US study shows: Poverty and social inequality are killers

Patrick Martin

Poor Americans are nearly twice as likely to die before they reach old age as rich Americans. That is the grim conclusion of a study released this week by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, on the impact of widening income and wealth disparities in the United States.

The study is based on extensive health and retirement surveys conducted by the Social Security Administration in 1992 and 2014. It examines a subset of the population, those between 51 and 61 years old in 1992, breaking this age group into five quintiles.

A homeless man moves his belongings from a street behind Los Angeles City Hall as crews prepared to clean the area Monday, July 1, 2019. (AP Photo/Richard Vogel)

As the accompanying chart shows, the GAO found that nearly half of those (48 percent) in the poorest quintile died before 2014, when they would have been between 73 and 83 years old. Of the wealthiest quintile, only a quarter (26 percent) died.

The connection between income and death rates was stark and irrefutable: from quintile to quintile, as income declines, death rates rise. The second-poorest fifth of the age group under study had the second-worst death rate, with 42 percent dead by 2014. The figures for the middle fifth and the second-highest fifth were 37 percent dead and 31 percent dead, respectively.

And while the poor have always gone to the grave earlier than the rich, the relative disparity is now worsening. According to several recent studies, the poorest 40 percent of women have lower life expectancies than their mothers, despite all the gains made by medical science over the past generation.

These figures provide insight into the staggering long-term human cost of poverty and inequality. The report says, in dispassionate, bureaucratic language, “GAO’s analysis … shows that differences in income, wealth, and demographic characteristics were associated with disparities in longevity.” Translated into plain language: poverty and inequality kill.

Other statistics reported this week give further indications of the deepening social crisis in America. The GAO report itself found that from 1989 to 2018, the labor force participation rate for those aged 55 or older rose from 30 percent to 40 percent, an increase of one-third. This shows the impact of stagnant incomes and the virtual disappearance of traditional pension plans. Older workers were forced to work longer and postpone retirement because they did not have enough money to live on.

A Census Bureau report issued Tuesday found a small drop in the poverty rate in 2018, but other social indicators were not so favorable. The total number of people in the US living in poverty remained appallingly high, at 38 million.

Median household income was $63,200, essentially unchanged from 2018. On a longer historical timeline, the Census report found that there has been virtually no increase in real wages for the past 20 years, since 1999, as wage gains have been wiped out by the rising cost of living.

The chart shows the survival rate for the poorest fifth and the wealthiest fifth of Americans aged 51 to 61 in 1992. By 2014, 48 percent of the poorest group were dead, compared to only 26 percent of the richest group.

The number of Americans without health insurance rose substantially in 2018, for the first time since the passage of Obamacare in 2010, from 25.6 million to 27.9 million, mainly because of the reduction in the number of people covered by Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Two policy changes by the Trump administration contributed to this decline: promoting new state regulations that restrict Medicaid eligibility, and threatening immigrants who apply for Medicaid or CHIP with being denied green cards in the future on the grounds that they have become “public charges.”

The Census report also confirmed the devastating dimensions of economic inequality in America. While the bottom fifth of households, those with annual incomes up to $25,600, accounted for only 3.1 percent of all household income, the top fifth, with annual incomes over $130,000, accounted for 52 percent, more than half. The top 5 percent, with incomes above $248,700, took in 23.1 percent of the total.

Rising inequality, persistent poverty, declining life expectancy for the mass of working people, the vanishing dream of a comfortable retirement: this is the reality that Trump hails as an America made “great” again. Nor do the Democrats—who controlled the White House for more than half the period in question—have any alternative. The two parties in Washington are rival factions within the same ruling elite, and they both defend American capitalism, the underlying cause of all these social evils.

The GAO report was not actually commissioned by Congress to expose the connection between poverty and premature death. On the contrary, its purpose was to examine the impact of changes in life expectancy on Social Security and Medicare so as to assist congressional efforts, supported by both parties, to cut spending on these “entitlement” programs long-term.

The authors of the report are quite conscious that their findings could be embarrassing to their congressional masters. They hasten to declare that they have found only a “statistical association” between poverty and higher death rates, adding that “we cannot determine from our analysis the extent to which income or wealth causes differences in longevity” [Emphasis added].

The report goes on to warn that despite lower life expectancy for the poor, “Taken all together, individuals may live a long time, even individuals with factors associated with lower longevity, such as low income or education. Those with fewer resources in retirement who live a long time may have to rely primarily on Social Security or safety net programs.” Translated into plain English: plans to eliminate these programs could run into widespread opposition, as they are increasingly the lifeline on which millions depend.

These fundamental social contradictions are the backdrop against which the working class is moving into historic struggles. Any major industrial action—such as a strike by the 155,000 workers at General Motors, Ford and Fiat Chrysler—can be the signal for the eruption of class conflict on a scale not seen in America since the 1930s.

American capitalism has been heaping up the raw material for such a political explosion for decades. Living standards for the working class have stagnated for more than four decades, with tens of millions in poverty in the richest country in the world, and more than a million homeless. The youth toiling in low-wage jobs are the first generation of American workers to live worse than their parents and grandparents. And these older generations, as the GAO report demonstrates, are finding it harder and harder to survive.

