New NPR: Reducing the Salience of Nuclear Weapons

Manpreet Sethi


As was expected with the arrival of President Trump to the White House, he put all US foreign policy issues under review. He has also called for a new Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) that is likely to be announced in 2018. The last NPR was brought out under the watch of former President Barack Obama in 2010 and much has changed since then, particularly in US-Russia relations. The last NPR had downgraded the threat from near peers such as Russia, reducing the need for retaining the kind of deterrence strategies that had been pursued during the Cold War years. Instead, the challenge of securing available nuclear material and technology worldwide in order to minimise, if not obviate, the risk of nuclear terrorism had been upgraded to the highest level. 

Accordingly, President Obama invested in Nuclear Security Summits even as he reduced the role of nuclear weapons in his national security strategy. In doing so, Obama had reversed some of the recommendations of the earlier NPR brought out by his predecessor in 2002. Drafted under President Bush, the previous NPR had promoted a unilateralist US posture premised on the idea of nuclear pre-emption, support for development of new types of nuclear weapons, retention of the option of nuclear testing, and pursuit of missile defence. While it had reduced the number of US nuclear weapons, it had contributed significantly to increasing the salience of these weapons. President Trump might end up taking the US down that path again as he has mandated the Pentagon to get him a nuclear arsenal that is “safe, secure, effective, reliable and aptly tailored to deter 21st century threats and reassure allies.”

While presidential preferences reflect significantly in the nature of the NPR, it is also influenced by the opposing pulls and pushes arising from the interests and concerns of the many stakeholders in the US nuclear arsenal. Concluded after several rounds of inter-agency deliberations, the NPR encapsulates many interests. Prima facie it appears that the Trump NPR will not draw away from the modernisation of the US arsenal that President Obama had approved before demitting office. It is likely to retain a strong focus on US nuclear weapons in order to handle the new threats that have emerged in the form of a more muscular Russia, a more assertive China, a more unpredictable DPRK and an Iran whose long-term intentions the US is still worried about. Given his own proclivity for military might, Trump is unlikely to change course unless some real breakthroughs become possible in the relationships with Russia, China and DPRK. Such possibilities look absolutely bleak at this time. Rather, all indications are that nuclear weapons states are moving towards modernising their arsenals and showcasing nuclear capabilities - in military parades and through cavalier statements. Not surprising then that several analysts are arguing in favour of retaining nuclear capability as a means of credible deterrence and dissuasion against proliferation. Amassing unlimited nuclear power is seen as being more effective to deter enemies, reassure allies, and to dissuade potential proliferators by giving them no hope “of ever achieving nuclear parity with the US.” Trump has made it clear that he is willing to race anyone on nuclear weapons and remain “on top of the pack.” 

While such bluster appears to be the order of the day, these arguments certainly have an adverse impact on international security. As officials prepare the NPR, it may help to remember three things. One, enemies are definitely deterred by the other side's military might but there is no proof that the promise of unlimited nuclear power deters more. Deterrence is a function of many sources and influences including, most importantly, the value at stake. Therefore, when a country attaches a great value to something – territory, survival, or stature – it is unlikely to be deterred even by the threat of nuclear devastation. The desire to possess unlimited nuclear power is a meaningless exercise since for those who want to be deterred, even a few would be enough; and for those who cannot be deterred, even an unlimited nuclear arsenal would be futile. 

Two, nuclear parity is hardly a pre-requisite for credible nuclear deterrence. Deterrence is based on the ability to inflict 'unacceptable damage' and hence is dependent on the unacceptability threshold of a country. There can never be symmetry in these thresholds and some countries could be willing to allow more damage to themselves - including accepting visions of more ‘dying beautifully’ - than others. Equivalence is not required in the nuclear game; not between US and Russia, or US and China. Therefore, an arms race in nuclear warheads is not only unnecessary but also damaging.

