MYANMAR'S POLITICAL TRANSITION:CHALLENGES OF THE 2015 ELECTION

Shankari Sundararaman


Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-à-vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROELECTRICITY DEAL: MAKING IT COUNT

Pramod Jaiswal


With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.

DRUG SMUGGLING ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN: IMPACT OF INCREASING INTERCEPTION

Vijay Sakhuja


Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.

AL QAEDA IN SOUTH ASIA: ZAWAHIRI WILL FAIL IN INDIA

San


Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen 
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

Ellen Bork


At this writing, it seems that the hundreds of trucks sent by Moscow with supplies for the residents of Eastern Ukraine will be delivered without further incident. For over a week, the long convoy wended its way toward the Ukrainian border, carrying with it the prospect for a spike in tensions between Moscow and Kiev. Concerns over the trucks’ contents—were they humanitarian supplies, or was the convoy a Trojan Horse, filled with weapons and munitions?—have been resolved. Even so, the drama over the convoy is unlikely
to be the last in Moscow’s months-long campaign to sow instability in Ukraine. After all, the Russian president’s main objective is to prevent the consolidation of a modern, democratic state in Ukraine, with economic prospects and political freedoms exceeding those he allows his own people. For him, hiving off Crimea in March to redeem a revanchist Russian claim wasn’t enough. By destabilizing Ukraine, Putin hopes to prevent its newly elected government from providing an attractive model for Russia’s citizens. It wasn’t so long ago that Putin faced a similar challenge from within his own country. Just a few years back, stunning demonstrations in Moscow and other cities prompted predictions that Putin would soon leave power. Despite government control of television and the electoral administration, and obvious signs of fraud, Putin’s ruling United Russia party failed to clear the 50
percent mark in the December 2011 Duma elections that ignited the protests. Exit polls and independent monitors suggest that the real result might have been considerably lower.
Putin, however, was determined to stay in power. In March 2012 he reclaimed the presidency in elections also tainted by fraud, and set about using vindictive
prosecutions and repressive laws to destroy the political opposition and civil society.
This has continued, even while the Kremlin sponsors subversion in Ukraine. In April, with the world’s attention focused on Ukraine, the Duma paved the way for the
abolition of direct elections for mayors and legislative councils in dozens of cities. Prohibitive requirements for ballot access have effectively sidelined a leading,
registered opposition party, the Republican Party of Russia–People’s Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS, by its Russian acronym). Among other things, the party’s legal status enabled Alexei Navalny, an anticorruption
campaigner who shot to prominence during the protest movement, to make a strong showing in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. For the upcoming Moscow Duma (city council) election this September, the
authorities have used signature requirements to disqualify a number of popular independent candidates.
In July, several respected organizations dedicated to human rights and rule of law were formally labeled “foreign agents,” making it difficult if not impossible for
them to continue their work. Even so, Putin has reason to worry. Aside from revealing
significant dissatisfaction with him and his clique, the protests unleashed sentiments common to democracy movements everywhere, regardless of culture or history. Protesters described themselves as motivated by a hunger for “decency,” “honesty,” and “conscience.”
Tracking Navalny’s campaign for mayor, the British writer Peter Pomerantsev observed that campaign workers cared “less about the man himself and more about a desire for personal dignity and clear rules of the game. ‘I don’t want to live in lies’ was a common phrase, as was ‘There must be an alternative to this system.’ ”
Such values are inimical to the exclusive Russian culture, hostile to individual rights and universal values, that Putin promotes to stoke tensions with the West and
distract attention from his misrule. It also puts him at odds with the liberal opposition, says Max Trudolyubov, opinion editor at the business daily Vedomosti , who
dismisses Putin’s cultural determinism as “wrong science.” “Rules and institutions change culture,” he says, not the other way around.
In recent years, Putin hasn’t had to worry that the West feels the same way. Writing about the West’s policies of “reset” and “partnership” with the Kremlin in the
American Interest in 2012, Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian political scientist, asked why the West no longer emphasizes liberal principles in its approach to Russia.
Perhaps, she ventured, it is because of the
disappearance of the Soviet Union as an ideological competitor, a backlash against the Bush era, or even the lure of “sweet deals.” “I can tell you how it looks from
the outside,” Shevtsova wrote. “It looks, first and foremost, like doubt that liberal democracy could appeal to the nondemocratic world, and secondly, like a
condescending attitude toward nations supposedly unable to accept liberal democratic principles.”
Leaders of Russia’s democratic opposition see the connection between Putin’s aggression abroad and his domestic agenda. They reject as “flimsy” the pretext—
protecting ethnic Russians—on which the Ukraine aggression is based. “The main reason” for the aggression in Ukraine, said Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov, co-chairmen of PARNAS at the outset of
Putin’s assault on Ukraine, “is the reluctance of the Russian authorities to recognize the Ukrainian people’s
sovereign right to its own fate. .  .  . Putin is trying to stifle freedom not only in Russia, but also in a neighboring country.”
Western governments have yet to appreciate this. Announcing new U.S. sanctions against Russia’s banking, energy, and arms industries on July 29, President Obama cast the measures as addressing only the “very specific issue of Ukraine.”
The West should seek more than just an “off-ramp” for Putin in Ukraine. Russia is already committed to free elections and human rights through its membership in
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Restoring these principles to
a central role would begin to address the link between Putin’s domestic agenda and his foreign adventurism, now on display in Ukraine, later perhaps elsewhere.
Neglecting them will allow Putin to exempt Russia from universal values and make the work of Russia’s democrats much harder. Until the West takes these principles—and the Russians who want to live under them—seriously, it will treat only the symptoms rather than the cause of Putin’s aggression.

JAMES FOLEY (1973-2014)

David Devoss


In the end, Jim Foley died just as he wanted to live, pursuing a story that mattered on the front line of hard news journalism. In Afghanistan, Libya, and finally Syria he recorded the horror, chaos, and occasional
compassion that define the war on terror. But it was his gruesome killing on the barren sands of a foreign land that truly conveys the evil that envelops the Islamic
Caliphate’s hooded assassins.
I got to know Jim Foley in 2009 when both of us worked on USAID-funded development projects in Baghdad. A former Teach for America instructor, Foley helped organize conferences and training seminars for a program designed to rebuild Iraq’s civil service, crippled by decades of isolation and autocratic administration.
We lived in a Red Zone compound guarded by African mercenaries and surrounded by concrete T-walls topped with razor wire. It was possible to see the surrounding Mansour neighborhood by climbing to the roof of a bombed-out building once used by Saddam’s intelligence service. But for the most part Jim Foley’s Iraq was an aural experience punctuated by nightly small arms fire, daily calls to prayer, and nearby car bombs that would blow out office windows and leave his apartment carpeted with glass.
Foley’s job took him “outside the wire,” but his glimpses of Baghdad came through the thick windows of an armored car that would drive as fast as possible directly to a government ministry. Put in place in early
2004 after al Qaeda beheaded several Westerners involved in the rebuilding effort, the tight security prevented further kidnappings. But the restrictions also
made it difficult for private contractors hired to implement development programs to really get to know Iraq.
Foley chafed under these restrictions. He wanted to understand the passions driving the conflict and meet the people whose lives had been upended by war. So in 2010 he left Iraq and moved to Afghanistan to become a freelance journalist.
Foley had been in Afghanistan for about six months when I called him on Skype. The company I worked for had an opening in Kabul for a communications director.
Would he be interested in the job? “I know it will pay more than you’re earning as a freelance journalist,” I hinted. “Try it for six months.” Foley laughingly said no thanks. “I’m finally doing what I want,” he said. “Yeah, the money’s not great, but I think I’m making a difference. Somebody needs to
report what’s going on here.”
In 2011, Foley moved to Libya, where he was captured and held along with two other journalists for 44 days. Following his release he briefly returned to the United
States and visited Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism. There he tried to explain to students the attraction of war zones. “The honest fact
is that when you see something really violent, it does a strange thing to you,” he confided. “It doesn’t always repel you; it draws you closer. Feeling like you’ve
survived something—it’s a strange sort of force that you are drawn back to. I think that’s the absolute reality.”

