US to ring China with missiles in nuclear arms race

Andre Damon

Within hours of the official withdrawal by the United States on Friday from the world’s most important nuclear treaty, the Pentagon made clear that it intends to ring China with missiles amid a rapidly accelerating nuclear arms race.

A Titan II nuclear missile [credit: US Department of Defense]

Speaking to reporters during a trip to Australia, US Defense Secretary Mark Esper said the Pentagon would deploy missiles prohibited under the treaty “sooner rather than later.”

“I would prefer months,” Esper said.

The deployment of medium-range missiles in the Pacific would turn the Chinese coast and the Pacific islands surrounding it into a nuclear battlefront, putting the lives of billions of people in China, the Koreas, Japan, Taiwan and the broader region at risk.

The INF treaty, which was signed between then President Ronald Reagan and his Soviet counterpart Mikhail Gorbachev in 1987, banned the US and Russia from developing missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,000 kilometers, meaning that most of Europe and much of the Pacific were off limits to the stationing of nuclear missiles.

President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev sign the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in the East Room of the White House, Dec. 8, 1987 [credit: White House]

However, as technological trends shifted military balances and the United States escalated its conflict with China, Washington increasingly came to view the Cold War-era treaty as conflicting with its aims of militarily encircling Beijing, which was not a signatory.

With the potential deployment of US nuclear missiles just minutes in flight-time from the Chinese mainland, tensions will be on a hair trigger, with the huge population of the region living under the specter of nuclear annihilation.

Responding to the US withdrawal from the INF treaty, UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that “the world will lose an invaluable brake on nuclear war.”

Daryl Kimball, executive director of the Arms Control Association, said that Trump is “pursuing a strategy that will create the conditions for a dangerous arms race.” The Financial Times warned, along the same lines, of Trump’s “rekindling of the nuclear arms race.”

In defending his decision to station missiles in a densely populated area thousands of miles away from America, Esper accused China of “weaponizing the global commons using predatory economics.”

In other words, China, by carrying out peaceful economic activities, is threatening the United States, and that should therefore be countered with the threat of military annihilation.

“We firmly believe no one nation can or should dominate the Indo-Pacific,” said Esper, a man who represents a country that once “scorched and boiled and baked to death” (in the words of Air Force General Curtis Lemay) hundreds of thousands of Japanese civilians in its war to conquer the Pacific.

2019 Shangri-La Dialogue: The Shadow of China

Vijay Shankar

The Shangri-La Dialogue, an Asian security summit held annually in Singapore, took place between 31 May-2 June this year. And, in a grand affirmation of design, its director general declared, “It is a unique meeting where ministers debate the region’s many pressing security challenges, engage in bilaterals and come up with fresh solutions together”. Yet the central and perhaps the only theme that loomed was the strategic road taken by China over the years: from ideology and foment to growth, revision, and regional domination. China’s participation was remarkable not just for the level of its delegate, the defence minister General Wei Shenghe, but also for the resolve to hold sway in the region that he so candidly declared. Unfortunately, it was not debate that defined deliberations but the impending pay-back for a “hundred years (since the opium wars) of humiliation” and the probability of a breakdown of the status-quo without an alternative.

That China’s stunning growth had shifted the strategic centre of gravity of the world is a reality; however, what startled was China’s unabashed announcement that the world will now have to “adapt to its success” and it can no longer be subjected to the “iniquities” of the past. A clear statement of disaffection with the current order and a burial of Deng’s strategy to “hide-power-and-bide-time.”

What is emerging is that an international order on China’s terms would amount to little else but a 'monocracy' since China has taken no step to convince through actions that its objectives are directed towards a more even-handed order, and that its methods are neither authoritarian nor mercantilist. Their dealings in Sri Lanka, Kenya, Guinea, or for that matter, engagement with the World Trade Organisation (WTO) since 2001 are stark reminders of just the opposite.

 It may be recalled that in 2001, China’s trade accounted for 4 per cent of world trade. At the time, the western world was faced with high cost labour, an aging population, and low-productive democracy, which made economic sense to turn to China. Today, while those conditions remain, the situation in China has changed: labour is no longer cheap. Today, China’s share of world trade has almost tripled to 11.8 per cent. Concessions negotiated when it joined the WTO are no longer politically tenable; neither for those that bestowed this largesse nor for others in competition. A regime more consistent with present-day China’s state of development would appear the order of the day. Indeed, it may be argued that the fall-out of the petrodollar system that boosted the US Dollar as the globally accepted reserve currency creates an immediate and persistent artificial demand for it. This, quite unfairly, benefits only the US and the oil cartel, making it a distressing paradox that calls for reforms to the WTO.

In the context of military power, China’s defence expenditure is the second largest in the world; its policies carry weight, often provoke, arouse suspicion, and are invariably acted upon from a security perspective. China’s “right to build infrastructure and deploy defensive capabilities on the islands and reefs in the South China Sea,” is emphasised in the latest iteration of its Defence White Paper. So, its strategies of Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD), developing the 'Assassin’s Mace', creation of confounding Air Defence Identification Zones (ADIZs), and activities in the South China Sea (SCS) to create a 'maritime great wall' are symptomatic not just of safeguarding interests, but to dominate the region with no legitimacy. Friction is mounting in these waters and China is not inclined to resolve these disputes with the other stakeholders.

