19 Jul 2016

German parliament expands law on sexual crimes

Christoph Vandreier

On July 7, the German parliament unanimously passed a massive expansion of the law covering sexual crimes. This legislation represents an escalation of a deliberate campaign to exploit an emotionally charged issue with the aim of strengthening the state and scapegoating refugees.
The revision of paragraph 177 of the criminal law code prescribes a punishment of up to five years in prison for sexual behaviour contrary to the “manifest wishes of another person.” The wishes of a person can be communicated through statements, but also through facial or bodily gestures.
The media has defended this change with the claim that it was previously necessary for the victim to actively defend him or herself for the legal definition of rape to be satisfied. This is false. In actuality, the legal definition of rape previously required the presence of coercion—that is, either violence had to be exercised, posing danger to life and limb, or the victim had to be in a defenceless state. So-called conclusive action could also fit the definition of coercion. That is, coercion was already considered to be present if the victim was able to tell from suggestions, gestures or glances from the perpetrator that he or she would be threatened with violence for not complying.
In fact, the change in the paragraphs on rape has a different purpose. Whereas coercion was previously defined in a way that was at least somewhat objective, its previous definition is now being replaced with the vague formulation “manifest wish.” It remains entirely unclear under what circumstances a wish is “manifest,” who determines how it is manifested and whether the perpetrator himself recognises it.
Even the president of the German Judges Association, Jens Gnisa, criticised the law in the Osnabrücker Zeitung for not being formulated clearly enough. As a consequence, it is “to be feared that there will be serious problems with the application of the new requirements in this sensitive area of criminal law.”
In reality, the paragraph is purposely vague. “Heiko Maas is a minister of justice, who loves very vague criminal law,” commented the left-liberal criminal lawyer Monika Frommel on Deutschlandradio Kultur. “Accordingly the aim is not lead to a punishment at all, but rather legal paragraphs.” The replacement of a clear definition of coercion with the violation of a “manifest wish” not only makes it easier to press charges and initiate an investigation, but opens the floodgates to whims on the part of judges.
Along with the creation of such empty paragraphs, the new law on sexual crimes massively expands what is considered a criminal act. The criminal act of “sexual harassment” in paragraph 184 is entirely new. Someone who touches another person on the behind, breast or genitals, without sexual coercion, can now be punished with a fine or a prison term of up to two years. Previously, such behaviour was dealt with as an insult.
The character of the changes in the legislation is especially clear in two additions that have been included, at short notice, in the new law. Paragraph 184j now says: “Anyone who belongs to a group of people who throng around someone in order to commit a crime will be punished with a fine or prison sentence of up to five years, if a member of this group commits a crime according to paragraph 177, 184 I StGB.”
This is a fundamental attack on basic democratic rights. The issue here is not one of premeditated conspiracy or accessory, which are already punishable anyway. It is about, for example, a case in which a group decides to steal a smartphone. While the victim is surrounded, a member of the group commits sexual harassment without the knowledge or endorsement of the others. Although the other members of the group have nothing to do with this crime, they can all be punished for it. This cannot be reconciled with the principles of the rule of law, but instead recalls collective punishment.
The German parliament linked the redrafting of paragraph 177 to the reactionary deportation law passed in February of this year. This law, which made it easier to deport refugees, included a rule according to which certain crimes can result to a so-called serious interest in deportation, regardless of the severity of the imprisonment imposed for the crime itself. This law was applied even to youth and was applied, in particular, in cases of sexual offence.
The rule was originally used in conjunction with the old version of paragraph 177. However, the German parliament has now decided that it should be applied in conjunction with the changed law. Since the new law not only covers coercion, but also lesser offences, an unwelcome kiss from a youth could conceivably lead to deportation. On the other hand, theft can only lead to deportation in cases of repeat offence.
The deportation rule is the real motivation behind all of the changes to the law on sexual offences. The purpose was never to protect people from sexual attacks. Back in January 2015, criminal lawyer Monika Frommel argued convincingly that the criminal law in this sensitive area is also of little help to the victims in borderline cases. She pleaded instead for civil rights protections against harsher criminal punishments.
More generally, social problems such as petty crime, street violence or sexual assaults cannot be solved with more severe punishments and the strengthening of the state. Rather, the militarisation and brutalisation of society serves as the breeding ground for such problems, and growing social inequality and ever more aggressive war policies produce such perpetrators.
The extreme right has always specialised in the exploitation of these emotionally charged issues in order to portray social problems in terms of individual responsibility and to call for a strengthening of the state. The fascist NPD regularly leads campaigns under the motto “defence of victims instead of defence of perpetrators” or “maximum penalty for child abusers.” The far-right “Citizens Movement for Germany” attacks this “soft justice” and demands preventive detention for all sexual offenders.
Such initiatives have now become acceptable to broad sections of the political establishment. The new legislation represents an escalation of the campaign to combine racist propaganda against refugees with the demand for a strong state.
This campaign commenced with the so-called “events in Cologne,” which were purposely exaggerated by the media in order to create a mood hostile to refugees. As before, there is no proof that anything more took place on New Year’s Eve at the main train station in Cologne than the type of attacks, theft and vulgar behaviour that unfortunately frequently accompany such large events.
A half-year later, the Federal Criminal Police Office (BKA) has now published a report acknowledging that only 120 suspects have been charged in the entire country because of the events in Cologne and similar events in other cities. Of these 120, just 4 people have been found guilty so far. The police could find no evidence of criminal conspiracy to commit these crimes. Nevertheless, the BKA claims that an estimated 2,000 people took part in the attacks, half of whom have not lived in Germany more than a year. How the police can claim to be able to determine how long people they are unable to identify have lived in the country remains a mystery.
However, all of the large newspapers have published the BKA numbers and quoted the head of the agency, Holger Münch, who said that there was “a connection between the emergence of this phenomenon and the large immigration numbers in 2015.” Immediately following New Year’s Eve, the same newspaper published racist articles and caricatures that showed black men sexually assaulting white women.
Representatives of all of the parties in parliament have taken part in the campaign. The faction leader of the Left Party, Sahra Wagenknecht, said with regard to Cologne: “Anyone who abuses the right to hospitality has forfeited the right to hospitality,” and demanded the deportation of criminal refugees.
The Green Party mayor of Tübingen, Boris Palmer, remarked to Die Welt on the BKA report that the attacks in Cologne were “something fundamentally different” from similar attacks during Oktoberfest, since the perpetrators came under the protection of a large flux of refugees to Germany. “The New Year’s Eve attacks have something to do with taking in refugees without registration and oversight,” he said. “One has to be able to say this sentence without having to hear immediately: then join the AfD [Alternative for Germany]!” said Palmer.
Given the clear unity among these parties, it is no wonder that the new law was passed without any opposition. The Greens and the Left Party abstained. Both of these parties explained that changes had been added that they did not wish to support openly. Nevertheless, they said that they fully supported the expansion of the law on sexual crimes.
In reality, both parties have played a central role in the entire campaign. They have mobilised feminist organisations to call for harsher punishments. The new law does not strengthen the rights of women, however, but rather that of the social apparatus.
The fact that all of the parties worked together on this legislation is a result of growing social tension. The political elite is reacting to the intensification of class opposition by closing ranks, strengthening the state and discarding the last remnants of its liberal sentiments.

