Manpreet Sethi
As expected, Russian President Valdimir Putin and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi covered all the usual areas of cooperation during the
former’s visit to New Delhi on 11 December, 2014. Russia has been India’
close partner over decades and the latter has reiterated the importance
of the relationship in contemporary times too. The Druzhba Dosti Vision
Statement (VS) covers the period of the next decade, anchored in a
special strategic partnership.
Obviously, the nuclear component of this relationship, which traverses
the entire range of activities from fuel fabrication to plant
decommissioning, is especially noteworthy. Building on the agreements
signed by both in 2008 and 2010, the 2014 Strategic Vision for
Strengthening Atomic Energy Cooperation envisages the construction of a
dozen nuclear power reactors over the next 20 years. It may be recalled
that Kudankulam (KK) 1, India's first Russian reactor, attained
full-rated power in 2014, and KK 2 is nearly ready too. Meanwhile, a
General Framework Agreement was signed in April 2014 for the
construction of KK 3 and 4 at the same site.
The next tranche of Russian nuclear reactors will require fresh site(s).
The 2014 nuclear cooperation VS mentions that the construction of
future nuclear plants would take into account “India’s demand for power,
the then available nuclear technologies including those that may be
developed jointly, mutually acceptable technical and commercial terms,
and the prevalent electricity tariffs.” Evidently and wisely, a lot has
been left to the consideration of factors prevalent in the future.
The Agreement also emphasises the involvement of Indian suppliers of
manufacturing equipment, fuel assemblies and spares for Russian reactors
to be constructed in India. Indeed, one of the hallmarks of India's
decision to import reactors from the international nuclear market has
been the insistence on including a large local component into their
construction. Even before Modi vocalised ‘Make in India’, the nuclear
sector has always been bound by this dictum. In fact, until 2008, it did
not have the option of foreign material, technology or components.
Retaining that focus while realising the ambitious national nuclear
expansion plans would certainly open employment opportunities for the
millions of young engineers and technicians passing out of the Indian
education system annually. In fact, another important aspect of the VS
in this context is the prospect of exploring “opportunities for sourcing
materials, equipment and services from Indian industry for the
construction of the Russian-designed nuclear power plants in third
countries.”
Given that the Russian nuclear industry is keen on exports, this would
enhance the capability and capacity of the Indian nuclear industry
through necessary transfer of technology.
The Statement also mentions joint extraction of natural uranium through
technical cooperation in mining activities, “within their own
territories and in third countries.” This would be significant for India
if it is to fulfill its nuclear expansion ambitions without having to
worry about the availability of fuel. At the same time, collaboration
on radioactive waste management, research and development on fusion
reactors etc. are all forward-looking aspects of the VS.
So, what stands in the way of realising the potential of the vision of
the statement? A few issues must be given due consideration. First, the
identification of fresh site(s) for the new Russian reactors may not be
as easy as it sounds. Given that public acceptance issues have acquired a
worrisome dimension in the post-Fukushima environment, the acquisition
of necessary land will call for much greater investment, and not just
monetary, by the nuclear establishment to reach out to the
constituencies to inform and educate them with the objective of winning
them over.
Second, the Indian nuclear liability law will require amendments to
become palatable to the nuclear industry anywhere, at home or abroad.
While rather cryptically, Russian government officials have “in
principle” agreed to the Indian nuclear liability law, this has been
done after factoring in the costs involved in the process. According to
some reports, the first and second units of the Kudankulam nuclear power
plants had cost India $1 billion each, but new units will cost triple
the amount in view of India's nuclear liability law. Even if this may be
an exaggeration, it must not be forgotten that any nuclear industry,
including Russian, is in the business of doing business. The cost will
be handed down to India only.
In such a situation, critics of nuclear power will jump at the
opportunity to drum up opposition to construction of new nuclear plants
on the ground of the high costs. Economics of nuclear reactors has
always been a matter of concern. In the past, the Nuclear Power
Corporation of India Ltd. has contended that its Pressurized Heavy Water
Reactors have been comparable in cost to other sources of electricity.
But, a high cost of imported reactors, owing to the nuclear liability
law imposing a huge burden on any nuclear industry, would put a black
mark against nuclear power.
Therefore, it would be a good idea to take a fresh look at the issue so
as to be able to make use of the opportunities that have opened up for
India in the field of international nuclear commerce. Amendment of the
law is not to appease outsiders but to make nuclear power an
implementable viable option for India itself.
A VS may be crafted when the decision-makers see potential, but it can
only be realised when they also see and address the challenges that
stand in the way.
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