When AFRICOM Evaluates Itself, The News Is Grim

Nick Turse

It’s rare to hear one top military commander publicly badmouth another, call attention to his faults, or simply point out his shortcomings. Despite a seemingly endless supply of debacles from strategic setbacks to quagmire conflicts since 9/11, the top brass rarely criticize each other or, even in retirement, utter a word about the failings of their predecessors or successors.  Think of it as the camouflage wall of silence.  You may loathe him.  You may badmouth him behind closed doors.  You may have secretly hoped for his career to implode.  But publicly point out failures?  That’s left to those further down the chain of command.

And yet that’s effectively exactly what newly installed U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) chief, General Thomas Waldhauser, did earlier this year in a statement to the Senate Arms Services Committee (SASC).  It’s just that no one, almost certainly including Waldhauser himself, seemed to notice or recognize it for the criticism it was, including the people tasked with oversight of military operations and those in the media.

Over these last years, the number of personnel, missions, dollars spent, and special ops training efforts as well as drone bases and other outposts on the continent have all multiplied.  At the same time, incoming AFRICOM commanders have been publicly warning about the escalating perils and challenges from terror groups that menace the command’s area of operations.  Almost no one, however — neither those senators nor the media — has raised pointed questions, no less demanded frank answers, about why such crises on the continent have so perfectly mirrored American military expansion.

Asked earlier this year about the difficulties he’d face if confirmed, Waldhauser was blunt: “A major challenge is effectively countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram in Nigeria, al-Shabaab in Somalia, and ISIL in Libya.”

That should have been a déjà vu moment for some of those senators.  Three years earlier, the man previously nominated to lead AFRICOM, General David Rodriguez, was asked the same question.  His reply was suspiciously similar: “A major challenge is effectively countering violent extremist organizations, especially the growth of Mali as an al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb safe haven, Boko Haram in Nigeria, and al-Shabaab in Somalia.”

All that had changed between 2013 and 2016, it seemed, was the addition of one more significant threat.

In the midst of Rodriguez’s 2016 victory lap (as he was concluding 40 years of military service), Waldhauser publicly drew attention to just how ineffective his run as AFRICOM chief had been.  Some might call it unkind — a slap in the face for a decorated old soldier — but perhaps turnabout is fair play.  After all, in 2013, Rodriguez did much the same to his predecessor, General Carter Ham, when he offered his warning about the challenges on the continent.

Three years before that, in 2010, Ham appeared before the same committee and said, “I believe that the extremist threat that’s emerging from East Africa is probably the greatest concern that Africa Command will face in the near future.”  Ham expressed no worry about threats posed by al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb or Boko Haram.  ISIL in Libya didn’t even exist.  And even that “greatest concern,” al-Shabaab, was, Ham noted, “primarily focused on internal matters in Somalia.”

In other words, over these last years, each incoming AFRICOM commander has offered a more dismal and dire assessment of the situation facing the U.S. military than his predecessor.  Ham drew attention to only one major terror threat, Rodriguez to three, and Waldhauser to four.

His Own Worst Critic

That said, Waldhauser isn’t the only AFRICOM chief to point a finger at Rodriguez’s checkered record.  Another American general cast an even darker shadow on the outgoing commander’s three-year run overseeing Washington’s shadow war in Africa:

“AFRICOM’s priorities on the continent for the next several years will be… in East Africa to improve stability there.  Most of that is built around the threat of al-Shabaab.  And then, in the North and West Africa is really built around the challenges from Libya down to northern Mali and that region and that instability there creates many challenges… And then after that is the West Africa, really about the Boko Haram and the problem in Nigeria that is, unfortunately, crossing the boundary into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger.  So those are the big challenges and then just the normal ones that continue to be a challenge are the Gulf of Guinea… as well as countering the Lord’s Resistance Army…”

That critic was, in fact, General David Rodriguez himself in an AFRICOM promotional video released on multiple social media platforms last month.  It was posted on the very day that his command also touted its “more than 30 major exercises and more than 1,000 military to military engagements” between 2013 and 2015.  It was hardly a surprise, however, that these two posts and the obvious conclusion to be drawn from them — just how little AFRICOM’S growing set of ambitious continent-wide activities mattered when it came to the spread of terror movements — went unattended and uncommented upon.

Waldhauser and Rodriguez have not, however, been alone in pointing out increased insecurity on the continent.  “Terrorism and violent extremism are major sources of instability in Africa,” Assistant Secretary Linda Thomas-Greenfield of the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in May.  “Terrorist organizations such as al-Shabaab, Boko Haram (which now calls itself the Islamic State in West Africa), al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), and al-Murabitoun are conducting asymmetric campaigns that cause significant loss of innocent life and create potentially long-term humanitarian crises.”

National intelligence director James Clapper, who called the continent “a hothouse for the emergence of extremist and rebel groups” in 2014, spoke of the dangers posed by the Lord’s Resistance Army and al-Shabaab, as well as terror threats in Egypt, Libya, Mali, Nigeria, and Tunisia, and instability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic of Congo, Burundi, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan before the Senate Armed Services Committee earlier this year.

And then there’s Brigadier General Donald Bolduc who heads Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAFRICA), the most elite U.S. troops on the continent.  He painted a picture that was grimmer still.  Last November, during a closed door presentation at the annual Special Operations Command Africa Commander’s Conference in Garmisch, Germany, the SOCAFRICA chief drew attention not just to the threats of al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, Boko Haram, ISIL, and the Lord’s Resistance Army, but also another “43 malign groups” operating in Africa, according to another set of documents obtained via the Freedom of Information Act.

The growth of terror groups from the one named by Ham in 2010 to the 48 mentioned by Bolduc in 2015 is as remarkable as it has been unremarked upon, a record so bleak that it demands a congressional investigation that will, of course, never take place.