Three, far from dissuading proliferation, a commitment to hold on to nuclear weapons infinitely is certain to fuel more proliferation. History illustrates that in order to deter nuclear weapons, a rival has but to acquire the same class of weapons. How then can proliferation be stopped? This is especially so when countries like DPRK have demonstrated that very few weapons are actually needed to achieve a range of objectives such as guarding against regime change, driving a hard bargain, or altering even a big nuclear power’s foreign policy.  Did the US not say early in 2006 that the “US would never live” with a nuclear DPRK? In fact, it has been doing so for the last decade and more.

The dangers arising from the presence of nuclear weapons are many: the risk of nuclear exchange, inadvertent escalation, miscalculation, unauthorised use, the threat of loose nukes, and above all, nuclear proliferation with its attendant risks. Moving to nuclear infinity means living with them in perpetuity. 

The US would do well to heed these risks and recognise the need for accepting and imposing certain mutual limits on weapons and testing. President Obama's dictum was no new nuclear warheads, capabilities, or missions. Retaining this basic thought would not only indicate fiscal prudence, which should appeal to the business-minded Trump, but also lead to better international security. Even if the international climate is averse to the idea of the elimination of nuclear weapons right now, attempts at reducing their salience through a number of bilateral and multilateral initiatives should be the priority. Moving towards more and more advanced capabilities to counter the adversary’s actions could only lead to more security dilemmas. Political dialogue coupled with downplaying military might can be the only win-win solution for the current slew of challenges.

African Development Bank Agriculture Fast Track (AFT) Fund for African Entrepreneurs 2017

Application Deadline: 16th May 2017

Eligible Countries: Benin, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal and Tanzania.

About the Award: The AFT Fund is a multi-donor trust fund managed by the African Development Bank with funding support from the US government represented by USAID (US$ 12 million), the Danish Government represented by DANIDA (US$ 1.8 million) and the Swedish Government represented by SIDA (US$ 10 million). It was launched on 8 May 2013 with initial funding amounting to US$ 23.80 million. The AFT is housed at the Agriculture and Agro-Industry department (OSAN) of the African Development Bank.

The AFT will provide grant funding for the initial project development costs of a broad range of agriculture infrastructure projects spanning the entire value chain – from production to market. These can emanate from the private or public sector and from local or international businesses. The types of projects envisioned range from rural feeder roads to agro-processing and marketing facilities to out-grower schemes. The emphasis will be on projects that contribute to food security and support to smallholders.

Type: Entrepreneurship

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Program: US$ 23.8 million

Eligibility: Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) in the agriculture sector, government agencies preparing agriculture infrastructure projects, non-governmental and civil society organizations such as farmer organizations and agriculture Fund Managers with clients seeking last mile financing or advisory services to formulate bankable agricultural development proposals.

Eligibility Screening: Applicants are required to answer ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ 6 to questions outlined in the Eligibility Screening. Only grant applicants who pass the Eligibility Screening will have access to the Concept Note Submission stage.

Selection: This stage is preceded by the Eligibility Screening stage. Applicants who pass the Eligibility Screening stage will have 2 weeks to submit a Concept Note through the grant application portal on this website. Applicants will be informed of the evaluation results of their Concept Notes within 4 weeks after the Concept Notes submission.

How to Apply: This is preceded by the Concept Note submission stage. Only applicants whose Concept Notes pass the selection criteria will be invited within 4 weeks to submit a Full Technical Application. Applicants will be informed of the evaluation results of their Full Technical Application within 6 weeks after the Full Technical Application submission.

Visit Program Webpage for details

Award Providers: US government represented by USAID, the Danish Government represented by DANIDA and the Swedish Government represented by SIDA.

Carnegie/University of Cape Town Postdoctoral and Early-Career Research Fellowships 2017

Application Deadline: 23rd May 2017

Eligible Countries: All African countries

To be taken at (country): University of Cape Town, South Africa

About the Award: The Carnegie Corporation has provided the University of Cape Town (UCT) with a grant to strengthen research leadership capacity in Africa through funding support for African scientists. Research Fellowships are being offered to support seven (7) Postdoctoral Fellows and four (4) Early-Career Researchers, to undertake infectious disease research projects affiliated with UCT’s Institute of Infectious Disease and Molecular Medicine (IDM). The intention is to develop a cohort of emerging academics and provide support for those transitioning to independent academic scientist positions so as to grow the next generation of academics and strengthen higher education in Africa.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 

Postdoctoral Fellowships: Applications for the Postdoctoral Fellowships are invited from candidates who:

• • have previously been awarded a Carnegie PhD or Postdoctoral Fellowship through the Next Generation of Academics in Africa (NGAA) programme;
• • are a national of any African country;
• • achieved their doctoral degree no more than 5 years ago and/or have completed no more than 2 years of postdoctoral training; and
• • are currently registered or intend to register as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at UCT, linked* to the IDM.

