Chintamani Mahapatra
India’s hyperactive Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now widely known for
his magic - the Modi Magic. His charisma made him popular ever since he
began his tour of India to campaign for the parliamentary election and
his charm became more widespread going beyond the borders of India soon
after he became the Indian Prime Minister.
In one month, Prime Minister Modi has held three summit level meetings
with three world leaders - Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese
President Xi Jinping and the US President Barack Obama. The Chinese
leader announced an investment of US$20 billion to develop
infrastructure in India; the Japanese leader declared an amount of US$35
billion and, while the American leader could make no such commitment,
the US-Indian Business Council estimated that Modi’s visit to the US
would bring about US$41 billion of investment to India.
Why the US president was not able to make an open commitment on
investing in India is not unknown. It is the private corporate sector in
the US that can make investment commitments and not the US
administration. And, investment, after all, is not aid!
There is no doubt that Modi’s summit meeting with the US President was
the most important among the three summits, not only because the US is a
superpower, but because Washington’s approach towards the new
government in Delhi would considerably impact China’s attitude and
Japanese engagement vis-à-vis India.
Critics point out that Modi’s US visit was high on symbolism and low on
substance. Some pointed out that the grand reception he received in New
York was the handiwork of the Gujarati community in the US. It has also
been argued that there was a big media hype in India about Modi’s US
visit, but there was nothing of significant importance in the coverage
by the US media. Still others complain that no new agreement was signed
during the Modi-Obama summit, no big ticket item was proclaimed, and
that there was nothing original in the joint statement issued by the two
leaders.
These are actually criticisms for criticism’s shake. First of all,
Modi’s address at the Madison Square was clearly aimed at the Indian
American community and not just the Gujarati community. In fact, the
short cultural programme before the Prime Minister’s arrival had an
India flavour and the Rajasthani dance performance by Gujarati dancers
symbolised the unity of India in diversity! The Prime Minister’s
announcement of life time visas for overseas Indians (PIO and CIO) was
not meant for the Gujarati community alone.
Secondly, American newspapers rarely give wide coverage to any one
foreign leader, and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with the US President
in view of this fact was like such meetings in the White House, that is,
almost a daily affair. Moreover, an article by the PM in The Wall Street Journal, a major voice of corporate America, and a joint article by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in the influential The Washington Post were quite uncommon feats.
Finally, a pair of eagle eyes is needed to discover the novel elements
in the US-India joint statement. First, the statement clearly and
strongly sends signals to Pakistan to rope in its home-grown terrorist
networks and to China to follow international law in handling maritime
disputes in the South China Sea. No diplomatic nicety was shown, unlike
earlier joint statements, in matters of tackling terrorism and managing
freedom of the seas.
Secondly, the need to robustly tackle the IS and D-Company, among other
terrorist outfits, and their safe heavens, was a significant part of the
joint statement and the mark of the Modi Government on this issue was
crystal clear.
Thirdly, the concord between the two leaders to clean up the logjam in
the implementation of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement was an
important declaration. The UPA government failed to implement years
after the declaration of the nuclear deal and six years after signing
the 123 agreement.
Significantly, Modi’s summit with President Obama preceded his
unprecedented corporate diplomacy marked by his meetings with the CEOs
of a large number of American Big Business houses and his public
diplomacy with the influential Indian American community. In both these
initiatives, the Prime Minister’s goal was to allure American
investments into India to create smart cities, modernise the country’s
infrastructure and turn India into a manufacturing hub of the world.
Modi was neither selling dreams nor making populist remarks. He had done
his home work. Based on his understanding of India’s strengths -
democracy, demography and demands - he tried to convince the American
public and the government the benefit of doing business in and with
India. Neither his corporate diplomacy nor his public diplomacy was
anathema to the White House.
Modi has planted many seeds in the US. The road to success, however, is long and not without hurdles.
19 Oct 2014
A NEW AFGHANISTAN: FOUR MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT GHANI
Suba Chandran
Will the new political arrangement (President and a Chief Executive
Officer) in Afghanistan work, and more importantly, deliver? Though it
looks simple in paper, given the recent history between the two
contenders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah – will the power-sharing
deal help Afghanistan stabilise?
One Country, Two Executives
One Country, Two Executives
The understanding simply means that there would be two Executives for
Afghanistan – the President (Ashraf Ghani) and a Chief Executive Officer
(either Abdullah Abdullah, or someone nominated by him). It does solve
the electoral dispute that had been raging between the two contenders
and threatening to derail the political process. However, will the
arrangement address the challenges facing Afghanistan?
The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.
Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.
The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq
The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.
Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.
The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq
The agreement is primarily due to the US’ pressure. And that poses the
second challenge for the new Afghan arrangement. How seriously committed
will the US be, once the new Afghan structure is in place? Undoubtedly,
the multiple visits by the US Secretary of State John Kerry and his
constant dialogue with both parties have ensured that the electoral
process has not been completely wasted. Abdullah was ready to leave the
process and pursue a different political path. Thanks to Kerry, the two
contestants could be brought together.
Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s, remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.
However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.
Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.
Advantage Taliban-Pakistan
Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s, remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.
However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.
Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.
Advantage Taliban-Pakistan
The third major challenge would be the resurgence of the Taliban, and
their supporters across the Durand Line. Despite multiple efforts,
negotiations with the Taliban have not succeeded until today. Moving
ahead, the reasons behind the failure would factor heavily in the new
government.
There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.
The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.
It’s the Economy, Stupid
There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.
The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.
It’s the Economy, Stupid
The economic situation and the human development indicators have been
transformed dramatically over the last decade. There are more schools,
roads, transmission lines etc., than has ever been in the history of
Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is evolving slowly but steadily, as are
the country’s government structures and non-governmental institutions.
Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.
Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president.
Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.
Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president.
PIRATES PREFER ENERGY CARGO
Vijay Sakhuja
Early this month, pirates released the hijacked MT Sunrise 689, a small
product tanker bound for Vietnam which went missing soon after it left
Singapore. During the captivity that lasted nearly six days, the pirates
siphoned 2,000 of the total 5,200 metric tons of oil valued at $4
million. They also stole the personal belongings of the crew and
threatened to kill if they did not follow orders – but assured them that
their only aim was to steal the oil carried onboard the vessel.
This is the 12th incident of piracy in Southeast Asia involving small
oil tankers. These vessels are easy targets because they are small, have
smaller crews, move at slow speeds, and the low freeboard makes
boarding comparatively easier and quicker. Perhaps the most worrying
aspect of these attacks is that pirates in Southeast Asia have taken a
liking for small product tankers carrying diesel that is sold to
prospective customers, who re-sell for anywhere between $400 and $650
per ton in the black market.
These pirates or robbers are popularly referred to as ‘Petro Pirates’
and are believed to be part of transnational organised crime groups who
own small tankers and are networked with the oil smuggling mafia.
Furthermore, these Petro Pirates appear to only steal cargo and not harm
the crew. For instance, in June 2014, pirates hijacked Orapin 4, a Thai
oil tanker, with its cargo of oil worth nearly $2.2 million; they stole
the oil, did not hurt the crew, but robbed them of watches, cell
phones, money and other valuables. Similarly, in April 2014, pirates
raided a tanker off the coast of Malaysia and stole 3 million liters of
diesel. In fact the business model of Petro Pirates’ does not appear to
include ransoms.
Interestingly, a similar story is being played out along the west coast
of Africa but on a larger scale. Early this year, MT Kerala, a 75,000
ton tanker carrying diesel was hijacked by Nigerian pirates off the
Angolan coast. The vessel was released after being siphoned of 12,270
tons of its diesel cargo. The pirates took the usual precautions of
disabling the Automatic Identification System, switching off
communications, and repainting the name of the vessel.
The International Maritime Bureau’s half year report for January to June
2014 recorded 23 incidents off the west coast of Africa, and Nigerian
waters has witnessed 10 such attacks. These trends are a continuation of
the past reports and the UK Chamber of Shipping records state that acts
of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea are worrisome – 62
attacks in 2012; 51 in 2013. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 19 per
cent of all maritime attacks worldwide. Significantly, the Gulf of
Guinea is believed to be a greater threat to shipping than Somalia
because of its flourishing oil and gas industry which attracts shipping,
unlike Somalia, where pirates preyed on targets of opportunity along
the busy sea route.
The West African piracy is driven by a commodity – oil – which is
available in abundance. For instance, Nigeria is an oil-rich country and
produces nearly 2 million barrels of oil per day. However, it has
limited refining capacity resulting in both export of crude and import
of refined oil thus generating sufficient maritime traffic for pirates
to feed on.
Unlike Nigeria, Singapore does not produce any oil but is the hub of the
Asian petrochemicals industry with a sophisticated refining, storage,
and distribution infrastructure, and therefore attracts significant
tanker traffic. A variety of large and small vessels carrying oil and
gas make port calls to deliver crude or carry refined products to
regional and global markets. According to the US Energy Information
Agency, the petrochemical industry is the backbone of Singapore's
economy and it has a refining capacity of nearly 1.4 million barrels of
oil per day.
The aforementioned incidents along the west coast of Africa and in
Southeast Asian waters offer an interesting feature. The business model
of piracy in both cases involves hijacking vessels for the cargo carried
onboard, and in particular, the refined energy products such as diesel.
It is plausible that pirates in Southeast Asia may have borrowed the
idea from West Africa – who appear to have become more sophisticated and
have graduated to hijacking bigger ships.
In essence, the pirates may not have changed their Modus Operandi
of attacking both small and big ships; instead they have become
cargo/commodity conscious and believe that stealing refined energy
products is more lucrative than waiting for ransoms. However, it is
useful to mention that the stolen oil or other products are carried in
smaller vessels that are equally vulnerable to interception by security
forces.
"CHINA THREAT" IN SOUTH ASIA: A PERSPECTIVE FROM CHINA.
Siwei Liu
President Xi Jinping’s six-day South Asian trip is over. Apart from a series of bilateral agreements, friendly high-level dialogues and other interactions, the trip also demonstrated the direction of China’s South Asian policy. Indeed, with growing bilateral and multilateral interactions with South Asia, China is looking for a more flexible and comprehensive policy to accommodate the present situation, and to some extent, respond to the related arguments of China as a threat in the region.
