illegal finances and arms trade, all of which has generated a strong impulse in Iran to control and affect stability in the Western region of Afghanistan.
Afghanistan and Iran have long been tied by culture and geography over centuries. Approximately one-fifth of Afghanistan’s population is Shia - a focal point for strife
- for Iran views itself as the guardian of Shiites. During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Khomeini dispensation created a sphere of influence by organising
and materially supporting the Shia community there. Soviet inabilities permitted Iran to form a network of
Afghan Shia organisations in the Hazarajat region. When the Soviets pulled out of Afghanistan, the country became a battleground for a proxy war between Iran,
Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Saudi’s sought the spread of their brand of Islam throughout Central Asia and Pakistan connived to install a Sunni-dominated
government and gain “strategic depth” against India.
Iran, having ended its eight-year war with Iraq, sought to establish a friendly government in Kabul, encouraging
non-Sunni groups to form a united front. These contrary interests spurred a civil war, frustrating Iran’s policies in the region. This time of confusion that saw
the rise of the Sunni Taliban. In 1996, the Taliban seized Kabul and overthrew President Rabbani, arousing the creation of a military front comprising Tajiks, Uzbeks, Hazaras, and Pashtuns, called the Northern
Alliance, that sought to counter the Taliban. Iran, India, Russia, Tajikistan, and the US supported the Northern Alliance with material, training and sanctuaries. It was only after 9/11 that support for the Northern Alliance extended to military intervention by the US to defeat the Taliban (and al Qaeda) and establish a new Afghan government. Iran’s interests in Afghanistan are in conflict with Pakistan’s single-track preference of an Islamist regime in Kabul (the purpose being to foster its misshapen policy of “Strategic depth” both geographically and ideologically to confront a rising India.) Pakistan also believes a weak and fundamental Islamist government in Kabul may be the best way to keep ethnic, irredentist claims at bay, while at the same time expanding its own influence. Such a policy only paves the way for increased military involvement by all parties including Iran.
Russia’s Part in the ‘Novaya Great Game’
There is a veiled attempt by Russia to fill the current void in Afghanistan despite the probability that destabilisation of the region may be the outcome. Greater competition between neighbouring powers, in Russian perceptions, may set the stage for a new “great game” for the so-called heart of Asia. Russia has need to enter this contest and vie for influence in Afghanistan against other, more motivated external players, not only
to reawaken and accentuate its great power status (as it has done in Ukraine and in Syria) but also, understanding the positions these countries hold and taking their conflicting postures into consideration, the
unfolding situation in Afghanistan will affect Russia’s security indirectly by way of Moscow’s allies in Central Asia. Central Asian nations fear the possible consequences of destabilisation in Afghanistan, which may include an influx of refugees or an upsurge in Islamic extremism, drug trafficking, and tran-border crime, and they may well turn to Moscow for help. It is also difficult to portray a Russia of the immediate future, blind to the emerging Chinese influence in the region by way of their grand scheme of the ‘Continental Silk Route’ and their efforts to corner strategic mineral resources (1400 mineral fields including rare earth elements and over three trillion USD in untapped deposits) that Afghanistan abounds in. The probability of competing politico-socio-economic interests morphing into security concerns is real.
The Central Asian Republics
The Central Asian Republics (CARs) worry about how instability in Afghanistan affects the survival of their own political regimes. These concerns are also symptomatic of their existential weaknesses. But reality
would suggest that Central Asia’s economic prospects depend more on China, Russia and India rather than on Western military presence in Afghanistan, if only internal
stability could be assured. And here lies the rub: CARs have historically depended upon centrally administered authoritarian rule such that even today they are unable to view a globalised world through any prism other than that provided by a distant Moscow, advancing a possible return of a Russian Domain 2.0. Recent moves by Putin to build greater security cooperation among the CARs particularly with Kazakhstan (key regional player) and consolidating military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan would underscore the prospects of revisiting
privileged partnerships and the return of the Super (Capitalist) Commissar. More worryingly, the stage will be set for enhanced friction in the region.
The Thing about Gathering Armies
The thing about ‘gathering armies’ is that it puts in stark relief the dangers that a policy drift can inflict upon a designated region. India cannot treat the post-2014 situation in Afghanistan as a potential Armageddon for its security in South Asia. An Islamist
takeover of Afghanistan and the country’s subsequent turn into a hotbed of international terrorism is not a certainty. India will have to take more responsibility for regional security. This heightened responsibility must first close out the possibility of armed intervention and
put in place a dispensation that promotes cooperative engagement in economic development and institution- building. Under all conditions the use of geography to
further strategic security interests by any of the stakeholders must be abhorred. This approach is consistent with idea of placing strategic stability above strategic competition.

2015: An Opportune Time for South Asian Regional Integration

Amita Batra

In May 2014, when India made the unprecedented gesture of inviting the heads of all SAARC member- countries for the oath taking ceremony of its new Prime
Minister, hopes were raised that a new beginning for regional cooperation in South Asia was now in the offing. A few months later, both days of the 18th SAARC Summit were spent speculating about the possibility of a breakthrough in the cold vibes shared by the heads of India and Pakistan. While the Summit was rescued with a last-minute agreement on energy cooperation, two
other agreements, on road and rail connectivity were left languishing.
The much-expected revival of SAARC did not happen; but there was a hint among SAARC members of moving ahead with interested partners. The first month of 2015
has seen interesting developments with the West Bengal Chief Minister accepting Bangladesh’s invitation for a visit and a surprise outcome of presidential elections in Sri Lanka. What do these three developments mean for South Asia?
First, it is time to reformulate the idea of regional cooperation in South Asia as open and differentiated regionalism. Member-countries should come together in smaller sub-regional groups with a focussed agenda
comprising both common challenges and aspirations that are cross-border in nature. Once they are successful in attaining the limited agenda, the aims and objectives can expand and so can the membership as
non-members would begin incurring the costs of non- accession. In due course, sub-regionalism would serve as a preparatory ground for merging into larger groupings as it would be indicative of the members’
willingness to act in a cooperative framework with their neighbours and a readiness to join larger groupings in the region that go beyond these members.
Within South Asia, sub-regional groups already exist. Membership in some of these sub-regional groupings extends beyond South Asia to Southeast Asian/ East Asian countries. These include the BBIN with
Bangladesh Bhutan, India and Nepal as members; the BCIM with Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar; and the BIMSTEC with Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand, as member economies.
Instead of the existing overlapping and all-
encompassing objectives of these sub-groupings, it would be better to delineate a workable agenda based on an area of comparative advantage for each and adopt a focussed approach towards its achievement. Issues of hydropower, movements of peoples, transit rights etc. could be primary areas for the BBIN;
connectivity and economic corridors for the BCIM; and supply chains in textiles and clothing and gas pipelines could constitute the working agenda for the BIMSTEC.
The resource and expertise-constrained South Asian economies may then be able to contribute to and benefit from these groupings in accordance with their potential. A necessary prior requirement in this context would be the establishment of an institutional mechanism that includes a secretariat, working groups with requisite expertise, regular meetings, coordination
and periodic exchange of information and reports. Over time, a merger or expansion of the sub-regional groupings could shape into regional formulation.
Second, apart from the Teesta water sharing arrangement and the land boundary agreement – two significant issues that might see a resolution during the
West Bengal chief minister’s February 2015 visit to Bangladesh – the two countries may also like to consider the issue of full transit to India’s northeast via Bangladesh. Preliminary action on this front was evident in 2014 when Bangladesh, under a special transit arrangement, allowed transport of food grains to Tripura through its territory. The certainty of a full transit
agreement will facilitate connectivity of the North-East Indian states with the rest of India and as a consequence, allow them to take advantage of the Indian economic dynamism.
Third, the political change that Sri Lanka recently saw augurs well for the India- Sri Lanka Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) negotiations
for which, beginning 2005, led to a framework agreement scheduled to be signed in 2008. Reservations regarding the services sector liberalisation, particularly
mode 4 related movement of professionals, investment and non- tariff barriers (NTBs) coupled with lack of political will have prevented the CEPA from being signed
and operationalised. In order for this to happen, the CEPA must uphold the same principles of non- reciprocity and differential treatment as was the case in
the India-Sri Lanka Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
The India-Sri Lanka FTA is an example of a south-south trade agreement that has taken into account the asymmetry of the two economies in its provisions and yet been successful in generating a positive outcome of increased trade for both economies. Deeper integration via the CEPA may be particularly opportune when India is attempting to revive its manufacturing sector; and fears with regard to NTBs and services liberalisation may be better combated with more rational assessments of alternative liberalisation scenarios.
Strengthening developing country linkages is an imperative in the post-global financial crisis period when several traditional Western markets are unable to generate sufficient growth and hence demand for
exports of these economies. Regionalism is being actively pursued by the rest of the world. South Asia must therefore make best of the available opportunities in this direction in 2015.