Conditions of Award: Successful candidates will be required to:

• • register as a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at UCT, linked* to the IDM;
• • enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with her/his Sponsor and adhere to the plans and agreements therein; and
• • comply with the UCT’s approved policies, procedures, and practices for the postdoctoral sector

Early-Career Fellowships: Applications for the Early-Career Fellowships are invited from candidates who:

• • have previously been awarded a Carnegie PhD or Postdoctoral Fellowship through the Next Generation of Academics in Africa (NGAA) programme;
• • are a national of any African country; and
• • currently hold, or are eligible to be awarded* , a full-time employment contract at UCT, linked** to the IDM, for the duration of the award.

Conditions of Early-Career Fellowship Award:  Successful candidates will be required to:

• • enter into a full-time contract academic appointment at UCT, linked* to the IDM;
• • enter into a Memorandum of Understanding with her/his Sponsor and adhere to the plans and agreements therein; and
• • comply with the UCT’s approved policies, procedures, and practices for the academic sector

Selection Criteria: 

Postdoctoral Fellowships: Applicants applying for their first Postdoctoral Fellowship must have graduated with a Doctoral degree or have submitted a Doctoral thesis for examination (proof of submission required). Existing Carnegie Postdoctoral Fellows can extend their current fellowship up to a maximum of 5 years, or register for a second senior Postdoctoral Fellowship.

Early-Career Fellowships: Applicants for the Early-Career Fellowships are expected to have started making important research contributions and begun to drive their own research (usually evidenced by publications), but require additional support to lead their own independent research group. For these candidates, a minimum of two years’ postdoctoral experience is required, except in the case of clinician scientists – we encourage applications from clinicians who hold, or do not yet hold, a PhD, with the latter on the understanding that they would register for a PhD. Applications will be assessed based on the candidate’s vision, their specific research plan, and its innovation/novelty. Awards will be made based on excellence of the ideas and evidence of appropriate support structures.

Number of Awards:  seven (7) Postdoctoral Fellows and four (4) Early-Career Researchers

Value and Duration of Program: The Postdoctoral Fellowships are valued at R250,000 p/a and the Early-Career Fellowships at R500,000 p/a. Fellowships are initially awarded for one (1) year, and are renewable up to three (3) years total, subject to satisfactory academic progress, compliance with the conditions of award, and on the availability of funds.

How to Apply: Applicants are required to submit:

• • a completed application form (see below);
• • PhD certificate or equivalent documentation (including proof of MBChB where applicable)

Enquiries and requests for application forms should be directed to Ms Jacqui Steadman (Email: jacqui.steadman@uct.ac.za). Completed applications are to be submitted to the same no later than Friday 23 May 2017.

Visit Program Webpage for details

Award Provider:  Carnegie Corporation

Important Notes: The Carnegie Corporation funding is aimed at advancing equity. For these awards, we will therefore seek particularly to attract black South Africans and candidates from other African countries.

Stanford University MBA Fellowship for African Students (Fully-funded) 2017/2018

Application Deadline: 7th June 2017 (5:00pm Pacific Time)

Offered Annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: African countries

To be taken at (Country): Stanford University, USA

Eligible Field of Study: Courses offered at the University.

About the Award: Stanford University is offering an MBA Fellowship program to eight Africans who wish to obtain a Stanford MBA degree. The program is set annually to assist citizens from Africa study at the university, acquire essential skill sets for the standard duration of two years and return to the continent, to work in vital positions that directly impact and improve Africa.