Doctors strike against Papua New Guinea government

John Braddock

Opposition to the Papua New Guinea (PNG) government of Prime Minister Peter O’Neill escalated on Monday, with doctors declaring they would only attend emergency cases until parliament meets again on Friday.
Following an order by the country’s Supreme Court, parliament sat last Friday for the tabling of an opposition motion of no-confidence in O’Neill, before adjourning for a week when the vote will take place. The ruling was a sign of sharpening tensions within the PNG elite under conditions of spiralling social turmoil. The court declared that repeated government attempts to block previous no-confidence motions posed “a real threat to parliamentary democracy,” and warned of legal sanctions if its decision was not implemented.
After meeting over the weekend with pilots, maritime workers and energy workers, the National Doctors Association supported demands that O’Neill stand down to face questioning over allegations of corruption. Doctors’ consultations and non-urgent medical procedures have been cancelled. “This will affect ordinary citizens,” association secretary Sam Yockopua warned, “but we need to place pressure on our politicians at a time of dire need.” Nurses will continue to work but many services will be shut.
The association is also demanding the restoration of public health funds, which have been slashed by up to 40 percent amid drastic government austerity measures. Yockopua declared on Facebook that PNG is facing “catastrophic meltdown” from the combination of “corruption with financial debt, slashing of health sector funding, and diminished production of health workers.”
The broadening opposition movement follows almost two months of protests and class boycotts at three universities, culminating in the police shooting of demonstrators at the University of Papua New Guinea campus on June 8. The student protest movement was suppressed, but the academic year was cancelled on July 5 after authorities failed to force a resumption of classes.
Since last Wednesday, “sick-outs” by airline pilots have caused ongoing disruptions to air services, with thousands of people stranded by grounded or delayed domestic and international flights. With air transport the principal means of travel around the country, the pilots’ stoppages are having a major impact.
Pilots have stopped work in response to an appeal by an opposition grouping, the Concerned Citizens Coalition (CCC), which includes aviation workers, lawyers and union officials. Spokesman and lawyer Moses Murray told Radio NZ: “I would not prefer the word strike.” Instead, pilots and doctors simply “exercised their conscience not to attend work.” Murray emphasised that the protests were “peaceful” and not intended to disrupt essential services.
Despite attempts by the protest and union leaderships to limit industrial action by the working class, opposition among key sections of workers is intensifying. Radio New Zealand reported that port workers are deliberately working slowly, in defiance of “advice” by the Maritime and Transport Workers unions not to take part in the protests.
Already this year, the doctors’ union has ended strikes at Lae General Hospital, including a two-week sit-in by senior staff and nurses in March. Complaints revealed there had been no microbiology unit for 13 years in the hospital, the operating theatre had been closed for eight months, the blood test section had been shut for six months and the blood bank crippled for a year. Many issues remain unresolved despite a government “inquiry.”
The protests are taking place in defiance of government threats to mobilise the police and armed forces to suppress any strike action. The newly-formed National Joint Security Taskforce, which includes the defence force and the national intelligence organisation, and operates under the command of the police commissioner, has been ordered to take action to counter civil unrest and “threats against the State.”
O’Neill’s Peoples National Congress party, with around 50 MPs, remains the largest party in the parliament. However, while the government still has a commanding majority, it is increasingly beleaguered.
Over 70 pro-government MPs have gone on a retreat this week at Alotau, the capital of Milne Bay Province on the far southeastern tip of the country, where they will stay until parliament resumes. The main purpose of the retreat is to corral members of the fragile governing coalition and keep them in lock-down, away from both popular pressure and lobbying efforts by the opposition.
The opposition parties claim to have 30 of the 56 MPs required to pass a no-confidence vote. Last Friday, four New Generation Party (NGP) members joined government minister Ben Micah and his Peoples Progress Party in defecting to the opposition. NGP leader Bire Kimisopa said the state of the economy, nationwide protests, and O’Neill’s evasion of corruption charges led to his decision to cross the floor. An opposition spokesperson said more MPs quit the government on Saturday.
A prominent opposition figure is former prime minister Michael Somare, who was a member of the pro-government National Alliance Party until late last year. Last week, he described PNG as “heading down an uncertain, slippery road, led by a man behaving increasingly like a dictator, showing total disregard for the law.” He repeated his previous demand that O’Neill resign.
International and domestic business interests are expressing alarm at the political instability swirling around the O’Neill government and over the rapidly deteriorating economy. China’s Xinhua news agency reported on June 30 that business confidence has been “rocked” by a combination of events stemming from the slumping oil and gas prices and spiralling government debt. The PNG kina has fallen 14.6 percent since July 2014, but analysts predict it needs to fall another 40 percent for exports to become competitive.
Opposition leader Don Polye declared he is confident of ousting O’Neill and forming a new government on Friday. The opposition, however, has no fundamental disagreement with the austerity agenda being imposed. Polye was O’Neill’s treasurer until 2014 and played a critical role in cutting social spending and attacking living standards.
None of PNG’s immense economic and social problems can be addressed, let alone resolved, simply by replacing O’Neill with another representative of the ruling class. Like the students, workers need a fundamentally different political strategy to that pursued by the trade unions, establishment political parties and civic organisations. The only means of defending the social and democratic rights of the working class and youth is on the basis of a socialist and internationalist perspective.