DERANGEMENT IN MOSCOW

Cathy Young


"Maybe it’s all a matrix and we’re all like programs written by somebody else. .  .  . And none of us really exists, just the matrix. The program works, you live your life and think everything’s fine. Here you are drinking coffee right now. But there is no coffee—it doesn’t exist.” So mused Fyodor Berezin, the middle-aged sci-fi writer turned “deputy defense minister” of the Donetsk People’s Republic—the self-proclaimed state of the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern Ukraine—in an
August interview with a reporter for the still-surviving independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta . “The matrix,” the concept from the 1999 cult film of the
same name in which reality turns out to be an illusion generated by human-enslaving computers, was a recurring theme in Berezin’s conversation with Novaya Gazeta’s Pavel Kanygin. Berezin even deflected queries on the whereabouts of suddenly elusive rebel commander Igor Strelkov-Girkin with the deadpan suggestion that Strelkov-Girkin might not actually exist —though he grew testy when Kanygin countered by asking whether the Donetsk Republic might not exist, either.
This bizarre exchange encapsulates the surreal quality of the war in eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s undeclared involvement is the world’s biggest open
secret. Russian soldiers are already getting killed in what official reports describe as accidents during military training. But the local separatist insurgents have been led mostly by Russian citizens—notably a
battle-reenactment hobbyist (Strelkov-Girkin) and a political spin doctor (former Donetsk Republic prime minister Alexander Borodai). The theater of the absurd has even spread to Russia itself, where “the matrix” is a rather apt metaphor for the virtual reality propounded by the official media and uncritically absorbed by much
of the population.

The Russian media landscape in the last six months has been dominated by nearly wall-to-wall coverage of Ukraine—or, rather, lurid propaganda masquerading as

coverage. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru , Moscow journalist Anton Orekh noted with amazement that a major subway accident in Moscow in mid-July—a train derailment that killed 24 people and injured dozens more—did not rate a single mention in the weekly news wrap-up on Rossiya, the country’s

leading news television channel, just days later: Once again, it was all Ukraine.

The grotesque pseudo-journalism that has become the norm in the official Russian media was starkly illustrated by the sensational story of the crucified boy.

On July 12, a week after the previously rebel-controlled city of Slavyansk was taken by Ukrainian troops, Russia’s TV-1 aired an interview with a refugee named Galina Pyshnyak, who told a bloodcurdling tale about the execution of an insurgent’s child before a crowd of Luhansk residents in the city’s main square. “They took a little boy, 3 years old .  .  . and nailed him to a billboard like Jesus,” Pyshnyak told the reporter; the

child’s mother, she said, was forced to watch and listen to his screams until she fainted, then was herself tied to a tank and dragged unconscious around the square. The story was widely ridiculed by Russian bloggers and debunked by Novaya Gazeta reporter Evgeny Feldman, who interviewed Slavyansk locals and found that no one

had heard of this horrific deed. Pyshnyak was later identified as the wife of an ex-member of Berkut, the special security squad of the deposed pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych. TV-1 never

retracted the story. Even token dissenters are now gone from Russian TV, where the spectrum of opinion ranges from patriotic

fervor to patriotic derangement. The latter is reliably represented by member of parliament Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, in a recent appearance on the popular TV-1 talk show Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, capped a rant about the world’s eternal war on Russia with the declaration that “Hitler only killed Russians.”

On another Sunday Evening , Solovyov himself not only lobbed the standard charge of “genocide” at the Ukrainian government but claimed that Ukrain-ian

president Petro Poroshenko had “frankly declared that he is under the direct control of the USA.” One of the guests, political analyst Semyon Bagdasarov, stressed that helping the separatists in Ukraine was a

life-and-death priority for Russia: “After all, [Kiev’s] goal is very specific—it’s not just to crush Donbass [the Donetsk region], it’s to destroy the Russian Federation by bringing down its government and dragging us into

civil war. That’s what’s at stake!” The other panelists nodded approval, while the studio audience burst into applause.

The derangement extends beyond current events. EJ.ru ’s media watch columnist Igor Yakovenko notes that TV commentary on the World War I anniversary was so heavy on rhetoric blaming the war on American

machinations that the uninformed viewer could easily assume that the United States was Russia’s main adversary in that conflict. TV-1 also aired a “documentary” exploring the “alternative” theory that

Archduke Ferdinand was actually killed by a British sniper acting at the behest of an international conspiracy of Freemasons bent on world domination, which later also engineered the Russian Revolution to

prevent Russia from emerging as one of the war’s victors.

In this toxic climate, the free media live on as small and embattled enclaves. Chief among these is the radio station Ekho Moskvy, which remains an outlet for

dissenting viewpoints and censored news despite being owned by Gazprom Media, an arm of the state- controlled natural gas giant. In case Ekho’s editors were not aware of their precarious position, they got a recent reminder from Gazprom Media chairman Mikhail Lesin.

In an interview with the Russian edition of Forbes , Lesin complained about the “rude” and “snarky” tone of Ekho’s liberal commentators but allowed that, at least

for now, he did not regard the station as a “problem asset.” If that changed, he concluded, “it would be overhauled tomorrow, and there would be a music

station called Ekho Moskvy. They’d sing, and that’s it— what’s the problem?”

Open calls to shut down the Russia-haters are now part of the mainstream. In early August, Izvestia columnist Sergey Roganov wrote that Russia was getting fed up

with “all the empty chatter in the social networks and the mass media” and generously offered to sacrifice his

own freedom of speech for a strong hand that would put an end to this “Russophobic babble.” The very next day, the paper ran a guest column by writer Vladimir Lowenthal, who opined that Russia’s “Maidan-type” dissenters were clearly impervious to reason and should

therefore be treated like sick people or members of dangerous cults—that is, stopped from preaching or spreading the virus to others.

So far, the Kremlin hasn’t acted on these threats; but while Ekho and other islands of dissent are allowed to exist, they are regularly and openly assailed as traitors.

In late June, a news program on the NTV channel aired an interview with a masked, armed insurgent in Donetsk who said that the insurgency was setting up a “chapter”

in Moscow in order to fight the “fifth column,” particularly Ekho Moskvy, which was spreading “lies” about eastern Ukraine. In comments liberally peppered with bleeps and accompanied by menacing gestures, the insurgent told Ekho’s staffers that their days were numbered and that they would soon be looking death in the face. More recently, NTV aired a program titled 13

Friends of the Junta, in which prominent Kremlin critics including novelist Dmitry Bykov, satirist Victor Shenderovich, and singer Andrei Makarevich were depicted as Judases ready to sell their souls for

Ukrainian or American money.

From such rhetoric, it is a short step to physical intimidation. In late August, an Ekho Moskvy reporter was assaulted while covering a pro-Ukraine rally in St.

Petersburg; a few days later, journalists from Novaya Gazeta and the struggling independent news channel TV Rain were attacked and threatened while covering the

funeral of two Russian soldiers apparently killed in Ukraine.

Today, polls by the independent Levada Center find that 70 percent of the Russian population gets all of its news from television and trusts the official media. Vladimir Putin’s approval rating, meanwhile, stands at 84 percent. Will this change if Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions start causing real pain to the population—and if more Russian draftees start dying in mysterious accidents? Or will the “zombie box,” as

Russian dissenters call state television, persuade them to blame the perfidious West and the domestic “fifth column”?