Admittedly, one of the challenges for China’s current South Asian policy is how to address doubts about the motivations for China’s foreign policy in the region, in particular, India’s worries about the “China threat.” China has repeatedly stated that it is keen on promoting peaceful development and cooperation toward win-win outcomes and cooperate with India towards regional prosperity, but in some Indian assessments, China’s rising profile in South Asia is not good news. For example, an Indian analyst argues that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a ‘string of pearls’ that could eventually undermine India pre-eminence and potentially become an economic and security threat.
Obviously, Xi’s visits in September not only tried to confirm that Beijing is putting greater emphasis on this region, but also demonstrate that it want to address its neighbours’ “China threat” perception. For this, the Chinese leader presented Beijing current South Asian policy with some new characteristics.
First, Xi emphasised common regional development. In his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, he said, “A South Asia that enjoys peace, stability, development and prosperity serves the interests of countries and people in the region and of China as well. China wants to live in harmony with all countries in the region and contribute its share to the development of the region. ” Xi not only suggested that China should work with the relevant countries to step up economic integration and connectivity in the region but also proposed that they come together to join the “Belt” and “Road” initiatives that aim at strengthening connectivity among countries along the traditional land and maritime silk roads.
Second, Xi emphasised multi-dimensional cooperation with South Asian partners. For economic cooperation, in the next five years, China plans to work with South Asian countries to increase bilateral trade to US$150 billion, its investments in South Asia to US$30 billion, and provide US$20 billion in concessional facilities to the region. It needs to be mentioned that Beijing also focuses on other modes of cooperation and interaction with South Asia. China is concentrating its efforts on expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges with South Asia. It plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities for 5,000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5,000 youth, and train 5,000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. In addition, China will work with South Asian countries to implement the China-South Asia Partnership Initiative for Science and Technology, give full play to the role of the China-South Asia Expo, and build new platforms for mutually beneficial cooperation.
There is no denying that during his trip, President Xi reaffirmed China’s good neighbourly foreign policy and made efforts to deepen strategic relations at the multilateral and bilateral levels, which is a timely move. It reflects what President Xi described: “the principles of China's neighbour diplomacy as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.” However, a one-time diplomatic trip may not be enough to address all the concerns and issues.
Although Xi’s South Asian trip opened a new door for China-South Asia relations, it is necessary for China to understand that challenges and problems still exist. In the future, China needs to undertake more dialogues and interactions both through the official and civilian channels with South Asia, in particular, India. As the two biggest powers in the region, China and India should both be positive and see the multiple levels of potential interaction in the future, and join hands in cooperation. It will benefit this region and the rest of Asia as well. In addition, China also should be aware of other challenges it might face such as how to deal with South Asia’s complicated regional relations, in particular, India-Pakistan relations, which needs China’s smart and cautious diplomacy. Other issues like Afghanistan’s stability and development, especially after 2014, will also test Chinese political and diplomatic wisdom. Just as some analysts say, China should realize that instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into other parts of South Asia and could possible threaten China.
President Xi Jinping’s six-day South Asian trip is over. Apart from a series of bilateral agreements, friendly high-level dialogues and other interactions, the trip also demonstrated the direction of China’s South Asian policy. Indeed, with growing bilateral and multilateral interactions with South Asia, China is looking for a more flexible and comprehensive policy to accommodate the present situation, and to some extent, respond to the related arguments of China as a threat in the region.
Admittedly, one of the challenges for China’s current South Asian policy is how to address doubts about the motivations for China’s foreign policy in the region, in particular, India’s worries about the “China threat.” China has repeatedly stated that it is keen on promoting peaceful development and cooperation toward win-win outcomes and cooperate with India towards regional prosperity, but in some Indian assessments, China’s rising profile in South Asia is not good news. For example, an Indian analyst argues that China is expanding its sphere of regional influence by surrounding India with a ‘string of pearls’ that could eventually undermine India pre-eminence and potentially become an economic and security threat.
Obviously, Xi’s visits in September not only tried to confirm that Beijing is putting greater emphasis on this region, but also demonstrate that it want to address its neighbours’ “China threat” perception. For this, the Chinese leader presented Beijing current South Asian policy with some new characteristics.
First, Xi emphasised common regional development. In his speech at the Indian Council of World Affairs, he said, “A South Asia that enjoys peace, stability, development and prosperity serves the interests of countries and people in the region and of China as well. China wants to live in harmony with all countries in the region and contribute its share to the development of the region. ” Xi not only suggested that China should work with the relevant countries to step up economic integration and connectivity in the region but also proposed that they come together to join the “Belt” and “Road” initiatives that aim at strengthening connectivity among countries along the traditional land and maritime silk roads.
Second, Xi emphasised multi-dimensional cooperation with South Asian partners. For economic cooperation, in the next five years, China plans to work with South Asian countries to increase bilateral trade to US$150 billion, its investments in South Asia to US$30 billion, and provide US$20 billion in concessional facilities to the region. It needs to be mentioned that Beijing also focuses on other modes of cooperation and interaction with South Asia. China is concentrating its efforts on expanding people-to-people and cultural exchanges with South Asia. It plans to offer 10,000 scholarships, training opportunities for 5,000 people, an exchange and training programme for 5,000 youth, and train 5,000 Chinese language teachers for South Asia in the next five years. In addition, China will work with South Asian countries to implement the China-South Asia Partnership Initiative for Science and Technology, give full play to the role of the China-South Asia Expo, and build new platforms for mutually beneficial cooperation.
There is no denying that during his trip, President Xi reaffirmed China’s good neighbourly foreign policy and made efforts to deepen strategic relations at the multilateral and bilateral levels, which is a timely move. It reflects what President Xi described: “the principles of China's neighbour diplomacy as amity, sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness.” However, a one-time diplomatic trip may not be enough to address all the concerns and issues.
Although Xi’s South Asian trip opened a new door for China-South Asia relations, it is necessary for China to understand that challenges and problems still exist. In the future, China needs to undertake more dialogues and interactions both through the official and civilian channels with South Asia, in particular, India. As the two biggest powers in the region, China and India should both be positive and see the multiple levels of potential interaction in the future, and join hands in cooperation. It will benefit this region and the rest of Asia as well. In addition, China also should be aware of other challenges it might face such as how to deal with South Asia’s complicated regional relations, in particular, India-Pakistan relations, which needs China’s smart and cautious diplomacy. Other issues like Afghanistan’s stability and development, especially after 2014, will also test Chinese political and diplomatic wisdom. Just as some analysts say, China should realize that instability in one part of the region inevitably bleeds into other parts of South Asia and could possible threaten China.
INDIA-PAKISTAN: WORKING BOUNDARIES AND LINES OF UNCONTROLLED FIRE
Salma Malik
After a much-deliberated stalemate, Afghanistan finally had a new democratic government with a power-sharing
arrangement. The signing of the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) provides a false sense of security to many who felt that the US military must not
pull out completely as the perceived regional proxies would turn Afghanistan into a complete proxy battlefield.
Though Pakistan has time and again reiterated its policy of non-interference and non-intervention in Afghan internal affairs, the same cannot be said about other regional actors. That will add to complicating the bilateral equation further. Another moot point is the Durand line, which always carries the potential to ignite
fiery exchanges of passionate and politically loaded rhetorics and on rare instances, exchange of firepower.
However, the more volatile of the “unofficial” boundaries has been the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary on the eastern border, which has over the years, successfully become a testing field of India-
Pakistan relations. Like any and all bilateral
arrangements between the two neighbors, the 2003 ceasefire agreement regarding the LoC has also been blatantly violated in the past several years. With both elected governments in Pakistan and India being driven by economics, the general perception was that even if there is no substantial progress on the bigger problem areas, at least both administrations will
try and maintain congenial relations and move towards progressive engagement. However the first sign of trouble was the calling-off of the Augus 2014 foreign
secretary level talks after Pakistan’s high commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri leadership. Interestingly, anyone familiar with the New Delhi diplomatic setup and the grand receptions held would
actually find a much greater number and variety of Kashmiri leadership in attendance, brushing shoulders
with all and sundry. Sensitivities aside, if seriously committed to the process, a better approach could have been registering a
well-worded protest and allowing the talks to proceed as per schedule. However, several times in the past too, much investment has been made in holding a meeting than making it meaningful. What if the meeting had proceeded as per schedule? There is little doubt that
nothing substantial would have resulted from the parleys. Despite a much clearer vision regarding what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants regarding
internal growth and development and a foreign policy to match with it, there was a somewhat vague gesturing vis-à-vis relations with Islamabad. Although, during his election campaigning Modi and his party had been vocally very anti-Pakistani, yet the very brief period of positive overturing soon after elections, gave space for optimism that perhaps things might be on the mend.The recent round of cross-LoC fire resulting in substantial infrastructural damage as well as heavy civilian fatalities on either sides of the LoC and working
boundary, has again brought out media histrionics seeking death to Pakistan and dealing the enemy (Islamabad) a crushing decisive blow. Where on one hand it makes the Modi government’s policy towards its
neighbor clear, it also retards the process (whatever it may be) substantially.
A recent statement by the new-kid-on-the-block, Bilawal Bhutto, regarding wresting the entire Kashmir from India got a knee-jerk reaction from across the border. Interestingly, one set of replies was hacking of the Pakistan Peoples Party web site by an Indian group which posted propaganda stuff with inflammatory statements. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too,
much to New Delhi’s displeasure highlighted the plight of Kashmiris at the recently concluded UNGA session in New York. Immediately, conspiracy theorists hinted at a silent pledge between Sharif and Modi regarding silence over the K-word.
However, what has intentionally been forgotten in this entire conflict narrative is the plight of flood-affected Kashmiri population, which has suffered loss of lives and livelihood.
Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations. Sooner or later the guns will fall silent, after claiming many lives both civilian and
military, with unpleasant words exchanged and angry gesturing at the political level. In the worse-case scenario, it may require a higher level of deployment, but that is highly unlikely. What it will claim in its wake is a chunk of peace, and a window of opportunity to act wisely by either side and discuss the problem, rather than indulging in blind rage and provocative statements.
Although New Delhi does not accord the same status to UNMOGIP than Pakistan, the latter’s proposal of making this office more proactive may not be a bad idea.
Apparently, sticking to bilateralism and seeking a third party’s role behind the curtains which results in crisis stability has become a norm for the two neighbors. The
current crossfire, while may apparently look like a good marketing strategy – with Modi allegedly approving an all-out assault – will further fracture the already fragile
base on which “conditional” peace stands. If either side is genuinely interested in peace, there is a need for reviewing both policies and postures.