US and Germany livid over failure of Turkish coup

Peter Schwarz

Judging by the reactions of the American and German governments to the failed coup in Turkey, there can be no doubt that they supported the rebels politically and had hoped for their success.
Washington, like Berlin, allowed much time to pass before tersely condemning the coup, only speaking out unequivocally when it was clear that the rebels had failed.
The first to speak on the night of the coup was US Secretary of State John Kerry, who issued a statement from Moscow at 11pm, local time. At that point, it looked as if the coup might succeed and Kerry was at pains to avoid speaking definitively.
He called in general terms for “stability and continuity within Turkey.” Only after Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had called via FaceTime for the people to resist, half an hour later, and the situation had begun to turn, did Kerry and President Barack Obama call for support for the “democratically elected government of Turkey.”
The German government waited even longer. Only early on Saturday, at 1:00 in the morning German time, did government spokesman Steffen Seibert send a brief message on Twitter calling for respect for democratic order and the protection of human lives. Later on Saturday morning, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier piped up and condemned “any attempt to alter the democratic order in Turkey by force.” In the afternoon, Chancellor Angela Merkel condemned the coup attempt in a brief statement to the press.
One might have expected that an armed insurrection within the ranks of the second-largest NATO military, with which both the American and German armed forces collaborate in the military alliance’s command structure and in daily war missions, would have unleashed a storm of condemnation, comment and debate. But nothing of the sort occurred.
Since the brief statements offering a pro forma defence of democracy were issued, the criticism from politicians and media outlets has been directed almost exclusively against the target of the attempted coup, Turkish President Erdogan. The American and German ruling elites are angry that Erdogan is purging the state and military apparatus of their agents and using the failed coup to act against his internal opponents and strengthen his right-wing Islamist supporters.
It is inconceivable that the Turkish officers would have dared launch the coup without support and encouragement from the American and German sides. Tensions between the government of President Erdogan and both Washington and Berlin have intensified in recent weeks—over the Kurdish question, the Syrian war and rapprochement between Turkey and Russia.
However, the rebels and those pulling the strings had clearly miscalculated. For reasons that are not yet clear, the putsch went awry. Those leading it had likely underestimated the public support Erdogan could mobilize.
Had the coup succeeded, Washington and Berlin would have supported it, as they had backed the 2014 coup in Ukraine and the bloody counterrevolution in Egypt the previous year. If Erdogan were now sitting in prison, like former Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi, who was also elected democratically, they would not be expressing a single democratic scruple. They have raised the question of democracy only now that it suits their political calculations.
While criticisms of the rebels are hardly to be heard, politicians on both sides of the Atlantic are warning the Turkish regime against “revenge, acting arbitrarily and the misuse of power,” and urging observance of the “rule of law and democratic principles.”
Following a meeting with the foreign ministers of the European Union, Kerry indirectly warned Turkey on Monday that it might lose its NATO membership if the government continued to act against its political opponents. “NATO membership supposes respect for democratic principles,” he announced.
Merkel, who exhibited no scruples in reaching a dirty deal with Erdogan on the return of refugees from war-ravaged countries, threatened an immediate end to EU accession talks if the Turkish government acted upon its threats and reintroduced the death penalty.
The media is playing a particularly cynical role in this campaign, pumping out government propaganda and making no secret of its sympathy for the rebels.
In an editorial headlined “The Countercoup in Turkey,” the New York Timescentred its fire on Erdogan and his government’s post-coup crackdown on political opponents. Barely concealing its surprise and disappointment over the failure of the putsch, the newspaper wrote: “Mr. Erdogan has been no friend to free expression, ruthlessly asserting control over the news media and restricting human rights and free speech. Yet thousands responded to his appeal, turning back the rebels and demonstrating that they still value democracy, even if Mr. Erdogan has eroded its meaning.” Die Welt published an editorial titled “Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the eternal victim,” in which it bluntly asked, “Isn’t it the case that the only reproach that can be made of the rebels is that they failed?” Although the newspaper answered “No,” it did not do so on democratic grounds, but because “one coup merely brings the next coup” and a military seizure of power creates martyrs.
The Welt am Sonntag charged the coup officers with amateurism, assigning them a slot “on the top ten list of clumsy coup attempts.” The newspaper concluded by expressing the hope that the next attempt would go better: “When Erdogan has firmly installed his Islamic presidential dictatorship, it could happen that those who yesterday blocked the way for the tanks will wish for a pragmatic military interregnum to reestablish Kemalist democracy.”
The conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung castigated the rebels’ dilettantism under the headline “Why the coup failed.” It offered advice on how to better manage things next time.
“The most important immediate question,” wrote Rainer Herrmann, “is how could an army that can look back on a long history of ‘successful’ coups undertake such a dilettantish attempt to seize power.”
“If the coup leaders wanted to be successful,” he continued, “they should have tried to take immediate control of the most important state institutions. Like their predecessors, they should have eliminated the civilian apex of the state.”
Herrmann expressly supported the aims of the rebels. Their statement, he wrote, contained points “which most critics of Erdogan and his government under Binali Yıldırım could support.” However, the rebels had failed to present “a road map or a programme for the coming months.”
But this could be rectified. “The attempted coup was defeated. However, the discontent in other sections of the army and police—responsible for public security outside the large cities—remains.”
Other articles accused Erdogan of staging the coup himself in order to create a pretext for the establishment of a personal dictatorship. Politico in the US wrote: “Some Western officials and analysts predict the thwarted coup will become Erdogan’s ‘Reichstag fire,’ a reference to the 1933 arson in Germany’s parliament that served as Hitler’s justification for suspending civil liberties, beginning the Nazi dictatorship.” Junge Welt, which is close to the German Left Party, also described the coup as possibly a “Turkish Reichstag fire.” The abortive putsch was “a further stage in Erdogan’s long-planned coup,” it wrote.
Kerry, Steinmeier and other ruthless defenders of imperialist interests stood behind the coup. The sensitivity of American interests involved is indicated by the fact that Incirlik airbase, one of the centres of the rebels, stores 50 American nuclear warheads.
Erdogan is a reactionary politician with authoritarian ambitions. But the settling of accounts with him is the task of the Turkish and international working class, not the Turkish military and imperialist powers. Not least, the coup attempt was aimed at pre-empting such a movement from below. Had the coup succeeded, the military would have detained tens of thousands of militant workers, as in previous military takeovers, torturing and murdering them, without Washington or Berlin blinking an eye.

