Ranjit Gupta
Following spectacular successes in routing government forces and other opponents in both Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) announced the establishment of an Islamic State (IS) on June 30, 2014 to the absolute astonishment of a stunned world. The IS controls 2/5ths of the Syrian territory and 2/5ths of Iraqi territory. It holds assets worth over $2 billion – cash taken from banks and government treasuries of the towns it has taken over in Syria and Iraq; ransom money from those kidnapped (including almost $135 million reportedly paid by European governments or companies to secure the release of their kidnapped nationals); revenues of about $2 million per day from sale of oil from the four oilfields in Syria and one in Iraq that it controls; from fees and taxes; from funding from
entities and individuals in Gulf countries, and looting from businessmen and common citizens in territories that it controls etc. It is virtually self-sufficient, economically and financially. It is very well-equipped militarily, having captured huge amounts of
sophisticated weaponry. It has about 10-12,000 fighters in Iraq, mostly Iraqi, and perhaps thrice as many in Syria, majority Syrian, with at least one-third being
foreigners, including many from Western countries. The world has not seen any terrorist entity like the IS. There is no option but to defeat the IS. Otherwise Iraq
and Syria will unravel and instability will cascade throughout West Asia with disastrous consequences for
the world at large. Positive omens are emerging in Iraq. The formation of a
national unity government is finally under way and once Sunnis start being given their rightful role, objectives publicly supported by both Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sunni population will almost surely reject the IS’s medieval ideology and brutal rule and defeat them as they had done earlier in 2008, in Anbar Province routing the Al
Qaeda in Iraq – the IS’s original avatar. The Baa’thist and other Saddam era army officers and personnel who had temporarily allied with the IS are beginning to leave. The IS cannot be sustained without the support of the Sunni population at large. The US air strikes enabled the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi Special Forces, who, unprecedentedly, worked together for the first time, to recover control of the Mosul dam, and on August 31,
the town of Amerli that had fallen to IS control in June. Even the traditional enemies of the Kurdistan Regional Government's leader Masoud Barzai, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, pitched in to help, and escorted the Yazidis to safety. The Sadrists, who had fought
bitterly against the Americans, have publicly requested US help and cooperation but without putting their troops into Iraq.
Significantly, GCC countries that have in the past, with considerable justification, been accused of financing the spread of Islamic extremism, have finally accepted that this virus is the greatest existential danger to them. It is significant that the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, had an excellent visit to Saudi Arabia last week. Repeatedly affirmed by King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has made it clear that the Islamic State is now its and the GCC’s preeminent enemy and defeating it is their top strategic priority. A variety of proactive measures have been initiated.
For the first time since the end of World War II, countries that have held opposing views on most regional issues in West Asia are all together, without exception, strongly opposing the IS. There are hundreds of US military advisers in Iraq and more will be deputed; US airstrikes have been increasing. Significantly, traditionally non-interventionist Germany, other EU countries, and Australia and Canada have announced weapons supply to the Kurds. Russia has provided Sukhoi fighters and a lot of other weaponry. Extensive help has been available from Iran – not merely weapons and funds but officers and small units of the Al Quds Force. Iran, for the first time, is supplying weapons to the Kurds. Iran and the US are cooperating although
there is understandable defensiveness for both sides about admitting it publicly.
Though there is a lack of clarity on how exactly the US intends to prosecute the war against the IS, on Aug 29, US Secretary of State John Kerry publicly announced
intentions of proactively leading an effort to establish a truly multinational coalition of states and entities against the IS and seeking UN Security Council endorsement.
Though the US, French and British leaders publicly maintain that they will not cooperate with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in combating the IS, in due time, ways will be found around current anti- Assad reservations. Meanwhile the US has started reconnaissance flights over Syria. Encouragingly, supplying arms to ‘moderate’ rebels by Western and GCC countries and Turkey is under review as these arms have in the past fallen in the hands of the IS. The Assad regime has also started confronting the IS more assertively.
Having said all this, the world must brace up to the reality that far more brutality, death, destruction and violence in West Asia lies ahead than has already been
witnessed as the war against the IS truly gets under way.