Questions Unasked, Questions Unanswered

U.S. Africa Command boasts that it “neutralizes transnational threats” and “prevents and mitigates conflict,” while training local allies and proxies “in order to promote regional security, stability, and prosperity.”  Rodriguez’s tenure was, however, marked by the very opposite: increasing numbers of lethal terror attacks across the continent including those in Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,Central African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Somalia, South Sudan, and Tunisia.  In fact, data from the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland shows that attacks have spiked over the last decade, roughly coinciding with AFRICOM’s establishment.  In 2007, just before it became an independent command, there were fewer than 400 such incidents annually in sub-Saharan Africa.  Last year, the number reached nearly 2,000.

While these statistics may be damning, they are no more so than the words of AFRICOM’s own chiefs.  Yet the senators who are supposed to provide oversight haven’t seemed to bat an eye, let alone ask the obvious questions about why terror groups and terror attacks are proliferating as U.S. operations, bases, manpower, and engagement across the continent grow.  (Note that this is, of course, the same Senate committee that Rodriguez misled, whether purposefully or inadvertently, earlier this year when it came to the number of U.S. military missions in Africa without — again — either apparent notice or any repercussions.)

In an era of too-big-to fail generals, an age in which top commanders from winless wars retire to take prominent posts at influential institutions and cash in with cushy jobs on corporate boards, AFRICOM chiefs have faced neither hard questions nor repercussions for the deteriorating situation.  (Similar records — heavy on setbacks, short on victories — have been produced by Washington’s war chiefs in Afghanistan and Iraq for the past 15 years and they, too, have never led to official calls for any sort of accountability.)

Rodriguez is now planning on resting at his northern Virginia home for a few months and, as he told Stars and Stripes, seeing “what comes next.”

U.S. Africa Command failed to respond to multiple requests for an interview with Rodriguez, but if he follows in the footsteps of the marquee names among fellow retired four-stars of his generation, like David Petraeus and Stanley McChrystal, he’ll supplement his six-figure pension with one or more lucrative private sector posts.

What comes next for AFRICOM will play out on the continent and in briefings before the Senate Armed Services Committee for years to come.  If history is any guide, the number of terror groups on the continent will not decrease, the senators will fail to ask why this is so, and the media will follow their lead.

During his final days in command, AFRICOM released several more short videos of Rodriguez holding forth on varioius issues.  In one of the last of these, the old soldier praised “the whole team” for accomplishing “a tremendous amount over the last several years.”  What exactly that was went unsaid, though it certainly wasn’t achieving AFRICOM’s mandate to “neutraliz[e] transnational threats.”  But what Rodriguez said next made a lot of sense.  He noted that AFRICOM wasn’t alone in it — whatever it was.  Washington, D.C., he said, had played a key role, too.  In that, he couldn’t have been more on target.  The increasingly bleak outlook in Africa can’t simply be laid at the feet of AFRICOM’s commanders.  Again and again, they’ve been upfront about the deteriorating situation.  Washington has just preferred to look the other way.

Israel adopts powers to suspend members of parliament

Jean Shaoul

Within weeks of Avigdor Lieberman and his nationalistic Yisrael Beiteinu (Israel Is Our Home) party joining Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu’s Likud-led coalition, the government has authored a raft of legislation that is little short of fascistic.

Last week, the Knesset passed legislation that will allow a three-fourths majority, 90 of the 120 members, to suspend serving legislators (MKs). The law is one of a number that allow disqualification of candidates and candidate lists for incitement against the state of Israel or “support” for the armed struggle of an enemy state or terror group against Israel.

The law is so loosely written that any verbal expression of sympathy for Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza could be interpreted to justify expulsion of a member of the Knesset.

It is aimed initially at Hanin Zoabi, who is one of the 13 members of the Joint Arab List, a coalition of the four Palestinian parties in Israel, and who joined the Knesset in 2009. She has been prominent in opposing Israel’s brutal suppression of the Palestinians.

She became the bête-noire of the ultra-nationalists for joining the Turkish flotilla as it tried to breach the naval blockade of Gaza in 2010, witnessing the Israeli commandos’ raid on the Mavi Marmara that killed 10 activists on board.

There have been repeated attempts to strip her of her parliamentary immunity and disqualify her for election. In July 2014, she was suspended from the Knesset for six months as retribution for saying five days after the kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers by Palestinians, “Is it strange that people living under occupation and living impossible lives, in a situation where Israel kidnaps new prisoners every day, is it strange that they kidnap? They are not terrorists. Even if I do not agree with them, they are people who do not see any way to change their reality, and they are compelled to use means like these.”

Zoabi said she encouraged the Palestinians to “declare a popular uprising” and “impose a siege on Israel instead of negotiating with it.” Earlier this year, she was fined and given a six-month suspended prison sentence for accusing Arab-Israeli police officers of being traitors.

Zoabi also said that Israel’s agreement to pay compensation to the families of the flotilla raid victims as part of a deal to restore full diplomatic relations with Turkey amounted to an admission that Israel’s soldiers were “murderers.”

Earlier, Ayman Odeh, leader of Hadash and chairman of the Joint Arab List, had threatened to resign from the Knesset if any members of his coalition are expelled. He said that Netanyahu “wants politics for Jews only” by alienating and infuriating the Arab public to the extent that it boycotts the next elections and thus no longer constitutes a political force capable of joining other opposition parties to bring down the government.

The bill follows Netanyahu’s remarks during last year’s election about “Arabs streaming to the polls in droves” last Election Day, the outlawing of the Northern Branch of the Islamic Movement and the uprooting of the Bedouin village of Umm al-Hiran. A few days ago, the authorities seized 325 acres of Bedouin land around the village of al-Araqib in the Negev for the construction of Jewish homes, and detained several residents who were protesting the bulldozing of their land.

Two weeks ago, the Knesset approved the so-called Transparency Law, which requires nongovernmental organizations that receive more than half their financing from foreign governments to disclose their donors’ identities in their publications, advertising and meetings with public officials. The new law targets some two dozen human rights and left-wing groups, including B’Tselem, Peace Now, Breaking the Silence and Yesh Din, critical of Israel’s policies toward Palestinians within the occupied territories and Israel.