Mapping out the Dhaka Gulshan Attack

Angshuman Choudhury


The current narrative of the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) surrounding the 1 July terror attack at Dhaka’s Gulshan area is premised on the assumption that there is no presence of the Islamic State (IS) in Bangladesh. The attack was directly claimed by the IS through its official news agency, Amaq. Attributing responsibility to ‘home-grown entities’ like the Jama’at ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and Ansar al-Islam (affiliate of al Qaeda), GoB argues that the attacks were meant to ‘destabilise’ the sitting government. While it may be partially correct in stating the role of domestic groups, the assumption is oversimplified, which ignores vital details of the attack.
This analysis will argue that the different indicators of the Gulshan attack point towards the emergence of new tactics that could suggest an evolving dynamic of Islamist extremism in Bangladesh.
GoB’s denial of IS involvement in Bangladesh is not new, having previously gone out of its way to deny IS involvement in a series of targeted attacks against religious-sectarian minorities, foreigners and secularists, despite the fact that the group has claimed responsibility for more than 20 such killings since December 2015. Furthermore, in April 2016, IS’ monthly propaganda magazine, Dabiq, claimed the establishment of a “regional branch of the Caliphate in Bangladesh, headed by an ‘Amīr” by the name Shaykh Abu Ibrahim al-Hanif. The interview with al-Hanif discussed the strategic importance of Bangladesh in expanding IS’ jihadist agenda. More crucially, Bangladesh’ foreign intelligence, Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI), has already stated that more than 1,000 Bangladeshi nationals have travelled to Iraq/Syria to join IS, and about 25 of them have returned to Bangladesh.

What Makes the Gulshan Attack Different?
The Gulshan attack was based on the recent Istanbul and Paris template of suicide-style attacks, as opposed to the signature modus operandi in Bangladesh, which targets one individual, and the perpetrators are intent on escaping. The only other attack that has come close in style was a suicide bombing attack, also claimed by IS, on an Ahmadi mosque in Rajshahi on 26 December 2015. By this virtue alone, the Gulshan attacks may signal the emergence of a new offensive orientation within domestic jihadist networks or the direct penetration of IS into Bangladesh.
The attack also seems to be a synthesis of older al Qaeda and newer IS tactics as the attackers singled out non-Muslims from Muslims before killing the former. This is not IS’ signature modus operandi, but is closer to the methods employed by al Qaeda (and its affiliates). The latter has repeatedly condemned the former for its wholesale mass slaughter tactics. This could point towards involvement of the locally-based Ansar.
Third, the attack was a significantly more sophisticated assault than previous attacks in Bangladesh. The use of semi-automatic AK-22 assault rifles and IEDs is unusual for Bangladesh’s terror landscape. However, while relatively sophisticated weapons were used to storm the bakery, the actual killings were done with machetes – a common thread in previous attacks in Bangladesh. Past arms seizures from JMB or Ansar in the last few years have largely been of crude weapons, with a single AK-22 featuring in a seizure on 27 April from Bogra district. Another attack, on a Shiite Mosque in the same district, claimed by the IS, involved machine guns.
Finally the fact that all the attackers came from privileged backgrounds was a significant difference from normal JMB recruits who tend to come from low-income demographics in the countryside.
A related question that arises is regarding the 7 July crude bomb and pistol attack outside a large Eid congregation in a Sunni mosque in Kishoreganj. No one claimed the attack, just like the Istanbul airport attack. Turkey too is a Sunni majority country. This fits in perfectly with IS’s targeting of ‘takfiri’ (non-believer) Sunnis and not claiming responsibility. All of this means that past operating patterns have been broken and a new synthesis of offensive patterns is emerging, which seem atypical of domestic terror groups in Bangladesh. In early 2016, intelligence agencies in Bangladesh warned of the formation of “JMB sleeper cells” with “highly educated members and technology experts” in the north of the country. These groups now somehow seem to have morphed into ‘wolf-packs’ pledging their allegiance to the IS and improvising tactics while being fundamentally domestic in nature.