After a much-deliberated stalemate, Afghanistan finally had a new democratic government with a power-sharing
arrangement. The signing of the controversial Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) provides a false sense of security to many who felt that the US military must not
pull out completely as the perceived regional proxies would turn Afghanistan into a complete proxy battlefield.
Though Pakistan has time and again reiterated its policy of non-interference and non-intervention in Afghan internal affairs, the same cannot be said about other regional actors. That will add to complicating the bilateral equation further. Another moot point is the Durand line, which always carries the potential to ignite
fiery exchanges of passionate and politically loaded rhetorics and on rare instances, exchange of firepower.
However, the more volatile of the “unofficial” boundaries has been the Line of Control (LoC) and working boundary on the eastern border, which has over the years, successfully become a testing field of India-
Pakistan relations. Like any and all bilateral
arrangements between the two neighbors, the 2003 ceasefire agreement regarding the LoC has also been blatantly violated in the past several years. With both elected governments in Pakistan and India being driven by economics, the general perception was that even if there is no substantial progress on the bigger problem areas, at least both administrations will
try and maintain congenial relations and move towards progressive engagement. However the first sign of trouble was the calling-off of the Augus 2014 foreign
secretary level talks after Pakistan’s high commissioner to India met with the Kashmiri leadership. Interestingly, anyone familiar with the New Delhi diplomatic setup and the grand receptions held would
actually find a much greater number and variety of Kashmiri leadership in attendance, brushing shoulders
with all and sundry. Sensitivities aside, if seriously committed to the process, a better approach could have been registering a
well-worded protest and allowing the talks to proceed as per schedule. However, several times in the past too, much investment has been made in holding a meeting than making it meaningful. What if the meeting had proceeded as per schedule? There is little doubt that
nothing substantial would have resulted from the parleys. Despite a much clearer vision regarding what Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi wants regarding
internal growth and development and a foreign policy to match with it, there was a somewhat vague gesturing vis-à-vis relations with Islamabad. Although, during his election campaigning Modi and his party had been vocally very anti-Pakistani, yet the very brief period of positive overturing soon after elections, gave space for optimism that perhaps things might be on the mend.The recent round of cross-LoC fire resulting in substantial infrastructural damage as well as heavy civilian fatalities on either sides of the LoC and working
boundary, has again brought out media histrionics seeking death to Pakistan and dealing the enemy (Islamabad) a crushing decisive blow. Where on one hand it makes the Modi government’s policy towards its
neighbor clear, it also retards the process (whatever it may be) substantially.
A recent statement by the new-kid-on-the-block, Bilawal Bhutto, regarding wresting the entire Kashmir from India got a knee-jerk reaction from across the border. Interestingly, one set of replies was hacking of the Pakistan Peoples Party web site by an Indian group which posted propaganda stuff with inflammatory statements. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif too,
much to New Delhi’s displeasure highlighted the plight of Kashmiris at the recently concluded UNGA session in New York. Immediately, conspiracy theorists hinted at a silent pledge between Sharif and Modi regarding silence over the K-word.
However, what has intentionally been forgotten in this entire conflict narrative is the plight of flood-affected Kashmiri population, which has suffered loss of lives and livelihood.
Cross-LoC fire has unfortunately become a barometer of India-Pakistan relations. Sooner or later the guns will fall silent, after claiming many lives both civilian and
military, with unpleasant words exchanged and angry gesturing at the political level. In the worse-case scenario, it may require a higher level of deployment, but that is highly unlikely. What it will claim in its wake is a chunk of peace, and a window of opportunity to act wisely by either side and discuss the problem, rather than indulging in blind rage and provocative statements.
Although New Delhi does not accord the same status to UNMOGIP than Pakistan, the latter’s proposal of making this office more proactive may not be a bad idea.
Apparently, sticking to bilateralism and seeking a third party’s role behind the curtains which results in crisis stability has become a norm for the two neighbors. The
current crossfire, while may apparently look like a good marketing strategy – with Modi allegedly approving an all-out assault – will further fracture the already fragile
base on which “conditional” peace stands. If either side is genuinely interested in peace, there is a need for reviewing both policies and postures.
A NUCLEAR BONUS TO COOPERATE AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE?
Majid Izadpanahi
Since the 1979 revolution, the Iran has accused the US interference in the West Asia as the root of regional instability. But there are cases when Tehran has cooperated with Washington when their interests coincided.
The Islamic State (IS) has ambitious political, economic, military and ideological plans, and continues to occupy territories and seeks recognition. The IS has captured
oil-rich areas in Iraq and Syria and is smuggling oil via Turkey. It has beheaded journalists, has inflicted heavy casualties and human tragedies in Iraq and Syria’s
Kurdish areas. The IS has become the richest and most powerful terrorist group ever, and now is marching towards Baghdad.
Today, the IS is considered a national security threat both by Iran and the US. Its movement towards the southern Iraqi cities of Samarra, Najaf and Karbala is Iran’s red line. Also, its anti-Shia policy and its military operation near Iran’s border directly threaten Iran. The US considers the IS as a threat to its citizens, and especially its approach and plan to seize Iraq’s oil rich
areas in the south, as dangerous. Iran and the US have a history of cooperation in tackling common enemies. First, it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and second, Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Iran fully supported the US attack on the
Taliban regime in 2001, and collaborated to establish political order in Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference. But immediately after that, the then US
President George Bush labelled Iran as “Axis of Evil” shocking Tehran and embittering the bilateral. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran once again
supported the US led coalition and provided them with intelligence inputs. Subsequently, however, the “all options are on the table” and “the regime change”
option had extremely adverse impacts on the reformists’ bid to improve relations with Washington.
Today, once again, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and US over Iraq. The IS is marching towards Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan, and southern Iraq, threatening Shia-majority areas and the oil-rich Kurdish
regions of the country. An overthrow of the central government in Baghdad is neither Iran’s interest nor the US’.
At present, Iran supports all groups involved in fighting the IS inside Iraq and Syria. Iran provides military advice to the Iraqi government, has military cooperation
with the Kurds and covers the news of the developments in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in his recent visit
to Iraq, reflected Iran’s approach towards Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government by conveying Tehran’s support to him. By visiting President Masoud
Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan, he proved Iran’s support to them by providing arms, ammunitions and intelligence.
The US also gives moral, material and logistical support to the Iraqi government to keep the IS out of Iraq. Therefore, given how Iran and the US are trying to
eliminate the same enemy, it is pragmatic for the two to come closer. However, there are several reasons for Iran preference to fight the IS alone instead of joining the
US-led coalition. To begin with, Iran was not invited for the Paris Conference, organised to create a coalition West Asian countries – that included a number of corrupt regimes – to defeat the IS. Saudi Arabia is accused of supporting the IS and other terrorist groups
such as the Taliban. Turkey helps the IS in selling oil – the latter’s main source of income – via plastic pipelines and other routes. Iranian officials denounce this conference as a farce and state that they would rather fight the IS alone.
Despite not being invited to the Paris Conference, US leaders have admitted to the importance of Iran in eliminating the IS. On August 21, Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department, Marie Harf, stated, “there is a
positive role Iran can play.”
At home, in Iran, after three decades of chanting anti- American slogan, distrusting the US and being accused of sponsoring terrorism and building nuclear weapons
by the US, incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration is being pressured by the conservatives to continue the war alone. Building the Iraqi army, supporting the government of
Iraq, supporting the integrity of Iraq, Iraq’s stability and security and eliminating the IS are goals both Iran and the US are attempting to achieve. Iran supports US air
strikes on the IS because it can help the cause: defeating a very dangerous enemy in Tehran’s neighbourhood.
Destroying the same enemy still could not form a coalition that includes both Iran and the US. Iran is now more conscious of its actions and foreign policy because it still remembers that after its unconditional
cooperation with the US in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, not only they did not get the results they expected but their overtures too were rejected; and the
reformists and moderates were defeated in the subsequent presidential election.
Despite the fact that the US’ elimination of the IS serves Iranian interests, it seems that the Iranian government now wants a nuclear bonus in return for coalition in order to reduce the conservatives’ pressure.
Since the 1979 revolution, the Iran has accused the US interference in the West Asia as the root of regional instability. But there are cases when Tehran has cooperated with Washington when their interests coincided.
The Islamic State (IS) has ambitious political, economic, military and ideological plans, and continues to occupy territories and seeks recognition. The IS has captured
oil-rich areas in Iraq and Syria and is smuggling oil via Turkey. It has beheaded journalists, has inflicted heavy casualties and human tragedies in Iraq and Syria’s
Kurdish areas. The IS has become the richest and most powerful terrorist group ever, and now is marching towards Baghdad.
Today, the IS is considered a national security threat both by Iran and the US. Its movement towards the southern Iraqi cities of Samarra, Najaf and Karbala is Iran’s red line. Also, its anti-Shia policy and its military operation near Iran’s border directly threaten Iran. The US considers the IS as a threat to its citizens, and especially its approach and plan to seize Iraq’s oil rich
areas in the south, as dangerous. Iran and the US have a history of cooperation in tackling common enemies. First, it was the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and second, Saddam Hussain’s Ba’athist regime in Iraq. Iran fully supported the US attack on the
Taliban regime in 2001, and collaborated to establish political order in Afghanistan during the Bonn Conference. But immediately after that, the then US
President George Bush labelled Iran as “Axis of Evil” shocking Tehran and embittering the bilateral. During the US invasion of Iraq in 2003, Iran once again
supported the US led coalition and provided them with intelligence inputs. Subsequently, however, the “all options are on the table” and “the regime change”
option had extremely adverse impacts on the reformists’ bid to improve relations with Washington.
Today, once again, there is a convergence of interests between Iran and US over Iraq. The IS is marching towards Baghdad, Iraqi Kurdistan, and southern Iraq, threatening Shia-majority areas and the oil-rich Kurdish
regions of the country. An overthrow of the central government in Baghdad is neither Iran’s interest nor the US’.
At present, Iran supports all groups involved in fighting the IS inside Iraq and Syria. Iran provides military advice to the Iraqi government, has military cooperation
with the Kurds and covers the news of the developments in Iraq. Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif, in his recent visit
to Iraq, reflected Iran’s approach towards Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi’s government by conveying Tehran’s support to him. By visiting President Masoud
Barzani of the Iraqi Kurdistan, he proved Iran’s support to them by providing arms, ammunitions and intelligence.