While many dissenters cautiously hope that Putin’s support is not as widespread or as deep as the polls suggest, one would be hardpressed to find optimists among them. In a verse commentary in Novaya Gazeta

inspired by Berezin’s interview, Bykov wondered with bitter sarcasm if the post-Communist “Russian spring” had ever been real. For Russians who greeted the fall of

the Soviet Union almost a quarter-century ago, the free country they welcomed is now gone, replaced by a bizarre would-be hybrid of a smaller Soviet Union and the czarist Russian empire. Virtual reality, indeed.

THE NEED FOR INDIA-AUSTRALIA MARITIME COOPERATION

Teshu Singh


Though India and Australia have a long history of interactions and cooperation at various international fora, the potential for cooperation in the Indian Ocean is yet to materialise. What can New Delhi and Canberra do to actualise the potential of the bilateral vis-à-vis matters pertaining to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?
Indian Ocean: The Australian Push
Australia has been an active player in the IOR in the past two years. Australia hosted two extremely important meetings, the Indian Ocean Region- Association (IORA) Summit in November 2013 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), titled
‘Protecting the ability to trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy’, in March 2014.
The 2009 Australian defence white paper assessed that the Indian Ocean will assume strategic significance in the forthcoming years, and would be as important as the Pacific. Furthermore, their most recent defence white paper, released in 2013, stated that “the cooperation with Indian as crucial.” This was followed by the release
of a strategy document on India thereby indicating the orientation of the Australian maritime policy. Notably, these developments have come at a time when the concept of the Indo-Pacific is gaining traction in the strategic circle. Primarily, the Indo-Pacific concept unites the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean
and is premised on the idea of stronger security cooperation among regional powers.
Australia and the Indian Ocean: Indian Responses So Far
Australia forms the part of India’s extended
neighbourhood, and has become important for the success of New Delhi’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP). India and Australia have together already participated in several multilateral maritime exercises, namely Malabar (2007) and Milan (2012). Additionally, to enhance defence cooperation, both countries have agreed to hold a joint naval exercise in 2015. Retrospectively, both countries have been working together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Ade, and during the
international fleet review INS Sahyadri, had taken part and are members of IORA, IONS, and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port Sate Control.
Additionally, the foreign ministers of both countries, along with their Indonesian counterpart, have, under the IORA banner, published a joint Op Ed. This clearly
indicates that the interest for the revival of maritime cooperation still exists in the region. However, the aforementioned endeavours are miniscule and there is
not much bilateral maritime cooperation between the two countries. Despite, Australia having second-largest navy after India, there have not been many interactions between the two navies.
The MH370 flight incident has proved that all the IOR countries can cooperate well if there is a direction and a common agenda. During the rescue operations, Australia was quite proactive as compared to other
countries; India was equally involved. India has immense maritime presence in the IOR and is looked upon as a regional ‘net security provider’. For that reason, India needs to foster regional connectivity. The
IORA, IONS and other Indian Ocean initiatives should be seen along with the India’s LEP.
Perhaps India can use Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s India visit, scheduled for September, as a platform to discuss the India- Australia maritime
cooperation. Today, the IOR has transformed from a ‘passageway’ to a ‘theatre’. Keeping the evolving regional geopolitics in mind, it is not possible for a
single power to take the responsibility for the security of the region. Therefore, it is imperative for India to cooperate with Australia to set the agenda for improving
overall security in the region. The two countries should devise a long-term proposal so that external powers have minimum role to play in the region.
Australia has already factored India’ importance in its defence white paper but New Delhi has not reciprocated to it. India still does not have a political doctrine
wherein it has given emphasis to Australia vis-a-vis the IOR. In a recently held conference at the Australia-India Institute, David Brewster, an expert on the subject
emphasised that India should develop closer relations with countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Africa.
From the Australian side, although 90 per cent of their own trade passes through the region, its policies in the IOR are greatly influenced by the framework of its
alliance with the US. Needless to mention, there is plethora of opportunities for the two countries vi-a-vis the IOR. There should be more people-to-people contact, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments in the IOR. Now the onus is on India and
Australia to lead the maritime cooperation in the IOR.

J & K: BACK TO SQUARE ONE

Shujaat Bukhari


After New Delhi unilaterally called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad, following the meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit, the cross-border shelling has again started with a bang. Few more lives have been lost and if seen technically, the 2003 ceasefire along the
borders has virtually come to an end.
New Delhi’s move to call off the talks is seen as an attempt to send a terse message to both Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led government in Delhi has surely started
“fulfilling” its electoral promises and this surprising move seems to be the beginning of a new rather tough bilateral journey.
“Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi had repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a pleasant surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something quite unexpected of the tough-talking Modi.
If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the grand swearing in ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger
outreach to all SAARC nations. It was during the brief meeting between Modi and
Nawaz the decision to hold the Foreign Secretary-level talks was taken. And the expectations were raised for a wider scope to formally renew the dialogue process
between the two sides. It had raised hopes that both leaders could meet in New York in September on the sidelines of UN General Assembly.
It is very difficult to read the mind of the new government in Delhi. Even the senior journalists and analysts in Delhi fail to assess any critical issue including that of foreign affairs. But will the tough line the new government has taken bear any fruit for lasting peace in the region. The reason New Delhi gave for calling off the talks was also not provocative enough to take an extreme step to say categorical no to
engagement with Pakistan.
In the past over six years including these three months of Modi government, Government of India’s major concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan and the dialogue have remained confined to issues related to terrorism, Mumbai trial and Hafiz Saeed et al. Whatever the progress on Mumbai and other issues, New Delhi had still shown willingness to engage with Pakistan.
The timing of this extreme step is also something one cannot easily ignore. Pakistan has been grappling with
more than one challenge to save the country from complete destabilization. From terrorism shaking its foundations to the new calls for reformation targeted at
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan has been going through one of the toughest tests in the recent past. Prime Minister Modi told Nawaz during his meeting in Delhi that his country should put break on aiding and
abetting terrorism, but three months was too less a time to see the results. And the reason to call off the talks as admitted by keen watchers of India and Pakistan affairs was not tenable. Pakistani leaders and envoys have been meeting Hurriyat leaders since 1994 and it has not changed the dynamics of the political engagement either between India or Pakistan or Delhi and Srinagar. The meetings between Hurriyat leaders and the Pakistani High Commissioner were publicized much in advance. If at all GoI had objection to these
interactions they could have barred them from flying down to Delhi. Putting them under house arrest is a routine in Srinagar.
It is interesting to note that Syed Ali Geelani, the octogenarian separatist leader has been under house arrest for over six months now and he was not allowed to offer a single congregational prayer on Friday. But he was not stopped from flying to Delhi. This uncovers the intentions of government to let these meetings happen
and then use them for calling off the FS level talks. In case Delhi would have stressed on terrorism, cross- border skirmishes and the prolonged delay in Mumbai trial, one could understand the essence of the decision to call off the talks and take the situation back to era of
hostility.
Many analysts are linking the decision to the forthcoming assembly elections in four states. Since BJP took a tough line during the election campaign for Lok Sabha elections, it will have to show the results on
ground. The four states including Jammu and Kashmir that are going to polls by the end of the year have already started witnessing heated campaigns revolving
the issues related to borders and Pakistan. This is surely going to help the BJP to polarize the voters and get the lion’s share. The lines are clearly drawn particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Since the BJP bagged two seats in Jammu in parliamentary elections they are now eyeing on most of the assembly segments.
BJP president Amit Shah’s warning to Pakistan on Monday that in case shelling continues the forces will give befitting reply also indicates how the party is going to up the ante on this front. With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this
renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003
and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and
vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders.
Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade. While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region. Unlike Vajpayee who did not enjoy majority for his party, Modi is strong and can over-rule any other leader. He has more advantages on delivering better than what Vajpayee did. In case Modi stops flexing muscle and starts peace mission, he will be remembered more than Vajpayee, who had earned goodwill in both Kashmir and Pakistan for his statesmanship, vision and delivering something different in last 60 years. Votes will come and go but the lives lost in the wake of tension will not come back and will further the distances.