Type: MBA Fellowship

Eligibility

1. To demonstrate the primary reason for the program, applicants must be ready to dedicate at least two (2) years to the development of the economy of Africa after the MBA program.
2. The MBA Fellowship will be awarded to Final-year undergraduates and graduates of institutions in Africa as well as African citizens who studied in countries outside of Africa.
3. To be eligible for the fellowship, applicants must also apply to the Stanford MBA Program.

Selection Criteria:

1. Merit
2. Commitment to developing Africa
3. Financial need

Number of Awardees: Eight (8)

Value of Scholarship: $160,000

Duration of Scholarship: Two years

How to Apply:

1. One-page resume or curriculum vitae (CV)
2. A 250-word essay on how applicant plans to effect change in Africa
3. Financial information
4. Awards and honours
5. History of employment
6. Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT) and/or Graduate Record Examination (GRE)

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Stanford University, United States of America.

GLG Social Impact Fellowships for Individuals and Organisations Interested in Social Work 2017

Application Deadline: 17th July, 2017

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Fellows and organisations in Countries in Africa: South Africa, Ghana, Kenya and Rwanda

To be taken at (country): Fellow’s Home country and USA

About the Award: The GLG Social Impact Fellowship leverages GLG’s learning platform to help top social entrepreneurs answer their organization’s critical strategic and operational questions, at no cost. Through the two-year Fellowship, ambitious and visionary nonprofit and social enterprise leaders learn in tailored interactions with experts across GLG’s membership and with each other.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: Fellows are leaders with strong records and visions for their organizations. They have great teams and do something innovative that’s likely to scale. They are personally committed to learning, excited to grow professionally, and articulate ambitions for their organizations’ growth which GLG is positioned to support.

Selection Criteria: Characteristics critical to the success of the Social Impact Fellowship programme which will be used as criteria for selection are:

Fellows

• CEOs/Founder that is committed to leading the organization during the fellowship.
• S/he understands the value of GLG, can articulate use cases, and is open to a thought partner in GLG and its experts.
• S/he is relentlessly seeking big impact through their organization, is curious and excited about learning, is open to feedback, and has developed a team and habits to allow for strategic thinking and pursuit of the next phase at the organization

Organizations

• Eligible Organizations
  • Nonprofit organizations with minimum operating budget of $1M and maximum of $12M
  • Mission-driven for-profits with annual operating budget under $500,000
  • Hybrid organizations of comparable size
• At an inflection point
  • Organizations that are a good fit for GLG’s Fellowship are no longer in early stages of development and leadership team members are ready to pursue ambitious growth plans. They have proven the concept of their impact and implemented their program in an initial (set of) site(s). When they come to GLG, they are looking to scale significantly, launch a new product based on the core principles of their initial model, or otherwise iterate on the impact they’ve established to date. Think of it as an organization’s move from 2.0 to 3.0.
• Average 3-5 years in operation
• Minimum 5 full-time staff
• Established leadership team supporting key strategic planning and execution

Number of Awardees: Several

Value of Fellowship : The Fellowship begins with an in-person convening October 16-18, 2017 in Austin, Texas., where Fellows learn how to use the GLG platform. Fellows then work with GLG to identify the top challenges facing their organizations and set learning objectives to meet those challenges.

Duration of Fellowship : Two years

How to Apply: Visit Fellowship page to apply

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Gerson Lehrman Group

IRDR Young Scientists Program for International Researchers 2017

Application Deadline: 3oth June 2017

Eligible Countries: All

About the Award: The Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction (SFDRR) calls for enhanced role of science and technology for evidence based decision-making. It also urges the need for innovation and partnership, which is linked to practise and diverse stakeholders. IRDR, with its mandate for integrated and trans-disciplinary research, would like to promote capacity building of young professionals, and encourage them to undertake innovative and needs based research which makes science-policy and science-practice linkages stronger.