13 Sept 2014
THE MILITARY'S SCRIPT AND ENDGAME
Suba Chandran
Is there a coup imminent in Pakistan? Or has it already taken place behind the scenes and the military is well embedded?
Javed Hashmi, the President of the PTI who has now distanced from Imran Khan has made few important statements hinting a script authored by the Establishment on the current political crisis in Pakistan.
What is this script and what is Pakistan military’s endgame in the current crisis? Does the military want the political crisis to escalate further and finally take over, justifying the inability and incompetence of the elected leadership to provide governance, and more importantly stability?
Though the ISPR statements from the military have distanced from such an intention, there is enough to suspect that the Establishment has a script, and is
enacting a political play in carefully calibrated steps. There are three major actors in this script; Nawaz Sharif
– the Prime Minister and the leader of the PML-N;
Imran Khan – the leader of PTI; and Tahirul Qadri – the leader of PAT.
The ISPR statement dated 31 August was a crucial hinting two salient points. The release after the Corps Commanders meeting stated that “the conference
reviewed with serious concern, the existing political crisis and the violent turn it has taken, resulting in large scale injuries and loss of lives. Further use of force will only aggravate the problem. It was once again
reiterated that the situation should be resolved politically without wasting any time and without recourse to violent means.” The two parties to the crisis-government led by Sharif and the protesters led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, have been following two different approaches. The government has been trying to maintain the status quo at the political level, and ensure there is no violence in the streets. The protesters, right from day one have been trying to upset the status, demanding nothing less than the resignation of an elected Prime Minister. More importantly, they were willing to use force to occupy the red zone and blast into government buildings including the office of the Prime Minister. Clearly, there is a section trying to maintain status quo
(the government in this case); and another trying to upset the equilibrium and create anarchy. By clearly telling that “the situation should be resolved politically…
without recourse to violent means” the ISPR statement has affected the position of the government and strengthened that of the protesters. If there is one party that could use force constitutionally, it is the State. And the ISPR Statement clearly equates both at the same length.
Majority in Pakistan, though are not satisfied with the performance of Sharif’s government ever since it took over, they are also highly critical of Imran Khan – Tahirul Qadri interference, which is not only
undemocratic, but also is a political blackmail. Javed Hashmi’s statements hint about a possible understanding between the Establishment and the two protesters.
Back to the original question, what is military’s script?
And what is its Endgame?
In retrospect, it appears to have started with the political trial of Musharraf. Though the military then under Gen Kayani and now under Gen Sharif did not make any overt references to the trial process, it is obvious no military could see their former COAS being dragged by the court. It also appears, again in retrospect, that Nawaz Sharif could have gone slow in
pursuing the case against Musharraf. Sharif wanted to return the favour and wanted Musharraf to go through what he underwent after the previous coup in the late 1990s. A section within Pakistan even discussed the need for reconciliation and avoiding any vendetta politics. Sharif could have avoided the trial and let Musharraf disappear into oblivion. Given the electoral
process and the performance of Musharraf’s clique in 2013 elections and the popular anger against him, he posed no threat to Sharif and his government. He
should have let Musharraf alone. And that is what the military also wanted. To be fair to Sharif, it was not only him who was
against Musharraf, but the entire judicial structure starting from the former Chief Justice – Iftikhar Chaudhry to the lawyers in district court were keen to prosecute him. In fact the lawyer movement which was
instrumental in dethroning Musharraf worked over time to ensure the trial process became intense. At the popular level, Musharraf became the scapegoat for
whatever had gone wrong during his tenure. The print, electronic and social media joined the chorus; the result was the “hang Musharraf hand” slogan became the
dominant political discourse during 2013-14.Though there was a popular sentiment against Musharraf, Sharif today is reaping the whirlwind.
Differences between Nawaz Sharif and the military have started expanding ever since. The Hamid Mir and Geo TV incidents only strengthened this divide. Nawaz Sharif was seen by the Establishment as an actor behind the Hamid Mir affair in which the military and its ISI was projected and targeted by a section publicly within Pakistan. While targeting of Musharraf could be tolerated, the Establishment would never like to see it being hounded by the media in public; when the serving ISI Chief became the target and his picture shown
continuously, that too live over the attack on Hamid Mir, the military and its intelligence agencies would have decided to strike back. Then came a short interregnum – Modi’s election and the invitation to his swearing in ceremony in New Delhi.
