1 Mar 2016

Bombardier adds to Northern Ireland manufacturing jobs massacre

Harvey Thompson

The Canadian-based airplane and train manufacturer Bombardier is making 7,000 job cuts in its global operations, with over 1,000 of those in its division in Belfast, Ireland.
The company employs 64,000 workers internationally and is one of Northern Ireland’s largest private sector employers, with around 5,500 workers. Many other workers are employed in its supply chain industries.
The corporation announced that 1,080 jobs would go at its Belfast plant, which makes the wings for its new C-Series plane. According to reports, the Belfast workers were informed their jobs were being ended via a text message.
Bombardier’s significance to the regional economy is huge—it accounts for around 7 percent of all manufacturing jobs across Northern Ireland (almost 50 percent of the total number of manufacturing jobs in Belfast itself) and produces 10 percent of Northern Ireland’s total manufacturing exports.
As well as making components for executive jets, four sites in and around Belfast produce parts for other manufacturers such as Rolls Royce.
However, by far the highest-profile department is that responsible for the development and production of composite wings for the Bombardier C Series, which is housed in a £520 million plant officially opened in 2013 by the British Prime Minister David Cameron.
Bombardier is the world’s largest builder of business jets by revenue and the biggest international manufacturer of passenger trains. The Financial Times commented that the firm “faces falling sales during 2016 because of cutbacks in business jet manufacturing. It predicted revenue of $16.5 billion-$17.5 billion in 2016, against $18.2 billion during 2015, less than analysts had been expecting.”
Alain Bellemare, who took over as president and chief executive of Bombardier Inc last year said, “We are turning Bombardier around to make this great company stronger and more competitive.”
Michael Ryan, the Vice-President of Bombardier’s Bombardier Belfast operation, said, “The whole global aerospace world is looking at how they can optimise their cost-base and that includes going to what we would call lower cost countries. If we want to compete being in a global market place then we need to take advantage of that where it’s relevant.”
Another 270 jobs will be cut at other non-aerospace sites in the UK, including Derby, Crewe and Burton-on-Trent.
The announcement at Bombardier’s Belfast division followed large-scale job cuts at tyre giant Michelin in Northern Ireland and cigarette producer, JTI Gallaher. Around 860 jobs are to go at Michelin when it closes its doors in 2018 and a similar number of jobs will be lost at JTI Gallaher when it shuts completely by the end of 2017. A number of other firms, including Caterpillar NI and Schrader Electronics, both based in County Antrim, have made substantial job cuts.
Stephen Kelly of Manufacturing NI said of the combined closures, “One percent of our manufacturers employ almost half of all those who work in manufacturing and 49 percent of turnover.”
Long-established manufacturing jobs such as those in Belfast are being terminated, as firms seek to continually lower their wage bill. Commenting on the spate of recent Belfast redundancies, the Financial Times stated, “One factor common to the three announcements is the companies’ emphasis on the need to become more competitive globally. This suggests that Northern Ireland’s relatively high wages and location at the periphery of the UK and the EU are making the province increasingly uncompetitive.
“In a statement last year, Michelin referred to the ‘heavy logistics costs’ related to manufacturing in Northern Ireland. On Wednesday, Bombardier, referring to its job cuts in Northern Ireland, said ‘it is crucial that we right-size our business in line with market realities’.”
The concern of the union bureaucracy is not with the fate of the workers, but to assist. Peter Bunting, assistant general secretary of the Irish Congress of Trade Unions declared that Northern Ireland “urgently needs a comprehensive and ambitious manufacturing strategy”.
The Unite trade union announced its sorrow at “the latest, cruel blow to Northern Ireland’s manufacturing sector. The scale of the losses reflect the severe market conditions being experienced by the group, which has led to over 7,000 job losses globally.”
No fight is being taken up to defend any of the jobs, with Unite adding, “The Northern Ireland Executive needs to redouble their efforts and secure alternative employment for those highly skilled workers who will be made redundant. Invest NI [the inward investment agency] must now commit themselves fully to proactively seeking foreign investment in manufacturing.”
Unite makes this bankrupt call despite Invest NI having already offered Bombardier £75 million of assistance between 2002 and 2015.
Fear of a social backlash over the haemorrhaging of jobs has led to sharp political recriminations in the Stormont Assembly, with both the Ulster Unionist Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) calling on the newly appointed Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) Enterprise Minister, Jonathan Bell, to resign.
The ruling elite fear a social backlash due to growing social inequality and rising unemployment. In Northern Ireland, 18 to 24-year-olds are 40 percent more likely to be unemployed than in any other region in the United Kingdom.
Mark Dougan, the acting director of the Prince’s Trust charity in Northern Ireland, wrote recently that it is “urgently calling on the Northern Ireland Executive to take bold, decisive action to eradicate long-term youth unemployment by 2020.”
In the Belfast Telegraph article, he noted that this year marks 10 years since the publication of the Ten Year Strategy for Children and Young People in 2006, “which set out a series of aims to help children and young people in Northern Ireland achieve their potential. Dougan concluded, “However, it is a shame that the opportunities for our young have diminished rather than flourished.”
In the past decade, youth unemployment has more than doubled to 21,000. Long-term unemployment has nearly tripled, and the number of young people in employment has fallen by 16 percent to 89,000.
The Belfast base of Bombardier’s operations—the Shorts plant—has historically been one of the plants at which privileges offered to Protestant employees have been used to tie workers politically to the Ulster bourgeoisie.
Unionism has rested on the claim that the interests of Protestant workers in Northern Ireland can be defended through an alliance with British capital. The breakup and decay of this relationship is embodied in the fate of the Shorts plant, once a pioneering company, taken over in 1989 by Bombardier and now an integral part of that corporation’s global operation.
Today, Shorts workers of all religious denominations are forced into global competition with other sections of the Bombardier workforce, in Canada, Germany, Sweden, the US and the UK. This process has created the objective basis for the international unification of the working class.
Past struggles of Bombardier workers were sabotaged by the respective trade union bureaucracies with invocations of defending the “national interest”, in order to justify their deepening collaboration with the financial elite. Unions, aided by the various Stalinist and pseudo-left groupings, have insisted that Bombardier workers have no other option than to pit themselves against their co-workers in other countries. The only way to defend jobs and conditions in any country is by the working class rejecting the nationalism of the trade union bureaucracy and all divisions based on religion, race, region or nation and uniting its struggles through adopting an international socialist perspective.