The decisive question is for working people to free themselves from the old organizations that have been used by the ruling elite to block any struggle against the profit system. This means breaking with the trade unions, run by corrupt stooges of the corporate bosses, and building rank-and-file committees democratically controlled by the workers themselves. And it means breaking from the nationalist perspective peddled by the trade unions, which seek to pit American workers against their class brothers and sisters around the world.

Capitalism is a global system, and it is impossible to fight the capitalists effectively in any country without the united efforts of the international working class. To carry out this struggle, the working class needs its own party, organized on an international basis and fighting for socialism in every country.

Food Security in South Asia and the Need for Regional Consensus-Building

Shatakshi Singh


While food security has been a matter of national policy focus in South Asian countries for some time, factors such as climate change merit an urgency to understand the issue as a regional-level concern. Within this context, three topics are germane.

The Idea of a South Asian Food BankIn 2007, a common food bank to hold food grain reserves was operationalised under the aegis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) . However, the SAARC food bank has been unable to function optimally due to certain inherent weaknesses.

SAARC’s inherent vulnerabilities have resulted in a state-of-affairs where regional consensus-building for cooperative mechanisms to ensure food security has been deficient. The blueprint of the SAARC Food Bank, too, is structurally flawed given how it places a considerably disproportionate burden on India. In the initial years, India’s food grain contribution towards the SAARC food bank’s capacity stock of 23.2 million tonnes, stood at 15.32 million tonnes.

However, although India’s initial pledge was to contribute substantially to the reserve, in the years ahead, the disproportion in contributions could potentially lead to friction given how the agriculture and food security landscape is changing rapidly due to climate change. It may be useful to consider a collective food grain reserve for South Asia, facilitated by adapting other successful, comparative models, such as that of the Economic Community of West African States. Addressing issues of accessibility and wastage could supplement the effort.

Collaborative Activities and Mutual Learning in Agricultural ResearchBased on the development of sophisticated national agricultural research systems in South Asian countries, it has been argued that they stand to gain from knowledge-sharing and collaborative research efforts for enhanced food security. The relevance of undertaking knowledge exchange activities in this sphere is apparent given the presence of contiguous agro-ecological tracks across South Asian territorial boundaries. The Punjab region, which spans the Indian and Pakistani landscape, and the Tarai region, which spans Indian and Nepalese territories, are some prime examples.

The predominance of wheat and rice in cropping patterns across South Asia provides impetus to such an endeavour. General coordination of research initiatives could translate to lower costs and efficiency for those involved. According to a report released by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), among South Asian countries, India spends the most on agricultural research and development. Additionally, India is already offering agro-technology and equipment to Myanmar, and has been doing capacity building activities in this sphere by establishing an agricultural research centre in the country. As such, India is also well-positioned to gain from following the Israeli model of exporting agricultural technology and expertise, given the advances made by the country in biotechnology, plant genetics, etc.

Cooperating in a technical field could also help contribute to regional integration. Since agriculture is central to ensuring domestic food security, regional research collaborations aimed at increasing agricultural productivity has the potential to facilitate a more holistic realisation of food security.

Sustainable Use of Water ResourcesAs a densely populated, resource-hungry region, the sustainable use of water resources, particularly transboundary rivers, is a significant area for collaborative action since it is directly responsible for crop health, and by extension, food security.

However, with respect to river water-sharing, most of the water catchment occurs in India, which often finds itself as a middle riparian. India’s trans-boundary river water policies impact four countries: Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. With the groundwater supply in India predicted to drop below demand by 2030, the dependence on freshwater resources will increase. Climate change risks will further compound the negative impact of water shortage on agricultural output given the aggregate demand for water in irrigation practices. Resultantly, working towards the sustainable management of domestic and transboundary water resources is crucial for overcoming future challenges to food security in the region.

Looking AheadAt present, in accordance with the recalibration of its policy priorities, India is redirecting its efforts towards revitalising the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), whose members include Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. Given this sub-region’s geographic diversity including in climatic conditions, cropping patterns etc, fresh approaches to ensure food security merit exploration. The need of the hour is a responsive cross-border mechanism that systematically addresses the concern by building bilateral and sub-regional consensus towards food security, as a step towards regional consensus.

Maritime Connectivity to the Russian Far East Necessitates Naval and Arctic Planning

Vijay Sakhuja


In September 2019, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, traveled to Russia where he was the chief guest at the 5th Eastern Economic Forum. During this visit, India and Russia signed multiple agreements on a range of topics. Specifically, New Delhi and Moscow signed a Memorandum of Intent to establish ‘maritime communication’ between Chennai and Vladivostok. The primary purpose of opening the route to the Russian Far East is to increase the volume of existing bilateral trade, which is expected to touch US$ 30 million in value by 2025. The cargo and commodities to be traded via this route have been identified as energy resources and agro based products such as timber, and would be transported from Vladivostok bound for Chennai.

Plans for maritime connectivity between the Russian Far East and India can be traced back to 2006 when the Russian tanker, MK Viktortitov, transported the first consignment of oil from Sakhalin-I to the New Mangalore Port, to be processed at the refinery. India’s then Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, late Murli Deora, labeled the 5,700 nautical miles long Sakhalin-Mangalore route as the “new silk route” and “new route of integration,” and called Russia an important friend whom India looks upon for its “energy needs and security of the country.” A similar euphoria is now visible and can be gleaned from the commentaries and op-eds that are doing rounds in the media, as also among the strategic community and think-tanks.