Conclusion
The above analysis strengthens the criticism that the current ‘home-grown terror’ narrative of the government of Bangladesh is tunnel-visioned and reductive. The Gulshan attack, in combination with the subsequent Kishoreganj mosque attack, seems to bear a common link to a newly emerging prototype of ‘glocal’ (global + local) jihad, currently in use by the IS, which is different from the earlier tactics employed by groups like al Qaeda.
For Bangladesh, the attacks signal a reorientation of extremist networks, or a form of ‘reorganised terror’ that is neither foreign nor home-grown, but rather a convenient fusion of both at a dual tactical-ideological level. Clearly, ‘home-grown terror’ is an inadequate classification for this new kind of hybrid terrorism, which demands a broader understanding of a new form of expansionist global jihad.

South China Sea: China’s Double Speak and Verdict at The Hague

Vijay Shankar


When Premier Xi rubbished the 12 July 2016 verdict of the International Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague on China’s claims over most of the South China Sea, what exactly was meant? For no international justice system had thus far ever called China to order for its expansionist strategy.

What The Hague had in fact done was not only to uphold the case filed by the Philippines in 2013, after China seized a reef in the Scarborough Shoal; but also condemned China’s conduct in the South China Sea (SCS) over construction of artificial islands and setting up military infrastructure. In an unequivocal rebuke,it found China’s expansive claim to sovereignty over the waters had no legal basis, historical or otherwise. The verdict gives motivation to the governments of Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam and Taiwan to pursue their maritime disputes with Beijing in the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA). Small wonder then is Premier Xi’s fulmination. 

The central issue before the PCA was the legality of China’s claim to waters within a so-called “nine-dash line” that appears on official Chinese charts. It encircles 90 per cent of the SCS, an area of 1.9 million square kilometres approximately equal to the combined areas of Afghanistan, Pakistan and Myanmar put together. Philippines’ contention was that China’s claims were in violation of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which both China and the Philippines have ratified. In its decision, the tribunal said any historic rights to the sea that China claimed “were extinguished” by the treaty. And its failure to be a party to the deliberations in no way bars the proceedings. The UNCLOS lays out rules for drawing zones of control over the world’s oceans and seas based on coastal orientation, while the concept of Historic Waters means waters that are treated as internal waters where there is no right of innocent passage.

As far as the “nine-dash line” (originally eleven-dash) is concerned; following the surrender of Japan in 1945, China produced a proprietorship chart titled "Position of the South China Sea Islands" that showed an eleven-dash line around the islands. This map was published by the Republic of China government in February 1948. It did not hold onto this position after it fled to Taiwan. The Chinese Communist Party, however,persisted with this cartographic notion, modifying the 11 to 9 dashes when in 1957, China ceded Bailongwei Island in the Gulf of Tonkin to North Vietnam. 
Map: The Nine Dash Line 
The PCA concluded that China had never exercised exclusive authority over the waters and that several disputed rocks and reefs in the SCS were too small for China to claim control of economic activities in the waters around them. As a result, it found China outside the law in as much as activities in Philippine waters are concerned. The tribunal cited China’s construction of artificial islands on the Mischief Reef and the Spratly archipelago as illegal in addition to the military facilities thereon which were all in Philippine waters.

The episode has besmirched the image of Xi Jinping, his politburo and indeed the credibility of the Communist Party of China (CPC). To lose their legal case for sovereignty over waters that they have heavily invested in must come as a rude shock to their global aspirations. A complaisant response may set into motion the unravelling of the CPC’s internal hold on the state as defence of maritime claims is central to the CPC’s narrative. Any challenge to this account is seen in Beijing as a challenge to the Party’s rule. But the die has been cast; it remains to be seen how more regions and neighbours respond to China’s unlawful claims wherever it is perceived to exist. An indication of the regional response was Vietnam’s immediate endorsement of the tribunal’s decision.

Thus far China has responded sardonically with a typical Cold War propagandist style avowal. “We do not claim an inch of land that does not belong to us, but we won’t give up any patch that is ours. The activities of the Chinese people in the South China Sea date back to over 2,000 years ago” said the front-page in the People’s Daily, which ridiculed the tribunal as a “lackey of some outside forces” that would be remembered as a “laughingstock in human history.” Such dippy doublespeak has no place in contemporary geopolitics. For China to do nothing about the matter will be difficult in the extreme. It does not take a political pundit to note that some form of immediate coercive military manoeuvre in the SCS is in the offing. Also, it would hardly be realistic to expect China to scurry away to dismantle the military infrastructure it has so far set up; more likely it is their revisionist policies that would be reviewed.

Towards the end of the Cultural Revolution, in 1976, China brought out a movie titled "Great Wall in the South China Sea;" it was  not about the inward looking narrative of Chinese civilisation but of  “expansive conquests that would knit together all of South East Asia.” The Hague’s verdict has grievously injured the latter strategy. And if the free world is to rein in China’s bid to rewrite the rule books, including the right to unimpeded passage in the SCS, then it would do well to convince her of the illegitimacy of her position. In the meantime, Indian diplomacy should promote the littorals of the SCS to seek arbitration for their maritime disputes with China at The Hague.