The US also gives moral, material and logistical support to the Iraqi government to keep the IS out of Iraq. Therefore, given how Iran and the US are trying to
eliminate the same enemy, it is pragmatic for the two to come closer. However, there are several reasons for Iran preference to fight the IS alone instead of joining the
US-led coalition. To begin with, Iran was not invited for the Paris Conference, organised to create a coalition West Asian countries – that included a number of corrupt regimes – to defeat the IS. Saudi Arabia is accused of supporting the IS and other terrorist groups
such as the Taliban. Turkey helps the IS in selling oil – the latter’s main source of income – via plastic pipelines and other routes. Iranian officials denounce this conference as a farce and state that they would rather fight the IS alone.
Despite not being invited to the Paris Conference, US leaders have admitted to the importance of Iran in eliminating the IS. On August 21, Deputy Spokesperson, US State Department, Marie Harf, stated, “there is a
positive role Iran can play.”
At home, in Iran, after three decades of chanting anti- American slogan, distrusting the US and being accused of sponsoring terrorism and building nuclear weapons
by the US, incumbent Iranian President Hassan Rouhani’s moderate administration is being pressured by the conservatives to continue the war alone. Building the Iraqi army, supporting the government of
Iraq, supporting the integrity of Iraq, Iraq’s stability and security and eliminating the IS are goals both Iran and the US are attempting to achieve. Iran supports US air
strikes on the IS because it can help the cause: defeating a very dangerous enemy in Tehran’s neighbourhood.
Destroying the same enemy still could not form a coalition that includes both Iran and the US. Iran is now more conscious of its actions and foreign policy because it still remembers that after its unconditional
cooperation with the US in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003, not only they did not get the results they expected but their overtures too were rejected; and the
reformists and moderates were defeated in the subsequent presidential election.
Despite the fact that the US’ elimination of the IS serves Iranian interests, it seems that the Iranian government now wants a nuclear bonus in return for coalition in order to reduce the conservatives’ pressure.
1 Oct 2014
AT THE KURDISTAN FRONT
Jonathan Spyer
A war is being waged along a 900-mile front between two entities that today constitute de facto quasi-states stretching across the old border between Syria and Iraq. These are the Islamic State to the south and a contiguous area of Kurdish-controlled territory to the north. Recently, I traveled to the latter, in regions of northern Iraq and northeast Syria, like the town of Derik, where I spoke with a Kurdish soldier who had recently been in a firefight with IS forces in the neighboring village of Jeza’a.
A war is being waged along a 900-mile front between two entities that today constitute de facto quasi-states stretching across the old border between Syria and Iraq. These are the Islamic State to the south and a contiguous area of Kurdish-controlled territory to the north. Recently, I traveled to the latter, in regions of northern Iraq and northeast Syria, like the town of Derik, where I spoke with a Kurdish soldier who had recently been in a firefight with IS forces in the neighboring village of Jeza’a.
A Kurdish Peshmerga fighter on the front lines near Erbil, September 10
“We
were fighting for 17 hours,” said the Kurd. He was with the People’s
Protection Units (YPG), affiliated with the PYD, the Syrian branch of
the Kurdistan Worker’s party, or PKK. “There must have been about 500 of
them,” he said of the IS militants. “Only about 90 of us. They’re
strange, the way they keep on coming at you. We got on each side of
them. In the end, you should have seen the trucks that came to take the
bodies away. Stacked up.”
He paused and took a drag on his cigarette. “I wasn’t hurt
bad,” he continued. “I dislocated my shoulder when I had to jump over a
wall after one of them threw a grenade. Then they got me out of there. I
killed three of them. It’s not nice, you know. One of them was just a
kid of about 16. But you’ve got no choice.”
So what does an IS attack look like, I asked. Do they just come running headlong at you?
“They don’t run,” he replied, looking directly at me as if
to acknowledge the eeriness of the thing he was saying. “They walk,” he
said. “At a normal pace. Towards you. Like they’re not afraid. And you
have to shoot them before they shoot you.”
The fighting at Jeza’a was one of the most intense clashes
to have taken place between the Islamic State and the YPG. The battle
formed part of a broader IS-Kurdish war taking place along a contiguous
frontline stretching from Jalawla on the Iraq-Iran border all the way to
Jarabulus on the line separating Syria from Turkey.
At Jeza’a, the Islamic State was trying to close the
corridor that the YPG had opened in order to bring Yazidi refugees from
the Sinjar Mountains to safety at the Newroz refugee camp outside Derik.
The more than 100,000 refugees who made their way to Newroz are
exhausted and traumatized. The Islamic State considers the Yazidi to be
“devil worshippers” who are thus denied the few privileges afforded the
so-called people of the book, i.e., Christians and Jews. Yazidi women
were sent to the prisons of IS-controlled Mosul, where they were later
sold as slaves or forced to wed IS fighters.
Conditions at Newroz are primitive, but there is food and
shelter. Further east, in the Kurdish Regional Government area of
northern Iraq, the towns of Dohuk and Erbil are swollen with refugees
who fled Mosul and Sinjar. The Islamic State’s march toward the KRG
capital of Erbil was stopped only by the intervention of the United
States Air Force, and they know that any attempt to push forward would
result in their obliteration from the air. The KRG’s Peshmerga forces
are facing them in hastily assembled positions cut into the dirt. These
frontlines are for the moment strangely silent.
In Erbil and in Dohuk, the half-built structures that
until very recently were symbols of economic growth and expansion have
been converted into makeshift homes for refugee families from further
south. You see refugees everywhere. In the evenings the cities have a
teeming, crowded feel to them. But the foreigners who came with the oil
companies that moved in to do business when the KRG was the most stable
part of Iraq are mostly gone. The bars and restaurants that opened up to
cater to them are empty. On a Thursday evening in the Deutscher Hof
restaurant in Erbil, one of the few places that serves cold beer, only a
couple of British security contractors are at the bar. The Indian staff
tell me that a month ago, the place would have been packed at this
time.
A considerable portion of Erbil’s Kurdish population also
left when it looked likely that the Islamic State was on its way. Some
sources spoke of a departure of up to 30 percent of Erbil’s residents.
The Peshmerga, with the help of Iraqi special forces as well as U.S. air
support, have begun to push back against IS. The Mosul Dam, a highly
symbolic conquest for the IS, was retaken on August 21. Since then, IS
has lost ground in a number of other places. The Peshmerga are now in
the process of reconquering oil fields close to Mosul.
West of the Syria-Iraq border, meanwhile, the YPG is
continuing its own fight against the Islamic State. I visited the
frontline area at the Yarubiya border crossing. The YPG seized the
crossing in early August, and now controls both the Iraqi and Syrian
sides of it. IS still holds a neighborhood immediately adjoining the
crossing. Sniping from both sides and mortar fire are regular
occurrences. But the morale of the YPG seemed high. “They can’t shoot,” a
female fighter told me cheerfully after we sprinted across open ground
to a concealed position a few hundred yards from a mosque where the IS
sniper was operating.
Conversations with Kurdish officials indicate that they do
not consider the fight with IS in Iraq and Syria to be a battle for the
preservation of those two states. Rather, the Kurdish national agenda
is visible just barely below the surface. General Maghdid Haraki of the
Peshmerga, an effective-looking figure clearly influenced by American
military style, put it most bluntly when he told me, “We have a
different land, different language, different mentality. I don’t know
why the world won’t see this. They just see ‘Iraq.’ ”
A senior KRG official linked to the political leadership
was more circumspect. “Iraqi Kurds are today still part of Iraq,” he
said. “But if a sectarian civil war starts in Iraq, we want no part of
it. And if the mess continues in Iraq and Kurdish rights are not
granted, then what is the point of it? Anyway, Kurds, like any other
nation, have the right to determine their own future.”
Nonetheless, the fact is that the Kurds are not unified
and their divisions are not easily resolved. The central rift is between
the two rival pan-Kurdish movements. One is Massoud Barzani’s Kurdistan
Democratic party, which controls the KRG. The other is Abdullah
Ocalan’s PKK, listed by the U.S. State Department as a terrorist
organization for its three-decade-long campaign of violence against
Turkey.
Still, when it comes to Kurdish self-determination,
PKK-associated officials sound similar to General Haraki and his
colleagues. Nilufer Koc, of the PKK-associated Kurdistan National
Congress, told me in Erbil that “what’s needed is a referendum on
independence here in Iraqi Kurdistan. And when we clear the issue of the
referendum, if a new Iraqi government continues to reject Kurdish
rights, then the Kurds need to take what belongs to them.”
UNSAVORY BEDFELLOWS
Lee Smith
Last week, Senator Ted Cruz helped unmask an
organization ostensibly founded to protect a Middle East minority. When
the Texas legislator, the keynote speaker, asked the gala dinner
audience comprising mostly Middle Eastern Christians at the In Defense
of Christians conference in Washington to stand with Israel, many hooted
and booed him off the stage. The hostility came as no surprise to me:
When I found myself the night before in the same bar as a group of IDC
speakers and organizers—at the Four Seasons in Georgetown—I ordered a
bottle of champagne and had it sent to their table. Not long after, the
D.C. Metropolitan Police detained me and a friend for an hour.
Gilbert Chagoury in 2003
IDC’s
proclaimed purpose—to protect Christians in the face of a jihadist
onslaught led at present by ISIS—is of utmost importance. However, too
many of the priests, prelates, and patriarchs from Lebanon, Syria, and
Iraq, as well as one of the organization’s key benefactors,
Lebanese-Nigerian billionaire Gilbert Chagoury, have also identified
themselves as supporters of the Iranian axis in the Middle East. ISIS is
a murderous group, but so is the regime in Tehran and so are its
clients, chief among them Syria’s Bashar al-Assad and Hezbollah in
Lebanon.
ISIS, as the world now knows all too well, has used
beheadings, crucifixions, and all forms of murder and torture to
terrorize its opponents, who include Christians, Yazidis, Alawites,
Shiite Muslims, and Sunnis who don’t pledge fealty. But Assad’s record
in Syria is no better. Besides the gas attacks and indiscriminate
bombings that have killed tens of thousands of innocents, his security
forces have specialized in acts of vindictive sadism. Early in the
uprising, for instance, they mutilated the corpse of a 13-year-old boy
before returning the body to his parents.