At this juncture, it is useful to understand at least three important aspects that anchor international shipping. First, that it is driven by profits, and freight forwarders and shipping companies make clear choices based on whether or not the voyage will be lucrative. The second pertains to the availability of ships to ensure that large volumes can be transported in a sustained manner. The third is the location of the port from where cargo is collected and finally discharged.

The Port of Vladivostok is the only multipurpose port in the Russian Far East and handles a variety of cargo including, bulk, containers, oil products, cars, heavy-duty vehicles etc. Over the past few years, its cargo handling has improved consistently. It is to be borne in mind that the Port of Vladivostok is located at higher latitude in the Arctic Circle and experiences severe sea-ice conditions between the months of December and March. This factor limits operations to those by ice-class vessels of category Ice2. However, assistance for icebreaking vessels can be obtained from port authorities by ships at the owner’s requests and expense. Currently, none of the Indian flagged vessels are ice-capable, which would require either Russian flagged vessels or chartering tankers from the market, but this is not a major challenge. However, in the instant case, there is little information about the amount of oil or gas that India wishes to import through Vladivostok to help determine the final landing cost.

Be that as it may, the latest development merits attention of Indian naval planners who must now think about the ‘new sea lane’ through the prism of security. Originating in Russia’s Far East and passing through the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait to Indian ports, the route entails careful safety as well as geopolitical and geostrategic risk assessments. The cargo must be secured against usual risks such as natural catastrophes (hurricanes and storms) and asymmetric threats and challenges that plague the South China Sea. Furthermore, the safety of such cargo is compounded by possible interception by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. It is fair to assume that Russia and China are strategic partners and this relationship should dissuade China from intercepting any Russian vessel/cargo bound for India. Also, a quid pro quo situation may arise, prompting the Indian Navy to pursue a corresponding response. In this regard, it would be useful to recall a recent contestation between Iran and UK after the former intercepted an Iranian vessel in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Indian Navy already has a well-practiced energy sea-lane security strategy for the route between the Persian Gulf and Indian ports. Furthermore, its capacity and capability to escort/protect critical energy shipments during prolonged crisis/wars is well known. For instance, in June 2019, under the aegis of Operation Sankalp, the Indian Navy deployed warships to ‘reassure’ Indian flagged vessels operating/ transiting through the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman following heightened tensions between the US and Iran and the latter had commandeered a British flagged vessel.

It is worth pointing out that the Indian Navy is committed to several other naval operations in the Indian Ocean and these engagements may curtail deployment in the South China Sea. Under the circumstances, a possible approach to protect Indian flagged/cargo carrying shipping through the South China Sea could be a cooperative mechanism among the maritime and naval forces of Japan and the US with whom India already has a working arrangement.

Finally, it would be useful for India to also think about Vladivostok as a springboard for its future engagement in Russia’s global energy market and the Arctic region involving the new Arctic LNG 2 project, the future project Arctic LNG 3, and the Northern Sea Route, which would be open for navigation for longer periods in the times to come.

US-North Korea Talks: Is Progress Without Reciprocity Possible?

Sandip Kumar Mishra

It is becoming obvious that unless the US provides some kind of security guarantee as well sanctions relief to North Korea, there will be no forward movement in US-North Korea denuclearisation talks. Despite open channels of communication between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump, and North Korea's recent offer to resume talks, Pyongyang has continued to conduct missile tests. Eight missile tests have taken place since July 2019, and the latest was on 10 September. There are three important indications from North Korea's behaviour. One, it is willing to continue denuclearisation talks with the US. Two, it will not consider giving up the nuclear option until clear and concrete reciprocal actions are initiated by the US. Three, North Korea seeks a deal with the US as soon as possible.

The first indicator – of North Korea's interest in talks – is evident in its recent posturing. Kim has been corresponding with Trump, he agreed to meet the latter at the DMZ at very short notice on 30 June 2019, avoids criticising him personally, and  has limited recent missile testing to short-range missiles. At the same time, Kim's disinclination to move ahead with the talks unless there are clear measures from the US in the form of sanction relief and a security guarantee is also evident. This is based on North Korea's avoidance of official-level dialogue with the US on various pretexts, and the increasing frequency of its short-range missile tests.

North Korea is of the belief that its demands can only be fulfilled by dealing directly with Trump, and that any other US official, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, do not have the capacity to facilitate them. So far, Trump has been unwilling to entertain North Korea's stipulation of reciprocity, and insists on official dialogue to lock in the details of the denuclearisation process.

The issue of reciprocity was explicitly raised for the first time by North Korea in the second summit between the two leaders at Hanoi – a demand that abruptly aborted the summit. The US reportedly proposed a partial concession on sanctions but demanded North Korean dismantlement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and beyond. North Korea made it clear that given limited trust between the US and North Korea, a gradual approach would be more appropriate.