Neither international law nor the United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) seem to evoke any reverence, whether it be their 'Nine-Dash Line', military bases on the Mischief Reef (Philippines' EEZ), artificial islands along the way, or the dispute over the Paracel and Spratly Islands. Nevertheless, China insists that the situation in the SCS is stable, citing, intriguingly, the “100,000 ships” that sail through every year as evidence that there is no threat to trade while denouncing “countries outside the region that have come to the SCS to flex muscles in the name of freedom of navigation.” Such power declarations hardly lend itself to the idea of a China that can be relied and respected to support a durable regional environment. China, however, remains ostensibly oblivious to the fact that the strategic pivot of the world has long shifted to the Indo-Pacific, making stakeholders in these waters from far beyond the region..

Meanwhile, global stresses have built-up over multiple issues relating to cyber espionage, human rights, and 5G technologies. China would appear to have regressed in terms of political openness, military bullying, creation of a Sino-centric economic bloc, and a disdainful approach to international law. This strategic orientation will probably augur well for China’s aspirations but hardly so for global prospects.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is ambitious and comes with its share of controversies. It has also rapidly increased China's overall risk profile. Added to China's internal debt, excess capacity, increasing labour costs, and high ratio of investment to growth, the prospects of increased recurrence of a Hambantota are portentous. The Centre for Global Development (CGD) has concluded that Beijing, encourages dependency using opaque contracts, rapacious loan practices, and corrupt deals that mire countries in debt to undercut their sovereignty. Their infrastructural dealings with Djibouti, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, the Maldives, Mongolia, Montenegro, Pakistan, and Tajikistan are stark reminders of how predatory economic policies work. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir had in 2018 announced the shelving of two major projects, part of China’s signature BRI, to avert falling into an obsequious debt trap. As recently as 15 July, Dawn, a Pakistani newspaper, reported on China's reminder to Pakistan of the grave consequences of reneging on the earlier signed China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) contract.

Now, what could all this mean?

Tensions in the Persian Gulf: Contextualising Iran’s Bolder Resistance to US Pressure

Vijay Sakhuja


A spate of seizures of oil tankers in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere has fueled ongoing tensions between Iran, and US and the UK. The latest incident, the third in a row, involves arrest of a vessel in the Persian Gulf by Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) on the grounds that it was “smuggling fuel for some Arab countries.” In July too, the IRGC  intercepted Panamanian-flagged Riah, suspected of smuggling oil, but it was the commandeering  of a British flagged vessel, Stena Impero, to Iranian waters that forced the British Royal Navy to shadow UK flagged merchant ships. The latter incident was ostensibly in response to the seizure by the British Royal Marines of the Iranian tanker, Grace-1, off Gibraltar, in the waters of British Mediterranean territory. It was alleged that the ship was carrying Iranian crude oil to the Baniyas Refinery in Syria, which has been under EU sanctions since 2014.

There is never a dull moment in the Persian Gulf. It has always attracted geopolitical, geostrategic and geoeconomic contestation between regional and external powers as well as among regional countries over freedom of navigation, safety and security of shipping, boundary disputes, and regional military developments. In most cases Iran has been the centre piece and has on many occasions threatened to block the Straits of Hormuz (SoH), a strategic choke point.

The ongoing tensions in the Persian Gulf have been simmering for some weeks now and have added to existing volatility in the prices of oil and gas in the international market that the US-China trade war caused. The marine underwriters have raised insurance rates, some shipping companies have decided not to send their vessels into the Gulf region, and others have issued advisories to their flagged vessels in the Strait of Hormuz and Persian Gulf waters to take protective measures and not to sail close to the Iranian coast.

Meanwhile, some navies have begun escorting their national flagged vessels and others are hoping the US and its partners will underwrite safety of international shipping. The US and the UK are attempting to build a naval coalition and have approached alliance partners, allies and friends—South Korea, Japan, EU and others—to join forces to ensure uninterrupted flow of shipping in the Gulf waters. There have been mixed reactions to the proposal and few appear to be convinced.

The EU is apparently not on board; the proposal has invited ‘silence or rejection’ from many of the EU member states and Germany has been particularly blunt to announce that it would not join “sea mission presented and planned by the United States.” There is ’distrust and resentment’ against the US and visible evidence of conflicting approaches adopted by both sides towards Iran. The EU has invested enormous political and diplomatic capital to salvage the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) and the US’s decision to walk out of the deal has dented their trust in US President Donald Trump’s strategy of ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran instead of a diplomatic solution.