And yet many of the clerics invited to speak at the IDC
conference are openly supportive of Assad. For instance, Maronite
patriarch Bechara Boutros al-Rai calls Assad a reformer. Maybe he took
that message to the White House when he met with Obama and Susan Rice
Thursday afternoon to ask for continued American support for the
Lebanese Armed Forces, even if its military intelligence unit is
controlled by Hezbollah. But whatever is wrong with Hezbollah or Assad,
many of the IDC clerics reason, at least they’re killing the Sunni
extremists who would kill them.
I referenced this conception of Assad’s role in the note I
sent along with the champagne: “Thanks IDC—and thanks Bashar al-Assad,
‘Protector of Christians’! XOXOXO.” I asked the waitress to deliver the
bottle directly to Chagoury, who according to leaked U.S. diplomatic
cables has supported Michel Aoun, Hezbollah’s key Christian ally in
Lebanon. A 2007 cable also explains that Chagoury is close to Suleiman
Franjieh Jr., another pillar of Lebanon’s pro-Damascus, pro-Hezbollah
March 8 political coalition and a man who calls Assad his friend and
brother. Former prime minister of Lebanon Fouad Siniora suggested to
then U.S. ambassador to Lebanon Jeffrey Feltman “that the U.S. deliver
to Chagoury a stern message about the possibility of financial sanctions
and travel bans against those who undermine Lebanon’s legitimate
institutions.”
My friend noticed that the bottle was returned to the bar
unopened. So there would be no thanks, sarcastic or otherwise, or
insults. We left, disappointed, and got into a taxi. A policeman stopped
the cab and told us to get out. His partner pulled out the note and
asked if I’d written it. Of course, I said. The recipient, she
explained, perceived it as a threat.
This was now getting interesting. A man who was a
confidant of Sani Abacha, head of one of the bloodiest and most corrupt
regimes in modern African history, and friends with Lebanese warlords
like Nabih Berri thought that a note accompanying a bottle of champagne
was threatening.
They can’t take a joke at their expense because usually
they don’t have to, my friend said. With them it’s always the principle
of “Do you know who I am?” This is what happens when you mess with a
powerful man, one of the richest men in the world. However, my friend
continued, this is not Nigeria or Lebanon—there are no thugs and
militias waiting in the wings. This is the United States of America.
The police asked us to wait while they talked with
Chagoury and his party. He’s a big Clinton donor. Who knows? Maybe he
had lawyers calling in to the police. After about half an hour, someone
with the Chagoury gang walked out from the hotel lobby and circled
around to get a look at us. The guy looked just like Samir Kassir, a
Lebanese journalist I met once when I lived in Beirut. But then I
remembered it couldn’t be him: Kassir was on the other side. For
opposing the Assad/Hezbollah condominium over Lebanon supported by the
likes of Chagoury, Kassir was killed with a car bomb in 2005.
What happens under the hoods of Lebanese cars, what goes
on in Nigerian prisons, is the province of men like Chagoury and their
political patrons. This is the capital of the free world. After an hour,
too long by any reckoning, the cops sent us on our way, happy to be
reminded on the eve of 9/11 that as Americans we stand with our friends
around the region of all faiths, Christian, Jewish, and Muslim, who
believe in what we believe in and fight for what we too often take for
granted—the right to express oneself freely, the obligation to mock
those who stand with murderers.
ALLAH AND WOMAN AT YALE
Daniel Gelernter
Ayaan Hirsi Ali spoke at Yale last week, and there was mild annoyance in the press section that no screaming protesters appeared to punch up the headlines. A small group distributed leaflets to people waiting outside; inside, all was quiet.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali spoke at Yale last week, and there was mild annoyance in the press section that no screaming protesters appeared to punch up the headlines. A small group distributed leaflets to people waiting outside; inside, all was quiet.
Ayaan Hirsi Ali
The
lack of disturb-ance was in part thanks to good planning—every seat was
filled, but no standing room was allowed, and the aisles were kept
clear. In the main, there was no disturbance because Ayaan Hirsi Ali is
hugely admired. The hundred or more people who were turned away for lack
of seats, some clutching copies of Infidel, her autobiography,
had hoped only to listen respectfully (and perhaps collect an
autograph). A great international thug syndicate has told Hirsi Ali
that, if she keeps talking, she’s dead. And she keeps talking. That
alone should win the admiration of every American.
Perhaps another reason the anti-Hirsi Ali protest fizzled
is that its front-line soldiers at Yale made fools of themselves. Yale’s
Muslim Students Association (MSA) was widely condemned for an open
letter that argued against her appearance on campus, claiming she lacked
the credentials to speak about Islam. (Never mind that she was raised
Muslim and now has a fatwa out against her.) The letter
referred to her childhood experiences of genital mutilation and forced
marriage as “unfortunate circumstances.”
The MSA’s letter was cosigned by 35 student organizations. Except not really. On the morning of Hirsi Ali’s appearance, the Yale Daily News reported
that many student groups—including Yale Hillel, Yale Friends of Israel,
and the Women’s Leadership Initiative—had been listed as cosigners
without their permission.
The attempts over the last decade to silence Ayaan Hirsi
Ali range from death threats to polite suggestions that she be barred
from campuses. They have served only to heighten her stature—and Hirsi
Ali is already impressively tall. She has a stately bearing, dresses
quietly and tastefully. She speaks slowly, with a rich and robust
accent. And you’ll never see a less affected speaker at a podium.
She began by thanking Yale in contrast with Brandeis
University. The latter had, only a few months earlier, first offered and
then rescinded an honorary degree and an invitation to appear at their
commencement ceremony. Yale will probably get more credit than it
deserves for the comparison: It was not the university but William F.
Buckley, Jr. Program, a conservative undergraduate group, that invited
her to speak on campus. Perhaps Yale will follow through and do the
decent thing and award her a degree this spring term. That would mean
something. It would turn Yale into a bastion of freedom overnight, at a
time when American universities are threatening to become an elaborate,
extremely expensive practical joke.
Hirsi Ali was introduced by Harvey Goldblatt, a professor
of Slavic languages, who praised her courage and especially her work on
women’s rights, and reminded the audience that part of a serious
academic environment is listening to opposing viewpoints. That this
reminder should be deemed necessary on a university campus is striking,
but even more striking was the almost pleading tone. There was a hidden
acknowledgment of helplessness, like a Wild-West saloon owner sidling up
to the local outlaws and saying, “Please, y’all, we don’t want any
trouble here.”
The protesters who had warned against a rabble-rousing
speech to be delivered by an ideological firebrand must have been doubly
disappointed. Hirsi Ali is a gentle, thoughtful speaker. There were no
red-meat “applause lines”—though she did often get applause. Her thesis
was simple: Any attempt to deal with Islamic terrorism is doomed unless
we acknowledge its connection to Islam. Every religion has a “core,” and
the core of Islam is to submit to the will of Allah. (That is, in fact,
what the word “Islam” means—submission to God. Hence also the
title of Hirsi Ali’s film collaboration with Dutch director Theo van
Gogh criticizing the treatment of women in Islam. Van Gogh was
subsequently murdered by an Islamic extremist.)
She insisted that there are not, as some suggest,
“many Islams”—but there are several sets of Muslims: The first group
are radicals who want to force the entire world into Islam by
eradicating everything else. The second group, the vast majority, are in
a “state of cognitive dissonance”—torn between the strict teachings of
the first group and their own consciences, which revolt at the
terrorists’ behavior. The third group, perhaps the smallest, are
reforming Muslims, who suggest, for example, that mosque and state
should be separate. Members of the third group are excommunicated,
exiled, threatened, murdered.
Hirsi Ali associates the rise of Islamic terrorism with
the rise of the first group. This new order represents a striking change
from the attitudes she knew growing up. In her early childhood in
Somalia, the attitude had been lenient: You kept what rules you could.
“If you neglected your religious duties, you were left alone.” Then a
new figure appeared, “the preacher teacher.” Most often he’d been
trained in Saudi Arabia. He would insist not only that all laws be
followed to the seventh-century letter, but that friends and family who
didn’t meet standards be snitched on immediately. If they would not
reform, ties must be broken. Christians must be converted or else ties
broken. Jews must simply be destroyed.
Hirsi Ali places the students of the MSA squarely in group
two—Muslims who should resist the radicals, but often unthinkingly (or
fearfully) direct their attacks in the wrong direction. Islamophobia,
she says, is a disingenuous term. Of course there are bigots of every
sort—there always have been. But why shouldn’t we criticize Islam as we
would any other religion? If we refrain from criticizing Islam alone, that expresses fear of Islam. That is true Islamophobia.
She concluded with a challenge to the MSA: Who is doing
the real damage to the image of Islam? Should these students protest
against reforming Muslims, or should they rather protest Boko Haram’s
sandwiching a Koran between two AK-47s on their flag? The flag’s
inscription reads “There is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is his
messenger.” The Saudi Arabian flag has the same inscription underlined
with a sword—in both cases, an ordinary theological inscription turned
into a threat. So, she asks, “will you submit—passively or actively—or
will you finally stand up to Allah?” Will you let the preacher teachers
destroy your communities, or will you tell them to bugger off? It was an inspiring speech and I think it would have given the MSA food
for thought, if they’d been there. I hope they get their hands on a
transcript.
FROM ROBESPIERRE TO ISIS
Gertrude Himmelfarb
The war on terror is over, the president assured us a
year ago. Now, we are told, that war is very much with us and will be
pursued with all due diligence. The president was obviously responding
to the polls reflecting the disapproval of the public, but also to
critics in his own party. Dianne Feinstein, chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, sadly commented on his admission that he had “no
strategy yet”: “I think I’ve learned one thing about this president,
and that is: He’s very cautious—maybe in this instance too cautious.”
The execution of Robespierre
Two
centuries ago, in the midst of another “war on terror”—or so he thought
of it—Edmund Burke rebuked his prime minister for a similar failing. He
had admired William Pitt for his leadership in the war with France, but
now, out of excessive caution, Pitt was seeking peace with that
“regicide” regime. “There is a courageous wisdom,” Burke wrote in his
“Letters on a Regicide Peace,” but “there is also a false reptile
prudence, the result not of caution but of fear. Under misfortunes it
often happens that the nerves of the understanding are so relaxed, the
pressing peril of the hour so completely confounds all the faculties,
that no future danger can be properly provided for, can be justly
estimated, can be so much as fully seen.”
That misplaced caution, or false prudence, was all the
more serious in the case of a “great state” like England, which had to
behave in a manner commensurate with its power.