According to reports, the military was not too keen in Sharif taking part in the ceremony. Earlier, Sharif has made numerous statements during the election
campaign to improve the Indo-Pak dialogue process. For Sharif, better Indo-Pak relations would give him better leverage internally within Pakistan, and give him
more space to manoeuvre vis-a-vis the Establishment. The decision to strike back at Sharif should have been taken place immediately after the Musharraf trial, and
then during Hamid Mir/Geo incidents. The sudden return of Tahirul Qadri to launch a revolution and Imran Khan finding faults with the 2013 election process in 2014 is
no coincidence. It would be a different issue, whether the Establishment is using these two protesters to teach Sharif a lesson, or the Imran and Qadri using the
military’s support to achieve their own Endgame. So what would the military warn to achieve? Look at what is has achieved so far. There is complete chaos in the capital. Reports in print, electronic and social media would highlight the popular anger against the political leadership and their inability to co-habit. The first major
achievement for the Establishment in the entire process would be the thorough discrediting of elected leaders and the democratic process. Second, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, the Establishment is attempting to reach an agreement with Sharif to diffuse the situation, which would ensure that the military would be in charge with Pakistan’s
policies towards US, Afghanistan and India.
Third, irrespective of coup, the political leadership both at the ruling and opposition sides know clearly who the real boss is. When the judiciary asked the protesters to
vacate, there was no response; but both Qadri and Imran went to meet the military leaders, when they were summoned. The government, though armed with
Constitutional provisions and even a support within the Parliament have been reluctant to take action. Certainly – neither the Parliamentary nor the Judiciary is
supreme. The GHQ is.
Is there a coup imminent in Pakistan? Or has it already taken place behind the scenes and the military is well embedded?
Javed Hashmi, the President of the PTI who has now distanced from Imran Khan has made few important statements hinting a script authored by the Establishment on the current political crisis in Pakistan.
What is this script and what is Pakistan military’s endgame in the current crisis? Does the military want the political crisis to escalate further and finally take over, justifying the inability and incompetence of the elected leadership to provide governance, and more importantly stability?
Though the ISPR statements from the military have distanced from such an intention, there is enough to suspect that the Establishment has a script, and is
enacting a political play in carefully calibrated steps. There are three major actors in this script; Nawaz Sharif
– the Prime Minister and the leader of the PML-N;
Imran Khan – the leader of PTI; and Tahirul Qadri – the leader of PAT.
The ISPR statement dated 31 August was a crucial hinting two salient points. The release after the Corps Commanders meeting stated that “the conference
reviewed with serious concern, the existing political crisis and the violent turn it has taken, resulting in large scale injuries and loss of lives. Further use of force will only aggravate the problem. It was once again
reiterated that the situation should be resolved politically without wasting any time and without recourse to violent means.” The two parties to the crisis-government led by Sharif and the protesters led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, have been following two different approaches. The government has been trying to maintain the status quo at the political level, and ensure there is no violence in the streets. The protesters, right from day one have been trying to upset the status, demanding nothing less than the resignation of an elected Prime Minister. More importantly, they were willing to use force to occupy the red zone and blast into government buildings including the office of the Prime Minister. Clearly, there is a section trying to maintain status quo
(the government in this case); and another trying to upset the equilibrium and create anarchy. By clearly telling that “the situation should be resolved politically…
without recourse to violent means” the ISPR statement has affected the position of the government and strengthened that of the protesters. If there is one party that could use force constitutionally, it is the State. And the ISPR Statement clearly equates both at the same length.
Majority in Pakistan, though are not satisfied with the performance of Sharif’s government ever since it took over, they are also highly critical of Imran Khan – Tahirul Qadri interference, which is not only
undemocratic, but also is a political blackmail. Javed Hashmi’s statements hint about a possible understanding between the Establishment and the two protesters.
Back to the original question, what is military’s script?
And what is its Endgame?