18 Jul 2016

INSEAD MBA Endowed Scholarship for Students in Mauritius 2017/2018

Brief description: INSEAD Business School is offering scholarship to Mauritian students to pursue full-time MBA programme.
Application Timeline:
  • Applications Open: 18 July 2016
  • Deadline: 3 August 2016
Offered annually? Yes
Eligible Countries: Mauritius
To be taken at (country): France
Eligible Field of Study: MBA courses
About the Award: A group of prominent business players in Mauritius created an endowed scholarship in 2015 so that young Mauritians admitted to the full-time MBA programme can qualify for financial support for their studies. The donors to this scholarship believe in the value of tertiary education and most have themselves followed a business course at INSEAD. The founding supporters of the scholarship are: Renaud Lagesse MBA’93D, Gilbert Espitalier-Noël MBA’90J, Antoine Delaporte MBA’ 88D, Raoul Harel, Currimjee Jeewanjee & Co. Ltd., Taylor Smith & Sons Ltd and Kingston Asset Management Ltd. One scholarship will be awarded each year.
Offered Since: 2015
Type: MBA
Eligibility: Candidates who are Mauritian nationals who are admitted to the full-time MBA programme may apply. Preference will awarded to those residing and working in Mauritius prior to the start of the MBA programme and in particular to candidates who are likely to return to Mauritius in the foreseeable future. The scholarship is awarded to candidates who demonstrate that they will benefit from financial assistance.
Number of Awardees: Not specified
Value of Scholarship: 10 000 EUR
Duration of Scholarship: Full-time
How to Apply: Complete Need-based Scholarship application and essay questions.
  • In approximately 350 words provide a concise but accurate description of your financial circumstances as well as your budget for the year at INSEAD. How do you expect to finance your studies if you do not obtain a scholarship from INSEAD? Why INSEAD should consider you for a need-based scholarship? What amount do you consider appropriate? Please do not forget to submit a number of supporting documents as required.
  • Only if you would like to be considered for the IAF Special Profile scholarships, please answer the following question in no more than 400 words: Briefly describe an instance or aspect in your life to date that has made you stand out amongst your peers or that you consider exceptional in one way or another.
Award Provider:  INSEAD Business School

INSEAD Nelson Mandela Endowed Scholarship for Sub-Saharan Africa 2017

Application Deadline: 3rd August 2016(for January 2017) and 7th November 2016 (for August 2017) | Offered annually?: Yes
Eligible Countries: Sub-Saharan Africans
To be taken at (country): INSEAD Business School (With campuses in France, Singapore and Abu Dhabi)
Brief description
The Nelson Mandela Endowed Scholarship is offered for candidates who are nationals of a sub-Saharan African country and have spent a substantial part of their lives and received part of their prior education in Africa. Preference will be given to candidates who require proven financial assistance.
To honour the life and work of President Nelson Mandela of South Africa, the INSEAD MBA Class of ’75 created an endowment at their 30th Class Reunion to provide financial support for one or more African participants per year at INSEAD in perpetuity. At their 5th reunion the Class of ’01J contributed to this important scholarship fund, as did the Class of ’97D on the occasion of their 10th reunion and the Class of ’69 at their 40th reunion.
INSEAD Business schoolEligible Field of Study: Masters in Business Administration
Eligibility Criteria
By way of their interests, activities and accomplishments candidates for this scholarship will need to demonstrate:
  • outstanding academic achievement and promise
  • aptitude for business and financial management
  • strong likelihood of spending the better part of their working careers in Africa and
  • a firm commitment to the goals of African development, understanding amongst peoples and public interest.
  • In awarding scholarships, INSEAD shall particularly seek candidates from southern Africa.
To be eligible for the Nelson Mandela Endowed Scholarship, candidates must be a national of a sub-Saharan African country and have spent a substantial part of their lives and received part of their prior education in Africa. Preference will be given to candidates who require proven financial assistance.
Essay topic
1).In 350-400 words state why you wish to undertake the INSEAD MBA and why you feel it is relevant to your particular educational needs. Furthermore, explain how you envisage contributing to the future development of your country after graduation and discuss why you should be selected as the Nelson Mandela scholar in your class.
2).In 200 words analyse what you consider to be the most significant issue relating to the society, politics, economics, or culture of your country or region today.
3).In 150-200 words provide a concise but accurate description of your financial circumstances as well as a cash flow forecast for the year at INSEAD.
Number of Scholarships: Not Specified
Value of Scholarship: Up to €20,000
Duration of Scholarship: 10 to 12 months
How to Apply
Visit Scholarship Webpage for application details

INSEAD Business School Scholarship for Needy Students 2017/2018

Brief description:  INSEAD Business School is offering scholarships to prospective students  for admission into 2017/2018 programmes who can adequately demonstrate financial need.
Application Deadline: 3rd August 2016(for January 2017) and 7th November 2016 (for August 2017)
Offered annually? Yes
Eligible Countries: None. Country of origin, academic and professional background, gender are disregarded.
To be taken at (country): France
Eligible Field of Study: MBA courses
About the Award: On the occasion of their 25th Class reunion, The Class of MBA’89J established this endowed scholarship in memory of their late classmate Glen Jones. The scholarship will help underwrite the breadth of diversity of participants in the INSEAD MBA programme: country of origin, academic and professional background, gender etc. The scholarship supports INSEAD’s commitment to bringing outstanding men and women professionals to the programme, especially those who demonstrate the need for financial assistance.
Offered Since: 2016
Type: MBA
Eligibility: Candidates admitted to the MBA Programme or invited to admissions interviews and demonstrating financial need.
Number of Awardees: Not specified
Value of Scholarship: 10 000 EUR
Duration of Scholarship: Full-time
How to Apply: Complete Need-based Scholarship application and essay questions.
  • In approximately 350 words provide a concise but accurate description of your financial circumstances as well as your budget for the year at INSEAD. How do you expect to finance your studies if you do not obtain a scholarship from INSEAD? Why INSEAD should consider you for a need-based scholarship? What amount do you consider appropriate? Please do not forget to submit a number of supporting documents as required.
  • Only if you would like to be considered for the IAF Special Profile scholarships, please answer the following question in no more than 400 words: Briefly describe an instance or aspect in your life to date that has made you stand out amongst your peers or that you consider exceptional in one way or another.
Award Provider: INSEAD Business School