Last year, then-defence minister Moshe Ya’alon banned Breaking the Silence from any contact with the military, accusing its members of being “traitors.”

The Transparency Law leaves the far more numerous settler and ultra-nationalist groups untouched, since they largely get their funding from private donations from abroad. According to Ha’aretz, American donors, including the late Irving Moskowitz, a casino mogul, and the Christian evangelical preacher John Hagee, channelled at least $220 million in tax-deductible payments over a four-year period to settler NGOs.

Netanyahu made the claim that the Transparency Law was necessary “to prevent an absurd situation, in which foreign states meddle in Israel’s internal affairs by funding NGOs without the Israeli public being aware of it.”

He himself is subject of a police investigation because all of his recent election campaign contributions have come from overseas sources. US billionaire Sheldon Adelson funds the loss-making free daily newspaper Israel Hayom that operates as the mouthpiece of the Netanyahu government.

The original version of the law would have required groups in receipt of funding from overseas governments to wear special tags when visiting the Knesset, implicitly branding them as traitors.

These efforts come amid Israel’s brutal crackdown on the unrest provoked last summer by right-wing elements, with the support of the security forces, over access to the Al-Aqsa mosque complex. Since October, more than 220 Palestinians have been killed, thousands injured and hundreds arrested in response to the attacks by lone Palestinian youths in the West Bank and Israel, who have killed some 30 Israelis and two Americans with stones, screwdrivers and knives, or their cars.

While the number of attacks has fallen, the Israeli security forces have continued to respond with extreme brutality, killing Palestinians on a weekly basis, including 26 Palestinian children in the West Bank and Gaza, and implementing collective punishment—illegal under international law. This has included demolishing the family homes of the alleged attackers, expelling Palestinian residents from Jerusalem, revoking the work permits of Palestinians who work in the settlements or in Israel, and imposing curfews and lockdowns.

A third measure is Israel’s new Anti-terrorism Law, which dramatically widens the range of offences to include sympathising with, encouraging and failing to prevent terrorism, gives Israeli police sweeping new powers to arrest suspects and deny them access to lawyers, and mandates long jail sentences.

The legislation is legitimised under the rubric of opposing terrorist activities of both Palestinians and Jewish extremists. However, its real immediate targets are Israel’s own Palestinian citizens, some 20 percent of Israel’s 8 million-plus population, and East Jerusalem residents. They can be penalized for any political activity in solidarity with the Palestinians in the occupied territories, who are subject to a separate system of Israeli military courts. More generally, these measures are aimed at preventing and suppressing any united opposition on the part of Jewish and Palestinian workers and youth to government policies.

China issues warning to Australia over South China Sea

Peter Symonds

The Global Times, a state-owned Chinese newspaper, last weekend published an editorial bluntly warning the Australian government against interfering in territorial disputes in the South China Sea. Entitled “‘Paper cat’ Australia will learn its lesson,” the comment declared: “If Australia steps into South China Sea waters, it will be an ideal target for China to warn and strike.”

The editorial followed the July 12 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague supporting virtually all of the US-sponsored Philippine case challenging Beijing’s maritime claims, including China’s “historic” right to much of the South China Sea. Beijing, which did not participate in the court proceedings, has declared that it will ignore the PCA decision.

The Global Times branded Australia as “one of the most delirious countries” that “immediately supported the arbitration result and claimed China ‘must’ abide by it, and also signed a joint declaration with the US and Japan.”

The US-Japanese-Australian declaration was signed after a meeting on the side-lines of the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Laos last week. While divisions among ASEAN members resulted in a vague joint communiqué that did not mention The Hague decision, the joint declaration insisted that the ruling was “final and binding on both parties.”

In remarks obviously directed against China, the three countries expressed “strong opposition” to any unilateral coercive action that could alter the status quo in the South China Sea. They urged all states “to refrain from such actions as large land reclamation and the construction of outposts as well as the use of those outposts for military purposes.”

For the past 18 months, Washington has mounted an increasingly shrill campaign against Chinese “expansionism” in the South China Sea, citing land reclamation and “militarisation” in particular. The US Navy has conducted three “freedom of navigation” operations (FONOPS) by sending destroyers within the 12-nautical-mile limits of islets under Chinese administration.

Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi lashed out last week at the US, Japan and Australia, declaring that the issue was a test of “whether you are peacemakers or troublemakers.” He described The Hague ruling as a “farce” and berated the three countries for playing up “the South China Sea issue and regional tensions, targeting China.”

The Global Times, however, singled out Australia, pointing out its “inglorious history” in relation to Aborigines, and its hypocrisy in relation to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), under which the Philippine case was heard. It highlighted Australia’s territorial claims in Antarctica, which are not widely recognised internationally, and its manoeuvring in relation to UNCLOS on its claims to the Antarctic continental shelf.

“Australia showed blunt double standards as if no one had a memory of what it did and said over the Antarctic,” the editorial stated.

“Australia is not even a ‘paper tiger,’ it’s only a ‘paper cat’ at best… Australia has unexpectedly made itself a pioneer of hurting China’s interest with a fiercer attitude than countries directly involved in the South China Sea dispute. But this paper cat won’t last.”

The editorial is not an official statement but the generally hawkish Global Times is owned by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) official organ, thePeople’s Daily. “I think the editorials of the Global Times are not exactly the Chinese government’s position, but in a way it does reflect the displeasure of the Chinese government,” Shi Yinhong, a Renmin University professor, told the Australian Broadcasting Corporation.

Beijing is well aware that the Australian government confronts a dilemma in balancing between its largest trading partner China, and its longstanding strategic ally, the United States. In an implicit threat of economic retaliation, the editorial noted that Australia has signed a free trade agreement with China—just last year.