In retrospect, it appears to have started with the political trial of Musharraf. Though the military then under Gen Kayani and now under Gen Sharif did not make any overt references to the trial process, it is obvious no military could see their former COAS being dragged by the court. It also appears, again in retrospect, that Nawaz Sharif could have gone slow in
pursuing the case against Musharraf. Sharif wanted to return the favour and wanted Musharraf to go through what he underwent after the previous coup in the late 1990s. A section within Pakistan even discussed the need for reconciliation and avoiding any vendetta politics. Sharif could have avoided the trial and let Musharraf disappear into oblivion. Given the electoral
process and the performance of Musharraf’s clique in 2013 elections and the popular anger against him, he posed no threat to Sharif and his government. He
should have let Musharraf alone. And that is what the military also wanted. To be fair to Sharif, it was not only him who was
against Musharraf, but the entire judicial structure starting from the former Chief Justice – Iftikhar Chaudhry to the lawyers in district court were keen to prosecute him. In fact the lawyer movement which was
instrumental in dethroning Musharraf worked over time to ensure the trial process became intense. At the popular level, Musharraf became the scapegoat for
whatever had gone wrong during his tenure. The print, electronic and social media joined the chorus; the result was the “hang Musharraf hand” slogan became the
dominant political discourse during 2013-14.Though there was a popular sentiment against Musharraf, Sharif today is reaping the whirlwind.
Differences between Nawaz Sharif and the military have started expanding ever since. The Hamid Mir and Geo TV incidents only strengthened this divide. Nawaz Sharif was seen by the Establishment as an actor behind the Hamid Mir affair in which the military and its ISI was projected and targeted by a section publicly within Pakistan. While targeting of Musharraf could be tolerated, the Establishment would never like to see it being hounded by the media in public; when the serving ISI Chief became the target and his picture shown
continuously, that too live over the attack on Hamid Mir, the military and its intelligence agencies would have decided to strike back. Then came a short interregnum – Modi’s election and the invitation to his swearing in ceremony in New Delhi.
According to reports, the military was not too keen in Sharif taking part in the ceremony. Earlier, Sharif has made numerous statements during the election
campaign to improve the Indo-Pak dialogue process. For Sharif, better Indo-Pak relations would give him better leverage internally within Pakistan, and give him
more space to manoeuvre vis-a-vis the Establishment. The decision to strike back at Sharif should have been taken place immediately after the Musharraf trial, and
then during Hamid Mir/Geo incidents. The sudden return of Tahirul Qadri to launch a revolution and Imran Khan finding faults with the 2013 election process in 2014 is
no coincidence. It would be a different issue, whether the Establishment is using these two protesters to teach Sharif a lesson, or the Imran and Qadri using the
military’s support to achieve their own Endgame. So what would the military warn to achieve? Look at what is has achieved so far. There is complete chaos in the capital. Reports in print, electronic and social media would highlight the popular anger against the political leadership and their inability to co-habit. The first major
achievement for the Establishment in the entire process would be the thorough discrediting of elected leaders and the democratic process. Second, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, the Establishment is attempting to reach an agreement with Sharif to diffuse the situation, which would ensure that the military would be in charge with Pakistan’s
policies towards US, Afghanistan and India.
Third, irrespective of coup, the political leadership both at the ruling and opposition sides know clearly who the real boss is. When the judiciary asked the protesters to
vacate, there was no response; but both Qadri and Imran went to meet the military leaders, when they were summoned. The government, though armed with
Constitutional provisions and even a support within the Parliament have been reluctant to take action. Certainly – neither the Parliamentary nor the Judiciary is
supreme. The GHQ is.
RELIGIOUS RADICALISATION IN XINCHIANG: IS CHINA'S GAME-PLAN TO BLAME?
Bhavna Singh
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post-
Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of
the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to
become-energy independent and hence cares little about the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War. However, this domination ended after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where
the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post-
Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of
the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to
become-energy independent and hence cares little about the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War. However, this domination ended after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where
the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
OF INQUILAB AND THE INQUILABIS
Salma Malik
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market? The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in
addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market? The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in
addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
CHANGING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER: OBAMA'S RESPONSE
Chintamani Mahapatra
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.