US, China agree to new UN sanctions on North Korea

Ben McGrath

The United States and China agreed last Thursday to harsh new UN sanctions against North Korea over its recent nuclear and rocket tests. The draft resolution was presented to members of the UN Security Council, with a vote expected soon. The sanctions, pushed by Washington, are designed to further isolate North Korea and cripple its economy.
While the full text of the resolution has not been released, several key points have been made public. Washington’s ambassador to the UN Samantha Power declared that the measures would be the toughest in 20 years. “These sanctions, if adopted, would send an unambiguous and unyielding message to the DPRK [Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] regime. The world will not accept your proliferation. There will be consequences for your actions,” she said.
The US has exploited North Korea’s nuclear programs to justify its military build-up in North East Asia, which is directed primarily at Beijing, not Pyongyang. The latest round of UN measures follow new unilateral US sanctions voted by Congress and approved by Obama last week, which will not only penalise North Korea but companies and individuals doing business with it—above all, in China, Pyongyang’s largest trading partner by far.
The far-reaching UN sanctions threaten to further destabilise the already highly unstable regime in Pyongyang. They include:
  •  All UN member states would be required to inspect shipments, whether by land, sea, or air, bound for and departing from North Korea for any banned goods, including those that could be used in its nuclear or rocket programs. The bans would extend to materials that could be used in chemical or biological weapon programs, as well as to tougher restrictions on luxury goods.
  •  Any companies, such as North Korea’s Ocean Maritime Management Company Limited, suspected of engaging in actions that violate the sanctions would have their port calls or flights barred.
  •  North Korea would be subject to a full weapons ban, which would apply not only to small arms and other conventional weapons, but to anything that could potentially be used for military purposes, including trucks.
  •  All financial transactions between North Korea and other countries would be banned and assets frozen if there is a belief that the funds are being used by Pyongyang for its weapon programs. In general, all North Korean financial institutions would be barred from opening new offices or branches overseas. The financial corporations of other nations would similarly be prevented from expanding within North Korea.
  •  A ban would be imposed on a range of North Korean exports, including gold, titanium ore and rare earth metals. Pyongyang would be able to buy oil and sell coal—a concession to China—but only for “livelihood purposes.” The import of any materials, such as aviation fuel, that could potentially have a military application will also be banned.
As most of North Korea’s trade is with China, the UN sanctions will put enormous pressure on Beijing, which is already being accused by Washington of not doing enough to rein in Pyongyang. The sweeping character of the new sanctions leave plenty of scope for new US accusations that China is aiding North Korea’s weapons programs by allowing the entry of dual-use articles or funds that are being siphoned off for banned purposes.
Speaking to the Financial Times, Bruce Klingner, a former US intelligence official now with the right-wing Heritage Foundation, declared that the restrictions on North Korean exports were “a significant ratcheting up of pressure” that would also raise the question of whether “China is severing or severely curtailing its economic trade with North Korea.” He condemned China for being “lax in enforcing its own export rules, let alone UN resolutions” and turning “a blind eye to North Korean proliferation.”
Choi Gyeong-su, head of the North Korea Resources Institute in Seoul, commented: “You can’t determine which part of the mineral trade is related to people’s livelihoods or not.” But the South Korean government used this very rationale to justify the closure earlier this month of the Kaesong Industrial Complex—a cheap labour zone across the border where South Korean companies employed North Korean workers.
Unification Minister Hong Yong-pyo claimed on February 14 that 70 percent of the funds earned at Kaesong had gone to North Korea’s weapon programs. The following day, Hong backtracked and admitted there was no evidence for his claims, but this has not prevented Seoul from continuing to make the allegation.
China has been pushing for a peaceful resolution to the confrontation over North Korea’s weapons programs. Commenting on the draft resolution, Liu Jieyi, Beijing’s UN ambassador, said it should “pave the way for a negotiated solution down the road, not be a stone wall.”
Beijing is deeply concerned that the US is exploiting North Korea’s nuclear and rocket tests to beef up its military presence in South Korea, including nuclear-capable strategic assets and the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile system. China also fears that a collapse of the North Korean regime could lead to a unified Korea, backed by US troops, directly on its northern border.
The US military is certainly preparing for war to intervene in North Korea. Large-scale annual joint US-South Korea military exercises, designated as Foal Eagle and Key Resolve, will start this month. For the first time, these war games will be based on the new Operational Plan 5015 agreed last year, whose scenarios include preemptive strikes on North Korean military positions and the assassination of officials, as well as the complete seizure of the Korean Peninsula.
General Curtis Scaparrotti, head of US forces in South Korea, spelled out the implications of such a war. He told the House Armed Services Committee last Wednesday: “Given the size of the forces and the weaponry involved, this would be more akin to the Korean War and World War II—very complex, probably high casualty.” Conflict on the Korean Peninsula would inevitably draw in other countries, including China.
The United States is chiefly responsible for the political crisis in Pyongyang and the sharp rise in tensions on the Korean Peninsula, having isolated North Korea for decades and scuttled previous agreements over Pyongyang’s nuclear program. Now as part of its “pivot to Asia” and military build-up against China, the US is deliberately exacerbating a dangerous flashpoint that could trigger a devastating conflict that would engulf the entire region.

28 Feb 2016

2016 - Aviation Scholarship for Women in Aviation

International Civil Aviation Organization
Aviation Scholarship

With the objective of enhancing the development of women in aviation, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) in conjunction with the International Aviation Women’s Association (IAWA), is offering an Aviation Scholarship for a professional woman in this field.
Candidates who are selected for the ICAO-IAWA Aviation Scholarship will be able to augment their professional experience in aviation by working on and contributing to specific aspects of the ICAO work programme at the international level for a period of nine months.
IAWA is supporting ICAO in its efforts to promote the development of women in aviation by providing voluntary contributions and by assisting in identifying those candidates who meet the requirements for the ICAO-IAWA Aviation Scholarship.

Requirements

·         An advanced university degree (Masters’ level or equivalent), in an aviation-related discipline
·         A minimum of two years of  experience in supporting technical work of an international aviation or aerospace organization, a civil aviation authority,  or similar related organization.
·         Fluency in English is required. Knowledge of any other of the following ICAO languages is an asset:  Arabic, Chinese, French, Russian, Spanish.