The rules and definitions of prudence can rarely be exact; never universal. I do not deny that in small truckling states a timely compromise with power has often been the means, and the only means, of drawling out their puny existence; but a great state is too much envied, too much dreaded, to find safety in humiliation. To be secure, it must be respected. Power, and eminence, and consideration, are things not to be begged. They must be commanded: and they who supplicate for mercy from others can never hope for justice through themselves.
It is an odd argument to come from Burke, and perhaps the
more telling for that. If there is any one political principle
associated with Burke, it is prudence. “Letters on a Regicide Peace” was
written in 1796. Five years earlier, in his “Appeal from the New to the
Old Whigs,” he had pronounced prudence the first of all virtues.
“Prudence is not only first in rank of the virtues, political and moral,
but she is the director, the regulator, the standard of them all.” But
prudence was associated with a corollary principle, “circumstances,”
which determine what is wise and prudent in any particular situation. On
this occasion, in a war with an implacable enemy, a misplaced prudence
was not a virtue but a fatal flaw.
The war with France was such an occasion, Burke believed,
because France was the consummate enemy, the very embodiment of terror.
The idea of the “Reign of Terror” (la Grande Terreur) was not,
as some have suggested, the invention of disaffected emigrés or hostile
historians. “Terror” was the term the revolutionaries publicly and
proudly applied to themselves. In December 1793, with the executions
well under way (they amounted to 30,000 or more in a two-year period),
the “Constitution of the Terror” officially inaugurated the “Government
of the Terror.” Robespierre, the head of the Committee of Public Safety,
explained why terror was the necessary instrument of the revolution—the
“Republic of Virtue,” as he saw it. “If the spring of popular
government in time of peace is virtue, the springs of popular government
in revolution are at once virtue and terror: virtue, without
which terror is fatal; terror, without which virtue is powerless. Terror
is nothing other than justice, prompt, severe, inflexible.”
(Robespierre was executed shortly after, one of the notable victims of
the Terror.)
Burke agreed with Robespierre about this, if about nothing
else: There was a necessary connection between the revolution and
terror, as there was between the Revolutionary Wars and terror. Burke’s
“Letters on a Regicide Peace” (like his Reflections on the Revolution in France)
may be accused of hyperbole. But if his account of the “scourge and
terror” of the Revolutionary Wars seems exaggerated, it is not at all
exaggerated applied to the current wars waged by the Islamic State.
Indeed, it is uncannily prescient. With only slight changes of wording,
we can adapt and update Burke’s tract. “Out of the tomb of the murdered
Monarchy in France [read: “Out of the womb of the murderous Islamic
State”] has arisen a vast, tremendous, unformed spectre, in a far more
terrific guise than any which ever yet have overpowered the imagination
and subdued the fortitude of man.” (One can also imagine the Islamic
State, as it imposes sharia law upon its terrain, assuming for itself the title of “Republic of Virtue.”)
It was not only a murderous war, Burke insisted, it was a “peculiar” war, and that made it all the more threatening.
We are in a war of a peculiar nature. It is not with an ordinary community, which is hostile or friendly as passion or as interest may veer about; not with a State which makes war through wantonness, and abandons it through lassitude. We are at war with a system, which, by its essence, is inimical to all other Governments, and which makes peace or war, as peace and war may best contribute to their subversion. It is with an armed doctrine that we are at war. It has, by its essence, a faction of opinion, and of interest, and of enthusiasm, in every country. To us it is a Colossus which bestrides our channel. It has one foot on a foreign shore, the other upon the British soil.
Burke’s words can be echoed almost exactly today, for it
is just such a peculiar war we are waging against just such a peculiar
enemy. The Islamic State is not an ordinary state with which we can
negotiate or compromise, not a “manageable problem” we can resolve
gradually and temperately, but an “armed doctrine,” a “system,” a
“faction of opinion,” which knows no compromise and cannot be managed.
With such an enemy, there cannot be a “red line” defining how far, and
no further, we may go; a “no troops on the ground” policy, limiting our
involvement in the war; an “end-of-war” strategy that prescribes at the
outset when and how the war will be terminated. On the contrary, a war
with such an enemy is a total war—and, Burke insisted, a “long war” (his italics). “I speak it emphatically, and with a desire that it should be marked, in a long
war; because, without such a war, no experience has yet told us, that a
dangerous power has ever been reduced to measure or to reason.” The
purpose of the war must be nothing less than to “destroy that enemy” or
it will “destroy all Europe,” and to do so “the force opposed to it
should be made to bear some analogy and resemblance to the force and
spirit which that system exerts.”
The pamphlet containing the two “Letters on a Regicide
Peace,” published in October 1796, was Burke’s last published work. He
died the following year. (Two other letters were published
posthumously.) He had described himself to a friend as “a dejected old
man, buried in an anticipated grave of a feeble old age, forgetting and
forgotten in an obscure and melancholy retreat.” The “Letters on a
Regicide Peace” gives no hint of that. It is as bold and vigorous as the
Reflections—and it was surprisingly popular, considering the
fact that Burke was urging upon England a long, dangerous, and costly
war. The mood of the American public today, to judge by the polls,
should be receptive to his message, understanding our war on terror as
he understood his, and willing to pursue it with the commitment and
energy it deserves.
NO WINNERS YET IN UKRAINE
Cathy Young
The conflict in Ukraine took some dramatic turns this
month that led many observers to conclude that the Kremlin was
succeeding in its effort to keep Ukraine under Russia’s thumb, with the
collusion of a spineless West. Actually, while Russia has wrested some
concessions, the handwringing is largely unwarranted—so far. But much
depends on the West’s willingness to continue applying pressure to
Russia and offer meaningful aid to Ukraine. And, even in the best-case
scenario, a “frozen conflict” zone in eastern Ukraine is a likely and
troubling outcome.
Civilians training to fight Russian-backed rebels in eastern Ukraine
In
the final days of August, when Ukrainian forces seemed close to routing
the pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine, their successful push
against the insurgency was abruptly and brutally reversed; all available
evidence indicates that, despite Moscow’s implausible denials, the
counter-offensive was led by invading Russian troops. With Ukrainian
fighters demoralized and reeling from their sudden losses, President
Petro Poroshenko agreed to ceasefire talks. On September 5,
representatives of Ukraine, Russia, and the self-proclaimed “people’s
republics” of Donetsk and Luhansk signed an agreement that suspended
Kiev’s “anti-terrorist operation” and at least temporarily left
pro-Russian separatists in control of parts of the Donetsk and Luhansk
regions.
Then, on September 12, came the news that key parts of
Ukraine’s about-to-be-ratified comprehensive trade agreement with the
European Union would not take effect until the start of 2016, in
consideration of Russia’s economic interests. This is, of course, the
same agreement that former Ukrainian president Viktor Yanukovych backed
out of in late 2013 because of Kremlin pressure and bribery—a move that
sparked the “Euromaidan” protests and sealed his political fate. Does
the delay mean that Vladimir Putin has won and the revolution has lost?
Some believe so. A Time column by the magazine’s Moscow correspondent, Simon Shuster, was titled “How Putin Got His Way In Ukraine.” Shuster—whose Time
cover story in late July portrayed Putin as having a near-supernatural
ability to win and grow more formidable with each crisis—argues that the
compromise made in Brussels gives the Russian strongman exactly what he
wanted in the first place: a say over Ukraine’s relationship with
Europe. This theme is echoed by European commentators such as Deutsche
Welle’s Bernd Johann, who wrote, “The EU has bowed to pressure from
Moscow. Ukraine can evidently become European only with the consent of
Russia.”
Many Ukrainians share these concerns; deputy foreign
minister Danylo Lubkivsky resigned in protest against the trade deal
postponement, saying it sent “the wrong signal” both to the Russian
aggressor and the citizens of Ukraine. The symbolism was reinforced when
Ukraine’s parliament, the Rada, approved the agreement with the EU on
the same day that it passed the law on the “special order of
self-government” in the rebel-held parts of eastern Ukraine.
In a blog post on the Ukrainska Pravda website,
Poroshenko adviser Yuri Lutsenko urged his compatriots to “stop the
cries of ‘all is lost.’ ” Lutsenko pointed out that the law applies only
to parts of the Luhansk and Donetsk regions, and only for a three-year
period—a far cry from Putin’s expansionist intent—and argued that the
truce would give Ukraine a chance to recover from hostilities and shore
up its military.
To some extent, this is spin control. But some independent
Russian commentators critical of the Kremlin also believe Ukraine is
gaining, not losing, from the Minsk agreement, whose terms are largely
identical to the ones Poroshenko offered, and the rebels rejected, in
June. Historian Mark Solonin argued on his blog that the deal spells the
end of Putin’s quest to reclaim Novorossiya (“New Russia,” the
czarist-era name for territories in eastern and southern Ukraine that
many Russian nationalists regard as Russia’s own). The insurgents are
required to disarm, disband, and allow local elections with proper
monitoring—presumably by the Organization for Security and Co-operation
in Europe, which organized the negotiations. It seems unlikely they will
comply; but, while the survival of the illegal Donetsk/Luhansk enclave
certainly poses problems for Ukraine, these problems are by no means
fatal.
While Ukraine was at a clear military disadvantage when it
accepted the agreement, one should not overrate the strength of
Russia’s position. A surprise attack to shore up the insurgency is one
thing; a full-scale, long-term military operation that entails huge
expenditures, extensive casualties, and de facto world pariah status is
very different. The Kremlin’s propaganda machine has been frighteningly
effective so far, and Putin’s approval ratings still hover around
85 percent. But it is far from certain that a population grown
accustomed to stability and even relative affluence will remain docile
in the face of an economic downturn and a steady stream of dead and
wounded young men returning home. Surveys by the Levada Center, Russia’s
most respected polling agency, show support for sending Russian troops
into Ukraine dropped from 74 percent in March to just 41 percent in
August.
From this perspective, the mass incursion of Russian
troops into eastern Ukraine in late August looks less like a prelude to
conquest than a face-saving stopgap measure to prevent Ukrainian troops
from crushing the insurgency, retaking rebel-controlled territory, and
dealing Russia and its proxies a humiliating defeat. Extending the
insurgency’s lease on life allowed Putin to force Ukraine into
negotiations in which Russia would ostensibly get to play peace broker.