INDIA-AUSTRALIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: BESPEAKING OF A NEW AGE
Sheel Kant Sharma
The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia last week is indeed a landmark achievement for their bilateral relations. Before leaving for his India visit, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was confident of reaching an agreement with India as he stated in Canberra that “We ought to be prepared to provide uranium to India under suitable
safeguards.” Considering the chasm that separated their positions twenty years ago on the main issues in the global nuclear mainstream, Abbot’s statement bespeaks
of a coming of age. He declared in India that “…there is a very high level of trust between us, and that is why we are signing this agreement.” Australia has provided
full assurance that it will be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India. Australia also supports India’s joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a member. The agreement will also cover other key areas in nuclear technology such as supply of isotopes and cooperation in regard to nuclear safety. Although Australia does not run nuclear power plants, it has an extensive nuclear enterprise comprising not only mining but also research in diverse areas including, for example, on making the
safeguards system more effective. It is to the credit of India’s nuclear program that it receives recognition from Australia in unequivocal terms, like “trust” and
scrupulous adherence to international laws “regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi.” This level of understanding and confluence of mutual interest takes the relationship to a truly strategic scale of cooperation; energy being central to it.
Looking at Australia’s immense natural resources and the vast unpolluted continent that lies at its disposal, Canberra’s role and profile in international arena in the coming decades will certainly grow much bigger. So far, it has played a modest role in the Asia Pacific compared to its potential albeit as a dependable and steadfast US ally and a robust economic partner for ASEAN and
China. India and Australia, as the Joint Statement issued after the prime minister’s visit demonstrates, are set to do a whole lot of things together for mutual benefit. The nuclear accord encapsulates and symbolises that coming together just as the seminal agreement between India and the US did in 2006. In recent years, a definitive sense has emerged in the Australian worldview that a strong and prosperous India will be a factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.
Coming to the uranium metal, its fortunes fluctuate wildly depending on the temperamental swings of the mass psychosis about “radiation” on the one hand and the inexorable push of nuclear power as a relatively cleaner and sustainable energy option for the energy
hungry planet. From its highs in the short years of nuclear renaissance in the middle of last decade, uranium prices have come down to nearly half that peak post the Fukushima disaster and subsequent sharp
retardation in nuclear power prospect – not only in Japan and Germany but also in liability-obsessed India. India’s vacillation on nuclear power projects is particularly shocking since its power needs today exceed its production by figures that approach a 100000 Megawatt and even coal fired thermal plant capacity languishing in shortfalls as big as 90000 Megawatt due
to fuel crunch, according to some estimates. It is significant that Australia has come forward as a reliable supplier not only for nuclear fuel but also for coal. An uninterrupted supply of uranium and its
augmentation to meet the requirements in Indian nuclear power plants will also raise their capacity factors to record highs.
As it is the global openings since the US deal have brought enormous improvements in fuel situation and the Rawatbhata nuclear power plant units today can boast of achieving a global peak in continuous,
unbroken running of a plant. Australia has, along with its neighbour, New Zealand,
considerable moral clout in the realm of global nuclear and advanced technology. India should benefit from the Australian leverage for its entry in the NSG – Australia
has kept the nuclear option out for meeting its power needs despite its vast uranium resources.
So, its support may hopefully carry greater clout with conscientious objectors of nuclear power like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland that are not easily persuaded to relax the rules for India. The commercial
factor in uranium deals, while important for the Australian mining industry, is hardly so big as to be accused of driving its government’s stance in the energy debate. The environmentalists, as Prime Minister Abbott has stated, are a highly significant lobby in Australia – that constantly oversees the mining industry to ensure that the green standards are observed to the utmost
level of satisfaction. It now remains for the company representatives from both sides to thrash out the details of contract terms for
supply of uranium. India’s Nuclear Power Cooperation Limited has been keen to build lifetime inventories for suitably safeguarded nuclear plants and would naturally want to obtain long-term supply guarantees. This should not pose a problem to arrive at, given the India’s record commitment to its safeguards obligations.