ISLAMIC STATE AND SOUTH ASIA: HOW REAL IS THE THREAT?

Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy


The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is a game-changer in international affairs today. Their unprecedented rise and ability to fight in two countries simultaneously without suffering serious losses - while attracting more recruits - is disquieting. Today, approximately 50,000 men (and boys as young as 11) from several countries fight under the IS banner, and
more are pouring in. West Asia and South Asia share strong linkages; any turbulence in West Asia has immediate direct and/or indirect repercussions in South Asia. Employing brutality that puts the al Qaeda to shame, what does the rise of the IS mean for South Asia?
Sectarian Schism: Susceptibility to Misuse
South Asia has a culturally diverse yet close-knit character with a complex political geography and history. While there are several common historical experiences, the divides are also many. The foremost,
apart from inter-religious differences, is that of sectarian issues. The IS will find exploiting this schism in Pakistan to be the most potent and ‘foolproof’ way to get a foothold in the region. South Asia is rife with ethno-religious and sectarian differences, especially among the region’s Muslim community. A significant number of people in the region belong to the Islamic
faith, and the Shia-Sunni divide, although primarily historical and ideological, has taken on a sinister form - especially in Pakistan. The key to evading and/or even
delaying the spread of the IS into South Asia would be to address these religious and sectarian divides.
Pakistan’s leadership continues to comply and/or turn a blind eye towards the forced Sunni-sation of the country and radical Sunni jihadists continue their pogrom
against religious minorities, especially the Shias, Ahmadiyyas and the Barelvis. The IS’ self-portrayal as the saviours of Sunnis in a Shia-dominated land could have grave implications for Pakistan - the sectarian
divide will only get worse if the IS co-opts even one Pakistan-based Wahabi jihadist group. Further, Shia- Sunni clashes will only intensify the Iran-Saudi Arabia
proxy war in Western and South-western Pakistan. While other regional countries have significant Muslim populations with common religious divides, sectarian
divides are not as strong. For instance, Muslims are the largest minority in India, and despite the considerable numbers belonging to various sects and sub-sects, the
divide is mostly limited only to ideological differences. Violent clashes between rival sects seldom take place.
In fact, although a couple of Indian citizens have joined the IS, for the most part, Indian society does not face a direct threat from the IS. Almost all Indian Muslims -
including activists, intellectuals and religious leaders - have denounced the IS. Adversity will befall only if Pakistan’s terrorist groups are co-opted by the IS, and
it will not be societal in nature; and whenever the IS moves forward with its South Asian agenda, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is where they will begin.
Fuel for Religious Radicalism
Already, many have taken a hard-line stance against the rising religious intolerance against Muslims in Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and Myanmar. The House of Saud feels threatened by the IS, and is likely to fund more madrassas and radical Islamist factions in order to rev up its defences against al-Baghdadi’s advance. The several Saudi-funded madrassas in western Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are already trouble-makers.
Additionally, the treatment of Muslims (such as that of Myanmar’s Rohingyas by both the clergy and the government, and the intolerance practised by Buddhist
radicals in Sri Lanka) pushes impressionable youth to seek solutions via al-Baghdadi’s means - that might reflect in the rising numbers of the Arakan Mujahideen in Myanmar, and other radicals in Sri Lanka. Although the recruits’ original motivations have localised origins, they get institutionalised in the idea of a global Muslim identity to fight for, after their ‘training’.
Turf War between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
The South Asian region could become the battleground for the turf war for influence and control between erstwhile allies, the IS and al Qaeda. The region is the epicentre of jihadist activities and the idea of reclaiming
the historical ‘Greater Khurasan’ (that includes parts of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Pakistan) is picking up pace. Both al-Baghdadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Mullah Fazullah have set their eyes on the region. Until now, many disillusioned youth joined the al Qaeda
as a means to achieve their goals - that were usually retribution and/or radical change. However, after Osama bin Laden’s death, the group’s core leadership shrunk in
size and the organisation became more franchisee-like. While bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as a weak leader who has failed to maintain the al Qaeda’s footing, the IS has managed to gain control
and administer territories like a government.
Prospects
In South Asia, Mullah Fazlullah, the relatively unknown Jaish-e-Khurasan group, and other factions snubbed by
Rawalpindi’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, are ripe for harvesting by the IS. The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. Given how South Asia was under Muslim rulers for a significant portion of history, the IS’s threat is very real, if not immediate.

COST OF PEACE

Suba Chandran


While there have been enormous emphasis in studying the cost of war and the evil effects of conflict, in the recent period, there have been an emphasis on the cost
of peace in terms of economic and political investments and its fallouts.
Can there be a cost to peace? In the public and political debates in countries such as the US and Israel, there have been questions and emphasis on “peace at what
cost”, “peace, but with honour” and “peace with justice”. The above inputs are based on an understanding that peace is desirable, but not to be fought with a high political or economic cost.
Efforts to arrive at peace in Afghanistan and Iraq have been questioned by a section in the US and elsewhere, in terms of cost involved. The human, material and economic cost for the US to ensure that peace prevails ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq has been high so far.
In fact, this argument has been effectively used not only in the US, but also in many European countries to cut the costs and get out of Afghanistan, irrespective of achieving the original goal. The general argument – “peace at what cost” in this
case primarily involves human, material and economic cost in fighting the war, with an ultimate objective to win it. Equally compelling arguments on similar lines
have been on “peace with honour” which could be seen in Israel’s approach towards Palestine. A section within Israel would prefer peace, but only on certain conditions. “Peace with honour” and the “high cost of peace” arguments have an inherent hawkish approach, which is negative in nature and essentially aims at
scuttling the peace process. The Iraqi example today would prove the fallacy of the above argument. If the cost – economic and political becomes a primary factor not to follow a peace process today and pursue the war/conflict to its ultimate end, we will have to pay a higher price tomorrow. If only the US had stayed the course in establishing peace in Iraq, and not aimed only at overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, the ISIL would not have become a
factor today. Iraq would not be this violent today, had there been enough emphasis on the process yesterday.
The US and the international community is repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan today. Israel has been seen pursuing a similar approach. Returning to a conflict mode to arrive at “peace with honour” is fraught with dangers. This would only
strengthen the hands of the hawks, who are waiting to push their own agenda. Peace cannot be achieved with the complete annihilation of the other party; it has to be
proactively fought and achieved. There has to be something for everyone; else, it would only be a matter of time before a section recuperates itself to spoil the larger process.
The above argument brings to the larger issue of complexities in fighting peace.
Waging War is easier than fighting peace. Waging Peace is complicated for it involves different actors and intricate issues. The political and economic costs in waging peace may definitely be higher; however,
irrespective of the cost involved, it has to be fought and achieved ultimately. Like engaging in developmental activities and building the basic infrastructure – if we
are worried and unhappy about the cost today and not engage in the same, we will have to undertake the same in the future, but with a higher price. No cost is high
enough to achieve peace.
One of the biggest complications in waging peace, especially in a post conflict society is the number of actors involved. The number of actors during a conflict phase, or during waging war is small and limited; the
opposing sides are clear and easy to identify, hence it is easy to fight a war or conflict. But waging peace involves multiple actors. Once the violence comes to an end in a protracted conflict, there emerge multiple groups and actors, as has been the
case in Sri Lanka, Nepal, J&K and India’s Northeast. Their demands are varied from strengthening panchayats and local institutions of governance to improving the business environment. From rehabilitating
the displaced to integrating the former combatants, suddenly there are multiple actors in the scene, each with a long list of demands.
At times, there is also a competition amongst the multiple groups to ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation packages. Groups that were never a party
to the conflict, and demands that were either muted or kept under the surface, come to the fore during the post-conflict period. The multiple demands are not only
clearly articulated, but also are loud, in terms of being projected. There are rallies and protests, at times even violent, with an objective to be a part of the political process and reap the peace dividend. Worse, in some cases, a peace process or solution in
one region, results in creating a domino effect in other regions. An example is the separation of Andhra Pradesh and creation of new Telengana state; today, there are multiple demands for creating new states in
India’s Northeast, by dividing, for example Assam and Nagaland.
While the demands are high in a post conflict situation, the capacity of the State and its institutions are limited in South Asia. Thanks to the prolonged nature of
conflict, in many parts of the conflict regions the State institutions and delivery mechanisms – from schools and hospitals have been affected. More than building
the infrastructure, the State is also handicapped with declining work culture in its institutions. It is extremely unfortunate and ironic, that in most of the post conflict
regions, which have been earlier known for hard work and honesty, today there is a casualness and corruption set in. On the one hand, in the post conflict societies
there are ever increasing demands, while on the other hand the ability and efficiency of the State and its institutions to deliver is declining. Not only the demands are increasing, but also the criticisms of the civil society against the State and its ability to deliver in a post conflict situation. Thanks to the vibrant media and the expanding reach of Social Media, the problems of governance are discussed in
public and in real time. For the State, which was primarily fighting the militants and separatists until now, it is suddenly in a new territory with numerous actors
with varying demands. Added to the problem, is also an increasing urge to
make use of the armed forces and the para military to engage in civilian functions. For example in Sri Lanka, where the war against the LTTE has come to an end,
there is not only huge manpower available to the State, but also seen as highly organised and efficient to implement projects. Such a process, though found
attractive and even useful, in the long run it would be counterproductive. The civilian institutions need to be strengthened and made accountable to deliver the goods.
Finally, the issue of trust between the Centre and the provincial units in post conflict situation in devolving power and responsibilities. In many parts of South Asia, the Centre is apprehensive of the State actors and are conservative in devolving powers to the units; even if there is devolution, certain areas or portfolios continue to remain with the Centre. More than financial and administrative issues, the “trust” factor, play a crucial role in this process.
Waging peace is a complex process only if we perceive it from a prism of economic, political and security costs. Once a conscious decision is made, that whatever may be the cost, the peace process should be continued to its logical conclusion, many pieces will fall in its place. No cost is high enough to wage peace.