Objectives

• Increase awareness among young scientists about Sendai Framework implementation and provide opportunities for further engagement through the Young Scientists Program on DRR.
• Collate existing research knowledge on DRR and identify research gaps and priorities in relation to the Sendai Framework Priorities for Action
• Identify opportunities to fund continued multi-disciplinary research by young scientists and early career researchers
• Provide technical support to promising young researchers in DRR fields
• Build and foster strong and dynamic networks among worldwide experts and institutions in DRR fields
• Develop, over time, a community of high-quality young professionals that can provide support for policy making decisions related to DRR

Offered Since: 2016

Type: Research, Fellowship

Eligibility: To be an IRDR Young Scientist, following are the necessary criteria:

• Age: Less than 40 years on the date of application
• Nationality: There is no bar on nationality
• Affiliation: The candidate needs to be affiliated with an academic program (either master or doctorate) either as a student or as a young faculty.
• Research subject: The subject of research needs to be related to disaster risk reduction and its link to broader environment and development issues.
• Endorsement: must be endorsed by academic supervisor (for student) or head of the department /graduate school (for the young faculties).

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Program: Once selected, as fellow can be an “IRDR Young Scientist” for a period of maximum three years. The fellow will receive the following benefits:

• Link to IRDR network of professionals and practitioners
• Access to IRDR Scientific Committee (SC) for academic support / advice
• Participation in IRDR related training programs (there would be a different selection process for each of the training program)
• A certificate for IRDR Young Scientist upon successful completion

Duration of Program: Minimum 1 year, and maximum 3 years. The applicant can make their choice, and the final decision will be made by IRDR.

How to Apply: There will be a selection process based on the eligibility criteria, and once finally selected by IRDR, the applicant would get a notification. The call for application is twice per year.

The applicants should submit the following materials:

1. Application Form( Young Scientists Programme Application Form)
2. Detailed Curriculum Vitae
3. Detailed Research Plan (10 pages Maximum)
4. Recommendation/Endorsement Letter from the Supervisor
5. Copy of Student/Faculty ID Card

The applicants should submit the materials to connect@irdrinternational.org before June 30, 2017.

Visit Program Webpage for details

Award Provider: Integrated Research on Disaster Risk

Association of African Universities (AAU) Graduate Internship Grants 2017

Application Deadline: Friday 19th May, 2017

Eligible Countries: African countries

About the Award: Through support from its development partners, namely African Capacity Development Foundation (ACBF) and Swedish International Development Agency (Sida), the AAU has secured funds for its member universities in good standing (whose annual subscription payment to AAU is up to date) to offer small grants of up to US$600 per student for graduate internships.

Type: Internship, Grants

Eligibility: 

• Grant applicants should be students pursuing post-graduate degree programmes. Applicants should note that the grants are for training purposes only and not meant for the completion of theses or dissertations.
• Applicants shall commit to undertake an internship programme for a period between twelve (12) and twenty-four (24 weeks).
• Applications should be supported with an authorisation note from the Head of Department of the applicant’s university as well as an official acceptance letter from the establishment wishing to host the intern.
• All applicants should submit a detailed curriculum vitae.
• A detailed but confidential supervisory report would be required from the host institution on the progression of the applicant during the period of internship, and from the university of the applicant on academic progress after the period of internship.
• Past beneficiaries of the AAU Internship Scheme are not eligible to apply.
• Consideration would be given to applicants who have no practical work experience.

Selection Criteria: Selection of successful applications would be based on a quota system revolving around gender (at least 40% of beneficiaries should be females); country (not more than 10 applicants per country) and language (at least 30% from Francophone institutions).

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Program: small grants of up to US$600 per student for graduate internships.

Duration of Program: Between twelve (12) and twenty-four (24 weeks).

How to Apply: Students are to apply online at:

https://www.aau.org/subs/grin/

Visit Program Webpage for details

Award Providers: African Capacity Development Foundation (ACBF) and Swedish International Development Agency (Sida)

Adelaide Scholarships International (ASI) Australia for Masters & Doctoral Studies 2017/2018

Application Deadlines:

• Round 1: 31st August 2017
• Round 2: 31st January 2018
• Round 3: 30th April 2018

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Field of Study: Courses offered at the university.

