The 10th Parliamentary elections were held in
Bangladesh on 5 January 2014 against the backdrop of
the opposition alliance’s boycott and blockade
programme, amidst a whirl of apprehensions, tension
and violence. The boycott of the major opposition party,
Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its allies,
particularly Jamaat-e-Islami, has emerged as the key
determinant of election outcomes and its aftermath.
Three views are particularly discernible about this
boycott. According to one view, this boycott was self-
imposed and was part of a larger strategic move by the
opposition parties. Riding on popular support and
ascendancy of hard-line leadership in parties, they took
an unyielding stance on elections. Another view is that
it was inevitable due to the lack of a conducive
environment for participation since the caretaker
government (CTG) system was scrapped by the 15th
amendment of the Constitution of Bangladesh. They
believe that no elections could be acceptable to them
without CTG. The third view is focused on the process
of holding elections under the current system, but with a
new poll-time administration and a bigger and more
substantive role of the Election Commission. Of course,
this has to be based on political settlement by the two
major political parties – the Awami League (AL) and
BNP. The United Nations-brokered initiative led by
Oscar Fernandez Taranco emphasised the third view to
resolve the impasse. Ironically, no political settlement
was reached. Both the ruling and opposition alliances
opted for absolute gains.
Having no option as per the constitutional provision as
well as political ‘common sense’, the government and
the Election Commission organised the elections. In
fact, the unique political environment in the country has
produced an unprecedented election both in its process
and outcome. A total number of 153 members of
Parliament were elected uncontested and the remaining
147 were up for voting. With a poor voter turnout (40
per cent by the Election Commission) by Bangladesh
standards (87 per cent in the December 2008 elections),
the ruling Awami League bagged 232 seats. The Jatiya
Party, made up of former military dictator Ershad, won
33 seats, becoming the second largest party in
Parliament. Members of Parliament have already sworn
in and a new Cabinet has been formed with Sheikh
Hasina as the Prime Minister of Bangladesh. Despite
some reservations, the international community has
recognised the government. The US and EU are
continuing their diplomatic parleys to bring all political
parties to a dialogue, and are working on the possibility
of a mid-term election.
Although the elections have been questioned by various
quarters in Bangladesh and beyond due to non-
participation of the main opposition parties, a critical
aspect of this election is the unleashing of widespread
violence before, during, and after the polls. Since the
early 1990s Bangladesh witnessed four general elections
held under a caretaker (CTG) system. Interestingly, all
defeated political parties and alliances seriously
questioned the credibility of these elections too. A
short-lived election was held in February 1996 under the
party-run administration which lasted for about forty
five days. In 2014, for the second time, an election was
held under a non-caretaker government (officially known
as an all-party government) in the post-mass upsurge
era. Unlike the past, the main opposition party was
invited to join the poll-time government, but it was
rejected. It became clear at the end of 2011 that politics
in Bangladesh was turning into a ‘zero-sum-game’
primarily on the question of ‘election administration’,
which was changed by the ruling alliance with their
brute majority in the national Parliament.
While the quality of the 10th Parliamentary elections has
been questioned in terms of credibility, inclusivity and
participation, domestic politics demands special mention
to understand the elections and its outcome. Domestic
politics in Bangladesh started to transform into a new
and difficult shape when the ruling alliance announced
the trial of war criminals. The International Crimes
Tribunal (ICT) was set up in 2009 as a war crimes
tribunal in Bangladesh to investigate and prosecute
suspects for the genocide and crimes against humanity
committed in 1971 by the Pakistani Army and their local
collaborators, Razakars , Al-Badr and Al-Shams . The
formation of ICT jolted the opposition camp. The second
largest party in the opposition camp, Jamaat-e-Islam is
directly linked with war crimes during the Liberation War
in 1971. Top leaders of Jamaat have been charged with
war crimes over the past four decades. The triggering
incident was the verdict against a central leader of
Jamaat, Moulana Delwar Hossain Sayedee. Following
the verdict in February 2013, the Party unleashed
massive violence throughout the country especially in
their strongholds – mainly border districts.
Violence has become a political weapon of opposition
politics, spearheaded by the war crimes-charged party.
The subsequent Hefazat phenomenon has added
impetus to this rising spree of political violence. The
intermingling of extremist violence and the political
movement led by the opposition alliance has emerged
as the body blow to Bangladesh’s nascent democracy.
With capital punishment being awarded to to one of the
leading war criminals – Abdul Kader Mollah - politics in
Bangladesh needs to be redefined and re-
conceptualised. The 10th Parliamentary elections were
held in the evolving parameters of Bangladeshi politics,
where political stability and democratic governance have
been traded with violence and extremism for absolute
political gains.
13 Jun 2014
STRATEGIC NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Politico-Military thought often harbours a puzzling
phenomenon when it organises concepts and
institutions in a mosaic of sometimes antithetical
notions. Contrary ideas are indeed intrinsic to the art of
political sagacity, but when form is defined by a belief,
in apparent conflict with content, then there appear
distortions more illusory than what logic would suggest.
So it is with the emergence of strategic nuclear
weapons. They are destructive to the extent that the
purpose of warfare is itself obliterated, underscoring a
compelling theory of war avoidance. By its side are
strategic non-nuclear weapons whose intent is to target
nuclear weapons that, ironically, seek a (precarious)
stability.
Conventional savvy will first suggest that non-nuclear
weapons can neither deliver the requisite high explosive
payload to assume a counter-force role against silo-
based or caverned nuclear systems; nor do they come
with the probability of kill that is demanded with such a
role. But just around the technological corner lurks high
impact penetration and shaped charges that make a
mockery of hitherto simple overpressure reckoning.
Second, nuclear pundits will insinuate that a partially
successful counter-force strike may in point of fact
catalyse escalation to a full blown nuclear exchange;
both contain candour of their own.
But strange is our circumstance when on the one hand
Pakistan presents us with a nuclear nightmare which
when articulated is a hair-trigger, opaque deterrent
conventionalised under military control, steered by a
doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity, and
guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds
unity with non-state actors. The introduction of tactical
nuclear weapons into the battle area further exacerbates
credibility of their control. It does not take a great deal
of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is
upon us. However, the very nature of the power
equation on the subcontinent and the extent to which it
is tilted in India’s favour will imply that any attempt at
bringing about conflict resolution through means other
than peaceful is destined to fail. In this context it is
amply clear that the threat of use of nuclear weapons
promotes only one case and that is the Pakistani
military establishment’s hold on the nation. On the other
hand is a Janus-faced China which, in collusion with
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, has not just
entrenched proliferatory links, but also doctrinal union
that permits a duplicitous approach to the latter’s
declared No First Use (NFU) posture and an option to
keep the South Asian nuclear cauldron on the boil. Also
significant is the alliance bucks the existing global non-
proliferation structure.
What may be derived from the current state of affairs,
with any conviction, is the political and military
unpredictability that prevails. This denies hope for
stability and the expectation of fitting conditions into a
convenient model, let alone providing for security
guarantees. Governments faced with such a conundrum
more readily prepare for a worst case scenario than try
and reconcile the true dimensions that uncertainty
introduces. It is preparedness, therefore, that endows
the only tool that can deter possible confrontation of a
nature that has earlier been designated as nightmarish.
India today is in a position to impress upon its
adversaries a deterrent relationship based on nuclear
war avoidance, with the proviso that the rationale of
nuclear weapons as a political tool and a means to
preclude a nuclear exchange are recognised and adhered
to. China’s galloping entwinement with the rest of the
world makes this proposition a real probability;
contingent upon our resolve and policies of seeking
mutuality with like-minded nations to rally around the
single point of preventing reactionary overturning of the
status quo. This despite the unilateral tensions that
China has precipitated in the East and South China Sea
over sovereignty, air defence identification zones and the
right to control fishing.
Pakistan is, however, a different cup of tea for it
portrays a perilous uncertainty, as would any nation
under military control that perceives in nuclear weapons
the ultimate Brahmastra. As with that weapon of mass
destruction, answers lay not just in the promise of
disproportionate retaliation but also in the credible
ability to prempt and counter its use. India has in place
nuclear weapons driven by a doctrine of NFU and
massive retaliation. What its strategic forces must now
equip itself with is select conventional hardware that
tracks and targets nuclear forces (all under political
control). This would provide the pre-emptive teeth to a
deterrent relationship that leans so heavily on NFU.
phenomenon when it organises concepts and
institutions in a mosaic of sometimes antithetical
notions. Contrary ideas are indeed intrinsic to the art of
political sagacity, but when form is defined by a belief,
in apparent conflict with content, then there appear
distortions more illusory than what logic would suggest.
So it is with the emergence of strategic nuclear
weapons. They are destructive to the extent that the
purpose of warfare is itself obliterated, underscoring a
compelling theory of war avoidance. By its side are
strategic non-nuclear weapons whose intent is to target
nuclear weapons that, ironically, seek a (precarious)
stability.
Conventional savvy will first suggest that non-nuclear
weapons can neither deliver the requisite high explosive
payload to assume a counter-force role against silo-
based or caverned nuclear systems; nor do they come
with the probability of kill that is demanded with such a
role. But just around the technological corner lurks high
impact penetration and shaped charges that make a
mockery of hitherto simple overpressure reckoning.
Second, nuclear pundits will insinuate that a partially
successful counter-force strike may in point of fact
catalyse escalation to a full blown nuclear exchange;
both contain candour of their own.
But strange is our circumstance when on the one hand
Pakistan presents us with a nuclear nightmare which
when articulated is a hair-trigger, opaque deterrent
conventionalised under military control, steered by a
doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity, and
guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds
unity with non-state actors. The introduction of tactical
nuclear weapons into the battle area further exacerbates
credibility of their control. It does not take a great deal
of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is
upon us. However, the very nature of the power
equation on the subcontinent and the extent to which it
is tilted in India’s favour will imply that any attempt at
bringing about conflict resolution through means other
than peaceful is destined to fail. In this context it is
amply clear that the threat of use of nuclear weapons
promotes only one case and that is the Pakistani
military establishment’s hold on the nation. On the other
hand is a Janus-faced China which, in collusion with
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, has not just
entrenched proliferatory links, but also doctrinal union
that permits a duplicitous approach to the latter’s
declared No First Use (NFU) posture and an option to
keep the South Asian nuclear cauldron on the boil. Also
significant is the alliance bucks the existing global non-
proliferation structure.
What may be derived from the current state of affairs,
with any conviction, is the political and military
unpredictability that prevails. This denies hope for
stability and the expectation of fitting conditions into a
convenient model, let alone providing for security
guarantees. Governments faced with such a conundrum
more readily prepare for a worst case scenario than try
and reconcile the true dimensions that uncertainty
introduces. It is preparedness, therefore, that endows
the only tool that can deter possible confrontation of a
nature that has earlier been designated as nightmarish.
India today is in a position to impress upon its
adversaries a deterrent relationship based on nuclear
war avoidance, with the proviso that the rationale of
nuclear weapons as a political tool and a means to
preclude a nuclear exchange are recognised and adhered
to. China’s galloping entwinement with the rest of the
world makes this proposition a real probability;
contingent upon our resolve and policies of seeking
mutuality with like-minded nations to rally around the
single point of preventing reactionary overturning of the
status quo. This despite the unilateral tensions that
China has precipitated in the East and South China Sea
over sovereignty, air defence identification zones and the
right to control fishing.
Pakistan is, however, a different cup of tea for it
portrays a perilous uncertainty, as would any nation
under military control that perceives in nuclear weapons
the ultimate Brahmastra. As with that weapon of mass
destruction, answers lay not just in the promise of
disproportionate retaliation but also in the credible
ability to prempt and counter its use. India has in place
nuclear weapons driven by a doctrine of NFU and
massive retaliation. What its strategic forces must now
equip itself with is select conventional hardware that
tracks and targets nuclear forces (all under political
control). This would provide the pre-emptive teeth to a
deterrent relationship that leans so heavily on NFU.
ARAB WORLD: TRYING TIMES AHEAD
Though the spotlight on West Asia is understandably
focused currently on the unquestionably exciting
prospect of a welcome and desirable reconciliation
between the US and Iran, which is more than likely to
happen, contemporary ground realities and trends in
large sections of the Arab World increasingly suggest
that Islamic extremism, personified by al Qaeda and its
affiliates in West Asia, is potentially an even greater
destabilising factor than the standoff vis-à-vis Iran had
been.
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen
Though four dictators were overthrown as a result of
the revolutionary turmoil in the Arab World, except in
tiny Tunisia which is the only success story, the current
situation in Egypt, Libya and Yemen is far more unstable
than when the dictators were ruling. In Libya, a large
number of armed militias have carved out fiefdoms
which they control, with the central government
becoming a nominal entity with its writ being virtually
non-existent in vast swathes of the country. Libya is a
Somalia in the making.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been Egypt’s and the Arab
world’s pre-eminent Islamic entity known for its
outstanding social and welfare services to the poor and
rural populations in particular. It was elected to form
the government which, after only one year in power, was
overthrown by the army, albeit demanded by a very
large number of protestors against ‘Islamic’ rule. Since
then, every week dozens of its supporters and many
Egyptian army and police personnel have been killed in
clashes between them.
The Brotherhood has been banned once again - dubbed
a terrorist organisation; this does not augur well for the
prospects of political Islam which is natural and
fundamental to the success of democracy in the
overwhelmingly Muslim Arab countries. It is very likely
that Gen Sisi, the present Army Chief and architect of
the hard line against the Brotherhood, is elected the
next President. All this will encourage support for
extremist groups as the only alternative to dictatorial
and Army rule.
Iraq and Syria
Syria is engulfed by a particularly devastating and
destructive civil war. More than 1,20,000 people have
been killed. Almost four million Syrians are refugees in
neighboring countries and five million have been
internally displaced. The dismantling of the Saddam
regime led to the border between Syria and Iraq
becoming porous; in the last year it has become
nonexistent for all practical purposes – huge spaces
between Baghdad and Damascus are controlled by
many different groups of Islamist fighters of various
hues, pre-eminent among them being the Iraq-based
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an al Qaeda
outfit.
Amongst Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime, the
ISIL is the best armed and most effective. Some weeks
ago it had established control over most of Aleppo
which is Syria’s largest city and in the process routed
not only government forces but also of other rebel
groups, and of the Western and Gulf countries’ backed
Syrian National Coalition and Syrian National Army. The
ISIL consists only of foreigners, mainly Iraqis, and its
brutality and single-minded commitment to the
establishment of an Islamic Emirate has now caused
other rebel groups, in particular the recently formed
Islamic Front, and the Syrian affiliate of the al Qaeda,
the al Nusra Front, to treat the ISIL as the major enemy
rather than the Assad regime. It is ironical that after so
much bloodshed Assad is likely to remain in power, but
of an anarchic and shattered Syria. Iraq is rapidly
slipping back into the anarchy that prevailed during
2005 to 2008.