Although North Korea was disappointed with the outcome – or lack thereof – of the Hanoi summit, it kept doors open for any indication of a change of mind by Trump. An expectation of a changed approach following Trump's expression of interest in meeting Kim after the G-20 summit followed. However, this third meeting also did not result in a useful, or new, outcome. Despite these disappointments, North Korea agreed to start official-level dialogue with the US, although it is no longer willing to do so. It is evident that Kim has waited it out based on the expectation of a US policy of accommodation and flexibility which has yet to make itself visible. North Korea is also obdurate about its position, and the deadlock continues.

This game of waiting each other out appears to be taking the process nowhere and has instead resulted in a deadlock. The current circumstances are not as alarming for the US because North Korea has not conducted nuclear tests in some time, and the issue of the remains of US soldiers who lost their lives during the Korean War has been addressed. North Korea, however, wants a deal before the end of the year. This arises from North Korea's belief that earning concessions from Trump, if played right, will be easier than another president, should he or she replace Trump.

It is also possible that Trump has realised the urgency of the issue drawing from the increasing frequency of missile tests, and the likelihood of a rapid deterioration in bonhomie. If a deal is not eventually forthcoming, North Korea may decide to conduct a nuclear or long-range missile test as escalation, and this would be ultimately detrimental to Trump's election prospects as well. It is reported that National Security Advisor John Bolton, who was the most hawkish in Trump's administration, was ousted (on the same day that North Korea conducted its last missile test), for this same reason.

In the coming days, the US could soften its stand in dealing with North Korea, and potentially adopt a principle of flexible reciprocity. It is important to underline however that Trump's inconsistency in messaging could lead to any eventuality, and it is naive to assume that he will become suddenly more nuanced and visionary in approach after Bolton's departure.

Catholic Relief Services International Development Fellows Programme (IDFP) 2020

Application Deadline: 1st November 2019

Eligible Countries: All

About the Award: The Catholic Relief Services International Development Fellows Program, or IDFP, is designed for individuals dedicated to a career in international development. While completing comprehensive training on program management and operations, fellows support CRS’ work in various sectors such as agriculture/livelihoods, health, peacebuilding, emergency response, education, microfinance, or a combination of these.
The fellows’ training focuses on project management, project design and proposal development, partnership and capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, budget and resource management, supply chain and logistics, human resources and security protocols.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 

• Graduate degree in field relevant and applicable to international development (e.g. Agriculture, Health, Engineering, Business, Public Administration, Finance, Supply Chain)
• Fluency in English with strong oral and written communication skills
• Professional proficiency in a second language (preference given to major languages spoken where CRS works)
• At least six months overseas work or volunteer experience in a developing country (consideration given to applicants with at least five years of experience living in a developing country)
• Strong interest in a career in development or emergency relief
• Willing to work in various regions and developing countries around the world
• Able to work respectfully and professionally in a cross-cultural environment

Number of Awards: CRS offers 20-30 fellowships each year.

Value of Award: CRS provides IDFP participants with the following benefits:

• Great opportunities for professional growth and development overseas
• Stipend, allowances, and furnished housing
• Transportation to and from the country
• Extensive insurance coverage (medical, dental, life, travel/accident, evacuation and personal household effects)
• Paid vacation, sick and personal leave, and 12 paid holidays
• Language learning assistance

Duration of Programme: 12 months

How to Apply: We welcome as a part of our staff and as partners people of all faiths and secular traditions who share our values and our commitment to serving those in need.
To be considered for the program, please complete the following 3 steps:

1. Prepare a statement of interest (preferably no more than one page) that answers the following two questions:
   1. Considering the 4 primary learning areas of the fellows’ foundational training, what relevant experience can you leverage to be successful in the program?
   2. Which of the 4 primary fellowship learning areas interests you most and why?
2. Update your resume or CV to highlight your relevant experience and qualifications
3. Complete the IDFP application

Visit Programme Webpage for Details

Award Providers: CRS

Stanford PACS – Digital Civil Society Lab Non-Resident Fellowship 2020

Application Deadline: 30th September 2019

Eligible Countries: International

To be Taken at (Country): USA

About the Award: The Non-Resident Fellowship supports social sector leaders to dedicate time to working on ideas that apply to broad swaths of civil society but that may not quite fit into their “day job.” The fellowship provides time, space, expertise, and financial support to help turn ideas into prototypes or action, and to build a cohort of fellows to support ongoing learning and community.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: The Non-Resident Fellowship is open to applicants 18 years of age or older who meet the following conditions:

• Meet all submission deadlines and submit the application in English;

• Commit to spend twelve months undertaking a project addressing one of two topical tracks: Digital Civil Society, or Race and Technology;
• Commit to contribute a final written report, video or audio interview;
• Commit to attend a week-long convening of the fellowship cohort at Stanford University, January 20-24, 2020. This week involves an introduction to the Lab and its research goals and activities, opportunities to meet other communities on campus, independent time to interact with scholars and research institutes on campus and in the area, and the development of individual year-long work plans. Fellows are encouraged to engage with and imagine/identify additional collective activities for their cohort.
• Please note that your initiative cannot involve a political campaign or legislative lobbying efforts.