J&K Election Verdict: For Integration, Not Assimilation

 Ashok Bhan

 

A credible democratic exercise has just concluded in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). Media is agog with rumours on government formation based more on arithmetic than any analysis on how the outcome could be best utilised to strengthen the peace process and to resolve the conflict in this sensitive state.

It is significant that in the 2014 assembly elections in J&K, the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) have made tremendous electoral gains at the cost of the ruling coalition partners, the National Conference (NC) and the Congress party. The huge margin of victory of some BJP candidates in Jammu province is clearly suggestive of a wave which could not cross the Pir Panchal. It is also creditable that 65 per cent of the voters exercised their franchise – the highest ever in an election in the past 25 years in J&K. The poll percentage in the assembly elections held after the turmoil had prevented elections in early 90s was 54 in 1996, 43 in 2002 and 61 in 2008. These statistics are surely indicative of important political trends but do they open a new window to the peace process and conflict resolution?

The biggest positive towards peace in this electoral exercise lay in the credible manner in which it was carried out.  This has to been seen in the backdrop that the rigged assembly election of 1987 is widely cited as one of the important causes of the conflict. The complexity of the elections in the conflict area has totally changed with the voters’ faith in the elections progressively increasing since 1996. The Indian democracy has been a victor and this will not go unnoticed in the strife-torn state as well as to the international community.

The allegiance to the Indian state in Jammu and Ladakh is almost total. Therefore, the variation in the vote per cent in these areas is incidental to the peace process. However, defying the separatists’ boycott call in the Kashmir valley and coming out to vote in large numbers in militancy-affected areas as well as constituencies with sizeable separatist influence is a big increment to the peace process. Sopore constituency – which the separatist leader, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, has represented three times – has elected a Congress candidate and polled 30 per cent votes as against 20 in 2008 and 8 in 2002. This segment polled a mere 1.03 per cent in the recent Lok Sabha polls. Similarly, the eight constituencies in Srinagar city, most of which have, under the separatists’ influence, been boycotting elections, have shown a sizeable turnout. True, some of it may be to neutralise the impact of postal ballots of the migrant voters. It is significant that the higher voter turnout in these has benefitted the PDP that has wrested five seats from the NC in the city.

Constituencies in south Kashmir still affected by residual militancy, such as Tral, Shopian, Pulwama and Pampore, registered a healthy voter turnout. Each of these seats have been won by PDP candidates.

The most important dividend of the elections comes from north Kashmir, where the People’s Conference, led by former separatist leader Sajad Gani Lone, won seats from Handwara and Kupwara. Though separatists have been participating earlier as proxy candidates, this is the first time that they have won seats under a party banner. They have realised the futility of violence and politics of agitations. The ballot has won over the bullet. This is a shot in the arm of the peace process.

Indo-Pak relations have nose-dived in 2014. There have been over 560 ceasefire violations – by far the highest after the ceasefire came into operation in 2003. The new year has begun with a series of ceasefire violations and a war of words. The boat incident off the coast of Gujarat and intercepts pointing fingers at Pakistani authorities show desperation across the border.  Therefore, there is little chance of resumption of talks between the two neighbours any time soon.

The nature of electoral verdict with a clear divide along the two regions will not allow any significant forward movement on addressing the internal dimension, particularly the relationship between the Indian Union and the state, even within the limits of the Constitution. Any acceptable political solution will be difficult to reach with the two dominant political entities representing diametrically opposite views on issues like dialogue with Pakistan, autonomy, self-rule, Article 370, and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act.

In the absence of any possibility of resolving the internal dimension of the conflict politically or early resumption of talks with Pakistan, the peace process may have to be restricted for some time to an agenda of development and slow but definite ongoing process of ‘integration’ of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of India. Any attempt at ‘assimilation’ will be resisted and will be highly counterproductive. The process of isolating separatists has begun but their weakening influence must not be taken for granted. The electorate has chosen their representatives by putting their lot with Indian democracy after defying the gun and separatists. Those mandated are the best equipped to totally isolate the separatists. This must not be lost sight of if the gains of the democratic exercise are to be taken forward to bring peace in the state.

Pakistan: The Military Courts

 D Suba Chandran

 

Of all the coups, overt and covert since 1947, the military in Pakistan should be smiling at the invitation by the Parliament to set up military courts. As a phenomenon and institution, the military courts are not new in the democratic history of nations; numerous countries have gone through this process in establishing them for a specific purpose at a particular time in their history.

Will the military courts that are being set up in Pakistan with the passage of 21st Constitutional Amendment Bill 2015 along with Pakistan Army Act (Amendment) Bill 2015 by a two-third majority in the Parliament lead to further erosion of democratic hold over governance? Or, will it only result in addressing the militancy in Pakistan, as it is being projected by the powerless government in power? Is this a right strategy for Pakistan?

Whatever may be the reasons behind the setting up of military courts, there are few larger issues. First, it clearly shows the failure of mainstream governance: not only the democratically elected government, but also the entire judicial process. Why would Pakistan need military courts to deal with terrorism, and not trial by regular courts? The argument is – the situation is not simple and merits serious and focussed intervention.

It is unfortunate, that the judiciary in Pakistan except for a brief period under the former Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry remained under the shadows of other institutions. Even today, political leaders and TV anchors make huge accusations against the honourable judges and the Supreme Court, and get away at the end with simple apologies submitted by their lawyers. Setting up of military courts mean an indirect acceptance of the inability of legal institutions to try terrorism and terrorists. The issue is not limited to the courage of the individuals or officials in the courtroom in ensuring a proper trial, but also include the ability of concerned security officials to make a proper case and present credible evidence following a thorough investigation.

While the military courts may circumvent the above issue, it will pose a larger problem in the long run. Military courts will always result in impinging civilian rights in a given political atmosphere, whether it takes place in US or in India or in Australia. This is bound to happen and has happened in the past. In Pakistan’s case, with so much of ethnic and regional polarization with Balochis, Sindhis, Mohajirs and Pashtuns, such an occurrence is inviting more problem to the nation building process.

Second, the setting up of military courts also means abdication of authority by the democratically elected government to the military. Both the governments – PML and the previous PPP were reluctant to take decisive actions against the militants. Though Nawaz Sharif did make a statement that the civilian government would decide which cases will be pursued by the military courts, this is a foregone conclusion. If the setting up of military courts in itself is a result of pressure from the Establishment, it will be difficult to believe that the elected government will have a choice in choosing which cases need to be pursued.

In retrospect, it appears both the military and democratic governments should have sincerely followed up with two big decisions that Gen Musharraf took in 2001 and 2007 respectively vis-a-vis Afghanistan and Lal Masjid. After those two crucial decisions, successive governments should have continued with fighting the militants both across the Durand Line and within Pakistan.

Unfortunately, there were repeated political deals and selective targeting of militants with a self-imposed delusion that this was not their war and was fallout of American War against Terrorism, which in turn was a residue of American led Cold War against the Russians in Afghanistan.

Finally, the larger question relates to the very objective seeing the military courts as a solution to the problem of terrorism in Pakistan. In fact the civilian government, by passing the relevant Bills in the Parliament has democratically elevated the problem as a solution. Nothing could be more dangerous than fighting terrorism in Pakistan.

How did terrorism become such a phenomenon in Pakistan internally? While there were issues relating to Baloch and Mohajir problem in the previous years, neither of the above had become such an “existential threat” to Pakistan, as the TTP led terrorism has become today. How did TTP become such a big monster? Where did it originate and how did it grow to this mammoth level.