Unlike the EU, at least one Asian country appears to be mulling over the issue. South Korea may redeploy its warship—which is currently engaged in counter piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden—to Persian Gulf. Unlike South Korea, Japan has cautioned against an ‘accidental conflict’ but it faces at least three dilemmas. First is the broader Japanese foreign policy objectives wherein it wants to engage Iran. The second is Japan’s Prime Minister, Shinzo Abe’s, role as a mediator between the US and Iran. The third is that Japan is still unsure about the kind of role it will be required to play in the Persian Gulf tensions. It is useful to mention that the Japanese Navy is already deployed in the Indian Ocean for a number of international and national commitments concerning maritime security. It may not be inclined to take more security responsibilities given that its neighborhood is already witnessing aggressive posturing by North Korea.

India appears confident of an uninterrupted crude supply into the country and an oil ministry official said that India has “robust crude sourcing plans in place” and could obtain supplies from across the globe at competitive prices including the US. The Indian Navy responded to the SoH tensions and has deployed its warships on escort duties to ensure safe transit of Indian flagged vessels. China has advised a diplomatic route to lower tensions, and has urged the US to refrain from applying ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran. Meanwhile Iran has cautioned foreign powers to leave the Persian Gulf and has announced that Iran and the neighbouring countries can ensure safety of shipping in the region.

The US has launched Operation Sentinel to uphold ‘maritime stability, ensure safe passage, and deescalate tensions’ in the Persian Gulf and north Arabian Sea, and the Pentagon has announced deployment of additional troops in Saudi Arabia. However, the international community does not appear to be in any mood to get involved in any confrontation between the US and Iran; even if at all any of the states decides to, other than the UK, it could at best be limited to redeployment of the existing naval forces in the region.

Amending Myanmar’s Military-Drafted Constitution: The Prime Agendas and Actors

Angshuman Choudhury


On 30 July, the union parliament of Myanmar formally initiated a debate on amending the military-drafted 2008 constitution, two weeks after a Charter Amendment Committee (CAC) submitted 3765 recommendations. Formed through a parliamentary vote in February 2019, the CAC comprises 45 members, including representatives from 14 political parties that have lawmakers in the parliament, and the Tatmadaw (military).

Amending the 2008 constitution, from which the Tatmadaw derives its political authority, was one of the key promises of the ruling National League for Democracy (NLD) when it came to power in 2015. With the next general election fast approaching, the NLD now appears eager to push it through the parliament.

But, the process is complicated and has the potential to unsettle the brittle civil-military equation in Myanmar, which could in turn trigger massive political instability. That said, it is a pivotal step in the ongoing process of democratic transition that could contribute towards consolidating the nascent multi-party system in Myanmar.

Political DifferencesThere is a general consensus across the civilian political spectrum in Myanmar that the 2008 constitution needs to be amended and that the Tatmadaw’s role in political affairs, reduced. However, there are critical differences between various factions on the overall pace and scope of this process.

Despite initiating the amendment process and having the highest number of representatives in the CAC (19), the NLD proposed only 109 amendments—a mere 2.9 per cent of the total. The Shan Nationalities League for Democracy (SNLD)—one of the oldest critics of the Tatmadaw (and an NLD ally)—proposed the most number (1112; 29.5 per cent) despite having merely two representatives in the CAC. The SNLD was trailed by the Arakan National Party (ANP) and Mon National Party (MNP) who proposed 858 (22.8 per cent) and 640 (17 per cent) recommendations, respectively.

A majority of the recommendations (1196) sought to amend the executive arm of the union, followed by the legislative (859) and judiciary (632). The NLD is particularly eager to change Article 59(f) that bars individuals with foreign-born family (read Aung San Suu Kyi) from becoming the president, and Article 436, which stipulates a special majority vote (over 75 per cent) to amend important articles of the constitution.

The above data shows that the NLD is more cautious about the amendment process than some of the main ethnic parties. Its delicate relationship with the military as the federal ruling party compels it to project a calculated middle-ground position and propose just enough recommendations that allow it to demonstrate political will and test the waters but not unsettle the Tatmadaw leadership. The ethnic parties, on the other hand, are willing to push the line farther and change a bulk of the charter. As representatives of minority populations who have faced the full brunt of the military’s majoritarian and authoritarian policies, they are eager to see the generals stripped off their political power without delay. In fact, many of them want to wholly revoke the military’s 25 per cent reserved parliamentary seat share immediately. The NLD, on the other hand, seeks a progressive retrenchment—15 per cent for the 2020 election and then a reduction of 5 per cent before every subsequent election.

The emerging political divide is further sharpened by the ascendant aspirations of smaller ethnic parties to broaden their voter bases and reclaim lost ground from the NLD in their own regions. This was reflected in the recent statement passed by the ‘ethnic-based’ SNLD to reframe itself as a ‘state-based’ party.

In all, the amendment process is a double-edged sword—it could disturb old alliances and create new ones, resulting in political uncertainty and policy paralysis in the short term. But, in the medium-to-long term, it can bring nuance to the multi-party system by driving regional parties to assert their own agendas with much more specificity. Ultimately, this will only offer voters a much more diverse set of political choices and give greater political agency to marginalised demographies.