Selection Criteria: The selection process will take into consideration the following criteria:

• Potential impact
• Does the project address a question or challenge that is broadly relevant across civil society?
• Will the project contribute significant new knowledge or create substantial positive change?
• Does the Fellow demonstrate a deep understanding of the issue their project addresses?
• Will the Fellow and the project benefit from engagement with an academic research community?
• Quality of project proposal
• Is the project plan thoughtful and well-articulated?
• Have potential risks and challenges received adequate consideration?
• Are goals, timelines, and deliverables realistic?
• Has the applicant identified potential partnerships that will catalyze the project?

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: All fellows will receive:

• A $20,000 stipend, paid at the beginning of the fellowship, to support work on a year-long project.
• A week-long in-person convening of the cohort on the Stanford campus, January 20-24, 2020. 
• Travel support to cover the cost of attending the January 2020 week-long convening.
• Project support up to $5,000 to support additional project-related travel and expenses as appropriate.
• Mentorship from fellowship directors and access to fellowship alumni from previous cohorts.

While we welcome applications from outside the United States, we are currently unable to support the acquisition of visas. If you are applying from outside the United States and are accepted, you will need to secure your own visa.

Duration of Award: 1 year

How to Apply: Interested applicants should complete the online application during the application window. 
During the application process you will be asked to submit:

• cover letter
• resume or CV
• brief project proposal
• contact information for two professional references

• It is important to go through all application requirements in the Award Webpage (see Link below) before applying.

Visit Award Webpage for Details

Adobe Research Fellowship 2020 for Graduate Students in STEM Fields

Application Deadline: 27th September 2019 at 5pm Pacific Time

About the Award: This year, Adobe will be awarding fellowships to graduate students working in the areas of computer graphics, computer vision, human-computer interaction, machine learning, visualization, audio, natural language processing, and programming languages.

Type: Fellowship, Research

Eligibility: In order to be considered for the 2020 Adobe Research Fellowship, students must meet the following criteria:

• Be registered as a full-time graduate student at a university.
• Remain an active, full-time student in a PhD program for the full duration of 2020 or forfeit the award.
• Cannot have a close relative working for Adobe Research.

Selection Criteria: Recipients are selected based on their research (creative, impactful, important, and realistic in scope), how their work would contribute to Adobe, their technical skills (ability to build complex computer programs), and their personal skills (problem-solving ability, communication, leadership, organizational skills, ability to work in teams).

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: The Adobe Research Fellowship consists of:

• A $10,000 award paid once.
• A Creative Cloud subscription membership for one year.
• An Adobe Research mentor.
• An internship at Adobe for the 2020 summer.

How to Apply: Applications must include:

• A research overview comprising two pages of text and figures not including citations. At least half a page should highlight how the student’s research could contribute to Adobe.
• Three letters of recommendation from those familiar with the students work. One letter should come from the student’s advisor.
• A CV.
• A transcript of current and previous academic records both undergraduate and graduate.

 Click here to begin.

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Enter for the British Council Alumni Awards 2020

Application Deadlines: 28th October 2019 (*please note, specific countries have an earlier closing date).

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: All countries except the UK

Eligible Field of Study: All

About the Award: The Alumni Awards celebrate the outstanding achievements of alumni and showcase the impact and value of a UK higher education. Award winners and finalists are leaders in their fields who have used their experience of studying at a UK university to make a positive contribution to their communities, professions and countries.
If you, or someone you know, studied in the UK and have gone on to achieve exceptional success, apply yourself or nominate someone today.

Type: Award

Eligibility: 

• Alumni must be currently residing in one of the 14 countries participating in the Alumni Awards 2020
• Alumni must have studied in the UK at degree level or above:
• within the last 15 years (i.e. 2004 or later)
• for a minimum of one term or semester
• enrolled at an officially recognised (160 institutions) or listed (650 institutions) UK higher education institution

Selection Criteria: All eligible applications will be assessed on the extent to which they meet the following four criteria:

1. IMPACT: evidence of tangible impact, and scale of impact, of your work (inspired by your UK education) in your profession/community/society.
2. UK INFLUENCE: evidence of how your UK education has played a key influence in your success and impact.
3. MEDIA TRACTION: Extent to which your success story is likely to resonate with local/regional/national media in your country of entry, or beyond (global media).
4. POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE AND INSPIRE: Extent to which (including capacity and willingness) you and your story are likely to influence and inspire the next generation of prospective internationally mobile students in your country of entry to choose the UK as their study destination.

If you are applying yourself, you will need to answer three short questions on the application form to explain how your UK higher education has contributed to your success and why you think you should be considered for an Alumni Award 2020.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: Finalists and winners at all levels (national, regional and global) will benefit from their global profile being made more visible through press and publicity opportunities, and building their professional networks. The three Global Alumni Award winners will be invited to the UK for a professional networking opportunity in Summer 2019.

How to Apply:  How to prepare to apply yourself, or nominate someone, for an Alumni Award 2020:

• Check the eligibility criteria and read the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
• Choose the award category
• Prepare a statement
• Gather supporting documents
• Apply or nominate here

Visit Program Webpage for details


Award Provider: British Council

Nokia Foundation Scholarships 2019/2020 for International Students to Study in Finland

Application Deadline: 30th September 2019

Eligible Countries: International

To be taken at (country): Finland

About the Award: Nokia Scholarships are granted to individuals pursuing a doctoral degree in information or telecommunications technology or in clearly related supporting scientific disciplines. Scholarship can be granted for doctoral studies in a Finnish university or to a Finnish applicant for doctoral studies abroad.