Details of Assignments

Selected candidates will work under the guidance of experienced professionals in the Air Navigation Bureau at the ICAO Headquarters in Montreal.
The Air Navigation Bureau (ANB) is responsible for providing technical guidance to the Air Navigation Commission (ANC), the Council and the Assembly. ANB provides technical expertise in aviation-related disciplines to States, industry and all elements of the Organization. The Bureau is also responsible for maintaining and implementing the Global Aviation Safety Plan (GASP) and the Global Air Navigation Plan (GASP), including its aviation system block upgrades as well as producing yearly safety and air navigation status reports. The Bureau develops technical studies and proposals for Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs), and Procedures for Air Navigation Services (PANS) for further processing by the governing bodies of ICAO. The Bureau also develops related procedures and guidance material. The Bureau also manages the Universal Safety Oversight Audit Programme (USOAP) that monitors  all States on a continuous basis.
Illustrative examples of areas of work and responsibilities which will be assigned are shown below, depending on the profiles of the selected candidates. The selected candidate will support activities related to the promotion of women in aviation, including, for example, the Annual ICAO-IAWA Connect event.
•              Support the development of Airport Collaborative Decision Making guidance material
•              Support the development of Air Traffic Flow Management related taxonomy and message set
•              Support the development of a taxonomy for medically related accidents and incidents
•              Develop or improve operational risk management concepts, metrics and analytical methods
•              Develop a database on dangerous goods-related accidents/incidents
•              Support further analysis on indicators contained in the global air navigation report, such as ASBUs implementation and outtake of PBN
•              Conduct a gap analysis on requirements for the provision of ground handling services among ICAO Member States. The analysis may include the collection of practices, analysis of input, surveys and the development of conclusions or recommendations
•              Conduct research and analysis on emerging aviation issues
•              Support airport runway safety team implementation activities
•              Draft material on validity and reliability of aviation language test for inclusion in Doc 9835
•              Mine and analyze ADREP data for incidents and accidents where language proficiency is involved
•              Develop a knowledge concept map for pilots in a phase of flight, and based on knowledge map developed, conduct a critical incident analysis
•              Develop a knowledge concept map for remote pilots in a phase of flight TBD, and based on knowledge map developed, conduct a critical incident analysis.
•              Draft Icing/de-icing/anti-icing manual (Doc 9640)
•              Support the establishment of FF-ICE related provision
•              Support the technical editing of the SWIM concept document
•              Support the technical editing process of the RPAS manual

Please Keep In Mind

·         Duration of assignment:  nine months
·         Living expenses:  a monthly stipend of USD 2,000 will be provided to assist the selected candidate in covering living expenses in Montreal
·         Visa: If required, a letter will be provided by ICAO to selected candidates to assist in obtaining entry visa to Canada (where applicable).
·         Medical insurance: the selected candidate will be required to provide proof of medical coverage for the duration of the Aviation Scholarship.
·         Travel costs:  the selected candidate is required to cover all costs related to travel to Montreal.

Application

If you are interested in being considered for an Aviation Scholarship for nine months at ICAO, you are invited to submit an online application at  ICAO's e-Recruitment website at https://careers.icao.int

Deadline for application is 15 March 2016

Timeline for selection

1)       Posting of announcement: 15 February 2016
2)       Closing date for applications:  14 March 2016
3)       Notification to candidates of outcome of their application:  May 2016
4)       Reporting date to Montreal of Selected Candidate:  October 2016

5)       Duration of Aviation Scholarship:  Nine months

Netherlands Fellowship Programme

Netherlands Government
Masters/PhD/Short Courses
Deadline: varies
Study in:  Netherlands
Course starts 2016/2017



Brief description:
The Netherlands Fellowship Programmes (NFP) promote capacity building within organisations in 51 countries by providing fellowships for training and education for professionals. The NFP offers fellowships for qualified Master studies, PhD studies, or short courses offered at participating Dutch Universities.
Host Institution(s):
Dutch Universities that offer NFP qualified programmes/courses.
Level/Field(s) of study:
NFP-qualified Masters Programme, PhD programmes or Short Courses. Find a course/programme at this link then contact the Dutch higher education institution that offers that course to find out whether it is NFP-qualified.
Target group:
The NFP is meant for professionals who are nationals of and work and live in one of the 51 NFP countries. The chances of obtaining an NFP fellowship increase if you live and work in Sub-Saharan Africa and/or if you are a woman.
Scholarship value/inclusions:
An NFP fellowship is intended to supplement the salary that the fellow should continue to receive during the study period. The allowance is a contribution towards the costs of living, the costs of tuition fees, visas, travel, insurance and thesis research. If applicable, the fellowship holder is expected to cover the difference between the actual costs and the amount of the personal NFP allowances.
Eligibility:
To be eligible you:
• must be a national of, and working and living in one of the countries on the NFP country list;
• must have an employer’s statement that complies with the format EP-Nuffic has provided. All information must be provided and all commitments that are included in the format must be endorsed in the statement;
• must not be employed by an organisation that has its own means of staff-development. Organisations that are considered to have their own means for staff development are for example:
– multinational corporations (e.g. Shell, Unilever, Microsoft),
– large national and/or a large commercial organisations,
– bilateral donor organisations (e.g. USAID, DFID, Danida, Sida, Dutch ministry of Foreign affairs, FinAid, AusAid, ADC, SwissAid),
– multilateral donor organisations, (e.g. a UN organisation, the World Bank, the IMF, Asian Development Bank, African Development Bank, IADB),
– international NGO’s (e.g. Oxfam, Plan, Care);
• must have an official and valid passport;
• must not receive more than one fellowship for courses that take place at the same time;
• must have a government statement that meets the requirements of the country in which the employer is established (if applicable).
Application instructions:
You need to apply directly with a Dutch higher education institution of your choice. Contact the Dutch higher education institution which offers the NFP-qualified course of your choice for application procedures. Deadline varies depending on the course and the University.
It is important to visit the official website (link found below) for detailed information on how to apply for this scholarship.
Website:
Related Scholarships: List of Netherlands Scholarships

End Times for the Caliphate?