While a section within Pakistan would live in a denial world and accuse the US, Israel and India for all the problems of violence within the country, the reality is far from it. The Establishment in Pakistan used J&K and Afghanistan to serve their narrow purposes during the 1980s and 1990s. The jihadi groups led by the Lashkar, Jaish, and the Harkat, and the sectarian groups led by the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and Sipah-e-Sahaba were all part of a larger problem created by the Establishment to serve its own interests both within and outside Pakistan. The Taliban in Afghanistan and the TTP in Pakistan were the fallouts; unfortunately for the Establishment, it has come back to haunt them. The stooges and trump cards today have become a threat.

Military courts will only bring the Establishment into the main environment and a lead actor. While military will have to play a leading role in any governmental strategy in fighting militancy, legal processes should be in civilian hands. Military can only be a fighting arm of a democratic government. Military courts can never be a substitute to democratic governance.

The Sharif government, perhaps under pressure has taken a decision that would haunt the democratic process further in Pakistan. Perhaps, he has found an easy way out, by outsourcing the process, and thereby abdicating the responsibility of the Parliament. Military has to be used as a strategy in fighting terrorism at the ground level, but not as a legal institution to try and convict.

To conclude, the military courts may not provide the right answers to fighting terrorism Pakistan. Problem can never be imposed as solutions! In this context, solutions lie with effective governance and credible democratic process, supported by an efficient judiciary. In fact, the court systems in Pakistan are already crowded with constitutionally established secular courts, the Shariah courts and the socially approved (and at times tolerated) local jirgas. There are enough courts already in Pakistan. What Pakistan needs is justice.

India-Pakistan Relations: A New Low

 Shujaat Bukhari

 

Relations between India and Pakistan are again at a new low as hostilities across the International Border (IB) and the Line of Control (LOC) in Jammu and Kashmir have intensified. At least seven people including civilians have been killed in the renewed shelling and firing from either side. Amid an uneasy calm both New Delhi and Islamabad have been blaming each other for the provocation. Even unveiled threats have become part of a discourse that is shaping up now.

An “apparently empowered” Defence Minister of Pakistan Khawja Asif talked of the “language India can understand” and on January 4 he even tried to put India on defensive by saying “India wants to keep us busy in a low-intensity war or low-intensity engagement on our eastern border. They are pursuing the same tactics of keeping our forces busy on all fronts”. Earlier Pakistan’s Foreign Affairs Adviser Sartaj Aziz had protested to External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj by saying that the Border Security Force had called the Rangers for a flag meeting but they instead opened fire. But Swaraj refuted the allegations saying “Pak commanders responded to our defensive fire by using higher caliber weapons, expanding conflict zone, targeting civilian habitations”. She also warned of consequences in case the mechanisms are not followed.

This acrimonious war of words not only brings to the fore the deep mistrust both the sides have developed but also the fact that the situation could take any turn. Even an incident of fishing boat casting off into Arabian Sea near Keti Bunder, 100 kilometers from Karachi became an issue of “Pakistan exporting explosives to India”. The incident, however, was caught in the controversy within India even as the boat that blew up was marked as “Terror Boat”. Two influential dailies The Indian Express and DNA raised questions over the claims that it was meant to carry explosives to India. Leading security expert Ajai Shukla dissected the press release from Ministry of Defence as also the inputs from intelligence sources. “Questions also abound over the MoD’s contention that there was an explosion on board. In a fuel fire, any high explosive on board the vessel would simply have caught fire and burnt, not exploded” he wrote in Business Standard. Immediately dismissing the boat as a “Terror Boat” also put in the context the strand relations and the level of mistrust that exists on both sides. In this particular case the example of November 26, 2008 attack in Mumbai came handy to link it with terror.

With Prime Minister Narendra Modi not making any statement vis a vis this fresh spate of violence across the borders and no investigation launched to see what exactly happens on borders, it has shrunk the space for creating an atmosphere of reconciliation. It is not known what is happening on Pakistani side and why the Pakistan’s ISI, Army or Rangers are engaged in a renewed phase of hostility. But on Indian side it is steadily becoming clear that as of now reconciliation with Pakistan is a closed chapter.

This all started in July last year when New Delhi took a major rather surprising step to unilaterally call off the Foreign Secretary-level talks in view of Pakistan High Commissioner meeting separatists in Delhi. At that time it was seen as “fulfillment” of Modi’s electoral promise in which he had talked tough in dealing with Pakistan with regard to terror. “Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a “pleasant” surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing-in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something different one would expect from a tough talking Modi. If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the tumultuous ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger outreach to all SAARC nations.

Political grapevine is that Modi has not been able to rein in the “hawks” within the establishment who are drawing inspiration from RSS agenda to adopt a tough posture vis a vis Pakistan. Pakistan has surely not given a fair deal to India as far as the trial of Mumbai is concerned, or the latest drama about Zaki ur Rehman Lakhvi is one example. But New Delhi too is not clear about its policy. It seems that the hard-liners within BJP, as also the RSS, have so far succeeded in implementing their hawkish agenda. This was the case during Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s tenure as well but he sidestepped the hawks and walked many extra miles. He crafted a mechanism of separating party interests from diplomacy. He showed how political leadership could assert itself and work independent of jingoistic agency thinking. That is how he stood alone among the Prime Ministers of India.

For Modi also, it was an opportunity to use his mandate and power to do something different. But so far he has not left any imprint of departing from the traditional mindset that runs the establishment. While being leader of the largest democracy in the world and biggest power in South Asia, he could have easily moved forward on his “intent” to carry along South Asian countries, as he had indicated by inviting SAARC heads to his investiture ceremony. Moreover, the electoral achievement he had in recent Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir, though no achievement in Valley, he could use the state’s unrest to open doors for reconciliation with Pakistan. After his stern message to his troops in November asking them to “Fire at will” in retaliation to Pakistani firing he has not made any major intervention in this phase of hostility. May be he is not happy with what is happening but he needs to come out of tutored situation and give a new hope to people using his power and mandate.

With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003 and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders. Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade.

While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region.

Sri Lanka: Stability in 2015

 Asanga Abeyagoonasekera

“Heroes are our guides in our journey towards freedom. Their lives and history are what makes our goal firm….let us light the fire of ambition in our hearts on this holy day,” said Prabhakaran, the ruthless terrorist leader of the Liberation Tigers of the Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka. Such words were content to his Heroes Day speech on 27 November, 2001. Eight years later, the incumbent Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa defeated Prabhakaran’s deadly military machine. This military defeat saw the decline of the idea of regional autonomy or the Tamil Eelam – win previously deemed impossible.

The eradication of the scourge of terrorism and barbarity in warfare is a tall task. The recent Peshawar attacks stand testimony to this. Violence against the innocents continues, even as we stepped into a new year. As the New Year begins its important to think about the world we have created; the killing of innocent children was disgraceful. As the most intelligent of species on our planet, the brutalities of our past and present make it evident that the time to strengthen a culture of values and protect our social fabric from the scourge of brutality, is now.

The Peshawar massacre is not alien to the South Asian or Sri Lankan cases. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE terrorists massacred innocent children when those children were asleep in remote villages. Sri Lanka won its battle against terrorism by sacrificing many lives, but it is not removed from the larger struggle of the world towards defeating terrorism. Terrorism in  anywhere should be addressed and defeated. The priority of the world’s agenda for the next decade should be to create a safe world for its inhabitants. Without this, economic and individual prosperity would be a difficult task.

When political systems fail to adjust to change, social instabilities may occur. The incumbent Sri Lankan president continued the political system with nearly 100 ministers introduced by the former president. The opposition campaign targets corruption and lack of good governance in the present regime. The importance of establishing the independent bribery commission and other commissions could be considered because they are the fundamentals in a democracy – and need strengthening. Loss-making government institutions have to be revived and strengthened. Meritocracy has to be introduced in all levels of governance. Instead of making ad hoc decisions, foreign policies must be formulated after incorporating research inputs instead of making ad hoc decisions. All these areas need development to achieve the $7500 per capita income by 2020.

In the build-up to the 8 January presidential polls, the political landscape has been volatile. Political crossovers have exceeded the maximum threshold levels. While it appears that these decisions were made to improve people’s lives, it is worth questioning as to whether decisions to switch sides were made with the consent of those who elected them. People vote for their representatives looking at their policies and political affiliations. How could elected representatives change sides without the consent of the very people who elected them to office? This crossover of politicians is a way of plundering votes and should not be encouraged as it will further deteriorate the political culture; a trust deficit with the political system is building among the people.