The delay in the full implementation of the Ukraine-EU
agreement might also be something of a face-saver for Russia. In many
ways, argues pro-Maidan Ukrainian journalist Sergii Gorbachov, it also
helps Ukraine. Postponing tariff-free imports from Western Europe (which
Putin has claimed would flood Russian markets with cheap goods) and
adoption of EU regulatory standards will give Ukraine breathing room to
phase in economic reforms; meanwhile, the EU already allows tariff-free
import of Ukrainian goods. The compromise also temporarily protects
trade with Russia, the sudden loss of which would be a serious blow to
Ukraine’s already ailing economy.
The delay will not affect Ukraine’s political integration
into Europe, with a view—reiterated by Poroshenko on his visit to North
America—to eventual EU membership. Thwarting that alliance, not stopping
cheap imports, was Putin’s real goal when he strong-armed Yanukovych
into rejecting the EU deal last year and agreeing to join Russia’s
alternative “Eurasian Customs Union” with Russia, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan. The compromise on the trade agreement does not even come
close to fulfilling those ambitions—just as the separatist enclave in
eastern Ukraine, shrunken to about half the size it was in June, hardly
fulfills his ambitions for Novorossiya.
That doesn’t mean Ukraine, or the West, has won. There is
little doubt that Putin will do further mischief, whether by trying to
undermine Ukraine’s EU trade agreement or by trying to destabilize
Ukraine through his proxies in Donetsk. The West must not let up on
sanctions—which, contrary to pessimistic predictions, are starting to
have some real bite—and must make it clear that there is a steep price
to pay for continued Russian intervention, including covert
intervention, in Ukraine. The OSCE must do what it can to monitor the
situation in rebel-held areas. Ukraine must be given vitally needed aid,
including defensive weapons.
As we enter a new Cold War, we should not underestimate Vladimir Putin. But it would also be wise not to overestimate him.
AL QAEDA IN INDIA
Saneya Arif
Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his
intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent.
Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not
appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black
flags of the Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few
Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the
possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an
organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and
secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has
remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio-
economic parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them
as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and
religious freedom.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals
regardless of religion can also be an additional source of optimism if
followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired
violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by
several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that
direction.
The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which
categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by
un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing
societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has
used the existing jihadi and sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As
much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the
Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and activities of
anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it
spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a
result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af-Pak region,
local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be
available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of
the Sunni Muslims in India. Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its
predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could
possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points.
Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these
organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a
foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among
the Indian Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of radicalisation
among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement
favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems
have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any
such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial
shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam
in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the
multiple communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike
other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian
cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in
spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is
clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted
as the next Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence.
India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India,
the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a
counter-narrative to AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a
divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even
handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base,
could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario,
certain precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have
grievances of marginalisation, state-discrimination, and sense of
alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be
tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing
multiculturalism is the need of the hour.
Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent
radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be
undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and
its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious
organizations have to work together.
THE NAXAL IDEOLOGY AND VIOLENCE
Bibhu Prasad Routray
How does one analyse the killings of 6105 civilians and security forces
in incidents related to left-wing extremism between 2005 and 2013?
Given that the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist), since its
formation in 2004, has been responsible for majority of these killings,
conventional analyses have mostly focused on big and small incidents
that produced these victims. While such methods are useful in terms of
attempting to grasp the growing or declining capacity of the outfit, it
is also useful to analyse the unceasing violence as upshot of an
ideology that has for decades underlined the necessity to shed the
enemy's blood to bring about a change in social and political order.
Three leaders – Charu Mazumdar, Kanu Sanyal and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah
– dominate the discourse on Naxalism, which began in the 1960s.
Mazumdar, in his ‘Eight Documents’ in 1965, exhorted the workers of the
Communist Party of India-Marxist (CPI-M) to take up armed struggle
against the state. He underlined that action and not politics was the
need of the hour. Such calls resulted in a number of incidents in which
the CPI-M workers started seizing arms and acquiring land forcibly on
behalf of the peasants from the big landholders in Darjeeling. These
incidents went on to provide the spark for the 1967 peasant uprising.
Following the formation of the All India Coordination Committee of
Revolutionaries (AICCR), that emerged out of the CPI-M in November 1967
and was renamed as All India Coordination Committee of Communist
Revolutionaries (AICCCR) in May 1968, Mazumdar further reiterated his
idea of khatam or annihilation of class enemies. Although incidents of
individual assassinations influenced by khatam resulted in repressive
state action targeting the naxalite cadres, the Communist Party of
India-Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), which was formed in 1969 breaking away
from the CPI-Marxist, continued professing violence as the key tool of
revolution.
While Mazumdar's preference for using violence to overthrow existing
social order and seizing state power remained the CPI-ML's mode of
operation till 1972, a counter ideology with a stress on agrarian
consolidation preceding an armed struggle was reiterated by Kanu Sanyal
following Mazumdar's death. Sanyal was not against the idea of an armed
struggle per se. However, he opposed Mazumdar's advocacy of targeted
assassination.
In the subsequent years, the CPI-ML split into several factions.
Although Sanyal himself headed a faction, he gradually grew redundant to
the extreme left movement and committed suicide in 2010. Towards the
last years of his life, Sanyal maintained that the CPI-Maoist's reliance
on excessive violence does not conform to original revolutionary
objectives of the Naxalite movement. On more than one occasion, Sanyal
denounced the “wanton killing of innocent villagers”. In a 2009
interview, Sanyal accused the CPI-Maoist of exploiting the situation in
West Bengal's Lalgarh "by using the Adivasis as stooges to carry forward
their agenda of individual terrorism."
In Andhra Pradesh, since the 'Spring Thunder' of Srikakulam in 1970,
Kondapalli Seetharamaiah, was responsible for the growth of the Naxalite
movement under the aegis of the CPI-ML. After leading a faction of the
CPI-ML and forming the People's War Group (PWG) in 1980 Seetharamaiah
oversaw a regime of intense violence, thus, earning the outfit the
description of "the deadliest of all Naxal groups". Even after the
expulsion of Seetharamaiah in 1991, the PWG and its factions remained
the source of extreme violence targeting politicians and security forces
in the state.
Kanu Sanyal's reluctant support for armed violence was, thus, somewhat
an aberration. Playing down the importance of mindless bloodshed
remained a peripheral of the Naxalite movement. Each transformation of
the movement thereafter in terms of splits, mergers, and formation of
new identities escalated the ingrained proclivity to use violence as an
instrument of expansion and influence. The CPI-Maoist represented a
natural progression of this trend. And as the fatalities data reveal,
each passing year, since its 2004 formation through a merger of the
Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) and the PWG, it became more and more
reliant on violence, rationalising the strategy as a defensive mechanism
essential to its existence.
In 2009 Koteshwar Rao alias Kishenji, who led the outfit in West Bengal
termed the violence as a "struggle for independence". Ganapathy, the
CPI-Maoist general secretary, reiterated in his February 2010 interview
that the violence is only a "war of self-defence" or a
"counter-violence" in response to a "brutal military campaign unleashed
by the state". Maoist Spokesperson Azad, who was later killed in
controversial circumstances, rejected the appeal for abjuring violence
by then Home Minister P Chidambaram in April 2010 indicating that such a
move would allow the "lawless" security forces "continue their
rampage". Azad also maintained that while the outfit generally avoids
attacking the non-combatants, "the intelligence officials and police
informers who cause immense damage to the movement" can not be spared.
Thus understood, few conclusions can be drawn, in contrast to beliefs
that a peaceful resolution of the conflict could be possible. Its
current frailty notwithstanding, regaining capacities to maximise
violence would be a priority for the CPI-Maoist. It will continue to
reject other methods of social and political change and maintain an
unwavering faith in the utility of violence. Even while realising that a
total victory vis-a-vis the state is unattainable, the outfit would
remain an agent of extreme violence in its own spheres of influence.
OBAMA'S NEW ISIS STRATEGY: IMPLICATIONS FOR INDIA
PR Chari
In his widely anticipated 15th anniversary address on the 9/11 attacks,
President Obama has clarified his objectives in the Middle East: “We
will degrade, and ultimately destroy, [the Islamic State] through a
comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy.”
Its contours are taking shape, but the new strategy would involve
airstrikes against militants and training the moderate opposition
fighters in Syria. The US will wage war against the Islamic extremists
and the regime of Syrian President Bashar Assad. Wary of domestic
opposition to getting mired in another overseas conflict after Iraq and
Afghanistan, Obama emphasized that he would seek Congressional approval
and international support from America’s Middle East and NATO allies.
Could American air power and the ground forces of its partners destroy
the Islamic State? There is enough realism around to appreciate that al
Qaeda, ISIS and similar extremist organizations propagate beguiling
ideals of equality, freedom, religious purity and so on to confront the
Western alliance, headed by the United States. It is difficult to defeat
an ideal, but its baneful effects can certainly be contained. This
understanding, is currently informing Obama’s rejuvenated
counter-insurgency strategy premised on assured domestic support and the
cooperation of allies, but restricting military action to airstrikes
and leaving ground action to allies.
Only a modest augmentation of US troops in Iraq is envisaged, raising
their total number to around 1500 for performing advisory functions by
manning tactical operations centers, protecting American personnel and
helping local security forces. An important, though unstated, component
of this revised strategy is human intelligence to pinpoint the location
of individual militant leaders for elimination by air and ground action.
Jordan is critical here.
The new Obama strategy envisages training the Free Syrian Army. Saudi
Arabia has apparently agreed to provide facilities in its territory for
their training and turning them turned around to combat the Islamic
extremists and the Assad regime. The dangers of this radical policy are
two-fold. First, the US and its allies, including Saudi Arabia, would be
getting embroiled in an enlarging Shia- Sunni sectarian conflict, with
the lines of division getting increasingly blurred. Thus Iran, Saudi
Arabia and the United States are becoming uneasy partners to confront
the ISIS and al Qaeda. But, Iran, alongside remnants of the Iraqi and
Assad regime still feel obligated to support Hamas against Israel. How
Obama’s revised Middle East strategy will sidestep these land mines of
Middle East politics remains to be seen.
So, what do these developments signify for India?
First, Obama’s 9/11 strategy is designed to ensure the continued
American presence in the Middle East; its vestigial continuance would,
hopefully, protect US national interests. It can similarly be adduced
that the US will not leave Afghanistan altogether after 2014, but
elements will remain in Bagram and other secure bases to enable air- and
drone-strikes against identified militant forces. Air-strikes do not
win wars, but they can seriously degrade the morale of rebel forces and
weaken them by decapitating their leadership. It would be in India’s
interests to support the US presence in Afghanistan, especially with the
al Qaeda threatening to turn its attention against India. A dialogue
with the US to firm up greater cooperation in this regard is called
for.