After Arab Spring: Is the Situation Better or Worse
Today?
Politics within all these countries is increasingly
determined by the gun. Thus, the singularly
inappropriately termed ‘Arab Spring’, hailed as the
belated ‘Enlightenment Moment’ for the Arab World, has
left it in a far worse situation than before. Islam in the
Arab World and West Asia is at war with itself -
between moderates and extremists; between Shias and
Sunnis; between pro-West Muslim countries (Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, UAE) and anti-West Muslim countries
(Iran, Syria, Lebanon).
Today, several countries of the Arab world have become
a blood soaked cauldron of bigotry and hate torn by
sectarian violence. If this fratricidal conflict continues,
significant portions of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen
could become like the Afghanistan of the 1980s and
early 1990s – a safe-haven and breeding ground for
terrorists.
Should South Asia, Especially India, be Worried?
Though the Arab countries themselves are the worst
affected, adverse consequences for the US, Europe and
the Indian subcontinent in particular, would also be very
much on the cards. This is particularly so in the context
of rising uncertainties as to what could happen in
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops. Pakistan
has become a dangerous hotbed of extremism also.
India needs to be particularly wary.
The world needs to proactively address the current
mayhem in West Asia with a sense of urgency. The
imperative need of the hour is that the United Nations
takes the initiative to convene a conference of concerned
countries and major powers to take on extremism in the
Arab World and West Asia, including confronting the al
Qaeda outfits headlong, militarily if need be.
focused currently on the unquestionably exciting
prospect of a welcome and desirable reconciliation
between the US and Iran, which is more than likely to
happen, contemporary ground realities and trends in
large sections of the Arab World increasingly suggest
that Islamic extremism, personified by al Qaeda and its
affiliates in West Asia, is potentially an even greater
destabilising factor than the standoff vis-à-vis Iran had
been.
Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen
Though four dictators were overthrown as a result of
the revolutionary turmoil in the Arab World, except in
tiny Tunisia which is the only success story, the current
situation in Egypt, Libya and Yemen is far more unstable
than when the dictators were ruling. In Libya, a large
number of armed militias have carved out fiefdoms
which they control, with the central government
becoming a nominal entity with its writ being virtually
non-existent in vast swathes of the country. Libya is a
Somalia in the making.
The Muslim Brotherhood has been Egypt’s and the Arab
world’s pre-eminent Islamic entity known for its
outstanding social and welfare services to the poor and
rural populations in particular. It was elected to form
the government which, after only one year in power, was
overthrown by the army, albeit demanded by a very
large number of protestors against ‘Islamic’ rule. Since
then, every week dozens of its supporters and many
Egyptian army and police personnel have been killed in
clashes between them.
The Brotherhood has been banned once again - dubbed
a terrorist organisation; this does not augur well for the
prospects of political Islam which is natural and
fundamental to the success of democracy in the
overwhelmingly Muslim Arab countries. It is very likely
that Gen Sisi, the present Army Chief and architect of
the hard line against the Brotherhood, is elected the
next President. All this will encourage support for
extremist groups as the only alternative to dictatorial
and Army rule.
Iraq and Syria
Syria is engulfed by a particularly devastating and
destructive civil war. More than 1,20,000 people have
been killed. Almost four million Syrians are refugees in
neighboring countries and five million have been
internally displaced. The dismantling of the Saddam
regime led to the border between Syria and Iraq
becoming porous; in the last year it has become
nonexistent for all practical purposes – huge spaces
between Baghdad and Damascus are controlled by
many different groups of Islamist fighters of various
hues, pre-eminent among them being the Iraq-based
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), an al Qaeda
outfit.
Amongst Islamist groups fighting the Assad regime, the
ISIL is the best armed and most effective. Some weeks
ago it had established control over most of Aleppo
which is Syria’s largest city and in the process routed
not only government forces but also of other rebel
groups, and of the Western and Gulf countries’ backed
Syrian National Coalition and Syrian National Army. The
ISIL consists only of foreigners, mainly Iraqis, and its
brutality and single-minded commitment to the
establishment of an Islamic Emirate has now caused
other rebel groups, in particular the recently formed
Islamic Front, and the Syrian affiliate of the al Qaeda,
the al Nusra Front, to treat the ISIL as the major enemy
rather than the Assad regime. It is ironical that after so
much bloodshed Assad is likely to remain in power, but
of an anarchic and shattered Syria. Iraq is rapidly
slipping back into the anarchy that prevailed during
2005 to 2008.
After Arab Spring: Is the Situation Better or Worse
Today?
Politics within all these countries is increasingly
determined by the gun. Thus, the singularly
inappropriately termed ‘Arab Spring’, hailed as the
belated ‘Enlightenment Moment’ for the Arab World, has
left it in a far worse situation than before. Islam in the
Arab World and West Asia is at war with itself -
between moderates and extremists; between Shias and
Sunnis; between pro-West Muslim countries (Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, UAE) and anti-West Muslim countries
(Iran, Syria, Lebanon).
Today, several countries of the Arab world have become
a blood soaked cauldron of bigotry and hate torn by
sectarian violence. If this fratricidal conflict continues,
significant portions of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Yemen
could become like the Afghanistan of the 1980s and
early 1990s – a safe-haven and breeding ground for
terrorists.
Should South Asia, Especially India, be Worried?
Though the Arab countries themselves are the worst
affected, adverse consequences for the US, Europe and
the Indian subcontinent in particular, would also be very
much on the cards. This is particularly so in the context
of rising uncertainties as to what could happen in
Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops. Pakistan
has become a dangerous hotbed of extremism also.
India needs to be particularly wary.
The world needs to proactively address the current
mayhem in West Asia with a sense of urgency. The
imperative need of the hour is that the United Nations
takes the initiative to convene a conference of concerned
countries and major powers to take on extremism in the
Arab World and West Asia, including confronting the al
Qaeda outfits headlong, militarily if need be.
TALIBAN TALKS AND THE FOUR HORSEMEN: BETWEEN PEACE AND APOCALYPSE
The previous article in this column discussed the talks
about talks with the Pakistani Taliban, and Sami-ul-Haq
being projected as the interlocutor between the State
and the Teherik-e-Taliban (TTP).
Since the previous column was written in early January
2014, three major developments have taken place. First
was a short military campaign against the militants in
Waziristan. Second was appointment of a 'four member
committee' by the government to negotiate with the
Taliban. Third was the acceptance of the TTP to
negotiate with the State, along with nomination of a
team from the Pakistani Taliban.
While the decision to negotiate with the TTP and the
latter’s response was itself a substantial achievement,
the harsh reality is that the problems for the State have
just begun. Given the issues and questions, this process
is likely to be anything but easy.
From Sami-ul-Haq to the Four Horsemen: A Changed
Strategy by the Government
During the last week of January 2014, the government
appointed a four member committee to negotiate with
the TTP, comprising of Rahimullah Yusufzai, Irfan
Siddiqui, Rustam Shah and Major (Retd) Amir.
Rahimullah Yusufzai is a well-known and independent
senior journalist. His writings in mainstream
newspapers have been balanced and he his insights are
respected. Irfan Siddiqui is also a senior journalist, but
today he is known more as a pro-Nawaz person; he is
also a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. Major
Amir has been reported as a former ISI officer who is
close to Nawaz Sharif. According to Amir Mir, "Major
(retd) Amir... has a murky past being the alleged
architect of the infamous ' Operation Midnight Jackal ' to
topple the first government of Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in 1989." ( The News , 30 January 2014). Rustam
Shah is a former diplomat who has served in
Afghanistan and is known to be sympathetic to the
Taliban.
In terms of the composition, it could be generally agreed
that two of them (Irfan Siddiqui and Major Amir) are
seen as closer to Nawaz Sharif. There is nothing wrong
in Sharif choosing his confidantes, in fact, given the
intricacies it is always useful for the Prime Miniester to
choose a team he has confidence in. However, as Fazlur
Rehman has already criticised, they were not chosen on
a consensus, nor they have a political background. The
four horsemen are all professionals in one field or the
other, but have never been politicians.
Will the four horsemen be able to deliver? Except for
Fazlur Rehman, the rest of the political leadership,
cutting across political lines at the national and regional
levels, seems to have faith in the new initiative.
From Suicide Attacks to a Ten Member Committee:
Understanding the Change in TTP
What has changed for the TTP in the last month that it
has agreed to negotiate with the government?
Was it because of the military strikes in Waziristan?
Given the nature of the attacks and the short duration,
it appears that the military strikes were aimed more at
convincing the US, where Sartaj Aziz was attempting to
revive the strategic dialogue between the two countries,
rather than at bringing the Taliban down. Had the latter
been the case, the strikes would have continued until
the TTP begged for a dialogue. However, this was not
the case.
Why did then the TTP agree to negotiate? Does it really
believe in negotiating with the government? Or is the
negotiation a strategy of its ongoing war with the
State?
What would the TTP Demand?
Will this negotiation between the TTP and the
government be without any preconditions? Unlikely. The
TTP is likely to emphasise that there should be no
military strikes in the first place. As a logical extension
of that, it is likely to pressurise the State to tell US that
the latter completely stop its drone programme. In fact,
the TTP leadership should be more worried about the
drone strikes than the military strikes. However
indiscriminate the military strikes are likely to be, they
can never be as precise as a drone attack. The TTP is
also likely to demand the release of its top leadership,
who have been arrested by the State and kept in
different jails.
Politically, the TTP is likely to pressurise the
government to sever ties with the US and ensure that
the Durand Line becomes irrelevant for the Afghan
militants.
Will the TTP also demand the imposition of shariah
elsewhere in Pakistan, as it demanded in Swat? It may
place that demand but is unlikely to carry it forward,
given that the time is not ripe. Such a demand may
perhaps be acceptable for the State in remote FATA or
the Swat valley, but not acceptable in the rest of
Pakistan. Not yet.
How Far will the State Go in Yielding to the TTP?
Clearly, the State is not keen in pursuing a military
option vis-à-vis the militants. The TTP would not
be satisfied with the status quo.
The primary question is not what the TTP wants.
Rather, it is how far the State is willing to go to
accommodate the TTP.
about talks with the Pakistani Taliban, and Sami-ul-Haq
being projected as the interlocutor between the State
and the Teherik-e-Taliban (TTP).
Since the previous column was written in early January
2014, three major developments have taken place. First
was a short military campaign against the militants in
Waziristan. Second was appointment of a 'four member
committee' by the government to negotiate with the
Taliban. Third was the acceptance of the TTP to
negotiate with the State, along with nomination of a
team from the Pakistani Taliban.
While the decision to negotiate with the TTP and the
latter’s response was itself a substantial achievement,
the harsh reality is that the problems for the State have
just begun. Given the issues and questions, this process
is likely to be anything but easy.
From Sami-ul-Haq to the Four Horsemen: A Changed
Strategy by the Government
During the last week of January 2014, the government
appointed a four member committee to negotiate with
the TTP, comprising of Rahimullah Yusufzai, Irfan
Siddiqui, Rustam Shah and Major (Retd) Amir.
Rahimullah Yusufzai is a well-known and independent
senior journalist. His writings in mainstream
newspapers have been balanced and he his insights are
respected. Irfan Siddiqui is also a senior journalist, but
today he is known more as a pro-Nawaz person; he is
also a Special Assistant to the Prime Minister. Major
Amir has been reported as a former ISI officer who is
close to Nawaz Sharif. According to Amir Mir, "Major
(retd) Amir... has a murky past being the alleged
architect of the infamous ' Operation Midnight Jackal ' to
topple the first government of Prime Minister Benazir
Bhutto in 1989." ( The News , 30 January 2014). Rustam
Shah is a former diplomat who has served in
Afghanistan and is known to be sympathetic to the
Taliban.
In terms of the composition, it could be generally agreed
that two of them (Irfan Siddiqui and Major Amir) are
seen as closer to Nawaz Sharif. There is nothing wrong
in Sharif choosing his confidantes, in fact, given the
intricacies it is always useful for the Prime Miniester to
choose a team he has confidence in. However, as Fazlur
Rehman has already criticised, they were not chosen on
a consensus, nor they have a political background. The
four horsemen are all professionals in one field or the
other, but have never been politicians.
Will the four horsemen be able to deliver? Except for
Fazlur Rehman, the rest of the political leadership,
cutting across political lines at the national and regional
levels, seems to have faith in the new initiative.
From Suicide Attacks to a Ten Member Committee:
Understanding the Change in TTP
What has changed for the TTP in the last month that it
has agreed to negotiate with the government?
Was it because of the military strikes in Waziristan?
Given the nature of the attacks and the short duration,
it appears that the military strikes were aimed more at
convincing the US, where Sartaj Aziz was attempting to
revive the strategic dialogue between the two countries,
rather than at bringing the Taliban down. Had the latter
been the case, the strikes would have continued until
the TTP begged for a dialogue. However, this was not
the case.
Why did then the TTP agree to negotiate? Does it really
believe in negotiating with the government? Or is the
negotiation a strategy of its ongoing war with the
State?
What would the TTP Demand?
Will this negotiation between the TTP and the
government be without any preconditions? Unlikely. The
TTP is likely to emphasise that there should be no
military strikes in the first place. As a logical extension
of that, it is likely to pressurise the State to tell US that
the latter completely stop its drone programme. In fact,
the TTP leadership should be more worried about the
drone strikes than the military strikes. However
indiscriminate the military strikes are likely to be, they
can never be as precise as a drone attack. The TTP is
also likely to demand the release of its top leadership,
who have been arrested by the State and kept in
different jails.
Politically, the TTP is likely to pressurise the
government to sever ties with the US and ensure that
the Durand Line becomes irrelevant for the Afghan
militants.
Will the TTP also demand the imposition of shariah
elsewhere in Pakistan, as it demanded in Swat? It may
place that demand but is unlikely to carry it forward,
given that the time is not ripe. Such a demand may
perhaps be acceptable for the State in remote FATA or
the Swat valley, but not acceptable in the rest of
Pakistan. Not yet.
How Far will the State Go in Yielding to the TTP?
Clearly, the State is not keen in pursuing a military
option vis-à-vis the militants. The TTP would not
be satisfied with the status quo.
The primary question is not what the TTP wants.
Rather, it is how far the State is willing to go to
accommodate the TTP.
PAKISTAN: HYPER-NATIONAL SECURITY STATE
For over six decades, the Pakistani elite have pursued a
`hyper-national security state’ geopolitical approach,
stemming from an almost continuous and obsessive
`search for power symmetry with India’, which has laid a
“geo-strategic curse” on the country at the expense of
any lasting political or economic reform. This has
resulted in `domestic stagnation and even chaos’.
Though seemingly successful in the short-term, or from
a tactical point of view, they distorted the country’s
development in the long run, imperilling its national
security.
This is the central thesis of the construct offered in `The
Warrior State – Pakistan in the Contemporary World’, a
new book by Dr TV Paul, Professor, International
Relations, McGill University, Canada.