On 8 January, these very people will elect their new president. Different polls predict different outcomes but concur on the likelihood of a very small margin. This author believes that even if the joint opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirisena, wins, he will miss the country’s target for two reasons:

Firstly, due to the coalition he has built with the former president and many others. In the event of an electoral victory, once the euphoria of the polls ceases, such a cocktail of political cultures will find it difficult to establish a common ground to work together to take the country forward.

Secondly, dismantling the system of the Executive Presidency. The promise of the removal of the executive presidency in 100 days is promising but the strategy afterwards is vague and unclear. After the proverbial 100 days, voters will find themselves being led by a different leader than the person they have trusted their vote in. The current opposition’s post-election strategy is limited in its pragmatic capacity.

President Rajapaksa, who surgically removed the terrorist tumor by an invasive surgery – a task his three predecessors failed at – will still carry more weight. The ongoing run-up to the polls is a necessary eye-opener to President Rajapaksa. The present government, despite its strengths, needs to commit to strict rules to tidy the country’s political culture and introduce better governance.

George Orwell's 1945 classic, ‘Animal Farm’, where the animals decided to rebel against the farmer and restore a new and better order, is a good example of today's political climate. What Orwell tried to demonstrate in his book was as to how easily political dogma can be turned into malleable propaganda. It is therefore important to understand the changes we wish to bring to our system, and the risk of political instability if we do a total system change.

J&K Government Formation: Tight Rope Walk

 Shujaat Bukhari

 

Jammu and Kashmir state is witnessing a confusing situation in the aftermath of Assembly elections that threw up a fractured mandate. A record high turnout, notwithstanding, no party is in a position to form a government. Even the game of cobbling up the numbers is becoming difficult, as the divergent political ideologies are still keeping the parties away from the negotiating table. To go or not to go, is the question for which the two major political parties – Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) – are struggling to find an answer for.

The high voter turnout that was witnessed despite boycott calls by separatists was expected to throw a “perfect mandate” but it divided the seats in an interesting manner. In contrast to expectations (of the party) as also the exit poll results, PDP could not secure 35 seats which could have placed it in a better position. Out of 87 seats, PDP could get only 28, BJP 25, National Conference 15, Congress 12 and others 7. Had PDP won 35 or more seats, it might have been in a position to easily cobble up with non-BJP forces. Even as NC offered the support, which in every sense was real and Congress also extended an unconditional hand, but there seem to be two important issues involved in taking the final decision vis-a-vis the support of the NC-Congress combination or NC and Congress separately.

One that NC and Congress were voted out of power by the people and joining the hands with either of them would mean disrespecting the mandate and the urge of people for the change. There is no denying the fact that in contrast to its complete drubbing in Parliament elections held in April 2014, NC has made a strong comeback by winning 12 seats from Kashmir valley and three from Jammu. Still the anti-incumbency was riding high during the elections, which cannot be negated. Moreover, NC and PDP getting together seems impossible given the inherent “ideological hate” both Abdullah and Mufti families are harbouring against each other.

On the other hand Congress has won the seats by accident as they based the candidates in the respective constituencies. Otherwise people’s ire against Congress that broke all the records of corruption was more evident on the ground. Humiliating defeat the party tasted in its strong bastion and home turf of its stalwart Ghulam Nabi Azad speaks volumes about how people treated the party that had invested so much in the region.

Another important factor, that apparently comes in way of a grand alliance talked about by senior Congress leader Ghulam Nabi Azad is that the majority of people in Jammu region have given their mandate to BJP. The mandate is clearer than what we saw in Kashmir valley. The BJP candidates won with huge margins ranging from 45,000 to 10,000 in most of constituencies, which clearly indicates how people threw their weight behind the right-wing part. In Kashmir that was not the case since the margins were thin in majority of the segments. So in the process of government formation, it is this mandate that is upsetting any permutation and combination based on the so-called “secular ideologies”.

Though there is an element of anti-Kashmir sentiment in the voting pattern in Jammu, at the same time to form a government without the participation of elected representatives of a region may not augur well for the health of the state. Of late there is also a debate going on around the idea of having a different “grand alliance” between PDP, BJP and Congress to ensure that all the three regions of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh are on board since Congress won three out of four from Ladakh. However, that again looks among the impossibilities as BJP and Congress could only get together in the world hereafter. To stitch such an alliance, it needs a “grand national interest” to emerge from within the political corridors of Delhi.

Though PDP and BJP are holding “serious” back channel negotiations and have even exchanged papers on crucial issues, it is the most critical phase in the existence of 15-year-old PDP to take a final call on the issue. For BJP it may still be easier to keep the contentious issue off the table. They had already mellowed down the rhetoric on issues such as Article 370, but for PDP it is to do something against a political ideology. BJP is more concerned about being part of a power structure since it has remarkably improved its tally from 11 seats in 2008 to 25 in 2014. Only by coming to power it can consolidate its base and further it in future. So the political ideology could wait.

For PDP it is both – to come into power to survive on the ground and also to ensure that its political ideology is not diluted to the extent that it is seen as a sell-out agent for the sake of power. As of now the PDP patron Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, has widened the spectrum of consultations with his MLAs and party leaders but is weighing the options considering the fallout of such an alliance. He may become Chief Minister for six years, but more troubling question that is tickling his mind is the future of his party.

One argument that is being articulated behind the tie up with BJP is that it would ensure development and free flow of funds. That, however, may not be tenable as there are many non-BJP ruled states in India and they don’t necessarily suffer on account of free flow of funds. Similarly during Congress rule there have been BJP governments in various states. Larger issue that PDP will have to manoeuvre around is the political situation in the state. That is why Mufti has pushed forward the “Agenda for Alliance” centering around the engagement with Pakistan,
separatists, cross LoC Confidence Building Measures, making a secure environment and bringing respite in the lives of the people.

This may be difficult for BJP to digest such a line of thinking, since Prime Minister Narendra Modi unilaterally called off Foreign Secretary-level talks in July and has adopted a hard posturing vis a vis Pakistan. But to Mufti’s understanding, the route for reconciliation with Pakistan passes through Kashmir and he would like to bargain hard on political issues rather than the development to come true to the sense of people in seeing him and his party as “saviours” in the mainstream camp.

If at all this alliance comes into existence, it may throw up an opportunity for Modi to tread on Vajpayee’s line of thinking which he has often invoked during last few months. But for Mufti, a shrewd politician, it may be difficult to join hands with a party that drew a blank in recent elections in Kashmir. To do business with BJP is nothing less than going to gallows with a hope to survive.

India-Pakistan Relations in 2015: Through a Looking Glass

 Salma Malik

The year is about to end, and keeping true to tradition, it is time for reflection and recollection. However bad the situation may become, the end of year holds an optimism that the coming year would prove better than the previous. 2014 began on a positive note despite the cross-border firings, as India headed for elections.

Although Narendra Modi’s election as the Indian prime minister did not come as a surprise, his garnering of the massive mandate was beyond expectation. Ironically, the election was highly reminiscent of the 2013 Pakistan general elections that brought former Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif back into power through a massive mandate. In both cases, the heavy mandates had a lot to do with absence of a strong alternative and the anti-incumbency sentinment more than anything else. Both elections also brought a daring third option, where in India’s case, the Aam Aadmi Party couldn’t defeat the established political vote base, and in Pakistan, the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaaf has been on a justice-seeking mission for the past several months, with sit-ins and marches across the country. However, in Pakistan, Modi’s campaigning and election to office was closely watched, and has been interpreted differently by different stakeholders.

On one hand, he has been alleged to be the architect of the 2002 Gujarat riots and as a result of his personal beliefs, views, ideological and party affiliations, is not viewed as someone who can deliver peace. This viewpoint gains further credence with his election manifesto that was heavily anti-Pakistan; spoke of the revision of Article 370 of the Indian constitution pertaining to Kashmir’s special status; reviewing of India’s nuclear doctrine with the possibility of the adoption of no NFU clause.

The second school of thought, though cautious, was more amiable to the idea of Modi being voted in specifically due to his economic vision and development agenda – and thus interpreted that he would not disturb the economic cart by engaging in conflict; rather he may actually be able to offer trade and commercial cooperation.

A possible third group was the nonchalant, indifferent category that seems to have given up on the re-engagement option. They believe Modi is for India alone and his coming to power will have no effect on the India-Pakistan situation. Finally, there is the ‘silver lining’ category, comprising compulsive optimists. To them, if anyone can deliver peace, it's Narendra Modi, and this is the strategic window of opportunity available to both sides to make or break.