MARCHES OF AZADI AND REVOLUTION

Suba Chandran


As expected, two marches – the “Azadi” march of Imran Khan and the “Revolution” march of Tahirul Qadri have merged to create a perfect storm for Pakistan on 14
August, its independence day. The situation in Islamabad, as on 13 August is tensed, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the twin cities of Pakistan waiting for the inevitable.
How would 14 August turn out? Will it be chaotic, but will remain relatively peaceful, as Tahirul Qadri’s march two years ago? Or will it turn violent, leaving larger scars, all in the name of azadi and revolution?
With Section 144 being imposed already in Islamabad, the people of the twin cities are extremely unhappy and annoyed with the two self-proclaimed revolutionaries and reformers. They are also equally unhappy with the Prime Minister for his ineffective handling of the situation, leading to this situation.
To be fair to Nawaz Sharif, even if he had wanted to take serious steps to diffuse the situation, neither Tahirul Qadri nor Imran Khan would have listened to it. Both the leaders seem to be determined to achieve their objectives. Imran Khan wants to topple this government and be made as the next Prime Minister. He simply could not accept that he does not have the mandate to
rule, as the majority have voted for the PML-N. In terms of number of votes and seats – though Imran Khan and his PTI have fared much better than the previous elections, still the 2013 election was not in favour of Imran. Only Imran Khan should understand the reason behind his undemocratic way to establish democracy and azadi. Had there been any election irregularities, he should have filed the complaints immediately after the elections to the Election Commission. Or atleast, should have refused to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa immediately after the election results and
should have followed up in the Parliament, Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Instead, he kept silent almost for a year and then suddenly decided to pull down the system, in which he is a part.
Given the lack of reasoning for Imran Khan’s sudden change, there could be only few explanations. Perhaps, after a year, Imran Khan today realizes that the PML-N
has lost its popular appeal in the last year, and the time is ripe to force the government to dissolve the Parliament and organise a general election. The PML-N may not have performed well during the last year, but
certainly it has not become unpopular to that level, that the people will be voting Imran Khan to become the next Prime Minister, if there is an election shortly. If the Sharif brothers have come down in the popularity chart due to their failure to provide better governance, Imran Khan and his party have not performed better to reap
any major benefit.
Another reason could be a larger conspiracy, led by the military and its intelligence agencies to effectively
intervene and change Nawaz Sharif, without going through another election. Why should the military and the ISI be unhappy with the new Prime Minister? Three reasons in particular; first the handling of Musharraf trial, which a section within the military consider it
unacceptable to try a former Chief of Army Staff.
Second, the decision of the government to establish a political dialogue with the TTP. And third, the Hamid Mir and Geo episode, in which Sharif was seen as joining hands with the former. Sharif could have avoided the Musharraf trial and found an excuse to allow him to leave the country under one
pretext or another. Unfortunately, neither the exile, nor the political experience during the last decade seems to have made more mature. True, the entire legal community also wanted to go after Musharraf, but Sharif could have avoided a show down. He deliberately let it happen. In terms of talking to the TTP, he could
have consulted more with the military and should have had them on board completely. On Hamid Mir, there were too many actors and factors, Sharif could not have done any better than what he did. Perhaps, the military and its ISI is pushing Imran Khan
and silently backing his un-democratic intervention to establish democracy. In the long run, it would only strengthen their case in terms of creating an impression
that the political elites and the parties in Pakistan are unfit to rule.
As far as Tahirul Qadri is concerned, as explained in earlier commentaries in this paper, he perhaps believe in himself as a messiah and saviour. He neither has the
numbers nor the support to get elected. Neither him nor his party would be able to secure considerable votes in any free and fair elections. He can get few people from
the rural areas to Islamabad for few days to block the roads. There have been complaints that the last time he camped, many of those marchers ransacked local shops and looted goods. Perhaps, more than democracy, it is the loot and “see Islamabad” attracts the crowd to move in along with Qadri. Otherwise neither Qadri nor his party has support at the grass root level to sustain an organised protest. He is
blackmailing the system. But the primary blame should go to the Sharif brothers.
In retrospect, it appears, despite all his drawbacks, Zardari dealt with Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in a much better way, that too politically. Zardari allowed to
Qadri and his supporters to camp in Islamabad, had a dialogue and let him go back without changing the electoral system, the primary objective of latter at that
time. People in Pakistan made fun of his effort and he became a political joke. Today, Sharif has elevated Qadri’s political standing, due to his immature political
handling and the use of force.
But the larger question is, what would happen on 14 August, and what would be the fallouts of it? If the State decides to use violence against the marchers of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, it would turn them into martyrs. If the State decides to do nothing and hope that better sense would prevail, it would be seen as politically weak and ineffective. If there is violence and a standoff in Islamabad, leading to a closure of the capital, the biggest victim would be
the democratic process and the net gainer would be the radical elements. For the military and its ISI, such a process would even give them a leverage to intervene
further. It would only increase their legitimacy to intervene, and expand the popular dissatisfaction against their elected leadership and democratic process.