Type: PhD

Eligibility: The applicant must receive a commitment statement from his/her principal supervisor, who must be a professor, docent, or senior scientist at the university at which the student is pursuing their degree. The statement must be submitted to the application database by the supervisor. The scholarship can be granted no more than two times to the same individual.

Number of scholarships: Not specified

Duration of Scholarship: The scholarship can be granted no more than two times to the same individual.

How to Apply: Nokia Scholarship Application

Visit scholarship webpage for details to apply

Robert Mugabe’s Legacy: Revolution, Amity and Decline

Binoy Kampmark

Robert Mugabe is the sort of figure that always caused discomfort. He was a permanent revolutionary, becoming, in time, the despotic ruler who frittered away revolutionary gain. He played multiple roles in international political consciousness. As Zimbabwe’s strongman, he was demonised and lionised in equal measure for a good deal of his time in power. His role from the 1990s – Mugabe, the West’s all-too-convenient bogeyman and hobgoblin – tended to outweigh other considerations. In the end, even his supporters had to concede that he had outstayed his welcome, another African leader gone to seed.

In 2008, Mahmood Mamdani noted the generally held view in publications ranging from The Economist to The Guardian that Mugabe the Thug reigned. Yes, he had helped in laying waste to the economy, refusing to share power with a more vocal and present opposition, and created an internal crisis with his land distribution policy. But this did little to explain his longevity, his recipe of partial coercion and consent, the teacher-visionary and the bribing mob leader. “In any case, the preoccupation with his character does little to illuminate the socio-historical issues involved.”

The obsession with character – one of Mephistophelian bargain and decay – is found in both the literature and the popular culture depicting Mugabe. The stock story is this: he taught in Ghana in 1963, a key figure in the nationalist movement split in what was then Rhodesia, becoming secretary general of the Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU). The Shona dominated ZANU was formed from the original Ndebele ethnic minority dominated Zimbabwe African People’s Union (ZAPU).

Prison followed in 1964; Mugabe fled to Mozambique in 1974 though not before a spell of imprisonment at the hands of Zambia’s Kenneth Kaunda (his escape was probably engineered by Zambians); by 1977, he had assumed control of the organisation, though Mozambique’s President Samora Machel never quite trusted him, taking a leaf out of Kaunda’s book in detailing the mischief maker, albeit briefly. Military victory was sought against the Smith regime in what was then white-controlled Rhodesia, and it was with some reluctance that Mugabe found himself a signatory to the British-sponsored settlement in 1979, one assisted by Lord Carrington, Kaunda, the Commonwealth Secretary General, Shridath Ramphal, and, ironically enough, white apartheid South Africa.

On becoming leader, he was deliciously accommodating in his rhetoric, despite having entertained the prospect of confiscating land owned by whites a la Marx-Lenin and wishing to hold white leaders to account in war crimes trials. In his national address in 1980, he spoke of the bonds of amity; he wished for bygones to be bygones. “If you were my enemy, you are now my friend. If you hated me, you cannot avoid the love that binds me to you and you to me.”

Initially, Mugabe the progressive shone through: healthcare and education programs were expanded; literary rates and living standards rose; white farmers were reassured that mobs would not be knocking on their doors. Whites were included in a mixed cabinet; heads reappointed in the army, the police and the Central Intelligence Organisation. But he had his eye on dealing with rivals.

In 1983, former members of ZAPU’s military outfit attacked targets in Matabeleland. The result was uncompromisingly bloody: anywhere upwards of 20,000 civilians killed; many more tortured, maimed, tormented. In four years, ZAPU had been defeated, absorbed into the ZANU-PF structure. The extinguishment of such rivalry paved the way for a Mugabe presidency and near-absolute rule.

By the 1990s, economic conditions were biting. Real wages fell; the International Monetary Fund demanded domestic readjustments to the economy. Economic stagnation kept company with increasingly repressive policies against journalists, students and opponents. Calculatingly, Mugabe propitiated war veterans by awarding them generous pensions in 1997. Then came the next threat: the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) led by Morgan Tsvangirai.

In February 2000, a national vote on a redesigned draft constitution, the progeny of ZANU-PF, proposed British compensation for land; absent that, white farms would be seized without due compensation. Its defeat by a narrow margin saw Mugabe step up his campaign, featuring farm occupations and the sponsorship of veterans to assist in invasions of farms owned by white farmers. Mugabe was returning to an old platform.

The prevailing psycho-portraiture for such behaviour is never consistent. One variant finds its culprit in a decision Mugabe made in 1996. Secretary Grace Marufu, 41 years Mugabe’s junior, became his wife, considered within certain circles a less than worthy replacement for Sally, who died in 1992. Wilf Mbanga, editor of The Zimbabwean newspaper spared no punches, seeing in Marufu a lever pulling, power hungry creature akin to Lady Macbeth. “He changed the moment Sally died, when he married a young gold-digger.”