All four are partially correct. Without doubt, this definitely is the right time, and even if New Delhi finds this clichéd, in contrast to Islamabad, the former holds the potential to call the shots – both for the better or worse. A peace offering which is substantive enough to alter the conflict spectrum will not come cheap, and will definitely extract a price. However in comparison to Pakistan, India is relatively better-positioned both domestically and otherwise to be in the driving seat. The window of opportunity is strategic, given how both Sharif and Modi have a common economic vision.

There is also a strong constituency that believes in economic engagement and increased connectivity and doing away with unnecessary red tapes vis-à-vis cross-border interaction. Modi enjoys a strong mandate and is not only opening to all countries (except Pakistan) but wants to create a legacy of his own. Can an amicable settlement of relatively minor disputes such as Siachen and Sir Creek help create that space?

Afghanistan too is, for the moment, enjoying a smooth transitional path, especially in terms of security, even if it is externally backed. How long does the “unity government” stay united depends on how prudently both Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive Officer Abdullah Abdullah decide their nominees and team. Afghanistan may not be the best proxy field for its eastern neighbors to settle scores. Perhaps it is simplistic to state, but the resumption of cross LoC firing and its geographical scope expanding to the working boundary should be seen as a substitute and viable alternative to open conventional hostilities.

Many argue that these violations are routine and nothing extraordinary. While it’s a true estimation, if contextualised under current circumstances, they represent an aggressive, dismissive and proactive India, which at the sub-conventional level, is sending appropriate signals to Islamabad. Will Islamabad adopt an alarmist approach to any and all anti-Pakistan statements issued by Modi and his team? Should the 44 plus formula and the revision of Article 370 not be dismissed as a paranoia, as the US insists? If there is a constitutional change in the status of Kashmir, can we afford to ignore the trigger-happy gun-toting non-state actors who are always on a look out for a new conflict?

Does this imply the proactive doctrine initiating in response to the proverbial Mumbai 2.0? If this be the case, then the pessimists have won. However, one thing is certain, that for the moment, Modi has not developed a policy to engage with Pakistan. One can only hope that that happens sooner than later, as the optimists feel that only the current set-up, given its strengths and capacity to implement change enjoys that strategic window of opportunity. Otherwise, not only will the peace process remain stalemated, but with passage of time, erode peace constituencies.

The recently-concluded SAARC summit demonstrated broad smiles, strong handshakes and applauses from the interested audience. If taken seriously, through the looking glass of 2015, in the alternate universe, SAARC performs in real terms; South Asia is a prosperous region, with high development and growth rankings instead of dismal governance indicators. From Afghanistan to Bangladesh there is increased interconnectivity, and together, the leaders seek a vision of prosperity.

A Fractured Mandate: The Big Picture

 D Suba Chandran

 

Most of the immediate reaction to the just concluded J&K Assembly election has been on its nature and the outcome. True, the verdict is fractured. But what caused it? Is the divided mandate a manifestation of a deeper issue that we have to focus more, than on who will form the government and who support it? What is the Big Picture that is evolving and what it means for the future stability of the State and its people?

Shujaat Bukhari titled his column as the “Fractured Mandate” and The Hindu editorial called it as a “Fragmented Verdict”. National newspapers referred the election results in the following phrases: “Jammu goes the saffron way”; “From a small fry, BJP emerges as major player in state”; and “No easy Options for PDP, BJP”. All these reflect perhaps a reality or a new beginning. The larger question is, what does this portend for J&K and how did this development emerge? Since an eventful year is coming to an end, it will be useful to do a retrospect and make a forecast on why it had happened and what it means.

Statistically, the BJP has swept the Jammu region, with an exception in few constituencies especially in Poonch district. From Bani, Basholi and Kathua to Chhamb, Akhnoor and Nowshera, the BJP has swept the region. However, further west, the story is different in Rajouri, Poonch, Mendhar and Surankote. PDP has captured Rajouri and Poonch, while Mendhar and Surankote have been won by the NC and Congress.

Similarly, there has been a sweep in Bhaderwah-Ramban-Kishtwar belt by the BJP. However, north of Ramban, across the Banihal, it is a different story in Kashmir Valley. The PDP has regained its support base in Kashmir Valley; in fact, had it not been for the boycott call and less polling in Sringar during the last elections, the PDP would have won more seats in 2008 itself.

Across the mighty Zoji La, there is yet another story in Kargil and Leh. The constituencies of Zanskar, Kargil, Leh and Nubra won by candidates who are independent or belonging to the Congress also tell a story.

Besides the bad performance of National Conference and Congress, which was expected, rejection of the Panthers Party and the emergence of Lone’s JKPC in north Kashmir, what do the recent elections signify?

Do the recent elections and its fractured mandate reflect a clear regional divide and a communal fault line in J&K? If the answer is an unfortunate yes, than the first big challenge for any party that forms the government is to address this divide. Why has the BJP that has swept the rest of Jammu region failed in Poonch and Rajouri? Why has PDP that has been the most successful in Valley, failed to repeat its performance outside it, except for few constituencies across the Pir Panjal? Any why has Ladakh neither preferred the BJP nor the PDP? This divide on regional and communal basis, perhaps is the biggest threat to the future of J&K.

The civil societies within J&K will have to ponder the larger implications of the election results, than narrowly focussing on whether PDP will align with BJP, or form the government with support from Congress and NC. The primary issue facing the political parties in J&K is not their ideology, or whether it helps or prevent from forming the next government. The big picture is how to address the looming threat, which has ended up in producing a hung verdict.

Non-addressal of the real cause, and looking at only managing its manifestation will only produce political instability and future hung assemblies. When did a party command a simple majority in J&K? Why has the State produced a series of hung assemblies in the last three elections? The answers remain elsewhere; the hung assembly is only a manifestation of a deeper problem, and just should not be seen as a Saffron Wave, or Modi sweep, or PDP resurgence.

Second major issue facing the new government in J&K and relatively another new one in New Delhi, is to break the political cycle between the State and Union governments. The issue is not whether the government in J&K is a coalition partner of the government in New Delhi; it is rather, how the two governments work in tandem in breaking the cycle of non-movement in crucial issues. Successful elections in J&K, formation of government, promise of movement between New Delhi and J&K, some movements and slogans on cross-LoC CBMs, stalemate, slow performance (if not non-performance) of the government within J&K,  disappointment, and the breakdown – has been the general pattern in the last fifteen years.

How to break the above cycle, and pursue a straight path? If the civil societies within J&K will have to come together to address the imbalance question within J&K, the civil societies in J&K and the rest of India will have to come together and discuss how to break the set pattern. Unfortunately, not only the political parties, even the civil societies on both sides of the Lakhanpur border post have invented myths that suit their narrative and does not understand the other.

Rest of India blissfully thinks that a successful election in J&K means the rejection of separatism and terrorism. Peace is measured in terms of absence of violence and the number of people killed or not killed in a day. On the other hand, J&K, especially the Valley is angry about anything and everything and points finger at New Delhi on every ills, with less or no introspection. Both the societies have created an artificial screen with inward looking script, reinforced by their own media perpetuating the monologue about each other. For the agencies and political parties, such a difference and screen fits their primary narrative and prevent them from breaking the cycle.

Else, there will be more Standing Committees, Working Groups and Interlocutors, running in a cyclical path. Perhaps, this is where the media, think tanks, research institutes and Universities could come in, and even join hands in preparing a framework, that would break the above cycle. Unfortunately, the above institutions – be it in J&K or in New Delhi, have been critiquing whatever is happening, without succeeding in providing an alternative. And the civil societies within J&K and across Lakhanpur post get carried away by daily developments and miss the big picture.

Let us sincerely hope, researchers and columnists do not have to write a similar commentary next December on our ability to break the cycle. There have been multiple false starts. Hope the new year and new governments in J&K and New Delhi achieve a sustainable breakthrough.