In the immediate aftermath of The Hague decision, US Vice President Joe Biden visited Australia and met with Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop, stressing the importance of the long history of Australian support for US-led wars. Undoubtedly behind closed doors, Biden put pressure on Canberra to mount its own “freedom of navigation” operations to intrude into Chinese-claimed territory in the South China Sea.

The Global Times editorial is a clear warning that Beijing will retaliate economically and possibly “strike” militarily if Australia “steps into South China Sea waters.”

The declaration is not only a measure of the extremely sharp tensions in the South China Sea but also of the political bankruptcy of the CCP regime. It is certainly the case that the prime responsibility for the dangerous situation in the South China Sea lies with Washington, which has recklessly ratcheted up its confrontation with Beijing to sow divisions between China and its neighbours. The US is recklessly inflaming flashpoints throughout the region as part of its “pivot to Asia” aimed at subordinating China to the interests of American imperialism.

However, the CCP leadership is incapable of making any appeal to the working class in China or internationally. Instead, Beijing is on the one hand seeking to cut a deal with Washington while on the other whipping up nationalism and engaging in an arms race that only intensifies the danger of war.

The Chinese foreign ministry announced last week that China and Russia would conduct naval exercises in the South China Sea in September. While the two navies have held joint war games before, next month’s operations are far from “routine” as claimed by spokesman Yang Yujun. In the wake of The Hague ruling, the US could well seize on the opportunity to once again raise tensions in the strategic waters. Russia has backed China’s claims in the South China Sea.

The CCP’s more hawkish elements, such as the Global Times, recklessly suggest a more confrontational strategy, utterly indifferent to the potential catastrophe that a conflict between nuclear-armed powers could bring. An incident involving Chinese and Australian warships in the South China Sea, whether deliberate or accidental, could quickly involve the US and escalate out of control.

UK delays nuclear plant deal signed with France and China

Robert Stevens

Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May decision to delay signing a deal to build the first new UK nuclear plant in 20 years has angered both China and France.

Under plans first outlined under the Labour government of Tony Blair more than a decade ago, the nuclear plant (Hinkley Point C) was to be built at a location in Somerset. It is designed to meet 7 percent of the UK’s electricity needs, with a capacity of 3.8 gigawatts.

Only months ago May’s predecessor, David Cameron, announced plans to begin construction in mid-2019, with the plant completed by 2025.

The decision to build the plant has been mired in controversy from its conception. The French firm EDF, 85 percent state-owned, was scheduled to finance most of the £18 billion cost. But under a provisional agreement signed by the Cameron government, one third was to be provided by nuclear companies closely tied to the Chinese state.

Late last Thursday evening, Tory business and energy secretary Greg Clark announced that the project was to be reviewed, with a final decision delayed to the autumn. This was just hours after EDF’s board had voted, by a narrow margin, to approve the project. Both parties had been set to sign formal legally binding contracts the following morning.

May’s move was made primarily at the behest of those sections of the ruling elite, including in the military and intelligence complex, who fear China’s projected role in the construction and running of a highly state sensitive facility.

As the culmination of a pro-Beijing orientation, the Cameron government laid out the red carpet to Chinese President Xi Jinping during his state visit to Britain last October. China involvement in Hinkley Point, as the first step to building its own nuclear power station in Bradwell, Essex, was feted alongside tens of billions of pounds agreed in trade and investment.

The deals followed the decision by the Tory government for Britain to become the first Western power to sign up to China’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in March 2015. This antagonised Washington, as it sharply cut across cut the US “pivot to Asia,” which aims at undermining Beijing diplomatically, economically and militarily. As a result, Cameron’s strategic orientation caused deep consternation in ruling circles, with the queen pointedly stating her displeasure at “very rude” members of a Chinese trade delegation.

May is reported to have long held a “suspicious approach” to China. As Home Secretary, she developed intimate links to the intelligence services and figures in the military. Some of these voiced trenchant complaints about Chinese investment in UK nuclear plants on the basis of their implications for security and Britain’s relationships with the US.

Vince Cable, the Liberal Democrat former business secretary in the 2010-2015 Conservative/Lib Dem coalition, revealed to the Sunday Telegraph that May had a “general prejudice” against Chinese investments in Britain and was against relaxing visa requirements for visiting businessmen. On this issue, she was overruled by Cameron’s Chancellor George Osborne, he said. Referring to the major Chinese telecommunications firm, Cable said May was “never completely satisfied about Huawei,” which has a major partnership with the largest private telecommunications firm in the UK, BT.

May “expressed in several different contexts severe reservations about China getting too close to the UK,” said Cable. “So I think she has form in adopting a more suspicious approach, more in line with the American position. ... Fairly early on in the coalition, she wanted to introduce a more stringent test of foreign investment, based on the American model of screening out projects that threaten national security.”

Regarding the Hinkley Point project, Cable said, “My recollection was that when approval was sought for Hinkley, she raised objections on grounds of national security issues and China.”

Nick Timothy, May’s joint chief of staff, was strident in opposing Chinese investment at Hinkley. In an article headlined, “The Government is selling our national security to China,” he said it could allow the Chinese “to use their role to build weaknesses into computer systems which will allow them to shut down Britain’s energy production at will.”

Timothy warned, “For those who believe that such an eventuality is unlikely, the Chinese National Nuclear Corporation—one of the state-owned companies involved in the plans for the British nuclear plants—says on its web site that it is responsible not just for ‘increasing the value of state assets and developing the society’ but the ‘building of national defence.’”

Timothy cited the assessment of the domestic intelligence agency MI5 that “the intelligence services of … China … continue to work against UK interests at home and abroad.”

China responded angrily to May’s decision stating Monday, “What China cannot understand is the ‘suspicious approach’ that comes from nowhere to Chinese investment in making the postponement.” It “cannot tolerate any unwanted accusation against its sincere and benign willingness for win-win cooperation,” read a statement from Xinhua, China’s state-run news agency.