DENIGRATING KASHMIRI MUSLIMS

Shujaat Bukhari


For the past few months Rahul Pandita, a journalist with ‘The Hindu’ has unleashed his “creativity” to project the Kashmiri Muslims as a community that has nothing to be proud of their past. Using ‘The Hindu’, widely read and respected newspaper of India known for its unbiased treatment of news and views, he has not lost any opportunity to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as intolerant religious bigots who have no respect for religious independence. So far it has remained a one- sided affair as he continues to thrust his opinion on the minds of millions of readers.
Pandita has every right to have a view and articulate that. But his tone and tenor only shows his intentions to denigrate the Kashmiri Muslims, who unfortunately
are in figurative majority in Kashmir. He blames the Kashmiri society for everything without going into the genesis of the wrongs that have been done during past
66 years. Kashmiri Pandits have played a significant role in shaping up the situation we are in right now.
As part of his diatribe, he earlier tried to project Kashmiri Muslims as “Shawl walas” (Shawl sellers) who would often dupe the Indian customers. He was perhaps the inspiration for the cellular company ‘Idea’ that had made a commercial on similar lines. It was later removed as people lodged a strong protest.
The latest piece Pandita has written in ‘The Hindu’ is about the controversy over Kousar Nag yatra. He focuses on the yatra through the octogenarian separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani, who was one among
many to “oppose” it. Politicization of issues like this in contemporary Kashmir is not new. This helps the vested interests from all sides. But the reality in this case is that the opposition to the conduct of yatra is not merely political. People in the area besides the civil society reacted with a measured response. Since the institutionalization of such pilgrimage has more than one message to be conveyed to the people, it ought to raise concerns.
In case of Amarnath, the number of pilgrims went up from a few thousand to five lakhs in the past two decades. What is perceived in Kashmir is that the yatra was institutionalized with an objective to convey that “Kashmir had been re-conquered”. It may not be true but the perception is so deep that the mistrust that
exists between state and people makes it a strong belief.
Not that the Kashmiri Muslims, who according to Pandita are all communal and have an Islamist agenda, are opposed to any such religious activity, but the way the yatras have been conducted in past 20 years have not helped to strike a chord with them. With political firmament laden with competing narratives and the contradictions in facilitating one religious activity and thwarting other, the sense of disempowerment has further deepened. There is no discounting the fact that some Kashmiri Pandits had been visiting Kousar Nag as a matter of respect for being the abode of Vishnu. But it has never been seen as a full-fledged yatra spread over a calendar. Usually whosoever would visit Kousar Nag would do so as an adventure since the area is a known trekking destination. Notwithstanding the fact that there are traces of such spots of religious significance in Nilimut Purana and Rajtrangni, the oldest testimonies to
Kashmir history, but all of them have not been popular destinations for pilgrimage. Many Kashmiri Pandits would authenticate that Kousar Nag was not a yatra
destination the way the newly formed Pandit body is projecting it. Pandits are also not known to go for Amarnath pilgrimage in large numbers.
In an interview with this newspaper, senior National Conference leader and Member of Legislative Council (MLC), Vijay Bakaya said Kousar Nag was never a pilgrim destination and that some groups were blowing the issue out of proportion.
“As far as I know, Kousar Naag has never been a pilgrimage destination and people have been going for trekking to this beautiful lake,” Bakaya said in the
interview. The former chief secretary said the environmental concerns of the people of Kashmir were legitimate and needed to be taken care of. With Pandita’s inherent hate for Kashmiri Muslims purring off and on, his bid is to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as an intolerant lot. Kashmiri Pandits surely
have lost their place due to the adversities of time. The armed rebellion in Kashmir is responsible for that and the killings which took place also cannot be condoned.
But the way the situation has shaped for Muslims in Kashmir for last 20 years is also not one of comfort and to blame the entire society for the miseries of the community is unfair. If Kashmiri Pandits blame Kashmiri
Muslims for not showing any concern over their displacement and killing of 219 Pandits, but as an “emancipated” community that has been elite for
centuries also failed in showing even a shred of solidarity with the latter in last two decades.
According to Mike Quigley, “Protection of religious freedom means considering the faiths and beliefs of everyone involved”.
Such freedoms cannot be enjoyed selectively and in isolation but can only be cherished by treating all the faiths on equal terms. In past 20 years the state
government has banned the Milad procession in Kashmir so is the case with the Muharram procession. Similarly
the religious leaders are not allowed to offer prayers in the mosques. Ideological differences apart, Geelani has been under house arrest for six months and he has not
been allowed to fulfill his religious duties. Law and order is an excuse that government uses to justify its actions.
But state has responsibility to maintain that with huge apparatus at its disposal. It cannot be done by putting every other person under house arrest. This amply
makes the distinction in according the religious freedom clear.
Coming back to Kousar Nag, the argument put in contrast is that how other water bodies have suffered in Kashmir and why the opponents are only concerned about this yatra. One may agree on this point that we need to talk about the decay of Dal, Wular and Anchar lake. But the moot question is why to pollute a clean water source then? It is state’s responsibility to ensure that the money spent on these bodies is utilized for retrieving them and the Kashmiri civil society has been
voicing its concerns all the time.
We as a society might not have done enough to protect these bodies but that does not mean that if a purevwater source is still away from human intervention it should in coming years replicate the Dal. Visits to
places of religious significance are welcome but the way the institutionalization is taking place through the state is not in the interest of the people. Politicization of
every issue has ruined Kashmir and to deal with it in compartments and with a clamour of victimhood does not augur well for a peaceful and safe Kashmir.