India’s Northeast: Need for a New Anti-Terror Policy

 Wasbir Hussain

The Christmas-eve massacre in Assam of more than 75 Adivasi men, women and children by rebels belonging to the Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB-S) has made two things clear - that it was a pure act of terrorism, not a routine incident of insurgency, and that an assortment of rebel leaders are still remote-controlling their trigger-happy foot soldiers from safe hideouts in India’s neighbourhood. By way of a response to this continuing bloodbath in Assam (46 people were gunned down by the same outfit in Baksa and Kokrajhar districts in May 2014), the new Government in New Delhi is expected to demonstrate on the ground its ‘zero tolerance’ policy on terror, besides coming up with a new anti-terror strategy that factors in the firm commitment of support from Myanmar, Bhutan and Bangladesh.
The Narendra Modi Government must put its ‘zero tolerance’ policy against terrorism into immediate operation in Assam because the NDFB-S men, during their raids in Sonitpur and Kokrajhar districts on the evening of 23 December 2014, did not hesitate to kill infants by putting their gun barrels into their mouths. This explains the brutality of their crime and the commitment of this armed group to indulge in terror. The same group had killed an Additional Superintendent of Police in January 2014, shot dead 46 people in May, and killed a school girl in August because they suspected her of being a ‘police informer.’ The question that arises is obvious: what is the Unified Command of the Army, police and the paramilitary, headed by the Chief Minister, doing by way of measures to neutralise the rebels?
That the Government of India’s peace policy is flawed has been proved yet again by the latest carnage. New Delhi is already ‘talking peace’ with two other NDFB factions: the NDFB (Progressive) and the NDFB (Ranjan Daimary). For the record, the NDFB (Ranjan Daimary) group - and Daimary himself - has been clearly accused by the security establishment, including the CBI, for involvement in the October 2008 serial blasts in Assam that had killed 100 people. Now, despite the year-long killing and extortion spree by the NDFB-S gunmen, some Assam Police officers are reported to have been engaged in ‘talks’ with some leaders of the outfit. Such actions - talking peace with killer gangs - amounts to according legitimacy to such groups and their actions and only encourage newer militant groups to upscale their violent acts. It is this policy of the Centre that which among other reasons is keeping insurgency alive and kicking in the Northeast. The rebels by now know they only have to agree to sit for talks if the going gets tough for them!
Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh did talk sense when he visited Assam in the wake of the latest massacre. He said there is no question of engaging in talks with killers who have shot dead even infants and ruled out any political solution to the issues of groups like the NDFB-S. Singh talked of a ‘time-bound’ security offensive to neutralise the rebels. The Centre must now make a policy statement and announce a moratorium on peace talks with newer militant groups in Assam and elsewhere in the Northeast. This will go a long way in sending out a clear message to new insurgent outfits who would realise that they are henceforth going to be dealt with as nothing but a law and order problem. After all, the Government cannot be expected to sign fresh Bodo accords with the two NDFB factions it is currently talking to. Again, for those uninitiated, the Centre had signed a Bodo Accord with the rebel Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) in 2003. The BLT thereafter transformed itself into a political party, contested local elections, and has been ruling the area for the past decade.
As usual, there have been claims and counter-claims in the wake of the carnage - central intelligence agencies have said they had intercepted radio conversations in which NDFB-S leaders were instructing their hit-squads to target Adivasis and that they had forwarded these to the Assam Police. If this is true, the Assam Government owes the people of the state an explanation as to the action taken on the information. But, killings by insurgents have become so commonplace in Assam and other Northeastern states like Manipur and Meghalaya that the local governments can afford to be complacent and unaccountable. Of course, the ongoing peace talks with a plethora of rebel groups only add to the confusion, surely even among the security forces on how to respond to a situation. Therefore, the need for a new anti-terror strategy.
The fact that External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj was quick to speak to Bhutanese Prime Minister Tshering Tobgay seeking his Government’s assistance in tackling the NDFB-S militants indicates the rebels may have once again opened shop inside the Himalayan nation or are sneaking in and out of its dense jungles. This is not surprising because the ULFA, NDFB and the Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) were flushed out of Bhutan by a joint Bhutan-India military assault in 2003. The External Affairs Ministry has also confirmed that Sushma Swaraj was in touch with other ‘friendly neighbouring’ countries as part of India’s bid to tame the Northeast rebels. This means that New Delhi is in touch with Myanmar and Bangladesh.
The Modi Government’s neighbourhood push is indeed notable, but commerce aside, New Delhi must also work out institutional mechanisms with Thimphu, Naypyidaw and Dhaka to deal with insurgents who operate sans borders in their trasnational criminal journey. The question now is this: can India work out an anti-terror strategy that transcends its borders and work together with the security establishments in Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan? There has been cooperation on this front but one is talking of something with standard protocols in place. One hopes Prime Minister Modi, Rajnath Singh and Sushma Swaraj will be able to devise an India-Myanmar-Bangladesh-Bhutan security umbrella to fight terror in the Northeastern frontier, and include Nepal too in the endeavour.

Obama’s Rapprochement with Cuba

 Amit Gupta

For the first six years of his presidency President Obama played nice with the Republicans in the hope that they would enact significant domestic policy reforms. Instead, he was met with obstruction and efforts to derail his most significant domestic achievement - the Affordable Care Act. Since the 2014 midterms the President has done what all his predecessors did when faced with domestic roadblocks - he has moved to try and conduct major changes in foreign policy. His administration has worked out a climate change deal with China and both countries have lowered tensions in the relationship. A food security deal has been struck with India thus paving the way for significant advances in the World Trade Organisation but the most interesting redefinition of US foreign policy has been the rapprochement with Cuba. After extensive and secret negotiations the US has decided to scrap the fifty year old policy of not engaging with Cuba and instead establish full diplomatic relations. Greater trade, investment, and increased flows of money from the Cuban diaspora in America to their relatives back home are expected to result from this policy shift.  Tourism has yet to be permitted but it is almost inevitable.

For over fifty years America’s Cuba policy has been held hostage by a vocal and politically active Cuban diaspora, conservatives who revile the Castro brothers as the last bastion of Communism in the western hemisphere, and by foreign policy and national security bureaucrats in Washington DC who have either built their careers on the Cuban embargo or just have long institutional memories. President Obama has correctly pronounced the policy a failure and, instead, sought to engage the Cuban government in a dialogue that will lead to a comprehensive transformation of the currently adversarial relationship. 
Opposition to the resumption of relations comes primarily from the Cuban-American community and the conservatives in the American political system.  Conservatives could have changed this policy a decade ago with little electoral blowback since the Cuban-American community has never been particularly fond of the Democrats because the die-hard Cuban nationalists still blame John F Kennedy for the botched Bay of Pigs invasion.
Further, the Cuban-Americans played a critical role in the electoral politics of Florida and were thus courted by both political parties in the US. But attitudes within the Cuban American community are changing and, at the same time, their political clout in Florida politics is diminishing as other Latino groups (who have a different political agenda) are surpassing the Cuban community in numbers. Moreover, the business opportunities that will come from opening up the island are going to be too hard for American corporations to resist. 
Cuba has high literacy rates and a trained work force that could work effectively if manufacturing is moved to that country. Its medical community can provide the type of care that makes medical tourism to the island an attractive possibility and there is great potential for American hotel groups that want to invest in the country’s tourist industry which at present is dominated by European companies. 
Additionally, members of the Cuban American diaspora have traditionally gone to Cuba from Mexico, Canada, and Jamaica but this is an unnecessarily arduous journey. Direct flights from the US would benefit both countries. 
Perhaps the biggest change is the one that President Obama is suggesting will happen. With greater interaction between the Cuban people and the US we are likely to see the push for increased liberalisation and democracy the lack of which being the very criteria on which sanctions were imposed in the 1960s. 
A Republican-led Congress, however, is going to make it difficult for the Obama Administration to move forward easily on rebuilding the relationship. There is already talk of not funding some of the President’s initiatives including paying for an embassy in Havana. What obstructionist and myopic Congressmen need to understand is that as Yitzhak Rabin put it: "You don’t need to talk to make peace with your friends. You need to make peace with your enemies.” Wise words.

China-North Korea: Reasons for Reconciliation

 Sandip Kumar Mishra

On the occasion of the third death anniversary of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il on 17 December 2014, Chinese President Xi Jinping sent a special message to the North Korean embassy in Bejing. The Chinese President underlined the significance of their “traditional friendship.” Xi Jinping also said that that China “is ready to work with the DPRK to maintain, consolidate and develop the traditional friendship.”