Second, it has been wryly observed that one assured supply source for
ready weapons in ISIS’s brutal efforts to overrun Iraq and Syria is the
US taxpayer. Significant numbers of semi-automatic rifles have been
captured by ISIS from military stockpiles in Iraq and Syria, apart from
heavier weapons like anti-tank HEAT (High-Explosive Anti-Tank) and
shoulder-fired anti-tank rockets that can destroy armored vehicles. Much
the same situation might arise in Afghanistan after the departure of US
and ISAF forces. According to reports significant numbers of vehicles,
small arms and ammunition will be left behind as they are prohibitively
costly to ship back to the United States. Much of this materiel might
find its way into India via terrorist groups operating in the
Afghanistan-Pakistan region, but with interests in Kashmir. How this
menace should be thwarted requires urgent consultations with the United
States.
Third, the growth of sectarianism in the Middle East crisis should
concern India. Extremists in the Middle East have targeted Christians
and other ethnic minorities, but also rival schisms within Islam. The
Shia-Sunni divide has become corrosive, which is also excoriating South
Asia, especially Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also India. This rapid
growth in sectarianism has to be guarded against, especially with the
coming into power in New Delhi of a political party with militant Hindu
roots. Concerns here are not ill-founded.
Obama’s newly minted Middle East policy will therefore have much wider
repercussions, including the US pivot towards Asia that concerns India;
further developments here will require India’s vigilant attention.
PAKISTAN AND THE COUP
D Suba Chandran
Almost after a month of intense politicking in Islamabad and the
multiple calls to Azadi and Inquilab with few thousand men and women,
why have Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri failed to achieve their primary
objectives? And why did the Khakis back off?
It appears very clear, that there is no revolution impending in the
immediate or distant future in the political landscape of Pakistan. Nor
is Nawaz Sharif is likely to resign, based on whatever has happened so
far. It would be a different story that Sharif may be forced to resign
at a future date for a different reason; but certainly, he is not
resigning and yielding to the “Container” democrats and revolutionaries.
First and foremost, the primary objectives of Tahirul Qadri and Imran
Khan failed under its own weight. Have they been pitched for something
that is within the realms of possibility, they would have achieved their
objectives, or at least a reached compromise closer to their position.
Tahirul Qadri promised a revolution and Imran Khan asked for Nawaz
Sharif’s resignation.
Second reason for their failure has been their ability to engage their
own party members and keep the protest movement coherent. Neither Qadri
nor Imran Khan could galvanize their protests and sit-ins into a larger
national movement. The numbers are sufficient enough to create
disruption, but not large enough to usher into a revolution.
Worse, as it happened to the PTI, there have been internal dissensions
within the party in terms of what needs to be achieved. Javed Hashmi
episode clearly highlights that not everyone within his party agreed
with Imran Khan. He has taken few decisions, contrary to what has been
advised by his own party seniors.
The Establishment did not move in. According to some, including Najam
Sethi, a section within the military including senior serving officials
conspired to over throw Nawaz Sharif using Imran Khan. However, the
military high command did not agree to such a strategy engaging an open
support to the revolutionaries against Nawaz Sharif. It is so obvious
from the fact that the protesters were raising slogans in favour of the
military when they were thrown out the building they had occupied
earlier – Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri were waiting for the final
decision by the “third” umpire.
Perhaps, the military used Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri to achieve what
they wanted. They used the crisis to ensure that the political
leadership approaches them in the first place to arbiter, and later draw
redlines in terms of what the Parliament could undertake and what
should be left to the domain of the Khakhis. Once they got embedded into
the political and foreign policy decision making, the military is not
too keen in overtly overthrowing Nawaz Sharif.
Lack of popular support to the protestors and their backers in the
Esrtbalishment could be another reason. Projecting a rare stand of
unity, political parties (except the PTI) sided with the government. The
PPP, MQM, ANP, JUI and JI did come together and realised that it is not
in their interest to weaken the Parliament or supporting movement
leading to a coup. None of the political parties are willing to face
another elections in the near future, are be willing to accept Imran
Khan as their next Prime Minister. With less that 40 seats at the
National Assembly, the PTI simply does not have the numbers to make any
real difference to the composition of Parliament.
Fifth, there was fatigue, especially in the media and amongst the
people. While a Jalsa may keep the attention of people for a short
period, people did not have the patience to see such a tamasha being
carried out on a daily basis. There was so much buzz in the media in
the initial days; later it became a drag. Worse, the rains and floods
have diverted the attention of people.
Finally, there has been no international support forthcoming to Imran
Khan and Tahirul Qadri. The biggest blow came, when Pakistan’s all
weather friend, decided to have a different look at the situation. China
cancelled the visit of its President XI Jinping to Pakistan. Neither
the US nor EU have been sympathetic to the cause of the revolutionaries.
Perhaps, the military also took the cue.
Does the above mean, Sharif’s position is strengthened today? Hardly. In
fact, his position is weaker than it was in July this year. He should
be well aware he has got another lease and can continue in the
Parliament. Only he would know what he has promised the military to
ensure that the latter does not intervene. The biggest question that he
should ask himself is – how did the situation come to this level in
August 2014, just one year after that mammoth electoral victory in May
2013?
The earlier Sharif find answers to those factors that have caused the
turnaround in the last fifteen months, the better for democracy in
Pakistan. Should he pursue a vendetta politics and ensure Musharraf gets
a stronger sentence? Should he engage in crony politics and ensure that
the institutions are not strengthened? Should he follow a populist
course and not engage in providing better governance?
Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri may be the problems. But the solutions are with Nawaz Sharif.
ISI, INDIA AND SRI LANKA
N Manoharan
The recent arrest of Sri Lankan national Arun Selvarajan in Chennai by
the National Investigation Agency (NIA) for spying on behalf of
Pakistan’s ISI is concerning. He is the third Sri Lankan arrested for
spying in the past over one year. Earlier, two Sri Lankan Muslims
(Mohammed Sakir Hussain and Suleman Hussain) and an Indian (Thameen
Ansari) were apprehended on similar charges. The arrestees confessed
that their handlers were agents posted at Pakistani High Commission
based in Colombo. Previously, it was Amir Zubair Siddiqui, who was
posted as visa counsellor, and later it was Haji alias Siraj Ali.
Sri Lanka and the ISI
Sri Lanka may not be conniving with Pakistan against India, but is being
used as a base by the ISI. Sri Lanka never allowed its territory for
any anti-India activities and the ISI operations may be happening
without Colombo’s knowledge.
Why Sri Lanka has been chosen as a base by the ISI? Why are the Sri
Lankans citizens involved? What is the purpose behind the Colombo
module? What is the state of counter-intelligence capability of India?
The ISI has been operating from some of the neighbouring countries of
India like Nepal, Bangladesh, Afghanistan, Myanmar and even Maldives.
The southern front of India remained unpenetrated for quite some time.
Sri Lanka could be the best base to do that for two specific reasons:
• Given the proximity and similarity of language and appearance, Sri Lankan Tamils and Sri Lankan Muslims, who also speak Tamil, would not find it difficult to reach Tamil Nadu and mix-up with the local population. Presence of large number of Sri Lankan refugees is yet another facilitating aspect.• Pakistan’s activities in Sri Lanka have not been seen with suspicion by the security establishment of the island state. Sri Lanka-Pakistan relations have been good without any irritants. Sri Lanka is ever grateful to Pakistan for all the military support during the Eelam War. In addition, when Sri Lanka was hauled by the international community for human rights excesses during that War, Islamabad rendered unstinted diplomatic support.
ISI and the Involvement of Sri Lankan Citizens
There are various reasons for the involvement of Sri Lankan Tamils and
Muslims in the spy ring. The primary motivation is financial. Unemployed
youth are easy targets. There is a theory that argues that part of the
reason for the involvement of Sri Lankan Muslims in ISI’s spy network is
their increasing radicalisation. But, the theory may explain if they
are involved in spying western targets based in India, but not acting
against Indian targets.
Pakistan obviously has denied the existence of an ISI base in Sri Lanka
targeted against India as “speculative” and “malicious media campaign”.
The denial is not surprising. Pakistani ISI has been assiduously
pursuing the objective of establishing espionage networks for collection
of India’s defence related information with reference to
deployment/movement of armed forces, information relating to vital
installations including sensitive information pertaining to the latest
knowhow with reference to technological advancement etc. For this
purpose, it has been able to organise resident agents and even allure
the lower staff in sensitive organizations for collection and
communication of sensitive information. When there is a roadblock there,
it has moved on to tap ethnic similarities in the neighbourhood.
Sri Lanka as a base: What is ISI’s Endgame?
What is concerning is the security dimension of the espionage. There are
two aspects to spying. One is to just gather information about the
enemy for the purpose of having information advantage. The second aspect
is to collect information with the aim to inflict damage.
Reconnaissance of Kalapakkam nuclear plant site, NSG Hub in Chennai,
Coast Guard installations on the eastern coast, Officers’ Training
Academy (OTA) in Chennai, Nagapattinam Port, the Madras Regimental
Centre in Wellington, harbours in Chennai and Ennore, DGP office and the
High Court complex in Chennai and Vizag and Kochi ports have been
carried out. Places like the Sulur Air Base, the Naval detachment in
Karaikal, naval installations located in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands
were on the pipeline. But, by then the spies have been arrested. Going
by the confessions of the arrestees, information gathering was meant for
planning a terror attack. The first ever terror attack in Chennai in
May this year is not unconnected to the larger ISI plot.
Meeting the Challenge: What is required?
Whoever has been arrested is only a tip of the iceberg. It is important
to find out how many more spies are on the prowl. This requires a
thorough review and revamping of counter-intelligence capabilities of
India. Counter-intelligence continues to be a weak spot in the Indian
intelligence infrastructure. It is important to develop a totally
different set of intelligence capabilities to cater to rapidly changing
threat environment. This needs to be done at several levels—from
training modules to doctrines to equipment to motivation. Intelligence
at the state level requires modernisation. Human intelligence (HUMINT)
requires more attention than just technical intelligence (TECHINT). Not
the least, the intelligence flow has to be both ways: from the Centre to
States and vice versa.
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