The Civil-military EquationUnsurprisingly, the military did not submit a single recommendation despite having eight representatives in the CAC and has withdrawn from the parliamentary debates. Needless to say, it does not want to relinquish political power by lending unconditional support to the process. In this, they have a decisive advantage in the form of an effective veto in the parliament—passing amendments requires over 75 per cent votes, and the military occupies 25 per cent of the seats.

But, the military too is treading a middle ground, not unlike the NLD. There is considerable popular and political support for the amendment process, including amongst the majority Bamar segments, which puts the Tatmadaw in an uncomfortable position. Consequently, the Tatmadaw has not rejected the process explicitly, but has criticised its structure. In February, it stated that the formation of the CAC was a “breach of constitutional rules,” but also noted that it is not against the amendment process. A month later, the deputy commander-in-chief said that any changes to the charter should be based on strict legal principles, and not just majority sentiments.

The Tatmadaw will do everything to stall the process in the pre-voting stage, lest the parliamentary debates become a nationwide movement. This includes encouraging its political proxy, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), to mobilise popular opposition—something that the military itself cannot do openly. The recent USDP rally in Mandalay—where the amendment process was portrayed as a threat to the “three main national causes” (“strong Union, national solidarity, and sovereignty”)—was case-in-point. The military could also use the ongoing armed conflicts in the country, especially in Rakhine State, to strengthen its position.

Despite the scant likelihood of the amendments passing the parliamentary vote due to the military’s veto, the sensitivity of the entire process, combined with the Tatmadaw’s staunch agenda of self-preservation, forebodes volatile times ahead. The threat of physical violence against pro-amendment factions, too, remains. Much would depend on the finer negotiations between the two main camps—civilian and military—and between the various political parties.

Women's Participation in Myanmar's Peace Process

Akanksha Khullar


For years, women in Myanmar have been powerful advocates for comprehensive peace and good governance, calling for reconciliation and democratic transition; demanding legislations that protect women’s rights; and leading civil society initiatives for reform. Yet, as Myanmar chugs forward with its ongoing peace process with the numerous Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) operating in the country, women’s meaningful inclusion in this mammoth exercise is yet to become substantial and comprehensive.

For instance, women-led and focused organisations have been conducting mass advocacy campaigns to secure women’s representation and involvement in the process by means of a 30 per cent reservation for women at different levels of political dialogue and peace negotiations. This demand not only arises from the need for affirmative action to facilitate women’s participation in the process, but is also in line with the country’s obligation as a signatory to the Convention to End Discrimination against Women. Nonetheless, these demands were neither included in the initial 2011 peace negotiations nor in the landmark peace accord—Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA)—signed between Naypyidaw and eight EAOs in October 2015. In fact, the text of NCA simply calls for the inclusion of a “reasonable number of women representatives in the political dialogue process.” 

The effect of this ambiguity is palpable. In January 2016, only 2 women served on the 48-member Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC)—the leadership body of the Union Peace Conference (UPC); and women comprised merely 7 per cent of the 700 participants at the UPC when it first convened. However, by the end of January 2016 UPC, pressure from civil society organizations (CSOs) to remedy this severe under-representation of women resulted in the decision to “strive to achieve 30 percent women’s participation in political dialogue.”

The subsequent years have witnessed an increase in women’s participation in the UPC, but the minimum target threshold of 30 per cent has not yet been achieved. To illustrate, women comprised 13 per cent of the 663 participants at the August 2016 UPC; 17 per cent of the 910 participants at the May 2017 UPC; and 22 per cent of the 1,112 attendees at the July 2018 UPC. The uneven growth in numbers suggests that structural barriers and other challenges still remain, and need to be addressed for a more robust involvement of women to become a reality. In fact, the 2018 UPC was marked by controversy and disagreement as the military objected to retaining the 30 per cent representation proposal, citing the failure of the previous UPCs to achieve the necessary numbers.

Currently, there are only 4 women among 78 participants within Myanmar’s NCA mechanisms; women comprise only 9 per cent of the Joint Ceasefire Monitoring Committee (JCM) members; and have no representation at the union level. This demonstrates a lack of a gender equitable approach in Myanmar’s national peace process, where women’s participation is extremely limited not only at the highest levels but also at the operational levels such as in ceasefire monitoring and substantive peace negotiations.

Need for More Women Peace-BuildersFundamentally, Myanmar’s peace process can be viewed as having two broad components: a) formal dialogues with EAOs who have signed the NCA; and b) engagement with those who have not yet signed the NCA. Although formal negotiations with the signatory EAOs are ongoing, it is the Tatmadaw’s (military) predominantly militarised approach towards the non-signatory EAOs interspersed with informal discussions and occasional ceasefires that impedes progress. Moreover, existing dialogue mechanisms have been unable to address inter-ethnic conflicts between the non-signatory EAOs. Considering that neither the JCM nor the government is in a position to take constructive action where non-signatory EAOs are involved, informal and community level peace-building processes might be better approaches to address these internal tensions.