Pakistan had its `great power patrons’ – the US and
China – both of whom it received massive military
assistance from; but even their policies and patronage
discouraged the adoption of `painful economic and
social reforms necessary for rapid, equitable economic
and political development’. Dr Paul tellingly brings out
how ever since its founding in 1947, Pakistan remained
at the center of major geopolitical struggles: the US-
Soviet Union rivalry; the conflict with India; the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan; and most recently, the
post-9/11 wars. Massive foreign aid kept pouring in
from major powers and their allies with a stake in the
region. The reliability of such aid defused any pressure
on the political elites to launch far-reaching domestic
reforms necessary to promote sustained growth, higher
standards of living, and more stable democratic
institutions.
Pakistan’s elite – primarily the military leaders who
repeatedly usurped power, abrogating constitution-
making and the evolution of democratic processes –
had, according to Dr Paul, `both the motive and
opportunity to pursue such policies’. Their strategic
ideas and ideological beliefs about statehood,
development and power became major factors in
determining strategies they followed. However, these
ideas were `devoid of prudence and pragmatism’ and
produced `unintended consequences, that were often
negative’.
Citing the European experience to understand the
relationship between war and state building in the
Pakistani context, the book suggests that Pakistan has
unfortunately tended to slide into the category of `weak’
or `failing states’ as its elites showed a proclivity to
dabble `in other regional conflicts, proxy wars or
promotion of insurgencies’, instead of devoting
capacities for `the creation of public goods to its
citizenry by way of education, healthcare, employment
and high standard of living’.
Tracing causes of this political evolution through its
turbulent history, Dr Paul concludes that Pakistan has
`ended up as a garrison or praetorian state’; whenever
the military ceded power to elected civilian governments,
it did so only partially. This left the country as a `
hybrid democratic model’ with the military remaining ` a
veto player’ in crucial decision making.
An interesting chapter is devoted to comparing
Pakistan’s internecine civil-military conflict with similar
situations in other Muslim majority countries such as
Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, and even with `non-Muslim
National Security States’ such as South Korea and
Taiwan. Though acknowledging some similarities
relating to the `existential nature of threats faced’, Dr
Paul finds Pakistan’s wars were `limited in nature’ and
were `never utilised by the elite to transform the
country’s economic policies’. The military’s dominance
`was never tamed’ and `the co-operation of civil society
groups’ was channelised `in the direction of geo-
political projects’, instead of garnering support for
policies of economic development. Religion was
repeatedly utilised in the quest for Islamic legitimacy
and as a crutch to justify the military’s abrogation of
democratic politics, in the process leading to the
`misuse of political Islam’; rise of sectarianism; and
endemic ethnic cleavages – all characteristics of weak,
insecurity-generating states.
The book examines how Pakistan is coping with `the
trap of the Warrior State’ today and whether it will
transform in the near future. Though some signs of
change are discerned, through growing introspection
among some sections of civil society, Dr Paul says
Pakistan’s `ongoing war-making efforts have deeply
affected its prospects for emerging as a tolerant,
prosperous and unified nation-state. He believes
`ironically, that Pakistan’s democratic elections and
political transitions made things worse domestically’,
leaving civil society much weaker and the middle class
`increasingly sympathetic to extremism’. The army has
recently taking on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
though this seems a reluctant and limited strategy
conditioned by calculations of calibrated response in the
context of Afghanistan. It still has the `temptation’ to
play `good Taliban’ and `bad Taliban’ while pursuing
tactical or asymmetric objectives. Offering a rather dour
prognosis, Dr Paul suggests that things could improve
`only if ideas and assumptions of the elite change
fundamentally’. The state could otherwise fall apart `if
they (the elite) persist in “double games”’.
The State’s long term policies have neither focussed on
economic development nor shown political cohesion.
Despite the impact of the internet revolution, enabled by
a reasonably free media, the younger generation has not
been allowed to globalise or benefit from economic
liberalisation. The education and science and technology
sectors have languished or remained bound under old
narratives of insecurity.
Emphasising `twin fears for the future in its immediate
neighbourhood’ – the fear of India and the fear of losing
primary influence over Afghanistan – Pakistan’s
military is shown to have assumed a protector’s role –
so typical in `Warrior States’ [Charles Tilly, in “War
Making & State Making as Organised Crime,” ‘Bringing
the State Back In’, 1985]. The army is called upon again
and again to assume the protector’s role from threats it
has itself created in the first place – thus showing how
`a protector can become a protection racketeer’.
Soundness of theoretical premises notwithstanding, this
is severe castigation indeed and may not go down well
with audiences in Pakistan, coming as it does from an
academic of Indian origin, albeit now ensconced in
hallowed climes. It also reflects, perhaps, an inadequate
and unduly pessimistic appreciation of complex social
and political factors influencing responses of various
players in the Pakistan’s domestic arena.
After Musharraf’s last disruption of democracy in
November 2007, the lawyers’ movement for restoration
of the higher judiciary definitely reflected deep-seated
changes in these relationships and a partial maturing of
civil society in the country. Both former President Asif
Ali Zardari and former Army Chief, Gen Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani understood these changes and made interesting
course corrections in typical behaviour patterns which
determined civil-military interactions in the five-year
interregnum (2008-2013). Thoughpolitical parties
remained weak, the army too could not or did not
voluntarily (sic!) exercise absolute power. The ignominy
of the Abbottabad action by the US to eliminate Osama
bin Laden was not lost either on a politically aware
polity or among young officers in the Pakistani Defence
Services, who were unhappy with their own impotence.
Though berated by new found judicial activism, the
civilian political leadership still sacked a retired General
as Defence Secretary during the strained `Memogate’
phase, though having to dismiss their chosen
Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, due to the
army’s insistence. Former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
Gilani nevertheless, lamented in a forceful speech in the
National Assembly that no organ of the State could
claim to be “a State within the State,” asserting that
“decision-making is done only by Parliament” and “all
institutions of the county remain answerable” to it.
Though civil society activism in Pakistan seems to have
ebbed, real political power is today diffused and spread
among several actors. The centre-right politicians who
received an overwhelming popular mandate in the 2013
general elections have built their own patronage and
connections with radical Islamic actors; and the latter
too have emerged with increasing clout in civil society.
The Pakistan People’s Party could not contest elections
freely due to threats from the Taliban and suffered at
the hustings due to anti-incumbency and mal-
governance. However, it retains its mass base in Sindh,
and could bounce back. As a national mainstream party,
it extended solidarity to the ruling PML (N), when civil-
military relations recently became strained. The
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM-Altaf) has its own
ethno-cultural clout, in the context of law and order
management in Karachi.
These factors place limits on the military’s ability to
control things entirely, though the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) remains the key military institution for
the manipulation of politics. This has been vividly
demonstrated in the crisis after the attack on Geo
compere, Hamid Mir, and the army-backed attempts to
coerce or curb freedom of the press.
On the ensuing military interaction with TTP too, Dr
Paul’s prognosis seems off the mark. With civilian
political leaders still paying lip service to mediation and
talks, how the army tackles what has been described as
the newest `existentialist threat’ against the State
perhaps needed to be explained beyond the parameters
of `a warrior state’ construct.
That said, Dr Paul’s book offers a rich bibliographic
canvas and is a welcome addition to the burgeoning
literature on political dynamics in Pakistan.
`hyper-national security state’ geopolitical approach,
stemming from an almost continuous and obsessive
`search for power symmetry with India’, which has laid a
“geo-strategic curse” on the country at the expense of
any lasting political or economic reform. This has
resulted in `domestic stagnation and even chaos’.
Though seemingly successful in the short-term, or from
a tactical point of view, they distorted the country’s
development in the long run, imperilling its national
security.
This is the central thesis of the construct offered in `The
Warrior State – Pakistan in the Contemporary World’, a
new book by Dr TV Paul, Professor, International
Relations, McGill University, Canada.
Pakistan had its `great power patrons’ – the US and
China – both of whom it received massive military
assistance from; but even their policies and patronage
discouraged the adoption of `painful economic and
social reforms necessary for rapid, equitable economic
and political development’. Dr Paul tellingly brings out
how ever since its founding in 1947, Pakistan remained
at the center of major geopolitical struggles: the US-
Soviet Union rivalry; the conflict with India; the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan; and most recently, the
post-9/11 wars. Massive foreign aid kept pouring in
from major powers and their allies with a stake in the
region. The reliability of such aid defused any pressure
on the political elites to launch far-reaching domestic
reforms necessary to promote sustained growth, higher
standards of living, and more stable democratic
institutions.
Pakistan’s elite – primarily the military leaders who
repeatedly usurped power, abrogating constitution-
making and the evolution of democratic processes –
had, according to Dr Paul, `both the motive and
opportunity to pursue such policies’. Their strategic
ideas and ideological beliefs about statehood,
development and power became major factors in
determining strategies they followed. However, these
ideas were `devoid of prudence and pragmatism’ and
produced `unintended consequences, that were often
negative’.
Citing the European experience to understand the
relationship between war and state building in the
Pakistani context, the book suggests that Pakistan has
unfortunately tended to slide into the category of `weak’
or `failing states’ as its elites showed a proclivity to
dabble `in other regional conflicts, proxy wars or
promotion of insurgencies’, instead of devoting
capacities for `the creation of public goods to its
citizenry by way of education, healthcare, employment
and high standard of living’.
Tracing causes of this political evolution through its
turbulent history, Dr Paul concludes that Pakistan has
`ended up as a garrison or praetorian state’; whenever
the military ceded power to elected civilian governments,
it did so only partially. This left the country as a `
hybrid democratic model’ with the military remaining ` a
veto player’ in crucial decision making.
An interesting chapter is devoted to comparing
Pakistan’s internecine civil-military conflict with similar
situations in other Muslim majority countries such as
Turkey, Indonesia, Egypt, and even with `non-Muslim
National Security States’ such as South Korea and
Taiwan. Though acknowledging some similarities
relating to the `existential nature of threats faced’, Dr
Paul finds Pakistan’s wars were `limited in nature’ and
were `never utilised by the elite to transform the
country’s economic policies’. The military’s dominance
`was never tamed’ and `the co-operation of civil society
groups’ was channelised `in the direction of geo-
political projects’, instead of garnering support for
policies of economic development. Religion was
repeatedly utilised in the quest for Islamic legitimacy
and as a crutch to justify the military’s abrogation of
democratic politics, in the process leading to the
`misuse of political Islam’; rise of sectarianism; and
endemic ethnic cleavages – all characteristics of weak,
insecurity-generating states.
The book examines how Pakistan is coping with `the
trap of the Warrior State’ today and whether it will
transform in the near future. Though some signs of
change are discerned, through growing introspection
among some sections of civil society, Dr Paul says
Pakistan’s `ongoing war-making efforts have deeply
affected its prospects for emerging as a tolerant,
prosperous and unified nation-state. He believes
`ironically, that Pakistan’s democratic elections and
political transitions made things worse domestically’,
leaving civil society much weaker and the middle class
`increasingly sympathetic to extremism’. The army has
recently taking on the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),
though this seems a reluctant and limited strategy
conditioned by calculations of calibrated response in the
context of Afghanistan. It still has the `temptation’ to
play `good Taliban’ and `bad Taliban’ while pursuing
tactical or asymmetric objectives. Offering a rather dour
prognosis, Dr Paul suggests that things could improve
`only if ideas and assumptions of the elite change
fundamentally’. The state could otherwise fall apart `if
they (the elite) persist in “double games”’.
The State’s long term policies have neither focussed on
economic development nor shown political cohesion.
Despite the impact of the internet revolution, enabled by
a reasonably free media, the younger generation has not
been allowed to globalise or benefit from economic
liberalisation. The education and science and technology
sectors have languished or remained bound under old
narratives of insecurity.
Emphasising `twin fears for the future in its immediate
neighbourhood’ – the fear of India and the fear of losing
primary influence over Afghanistan – Pakistan’s
military is shown to have assumed a protector’s role –
so typical in `Warrior States’ [Charles Tilly, in “War
Making & State Making as Organised Crime,” ‘Bringing
the State Back In’, 1985]. The army is called upon again
and again to assume the protector’s role from threats it
has itself created in the first place – thus showing how
`a protector can become a protection racketeer’.
Soundness of theoretical premises notwithstanding, this
is severe castigation indeed and may not go down well
with audiences in Pakistan, coming as it does from an
academic of Indian origin, albeit now ensconced in
hallowed climes. It also reflects, perhaps, an inadequate
and unduly pessimistic appreciation of complex social
and political factors influencing responses of various
players in the Pakistan’s domestic arena.
After Musharraf’s last disruption of democracy in
November 2007, the lawyers’ movement for restoration
of the higher judiciary definitely reflected deep-seated
changes in these relationships and a partial maturing of
civil society in the country. Both former President Asif
Ali Zardari and former Army Chief, Gen Ashfaq Parvez
Kayani understood these changes and made interesting
course corrections in typical behaviour patterns which
determined civil-military interactions in the five-year
interregnum (2008-2013). Thoughpolitical parties
remained weak, the army too could not or did not
voluntarily (sic!) exercise absolute power. The ignominy
of the Abbottabad action by the US to eliminate Osama
bin Laden was not lost either on a politically aware
polity or among young officers in the Pakistani Defence
Services, who were unhappy with their own impotence.
Though berated by new found judicial activism, the
civilian political leadership still sacked a retired General
as Defence Secretary during the strained `Memogate’
phase, though having to dismiss their chosen
Ambassador to the US, Hussain Haqqani, due to the
army’s insistence. Former Prime Minister Yousaf Raza
Gilani nevertheless, lamented in a forceful speech in the
National Assembly that no organ of the State could
claim to be “a State within the State,” asserting that
“decision-making is done only by Parliament” and “all
institutions of the county remain answerable” to it.
Though civil society activism in Pakistan seems to have
ebbed, real political power is today diffused and spread
among several actors. The centre-right politicians who
received an overwhelming popular mandate in the 2013
general elections have built their own patronage and
connections with radical Islamic actors; and the latter
too have emerged with increasing clout in civil society.
The Pakistan People’s Party could not contest elections
freely due to threats from the Taliban and suffered at
the hustings due to anti-incumbency and mal-
governance. However, it retains its mass base in Sindh,
and could bounce back. As a national mainstream party,
it extended solidarity to the ruling PML (N), when civil-
military relations recently became strained. The
Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM-Altaf) has its own
ethno-cultural clout, in the context of law and order
management in Karachi.
These factors place limits on the military’s ability to
control things entirely, though the Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI) remains the key military institution for
the manipulation of politics. This has been vividly
demonstrated in the crisis after the attack on Geo
compere, Hamid Mir, and the army-backed attempts to
coerce or curb freedom of the press.
On the ensuing military interaction with TTP too, Dr
Paul’s prognosis seems off the mark. With civilian
political leaders still paying lip service to mediation and
talks, how the army tackles what has been described as
the newest `existentialist threat’ against the State
perhaps needed to be explained beyond the parameters
of `a warrior state’ construct.