About Scholarship: The University of Adelaide offers a scholarships scheme for international students undertaking postgraduate research study for Master’s and Doctoral degrees. The purpose of the financial award programme is to attract high quality overseas postgraduate students to areas of research strength in the University of Adelaide to support its research effort.

Type: Masters & Doctoral

Selection Criteria : The selection and ranking of applicants within the University of Adelaide is undertaken by the Graduate Scholarships Committee, using the criteria of academic merit and research potential.

Eligibility

• In order to be eligible applicants are required to have successfully completed at least the equivalent of an Australian First Class Honours degree (this is a four year degree with a major research project in the final year). All qualifying programs of study must be successfully completed.
• Scholarships will be awarded on academic merit and research potential. Extra-curricular achievements are not considered.
• International applicants must not hold a research qualification regarded by the University of Adelaide to be equivalent to an Australian Research Doctorate degree or, if undertaking a Research Masters degree, not hold a research qualification regarded by the University of Adelaide to be equivalent to or higher than an Australian Research Masters degree.
• International applicants who have not provided evidence of their meeting the minimum English language proficiency requirements for direct entry by the scholarship closing date, or who have completed a Pre-Enrolment English Program to meet the entry requirements for the intended program of study, are not eligible.
• Candidates are required to enrol in the University of Adelaide as ‘international students’ and must maintain ‘international student’ status for the duration of their enrolment in the University.
• International applicants are not eligible if they have already commenced the degree for which they are seeking an award, unless they can establish that they were unable to apply in the previous round.
• Scholarships holders must commence study at the University of Adelaide in the semester the scholarship is offered.
• Applicants who applied and were eligible for consideration in an international scholarship round, and were unsuccessful, will automatically be reconsidered in the following international scholarship round, assuming they hold a valid offer of candidature for that intake. An applicant who has been considered in 2 rounds cannot be reconsidered in any future scholarship rounds.

Number of Scholarships: Not specified

Value of Scholarship:

• Course tuition fees for two years for a Masters degree by Research and three years for a Doctoral research degree (an extension is possible for doctoral programs only),
• An annual living allowance ($26,288 in 2016) for two years for a Masters degree by Research and three years for a Doctoral research degree (an extension is possible for doctoral programs only), and
• For Postgraduate Research (Subclass 574) visa holders the award provides compulsory standard Overseas Student Health Cover (OSHC) Worldcare policy for the student and their spouse and dependents (if any) for the standard duration of the student visa.  It does not cover the additional 6 month extended student visa period post thesis submission. If the award holder does not hold a subclass 574 visa then he/she is responsible for the cost of health insurance.

Duration of Scholarship: 2 years for Masters; 3 years for Doctoral

Eligible Countries: All countries except Australia and New Zealand

To be taken at (country): University of Adelaide, Australia

How to Apply

To apply, you have to submit a formal application for Admission and a Scholarship via an online application system. There is no application fee.

Visit scholarship webpage for details

Sponsors: University of Adelaide, Australia

Important Notes: The offer of a scholarship is contingent upon a student not being offered another award by the Commonwealth of Australia, the University of Adelaide, or an overseas sponsor. The University reserves the right to withdraw an offer of a scholarship at any time prior to enrolment if it is advised that an awardee has been offered a scholarship equal to or in excess of the financial value of the award offered by the University.

Google Global Good Fellowship for Entrepreneurs 2018

Application Deadline: 30th June 2017

Eligible Countries: All

To be taken at (country): Washington, D. C., US

About the Award: The Global Good Fund Fellowship is a 12-month program supporting the leadership development of young social entrepreneurs across the globe. The Global Good Fund develops these innovators by pairing them with executives who serve as Mentors, and by providing leadership assessment resources, a network of peers, sector expertise, and targeted financial capital.

The result is empowered leaders who scale their social enterprises and ultimately deliver sustainable social impact. We believe growing leaders is the most effective strategy for solving complex social problems and achieving global good.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: In order to be considered for the fellowship, candidates must meet the following minimum requirements:

• Enterprise that the candidate leads is at least one-year old;
• Enterprise must have at least one full-time employee in addition to the candidate;
• Candidate is committed full‐time to running his/her enterprise;
• Candidate is under 40 years of age (if 40 or older, explain rationale for joining fellowship);
• Candidate should not be currently receiving formal coaching/mentoring support;
• Candidate has to be in a position where s/he has decision making power.