Patrick Cockburn

The war in Syria and Iraq has produced two new de facto states in the last five years and enabled a third quasi-state greatly to expand its territory and power. The two new states, though unrecognised internationally, are stronger militarily and politically than most members of the UN. One is the Islamic State, which established its caliphate in eastern Syria and western Iraq in the summer of 2014 after capturing Mosul and defeating the Iraqi army. The second is Rojava, as the Syrian Kurds call the area they gained control of when the Syrian army largely withdrew in 2012, and which now, thanks to a series of victories over IS, stretches across northern Syria between the Tigris and Euphrates. In Iraq, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), already highly autonomous, took advantage of IS’s destruction of Baghdad’s authority in northern Iraq to expand its territory by 40 per cent, taking over areas long disputed between itself and Baghdad, including the Kirkuk oilfields and some mixed Kurdish-Arab districts.
The question is whether these radical changes in the political geography of the Middle East will persist – or to what extent they will persist – when the present conflict is over. The Islamic State is likely to be destroyed eventually, such is the pressure from its disunited but numerous enemies, though its adherents will remain a force in Iraq, Syria and the rest of the Islamic world. The Kurds are in a stronger position, benefiting as they do from US support, but that support exists only because they provide some 120,000 ground troops which, in co-operation with the US-led coalition air forces, have proved an effective and politically acceptable counter to IS. The Kurds fear that this support will evaporate if and when IS is defeated and they will be left to the mercy of resurgent central governments in Iraq and Syria as well as Turkey and Saudi Arabia. ‘We don’t want to be used as cannon fodder to take Raqqa,’ a Syrian Kurdish leader in Rojava told me last year. I heard the same thing this month five hundred miles to the east, in KRG territory near Halabja on the Iranian border, from Muhammad Haji Mahmud, a veteran Peshmerga commander and general secretary of the Socialist Party, who led one thousand fighters to defend Kirkuk from IS in 2014. His son Atta was killed in the battle. He said he worried that ‘once Mosul is liberated and IS defeated, the Kurds won’t have the same value internationally.’ Without this support, the KRG would be unable to hold onto its disputed territories.
The rise of the Kurdish states isn’t welcomed by any country in the region, though some – including the governments in Baghdad and Damascus – have found the development to be temporarily in their interest and are in any case too weak to resist it. But Turkey has been appalled to find that the Syrian uprising of 2011, which it hoped would usher in an era of Turkish influence spreading across the Middle East, has instead produced a Kurdish state that controls half of the Syrian side of Turkey’s 550-mile southern border. Worse, the ruling party in Rojava is the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which in all but name is the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), against which Ankara has been fighting a guerrilla war since 1984. The PYD denies the link, but in every PYD office there is a picture on the wall of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Ocalan, who has been in a Turkish prison since 1999. In the year since IS was finally defeated in the siege of the Syrian Kurdish city of Kobani, Rojava has expanded territorially in every direction as its leaders repeatedly ignore Turkish threats of military action against them. Last June, the Syrian Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) captured Tal Abyad, an important crossing point on the Turkish border north of Raqqa, allowing the PYD to link up two of its three main enclaves, around the cities of Kobani and Qamishli; it is now trying to reach the third enclave, further west, at Afrin. These swift advances are possible only because the Kurdish forces are operating under a US-led air umbrella that vastly multiplies their firepower. I was just east of Tal Abyad shortly before the final YPG attack and coalition aircraft roared continuously overhead. In both Syria and Iraq, the Kurds identify targets, call in air strikes and then act as a mopping-up force. Where IS stands and fights it suffers heavy casualties. In the siege of Kobani, which lasted for four and half months, 2200 IS fighters were killed, most of them by US air strikes.
Ankara has warned several times that if the Kurds move west towards Afrin the Turkish army will intervene. In particular, it stipulated that the YPG must not cross the Euphrates: this was a ‘red line’ for Turkey. But when in December the YPG sent its Arab proxy militia, the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), across the Euphrates at the Tishrin Dam, the Turks did nothing – partly because the advance was supported at different points by both American and Russian air strikes on IS targets. Turkish objections have become increasingly frantic since the start of the year because the YPG and the Syrian army, though their active collaboration is unproven, have launched what amounts to a pincer movement on the most important supply lines of the IS and non-IS opposition, which run down a narrow corridor between the Turkish border and Aleppo, once Syria’s largest city. On 2 February the Syrian army, backed by Russian air strikes, cut the main road link towards Aleppo and a week later the SDF captured Menagh airbase from the al-Qaida-affiliated al-Nusra Front, which Turkey has been accused of covertly supporting in the past. On 14 February, Turkish artillery started firing shells at the forces that had captured the base and demanded that they evacuate it. The complex combination of militias, armies and ethnic groups struggling to control this small but vital area north of Aleppo makes the fighting there confusing even by Syrian standards. But if the opposition is cut off from Turkey for long it will be seriously and perhaps fatally weakened. The Sunni states – notably Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar – will have failed in their long campaign to overthrow Bashar al-Assad. Turkey will be faced with the prospect of a hostile PKK-run statelet along its southern flank, making it much harder for it to quell the low-level but long-running PKK-led insurgency among its own 17 million Kurdish minority.
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ErdoÄŸan is said to have wanted Turkey to intervene militarily in Syria since May last year, but until now he has been restrained by his army commanders. They argued that Turkey would be entering a highly complicated war in which it would be opposed by the US, Russia, Iran, the Syrian army, the PYD and IS while its only allies would be Saudi Arabia and some of the Gulf monarchies. Entry into the Syrian war would certainly be a tremendous risk for Turkey, which, despite all its thunderous denunciations of the PYD and YPG as ‘terrorists’, has largely confined itself to small acts of sometimes vindictive retaliation. Ersin Umut Güler, a Turkish Kurd actor and director in Istanbul, was refused permission to bring home for burial the body of his brother Aziz, who had been killed fighting IS in Syria. Before he stepped on a landmine, Aziz had been with the YPG, but he was a Turkish citizen and belonged to a radical socialist Turkish party – not the PKK. ‘It’s like something out of Antigone,’ Ersin said. His father had travelled to Syria and was refusing to return without the body, but the authorities weren’t relenting.