That said, Dr Paul’s book offers a rich bibliographic
canvas and is a welcome addition to the burgeoning
literature on political dynamics in Pakistan.
12 Jun 2014
TTP AND THE KARACHI AIRPORT ATTACK
Karachi has been generally referred as the City of
Lights. But this Sunday, unfortunately it became the
City of Flames – literally and figuratively, with its airport
being attacked by the Pakistani Taliban and smoke
spiralling out.
While in the coming days there are likely to be multiple
analyses on this attack, two simple questions need to
be addressed – what does the attack say of what is
happening, and what does it mean for the events to
come.
Just a week before the attack on Karachi Airport, the
social, print and electronic media was full of reports
discussing the split within the Taliban, especially in
Waziristan. One of the Mehsud factions led by Said
Khan Sajna announced in public that they are leaving
the TTP fold; one of the spokespersons of the Sajna
faction was reported to have announced the following
as the reason for the split: “The central leadership has
gone into the hands of unseen forces, sectarian issues
and extortion in the name of Taliban…We have decided
to go our own way.”
Following the above difference, there was a general
belief and expectation that the Pakistani Taliban under
the leadership of Fazlullah would be weakened and easy
to target by the State forces. The fact that Sajna, who
had announced the split belongs to the Mehsud tribe in
Waziristan made many to believe that with the
Mehsuds, the most powerful groups within the TTP
deciding to part ways, the TTP would lose its impact
and importance. Immediately, following the above
announcement, the government also announced a group
of tribal elders in Waziristan to evict all the foreign
fighters from the region; the State gave them a 15 days
ultimatum.
The attack on Karachi airport by the Pakistani Taliban
should be interpreted in the above background. Days
within the announcement of the split and the ultimatum,
the TTP decided to answer to those two developments
in an appalling manner. From New York Times and
Washington Post in the US to the Sydney Morning
Herald in Australia, every news agency – print and
electronic covered the horror and gave substantial space
to what had happened in their front pages and
editorials.
So, the Pakistani Taliban has sent a strong and
powerful statement not only to the State in Pakistan,
but also the rest of international community, that
neither the split within the ranks, nor the announcement
of an impended attack would frighten them. This seems
to be the first major statement of the TTP’s attack on
the Karachi Airport.
Second, the attack in Karachi, far away from what is
believed to its nerve center – the tribal agencies of the
FATA along the Durand Line also convey the reach of
the TTP. And this is not the first attack in Karachi. Few
years earlier, in May 2011, the Taliban carried out a
similar spectacular attack on the PNS Mehran, a Naval
base in Karachi, destroying warplanes and also a P-3C
Orion using just rocket-propelled grenades and heavy
machine gun fire. A similar strategy was used few days
ago in the Karachi airport attack as well.
Third, the attack also reveals the ability of the TTP to
carry out high profile attacks on a regular basis.
Consider the following attacks after the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto since 2007 – on the GHQ in Rawalpindi
(2009), PNS Mehran in Karachi (2011), Minhas Airbase
in Kamra (2012) and Bacha Khan International Airport in
Peshawar (2012). And in almost all these cases, it was
not a huge attack, in terms of numbers; almost like the
fidayeen attacks that J&K witnessed during the last
decade – a small group of well trained and battle
hardened militants (in the case of Karachi Airport attack
– ten militants) creating a huge mayhem, leaving
security, economy and regular life in tatters.
It clearly reveals a pattern in terms of both the reach
and ability of the TTP; and also perhaps it highlights
the failure of the security and intelligence agencies.
Worse, some analysts within Pakistan even consider,
that there could be some information from inside. A
targeted suicide attack of two military/intelligence
officers near Islamabad few days ago, by the bombers
dressed as beggars in a railway crossing make a section
suspect that the TTP could be getting some insider
information.
Besides what has happened, what this attack means for
the future is also equally important. The Karachi Airport
is no ordinary one in the region; it is the largest
international airport in Pakistan, acting as a powerful
connectivity hub and economic gateway to the country.
All leading airlines and cargo planes have Karachi as
their main destination than Lahore or Islamabad. The
security situation in the rest of Pakistan had already
made many of the airlines and related agencies to cut
down their operations. With this attack very much inside
the Airport, one is likely to see further curtailing of
international airlines from Europe in particular, which
further acts as a hub to North America.
With the recent budget announcement and the
expectation to revive the economy and foreign direct
investment, the Airport attack is likely to leave huge
trails in the subsequent months on the potential to
attract investment, thereby improve the country’s
economy. With bad news spreading all over the world
about what is happening within Pakistan, any decline in
the air traffic further means limited travel to know and
understand the ground situation. This connectivity is
important for any major corporation to make any
investment in Pakistan.
The Karachi Airport attack would also mean the end of
peace talks between the government and the TTP, which
was actually being dragged during the last few months.
Early this year, there were so many expectations within
a section, especially within the Sharif government that
the talks between the TTP and the government would
ultimately yield to peace. Both sides announced multiple
committees and even few ceasefires. There were even
few reports that the military was not totally happy with
what was happening in terms of the talks between the
TTP and the political leadership. A section within the
Civil Society even suspected that the TTP would only
use this opportunity to hit back at a later stage. It
appears, that is what has happened.
The dialogue between the TTP and the government is
now in tatters. Will the civilian and military leadership
come together now, and start a full blown war against
the militants and militancy within Pakistan? Will
Pakistan stand up against violence and militancy?
In the past, as explained earlier in this commentary,
there were numerous instances of high profile attacks
led by the TTP, even on military targets for example the
bases of Air force and Navy, and also on the GHQ in
Rawalpindi. There was even a suicide attack on the
President. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s response to
militancy so far has been divided with one section
strongly advocating negotiations as a means. The State
should attempt the same as a strategy; but when such
an approach does not yield the desired result, it should
also be open to pursue a military strategy. Perhaps, a
section in Pakistan, even within the Establishment
believes that these non-State actors would be an asset
elsewhere in the near future.
What has happened in Karachi Airport shows the reach
and resolve of the TTP to continue its violent march
Lights. But this Sunday, unfortunately it became the
City of Flames – literally and figuratively, with its airport
being attacked by the Pakistani Taliban and smoke
spiralling out.
While in the coming days there are likely to be multiple
analyses on this attack, two simple questions need to
be addressed – what does the attack say of what is
happening, and what does it mean for the events to
come.
Just a week before the attack on Karachi Airport, the
social, print and electronic media was full of reports
discussing the split within the Taliban, especially in
Waziristan. One of the Mehsud factions led by Said
Khan Sajna announced in public that they are leaving
the TTP fold; one of the spokespersons of the Sajna
faction was reported to have announced the following
as the reason for the split: “The central leadership has
gone into the hands of unseen forces, sectarian issues
and extortion in the name of Taliban…We have decided
to go our own way.”
Following the above difference, there was a general
belief and expectation that the Pakistani Taliban under
the leadership of Fazlullah would be weakened and easy
to target by the State forces. The fact that Sajna, who
had announced the split belongs to the Mehsud tribe in
Waziristan made many to believe that with the
Mehsuds, the most powerful groups within the TTP
deciding to part ways, the TTP would lose its impact
and importance. Immediately, following the above
announcement, the government also announced a group
of tribal elders in Waziristan to evict all the foreign
fighters from the region; the State gave them a 15 days
ultimatum.
The attack on Karachi airport by the Pakistani Taliban
should be interpreted in the above background. Days
within the announcement of the split and the ultimatum,
the TTP decided to answer to those two developments
in an appalling manner. From New York Times and
Washington Post in the US to the Sydney Morning
Herald in Australia, every news agency – print and
electronic covered the horror and gave substantial space
to what had happened in their front pages and
editorials.
So, the Pakistani Taliban has sent a strong and
powerful statement not only to the State in Pakistan,
but also the rest of international community, that
neither the split within the ranks, nor the announcement
of an impended attack would frighten them. This seems
to be the first major statement of the TTP’s attack on
the Karachi Airport.
Second, the attack in Karachi, far away from what is
believed to its nerve center – the tribal agencies of the
FATA along the Durand Line also convey the reach of
the TTP. And this is not the first attack in Karachi. Few
years earlier, in May 2011, the Taliban carried out a
similar spectacular attack on the PNS Mehran, a Naval
base in Karachi, destroying warplanes and also a P-3C
Orion using just rocket-propelled grenades and heavy
machine gun fire. A similar strategy was used few days
ago in the Karachi airport attack as well.
Third, the attack also reveals the ability of the TTP to
carry out high profile attacks on a regular basis.
Consider the following attacks after the assassination of
Benazir Bhutto since 2007 – on the GHQ in Rawalpindi
(2009), PNS Mehran in Karachi (2011), Minhas Airbase
in Kamra (2012) and Bacha Khan International Airport in
Peshawar (2012). And in almost all these cases, it was
not a huge attack, in terms of numbers; almost like the
fidayeen attacks that J&K witnessed during the last
decade – a small group of well trained and battle
hardened militants (in the case of Karachi Airport attack
– ten militants) creating a huge mayhem, leaving
security, economy and regular life in tatters.
It clearly reveals a pattern in terms of both the reach
and ability of the TTP; and also perhaps it highlights
the failure of the security and intelligence agencies.
Worse, some analysts within Pakistan even consider,
that there could be some information from inside. A
targeted suicide attack of two military/intelligence
officers near Islamabad few days ago, by the bombers
dressed as beggars in a railway crossing make a section
suspect that the TTP could be getting some insider
information.
Besides what has happened, what this attack means for
the future is also equally important. The Karachi Airport
is no ordinary one in the region; it is the largest
international airport in Pakistan, acting as a powerful
connectivity hub and economic gateway to the country.
All leading airlines and cargo planes have Karachi as
their main destination than Lahore or Islamabad. The
security situation in the rest of Pakistan had already
made many of the airlines and related agencies to cut
down their operations. With this attack very much inside
the Airport, one is likely to see further curtailing of
international airlines from Europe in particular, which
further acts as a hub to North America.
With the recent budget announcement and the
expectation to revive the economy and foreign direct
investment, the Airport attack is likely to leave huge
trails in the subsequent months on the potential to
attract investment, thereby improve the country’s
economy. With bad news spreading all over the world
about what is happening within Pakistan, any decline in
the air traffic further means limited travel to know and
understand the ground situation. This connectivity is
important for any major corporation to make any
investment in Pakistan.
The Karachi Airport attack would also mean the end of
peace talks between the government and the TTP, which
was actually being dragged during the last few months.
Early this year, there were so many expectations within
a section, especially within the Sharif government that
the talks between the TTP and the government would
ultimately yield to peace. Both sides announced multiple
committees and even few ceasefires. There were even
few reports that the military was not totally happy with
what was happening in terms of the talks between the
TTP and the political leadership. A section within the
Civil Society even suspected that the TTP would only
use this opportunity to hit back at a later stage. It
appears, that is what has happened.
The dialogue between the TTP and the government is
now in tatters. Will the civilian and military leadership
come together now, and start a full blown war against
the militants and militancy within Pakistan? Will
Pakistan stand up against violence and militancy?
In the past, as explained earlier in this commentary,
there were numerous instances of high profile attacks
led by the TTP, even on military targets for example the
bases of Air force and Navy, and also on the GHQ in
Rawalpindi. There was even a suicide attack on the
President. Unfortunately, Pakistan’s response to
militancy so far has been divided with one section
strongly advocating negotiations as a means. The State
should attempt the same as a strategy; but when such
an approach does not yield the desired result, it should
also be open to pursue a military strategy. Perhaps, a
section in Pakistan, even within the Establishment
believes that these non-State actors would be an asset
elsewhere in the near future.
What has happened in Karachi Airport shows the reach
and resolve of the TTP to continue its violent march
11 Jun 2014
SCOTLAND AND BRITAIN IN THE BALANCE
YOU DON’T win because you don’t
care enough.” The Ukrainian chess
player’s pithy observation in Allan
Massie’s fine novel A Question of
Loyalties resonates today where the
continent’s extremes meet, from the eastern
borderlands to the far northwest.
The violent political coercion in Ukraine is
in deep contrast to the peaceful, democratic
nature of the process under way in Scotland,
where Scots will vote on their country’s
independence on 18 September and therefore
decide also the destiny of the United Kingdom
state. Yet if the principles at stake in each
case – sovereignty, law, citizenship, belonging
– are similar, so too is the fact that those
seeking to change the status quo seem driven
by a far greater inner conviction than their
adversaries. (And this is true of both their
immediate adversaries and, in Brussels and
London, their more remote ones.)
Scotland’s chief twentieth-century poet and
controversialist Hugh MacDiarmid (1892–
1978) is more often quoted by scandalised
anti-nationalists these days, but his lines, “The
present’s theirs, but a’ the past and future’s
oors,” well conveys the confident ownership
of the independence argument by the “yes”
side, led by the Scottish National Party, or
SNP, government in Edinburgh.
Greatly aided by an ultra-committed
grassroots campaign (whose architect, Stephen
Noon, describes its mantra as “conversion
through conversation”), the “yes” side is
managing an extraordinary feat. It is making
“no” advocates resemble squatters in their
own land, unable to offer a coherent vision of
Scotland’s future as a nation in its own right.
The latter are aware of the danger; as Alistair
Carmichael, the Scottish secretary in London’s
coalition government (and a Liberal
Democrat), writes in the Scotsman on 16 May,
“[in] this crucial debate on the future of our
nation, we cannot allow the feeling to grow
that to be on the other side of the argument
from the SNP is somehow to be less Scottish.”
True, nothing is predestined in post-Calvinist
Scotland. And a feature of this long campaign
– launched in the early weeks of 2012 and
thus now well into its third year – is that the
anti-independence, or unionist, side has
enjoyed a consistent , if lately diminishing,
polling lead. It remains the favourite to win.
But atmosphere and momentum matter, both
in themselves and because they reflect what
both camps perceive to be happening on the
ground. With the winning post lying just
beyond a packed season of symbolic national
jousts – the Bannockburn battle anniversary,
its Armed Forces Day rival, the
Commonwealth Games, the Great War
commemoration – the youthful Yes Scotland
steed looks more sprightly than the Better
Together pantomime horse.
HE EARLY weeks of 2014 made the
contrast more marked, in two ways.
First, they provided fresh and vivid
examples of the political misjudgement
that has long gripped the wider case for
unionism in Scotland. A series of speeches by
the UK establishment’s economic A-team –
prime minister David Cameron, chancellor
George Osborne, Bank of England governor
Mark Carney – questioned the case made in
the Scottish government’s vast independence
prospectus : namely, that a post-UK Scotland
could expect to continue in a currency union
with the rUK (“residual” or “rest of” the UK).