In both situations, third party mediation by women could potentially fill the critical gaps as women in Myanmar are at the forefront of civil society advocacy. Numerous women’s CSOs that emerged from areas affected by the conflict are already helping with back-channel discussions and advising stakeholders in the peace process. As such, they are already contributing towards the agenda of nationwide peace. However, their efforts have been consistently marginalised with restricted formal participation in peace talks. With adequate recognition and increased representation, they can make the much needed impact towards reducing, preventing and eventually ending the ongoing armed conflict.

As far as inter-EAO conflicts are concerned, women from different ethnic groups can collaborate to build trust to overcome ethnic and other differences, and pursue programs through well-established CSOs and women’s networks to achieve the mutual goals of peace, reconciliation and equitability. In addition to women’s participation at the grassroots level, a greater participation of women is needed at the top-most decision-making levels for two fundamental reasons:

Firstly, given how the overall agenda of peace negotiations is derived from the high-level bodies, increased and equitable representation of women in these bodies is essential for ensuring that the differential impact of conflict and peace agreements on women, and respect for women’s rights feature comprehensively in Myanmar’s overall peace settlement frameworks and mechanisms.

Secondly, gender equality and equity are among the essential factors that determine the quality and sustainability of peace agreements. Women’s inclusion at higher decision-making levels could serve as an example and even facilitate trickling down of gender equitable practices in the overall structures, agendas and different rungs of the peace bureaucracy. Comprehensive participation of women will also contribute towards the greater legitimacy and inclusivity of the peace process.

Looking AheadIn the past, to overcome their limited representation during peace talks, women in Myanmar explored alternative ways to participate, such as by means of informal peace-building activities like tea-break advocacy, where female peace campaigners lobbied male delegates while serving them tea during breaks. Such efforts, however, must now be translated into meaningful representation of women in the formal peace-building mechanisms. Strengthening women’s participation at both macro and micro levels is necessary for Myanmar’s peace process to result in effective, sustainable and equitable peace.

Amelia Earhart Fellowship 2020 for Women in Aerospace/Mechanical Engineering

Application deadline: 15th November 2019

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Women from Any Country

To be taken at (country): Any University or College offering Accredited Degrees in any country.

Subject Areas: PhD/Doctoral degrees in Aerospace-related Sciences and Aerospace-related Engineering

About the Award: Zonta International established the Amelia Earhart Fellowship in 1938 in honor of legendary pilot and Zontian, Amelia Earhart. Today, the Fellowship of US$10,000 is awarded annually to 35 talented women, pursuing Ph.D./doctoral degrees in aerospace-related sciences or aerospace-related engineering around the globe.

Offered Since: 1938

Type: PhD/Doctoral

Eligibility:

• Women of any nationality pursuing a Ph.D./doctoral degree who demonstrate a superior academic record in the field of aerospace-applied sciences or aerospace-applied engineering are eligible.
• Students must be registered in a full-time Ph.D./doctoral program and completed at least one year of that program or have received a master’s degree in an aerospace-applied field at the time the application is submitted.
• Applicants must not graduate from their Ph.D. or doctoral program before April 2021.
• Please note that post-doctoral research programs are not eligible for the Fellowship.
• Members and employees of Zonta International or the Zonta International Foundation are also not eligible to apply for the Fellowship.
• Note that previous Amelia Earhart Fellows are not eligible to apply to renew the Fellowship for a second year.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Benefits of Fellowship:

• Fellowship of US$10,000 is awarded annually
  
• The Fellowship enables these women to invest in state-of-the-art computers to conduct their research, purchase expensive books and resource materials, and participate in specialized studies around the globe.
• Amelia Earhart Fellows have gone on to become astronauts, aerospace engineers, astronomers, professors, geologists, business owners, heads of companies, even Secretary of the US Air Force.

Duration of Fellowship: One year (current fellows can reapply to renew the fellowship each year)

How to Apply: The Zonta International Amelia Earhart Fellowship Committee reviews the applications and recommends recipients to the Zonta International Board of Directors. All applicants will be notified of their status by the end of April.

Apply Now

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Sponsors: Amelia Earhart Fellowships are made possible by generous contributions to the Zonta International Foundation Amelia Earhart Fellowship Fund.

Important Note: Please note that post-doctoral research programs are not eligible for the Fellowship. Members and employees of Zonta International or the Zonta International Foundation are also not eligible to apply for the Fellowship.

World Bank Group Africa Fellowship Programme 2020 for sub-Saharan African Graduates

Application Deadline: 25th August, 2019

Eligible Countries: Sub-Saharan African countries

To be taken at (country): World Bank offices in Washington, D.C. or in a Sub-Saharan country

About the Award: Launched in 2013, the World Bank Group (WBG) Africa Fellowship Program targets young talented African nationals who are completing or recently completed a Ph.D. in an area relevant to the World Bank’s work. The fellowship program has been very successful since its inception, building a strong pipeline of young African talent interested in a career in development, in international institutions, African governments, think tanks, and academia.
The program offers chosen fellows a six-month assignment at World Bank Group (WBG) offices in Washington D.C. or in country offices to gain hands-on experience in the operations of the WBG. This includes knowledge generation and dissemination, design of global and country policies, and the building of institutions to achieve inclusive growth in developing countries. While benefiting from research and innovation in multiple sectors, fellows will also work on research, economic policy, technical assistance, and lending operations that contribute to the World Bank’s goal of eliminating poverty and increasing shared prosperity. Through the fellowship, we aim to build the capacity of the next generation of African change makers in development, policy-making and promote the goals of reducing poverty in the region.
The 2020 WBG Africa Fellowship Program expects to host up to 15 fellows. This year, with the support of the Think Africa Partnership, a private sector window provides support for 10 additional fellowship positions with a special focus on private sector development and finance. The additional 10 fellows will work on improving the macroeconomic, business and financial frameworks to enhance private sector investment, strengthen economic policy making and ultimately promote economic growth across the region.