His former home affairs minister, Dumiso Dabengwa, pinpointed a different year when the great compromiser and negotiator changed: 2000. There are no gold-digging suggestions, merely political manipulations filtered with a bit of paranoia. “He held compromising material over several of his colleagues and they knew they would face criminal charges if they opposed him.”

Overwhelmingly, the narrative is of the great hope that failed, the rebel who trips. This echo of the good man gone bad is detectable in celluloid, with the fictional state of Matobo in The Interpreter, featuring as its political backdrop a bookish schoolteacher who defeated a white-minority regime but fouled up matters by turning into a tyrant. “The CIA-backed film,” suggested the then acting Minister for Information and Publicity, Chen Chimutengwende, “showed that Zimbabwe’s enemies did not rest.”

Mugabe was every bit the contradiction of the colonial-postcolonial figure, supported one day as the romantic revolutionary to be praised, reviled as the authoritarian figure to condemn, the next. The revolutionary to be feted was a motif that continued through the 1980s, despite signs that the hero was getting particularly bloodthirsty. A string of honours were bestowed like floral tributes to a conquering warrior: an honorary doctorate of laws from the University of Massachusetts in 1984, despite the butchering of the Ndebele; an honorary doctorate from the University of Edinburgh (subsequently revoked in July 2007); a knighthood from Queen Elizabeth II in 1994.

Accounts such as Martin Meredith’s Our Guns: Robert Mugabe and the Tragedy of Zimbabwe, point to the aphrodisiac of power, violence as currency, the cultivated links with the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s Laurent Kabila, and the creation of a crony state. The DRC connection softened the blows of international sanctions, at least to some extent, keeping rural voters in clover and the security forces content. Such arrangements, involving a juggling of loot and measuring out the spoils, is rarely indefinite.

The narrative of the power mad creature runs through as a counter to the liberal thesis that Mugabe started with promise, and went sour. This would have been tantamount to suggesting that Lenin insisted on changing the world through even-tempered tea ceremonies and soft voiced mediation, only to endorse revolutionary violence at a later date. James Kirchick, oft fascinated by the wiles of demagoguery, saw the strains of brutality early: Mugabe’s time in prison, as with other revolutionaries, led to a certain pupillage with power, a sense of its necessity. Degrees in law and economics were earned via correspondence from the University of London, a way to pass carceral time for subversive actions against the white Smith regime in 1964. All that time, he nursed Marxist-Leninist dreams.

As leader of the movement to oust the white regime, Mugabe was not sparing with his use of violence. In this, he differed from the founder of the ZANU founder Ndabaningi Sithole, who renounced terrorism and subversion after his 1969 sentence for incitement. Nor was he averse to internal suppression: his cadres had to be trustworthy in the cause.

Over time, the distance between Mugabe the ruler, and the Zimbabwean citizenry, grew. International sanctions, applied with much callousness, bit. Hyperinflation set in. The state was left bankrupt. Food shortages in 2004 did not sway him. “We are not hungry,” Mugabe told Sky News. “Why foist this food upon us? We don’t want to be choked. We have enough.”

In November 2017, a coup by senior military personnel was launched in terms that seemed almost polite, a sort of dinner party seizure. Mugabe was placed under house arrest; his ZANU-PF party had decided that the time had come. The risk of Marufu coming to power was becoming all too real, though this femme fatale rationale can only be pushed so far. There were celebrations in the streets. Thirty-seven years prior, there were similar calls of jubilation for the new leader. Left with his medical ailments, Mugabe died at Gleneagles Hospital, Singapore on Friday, farewelled by his successor President Emmerson Mnangagwa as “an icon of liberation, a pan Africanist who dedicated his life to the emancipation of his people.” The muse of history can be atrociously fickle.

Confronting Global Warming and Austerity

Dean Baker

In the United States, proposals for a Green New Deal have been getting considerable attention in recent months as activists have pressed both members of Congress and Democratic presidential candidates to support aggressive measures to combat global warming. There clearly is much more that we can and must do in the immediate future to prevent enormous damage to the planet.

However, major initiatives in the United States to combat global warming will almost certainly require some increases in taxes. There is likely some slack in the U.S. economy (perhaps we’ll see more slack as a result of Donald Trump’s misfires in his trade war), but a major push involving hundreds of billions of dollars of additional annual spending (2-3 percent of GDP) will almost certainly necessitate tax increases. This doesn’t mean we shouldn’t move quickly to take steps to save the planet, but these steps will have some cost.

In contrast, most of Europe is in a situation where it could easily make large commitments toward increased spending on clean energy, mass transit, and conservation at essentially no economic cost. In fact, a Green New Deal Agenda in Europe is likely to lead to increased employment and output. The big difference is that Europe is much further from facing constraints on its economy. It has plenty of room to expand output and employment without seeing inflation become a problem.

Before getting into the specifics on Europe’s economy, it is important to add a bit of perspective. The European countries have been far better global citizens in this area than the United States. Their per-person emissions are roughly half as much as the United States. Furthermore, many European countries have already taken aggressive measures to promote clean energy and encourage conservation.

Solar energy accounts for 7.3 percent of Italy’s electric power, 7.9 percent of Germany’s and 4.3 percent for the European Union as a whole. By comparison, the United States gets just 2.3 percent of its electric power from solar energy. There is a similar story with wind energy where the European Union’s installed capacity is more than 70 percent higher than the United States.