The tone of the interventions varied according
to the persona and his position. Cameron’s
more placatory address (delivered at the site
of the London Olympics) was a don’t-forget-
Emeli-Sandé celebration of the United
Kingdom’s “intricate tapestry,” Carney’s a
nuanced outline of the concessions of
sovereignty that a currency union would
require (using the eurozone’s troubles as a
subtle code). Osborne alone, the cold strategist
to Cameron’s sunny-side-up act, exuded
genuine menace.
Such warnings were reinforced by statements
from several high-profile companies with
head offices or extensive interests in Scotland.
For them, the prospect of independence
raised potential risks and costs that in
principle might influence investment or
location decisions. The Confederation of
British Industry, or CBI, attempted to register
as a “no” supporter with the electoral
commission that governs the referendum
process; this would allow it to spend money on
advertising its views. In addition, UK
ministers from several government
departments continued to insist or imply that
matters in their field of competence – defence
and its contracts, pensions and their
guarantees, energy and its subsidies, security
and its intelligence sharing, the European
Union and its conditions of membership –
would turn out badly for Scotland if the
country voted “yes.”
Taken together – especially by a Scottish
public acutely sensitised to real or perceived
slights from a southerly direction, but even by
the non-aligned or mildly independence-
sceptic – the heavyweight barrage looked and
sounded intimidatory. An argument could be
had on equal terms, was the dominant feeling;
if the empire was striking back, though –
whether consciously or because it couldn’t
help itself – then it would be rebutted. The
Scots, amid the flurry, realised that the
political terms of trade between themselves
and London had moved, if not actually
reversed.
Indeed, the impact on the polls was the
opposite of what London’s schedulers
intended, for the ensuing weeks saw a
perceptible rise in “yes” responses – albeit by
different measures and without clarifying
voters’ many underlying uncertainties.
Moreover, fourteen leading Scottish
institutions, among them universities and
broadcasters, resigned from the CBI in protest
at its implied political stance. And in a
stirring editorial, Glasgow’s Sunday Herald –
whose weekday stablemate is considered,
alongside Edinburgh’s Scotsman , Scotland’s
only national broadsheet – “came out” for
independence (the phrase from the doomed
Jacobite rising of 1745 seems oddly, perhaps
ominously, apposite):
We believe that now is the time to roll up our
sleeves and put our backs into creating the
kind of society in which all Scots have a stake.
Independence, this newspaper asserts, will put
us in charge of our destiny. That being the
case, Scots will have no one to blame for their
failings, no one to condemn for perceived
wrongs. We will, for the first time in three
centuries, be responsible for our decisions,
for better or worse… What is offered is the
chance to alter course, to travel roads less
taken, to define a destiny… The prize is a
better country. It is, truly, as simple as that.
It’s too early to say that the first months of
2014 will prove a turning-point in the entire
campaign (a case Iain Macwhirter, the
Herald’s political columnist, argues with
characteristic verve). These developments do,
though, signal the exhaustion of the rhetoric
of command as a tool of intra-British
statecraft. The Scots, albeit helped by an
ingenious filtering of the top-dog aspects of
their past, have gone way beyond that. But all
is fair in love, war and Scottish politics. The
crucial question now is whether Better
Together has anything more convincing in its
locker.
ABBOTT GOVERNMENT'S WAR ON TRANSPARENCY.
Political attention over the past few
weeks has been fixed on the drama of
the Abbott government’s first budget –
the winners and losers, the problem of
broken promises, the prospects in the
Senate. Beyond that, though, the budget
reinforces another trend of potentially great
significance for the quality of Australian
democracy. Since its beginnings, the
government has made a series of decisions
that mean public scrutiny of its policies and
their implementation is more difficult.
As soon as the Coalition took government last
September, it set about distinguishing itself
from its defeated, discredited predecessor. It
would be a “no surprises, no excuses”
government, Tony Abbott promised , and his
first weeks in the job were designed to project
an image of methodical deliberation. “Never
before in Australian history has there been
such a quiet transition to a new
administration,” veteran correspondent
Laurie Oakes wrote admiringly. “Abbott and
his team ignored the hungry media beast’s
demand to be fed.”
Within months, though, Oakes was accusing
the Coalition of “thumbing its nose at voters”
by avoiding media scrutiny. The new
government, it soon became clear, was even
more determined than its predecessors to
control the flow of information to the media
and the public.
The earliest decisions set the tone. All requests
for interviews with Coalition frontbenchers
would need the approval of the prime
minister’s office. MPs were banned from
engaging in political commentary on
Facebook and Twitter. The code of conduct for
ministerial staff gained a new clause, also
banning political commentary on social
media. One disenchanted senator, Ian
Macdonald, accused Abbott’s office and his
chief of staff, Peta Credlin, of “obsessive,
centralised control.”
Next, the government introduced rules
covering public servants’ use of social media
in their official and private capacities. “The
sweeping new rules will even cover public
servants posting political comments
anonymously, including mummy bloggers on
parenting websites,” marvelled the Daily
Telegraph. Public employees were expected to
report breaches by their colleagues.
The move was supported by the Human Rights
Commission’s new “freedom commissioner,”
Tim Wilson. “Ultimately,” he said, “public
servants voluntarily and knowingly choose to
accept these limits on their conduct when they
accept employment.” In other words, if they
didn’t like the new restrictions, they had the
freedom to resign.
The government also tightened freedom of
information, or FOI, procedures. After the
previous election, in 2010, at least seventeen
departments released the briefs they had
prepared for the incoming government,
providing valuable information to journalists
and the public about policy positions and
challenges. No such release came after last
year’s election, reported Crikey ’s Bernard
Keane, and officials were unable to explain
the logic behind the reversal. FOI requests for
the briefings were also refused .
In May, the attorney-general’s department
declined to release a $400,000 report by
KPMG examining three of Australia’s federal
courts. According to the Australian’s Sean
Parnell, it justified its decision on the novel
grounds that to make it public “would have an
impact on the proper and efficient conduct of
the department” because “it would impede the
provision of frank, independent advice from
professional services firms to inform policy.”
Such an open-ended exemption would justify
withholding any consultancy report to
government. As Parnell put it, “tactics of
secrecy and obfuscation have returned to the
fore in Canberra.”
Meanwhile, the under-resourced Office of the
Australian Information Commissioner was
taking 250 days, on average, to finalise
requests for external reviews of decisions to
refuse FOI requests. On budget night the
government neatly disposed of this problem
by abolishing the office. In future, appeals
against FOI refusals are to be handled by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Attorney-
General’s or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
The office was created in 2010 to address the
long turnaround times and expensive appeals
in the working of the FOI system; its abolition
is likely to make it harder and more
expensive for FOI users to extract
information.
The government’s resistance to disclosure is
having an impact not only on what
information is released but also on what is
produced, and by whom. Recent conservative
governments have been much more active
than the Rudd–Gillard government in
moulding the senior sections of the public
service to their liking. The most disturbing
example is the Abbott government’s
insistence, immediately on taking office, that
Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson resign
his position, with effect later this year. Both
John Howard and Peter Costello advised
against the forced resignation, and
Parkinson’s predecessor, Ken Henry,
described it as unprecedented in the
department’s 113-year history. “No
government has ever thought it appropriate to
remove the head of the Treasury,” he said,
“and put in somebody who they think is of… a
more comfortable political character.” If that
was Abbott’s motive, he said, then it was
“disappointing” and “a historic action.” But
according to the Conversation ’s Michelle
Grattan, a key factor was Parkinson’s earlier
role as head of the Department of Climate
Change.
weeks has been fixed on the drama of
the Abbott government’s first budget –
the winners and losers, the problem of
broken promises, the prospects in the
Senate. Beyond that, though, the budget
reinforces another trend of potentially great
significance for the quality of Australian
democracy. Since its beginnings, the
government has made a series of decisions
that mean public scrutiny of its policies and
their implementation is more difficult.
As soon as the Coalition took government last
September, it set about distinguishing itself
from its defeated, discredited predecessor. It
would be a “no surprises, no excuses”
government, Tony Abbott promised , and his
first weeks in the job were designed to project
an image of methodical deliberation. “Never
before in Australian history has there been
such a quiet transition to a new
administration,” veteran correspondent
Laurie Oakes wrote admiringly. “Abbott and
his team ignored the hungry media beast’s
demand to be fed.”
Within months, though, Oakes was accusing
the Coalition of “thumbing its nose at voters”
by avoiding media scrutiny. The new
government, it soon became clear, was even
more determined than its predecessors to
control the flow of information to the media
and the public.
The earliest decisions set the tone. All requests
for interviews with Coalition frontbenchers
would need the approval of the prime
minister’s office. MPs were banned from
engaging in political commentary on
Facebook and Twitter. The code of conduct for
ministerial staff gained a new clause, also
banning political commentary on social
media. One disenchanted senator, Ian
Macdonald, accused Abbott’s office and his
chief of staff, Peta Credlin, of “obsessive,
centralised control.”
Next, the government introduced rules
covering public servants’ use of social media
in their official and private capacities. “The
sweeping new rules will even cover public
servants posting political comments
anonymously, including mummy bloggers on
parenting websites,” marvelled the Daily
Telegraph. Public employees were expected to
report breaches by their colleagues.
The move was supported by the Human Rights
Commission’s new “freedom commissioner,”
Tim Wilson. “Ultimately,” he said, “public
servants voluntarily and knowingly choose to
accept these limits on their conduct when they
accept employment.” In other words, if they
didn’t like the new restrictions, they had the
freedom to resign.
The government also tightened freedom of
information, or FOI, procedures. After the
previous election, in 2010, at least seventeen
departments released the briefs they had
prepared for the incoming government,
providing valuable information to journalists
and the public about policy positions and
challenges. No such release came after last
year’s election, reported Crikey ’s Bernard
Keane, and officials were unable to explain
the logic behind the reversal. FOI requests for
the briefings were also refused .
In May, the attorney-general’s department
declined to release a $400,000 report by
KPMG examining three of Australia’s federal
courts. According to the Australian’s Sean
Parnell, it justified its decision on the novel
grounds that to make it public “would have an
impact on the proper and efficient conduct of
the department” because “it would impede the
provision of frank, independent advice from
professional services firms to inform policy.”
Such an open-ended exemption would justify
withholding any consultancy report to
government. As Parnell put it, “tactics of
secrecy and obfuscation have returned to the
fore in Canberra.”
Meanwhile, the under-resourced Office of the
Australian Information Commissioner was
taking 250 days, on average, to finalise
requests for external reviews of decisions to
refuse FOI requests. On budget night the
government neatly disposed of this problem
by abolishing the office. In future, appeals
against FOI refusals are to be handled by the
Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Attorney-
General’s or the Commonwealth Ombudsman.
The office was created in 2010 to address the
long turnaround times and expensive appeals
in the working of the FOI system; its abolition
is likely to make it harder and more
expensive for FOI users to extract
information.
The government’s resistance to disclosure is
having an impact not only on what
information is released but also on what is
produced, and by whom. Recent conservative
governments have been much more active
than the Rudd–Gillard government in
moulding the senior sections of the public
service to their liking. The most disturbing
example is the Abbott government’s
insistence, immediately on taking office, that
Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson resign
his position, with effect later this year. Both
John Howard and Peter Costello advised
against the forced resignation, and
Parkinson’s predecessor, Ken Henry,
described it as unprecedented in the
department’s 113-year history. “No
government has ever thought it appropriate to
remove the head of the Treasury,” he said,
“and put in somebody who they think is of… a
more comfortable political character.” If that
was Abbott’s motive, he said, then it was
“disappointing” and “a historic action.” But
according to the Conversation ’s Michelle
Grattan, a key factor was Parkinson’s earlier
role as head of the Department of Climate
Change.
A NEW FOREIGN POLICY AGENDA FOR MODI: "LOOK WEST"
Within a week of the new Indian government assuming
office, South Block hosted two important events: the
foreign minister of Oman visited the new Indian minister
of external affairs, and a ministerial delegation from
Qatar followed shortly after, to hold foreign office
consultations with their Indian counterparts.
The timing of these visits is significant. It could indicate
some seriousness among the Indian leadership towards
deepening New Delhi’s engagement with West Asia.
Despite the overwhelming scale of historical and
economic linkages, Indian policy-making has not taken
substantial concentrated efforts towards expanding this
promising engagement.
A ‘Look West Policy’ (LWP) like India’s famed ‘Look
East Policy’ has often been spoken about, but there has
not been a formal institutionalisation of the same. This
will need a concentrated focus – like the LEP – for the
region, to formulate effective policies. While trade is a
significant component of this relationship, the essence
of the LWP will be the multi-dimensionality of its
character. As much as India trades with the region, also
important are the issues of security, culture, people-to-
people linkages, and those of a wider geopolitical and
geostrategic nature.
Look West Policy: Primary Rationales for Induction
Diaspora & remittances: The West Asian region is home
to millions of non-resident Indians; and they were
responsible for approximately half of the US$69 billion
worth of remittances that flowed into India in 2012.
However, the introduction of the Nitaqat laws in many
Gulf countries has resulted in several thousands of these
workers having to return to India. While it is unfair to
view the returnees as a liability, one cannot ignore the
economic and social impact of this mass re-migration.
India is not prepared to assimilate all these people into
its own economy just yet. Already, unemployment rates
are high, and the economy is not doing well. Job
creation will take a while, and until then, there will be
some strain on the economy.
Energy: India, being a growing economy, is perpetually
energy-hungry. West Asian nations are among the
primary suppliers of oil and gas that keep the Indian
economy running. Stable and more improved relations
between India and the region are key to securing and
expanding on these sources. Projects such as the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline lay suspended due to several
other reasons. However, proposed projects such as the
Oman-India Pipeline, an undersea gas pipeline – that
Iran too has expressed interest in – look promising.
India’s attempts at ensuring energy security therefore
cannot bypass engagements with the region.
Maritime security: Be it trade or energy supply routes,
or even national security, the significance of an effective
maritime security infrastructure in the Indian Ocean –
the maritime link connecting India with several of its key
West Asian partners – is pivotal to ensuring safety,
stability, and disaster-management for the region. The
Indian Ocean Region is a major geographical stretch
through which a large chunk of the world’s business is
conducted. Already, there is a constant threat of piracy
in the western Indian Ocean. A concentrated policy will
be needed to identify specific issues and areas of
cooperation between India and West Asia, in order to
ensure smooth and secure movement.
Furthermore, in recent times, there have been many
debates on the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to boost
connectivities between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. The two regions already have robust
connectivities, but more can be done. However, if this
concept of the Indo-Pacific has to become a reality,
there is a need for enhanced cooperation in various
areas among the key players in each region, before
connecting the regions. Eventually, the LWP and the LEP
can lay the foundations for the realisation of the ‘Indo-
Pacific’.