Calling the deal into question is also a serious blow to France, which was able to strike a hugely profitable deal to generate electricity at Hinkley for its projected 35-year lifespan. The Financial Times commented, “Delays to the project will be a complicating factor at a time when Anglo-French relations are already under strain. For Paris it is imperative to prove that new technology to be built at Hinkley by EDF is viable after endless problems with reactors under construction in Finland and France. Export orders are also vital for the French nuclear industry at a time when Japan and Germany have both ended their nuclear programmes.”

May’s readiness to antagonise France is in line with her pledge to be tough in seeking the best conditions for the UK following June’s referendum vote for Britain to leave the EU. Writing in the Financial Times, columnist and energy policy blogger Nick Butler wrote, “In the post-Brexit world competitiveness is critical.” The “obvious risks [over Hinkley] were such that the only prudent response is to pause and to reconsider all the options,” he continued.

Enthusing that May has “appreciated that approval of the project is now a UK bargaining chip in Britain’s relationship with the French,” he noted, “Cancelling the Hinkley project would destroy the thousands of jobs promised along the supply chain—most of which is located in France. The pressure is now on President François Hollande, who faces a very difficult re-election campaign next year, to force EDF to come up with a much better offer.”

Hinkley Point highlights divisions within ruling circles over the indifference of Labour and Tory governments towards the preservation of national infrastructure and industry. By 2012, half of the UK’s assets had been sold to foreign owners by successive Labour and Conservative governments. By 2016 foreign investors owned £1 trillion worth of British companies. A significant element of business support for a Leave vote, as reflected in the “Brexiteers” in the Tory party, was based on concern that the economy was in danger of losing its ability to compete through an over-reliance on foreign investment.

Last week it was announced that Britain’s leading microchip designer, ARM Holdings, was being sold to Japanese firm SoftBank for £24 billion. In response, retail businessman John Mills, who chaired the Labour Leave campaign, wrote in the Guardian , “It should be stopped, and the whole trend of selling off British industrial assets should be stopped too.”

Mills complained that “profits made on foreign-owned companies are most likely to be paid in taxes to foreign governments.” Mills concluded, “By having a policy of selling our assets to foreign owners as the first option, we are storing up incalculable problems, which will inevitably lead to severe economic difficulties.”

THAAD and South Korea-China-US Dynamics

Rahul Raj

After much speculation and discussion, South Korea and the US have finally reached a crucial decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) system. The American-made missile defence system has been a sensitive issue both domestically and in the international arena, but it was a calculated decision by the administration of South Korean President Park Guen-hye to accept the deployment. The THAAD debate tested the durability of Korea’s alliance with the US; Seoul had to choose between the wishes of its most loyal security partner and its largest trade partner – China. US Secretary of State, John Kerry and American military officials have been urging Seoul to consider THAAD since 2015, but South Korea played a game of “strategic ambiguity,” giving no hints of what it might do. One of the concerns for South Korea was the opposition by China, which views THAAD as an American ploy to monitor its military activities and missile locations. 

 

Serious consideration of the system gained momentum after a North Korean nuclear test in January, which was followed by a series of missiles tests. Chinese inability to contain North Korea’s behaviour and its lackadaisical response to the tests did not sit well with President Park, who has tried to woo  since coming to power, hoping that Beijing might use its influence to keep Pyongyang in check. After the North's nuclear test, the South Korean defence minister made an emergency call to his Chinese counterpart through a recently established hotline between the two countries but the call was not answered. President Park subsequently announced that South Korea was reviewing THAAD. Arguably, since Beijing has been unsuccessful in stopping Pyongyang's belligerent activities, which could have addressed Seoul's security concerns, the former, partly, has itself to blame. In February, Admiral Harry Harris, commander of the US Pacific forces, told China that it should have exerted more influence on North Korea if it sought to prevent the deployment of THAAD.

After Seoul and Washington decided to initiate official discussions about THAAD, the response from Beijing was predictably harsh. China’s ambassador to South Korea, Qiu Guohong, warned that there would be instant fallout in bilateral relations. For China, opposition to THAAD has become a bigger issue than controlling North Korea because it feels that the missile defence system will upset the balance of power in the region. China also fears that the AN/TPY-2 radar used in THAAD, which has a range of about 1,800 km, could snoop on its military installations and missile locations, posing a threat to its national security. In order to assuage Beijing’s security concerns, both Seoul and Washington have reiterated that the sole focus of the THAAD system in South Korea would be North Korean nuclear and missile threats and would not target any other countries. Although there have been suggestions of alternatively deploying the South Korean made Korea Advanced Missile Defence (KAMD) in order to deflect Chinese ire, a recent study by Hannam University in Daejeon suggests that the Korean system would not be sophisticated enough to counter a North Korean missile threat even if it were upgraded. In any case, KAMD would not be ready until 2023.

Another area of concern for the US is that North Korean nuclear threats have stimulated the interests of Japan and South Korea in developing nuclear weapons. In April, the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced that the Japanese constitution does not ban the possession of nuclear weapons. In June, US Vice President Joe Biden, during a meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, suggested that in the face of North Korea's nuclear threats, Japan may seek nuclear weapons of its own. It is no secret that South Korea has tried to acquire nuclear weapons in the past, and in the aftermath of North Korea's nuclear tests, the South Korean newspaper Chosun Ilbo reported that voices calling for the development of nuclear weapons have been getting louder. Although both Japan and South Korea are signatories to the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it would not prevent them from acquiring nuclear weapons if they felt that US extended deterrence was not enough to meet their national security concerns. Hence, THAAD would not only counter North Korea's perennial threats but help the US protect its allies without setting off a nuclear arms race in Asia.