African Humanities Research Fund for African Students 2017/2018

Application Deadline: January 2017 (annual) |
Offered annually? Yes
Scholarship Name: ORISHA DPhil Scholarship (African Humanities Research Fund)
Brief description: The African Studies Committee offers ORISHA DPhil Scholarships in Humanities for Africans Students who will be registered as Graduate Students of the Oxford University in Africa 2016-2017
Accepted Subject Areas: Students may be registered in any of the following disciplines: African Studies, Social and Cultural Anthropology, Archaeology, Development Studies, History, Human Geography, Literature, Politics and International Relations, Religious Studies. Proposals must include a major focus on Africa.
About Scholarship
The African Studies Committee invites applications for the ORISHA Studentship for research in the Humanities in Africa from persons who will be registered as graduate students of the UniversityUniversity of Oxford
Scholarship Offered Since: DPhil Scholarships for Africans
Who is qualified to apply?
Students from African countries are strongly encouraged to apply.
Applicants for the scholarship may be new candidates for admission to the University, or already registered as graduate students.
The scholarship can only be awarded to a student who has been accepted for study at the University.
How Many Scholarships are available? Not Specified
What are the benefits?
The scholarship will cover college and university fees and a maintenance allowance.
How long will sponsorship last?
The award is available for three-year doctoral degrees. Renewal for two and three year periods is subject to satisfactory progress.
Eligible Developing Countries: African students
To be taken at (country): University of Oxford
How to Apply
Those applying to the University for the first time should ensure that their application for entry is made before the second application deadline.
The scholarship alternates between St Cross and St Antony’s College. New and continuing students should name St Antony’s College as their college of first choice on their University and scholarship application form.
Please email a cover letter clearly stating the Department you have applied.
Visit Scholarship Webpage for more details
Sponsors: The African Studies Committee
Important Notes: The University of Oxford academic admissions procedure is separate from that for this scholarship.
This email should be received by the  Administrator, African Studies Centre,African.Studies@africa.ox.ac.uk by the deadline.

Assessing Bangladesh’s Ground Reality

Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman


Walking down the streets of Gulshan and Mohakhali in the central business district of Dhaka, one can sense a curious mix of chaos and order. Various government offices, private and international donor agencies, conference centres, embassies, shopping malls, hotels, restaurants of almost every major international cuisine and upscale residential colonies dot this area and the business activity here is a mark of the growth aspirations of Bangladeshi society. It was here, by the waterfront, in the Holey Artisan Bakery at Gulshan, that the heart of Dhaka was hit by terror on 1 July 2016. 

It is clear that homegrown terrorism has shown its ugly face in Bangladesh in a violent, sophisticated and calculated manner. All around the world, where such attacks have taken place in recent memory, it has become increasingly convenient to assign responsibility to various terror front organisations and also for such outfits to take responsibility, be it international or domestic ones. However, one needs to dig deeper and find out how young Bangladeshis have come to this juncture, where they have gone to such depths of radicalisation. It is a long and difficult process to unravel the underlying reasons behind such events; instead of merely blaming the Islamic State (IS) for Bangladesh’s recent terror attacks the situation requires a comprehensive assessment of Bangladesh’s ground reality.

Let us shift attention to the height of the Shahbagh movement in February 2013, when Dhaka was in a frenzy of student-led activism and where students and people from all parts of the country converged, demanding capital punishment for the Razakars (a paramilitary force formed by the Pakistani Army in East Pakistan during the Bangladesh Liberation War, 1971) who were accused of leading the brutal killings and rapes during the Bangladesh Liberation Movement. The ruling Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League party and the Shahbagh protestors were politically pitted against the opposition, the Khaleda Zia-led Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and its ally the Jamaat-e-Islami. The political polarisation between important leaders of the Jamaat was intense amidst the sentencing of the Razakars and this led to a subsequent boycotting of the parliamentary elections by the opposition parties, marking a complete breakdown of electoral democracy.

The opposition-led violence in various parts of Bangladesh left the country paralysed, with the city of Dhaka and several pockets of Jamaat influence in the country witnessing spectacular and barbaric incidents of violence. In the political life of Bangladesh, this trend of violence is the main element that has remained unabated ever since; and disturbingly, has taken on a normalisation trend. Such violence, by the use of machetes, blades, swords etc, has come to be seen as the norm in the narrative of political violence in Bangladesh and the government has utterly failed in containing this. The government of Bangladesh has conveniently chosen to blame all the political violence in the country on its main opposition party and the Jamaat.

In recent memory too Mohakhali and Gulshan have witnessed barbaric incidents of political violence, during strikes, bandhs and hartals, with people being slaughtered on the streets. Conference attendees and other international donor agencies’ visitors have had to be ferried from their hotels to central Dhaka in ambulances on such days and this too is seen as normal. The killings of liberal bloggers, LGBTQ+ rights activists, Hindu and Buddhist minorities in various parts of Bangladesh, including Dhaka, have been witness to similar barbaric violent incidents, which have been covered well in the national and international media. The government has failed to contain such sporadic incidents of brutal killings, and this spectre of violence has taken a mindset form.