LATE BUT WELCOME REALIZATION

Shujaat Bukhari


What Israel has been doing in Gaza for past about a month has put humanity to shame. It has also exposed the double standards of world powers and brought to the fore the fact how insensitive and incapacitated the
Muslim nations are. Whatever the fate of hapless Palestinians, the situation has, however, thrown up more lessons for Muslims world over. The offensive may have a dangerous consequence of pushing more Muslims towards radicalism thus opening new doors of destruction. During the past one month the disturbing situation in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Africa has
raised more questions about why trouble is taking place in Muslim countries only. More than 6000 people were killed by the ISIS led by the self-styled “Caliph” Al Baghdadi, thereby putting the words “human rights
violations” to shame. Muslims killing Muslims is the biggest challenge, which Islam, second largest and the fastest growing religion in world is facing now.
Out of many leafs of those lessons, the one which is relevant to Kashmir is that the separatists have given up their hope on the Muslim world through their “representative” bodies such as Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Arab League. Time and again the OIC has been passing resolutions and sending out
invitations to the separatist leaders who proudly publish them in the local media to impress the people with their “popularity” at the world level. Kashmiri leaders, with
the blessings of Pakistan, had been given the Observer status in OIC and many of them have attended the conferences and enjoyed their hospitality. The outcome
has been one odd resolution condemning the human rights violations by India and a line to urge them to resolve the Kashmir issue.
With unending bloodshed shaking the conscience of every conscientious citizen, except those who believe in not annoying the Americans and their cohorts, the
separatists in Kashmir also started realizing that it was useless to pin hopes on OIC or Arab League. For the first time, in many years, the separatists of various factions and colours have spoken in one voice. From
Syed Ali Shah Geelani to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik, they have criticized the OIC and the Arab world for maintaining a criminal silence over
genocide in Gaza. They have also asserted that to rely on them for intervention in resolution of Kashmir issue was not pragmatic.
In the past the noise by OIC or Arab League has been purely an exercise orchestrated by Pakistan to make India restless. That is why the separatists had fallen in this trap of a “false hope”. Moderate Hurriyat leader
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was seen as the last one to rely on them and given them (OIC) legitimacy in the overall process of resolution of Kashmir. But the fact remains
that the resolutions passed by OIC had no impact on India like many other reports. The Arabs countries traditionally have had good relations with India. Once the OIC would pass the resolutions, the Arab leaders would convey (in private) to the Indian governments that they actually did not know what the resolution was and they were not party to it. It may sound funny but
the argument, according to insiders in External Affairs Ministry, they would make was that only Pakistan and Turkish Foreign Ministers would know English and
whatever resolutions they draft they get passed through a consensus. But in practice also the Arab countries would not do anything to side with Kashmir and support
the political cause. For few years, Kashmir would be part of special dua (prayers) on Friday in Makkah and Madinah but that also has disappeared now.
Iran was considered to be vocal among Muslim nations to talk about political rights subjugated by various countries. In case of Palestine the voice was louder and continues to be so. But on Kashmir, it too could not afford to annoy India and helped it out in the worst crisis. When situation in Kashmir in early 90s was a flash point in world, India was on back foot and it had
become difficult for New Delhi to seek defense at the International level. Though focus shifted to Gulf War in 1991, it continued to invite attention at the world
forums. In 1994, sanctions were almost imposed against India when a resolution in the United Nations was withdrawn at the last moment by then Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhuttoo after Iran’s
intervention. The resolution, if passed, would have put India in dock. But the efforts by Iran prevailed upon Bhuttoo, coupled with the work done by a highly erudite Indian delegation led by former Prime Minister A B Vajpayee with Farooq Abdullah as its deputy leader and then Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid as the member, thus saving New Delhi from the biggest ever diplomatic crisis.
Otherwise also the interest of world powers in seeing Kashmir as the flashpoint has decreased to a great level and that also is reflected in how New Delhi sees the
situation. Not acknowledging the transition from violence to nonviolence as a space to resolve the issue also has a lot to do with this changing global discourse. Many experts believe that non-resolution of Kashmir issue would continue to threaten the peace in the region.
In the given circumstances a third party intervention of Kashmir seems impossible. Pakistan becoming internally weak and losing ground at the diplomatic level after the 9/11 has caused more harm to Kashmir, as it has been linked to “International terror network” and “Global Jehad”. It is only the people of Kashmir who have to
find ways and means to find a solution and of course the onus lies on India and Pakistan to facilitate that course. Whether the powers could play any role or not,
veteran CIA official Bruce Reidel in his latest book “Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back”, argues that resolving Kashmir is
not only important for preventing a nuclear conflict between two countries but also for prosperity of both India and Pakistan. Even as he believes that “history has shown that American actions can make a bad situation worse, and it has shown only limited evidence that they can make things fundamentally better”, but at the same time makes a case for non-formal initiative to
make the two countries amenable to a resolution. In this backdrop, the statements by separatist leaders vis-a-vis the OIC and Arab League or largely about the Arab world are significant and have thrown up an opportunity to think out of box to deal with the stand off on its own. The realization has come late but nevertheless welcome.

A STRATEGIC REVIEW FOR INDIA

Manpreet Sethi


All major nuclear weapon states periodically issue official statements in the form of a Review or a White Paper to provide a peep into their threat assessments and response priorities. The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is well known. Russia too periodically announces
a military doctrine and has used it to signal change in the circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1998, China has been bringing out a White Paper on
National Defence (WPND) mostly every two years to indicate how it conceptualises its national defence, threat perceptions and security goals, including in the nuclear domain. So do the UK and France.
Most such documents provide general indications on the nation’s assessment of its threat environment and the kind of capability that it wishes to build. For instance, the US NPR of 2010 identified nuclear terrorism and proliferation as the topmost threats facing the country.
Accordingly, Washington put its focus on global efforts aimed at securing nuclear materials. It also articulated that countries found guilty of sponsoring terrorists could
face US military strikes. Since the threat from near nuclear peers was found of a second order, the US downgraded its nuclear readiness posture by removing
its nuclear bombers from 24 hour alert and also de- MIRVing its missiles.
Similarly, the Chinese WPND explains the country’s threat perceptions and national security goals. It provides generic references to the growing advancements in national ability to conduct joint operations with precision, informationised strikes etc.
Over the last three White Papers, China has devoted complete sub-sections to explaining the role and capabilities of its nuclear force or the Second Artillery Corps (SAC). While the 2008 Paper had called upon the SAC to “build a streamlined and effective strategic force by raising the informationaisation of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control and increase capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counter-
strikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles,” the 2010 Paper stressed modernisation of “capabilities
in rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection and survivability.”
Given that the SAC has the responsibility for both conventional and nuclear missiles, the Paper also reveals how China continues to “improve the conditions of on-base, simulated and networked training” including in conduct of “trans-regional manoeuvres” and in “complex electromagnetic environments.” Such
disclosures on posture are meant to buttress deterrence.
Crafted along similar lines, an Indian Strategic Review - ISR (or whatever else it may be called: Strategic Policy Review, or a White Paper) - would be particularly helpful in addressing some of the concerns that have been raised in recent times on the credibility of the Indian nuclear deterrent. Of course, the ISR would traverse a range of security issues. But in the nuclear dimension, besides a reiteration of the basic doctrinal attributes of India’s nuclear deterrence, it could highlight some specific issues. Two examples by way of an illustration could be mentioned.
The first could be an articulation of the role of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in India’s nuclear strategy. Going by the recent technological developments, India seems
to be surely and steadily moving towards the development and eventual deployment of some kind of a BMD capability. However, if India is to ensure that this capability does not destabilise nuclear deterrence equations with Pakistan and China, it is imperative that certain clarity be brought to the nature and type of BMD that India plans to have. It is evident that perceiving it
as eroding its deterrence, Islamabad has begun investing in cruise missiles and other counter-measures to defeat an Indian BMD. In case India is to escape being pulled into an offence-defence spiral, it is necessary that the logic and scope of the Indian BMD is explained as a measure for enhancing survivability of its retaliatory capability (warheads, delivery systems and C2) in view of India’s no first use (NFU). Given India’s missile threat environment, it is virtually impossible to protect its cities unless the BMD is technologically of a
very high order and that obviously means expending large amounts of money. But, by explaining the rationale of the BMD for protecting India’s counter-strike capability, its destabilising effects can be arrested. And, the ISR could be one means of such communication.
Yet another issue that could do with some clarity is India’s response to an act of nuclear terrorism. Given India’s experience of Pak-sponsored terrorism, this is a threat that looms large. It would be worthwhile for New Delhi to express its assessment of such a threat and its likely responses. This would showcase resolve that no such act would go unpunished. Doing so through the
ISR would enhance deterrence. Opacity and ambiguity in nuclear numbers and postures
has been an attribute of the Indian nuclear strategy.
However, an ISR can perform the crucial task of clearing misperceptions through a certain amount of transparency without going into specifics of the arsenal. This is critical given that misperceptions and
miscalculations can result in an inadvertent nuclear escalation especially between nuclear neighbours that share border disputes and are prone to border skirmishes. Such a document would actually be of immense value for two reasons. One, it would aid strategy formulation and action prioritisation within the country while providing assurance to the domestic public. Simultaneously, it would communicate with the adversary, and its content and tenor could create the
atmospherics to help stabilise nuclear equations.