The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia last week is indeed a landmark achievement for their bilateral relations. Before leaving for his India visit, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was confident of reaching an agreement with India as he stated in Canberra that “We ought to be prepared to provide uranium to India under suitable
safeguards.” Considering the chasm that separated their positions twenty years ago on the main issues in the global nuclear mainstream, Abbot’s statement bespeaks
of a coming of age. He declared in India that “…there is a very high level of trust between us, and that is why we are signing this agreement.” Australia has provided
full assurance that it will be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India. Australia also supports India’s joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a member. The agreement will also cover other key areas in nuclear technology such as supply of isotopes and cooperation in regard to nuclear safety. Although Australia does not run nuclear power plants, it has an extensive nuclear enterprise comprising not only mining but also research in diverse areas including, for example, on making the
safeguards system more effective. It is to the credit of India’s nuclear program that it receives recognition from Australia in unequivocal terms, like “trust” and
scrupulous adherence to international laws “regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi.” This level of understanding and confluence of mutual interest takes the relationship to a truly strategic scale of cooperation; energy being central to it.
Looking at Australia’s immense natural resources and the vast unpolluted continent that lies at its disposal, Canberra’s role and profile in international arena in the coming decades will certainly grow much bigger. So far, it has played a modest role in the Asia Pacific compared to its potential albeit as a dependable and steadfast US ally and a robust economic partner for ASEAN and
China. India and Australia, as the Joint Statement issued after the prime minister’s visit demonstrates, are set to do a whole lot of things together for mutual benefit. The nuclear accord encapsulates and symbolises that coming together just as the seminal agreement between India and the US did in 2006. In recent years, a definitive sense has emerged in the Australian worldview that a strong and prosperous India will be a factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.
Coming to the uranium metal, its fortunes fluctuate wildly depending on the temperamental swings of the mass psychosis about “radiation” on the one hand and the inexorable push of nuclear power as a relatively cleaner and sustainable energy option for the energy
hungry planet. From its highs in the short years of nuclear renaissance in the middle of last decade, uranium prices have come down to nearly half that peak post the Fukushima disaster and subsequent sharp
retardation in nuclear power prospect – not only in Japan and Germany but also in liability-obsessed India. India’s vacillation on nuclear power projects is particularly shocking since its power needs today exceed its production by figures that approach a 100000 Megawatt and even coal fired thermal plant capacity languishing in shortfalls as big as 90000 Megawatt due
to fuel crunch, according to some estimates. It is significant that Australia has come forward as a reliable supplier not only for nuclear fuel but also for coal. An uninterrupted supply of uranium and its
augmentation to meet the requirements in Indian nuclear power plants will also raise their capacity factors to record highs.
As it is the global openings since the US deal have brought enormous improvements in fuel situation and the Rawatbhata nuclear power plant units today can boast of achieving a global peak in continuous,
unbroken running of a plant. Australia has, along with its neighbour, New Zealand,
considerable moral clout in the realm of global nuclear and advanced technology. India should benefit from the Australian leverage for its entry in the NSG – Australia
has kept the nuclear option out for meeting its power needs despite its vast uranium resources.
So, its support may hopefully carry greater clout with conscientious objectors of nuclear power like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland that are not easily persuaded to relax the rules for India. The commercial
factor in uranium deals, while important for the Australian mining industry, is hardly so big as to be accused of driving its government’s stance in the energy debate. The environmentalists, as Prime Minister Abbott has stated, are a highly significant lobby in Australia – that constantly oversees the mining industry to ensure that the green standards are observed to the utmost
level of satisfaction. It now remains for the company representatives from both sides to thrash out the details of contract terms for
supply of uranium. India’s Nuclear Power Cooperation Limited has been keen to build lifetime inventories for suitably safeguarded nuclear plants and would naturally want to obtain long-term supply guarantees. This should not pose a problem to arrive at, given the India’s record commitment to its safeguards obligations.
MYANMAR'S POLITICAL TRANSITION:CHALLENGES OF THE 2015 ELECTION
Shankari Sundararaman
Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-Ã -vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.
Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-Ã -vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.
INDIA-NEPAL HYDROELECTRICITY DEAL: MAKING IT COUNT
Pramod Jaiswal
With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.
With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.
DRUG SMUGGLING ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN: IMPACT OF INCREASING INTERCEPTION
Vijay Sakhuja
Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.
Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.
AL QAEDA IN SOUTH ASIA: ZAWAHIRI WILL FAIL IN INDIA
San
Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.
Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.
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