Type: PhD, Fellowship

Eligibility: A candidate of the World Bank Africa Fellowship must:

• Be a Sub-Saharan national who are recent Ph.D. graduates, or current doctoral students within a year of completing or graduating from a Ph.D. program in all relevant field of development, including, but not limited to economics, education, health, governance, energy, agriculture, infrastructure and demography.
• Have an excellent command of English, both written and verbal
• Be under the age of 32 by the closing of the application period. Preference may be given to those born on or after Oct 1, 1988.

Selection Criteria: The following additional attributes are highly desirable:

• a command of an additional World Bank official language
• national from fragile and conflict-affected countries
• candidates from refugee and internally displaced communities and/or with proven experience on forced displacement

After submitting an application online, the most promising candidates for the World Bank Africa Fellowship will be identified, and their application packages forwarded to World Bank Africa Region managers and participating departments for consideration. Departments and managers will then indicate their preferences, as well as the project to be undertaken.
Selected candidates will then be notified and, upon acceptance, will be hired as short-term consultants for a minimum of six months.

Number of Awardees: 25

Value of Fellowship: Fellows will receive consultant fees, round-trip economy class air travel to Washington, D.C. or a WBG country office from their university, and worker’s compensation insurance.

Duration of Fellowship: Fellows will spend a minimum of six months. The fellowship period of engagement is January-June 2020.

How to Apply: Apply for the Africa Fellowship Program now


Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Vital Voices GROW Fellowship Accelerator Program 2020 for Female-Owned Businesses

Application Deadline: 31st August 2019

Eligible Countries: Countries in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa

About the Award: The VV GROW Fellowship is a highly competitive one-year accelerator program for women owners of small and medium businesses in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa. The program includes customized business skills training, technical assistance, leadership development, and access to networks to grow their businesses and increase their leadership impact.
Through global and regional online and in-person interventions, fellows focus on strategy and long-term business value paired with action-oriented plans. They amplify their role as leaders in their businesses and their communities to create jobs, stimulate long-term economic growth and produce wider social benefits.
The one-year program includes:

1. Global Virtual Learning: Over 4 months, fellows complete a series of weekly webinars, assignments, online courses, assessments, and one-on-one calls with peers, Vital Voices staff, and trainers. Fellows begin to build their knowledge about marketing, networking, business planning, financial management and leadership, the core topics of the program. Fellows assess the current state of their business and leadership in order to determine where they are; analyze their business to identify opportunities for growth; and define specific business growth goals to identify where they want to go.
2. Regional In-Person Training: Each year, fellows from each region gather in one country in their region to participate in a four-day, in-person training workshop that will guide them in creating an action plan outlining how they will accomplish their business growth goals. Fellows also get the opportunity to meet, network with, and learn from other fellows from their region, Vital Voices staff and trainers.
3. Growth Services and Support: Following the in-person training, fellows carry out their action plans, revise them, and evaluate their progress towards their growth goals. Throughout the last 6 months of the fellowship, Vital Voices staff connects fellows to individualized growth services and support based on the goals and action items in their action plan

Type: Fellowship/Entrepreneurship

Eligibility: Women business owners in Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa, who:

• Own a business that has been in operation for at least 3 years,
• Employ at least 3 full time staff, and
• Generate at least USD $40,000 in annual sales
• Reside in the same country as your business for at least 7 months out of the year
• Are proficient in spoken and written English

Selection Criteria: As an interested applicant, you:

• Are motivated to build the skills and make the changes needed to grow your business
• Have the authority to make critical decisions within your business
• Have demonstrated leadership within your community
• Are enthusiastic about participating in a one-year business accelerator program
• Are willing to have Vital Voices track your business growth for 1 year during the Fellowship, and up to 5 years afterwards and are committed to participate in data collection methods including online surveys and phone calls

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: A limited number of need and merit based scholarships will be available. Details will be provided in the notifications of acceptance into the program.
The VV GROW Fellowship is a highly competitive program that provides customized business skills training and support valued at over US $25,000 per participant. Through the Fellowship, participants receive:

• Strengthened knowledge, skills, and confidence in 5 core areas: business planning, leadership, financial management, networking, and marketing
• Access to highly qualified staff and business consultants
• Interactive webinars led by expert trainers from across the globe
• A 4-day in-person, regional training workshop
• Joining a network of women business leaders from across the globe
• Referral(s) to business support services tailored to your needs
• A certificate of program completion
• Entry into the Vital Voices Global Leadership Network upon graduation

Duration of Program: 1 year

How to Apply: Apply here

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

NED Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellowship 2020 for Developing Countries

Application Deadline: 1st October, 2019.