  

Discussions surrounding THAAD have brought political divisions and protests in the country, but given that its security is dependent on the US, South Korea cannot ignore the interests of its critical ally, which has been protecting the country since the Korean War. Any misadventure by North Korea not only threatens South Korean national security but puts in jeopardy the lives of 28,500 American troops stationed in the country. In order to address doubts over safety concerns, the US military showed off a THAAD battery stationed in Guam to South Korean journalists on 18 July, informing them that the electromagnetic waves emitted by the missile system radar are much lower than permissible levels set by the Korea Communications Commission. 

The coming days will be difficult for South Korea; it must assuage fears over THAAD among its citizens, bring unanimity among the ruling and opposition parties as well as continue to ease Chinese objections. The decision to deploy THAAD is a very difficult one, but also an unavoidable reality. South Korean diplomacy must gingerly balance the delicate relationships between the US and China without compromising its national security interests.

China’s Game on North Korea

Sandip Kumar Mishra

It was a strange moment of diplomacy in Laos when North Korea tried to bring about a revision in the chairman’s statement issued at the 23rd ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The statement was issued on 27 July after the conclusion of the two-day meetings of foreign ministers of the 27 member countries of the ARF. The chair country Laos, which has good relations with North Korea, tried to explore the possibility of revising the statement but had to finally reject it because all other countries were in opposition. In fact, in the usual manner, ARF’s statement this year expressed concern over North Korean nuclear and missile programmes. Almost similar statements were issued at previous ARFs in 2015 and 2014 in Malaysia and Myanmar respectively, at which North Korea had not brought up the possibility of such revision.

In another interesting move, North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Yong-ho stayed two more days in Laos after the end of the ARF. This could be seen as a move to consolidate North Korea's friends in the Southeast Asian region. However, it also may not be totally delinked from the ARF dynamics. Even though more sanctions and pressures on North Korea have been put by the international community after its fourth nuclear test in January this year, North Korea seems to be becoming increasingly confident. The secret of this renewed confidence is basically China’s U-turn in its policy towards North Korea.

In the last few years, the South China Sea and East China Sea have emerged as an arena of tension and for power projection. Aggressive Chinese moves and the uncompromising stands of the other involved countries, including the US, had led to a worrisome situation in regional politics. China under Xi Jinping apparently has fully abandoned the old dictum of ‘build your capacity and hide your strength’ and now demands ‘great-power relations’ with the US. Earlier, China tried to placate some US allies such as South Korea, through diplomatic means and aspired to outsmart the US in the region. However, in the process, it distanced itself from North Korea without being successful in creating any gap in the US-South Korea alliance.

Two recent developments - the US success in persuading/pressuring South Korea to have Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system installed on the Korean peninsula and the judgement of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague on the South China Sea - have been major setbacks for China. Now, China can either move backward and yield or it can move forward more aggressively in regional politicking. At present, it seems that China has opted for the second and initiated a more overt policy to dominate the region. In the process, the significance of North Korea in Chinese foreign policy has become more salient. In 2016, China has been trying to accommodate North Korean ambitions and repair its bilateral relations with Pyongyang, though North Korea has not shown any sign of compromise on most Chinese demands, such as economic reforms and abandoning nuclear weapons. China entertained the former North Korean Foreign Minister Ri Su-yong in Beijing in May 2015 and arranged his meeting with the Chinese President Xi Jinping despite no change in North Korean behaviour.

China’s game with regard to North Korea has become more obvious with the foreign ministers of China and North Korea arriving together, in the same airplane, from China to Laos, to participate in one of the region's broadest multilateral fora, the ARF. Furthermore, to make this camaraderie even more obvious, the two leaders stayed in the same hotel. It was done deliberately by China to show the international community about its non-compromising intent in regional politics.

China's new game is going to be responded to by the big players in the region, such as the US, Japan, Australia and India, by their moving closer to one another in military-strategic cooperation. In fact, China is not oblivious to this fact, and in spite of knowing these counter responses, is ready to escalate the matter.

Both sides must remember that a full-scale war or conflict between the big players cannot be a pragmatic option given the cost attached to it. A military solution to any of these regional issues is next to impossible. The escalation of hostility and non-compromising stands would create a dilemma for the smaller, more responsible countries of the region to take sides, and provide space for irresponsible and ‘rogue’ countries like North Korea to manoeuvre. It is important that the big players understand this reality and be more imaginative and accommodating in pursuing their national interests.

India’s ‘Soft’ Counter-Terrorism: Lessons from Singapore

Husanjot Chahal

In May 2016, the Delhi Police released four youth reportedly indoctrinated with Jaish-e-Mohammed’s (JeM) ideology after organising a set of counselling sessions, including weekly visits to a psychologist and a Muslim scholar. It was one of the rare occasions when positive reinforcement was apparently used as a tactic to de-radicalise terror suspects. India’s counter-terror strategy has recently seen use of soft approaches such as no-first arrest, guidance, countering radical narratives, etc to supplement hard tactics. The Delhi Police’s decision appears to be in conformity with this trend.

Soft approaches to counter terror have been used in many countries, such as Singapore, whose unique model provides an interesting case study, and elements of that approach may be relevant to the Indian system.

Singapore follows a bi-layered counter-terrorism strategy. A thicker layer involving numerous soft measures is backed by a second layer comprising hard security measures and stringent laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA). The soft approach has two main components – a) involving the community to counter radical ideologies, and b) building social resilience. There are four major lessons that can be learnt from Singapore’s experience.

Community Briefings

In its counter-ideological initiatives, the Singapore government involved its Muslim community very conscientiously ever since the first indigenous terror network of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) was exposed in the city-state in 2001. Its Home Ministry briefs the community members on every arrest, before media disclosures. Such briefings often involve clarifications that it does not view the terror outfit’s ideology as representative of “true Islam” and are aimed to reassure the minority community that the state does not see it as a source of potential trouble.

This small, yet significant step can prove to be very useful in the Indian context where the minority’s views of government actions are shaped by biased media reportage and also by the fact that some terrorists’ arrests and counter-terror operations have proved to be fabricated cases for acquiring promotions and rewards.