The Turkish response to the rise of Rojava is belligerent in tone but ambivalent in practice. On one day a minister threatens a full-scale ground invasion and on the next another official rules it out or makes it conditional on US participation, which is unlikely. Turkey blamed a car bomb in Ankara that killed 28 people on 17 February on the YPG, which must increase the chances of intervention, but in the recent past Turkish actions have been disjointed and counterproductive. When on 24 November a Turkish F-16 shot down a Russian bomber in what appears to have been a carefully planned attack, the predictable result was that Russia sent sophisticated fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft missile systems to establish air supremacy over northern Syria. This means that if Turkey were to launch a ground invasion, it would have to do so without air cover and its troops would be exposed to bombing by Russian and Syrian planes. Many Kurdish political leaders argue that a Turkish military invasion is unlikely: Fuad Hussein, the KRG’s president’s chief of staff, told me in Erbil last month that ‘if Turkey was going to intervene then it would have done so before shooting down the Russian jet’ – though this assumes, of course, that Turkey knows how to act in its own best interests. He argued that the conflict would be decided by two factors: who is winning on the battlefield and the co-operation between the US and Russia. ‘If the crisis is to be solved,’ he said, ‘it will be solved by agreement between the superpowers’ – and in the Middle East at least Russia has regained superpower status. A new loose alliance between the US and Russia, though interrupted by bouts of Cold War-style rivalry, produced an agreement in Munich on 12 February for aid to be delivered to besieged Syrian towns and cities and a ‘cessation of hostilities’ to be followed by a more formal ceasefire. A de-escalation of the crisis will be difficult to orchestrate, but the fact that the US and Russia are co-chairing a taskforce overseeing it shows the extent to which they are displacing local and regional powers as the decision-makers in Syria.
For the Kurds in Rojava and KRG territory this is a testing moment: if the war ends their newly won power could quickly slip away. They are, after all, only small states – the KRG has a population of about six million and Rojava 2.2 million – surrounded by much larger ones. And their economies are barely floating wrecks. Rojava is well organised but blockaded on all sides and unable to sell much of its oil. Seventy per cent of the buildings in Kobani were pulverised by US bombing. People have fled from cities like Hasaka that are close to the frontline. The KRG’s economic problems are grave and probably insoluble unless there is an unexpected rise in the price of oil. Three years ago, it advertised itself as ‘the new Dubai’, a trading hub and oil state with revenues sufficient to make it independent of Baghdad. When the oil boom peaked in 2013, the newly built luxury hotels in Erbil were packed with foreign trade delegations and businessmen. Today the hotels and malls are empty and Iraqi Kurdistan is full of half-built hotels and apartment buildings. The end of the KRG boom has been a devastating shock for the population, many of whom are trying to migrate to Western Europe. There are frequent memorial prayers in mosques for those who have drowned in the Aegean crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands. The state’s oil revenues now stand at about $400 million a month; expenditure is $1.1 billion, so few of the 740,000 government employees are being paid. In desperation, the government has seized money from the banks. ‘My mother went to her bank where she thought she had $20,000,’ Nazdar Ibrahim, an economist at Salahaddin University in Erbil, told me. ‘They said: “We don’t have your money because the government has taken it.” Nobody is putting money in the banks and it is destroying the banking system.’
The KRG promoted itself as a ‘different Iraq’, and so, in some respects, it is: it’s much safer to live in than Baghdad or Basra. Though Mosul isn’t far away, there have been few bomb attacks or kidnappings in Iraqi Kurdistan compared to elsewhere in the country. But the KRG is an oil state that depends wholly on oil revenues. The region produces almost nothing else: even the vegetables in the markets are imported from Turkey and Iran and prices are high. Nazdar Ibrahim said that clothes she could buy in Turkey for $10 cost three times as much at home; Iraqi Kurdistan, she suggested, was as expensive to live in as Norway or Switzerland. The KRG’s president, Massoud Barzani, has declared he will hold a referendum on Kurdish independence, but this is not an attractive option at a time of general economic ruin. Asos Hardi, the editor of a newspaper in Sulaymaniyah, says protests are spreading and in any case ‘even at the height of the boom there was popular anger at the clientism and corruption.’ The Iraqi Kurdish state – far from becoming more independent – is being forced to look to outside powers, including Baghdad, to save it from further economic collapse.
Similar things are happening elsewhere in the region: people who have been smuggled out of Mosul say that the caliphate is buckling under military and economic pressure. Its enemies have captured Sinjar, Ramadi and Tikrit in Iraq and the YPG and the Syrian army are driving it back in Syria and are closing in on Raqqa. The ground forces attacking IS – the YPG, the Syrian army, Iraqi armed forces and Peshmerga – are all short of manpower (in the struggle for Ramadi the Iraqi military assault force numbered only 500 men), but they can call in devastating air strikes on any IS position. Since it was defeated at Kobani, IS has avoided set-piece battles and has not fought to the last man to defend any of its cities, though it has considered doing so in Raqqa and Mosul. The Pentagon, the Iraqi government and the Kurds exaggerate the extent of their victories over IS, but it is taking heavy losses and is isolated from the outside world with the loss of its last link to Turkey. The administrative and economic infrastructure of the caliphate is beginning to break under the strain of bombing and blockade. This is the impression given by people who left Mosul in early February and took refuge in Rojava.
Their journey wasn’t easy, since IS prohibits people from leaving the caliphate – it doesn’t want a mass exodus. Those who have got out report that IS is becoming more violent in enforcing fatwas and religious regulations. Ahmad, a 35-year-old trader from the al-Zuhour district of Mosul, where he owns a small shop, reported that ‘if somebody is caught who has shaved off his beard, he is given thirty lashes, while last year they would just arrest him for a few hours.’ The treatment of women in particular has got worse: ‘IS insists on women wearing veils, socks, gloves and loose or baggy clothes and, if she does not, the man with her will be lashed.’ Ahmad also said that living conditions have deteriorated sharply and the actions of IS officials become more arbitrary: ‘They take food without paying and confiscated much of my stock under the pretence of supporting the Islamic State militiamen. Everything is expensive and the stores are half-empty. The markets were crowded a year ago, but not for the last ten months because so many people have fled and those that have stayed are unemployed.’ There has been no mains electricity for seven months and everybody depends on private generators which run on locally refined fuel. This is available everywhere, but is expensive and of such poor quality that it works only for generators and not for cars – and the generators often break down. There is a shortage of drinking water. ‘Every ten days, we have water for two hours,’ Ahmad said. ‘The water we get from the tap is not clean, but we have to drink it.’ There is no mobile phone network and the internet is available only in internet cafés that are closely monitored by the authorities for sedition. There are signs of growing criminality and corruption, though this may mainly be evidence that IS is in desperate need of money. When Ahmad decided to flee he contacted one of many smugglers operating in the area between Mosul and the Syrian frontier. He said the cost for each individual smuggled into Rojava is between $400 and $500. ‘Many of the smugglers are IS men,’ he said, but he didn’t know whether the organisation’s leaders knew what was happening. They certainly know that there are increasing complaints about living conditions because they have cited a hadith, a saying of the Prophet, against such complaints. Those who violate the hadith are arrested and sent for re-education. Ahmad’s conclusion: ‘Dictators become very violent when they sense that their end is close.’
How accurate is Ahmad’s prediction that the caliphate is entering its final days? It is certainly weakening, but this is largely because the war has been internationalised since 2014 by US and Russian military intervention. Local and regional powers count for less than they did. The Iraqi and Syrian armies, the YPG and the Peshmerga can win victories over IS thanks to close and massive air support. They can defeat it in battle and can probably take the cities it still rules, but none of them will be able fully to achieve their war aims without the continued backing of a great power. Once the caliphate is gone, however, the central governments in Baghdad and Damascus may grow stronger again. The Kurds wonder if they will then be at risk of losing all the gains they have made in the war against Islamic State.