National and regional security: Any form of tumult in
the West Asian region invariably has an impact on India
and South Asia as a whole. For strategic reasons, India
seeks peace and political stability and security in the
West Asian region – sentiments reciprocated by the
countries of the region in their assessments towards
West Asia as well as South Asia. So far, India has been
pragmatic in its policies towards the West Asian region
–excellent examples of which are balancing its
relationships with Palestine and Israel; and Saudi Arabia
and Iran, among others.
However, there is more that needs to be done, and for
that, there needs to be better, more polished and astute
understanding of the region in our country – especially
in the light of the impending US withdrawal from
Afghanistan; the thawing in the US-Iran bilateral; the
ongoing civil war in Syria and its implications;
implementation of the Nitaqat policies in the Gulf
countries; and the rising fundamentalism, especially in
the franchisee-ing nature of terror networks, among
others.
These are among the primary reasons why India must
and will expedite its engagement with countries in West
Asia in the coming months. For the new government
that took office in May 2014 – one that won the
elections with a campaign based primarily on promises
of improved trade, economic development, employment,
investment and better infrastructure – there would not
be a more apt initiative to begin with than
institutionalising the LWP; updating, revolutionising and
expanding New Delhi’s linkages with India’s largest
trading partner-bloc, West Asia.
office, South Block hosted two important events: the
foreign minister of Oman visited the new Indian minister
of external affairs, and a ministerial delegation from
Qatar followed shortly after, to hold foreign office
consultations with their Indian counterparts.
The timing of these visits is significant. It could indicate
some seriousness among the Indian leadership towards
deepening New Delhi’s engagement with West Asia.
Despite the overwhelming scale of historical and
economic linkages, Indian policy-making has not taken
substantial concentrated efforts towards expanding this
promising engagement.
A ‘Look West Policy’ (LWP) like India’s famed ‘Look
East Policy’ has often been spoken about, but there has
not been a formal institutionalisation of the same. This
will need a concentrated focus – like the LEP – for the
region, to formulate effective policies. While trade is a
significant component of this relationship, the essence
of the LWP will be the multi-dimensionality of its
character. As much as India trades with the region, also
important are the issues of security, culture, people-to-
people linkages, and those of a wider geopolitical and
geostrategic nature.
Look West Policy: Primary Rationales for Induction
Diaspora & remittances: The West Asian region is home
to millions of non-resident Indians; and they were
responsible for approximately half of the US$69 billion
worth of remittances that flowed into India in 2012.
However, the introduction of the Nitaqat laws in many
Gulf countries has resulted in several thousands of these
workers having to return to India. While it is unfair to
view the returnees as a liability, one cannot ignore the
economic and social impact of this mass re-migration.
India is not prepared to assimilate all these people into
its own economy just yet. Already, unemployment rates
are high, and the economy is not doing well. Job
creation will take a while, and until then, there will be
some strain on the economy.
Energy: India, being a growing economy, is perpetually
energy-hungry. West Asian nations are among the
primary suppliers of oil and gas that keep the Indian
economy running. Stable and more improved relations
between India and the region are key to securing and
expanding on these sources. Projects such as the Iran-
Pakistan-India pipeline lay suspended due to several
other reasons. However, proposed projects such as the
Oman-India Pipeline, an undersea gas pipeline – that
Iran too has expressed interest in – look promising.
India’s attempts at ensuring energy security therefore
cannot bypass engagements with the region.
Maritime security: Be it trade or energy supply routes,
or even national security, the significance of an effective
maritime security infrastructure in the Indian Ocean –
the maritime link connecting India with several of its key
West Asian partners – is pivotal to ensuring safety,
stability, and disaster-management for the region. The
Indian Ocean Region is a major geographical stretch
through which a large chunk of the world’s business is
conducted. Already, there is a constant threat of piracy
in the western Indian Ocean. A concentrated policy will
be needed to identify specific issues and areas of
cooperation between India and West Asia, in order to
ensure smooth and secure movement.
Furthermore, in recent times, there have been many
debates on the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ to boost
connectivities between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific
Ocean. The two regions already have robust
connectivities, but more can be done. However, if this
concept of the Indo-Pacific has to become a reality,
there is a need for enhanced cooperation in various
areas among the key players in each region, before
connecting the regions. Eventually, the LWP and the LEP
can lay the foundations for the realisation of the ‘Indo-
Pacific’.
National and regional security: Any form of tumult in
the West Asian region invariably has an impact on India
and South Asia as a whole. For strategic reasons, India
seeks peace and political stability and security in the
West Asian region – sentiments reciprocated by the
countries of the region in their assessments towards
West Asia as well as South Asia. So far, India has been
pragmatic in its policies towards the West Asian region
–excellent examples of which are balancing its
relationships with Palestine and Israel; and Saudi Arabia
and Iran, among others.
However, there is more that needs to be done, and for
that, there needs to be better, more polished and astute
understanding of the region in our country – especially
in the light of the impending US withdrawal from
Afghanistan; the thawing in the US-Iran bilateral; the
ongoing civil war in Syria and its implications;
implementation of the Nitaqat policies in the Gulf
countries; and the rising fundamentalism, especially in
the franchisee-ing nature of terror networks, among
others.
These are among the primary reasons why India must
and will expedite its engagement with countries in West
Asia in the coming months. For the new government
that took office in May 2014 – one that won the
elections with a campaign based primarily on promises
of improved trade, economic development, employment,
investment and better infrastructure – there would not
be a more apt initiative to begin with than
institutionalising the LWP; updating, revolutionising and
expanding New Delhi’s linkages with India’s largest
trading partner-bloc, West Asia.
WHAT CONCERNS YOUNG KASHMIR?
I never had any doubt about the ability of Kashmiri
youth to think and look positively towards making this
place better. But it is also a fact that they need to be
pushed to do something on their own. Dependence on
government jobs has always held them back from doing
something different. However, those who took a leaf out
in the non-governmental sector have proven that they
have the capacity to lead and be a source of livelihood
for many more.
It is not only the sense of job security when you join the
government, but also the inherent rot in the system that
discourages youth from taking entrepreneurship as their
career.
When Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently revoked the
Recruitment Policy he had himself implemented in 2010,
a senior government officer told me: “He has done the
greatest disservice to youth who had moved towards
self employment with dwindling benefits in a
government job”. But Omar had to do it in a bid to
resurrect his party after the recent poll debacle.
ALOHA TEST
What ails the system is something that concerns even a
youngster in a school. Last Sunday I had a chance to
sit in the interview panel for General Ability Test (GAT)
conducted by Aloha Learning Center for 9th class. While
I was impressed with the budding talent and
understanding of the issues the young students have
been developing, it was also painful to see how
depressed they were with the corruption, nepotism and
favouritism in the system. That is why many of them
had set their goal to become an IAS officer. Whether
they will succeed in first realizing their goal and later
curbing the corruption is a different issue but the way
this threat is weighing heavily on their minds speaks
volumes about how the society is reacting to it. “Either
you have to be from an elite family or you have to have
money, then only you can succeed,” a young student
told the panel, adding: “I want to become an IAS officer
and curb the corruption”.
There were a few voices about the human rights
violations, repression and denial of political rights. A few
of them wanted to be doctors despite the fact that the
profession is losing the sheen for want of jobs in the
government sector. “They (doctors) have made it a
business and I want to become a doctor who can help
the poor,” was the response of a girl student who
narrated how her grandfather was “mistreated” and was
taken to Amritsar for eye surgery.
Refrain, however, was that corruption has eaten into the
vitals of the society and politicians and bureaucrats
have set up a system of favouritism and nepotism in
which merit is marred and the poor are deprived. The
youngsters seemed determined in fighting this menace
but the question is that can one or two or ten such
people overcome this challenge. The sense of
hopelessness in the existing system has dangerous
dimension of drifting these youngsters away to
something else. To me it looked that corruption should
be a separate subject in the school curriculum to
sensitize them at the young age.
RABITA
Earlier in the last week of May similar concerns came up
during an interaction with the higher level of youth. The
occasion was “Rabita—Business Leadership Summit”,
organized by Center for Business Leadership led by
young lawyer Nadeem Qadri. The summit had young
graduates mostly from business management
background as the participants. Their articulation of
ideas was simply brilliant and above all their penchant
to make Kashmir better was visible on their faces. We
cut a beautiful and tasty cake made at home by a
young girl Farah Tanki. Armed with a degree in Food
Technology she has set on the path of taking up the
cake making as a full time business. There were many
such young boys and girls who came up with pragmatic
proposals.
They listened to successful entrepreneurs and business
leaders and were ready to draw inspiration from them.
But again what was flagged off as a major concern that
had potential to halt their dreams was corruption.
“Entrepreneurship is the only solution to a depressed
Kashmir but does the system allow us to move
forward,” questioned a young graduate. Age old
mechanisms based on stale rules and regulations have
dampened the spirits of young people as they are forced
to run from the pillar to post to even get themselves
registered. They did acknowledge that Entrepreneur
Development Institute at Pampore had come up with a
changed insight and outlook to help youth and many
had succeeded in moving forward from that platform.
But the overall policy set up fails to change the mind.
They urged for having a single window system for
clearance of cases as they had to pay for getting their
papers cleared from various agencies such as Industries
Department, Pollution Control Board and SIDCO. The
individual authorities need to be abolished.
In case the government wakes up to the concerns of
these youth, entrepreneurship can become a reality and
help the government also to overcome the challenge of
unemployment. According to a survey conducted by
International NGO Oxfam, ‘Kashmir today is a sea of
unemployed youth, a place where infrastructure is
crippled and there is almost no effort to encourage
private enterprises and self-employment.’ The study
reveals that opportunities for professional education
remain very limited. Out of roughly 700,000 youth in the
age group of 18-30 years, close to 50 percent remain
unemployed despite higher education. In addition to the
fact that employment is a major issue confronting
youth, addressing the political conflict also occupies a
special place in the entire discourse revolving around
them”.
Glorifying the government job, notwithstanding the fact
that we need people in administrative services, is not
the solution. Government must instil confidence among
the educated youth that the system that has worked
against the people for many decades now will follow the
road of changed world. Corruption is a menace that is
now a concern for even a class 9 student, this can be
seen as hope for its end but it has other effects as well
youth to think and look positively towards making this
place better. But it is also a fact that they need to be
pushed to do something on their own. Dependence on
government jobs has always held them back from doing
something different. However, those who took a leaf out
in the non-governmental sector have proven that they
have the capacity to lead and be a source of livelihood
for many more.
It is not only the sense of job security when you join the
government, but also the inherent rot in the system that
discourages youth from taking entrepreneurship as their
career.
When Chief Minister Omar Abdullah recently revoked the
Recruitment Policy he had himself implemented in 2010,
a senior government officer told me: “He has done the
greatest disservice to youth who had moved towards
self employment with dwindling benefits in a
government job”. But Omar had to do it in a bid to
resurrect his party after the recent poll debacle.
ALOHA TEST
What ails the system is something that concerns even a
youngster in a school. Last Sunday I had a chance to
sit in the interview panel for General Ability Test (GAT)
conducted by Aloha Learning Center for 9th class. While
I was impressed with the budding talent and
understanding of the issues the young students have
been developing, it was also painful to see how
depressed they were with the corruption, nepotism and
favouritism in the system. That is why many of them
had set their goal to become an IAS officer. Whether
they will succeed in first realizing their goal and later
curbing the corruption is a different issue but the way
this threat is weighing heavily on their minds speaks
volumes about how the society is reacting to it. “Either
you have to be from an elite family or you have to have
money, then only you can succeed,” a young student
told the panel, adding: “I want to become an IAS officer
and curb the corruption”.
There were a few voices about the human rights
violations, repression and denial of political rights. A few
of them wanted to be doctors despite the fact that the
profession is losing the sheen for want of jobs in the
government sector. “They (doctors) have made it a
business and I want to become a doctor who can help
the poor,” was the response of a girl student who
narrated how her grandfather was “mistreated” and was
taken to Amritsar for eye surgery.
Refrain, however, was that corruption has eaten into the
vitals of the society and politicians and bureaucrats
have set up a system of favouritism and nepotism in
which merit is marred and the poor are deprived. The
youngsters seemed determined in fighting this menace
but the question is that can one or two or ten such
people overcome this challenge. The sense of
hopelessness in the existing system has dangerous
dimension of drifting these youngsters away to
something else. To me it looked that corruption should
be a separate subject in the school curriculum to
sensitize them at the young age.
RABITA
Earlier in the last week of May similar concerns came up
during an interaction with the higher level of youth. The
occasion was “Rabita—Business Leadership Summit”,
organized by Center for Business Leadership led by
young lawyer Nadeem Qadri. The summit had young
graduates mostly from business management
background as the participants. Their articulation of
ideas was simply brilliant and above all their penchant
to make Kashmir better was visible on their faces. We
cut a beautiful and tasty cake made at home by a
young girl Farah Tanki. Armed with a degree in Food
Technology she has set on the path of taking up the
cake making as a full time business. There were many
such young boys and girls who came up with pragmatic
proposals.
They listened to successful entrepreneurs and business
leaders and were ready to draw inspiration from them.
But again what was flagged off as a major concern that
had potential to halt their dreams was corruption.
“Entrepreneurship is the only solution to a depressed
Kashmir but does the system allow us to move
forward,” questioned a young graduate. Age old
mechanisms based on stale rules and regulations have
dampened the spirits of young people as they are forced
to run from the pillar to post to even get themselves
registered. They did acknowledge that Entrepreneur
Development Institute at Pampore had come up with a
changed insight and outlook to help youth and many
had succeeded in moving forward from that platform.
But the overall policy set up fails to change the mind.
They urged for having a single window system for
clearance of cases as they had to pay for getting their
papers cleared from various agencies such as Industries
Department, Pollution Control Board and SIDCO. The
individual authorities need to be abolished.
In case the government wakes up to the concerns of
these youth, entrepreneurship can become a reality and
help the government also to overcome the challenge of
unemployment. According to a survey conducted by
International NGO Oxfam, ‘Kashmir today is a sea of
unemployed youth, a place where infrastructure is
crippled and there is almost no effort to encourage
private enterprises and self-employment.’ The study
reveals that opportunities for professional education
remain very limited. Out of roughly 700,000 youth in the
age group of 18-30 years, close to 50 percent remain
unemployed despite higher education. In addition to the
fact that employment is a major issue confronting
youth, addressing the political conflict also occupies a
special place in the entire discourse revolving around
them”.
Glorifying the government job, notwithstanding the fact
that we need people in administrative services, is not
the solution. Government must instil confidence among
the educated youth that the system that has worked
against the people for many decades now will follow the
road of changed world. Corruption is a menace that is
now a concern for even a class 9 student, this can be
seen as hope for its end but it has other effects as well
JAPAN AND US IN ASIA PACIFIC: COUNTERING CHINESE ASSERTIVENESS
The statements issued by Japanese Prime Minister
Shinzo Abe and US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at
the Shangri La Dialogue show the renewal of tension in
the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China. The US remarks
were a follow-up to Abe’s criticism against China’s
assertiveness in the region with a special focus on the
South China Sea dispute.