The terror attacks at Holey Artisan Bakery and the methods used for killing - in addition to using automatic weapons the attackers cut and mutilated the victims with sharp blades and machetes - are indicative of the normalisation of such violent and brutal means in Bangladesh. This has gained dangerous proportions in the post-Shahbagh political polarisation phase, and the recent attacks have shown that young terrorists are taking to such brutal means as a preferred, and in all likelihood, the normal choice to create terror. The government and the civil society in Bangladesh will have to address these underlying manifestations of violent means, and realise that homegrown terror will take shape from what are generally acceptable and normal modes of violent behaviour.

The events have regional implications as well, and can affect India through its porous borders. India must be well prepared, and not wait for such an event to happen. It must engage with Bangladesh in combating terror activities, which have the potential of spreading in the region. Bangladesh should and must wake up to its ground reality, late as it already is, and take effective steps to revert this process of the brutalisation of political violence, which is now being manifested in terror activities. The restoration of faith in a healthy electoral democracy in Bangladesh is also in its best interests and its larger neighbourhood. Terror and its means are evolving, and the approach to understand it and offer solutions must also evolve.

Foreign minister resigns as Maldives political crisis intensifies

Wasantha Rupasinghe

Maldives Foreign Minister Dunya Maumoon resigned from President Abdulla Yameen’s government early this month in protest against the reintroduction of capital punishment.
A former strong supporter of the government, Maumoon’s decision followed the resignation, three weeks earlier, of Home Minister Umar Naseer who announced he will contest the next presidential election in 2018. Thirteen cabinet ministers have now quit the Yameen government since it came to power in November 2013.
The intensifying political crisis of the Maldives government is a direct result of the US-led “pivot” to Asia and its alliance with India, aimed at undermining Chinese influence throughout the region, including in the strategically-located Maldives archipelago and across the Indian Ocean as a whole.
Maumoon’s resignation came three weeks after the Maldives Supreme Court upheld the death sentence of Hussein Humaam, 22, convicted for killing Afrasheem Ali, a high-profile parliamentarian in October 2012. The court rejected a plea by family members of the murdered MP to delay the death penalty because of significant unanswered questions about the investigation into the murder. Political opponents of the government allege that the Maldives judiciary is biased.
In her resignation statement, Maumoon said she had “profound differences of opinion” over the reintroduction of the death penalty and that there were serious questions about “the delivery of justice in Maldives.” The former foreign minister, who voiced no opposition to Yameen’s restoration of the death penalty in May 2014, is responding to criticism by the US and the EU. These concerns have nothing to do with capital punishment, but are over the Yameen government’s political tilt toward China.
Maumoon’s resignation also underscores an increasing rift between her father, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, head of the ruling Maldives Progressive Party (PPM), and President Yameen. The PPM leader has publicly criticised constitutional changes made by the Yameen government in July 2015 to authorise foreign freeholds in the Maldives.
The Indian media noted at the time that these changes would open the way for China to construct military bases in the Maldives. This claim was echoed by the pro-US opposition Maldives Democratic Party (MDP).
Last month, Gayoom called on PPM parliamentarians to vote against Yameen’s amendments to the Tourism Act that would allow the government to lease islands, lagoons and plots of land without a competitive bidding process. While Yameen was able to persuade the MPs to pass the bill, Gayoom’s son, Faris Maumoon Gayoom was expelled from the PPM when he voted against it.
The political bitterness continues, with Gayoom refusing to give Yameen PPM endorsement for the presidential elections due in 2018. In retaliation, Yameen is attempting to remove Gayoom as party president, has sacked Gayoom loyalists from party positions, and initiated an Anti-Graft Commission probe of Gayoom.
Thus far, Gayoom, a pro-US dictator who ruled the Maldives from 1978 until 2008, has not voiced any concern about Yameen’s close relations with Beijing. The country’s relations with China were, in fact, first boosted under the Gayoom administration.
China is now the main investor in the Maldives, building houses, roads and key bridges, including “China-Maldives Friendship Bridge” linking the eastern edge of Male to western Hulhule Island. At the end of 2014, the Maldives joined China’s 21st Century Maritime Silk Road project.
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has increased diplomatic pressure on the Yameen government. Early last year, Modi cancelled a scheduled visit to Male, the Maldives capital, but has sent a host of envoys, including external affairs minister Sushma Swaraj, to the country. In April, Yameen signed an “Action Plan for Defence Cooperation” with India.
Yameen is also facing international and domestic pressure over human rights abuses and the jailing of political opponents, including opposition MDP leader and former President Mohamed Nasheed. Nasheed was jailed for 13 years in 2015 under the country’s anti-terrorism laws for ordering the detention of criminal court Justice Abdulla Mohamed in 2012.
In January, Yameen, under intense pressure from the US and Britain, allowed Nasheed to leave the Maldives, ostensibly for overseas medical treatment. In May Nasheed was granted political asylum by the British government, which is backing his campaign against Yameen.
On June 1, five rival opposition groups, including the MDP, announced the formation of the United Opposition of Maldives (UOM) to remove Yameen. It is urging supporters to overcome their differences in order to “restore” democracy in the country.
Established in London, the UOM has formed a 19-member shadow cabinet and is run by key leaders in exile. These include Yameen’s former defence minister, Mohamed Nazim, and former Maldives vice president Mohamed Jameel Ahmed. It has called on the Indian government to take a more active role in “restoring democracy” in the Maldives and consider imposing sanctions.
Giving voice to India’s growing concern about the escalating political crisis in the Maldives and increasing Chinese influence in the archipelago, an article in the Business Standard commented: “In seeking to balance its geo-strategic interests, along with the need to remain engaged with the Yameen government, India cannot afford to trust Yameen’s enunciation of an ‘India First’ approach. Especially when at stake is India’s influence in the Indian Ocean region.”