It is definitely a clear departure from the recent attitude of Xi Jinping and China towards North Korea. First, the message was delivered to the North Korean embassy in Beijing by the fifth highest official in the Chinese Communist Party hierarchy, Liu Yunshan. Second, it has been the most open and straight forward statement by the Chinese President emphasising China’s old friendship with North Korea since he assumed power in early 2013. Third, it was given on the occasion of the third death anniversary of Kim Jong-il, which according to the Confucian tradition means the end of the official mourning period and beginning of the new leader’s rule. In a way, it means granting legitimacy to Kim Jong-un, who has had a few differences smooth with China since coming to power. Fourth, Xi Jinping’s statement and the profile of the Chinese delegate to the North Korean embassy are very significant because they happened despite China not being officially invited to the death anniversary programme in North Korea.

What were China’s Objections?
The China-North Korea relationship has been derailed in recent years. China’s first and foremost discomfort with Pyongyang is related to the North Korean nuclear programme, not because of it does not want a nuclear North Korea but more because it would bring a direct US strategic response to the region. The North Korean nuclear programme may also propel South Korea and Japan to move on a similar course of nuclear weaponisation. The second important Chinese objection is the lack of economic reforms. China apparently wants North Korea to adopt Chinese-style reform if it wants to survive and survive well.

China was reportedly disappointed with Kim Jong-un on both accounts, and 2013 was particularly disappointing for bilateral relations. In February 2013, North Korea had its third nuclear test, which invited sharp international criticism. In March-April 2013, North Korea escalated military tensions and rhetoric towards South Korea and the US when they were conducting their annual joint military exercise. North Korea cut-off hot line communications with South Korea and closed down Gaeseong Industrial complex. In spite of Chinese persuasion, North Korea escalated the situation to a point that prompted the US to send its stat-of-the-art weapon systems to the region and install a missile defence system at Guam. In December 2013, North Korea executed the number two in the North Korean power hierarchy, Jang Song-thaek, who was supposed to be the closest to China and was pro-reform. It was reported that a clear signal was being sent to China.

Xi Jinping tried to put pressure on North Korea by cooperating with the international community on the issue of economic sanctions after the nuclear tests and by having two summit meets with South Korean leader Park Geun-hye without any high-level Chinese visits to North Korea.

Context of Rapprochement
However, it seems from recent developments that China has decided to reach out to North Korea even though North Korea does not look ready to change its course. There are important reasons for this. One, China has been disappointed by South Korean reciprocity, as despite good Chinese posturing, South Korea is still not ready to think beyond its primary ally in the region, the US. Two, US, South Korea and Japan recently signed a trilateral intelligence-sharing agreement related to threats emanating from North Korea. China has criticised this move and considers that the mechanism might be used to share information about China as well. Three, China does not find it appropriate on the part of the international community, especially the US, South Korea and Japan, to become ‘over-proactive’ on the issue of human rights violations in North Korea. Although because of the veto from China and Russia, the matter could not move forward, it was definitely a coordinated move to declare North Korean human rights violations ‘crime against humanity’ and refer it to the International Criminal Court (ICC). China worries that such precedents would be bad for Beijing. Four, North Korea over the past year had been moving closer to Russia. In December 2014, No Kwang-chol, vice chief of the General Staff of the North's Army met his Russian counterpart, and Choe Ryong-hae, the Workers' Party of Korea secretary met Russian Foreign Minster and pledged to improve bilateral defence and economic relations. Furthermore, Russian President Vladimir Putin has invited North Korean leader Kim Jong-un to Moscow in 2015.

All these developments have made China rethink its policy of putting pressure on North Korea and it seems that a new beginning in the estranged bilateral relationship might be sought by Xi Jinping. China has taken the first step in the process of rapprochement, now it’s up to North Korea to respond.

NKATAA (1st Online Grocery Stores in Abuja, Nigeria) - Delivery at your Doorstep WITHIN 3 HOURS

www.nkataa.com/obakeye 
Mobile - +2348036842228

India’s Nuclear Doctrine: Reviewing NFU and Massive Retaliation

 Gurmeet Kanwal

The BJP’s election manifesto had promised to review India’s nuclear doctrine to “make it relevant to challenges of current times…” Regardless of election-time rhetoric, it is necessary that important government policies must be reviewed periodically with a view to re-validating their key features.
India had declared itself a state-armed with nuclear weapons after a series of nuclear tests at Pokhran, Rajasthan, on 11 and 13 May 1998. India’s deterrence is premised on the dictum that nuclear weapons are political weapons and not weapons of warfighting and that their sole purpose is to deter the use and threat of use of nuclear weapons by India’s adversaries. A draft nuclear doctrine was prepared by the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) chaired by the late K Subrahmanyam and handed over to the government on 17 August 1999.
After a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the government issued a statement on 04 January 2003 spelling out India’s nuclear doctrine. The government statement said that India will build and maintain a credible minimum deterrent; follow a ‘No First Use’ posture; and, will use nuclear weapons only “in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere.” It was also stated that nuclear retaliation to a first strike will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage; nuclear weapons will not be used against non-nuclear weapon states; and, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons in the event of a major attack against it with biological or chemical weapons.
Criticism of the nuclear doctrine has mainly been centred on a few key issues: NFU will result in unacceptably high initial casualties and damage to Indian population, cities and infrastructure; ‘massive’ retaliation is not credible, especially against a tactical nuclear strike on Indian forces on the adversary’s own territory; and nuclear retaliation for chemical or biological attack would be illogical, especially as the attack may be by non-state actors.
Several Indian analysts have been critical of the NFU posture since its acceptance by the government. Recently, Lt Gen (Retd) BS Nagal, former C-in-C, Strategic Forces Command (SFC), has questioned the efficacy of the NFU doctrine. According to him, “It is time to review our policy of NFU… (the) choices are ambiguity or first use.” He gives six reasons for seeking a change: NFU implies acceptance of large-scale destruction in a first strike; the Indian public is not in sync with the government’s NFU policy and the nation is not psychologically prepared; it would be morally wrong - the leadership has no right to place the population ‘in peril’; NFU allows the adversary’s nuclear forces to escape punishment as retaliatory strikes will have to be counter value in nature; an elaborate and costly ballistic missiles defence (BMD) system would be required to defend against a first strike; and, escalation control is not possible once nuclear exchanges begin. (“Checks and Balances”, Force, June 2014.)
The most common scenarios normally considered appropriate for first use include first use by way of pre-emption based on intelligence warning, or during launch on warning (LoW) or launch through attack (LTA). In all of these, there are no easy answers to some obvious questions: What if intelligence regarding an imminent first strike is wrong? Can the destruction of the adversary’s cities be justified on suspicion of imminent launch? The adversary’s surviving nuclear weapons will be employed to successfully target major Indian cities. Is it worth risking Delhi, Mumbai and other cities for dubious gains?
Major military reverses during war are also offered as a justifiable reason for the first use of nuclear weapons. In none of the traditional worst-case scenarios, for example the cutting off of the Pathankot-Jammu national highway NH-1A somewhere near Samba by the Pakistan army, is the situation likely to become so critical as to justify escalation to nuclear levels by way of a first strike as sufficient reserves are available to restore an adverse situation.
The NFU posture is strategically logical and rational on several counts. It has led to major diplomatic gains, including the lifting of sanctions, civil nuclear cooperation agreements and accommodation in multilateral nuclear export control regimes. Most of these gains will be frittered away if India opts for first use. Complex command and control and sophisticated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems are necessary for a first use posture. A first use posture will deny India the opportunity to engage in conventional warfare below the nuclear threshold if it becomes necessary. First use will lower the nuclear threshold and make the use of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) more likely. And, South Asia will again be dubbed a ‘nuclear flashpoint’; this will encourage international meddling and will discourage investment.
Deterrence is ultimately a mind game. The essence of deterrence is that it must not be allowed to break down. India’s nuclear doctrine must enhance and not undermine nuclear deterrence. It emerges clearly that NFU is still an appropriate posture for India’s nuclear doctrine. However, the word ‘massive’ in the government statement should be substituted with ‘punitive’ as massive is not credible and limits retaliatory options. The threat of nuclear retaliation against chemical and biological attack should be dropped from the doctrine. The credibility of India’s nuclear doctrine needs to be substantially enhanced through appropriate signalling.

Foreign Fighters of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns and Punjabis?