What are the expectations that the US and Japan have
in the region and what do they expect from China?
Where is the region heading towards?
Deciphering the Statements
The statements at the Dialogue revolved around
resolving the South China Sea dispute, Chinese
assertiveness in the region, strengthening allies and
partners in the region, and enhancing ASEAN’s defence
capabilities and posture. It was mostly directed against
recent Chinese activities. The Chinese responded to the
allegations as being untruthful and a malicious attempt
that aimed at tarnishing its reputation in the
international system.
Shinzo Abe stated that Japan will play a proactive role
in Asia and in the world, under the new banner,
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.” It is likely to signify
that Japan is resorting to a Cold War stance or that its
role has been undermined in recent times. He also
extended his support to the ASEAN countries, and
advised them to act wisely and follow international rules
to settle the South China Sea dispute. He indirectly
criticised China for strengthening its military and using
coercion to settle the dispute, which is against the rule
of law. The repetition of the phrase ‘rule of law’ is likely
to strengthen his assertion that China is unwilling to
settle the dispute through international law and is
resorting to force or coercion.
Japan has resorted to alliance-making with the ASEAN
and other countries in the region to their defence
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This is so that the ASEAN
will not be undermined by China and can prevent the
use of force by the same in the future. Japan wants the
ASEAN to be proactive and effectively utilise the East
Asia Summit to check military expansion in the region
and be transparent on their military budget so that
misconception can be averted.
Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling
disputes through peaceful means, following international
rules, and strengtheningthe defence capabilities of the
allies that were directly criticising China’s recent
provocative behavior in the region. He mentioned that
countries in Asia-Pacific are working with the US to
sustain a rule-based order that has been followed since
the end of World War II, suggesting perhaps that the US
rule-based order has been undermined with the growing
assertion of China. He reaffirmed that the US would
increase its military engagement in the region than ever
before and strengthen its allies and partners because
the Asia-Pacific will play a crucial role in the 21st
century.
Hagel also mentioned that if China wants to play a
significant role in the region it has to use coercion
against North Korea’s destabilising provocation; this
would be in its own interest and also help regional
stability. This would be preferable to coercion being
against neighbours and neglecting that the South China
Sea is “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.” The
US believes that with the growing significance of the
ASEAN forum, it is essential that each country work
together to achieve greater cohesion and prevent
countries like China from taking advantage of them.
Where is the Region Heading?
Chinese assertiveness in the region has brought back
the US and Japan to play a proactive role. Hagel
revisited General George Marshall’s words that “the
strength of a nation does not depend alone on its
armies, ships and planes…[but] is also measured by…
the strength of its friends and [its] allies.” It is likely
that the US is resorting to a Cold War strategy by
creating alliances and partners to strengthen its
presence in the region. The US and Japan acknowledged
that strengthening the ASEAN security community can
be effectively used to counter the growing Chinese
aggression in the region. However, due to the lack of
consensus on the South China Sea dispute between the
ASEAN countries, it is unclear whether they will be able
cooperate with the US and Japan to settle the dispute.
It is likely that the region will become more volatile with
divergent issues like North Korea’s nuclear programme,
Thailand and Myanmar’s setbacks in democratic
development and various unresolved territorial disputes
complicating it. In addition to these circumstances,
Philippines filing a case against China in the
international tribunal followed by Vietnam’s threat to
file a case as well are only toughening Chinese
behaviour in the region.
The US and Japan are increasing their military
engagement and strengthening regional countries’
defence postures - this is likely to receive a counter-
attack from China. The synergism of Japan and the US
will first increase conflict among countries and add to
instability in the region before gradually lessening
tensions.
Shinzo Abe and US Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel at
the Shangri La Dialogue show the renewal of tension in
the Asia-Pacific with the rise of China. The US remarks
were a follow-up to Abe’s criticism against China’s
assertiveness in the region with a special focus on the
South China Sea dispute.
What are the expectations that the US and Japan have
in the region and what do they expect from China?
Where is the region heading towards?
Deciphering the Statements
The statements at the Dialogue revolved around
resolving the South China Sea dispute, Chinese
assertiveness in the region, strengthening allies and
partners in the region, and enhancing ASEAN’s defence
capabilities and posture. It was mostly directed against
recent Chinese activities. The Chinese responded to the
allegations as being untruthful and a malicious attempt
that aimed at tarnishing its reputation in the
international system.
Shinzo Abe stated that Japan will play a proactive role
in Asia and in the world, under the new banner,
“Proactive Contribution to Peace.” It is likely to signify
that Japan is resorting to a Cold War stance or that its
role has been undermined in recent times. He also
extended his support to the ASEAN countries, and
advised them to act wisely and follow international rules
to settle the South China Sea dispute. He indirectly
criticised China for strengthening its military and using
coercion to settle the dispute, which is against the rule
of law. The repetition of the phrase ‘rule of law’ is likely
to strengthen his assertion that China is unwilling to
settle the dispute through international law and is
resorting to force or coercion.
Japan has resorted to alliance-making with the ASEAN
and other countries in the region to their defence
posture in the Asia-Pacific. This is so that the ASEAN
will not be undermined by China and can prevent the
use of force by the same in the future. Japan wants the
ASEAN to be proactive and effectively utilise the East
Asia Summit to check military expansion in the region
and be transparent on their military budget so that
misconception can be averted.
Hagel pointed out several security priorities: settling
disputes through peaceful means, following international
rules, and strengtheningthe defence capabilities of the
allies that were directly criticising China’s recent
provocative behavior in the region. He mentioned that
countries in Asia-Pacific are working with the US to
sustain a rule-based order that has been followed since
the end of World War II, suggesting perhaps that the US
rule-based order has been undermined with the growing
assertion of China. He reaffirmed that the US would
increase its military engagement in the region than ever
before and strengthen its allies and partners because
the Asia-Pacific will play a crucial role in the 21st
century.
Hagel also mentioned that if China wants to play a
significant role in the region it has to use coercion
against North Korea’s destabilising provocation; this
would be in its own interest and also help regional
stability. This would be preferable to coercion being
against neighbours and neglecting that the South China
Sea is “a sea of peace, friendship and cooperation.” The
US believes that with the growing significance of the
ASEAN forum, it is essential that each country work
together to achieve greater cohesion and prevent
countries like China from taking advantage of them.
Where is the Region Heading?
Chinese assertiveness in the region has brought back
the US and Japan to play a proactive role. Hagel
revisited General George Marshall’s words that “the
strength of a nation does not depend alone on its
armies, ships and planes…[but] is also measured by…
the strength of its friends and [its] allies.” It is likely
that the US is resorting to a Cold War strategy by
creating alliances and partners to strengthen its
presence in the region. The US and Japan acknowledged
that strengthening the ASEAN security community can
be effectively used to counter the growing Chinese
aggression in the region. However, due to the lack of
consensus on the South China Sea dispute between the
ASEAN countries, it is unclear whether they will be able
cooperate with the US and Japan to settle the dispute.
It is likely that the region will become more volatile with
divergent issues like North Korea’s nuclear programme,
Thailand and Myanmar’s setbacks in democratic
development and various unresolved territorial disputes
complicating it. In addition to these circumstances,
Philippines filing a case against China in the
international tribunal followed by Vietnam’s threat to
file a case as well are only toughening Chinese
behaviour in the region.
The US and Japan are increasing their military
engagement and strengthening regional countries’
defence postures - this is likely to receive a counter-
attack from China. The synergism of Japan and the US
will first increase conflict among countries and add to
instability in the region before gradually lessening
tensions.
10 Jun 2014
UKRAINE: TIME TO CUT A DEAL?
On 7 May, after months of unrelenting
economic, military and propaganda
campaigns against his fraternal
neighbour, Ukraine, President Putin
suddenly signalled what appeared to be a
change in direction. He called on the “pro-
Russian” separatists in the eastern
Ukrainian provinces of Donetsk and
Luhansk to postpone their referendums on
independence, and declared that the
presidential elections scheduled by Kiev for
25 May were a “step in the right direction.”
Earlier, on 28 April, Russian defence
minister Sergey Shoigu had claimed that the
Russian forces deployed on the Ukraine
border for months had returned to their
bases, a claim Putin repeated on 7 May. As
became clear in each case, no such
withdrawals were observed by anyone able to
do so, which seemed to suggest that any
softening of the Kremlin’s line on Ukraine
was an optical illusion.
Seemingly in defiance of Putin’s calls for a
postponement, the separatists in Donetsk and
Luhansk held their hastily scheduled
“referenda” on 11 May, with slightly farcical
claims of huge turnouts and Soviet-style
electoral margins in their favour. But their
appeal for Moscow to annex them, as it had
earlier annexed Crimea, elicited no response.
Putin has since declared again his readiness
to accept the results of the Ukrainian
presidential poll and repeated his assurance
that the troops would be withdrawn; and this
time there are indications that the troops may
indeed be embarking on a draw-back (though
many of the units could be redeployed within
a couple of days).
Despite the more conciliatory tone, Putin has
continued to make some ominous
pronouncements: renewed threats of another
gas-price war to force Ukraine to pay the
abrupt increase Gazprom is demanding;
claims that Ukraine is in the grip of a civil
war; and the polite suggestion that his close
friend Viktor Medvedchuk (Putin is godfather
of one of Medvedchuk’s children), the most
pro-Kremlin politician in the Ukrainian
political class, should become the mediator
between the Kiev government and the
“rebels” in the eastern provinces. But to
Western capitals, desperately eager to find a
solution to the problem that would relieve
them of any need for sterner measures, any
change of tone will be grasped as a sign that
Putin is finally ready to “de-escalate.”
Putin is not known for any propensity to take
a backward step, much less sudden about-
turns. In the matter of Ukraine, he has shown
a particular determination to prevail from
well before the military operation against
Crimea. So what are we to make of Putin’s
unexpected amiability? What may have
brought it about, how genuine is it, and how
long may it last? Have his objectives changed,
or is this merely a tactical shift?
he heavy media coverage of the
Ukrainian issue recently has probably
made its fundamental grammar and
vocabulary more familiar to the general
reader. But to judge by commonly recurring
omissions and misconceptions in public
discussions some salient facts might be worth
recalling.
While Russians and Ukrainians are ethnically,
linguistically, religiously and culturally close,
there are important differences between
them, only partly flattened out by tsarist and
Soviet conditioning. And those differences are
apparent within Ukraine itself. For historical
reasons, central and western Ukraine have
come under the influence over centuries of
the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland. A
substantial minority concentrated in the west
are Uniate Catholics by belief or tradition,
whose homelands had never formed part of
Russia before the end of the second world
war. Though Orthodoxy is the religion, at
least nominally, of the overwhelming
majority, there is an important difference
between the followers of the Moscow and Kiev
Patriarchates of the Orthodox Church. The
Moscow Patriarchate has always been
favoured by Moscow and its Ukrainian
loyalists, but the more nationalist Kiev
Patriarchate may actually have a slightly
larger following within Ukraine. Their
relationship is troubled. There is also a much
smaller Autocephalous Ukrainian Orthodox
Church.
Moscow rulers have often sought to suppress
Ukrainian language and culture. The Soviet
leadership in its early years was more liberal
in such matters, but for much of its
subsequent history it was very oppressive.
Even since Ukraine became an independent
state, Russia has refused to tolerate more than
the most minimal cultural facilities for the
millions of Ukrainians living in Russia. In
Moscow-ruled Ukraine, by contrast, Russian
enjoyed a privileged status and the use of
Ukrainian was informally or formally
tabooed. Independent Ukraine has taken
modest steps to improve the relative position
of Ukrainian within the state, which has
tended to anger some Russian speakers.
But the use of Russian is under no serious
threat, and repeated suggestions in the media
that the government that emerged after the
Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square)
protests wants to ban Russian are
misinformed. The bill in question, though
politically foolish given its timing, was aimed
not at “banning” Russian, a totally impossible
objective, but rather at restoring greater
official status to Ukrainian in an attempt to
rebalance very partially the wrongs of the
past. It was, anyway, very quickly vetoed by
provisional president Oleksandr Turchynov
and withdrawn.
The Soviet period was a series of demographic
disasters for most of the country. But it was
worst of all for the “ bloodlands” of Ukrainian,
Belarusian, Baltic and Polish settlement. Per
capita, Jews, but also Ukrainians and
Belarusians, suffered far more than Russians.
Slips of the tongue equating Soviet citizens
with “Russians” and referring to the twenty-
five or thirty million Russian dead in the
second world war serve to erase a universe of
suffering sustained in the west of the country,
in which Stalin’s regime was partly complicit
as a perpetrator. Similarly, in the 1930s
Ukrainians were among those national
groups, together with Jews and Poles, who
suffered disproportionately in the purges.
The early Bolshevik leadership had
encouraged strong development of the
languages and culture of the national
minorities, partly to ensure victory over the
Whites in the civil war of 1917–22. The
Ukrainian communist leadership of the 1920s
was active in this respect. From the late
1920s, however, Stalin brutally reversed this
policy to favour Russian, and the whole
emergent generation of Ukrainian national
communist leaders and cultural activists was
decimated.
Worst of all, in the process of brutally
collectivising agriculture in Ukraine (which
had been the breadbasket of the empire), and
then extracting grain from it for export, Stalin
inflicted terrible casualties. The culmination
was the artificial famine of 1932–33, which
led to mass starvation and innumerable acts
of cruelty aimed at preventing the victims
from receiving any relief. Historians debate
both the numbers of dead and the Kremlin’s
precise intent in manufacturing this holocaust
(known in Ukrainian as holodomor ), but
whether it was genocide by some definition or
not, at least three million Ukrainians perished
(and some estimates go higher).
The Soviet regime suppressed discussion of
these monstrous events and succeeded in
largely obliterating them not only from the
public domain, but also to a considerable
degree from popular awareness. The Russians
who were encouraged to migrate into
depopulated parts of Ukraine have even less
awareness of the past. Through discreet and
indeed hazardous family communication,
Ukrainians have retained at least a
fragmented folk memory of the great famine,
which naturally doesn’t always dispose them
positively to Moscow. For its part, the Putin
regime greatly resented pro-Western
president Viktor Yushchenko’s attempts to
restore a basic historical understanding
among Ukrainian citizens of the holodomor ,
which was at odds with Putin’s policy of
progressively rehabilitating Stalin and his
works. When Viktor Yanukovych succeeded
Yushchenko in 2010, he moved quickly to de-
emphasise the issue and de-fang it of any
anti-Russian accents, a difficult exercise in
the circumstances.
Until recently, despite the burden of history,
Ukrainians and Russians have continued to
get on reasonably well with one another in
Ukraine. Ukrainians living side by side with
Russians in other parts of the post-Soviet
sphere mingle easily, intermarry with
Russians, and often adopt Russian ethnicity
and the Russian language. The same has been
largely true of Ukraine itself. It was not the
case, Kremlin propaganda notwithstanding,
that ethnic Russians faced any threats of
persecution from Ukrainian fellow-citizens in
the east of Ukraine before the invasion of
Crimea. At most they might experience
irritation at the public use of what they
regarded as an inferior but basically
comprehensible rustic dialect in public places
or on street signs.