Facilitating Vs Employing

Globally, community leaders play a significant role in counter-terrorism by providing a counter narrative to the misconceived notions of radicalised individuals. In Singapore, the same is done by the Religious Rehabilitation Group (RRG), an all-volunteer group of Islamic scholars and teachers involved in the rehabilitation of detained operatives (through counselling) and countering radical ideologies (through publications and seminars). It was formed by two prominent community leaders in Singapore who were concerned about the dangerous ideology being sketched by radicalised detainees. Working alongside the RRG, the Singapore government has ensured that its part in such an act is that of a facilitator only. This gives the procedure more credence within the community.

In India, the government has attempted to co-opt clerics to prevent youth radicalisation. While dealing with detainees, community members are used more as tools to serve a purpose. In the JeM arrests, for instance, a Delhi Police official noted how Muslim cleric counsellors would be paid a “fee for their services”. Such an approach, evidently, comes with a short shelf-life and is visibly ill-founded. It has, not surprisingly, divided the community between supporters (the so-called sarkari mullahs) and non-supporters of the government.

Steering Clear of Polarisation

While facilitating voices, it is important to avoid pitching one religious orientation against the other. The Indian Prime Minister has been showcasing the Sufi order as a counter to radical Islam. Not only does it induce divisions in the community, but it also limits the appeal of the message by being exclusive in character. 

The Singapore government faced a similar situation in the initial phases of the RRG. Individuals at the forefront of its counter-ideological work were well known Sufi leaders who inadvertently shaped its content and ideas. This was not well received among certain segments of the Muslim community, especially among the Salafis. The situation aggravated when one Sufi practitioner’s statement was seen as anti-Salafi - he equated Salafism to extremism. The issue was soon rectified as the RRG started fielding non-Sufi asatizah(religious teachers) in its public forums and expanded its content.

It is suggested that a community-based initiative with an inclusive approach that draws a line between those who are pro-violence and terrorism and those who are against it, is more likely to succeed.

More Effective Inter-Faith Dialogues

Given Singapore’s multi-cultural set-up (not unlike India’s), its leaders have always stressed that social harmony and a strong psychological defence against ideologies that induce divides must be stressed. This has been primarily done through well-organised inter-faith platforms such as the Inter-Racial and Religious Confidence Circles (IRCC) and its Community Engagement Programme (CEP). These dialogues aim to build bridges between communities during peace-time, so that they can act as a safety net during times of conflict.

Unlike India, the platforms in Singapore are not for mere display where participants subsequently return to their sectarian rhetoric. Instead, they are seen as problem solving mechanisms and not talk-shop conferences. India needs to make these dialogues much more organised and effective to have practical implications on the society in countering the xenophobic views within it.

Out of a whole range of other lessons that can be learnt from Singapore, these four are perhaps most practicable, requiring the social conditioning of security agencies and shaping a nuanced official policy that is more likely to deliver results in these challenging times.

Masters Fellowships in Public Health and Tropical Medicine for Low and Middle Income Countries UK 2016

Application Deadline: Applications are considered three times a year. Past deadline: 22 March 2016. Next deadline: 30 August 2016

Fellowships must be taken up within one year of award.

Scholarship Name: Masters Fellowships in Public Health and Tropical Medicine

Brief description: Wellcome Trust offers Fellowship in Public Health and Tropical Medicine for Masters students from low- and middle-income (developing) countries, UK, 2016

Subject Areas: Public Health and Tropical Medicine, with particular interest in social sciences, demography, health economics, medical statistics and vector biology.

About Scholarship

This scheme strengthens scientific research capacity in low- and middle-income countries, by providing support for junior researchers to gain research experience and high-quality research training at Masters Degree level.

Research projects should be aimed at understanding and controlling diseases (either human or animal) of relevance to local, national or global health. This can include laboratory based molecular analysis of field or clinical samples, but projects focused solely on studies in vitro or using animal models will not normally be considered under this scheme.

Scholarship Type: Masters Fellowship for developing countries

Eligibility: You should be:

• A national or legal resident of a low- and middle-income country, and hold a first degree in subject relevant to tropical medicine or public health (clinical or non-clinical). See list of countries below.
• At an early stage in your career, with limited research experience, but have a demonstrated interest in or aptitude for research.

Benefits

Fellows will receive a stipend in accordance with the cost of living in the country in which he/she will be studying; travel costs and support for approved tuition fees. Masters training by distance learning is acceptable.

Research-dedicated costs (excluding salary/stipend costs) should not exceed £20 000 per annum.

Duration: This fellowship normally provides up to 30 months’ support. A period of 12 months should normally be dedicated to undertaking a taught Masters course at a recognized centre of excellence, combined with up to 18 months to undertake a research project.

Eligible African Countries: Algeria, Angola,  Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Dem. Rep. , Congo, Rep., Côte d’Ivoire, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Federation Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey , Uganda, Ukraine,  Rep. Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Other Countries: Afghanistan, Albania, American Samoa, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh,  Belarus, Belize, Bhutan, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Arab Rep., El Salvador, Fiji, The Georgia, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Rep. Iraq, Jamaica, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Korea, Dem Rep., Kosovo, Kyrgyz, Republic Lao PDR, Lebanon, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, Mexico, Micronesia, Fed. Sts., Moldova, Mongolia, Montenegro, Mayotte, Myanmar, Nepal, Pakistan, Palau, Panama, Papua New Guinea,  Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Russian, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, Serbia, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, St. Kitts and Nevis St. Lucia St. ,Vincent and the Grenadines, Suriname, Syrian, Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Vanuatu, Venezuela, RB Vietnam,  West Bank and Gaza Yemen,

To be taken at (country): UK

How to Apply

Visit the Scholarship Webpage for details

AAU Entrepreneurship Internships for Graduates in Eastern, Southern and Francophone African Countries. USD600

Brief description: The Association of African Universities (AAU) is offering small grants for Graduate Internships targeting Eastern Africa, Southern Africa and Francophone member universities.