An Open Letter To The People Of West Papua

James Burrowes & Robert J. Burrowes

James Burrowes - 1942
Wa wa wa wa.

We have recently been discussing your ongoing courageous struggle to liberate yourselves from more than 100 years of occupation, first by the Netherlands, briefly and brutally by Japan during World War II, and now by Indonesia. In that regard, we would each like to share a brief message with you, our friends from West Papua.

From James: I have been very impressed with the information gleaned from my son Robert Burrowes after his recent meeting in Brisbane with your leaders Octovianus Mote, Benny Wenda, Jacob Rumbiak and Rex Rumakiek of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua.

The work and dedication you have been devoting to the cause of freedom for West Papua has inspired me to recall my own experience with some of your ancestors during my 4 years with the Australian Imperial Force (AIF) during World War II, which included 2½ years as a coastwatcher. Ten months of this time was spent in enemy-held territory as a signaller.
James Burrowes-2016
I am 92 years old now, but in those days from 1942 to 1945 I was Sergeant James Burrowes VX136343 in 'M' Special Unit of the Allied Intelligence Bureau, known as the 'Coastwatchers'. Our intelligence role for the war effort was described by Admiral Halsey, Commander of the US 7th Fleet, in these words: 'Without the Coastwatchers, the Pacific War would not have been won!'

Therefore, in this context, I would like to briefly relate the contribution of some of your Papuan ancestors who were also coastwatchers, assisting and being part of parties infiltrated into Japanese-held territory.

Those I can name include Papuans known to us as Yali, Mas, Buka and Mariba although I can name many others such as Golpak, his son Kaole, Yauwika, Rayman and Ishmael. Some, including Sgt-Major Simogun, are famous and were duly honoured with the British Empire Medal and/or Loyal Service Medal for their fighting service. I mention the first four named for a specific reason.

I recall one very notable incident when eleven coastwatchers paddled ashore in rubber crafts from a submarine at Hollandia (now Jayapura, the capital of West Papua) only to be wrecked by the surf, losing most of their equipment, before being ambushed by the Japanese. Five coastwatchers (including Papuans Mas and Buka) were killed and those remaining (which included the Papuans Yali and Mariba and the Indonesian known as Lancelot) somehow managed to escape and, after incredible hardship, later rejoined allied forces.
On a personal note, I am lucky to be here today. I was selected to go on that Hollandia venture but, at the last minute, the signaller Jack Bunning replaced me after recovering from sickness. He was one of the men killed! I am also lucky to be one of the handful of Australian coastwatchers still alive to tell our story.

I would be thrilled if any survivor or relative of any of the Papuans named is still able to connect with this experience from some 72 years ago.
Hollandia party: West Papuan & Australian coastwatchers in - WWII
I have included a photo of the Hollandia party (in which you will see the four Papuans), a photo of Sgt-Major Simogun, and two photos of myself from way back then and now.
Coastwatcher Sgt Maj Simogun BEM LSM - WWII
I sincerely wish you the very best of success in your long-term struggle for independence.

You helped us to preserve the independence of Australia from Japan.

Best regards

Jim Burrowes 

From Robert: When I was a child, each year my father would take me to the Shrine of Remembrance in Melbourne at the beginning of July. I would listen to an old man talk about the sinking of the 'Montevideo Maru', a Japanese prisoner of war ship that was sunk during World War II, killing all of the 1,053 Australian prisoners of war on board. I would watch my aunt crying as this story was told.

One of the prisoners on this ship was my father's older brother, Robert (Bob), who had been captured at Rabaul during the Japanese invasion on 22 January 1942. Bob was a member of the 34th Fortress Engineers of the Australian Imperial Force and had been responsible for installing guns at Praed Point in Rabaul Harbour.

Apart from his older brother, my father also lost his twin brother Thomas (Tom) during the war. Tom was a member of the RAAF's 100 Squadron and the Beaufort Bomber on which he was a wireless airgunner was shot down over Rabaul on his first mission on 14 December 1943.

My childhood is dotted with memories of my uncles: wearing Bob's war medals to school on ANZAC Day, going to the Shrine of Remembrance each year, and listening on those rare occasions when Dad talked about his brothers.

Sometimes, when asked, Dad would also talk about his own experience during the war. He was a member of 'M' Special Unit, a coastwatcher operating behind enemy lines in Japanese-occupied New Guinea.

Whenever he talked about his experience and the efforts of fellow coastwatchers, Dad would invariably mention their heavy reliance on the Papuans who also served as coastwatchers. In his words: 'Without them there would have been NO Coastwatchers as they were the ones guiding us, carrying all our gear, building our thatched shelter, cooking, protecting us as sentries – you name it.'

In 1966, the year I turned 14, I decided that I would devote my life to working to end human violence. This is more than a life passion: It is why I live.

One of the things that I have learned is that we can use thoughtfully applied nonviolent strategy to defeat occupying powers. I wrote a book on how to do this. See 'The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach'. http://www.sunypress.edu/p-2176-the-strategy-of-nonviolent-defe.aspx

Just as Papuan ancestors helped my father and fellow coastwatchers to play a key role in defeating an occupying power, it is now my duty and great privilege to help the people of West Papua to defeat another one.

Papua Merdeka!

Robert J. Burrowes 

The Rape Of East Timor: "Sounds Like Fun"