The main resentments of Russians in eastern
Ukraine centred on the fact that the central
government in Kiev, controlled by the
Donetsk-based Yanukovych clan, had done
nothing to improve their standard of living,
rather the reverse. Meanwhile, as they were
keenly aware, he and his notorious familia
were dipping into the public purse right up to
their armpits. Because of the cultural and
historical differences between the east and
west of the country, some political
polarisation also existed, reflected in differing
regional levels of support for the main
political parties.
But the differences were less than virulent,
and in the twenty-odd years since
independence they had been successfully
managed by elections that tended to produce
regular alternation between eastern-oriented
and western-oriented presidents. Eastern
Ukrainians were mostly unenthusiastic about
the pro-Western Orange revolution of 2004–
05 and the Maidan protests of 2013–14,
though a substantial minority in the east,
including Russians and Russian-speakers,
supported them as movements that might
improve their standards of living and
increase probity in public life.
In fact, there was a degree of structural
pluralism in Ukrainian society, which
contributed to the retention of more
democratic freedoms in the country than in
neighbouring Russia or Belarus, for example.
In that sense, Ukraine was a more democratic
polity than any other part of the former
Soviet Union, apart from the Baltic states and
Georgia, and remains so despite the current
artificially induced turbulence.
THE SEISMIC SHIFTS BEHIND THE COUP IN THAILAND
Thailand has been in crisis since an
armed forces coup overthrew prime
minister Thaksin Shinawatra in
September 2006, ultimately forcing
him into exile. Although his opponents used
fair means and foul to keep various
incarnations of Thaksin’s party out of
power, his sister Yingluck Shinawatra
became Thailand’s first female prime
minister following a resounding electoral
victory for Thaksin’s Pheu Thai (For Thai)
party in 2011.
But Yingluck’s government started to unravel
in 2013 when it attempted a mass amnesty for
those charged with corruption or other
crimes. It was clear the amnesty was designed
to allow Thaksin to return from exile.
Opposition to the government surged, further
fuelled by the failure of a populist rice-
subsidy scheme that not only provided
opportunities for corruption but also proved
so costly that the government couldn’t honour
its payments. Yingluck faces corruption
charges over the scheme.
On 7 May, the Constitutional Court removed
Yingluck office for her role in trying to install
the brother of Thaksin’s former wife as police
chief. She pleaded, disingenuously, that he
was no longer family. The divorce was a
political convenience, of course, and
Yingluck’s manoeuvre shows just how
ingrained oligarchic politics is in Thailand.
In the end, the evolving crisis led to another
coup on 22 May. Intriguingly, it has met with
much less opposition than anyone expected.
o understand the crisis in Thai politics,
it’s important to examine the
momentous changes Thai society has
undergone in recent decades. If certain
key institutions, such as the monarchy, have
not yet been transformed, then they are about
to be. Old relationships have been
destabilised; new ones are not yet in place. It
is this setting – the perfect opening for a
populist demagogue like Thaksin – that
explains much more about contemporary
Thailand than the grossly simplified image of
a struggle between the “rural poor” and the
urban middle-class and elites.
I have been watching events unfold from
neighbouring Laos, a perfect observation
point. Thailand’s northeast region, just across
the border, accounts for 31 per cent of the
total population. Commonly called Isan (and
its people, Khon Isan), the region is mostly
ethnic Lao, and has been a major base of
support for Thaksin. According to
anthropologist Charles Keyes, the region’s
ethno-regional identity and solidarity has
made the local people into a formidable
political force. But, as Keyes also shows, Isan
has been transformed out of sight since he
first visited fifty years ago.
When Keyes and his wife Jane went to central
Isan in 1963–64 it was still the poorest region
in Thailand. Self-sufficient peasants battled
with irregular rainfall and poor soils to make
ends meet. The local geography conspired
against commercial agriculture, and so men
had begun heading to Bangkok for work in
construction or other menial jobs, especially
during the dry season. When Thailand
became a playground for US troops on leave
from the war in Vietnam, women headed to
the urban bars and brothels for work.
American aid drove roads through the region
and sped up the circulation of people between
city and countryside. Drawn out of their rural
isolation, the migrants came into contact with
others like themselves from across Isan,
fomenting an ethno-regional sentiment.
Together, they became aware of the wealth
differences between Isan and Bangkok.
For residents of Bangkok, many of whom were
of Sino-Thai descent, these dark, short-
statured people in simple clothing were ban
nok, “country bumpkins” whose dialect was
crude to their ears. When TV came along they
became the fall guys in Thai comedies, and in
everyday life they had to suffer the contempt
of those above them.
Keyes describes how the people of this region
became Thai through an expansion of the
national bureaucracy, the centralising of the
Buddhist sangha, and especially – since the
1930s – schools that educated both boys and
girls. They learned to use the central Thai
language and its various polite forms and,
especially from the 1950s on, they learned to
love the Thai king, Bhumiphol Adulyadej.
Essentially, it was good old-fashioned nation
building, and similar processes occurred for
every region, including Bangkok, where the
Chinese, for instance, needed to be turned
into Thais.
Migration in search of work, especially
overseas, transformed the lives of Isan’s
peasants to the point where they became rural
entrepreneurs. “By the early twenty-first
century,” writes Keyes, “non-agricultural
work had become the most significant source
of cash income for villagers. The money
villagers brought back from urban or overseas
work was increasingly invested not in
agriculture but in small enterprises such as
convenience stores, repair shops, and food
stalls as well as rice mills.” Importantly, it
was also used to pay for higher education for
children, of whom there were fewer now that
women were embracing birth control.
Thaksin’s power base is in the north, around
Chiang Mai, where the conditions suited full-
scale commercial farming. This, too, caused
migration from the countryside to the city
and upward mobility through education. The
north’s ethno-regional identity is strong –
they are known as Khon Muang – but because
their aristocracy had been seamlessly
absorbed by the Siamese state they are not
looked down on like the people of Isan.
Indeed, Thai soap operas are more likely to
romanticise old northern aristocratic life and
emulate its speech forms.
n one sense, what had been forming in
the Thai countryside by the time of
Thaksin’s rise in the late 1990s was a
rural entrepreneurial class determined to
better their lives and sweep away any
bureaucratic obstacles. Thaksin the mega-
entrepreneur played to this audience
perfectly, and his million-baht-per-village
loan scheme, alongside cheap universal
healthcare, won him unwavering support. The
majority of activists in the Red Shirt
movement are in their forties or older –
exactly the group that has made the transition
from scarcity to having tasted the good life.
Big, shiny cars are now ubiquitous on Isan’s
highways; as one Red Shirt follower said, “We
are not going back to riding motorcycles.”
This doesn’t quite fit with journalistic clichés
about the “rural poor.” In the same way,
bland assertions about the “Bangkok middle-
class” blur the changing urban landscape.
As its skyline shows, Bangkok has been
remade since 1980 by dramatic economic
growth. The city’s workforce has diversified
and middle-class occupations have grown
steeply. Labour shed by agriculture has
flowed into manufacturing, where the
workforce grew from 14 per cent of the total
in 1990 to 20 per cent in 2008. But white-
collar work grew even faster – from one-in-
five employees to almost one-in-three – and
within its ranks professionals and senior
white-collar workers grew fastest.
Even in Keyes’s rural village, 17 per cent of
children in 2005 had gone on from high
school to vocational colleges or (in 4 per cent
of cases) to university, and 22 per cent had
finished high school. Because most of them
sought white-collar jobs, often in the capital,
migrants played an important role in the
growth of the middle class in Bangkok. Many
are upwardly mobile, socially and culturally,
and have learned to speak flawless central
Thai. They dress for and aspire to an affluent
urban lifestyle. An important indicator of the
dislocations involved in cultural change,
however, is the fact that the Bangkok
metropolitan area has one of the highest non-
marriage rates for women in their twenties
and thirties of any city in Southeast Asia.
For these upwardly mobile new members of
the middle class, the plebeian style adopted by
the Red Shirts is exactly what they are
running away from. Of course, many of them
aren’t politically active, but others have
joined the anti-Thaksin forces because they
agree with the middle-class critique of the
government corruption epitomised by the
Thaksin years. No doubt these migrants are
part of the reason why the Thai press speaks
of bitter divisions in families over politics.
Over this same period, Thailand’s elite has
also changed radically. The Asian financial
crisis of 1997 hit Thailand especially hard,
sending many old business families to the
wall. The boom years had been built on major
inflows of foreign investment and a globalised
economy. Close relations with the Thai state
had once provided local capitalists with very
comfortable incomes, but now globalisation
had destabilised the cosy arrangements. In
fact, Thaksin’s wealth in the
telecommunications sector had initially been
built on a deal that gave him a monopoly. Yet
he was part of a new breed of Thai capitalists
who thought globally and aimed to take over
the government and run the state as if it was
a business. As Pasuk Phongpaichit and Chris
Baker write in their superb biography,
“Thaksin’s project was built around a fatal
confusion – between business and politics,
country and company, Shin Corp and
Thailand. Throughout his career, politics and
profit-making were entwined around one
another like a pair of copulating snakes.”
After the election of his Thai Rak Thai (Thai
Love Thai) party in January 2001, Thaksin’s
already rich business and family network
went into a feeding frenzy.
The monarchy, headed by enigmatic King
Bhumiphol Adulyadej, is also about to change
irreversibly. A conservative who believes in
rule by righteous individuals, the king has
done deals with military dictators to
strengthen the monarchy but has never been
a thug himself. His preference, as much as
one can discern it, is for a form of guided
democracy. He has been an enormously
popular and respected figure for many
decades. But he became physically enfeebled
just as the political turmoil began, and the
Queen has since been crippled by a stroke,
and so now the royal couple are marionettes
of the Privy Council.
The heir, Crown Prince Vajiralongkorn, has
none of his father’s political talent or
charisma. He is believed to have had dealings
with Thaksin, although it is unclear what these
amount to. In late November last year,
according to the Economist, “the King signed a
decree mandating that all decisions by the
powerful defence council were subject to veto
by the Crown Prince,” but whether
Vajiralongkorn really wields this power is
moot. With the passing of King Bhumiphol,
the personalised networks that have been
spun around him for so long will unravel and
Vajiralongkorn will find himself presiding
over a weakened monarchy. It will be a big
blow for conservatives.
AFGHANISTAN, US AND THE PEACE PROCESS
If the rise in violence this month is any mark of the year
that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn
out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season
in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in
fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence,
shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there
have been several attacks, in and around the fortified
diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign
security personnel, government and military
installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what
is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its
third Presidential elections in April 2014.
US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend
is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents
targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced
their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a
pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition
process, withdrawal of international troops, and
handover of all political, security and development
responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the
challenges to peace and security are many, the
solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to
reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such
mechanism has been the Afghan peace and
reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was
launched in 2010. This process envisioned political
means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation
and reintegration of insurgents through talks and
negotiations. This process was to assist the security
transition process and set the stage for the handover of
all responsibilities from international to Afghan
ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of
achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and
growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation
needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With
the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the
insurgency almost next to none, many are left
wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014
period.
The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with
a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which
have been implemented simultaneously. The
reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-
national level where foot soldiers are enticed to
reintegrate and take advantages of the financial
incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on
the other hand has been implemented at the national
and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has
been approached to participate in official channels of
communication with the Afghan government in the
hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead
to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has
been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local
commanders, making reintegration a relatively
successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts
have consistently hit roadblocks with no major
achievements to date.
The Afghan government and its international partners
have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by
employing several trust-building mechanisms. These
include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan
government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist
against former Taliban members, the creation of a
political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for
their participation in mainstream politics, allowing
representatives of the insurgency to participate in track
II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed
groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be
included into the power structure of the state. In
response, the Taliban have increased their attacks
across Afghanistan, continued to engage in
indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the
spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which
marked the second highest recorded year since 2001,
targeted killings of Afghan government officials including
the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and
Afghan National Security Forces, continued
implementation of their draconian laws in areas under
their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the
Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet
regime which has sustained their inflexibility in
accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which
include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking
ties with international terrorists groups including al
Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban
have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the
years, their actions however continue to denote another
tone.
It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government
and its international backers will strike a peace deal
with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate
post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not
surprising considering that in the past five years the
Afghan government and the international community
have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts
have become ever more daunting as the security
transition process enters its last tranche and the
international community is set to withdraw by the end
of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges
between the Afghan government and the insurgency by
the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground
realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a
position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened,
instead of weakened, by the peace process.
that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn
out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season
in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in
fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence,
shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there
have been several attacks, in and around the fortified
diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign
security personnel, government and military
installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what
is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its
third Presidential elections in April 2014.
US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend
is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents
targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced
their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a
pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition
process, withdrawal of international troops, and
handover of all political, security and development
responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the
challenges to peace and security are many, the
solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to
reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such
mechanism has been the Afghan peace and
reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was
launched in 2010. This process envisioned political
means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation
and reintegration of insurgents through talks and
negotiations. This process was to assist the security
transition process and set the stage for the handover of
all responsibilities from international to Afghan
ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of
achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and
growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation
needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With
the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the
insurgency almost next to none, many are left
wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014
period.
The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with
a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which
have been implemented simultaneously. The
reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-
national level where foot soldiers are enticed to
reintegrate and take advantages of the financial
incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on
the other hand has been implemented at the national
and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has
been approached to participate in official channels of
communication with the Afghan government in the
hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead
to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has
been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local
commanders, making reintegration a relatively
successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts
have consistently hit roadblocks with no major
achievements to date.
The Afghan government and its international partners
have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by
employing several trust-building mechanisms. These
include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan
government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist
against former Taliban members, the creation of a
political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for
their participation in mainstream politics, allowing
representatives of the insurgency to participate in track
II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed
groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be
included into the power structure of the state. In
response, the Taliban have increased their attacks
across Afghanistan, continued to engage in
indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the
spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which
marked the second highest recorded year since 2001,
targeted killings of Afghan government officials including
the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and
Afghan National Security Forces, continued
implementation of their draconian laws in areas under
their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the
Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet
regime which has sustained their inflexibility in
accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which
include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking
ties with international terrorists groups including al
Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban
have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the
years, their actions however continue to denote another
tone.
It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government
and its international backers will strike a peace deal
with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate
post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not
surprising considering that in the past five years the
Afghan government and the international community
have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts
have become ever more daunting as the security
transition process enters its last tranche and the
international community is set to withdraw by the end
of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges
between the Afghan government and the insurgency by
the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground
realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a
position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened,
instead of weakened, by the peace process.
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