PAKISTAN: DEGRADED DEMOCRACY

Sushant Sareen


At the time this comment is being penned, the Imran Khan’s ‘ Azadi ’ March and Tahirul Qadri’s ‘Inquilab’ (revolution) March are besieging Islamabad.
The former is demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; accountability of all people involved in rigging the 2013 election in favour of the
current ruling dispensation; electoral reforms; and a government of non-political persons to conduct fresh elections. The latter wants a complete overhaul of the
current political system – hence revolution, though in a legal and constitutional way without resorting to violence, which is in itself a contradiction.
Even though the turnout of these two marches is nowhere close to the million or more that was being spoken about, Pakistan’s capital city is on the
tenterhooks. The fear is that if the crowds go out of control and large-scale violence erupts, it could well lead to the collapse of the government. Needless to say, such disturbances will bring neither Azadi nor
Revolution. Quite to the contrary, it will stifle ‘ Azadi ’ and usher in a counter-revolution by that most reactionary of all forces in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.
Perhaps when the Pakistan Army put Khan and Qadri to the job of destabilising Nawaz Sharif’s government and bringing it under such immense pressure that it buckles and accepts its subservience to the military
establishment, they never thought things would reach a point where they might have to step in and take over directly. But a series of administrative mishandlings and
political miscalculations by the governments in Islamabad and Lahore, coupled with ever rising stridency in the positions of Khan and Qadri, have
brought the situation to a point where an honourable exit for any of the main protagonists seems next to impossible.
This means while all the protagonists are going for broke – they believe they will either worst their adversary or suffer grievous and maybe even irrecoverable damage to their politics – none of them is
going to emerge from this battle unscathed. The only winner will be the cat (read Pakistan Army) which made the monkeys (read Pakistan's political class) fight over
the spoils of power. After all, Pakistan is a unique case where even the courts have upheld the legitimacy of military coups by calling them a revolution! Clearly, neither Imran Khan nor Tahirul Qadri have
thought through the logic of what they are demanding. This is hardly surprising considering that someone else has been doing the thinking for them. The dialectics of their demands is that unless Nawaz Sharif is ready to roll over and play dead – which is extremely unlikely – the only way they can get what they want is through an
extra-constitutional takeover. Bizarrely, even as they both emphatically stand against any military intervention, they are pushing things in a direction where the political logjam can only be broken by such
an intervention.
For his part, Nawaz Sharif is showing remarkable and uncharacteristic composure, and even a spirit of
accommodation towards Khan’s and Qadri’s clearly illegitimate, illogical and illegal demands. But sooner or later, Sharif will dig in his heels. Already, some of his
advisors are reported to be telling him that any big compromise on the demands of the agitationists will irretrievably damage the government and render it a virtual lame-duck in practically all important aspects of
national policy making. If that happens, Sharif might continue to enjoy the title of prime minister but will wield as much power as the head of a municipality. The
trouble for the ruling party is that this is precisely what the army wants if Nawaz Sharif is to continue in office.
While the army has fixed Sharif nice and proper, and it is quite apparent by now that Sharif can only survive if he accepts subservience to the military, it is still unclear if the military has a plan to de-escalate the political crisis. Will Khan accept the military’s diktat? What will
be the quid pro quo which helps him keep his face among his supporters whom he has charged to an unsustainable level? Will the sop offered to Imran Khan be acceptable to Sharif, especially if it involves anything
beyond electoral reforms? And if Khan refuses to back down, will the army force Sharif out of office? For the army, to cut Khan and Qadri down to size at this stage
means losing a potent political tool to keep Sharif under pressure – something they would be averse to doing.
But deposing Sharif will also not solve the problem because that would set in motion the destabilising politics of the 1990s. Worse, even if Nawaz Sharif eats the humble pie and Khan backs down this time, the government will remain in crisis mode for the rest of its term, something that will seriously distract it from its ambitious economic agenda. Most importantly, if this
round of the political slugfest ends in a draw, it will only set the stage for the next round of an even worse civil- military confrontation, which won’t be long in coming. What this means is that all those singing hosannas for democracy having finally stuck roots in Pakistan need to
start singing dirges.

EBOLA: CONCERNS FOR INDIA

N Manoharan


Should India be worried about the outbreak of Ebola virus in Western Africa that is more than 9000 km away? Is the situation so alarming? What it Ebola all about? What are the counter-measures required?
In an increasingly globalised world, no distance is far away. It is a matter of few hours by direct flight. The virus has been spreading fast. Thankfully, it is not an
airborne disease. It is however communicable. Since the first case of outbreak reported in February 2014 in
Guinea, the disease has spread to Sierra Leone, Liberia and recently to Nigeria, all along the West African coast. The main vector is the traveller, both within and outside the continent. Saudi Arabia has reported a case of an infected person, a returnee from Sierra Leone. The US has airlifted two of its infected citizens; Spain had flown an affected priest who has since passed. Usually an inland phenomenon, it is intriguing why the Ebola virus is spreading along the coast this time. The current
outbreak has so far claimed over 900 lives, in addition to 2000 infected; more deadly than all the hitherto Ebola outbreaks. The cause for worry is the fact that the Ebola disease has neither a vaccine nor curative
medicine; once infected there is only a 10 per cent chance of survival.
The disease took its name from the Ebola River, the site of the first outbreak in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). Genus Ebolavirus is one of three
members of the filovirus family (the other two being Marburg Virus and Cueva Virus). Interestingly, Ebola Virus comprises five distinct species: Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV), Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), Sudan
ebolavirus (SUDV), Reston ebolavirus (RESTV) and Taï Forest ebolavirus (TAFV). The present outbreak is EBOV, considered the most dangerous of all. The incubation
period is 21 days.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), symptoms of the disease include the sudden onset of fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash,
impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases, both internal and external bleeding. Patients report low white blood cell and platelet counts and elevated liver
enzymes. These symptoms are broadly similar to one or the other diseases like malaria, typhoid fever, shigellosis, cholera, leptospirosis, plague, rickettsiosis,relapsing fever, meningitis, hepatitis and other viral
haemorrhagic fevers. This makes diagnosis all the more difficult.
Ebola is a zoonotic disease transmitted to people by wild animals or by other infected patients. Fruit bats are considered Ebola’s ‘reservoir host’, in which a pathogen or virus lives inconspicuously without causing
symptoms. That means the geographic distribution of inhabitation of fruit bats is prone to Ebola. Ebola is introduced into the human population through close contact with the blood, secretions, organs or other
bodily fluids of infected animals. Ebola then spreads in the community through human-to-human transmission, with infection resulting from direct contact (through
broken skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, and indirect contact with environments contaminated with such fluids. Burial ceremonies in
which mourners have direct contact with the body of the deceased person can also play a role in the transmission of Ebola.
The outbreak is more concerning for India because of its increasing footprints in Africa. Nearly 50,000 Indian citizens are working in the affected West African
countries alone. They range from businessmen, labourers, professionals and peacekeepers who travel back home frequently. India-Africa trade is about USD
35 billion. Oil is an important component of the trade, especially from Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan, which are Ebola-prone countries.
India has stepped up preventive measures like screening and tracking of passengers originating or transiting from the region and travel advisory to defer non-essential
travel to Africa, and rightly so. But this is not enough.
All transit destinations like Dubai need to be alerted; flights and passengers from these transits should be screened. Maldives has already issued similar health alerts. Sri Lanka needs to follow as Colombo airport is
a major travel hub. Oil-tankers and other merchant vessels have to be sanitised adequately. It is also important to raise awareness among the common man
on the risk factors. Thorough cooking of animal products like milk and meat is advisable. Then, there are protective measures that require to be adopted by
people closer to the patients like avoiding close physical contacts, wearing gloves and appropriate personal protective equipment when taking care of ill patients at home, regular hand washing with disinfectant after visiting patients, and prompt and safe cremation of those died of the disease. If ignored, consequences can be catastrophic in terms of lives, socio-economic
disruption and spread to other countries. The longer the outbreak in West Africa persists, the more the chances for the Ebola virus to mutate and adapt. That is the
main worry in the long-run.