Application Deadline: 15th August, 2016

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Eastern Africa, Southern Africa  and Francophone member countries

To be taken at (country): Host countries

Eligible Field of Study: All

About the Award: The Association of African Universities (AAU) has intensified its advocacy for students from African universities to acquire employable skills for the world of work upon graduation from their universities. Through financial assistance from the Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), the AAU has secured some funds to offer small grants of up to US$600 per person for graduate internships for its member universities.

Type: Grants & Internships

Eligibility: 

• candidates should be students in an AAU member institution in Southern or Eastern Africa, or a Francophone member institution, and the institution must be in good standing.
• Grant candidates should be students pursuing post-graduate degree programmes. Applicants should note that the grants are for training purposes only and not meant for the completion of theses or dissertations.
• candidates shall commit to undertake an internship programme for a period between twelve (12) and twenty-four (24 weeks).
• Applications should be supported with an authorisation note from the Head of Department of the applicant’s university as well as an official acceptance letter from the establishment wishing to host the intern.
• All candidates should submit a detailed curriculum vitae.
• A detailed but confidential supervisory report will be required from the host institution on the progression of the applicant during the period of internship, and from the university of the candidates on academic progress after the period of internship.
• Consideration will be given to candidates who have no practical work experience.
• In the Grant Award Agreement, sixty percent (60%) of the total grant will be disbursed upon the submission of the required letters of intent from both the university and the employer to cater for transport and other incidentals. The other forty percent (40%) will be disbursed after the successful completion of the internship, receipt of deliverables from the university and the employer.
• A tracer of the intern’s employment status will be conducted six months after graduation from the university.
• Any breach of these Conditions shall lead to the termination or invalidity of the grant for which the Grantor shall recall or request the amount awarded to be refunded.

Selection Criteria: Selection of successful applications will be based on a quota system revolving around gender (at least 40% of beneficiaries should be females); country (not more than 10 applicants per country) and language (at least 30% from Francophone institutions).

Number of Awardees: Not more than 10 applicants per country

Value of Scholarship: up to US$600

Duration of Scholarship: Between twelve (12) and twenty-four (24 weeks).

How to Apply: Interested applicants should submit their applications online including the required support documents not later than 15th August, 2016. Please note that ONLY online submissions will be accepted.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Association of African Universities (AAU)

Ochberg Fellowship for Journalists Reporting Conflicts and Violent Cases 2016. Fully-funded to New York.

Brief description: The Ochberg Fellowship is the Dart Center’s flagship program for veteran and mid-career journalists who wish to deepen their knowledge of emotional trauma and psychological injury, and improve reporting on violence, conflict and tragedy.

Application Deadline: The application deadline is 30th September, 2016.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Countries in Central and South America, Europe, the Asia Pacific region, Africa and the Middle East.

To be taken at (country): The program will be held at Columbia University in New York City, USA.

Eligible Fields: Reporting on violence, conflict and tragedy.

About the Award: The Dart Center Ochberg Fellowship is a unique seminar program for veteran and mid-career journalists who wish to deepen their knowledge of emotional trauma and psychological injury, and improve reporting on violence, conflict and tragedy.

The Fellowship is led by a core faculty of prominent journalists and mental health professionals associated with the Dart Center, along with a visiting faculty.

Reporting responsibly and credibly on violence or traumatic events — on street crime and family violence, natural disasters and accidents, war and genocide — is a major challenge. The Ochberg Fellowship enables outstanding journalists from around the globe to explore these critical issues during a week of seminars held at Columbia University in New York City. Program activities include briefings by prominent interdisciplinary experts in the trauma and mental health fields; conversations with journalist colleagues on issues of ethics and craft; and a variety of other opportunities for intellectual engagement and peer learning.

Offered Since: 1998

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 

• The Ochberg Fellowships are open to outstanding journalists (with at least five years experience) working across all media.
• Past Fellows have ranged from small-town and regional general-assignment and crime reporters to war photographers and foreign correspondents for international news organizations. Applicants’ work must demonstrate journalistic excellence and a strong track record of covering violence and its impact on individuals, families or communities.
• Fellowships are open to print, broadcast and digital reporters, photographers, editors and producers with at least five years of professional journalism experience are eligible to apply. Approximately half of the Fellows will be based in North America, with the balance drawn from Central and South America, Europe, the Asia Pacific region, Africa and the Middle East.
• All fellowship seminars are conducted in English. Fellows must be fluent in spoken English to participate in the program.

Selection Criteria: Participants are reviewed by a judging committee comprised of Dart Center staff, Fellowship faculty and past Fellows. Selection is not based on any single factor. Judges’ consider a variety of factors, with an emphasis on whether applicants:

• demonstrate consistent and thoughtful journalistic engagement with issues of violence, conflict, tragedy and their aftermath;
• have demonstrated journalistic excellence and leadership;
• will likely benefit personally and professionally from the Fellowship experience and contribute meaningfully to the program.

Other considerations may include geographic and other diversity, and overall group composition.

The judging committee will review applications and select 12 fellows for 2016-2017. Selected fellows will be notified by email in early-November.

Number of Awardees: Several

Value of Programme: The Ochberg Fellowship covers roundtrip travel, lodging, meals and expenses directly related to participation. The program does not cover travel or health insurance, additional nights of lodging beyond the Fellowship’s duration or ground transportation in fellows’ home cities.

Fellows attend an intensive weeklong program of seminars held at Columbia University in New York City. Program activities include briefings by prominent interdisciplinary experts in the trauma and mental health fields; conversations with journalist colleagues on issues of ethics, craft and practice, and and a variety of other opportunities for intellectual engagement and peer learning.

Duration of Programme: The program will be held from January 16 – 21, 2017

How to Apply: Click here to apply.

Visit Programme Webpage for details

Award Provider: The Dart Center for Trauma in Journalism