D Suba Chandran

There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.
What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?
Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.
The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.
The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.
The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.
While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.
Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.
Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.
It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh - played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.
Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.
A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.
If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?
There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.

US-Russia and Global Nuclear Security: Under a Frosty Spell?

 Sheel Kant Sharma

It is twenty years since acute concern about unauthorised and malevolent access to sensitive nuclear material and radioactive substances, particularly from successor states to the former Soviet Union, roused the international community in 1994. Nuclear security has since remained at the centre of post-Cold War cooperation between the US and Russia over these past two decades - till that cooperation was given severe body blows by the chill that has set in the relations between Putin’s Russia and the West. While the immediate root of this frosty development lies in Ukraine and Crimea, President Putin’s Sochi speech last month seemed to lay down a new manifesto for a Cold War redux. The APEC summit in China and the G20 meeting in Australia earlier this month failed to dispel the frost and, on the contrary, hardened it as the Russian president was cold shouldered and treated with concerted tough talk by his Western interlocutors.

Even prior to these summits Russia had put an end to the twenty year process begun by the famous Nunn-Lugar team in the US to salvage nuclear material, technology and installations in Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Moscow used to describe them. This programme championed by the Nunn-Lugar team has been a success story that now risks being burnt up by the exacerbating diplomatic fracas with Russia. Even someone as committed to the transformation of East-West relations as Gorbachev has voiced fears about a renewed Cold War.

The Nuclear Security Summit process which has been the high point of Barack Obama’s presidency, and supported widely by 59 states, is not spared anymore by an irate Russia which has advised US and all concerned that it would only work for nuclear security within the IAEA framework. Russia announced it would not join the Sherpas’ meetings for the next NSS which is going to be hosted by US in 2016. There has been in addition a whole slew of international initiatives geared to securing nuclear materials, facilities and the enterprise in general from threats of terrorism. In all of these Russia had been an active and willing partner. Since its nuclear enterprise remains vast and as diversified as that of the US it is hard to visualise the future of all those initiatives without a well disposed Russia.

Fear of nuclear terrorism has gone up a few more notches in the past year due to the unmitigated horrors disseminated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and its propensity to stop at nothing. Among the elaborate action points deliberated and recommended by the Nuclear Security Summits so far, not all are limited to the IAEA even though its centrality has been progressively underscored. The principal requirement in grappling with threats to nuclear security is the combined unbroken pressure from moral, diplomatic, civil society and legal angles. The existing legal instruments and the Security Council edicts are still in the formative stage of enforcement. Undiminished support and cooperation of all major countries with nuclear materials and technology is the sine qua non. It remains to be seen how Russia will play ball in diverse forums.

There have been critiques of the post-Cold War world order, some of them quite harsh too, but to leverage such critiques to a particular situation of conflict and tension, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This applies to both sides of the tense situation in Ukraine just as it does to the ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear future. A relapse to a Cold War-like division of the world would benefit no one just as it did not help even during the heady years of the last Cold War. Neither the triumphalism that marked the 1990s nor a panicked reassertion of destructive power as witnessed in recent months can help in stabilising international nuclear diplomacy, be that in regard to non-proliferation or strategic arms reduction or nuclear security. The edifice created over the past two decades in regard to each of these spheres merits preserving.

Absence of negotiated agreements has also presaged a host of sub-legal or voluntary arrangements to fix the problems posed by inadequate controls on nuclear material - these voluntary arrangements ought not to be interrupted in pique or partisan parsimony as in budget cuts in the US Congress on valuable nuclear security programmes. As regards the centrality of the IAEA, that has also been a result of the growing common understanding about a range of voluntary steps that have been generally supported over the past two decades such as peer reviews, advisory services or collation of related data banks or coordination of intelligence and forensics among different organisations.

Prime Minister Modi stated in Canberra this week that we do not “have the luxury to choose who we work with and who we don’t.” This sentiment remains key to strengthening and sustaining a norms-based order to cope with new age threats like nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are two significant examples in this regard. The entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be a big step forward where cooperation of major players remains crucial. 

It is to be hoped that the tough talk possibly conceals quiet diplomacy to restore balance and stability in great power relations and pave the way forward. Until there is progress in that direction a climate of suspicion is unlikely to help global endeavour towards greater nuclear security.

Myanmar: Why the Islamic State Failed Here

 Aparupa Bhattacherjee

 

The Islamic State (IS) unilaterally declared an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This has resulted in the increase in the numbers of radicalised Muslims from all over the world travelling to the region to support the IS, and Southeast Asia is no exception.

According to reports, there are roughly 30 Malaysians, 60 Indonesians, 50 Filipinos, one Cambodian and a few Singaporeans have already joined the IS. However, there are barely any reports that cite Muslims from Myanmar having joined terrorist group. Why is that the case? Why are there low or negligible numbers of radical Islamist jihadists joining the IS from Myanmar? What are the general sentiments the Myanmarese Muslims foster towards the IS?

The Anti-Muslim Sentiment Factor
The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar to some extent thrives on the misinformed notion that most Muslims encourage terrorism. The presence of militant and secessionist groups such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and a newly formed fundamental group called the Arakan Mujahedeen (AM) have resulted in the development of such a perception. Muslims in Myanmar are aware of this notion and that radical Buddhists misuse the sentiment.

Thus, Myanmarese Muslims know and feel that any news of anyone from their community’s involvement in any kind of terrorist activity would worsen the already bad situation for them; especially given their small number (approximately four per cent) in comparison to the majority Buddhists (approximately 89 per cent).

Although there are grievances among Muslims over the use of violence against their community in various riots that have taken place since 2012, most of them feel that violence is not a good medium of response.

This became clear when the London based Myanmarese Muslim association became the first to announce their denial to support any al Qaeda dream to “raise the flag of Jihad” across South Asia, and stated that Myanmarese Muslims will never accept any assistance from a terrorist organisation.

Lack of Vanguards?

In Southeast Asian countries, most jihadist recruiters are home-grown terrorist organisations. In Myanmar, both the RSO and the ARNO are too weak to play this role.  The AM, although armed, so far claims to want to achieve political emancipation of the Rohingya Muslims via political means as opposed to resorting to violence.  The RSO, which shifted its base to Bangladesh after the 1977 Nagamin operation in Myanmar, has thrived due to support from the Islami Chhatra Shibir, a wing of Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and also from Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  Heavy crackdowns by the incumbent Awami League government in Dhaka, both on the JeI and the RSO, and the disintegration of the JI into several smaller and weaker groups are among the reasons for present state of the RSO.

Significant numbers of Myanmarese Muslims are naturalised citizens of the country; and even for those who are full citizens, restrictions are placed on travel simply because they belong to a minority religion. Thus, travelling to Iraq and Syria is only possible via Bangladesh, and that too, only illegally. This is no other viable option given Dhaka’s strict vigilance measures. Furthermore, the lack of support from recruiters too deters most radicalised Myanmarese Muslims from traveling to unknown lands to wage jihad.

Lower Levels of Ideological Indoctrination?

Both the RSO and the ARNO were formed with an aim to create a separate state for Rohingya Muslims as opposed to waging jihad. Economic and political segregation were the bases of the formation of these groups. They were introduced to the concept of ‘global jihad’ only after their link up with al Qaeda and the JI.

However, both organisations were not influential enough, and not based in Myanmar, resulted in their failure to instil their extremist ideology among the locals. Thus, unlike other terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the RSO and the ARNO did not manage to anchor the extremist ideology in their home ground.

The large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims who travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamic education in 1990s were the ones who brought the seeds of radical Islam to the region.  Myanmar was an exception in this case. Factors such as globalisation, urbanisation, and westernisation that, in the 1990s, led other Southeast Asian Muslims to travel abroad to study religion, did not influence the Myanmarese.  This was because Myanmar, during that period, was under the military Junta rule, and as a result, was cut off from the rest of the world.

Many madrassas in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Thailand also function as media for the dissemination of jihadist ideology. In Myanmar, the presence of such madrassas preaching radicalised interpretations of Islam are only restricted to the northern areas of the Arakan province; and here too, the numbers are trivial. Thus, it appears that Myanmar so far lacks the necessary apparatus key to create a conducive environment for the growth and grip of radical Islam – which also explains the limited influence, the IS’s propaganda for ‘global jihad’ has had on Myanmarese Muslims.