John Pilger

Secret documents found in the Australian National Archives provide a glimpse of how one of the greatest crimes of the 20th century was executed and covered up. They also help us understand how and for whom the world is run.
The documents refer to East Timor, now known as Timor-Leste, and were written by diplomats in the Australian embassy in Jakarta. The date was November 1976, less than a year after the Indonesian dictator General Suharto seized the then Portuguese colony on the island of Timor.
The terror that followed has few parallels; not even Pol Pot succeeded in killing, proportionally, as many Cambodians as Suharto and his fellow generals killed in East Timor. Out of a population of almost a million, up to a third were extinguished.
This was the second holocaust for which Suharto was responsible. A decade earlier, in 1965, Suharto wrested power in Indonesia in a bloodbath that took more than a million lives. The CIA reported: "In terms of numbers killed, the massacres rank as one of the worst mass murders of the 20th century."
This was greeted in the Western press as "a gleam of light in Asia" (Time). The BBC's correspondent in South East Asia, Roland Challis, later described the cover-up of the massacres as a triumph of media complicity and silence; the "official line" was that Suharto had "saved" Indonesia from a communist takeover.
"Of course my British sources knew what the American plan was," he told me. "There were bodies being washed up on the lawns of the British consulate in Surabaya, and British warships escorted a ship full of Indonesian troops, so that they could take part in this terrible holocaust. It was only much later that we learned that the American embassy was supplying [Suharto with] names and ticking them off as they were killed. There was a deal, you see. In establishing the Suharto regime, the involvement of the [US-dominated] International Monetary Fund and the World Bank were part of it. That was the deal."
I have interviewed many of the survivors of 1965, including the acclaimed Indonesian novelist Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who bore witness to an epic of suffering "forgotten" in the West because Suharto was "our man". A second holocaust in resource-rich East Timor, an undefended colony, was almost inevitable.
In 1994, I filmed clandestinely in occupied East Timor; I found a land of crosses and unforgettable grief. In my film, Death of a Nation, there is a sequence shot on board an Australian aircraft flying over the Timor Sea. A party is in progress. Two men in suits are toasting each other in champagne. "This is a uniquely historical moment," babbles one of them, "that is truly, uniquely historical."
This is Australia's foreign minister, Gareth Evans. The other man is Ali Alatas, the principal mouthpiece of Suharto. It is 1989 and they are making a symbolic flight to celebrate a piratical deal they called a "treaty". This allowed Australia, the Suharto dictatorship and the international oil companies to divide the spoils of East Timor's oil and gas resources.
Thanks to Evans, Australia's then prime minister, Paul Keating -- who regarded Suharto as a father figure -- and a gang that ran Australia's foreign policy establishment, Australia distinguished itself as the only western country formally to recognise Suharto's genocidal conquest. The prize, said Evans, was "zillions" of dollars.
Members of this gang reappeared the other day in documents found in the National Archives by two researchers from Monash University in Melbourne, Sara Niner and Kim McGrath. In their own handwriting, senior officials of the Department of Foreign Affairs mock reports of the rape, torture and execution of East Timorese by Indonesian troops. In scribbled annotations on a memorandum that refers to atrocities in a concentration camp, one diplomat wrote: "sounds like fun". Another wrote: "sounds like the population are in raptures."
Referring to a report by the Indonesian resistance, Fretilin, that describes Indonesia as an "impotent" invader, another diplomat sneered: "If 'the enemy was impotent', as stated, how come they are daily raping the captured population? Or is the former a result of the latter?"
The documents, says Sarah Niner, are "vivid evidence of the lack of empathy and concern for human rights abuses in East Timor" in the Department of Foreign Affairs. "The archives reveal that this culture of cover-up is closely tied to the DFA's need to recognise Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor so as to commence negotiations over the petroleum in the East Timor Sea."
This was a conspiracy to steal East Timor's oil and gas. In leaked diplomatic cables in August 1975, the Australian Ambassador to Jakarta, Richard Woolcott, wrote to Canberra: "It would seem to me that the Department [of Minerals and Energy] might well have an interest in closing the present gap in the agreed sea border and this could be much more readily negotiated with Indonesia ... than with Portugal or independent Portuguese Timor." Woolcott revealed that he had been briefed on Indonesia's secret plans for an invasion. He cabled Canberra that the government should "assist public understanding in Australia" to counter "criticism of Indonesia".
In 1993, I interviewed C. Philip Liechty, a former senior CIA operations officer in the Jakarta embassy during the invasion of East Timor. He told me: "Suharto was given the green light [by the US] to do what he did. We supplied them with everything they needed [from] M16 rifles [to] US military logistical support ... maybe 200,000 people, almost all of them non-combatants died. When the atrocities began to appear in the CIA reporting, the way they dealt with these was to cover them up as long as possible; and when they couldn't be covered up any longer, they were reported in a watered-down, very generalised way, so that even our own sourcing was sabotaged."
I asked Liechty what would have happened had someone spoken out. "Your career would end," he replied. He said his interview with me was one way of making amends for "how badly I feel".
The gang in the Australian embassy in Jakarta appear to suffer no such anguish. One of the scribblers on the documents, Cavan Hogue, told the Sydney Morning Herald: "It does look like my handwriting. If I made a comment like that, being the cynical bugger that I am, it would certainly have been in the spirit of irony and sarcasm. It's about the [Fretilin] press release, not the Timorese." Hogue said there were "atrocities on all sides".
As one who reported and filmed the evidence of genocide, I find this last remark especially profane. The Fretilin "propaganda" he derides was accurate. The subsequent report of the United Nations on East Timor describes thousands of cases of summary execution and violence against women by Suharto's Kopassus special forces, many of whom were trained in Australia. "Rape, sexual slavery and sexual violence were tools used as part of the campaign designed to inflict a deep experience of terror, powerlessness and hopelessness upon pro-independence supporters," says the UN.
Cavan Hogue, the joker and "cynical bugger", was promoted to senior ambassador and eventually retired on a generous pension. Richard Woolcott was made head of the Department of Foreign Affairs in Canberra and, in retirement, has lectured widely as a "respected diplomatic intellectual".
Journalists watered at the Australian embassy in Jakarta, notably those employed by Rupert Murdoch, who controls almost 70 per cent of Australia's capital city press. Murdoch's correspondent in Indonesia was Patrick Walters, who reported that Jakarta's "economic achievements" in East Timor were "impressive", as was Jakarta's "generous" development of the blood-soaked territory. As for the East Timorese resistance, it was "leaderless" and beaten. In any case, "no one was now arrested without proper legal procedures".
In December 1993, one of Murdoch's veteran retainers, Paul Kelly, then editor-in-chief of The Australian, was appointed by Foreign Minister Evans to the Australia-Indonesia Institute, a body funded by the Australian government to promote the "common interests" of Canberra and the Suharto dictatorship. Kelly led a group of Australian newspaper editors to Jakarta for an audience with the mass murderer. There is a photograph of one of them bowing.
East Timor won its independence in 1999 with the blood and courage of its ordinary people. The tiny, fragile democracy was immediately subjected to a relentless campaign of bullying by the Australian government which sought to manoeuvre it out of its legal ownership of the sea bed's oil and gas revenue. To get its way, Australia refused to recognise the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea and unilaterally changed the maritime boundary in its own favour.
In 2006, a deal was finally signed, Mafia-style, largely on Australia's terms. Soon afterwards, Prime Minister Mari Alkitiri, a nationalist who had stood up to Canberra, was effectively deposed in what he called an "attempted coup" by "outsiders". The Australian military, which had "peace-keeping" troops in East Timor, had trained his opponents.
In the 17 years since East Timor won its independence, the Australian government has taken nearly $5 billion in oil and gas revenue - money that belongs to its impoverished neighbour.
Australia has been called America's "deputy sheriff" in the South Pacific. One man with the badge is Gareth Evans, the foreign minister filmed lifting his champagne glass to toast the theft of East Timor's natural resources. Today, Evans is a lectern-trotting zealot promoting a brand of war-mongering known as "RTP", or "Responsibility to Protect". As co-chair of a New York-based "Global Centre", he runs a US-backed lobby group that urges the "international community" to attack countries where "the Security Council rejects a proposal or fails to deal with it in a reasonable time". The man for the job, as the East Timorese might say.