Offered annually? Yes

To be taken at (country): Washington, D.C., USA

Eligible Fields of Study: Topics focusing on the political, social, economic, legal, or cultural aspects of democratic development

About the Award: The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program offers five-month fellowships to practitioners to focus on strategies and best practices for developing democracy in their country of interest; and to scholars to conduct original research for publication. Projects may address the economic, political, social, legal, or cultural aspects of democratic development and include a range of methodologies and approaches.
The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a private, nonprofit foundation dedicated to the growth and strengthening of democratic institutions around the world. Established in 1983 with funding from the U.S. Congress, the Endowment makes hundreds of grants each year to support pro-democracy groups in Africa, Asia, Eurasia, Latin America, and the Middle East.
Two different Tracks exist for participants: Practitioner Track and Scholarly Track

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: Proficiency in the English language. Eligibility differs according to the Track an interested candidate may belong:

1. Practitioner Track:
The Reagan-Fascell program was established with the primary purpose of supporting democracy activists, human rights advocates, journalists, and others who work on the frontlines of building democracy in emerging and aspiring democracies. The program provides practitioners with a needed break from their daily routine so that they may reflect on their work, exchange ideas and experiences with counterparts in the United States, and reevaluate techniques for building democracy in their country of origin.
Practitioner fellowships are typically five months in duration and culminate in a report, short article, op-ed, handbook, or another product, as well as a formal presentation of the fellow’s analysis and ideas.

Eligibility
Applicants interested in the practitioner track are expected to have substantial practical experience working to promote democracy or human rights in their country of origin or interest. There are no specific degree requirements for the practitioner track. A Ph.D., for instance, is not required of practitioner applicants. While there are also no age limits, applicants on the practitioner track are typically mid-career professionals with several years of professional experience in the field of democracy and human rights.
Examples of eligible candidates for the practitioner track include human rights advocates, lawyers, journalists, labor leaders, political party activists, diplomats, professional staff of civic or humanitarian organizations, and other civil society professionals from developing and aspiring democracies.


2. Scholarly Track
In recognition of the importance of intellectual contributions to the theory and practice of democracy, the Reagan-Fascell program offers a scholarly track for scholars, professors, and established writers. Applicants for this track may be scholars from emerging and aspiring democracies or accomplished scholars from the United States and other established democracies.
Fellowships on the scholarly track are typically five months in duration. Scholars make at least one public presentation of their work and complete a substantial piece of writing (typically an article or book) for publication.

Eligibility
Applicants interested in the scholarly track are expected to possess a doctorate (a Ph.D., or academic equivalent) at the time of application, to have a proven record of publications in their field, and to have developed a detailed research outline for their fellowship project.
Examples of eligible candidates for the scholarly track include college and university professors, researchers, journalists, and other writers from developing and aspiring democracies. Distinguished scholars from the United States or other established democracies are also eligible to apply. Occasionally, a professional who is planning to write a book or other scholarly publication may qualify to apply on the scholarly track.

Eligibility Requirement for all Applicants

• Citizens of any country may apply
• Proficiency in the English language
• Topics focusing on the political, social, economic, legal, or cultural aspects of democratic development
• Availability to be in residence at the International Forum for Democratic Studies in Washington, D.C., during the year for which candidates are applying for a fellowship

English Language Requirement: Under new visa regulations, exchange program sponsors are required to ascertain prospective J-1 exchange visitors’ proficiency in the English language prior to their arrival in the United States. In compliance with these regulations, fellowship finalists seeking J-1 visa sponsorship will be invited to participate in brief video interviews via Skype with Reagan-Fascell staff.
All application materials must be submitted in English. While fellows’ primary product may be in their native language, they should have a solid command of written and spoken English for general communication purposes.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Fellowship: Fully-funded

• Research
• Capacity Building
• Impact
• Exchange

Duration of Fellowship: Five (5) months.  

How to Apply: There are five steps to the online application process:
Step 1: Applicant Information
Step 2: Project Proposal for the Practitioner Track or for the Scholarly Track
Step 3: Letters of Recommendation
Step 4: Resume/CV and Biography
Step 5: Certification

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Award Provider: The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) Foundation

Important Notes: The Reagan-Fascell Democracy Fellows Program does not award scholarship funds, loans, or any other type of financial aid to university students, graduate students, or postdoctoral researchers. In addition, our fellowship program is not an educational or training program leading toward an academic degree.

A “No Deal” Brexit Would Spark an Economic Cold War with the EU

Patrick Cockburn 

Bluff was a central feature of British power even when the British empire covered a large part of the globe. A story illustrating this tells of a royal navy captain who was sent with a small ship to the far east to force a defiant local ruler to obey some orders issued by the British authorities.