Candidates who meet the requirements will be invited to participate in Phase II of the application process.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Program: Following a rigorous five-stage process, selected Global Good Fund Fellows embark on a structured 12-month journey of experiential learning, executive mentoring and that leverages proprietary leadership development tools and methods honed since 2012. At our core is The Global Good Fund 360 MIRROR – the first evidence-based leadership assessment created specifically for social entrepreneurs. Our proven leadership development tools and services are also available to individuals, social enterprise organizations, NPOs and impact-driven corporations.

Each Fellow receives a leadership development grant of up to $10,000. These funds are used explicitly for LDP implementation and leadership development with a special focus on experiential learning.

Duration of Program: 12 months (Jan 1-Dec 31 2018)

How to Apply: Apply here

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Award Provider: The Global Good Fund

The World For Ransome: The Effects of Wannacry

Binoy Kampmark

What a stealthy bugger of a problem. Malware deftly delivered, locking the system by encrypting files and making them otherwise impossible to access unless a fee is paid. A form of data  hijacking that can only be admired for its ease of execution, for its viral-like replication that seeks, even hunts, vulnerable “unpatched” computer systems.

The global information environment is well and truly primed for plunder, vulnerable to such malicious “worms” as WannaCry.  Each age creates the next circumstance for profit, often outside the boundaries deemed acceptable at the time.  In a networked age reliant on huge quantities of data, times are good for the intrepid.

The weekend reporting on the WannaCry ransomeware worm was filled with predictable gruesomeness, suggesting that the unfortunates turning up to work on a Monday could well discover they were unable to access work files.

Much of the damage had already been done, with notable targets being the National Health System in Britain, and the Spanish telecommunications company Telefonica. In Britain, patients had to be relocated, and scheduled operations and treatment delayed if not cancelled altogether. Crisis meetings were held by members of the May government.  As one doctor put it in eerily apocalyptic fashion, “our hospital is down.”

Another notable country target was Russia, including networks within the Interior Ministry, suggesting that the cyber misfits in question may have overstretched in their enthusiasm. Russia tends to figure, as it does in other jottings of demonology, as a place of sanctuary for the cyber crooked, bastion where IT sorties can be launched.  But not now.

More useful, if sobering analysis, came from Nicholas Weaver, who noted that the strength of the attack was its multi-vector nature.  “If a targeted user receives a worm-laden email and clicks on the attachable executable, the worm starts running.” (Computer speak tends to get mangled in its descriptions, since worms would otherwise crawl. But not wCry, which does its damage at an enthusiastic gallop.)

This delightful worm capitalises on a vulnerability evident in the network protocol in Microsoft Windows termed Server Message Block.  This is where the ransomeware does its bit, encrypting the files in question, and locking out users on pain of ransom.

Much in this saga is based on systems that were never reformed.  UK Health Secretary Jeremy Hunt had been badgered by his shadow counterpart, Jonathan Ashworth, that the NHS’s computer systems were dangerously outdated and susceptible to attack.

While victim blaming is second nature to this trade, Weaver’s salient observation is that the computer industry is just as responsible, if not more so.  The persistent use of executable attachments should trigger liability, if not shame.

Developers and members of industry, in other words, should be made the classroom dunces.  “Our bottom line up front,” claim Ben Buchanan, Stuart Russell and Michael Sulmeyer for Lawfare, “is that, VEP (Vulnerabilities Equities Process) or no VEP, today’s ransomeware attack highlights the risks of relying on software that is no longer supported by its developer (like windows XP) and of not applying patches that the developer makes available (like MS17-010).”

This brings us to the body that keeps giving, albeit indirectly and haphazardly: the US National Security Agency.  In April, a group calling itself Shadow Brokers released a set of tools pilfered from the NSA, including the vulnerability occasioned by SMB.