But in the battle to slow global warming, simply doing better than the United States is not good enough. The European Union can and must do more to reduce its greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.

The most immediate obstacle to aggressive measures to reduce GHG emissions in Europe is the continent’s mindless push for austerity. European governments, led by Germany, have become obsessed with keeping deficits low and balancing budgets. Most have small deficits or even budget surpluses.

Germany exemplifies the European austerity obsession with a budget surplus that is close to 2.0 percent of GDP ($420 billion in the US economy). To some extent, fiscal austerity is not a choice. The eurozone’s rules require low budget deficits for the countries that use the euro, but even countries outside the eurozone have joined the austerity party. The United Kingdom has a budget deficit of less than 1.5 percent of GDP, Denmark less than 0.5 percent of GDP, and Sweden has a budget surplus of close to 0.5 percent of GDP.

There are certainly circumstances under which budget deficits can be too high, but these clearly do not apply to the countries in the European Union at present. Inflation has been persistently low and has been falling in recent months. The inflation rate for the eurozone countries has averaged just 1.0 percent over the last 12 months.

The story is even more dramatic if we look at interest rates. The classic problem of a large budget deficit is that it leads to high-interest rates that crowd out investment. Not only are interest rates extraordinarily low across Europe, in many countries investors have to pay governments to lend them money.

The interest rate on a ten-year government bond in France is -0.43 percent. In the Netherlands, it is -0.57 percent, and in Germany it is -0.71 percent. That means Investors have to pay Germany 0.71 percent annually to lend the government money.

This is the context in which the concern for low budget deficits in these countries is utterly mindless. The financial markets are effectively begging these governments to borrow more money, but they refuse to do so. The need to address global warming makes this refusal especially painful.

The fact that interest rates and inflation are so low indicates that these governments are needlessly sacrificing growth and jobs. That story would be bad enough in normal times –people should not go without work and important social needs should not go unmet for no reason — but the picture is much worse when we consider the urgent need to slow global warming.

If they were not limited by an unnecessary fixation with budget deficits, these governments could take strong measures to reduce emissions. For example, they could either pay directly to install solar and wind power, or provide large subsidies to businesses and homeowners. They could be subsidizing the switch to electric cars and making mass transit cheap or free, while they vastly ramp up capacity.

Emanuel Macron did try steps in this direction last year, but he stumbled over the eurozone’s austerity requirement. Since France was already near the caps on budget deficits demanded by the rules of the eurozone, he was forced to impose new taxes to offset the additional spending he proposed to reduce GHG emissions. Since the taxes he imposed were largely regressive, they prompted a massive reaction (the “yellow vest” protests), which forced Macron to back away from most of his green agenda.

If France didn’t face an artificial budget constraint imposed by the European Union, Macron could have simply borrowed to pay for his green agenda. It likely would have been far better received in that situation. People who are just scraping by will resent taxes to discourage energy use. They are less likely to get angry over subsidies to improve the insulation of their homes or to install solar panels.

The absurd fixation of the EU on budget deficits should be getting more attention in the media. While events outside the United States generally don’t make much news, there has been no shortage of coverage of Boris Johnson, the prime minister of the United Kingdom, and his hare-brained efforts to pull the U.K. out of the EU.

Brexit, especially the no-deal Brexit that Johnson seems to favor, will impose needless economic costs on the country, but the harm done by unnecessary austerity in Europe is far greater. While Johnson is largely portrayed as a power-hungry clown in the U.S. media, the enforcers of European austerity are treated with great respect. While these enforcers may all be smart and highly-educated people, their clownishness on this issue puts Johnson to shame.

There is one more point on austerity and combating climate change that is worth mentioning here. The world has been appalled to see much of the Amazon in flames. While this is most immediately attributable to the development policies of Brazil’s far-right president, Jair Bolsonaro, there actually is a much deeper problem here.

The Amazon is a unique habitat that should be preserved in any case, but its survival is so important in the fight to limit global warming because of what the rest of the world has been doing. Rich countries have engaged in large-scale deforestation of their own lands, as well as having paid developing countries to destroy much of their natural forests to provide wood and other resources. In addition, we have been spewing vast amounts of carbon dioxide into the earth’s atmosphere for more than a century.

This is the context in which the Amazon matters hugely for limiting GHG. Placing all of the blame on Brazil is fundamentally misrepresenting the history of the problem. Brazil must act to preserve the Amazon, but it should be paid for this choice by the rich countries. It will be foregoing a path that would aid its development, just as the rich countries were able to benefit economically by causing irreparable damage to their environment.

Since climate change really is a global problem, we need to have the most effective measures to be taken, regardless of the country. Where we expect the actions to come from a developing country like Brazil, the rich countries will have to foot the bill.

This is both a question of fairness and realism. We can’t force Brazil to protect the Amazon. No one is going to send in troops to prevent its destruction. We can make it more profitable for Brazil to protect the Amazon than to destroy it. And, with so much slack in the EU economies, this would be a great use of some of their resources. Perhaps one day we will have a sane government in the United States and we will contribute our share.