“What do I do if he refuses to do what I tell him?” the captain asked his superiors before departing. “We don’t have any more ships available, so you’ll just have to turn around and come home again,” was the less than comforting reply.

The captain sailed on his mission and transmitted the British demands to the recalcitrant ruler. “What will happen if I refuse to obey?” he asked. “In that case,” replied the captain menacingly, “I will have no alternative but to carry out the second half of my instructions.”

On that occasion, the British got their way, but it is only great powers that can afford to bluff like this and get away with it. Their bluff is not called because nobody wants to find out the hard way if they mean it. A mistake of Theresa May was to make the vague threat of a no-deal Brexit so central to her strategy and expect this to be taken seriously by Brussels. Most there thought she was bluffing because they believed that Britain would not do anything so economically self-destructive and politically divisive. Boris Johnson is now refurbish the no-deal threat to give it credibility, but this does not change the balance of forces which are, as always, skewed against Britain and in favour of the EU, something the Eurosceptics never seem to understand.

Analysis of a no-deal Brexit frequently lacks realism because the focus is on economics rather than politics. This contradicts the experience of the last three years when the prospect of Britain’s departure from the EU has generated great political destruction, but only limited economic damage for the obvious reason that Britain has yet to leave the EU. A British no-deal departure from the EU would, on the contrary, be opposed by so much of the population that it would produce a political earthquake, widening still further the fault lines within British society that are already gaping wide.

The hard-right cabinet appointed by Johnson implicitly recognises that the divisions within the Conservative are so rancorous as to be a recipe for paralysis if all factions are represented in government. But temporary cohesion achieved by giving almost all ministries to a single faction of the Conservative Party, which itself is a minority in parliament, may well prove more explosive. The fact that the most important decision taken in Britain for eighty years is being taken by such an unrepresentative group delegitimises it from the beginning.

A no-deal Brexit would only be the opening shots of an economic cold war waged against the rest of Europe in a conflict that might go on for years. This is unsurprising because a new feature of conflicts between nation states globally is that economic hostilities are replacing military hostilities, though the degree of confrontation varies vastly from country to country. The conflict between the US and Iran in which President Trump is trying to batter the Iranians into submission by an ever-tightening economic siege is the closest to a shooting war.

US and EU sanctions on Syria are similarly an attempt at economic strangulation. Their purpose according to US special envoy James Jeffery is to “make life as miserable as possible for that flopping cadaver of a regime and let the Russians and Iranians, who made this mess, get out of it”. In practice, it is ordinary Syrians who are expiring because of collapsing living standards and lack of medical attention while the Syrian leadership suffers scarcely at all.

Sanctions and tariffs are central to Trump’s effort to make America great again and it is not an unintelligent strategy. It puts intense pressure on China as America’s great rival, but also on Canada and Mexico. America’s vaunted military superiority failed to win wars in Iraq and Afghanistan leading Trump to avoid similar debacles. In two and a half years he has not started a single military conflict, but he has started a series of trade wars. He understands that the US Treasury has a more impressive record in waging economic warfare than the Pentagon does in fighting hot wars. Sanctions and tariffs, unlike shooting wars, can be switched on and off and are less politically tricky because there are no dead American bodies coming home.

This approach matters to the UK because outside the EU it will inevitably be even more dependent on the US. A sign of this was the highly provocative and dubiously legal seizure by royal marine commandos of the Iranian oil tanker Grace 1 off Gibraltar on 4 July. This predictably led to the Iranian tit-for-tat capture of the British-flagged Stena Impero in the Strait of Hormuz on 19 July. In one of his last statements as foreign secretary, Jeremy Hunt said that Britain was not joining the US policy of “maximum pressure” on Iran, though it seemed to have just done that, and was looking to European states, notably France and Germany, to set up a shipping protection force in the Gulf.

Many are pointing out the irony of the UK looking for EU states to provide naval escorts in the Gulf at the very moment that Johnson is asserting his intention to take Britain “do-or-die” out of the EU on 31 October. A UK decision to openly join – as it already seems to have done covertly – the US-led alliance against Iran would be an early pointer to the emergence of an Anglo-Saxon Trump/Johnson coalition in the Middle East.

Even more important would be the unavoidable reliance of Britain on the US in the event of a no-deal Brexit or a British departure from the EU so ragged and contentious that it would start a long-lasting economic cold war between the two. In such a confrontation, Johnson would look to Trump and Washington not just for a trade deal but for all-embracing political support against the EU.

Brexit in Britain has long ceased to be solely about leaving the EU and has become a vehicle for hard-right wing policies seeking to remodel Britain along lines closer to Trump’s America than the EU. In the event of rivalry with the EU, the UK would look to deregulation and lower taxes for business to attract companies away from the EU states.

Turning Britain into a “Singapore on Thames” sounded zany and impractical when first raised as an option after the referendum, but it is more feasible today – and attractive to much of the present cabinet – in the context of a permanent hostile relationship between Britain and the EU.

From Trump’s point of view, standing with Britain in such an economic cold war would be a way of weaponising the post-Brexit situation to destroy or damage the EU, the world’s largest trading bloc, to which he has always been opposed.