Scrapping Trident And Transitioning To A Nuclear-Free World

Rajesh Makwana

As the illicit trade in nuclear weapons escalates alongside the risk of geopolitical conflict, it’s high time governments decisively prioritised nuclear disarmament – and that means scrapping Trident, the UK’s inordinately expensive nuclear deterrent, which would also facilitate the redistribution of scarce public resources to fund essential services.
As geopolitical tensions escalate in the Middle East and the world teeters on the brink of a new Cold War, it’s clear that the only way to eliminate the threat of nuclear warfare is for governments to fulfil their long-held commitment to the “general and complete disarmament” of nuclear weapons – permanently. A bold and essential step towards this crucial goal is to decommission Trident, the UK’s ineffective, unusable and costly nuclear deterrent submarines. Renewing Trident would not only undermine international disarmament efforts for years to come, it will reinforce the hazardous belief that maintaining a functional nuclear arsenal is essential for any nation seeking to wield power on the world stage.
Needless to say, modern nuclear bombs are many times more destructive than those dropped on Japan at the end of the Second World War, and would result in a host of immeasurably devastating impacts on the natural world and human life if they were deployed today. The extent to which nuclear weapons currently proliferate the globe is therefore alarming and underscores the need for radical action on this critical issue. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, nine countries (the United States, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea) possess a total of 16,000 nuclear weapons, of which 4,300 are deployed with operational forces and 1,800 are “kept in a state of high operational alert” – which means they can be launched within a 5 to 15-minute timeframe if necessary.
However, these figures don’t tell the full story. According to the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, five other European nations host US nuclear weapons on their territory as part of a NATO agreement, and 23 additional countries rely on US nuclear capabilities for their national security. Furthermore, the spread of nuclear technology and the illicit trade in nuclear weapons means that any state can potentially develop or purchase nuclear-grade weapons, which confirms the widely held view that a number of other nations unofficially harbour nuclear warheads, and many more could do so in the years ahead.
Fading visions of nuclear disarmament
The abundance of nuclear weapons and related technology highlights the weakness of the international Non-Proliferation Treaty, which has only made limited progress on nuclear disarmament since its inception in 1968 despite near universal membership. With high levels of nuclear stockpiles still in existence, there is also a very real risk of unintended but deadly consequences. According to a report by The Royal Institute of International Affairs, there have been 13 instances of nuclear bombs being ‘accidently’ deployed since 1962 by Russia, the US and other countries – mainly due to technical malfunctions or breakdowns in communication. As international disarmament efforts diminish, such risks are set to increase alongside the growing likelihood of targeted terrorist attacks on existing nuclear facilities.
It’s clear that Trident, like every other nuclear weapons system, is a relic of a bygone age that simply cannot guarantee the safety of any nation at a time when global terrorism and climate change pose a far more urgent threat to national security than other states with nuclear weapons. As the columnist Simon Jenkins puts it, “All declared threats to Britain tend to come either from powers with no conceivable designs on conquering Britain or from forces immune to deterrence.” Indeed, most countries of the world (including 25 NATO states) don’t maintain their own nuclear stockpiles, and yet they have been just as successful in ‘deterring’ nuclear war as the UK.
Moreover, the International Court of Justice has ruled that the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law, which means that their use would be illegal in virtually any situation. Given that it is close to unimaginable that a so-called world leader would ever deploy nuclear weapons (on ethical and legal grounds, as well as for fear of retaliatory consequences) their value as an effective deterrent is unjustifiable and deeply flawed. The farcical arguments employed to rationalise building and maintaining such weapon systems are amusingly summarised in a Yes, Prime Minister comedy sketch from 1986, which aired soon after Margret Thatcher first inaugurated the Trident missile system in the UK:
Sir Humphrey: With Trident we could obliterate the whole of eastern Europe.
Hacker: I don’t want to obliterate the whole of eastern Europe.
Sir Humphrey: But it’s a deterrent.
Hacker: It’s a bluff. I probably wouldn’t use it.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but they don’t know that you probably wouldn’t.
Hacker: They probably do.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, they probably know that you probably wouldn’t. But they can’t certainly know.
Hacker: They probably certainly know that I probably wouldn’t.
Sir Humphrey: Yes, but even though they probably certainly know that you probably wouldn’t, they don’t certainly know that, although you probably wouldn’t, there is no probability that you certainly would.
Redistributing vital public resources
Given that the nine nuclear-armed governments together spend an astounding $100bn a year on nuclear forces (mainly via private corporations), those who play a significant role in sustaining this appalling industry are also likely to be profiting handsomely from it. In the UK, for example, strong support for renewing Trident comes from the lucrative and influential defence industry as well as the many banks, insurance companies, pension funds and asset managers that invest heavily in companies producing nuclear weapon systems. According to some calculations, 15 percent of members in the UK’s House of Lords “have what can be deemed as 'vested interests' in either the corporations involved in the programme or the institutions that finance them”.
In both moral and economic terms, spending such vast amounts of public money on producing these weapons of mass destruction is tantamount to theft as long as austerity-driven governments profess to lack the funding needed to safeguard basic human needs and ensure that all people have sufficient access to essential public services. While estimates for the cost of renewing Trident vary considerably, it is likely that the initial outlay will be in the region of £30-40bn ($42-56bn), although this figure could rise to as much as £167bn ($234bn) over the course of its lifetime.
Rather than wasting these vast sums on the inhumane machinery of warfare, some of it could be used to provide emergency assistance to desperate refugees and asylum seekers that the Tory government has shamefully neglected, or to shore up overseas aid budgets that are being syphoned away to cover domestic refugee-related expenses. As the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) calculate, if £100bn ($140bn) from the Trident budget was spent bolstering vital public services instead, it would be enough to “fully fund A&E services for 40 years, employ 150,000 new nurses, build 1.5 million affordable homes, build 30,000 new primary schools, or cover tuition fees for 4 million students.”
In light of the pressing need to decommission nuclear stockpiles and redistribute public resources in a way that truly serves the (global) common good, the upcoming vote in the UK Parliament on renewing Trident presents an important opportunity for campaigners and concerned citizens to raise our voice for a just and peaceful future. Many thousands of protesters are expected to unite on the streets of London this Saturday 27th February in a joint demand to end the UK’s Trident program and share public resources more equitably. As CND point out in their scrap trident campaign, it's high time the UK government complies with its obligation under international law to eliminate our nuclear arsenal: “By doing so we would send a message to the world that spending for peace and development and meeting people’s real needs is our priority, not spending on weapons of mass destruction.”