The Microsoft public relations machine went through the motions of putting out the fires, explaining that the company had already dealt with the vulnerabilities (patched them, if you will) in March, including a patch against the spread of the WannaCry ransomeware.  Much of this was occasioned by a helpful disclosure to the company from US government sources.

This entire process revealed a certain dance between government agencies and vendors in the exchange system known as the VEP. Through this tense understanding, the US government designates which discovered software vulnerabilities should be passed on to vendors.

The vendors, in turn, apply the relevant, protective patches, though whether this is actually done is quite another matter.  There is also every chance that the US government will refuse to reveal such a vulnerability in the first place. Being in the business of hacking, some cards will be well and truly hidden, to be procured when required.  Such an instance arose in 2014, when the Heartbleed vulnerability was exposed to much fanfare.  The response from US government officials was one of implausible deniability.

Entities such as the Patients’ Association in Britain have condemned the outfit behind the attack, but also noted that the entire establishment remained green and inadequately prepared. Unprotected and unbacked, software left unsupported by developers is fit for the dustbin of history.  In the meantime, the catastrophe stemming from future attacks is easy to envisage.

How Al-Nusra Front Split Up From Islamic State?

Nauman Sadiq

Since the beginning of the Syrian conflict in August 2011 to April 2013, Islamic State and al-Nusra Front (currently Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, JFS) were a single organization that chose the banner of “Jabhat al-Nusra.” Although the current al-Nusra Front is led by Abu Mohammad al-Julani but he was appointed as the emir of al-Nusra Front by Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, the leader of Islamic State, in January 2012.

Thus, the current al-Nusra Front is only a splinter group of Islamic State which split from its parent organization in April 2013 over a dispute between the leaders of the two organizations.

In March 2011, protests began in Syria against the government of Bashar al-Assad. In the following months, violence between demonstrators and security forces led to a gradual militarization of the conflict. In August 2011, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was based in Iraq, began sending Syrian and Iraqi jihadists experienced in guerilla warfare across the border into Syria to establish an organization inside the country.

Led by a Syrian known as Abu Mohammad al-Julani, the group began to recruit fighters and establish cells throughout the country. On 23 January 2012, the group announced its formation as Jabhat al-Nusra.

In April 2013, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi released an audio statement in which he announced that al-Nusra Front had been established, financed and supported by the Islamic State of Iraq. Al-Baghdadi declared that the two groups were merging under the name “Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.” The leader of al-Nusra Front, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, issued a statement denying the merger and complaining that neither he nor anyone else in al-Nusra’s leadership had been consulted about it.

Al-Qaeda Central’s leader, Ayman al Zawahiri, tried to mediate the dispute between al-Baghdadi and al-Julani but eventually, in October 2013, he endorsed al-Nusra Front as the official franchise of al-Qaeda Central in Syria. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, however, defied the nominal authority of al-Qaeda Central and declared himself as the caliph of Islamic State of Iraq and Syria.

Keeping this background in mind, it becomes amply clear that a single militant organization operated in Syria and Iraq under the leadership of al-Baghdadi until April 2013, which chose the banner of al-Nusra Front, and that the current emir of the subsequent breakaway faction of al-Nusra Front, al-Julani, was actually al-Baghdadi’s deputy in Syria.

Thus, the Islamic State operated in Syria since August 2011 under the designation of al-Nusra Front and it subsequently changed its name to Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in April 2013, after which it overran al-Raqqa in the summer of 2013, then it captured parts of Deir el-Zor and fought battles against the alliance of Kurds and the Syrian regime in al-Hasakah. And in January 2014 it overran Fallujah and parts of Ramadi in Iraq and reached the zenith of its power when it captured Mosul in June 2014.

Moreover, many biased political commentators of the mainstream media deliberately try to muddle the reality in order to link the emergence of Islamic State to the ill-conceived invasion of Iraq by the Bush Administration in 2003. Their motive behind this chicanery is to absolve the Obama Administration’s policy of nurturing militants against the Syrian regime, since the beginning of the Syrian civil war until June 2014, when the Islamic State overran Mosul and the Obama Administration made a volte-face on its previous policy of indiscriminate support to Syrian opposition and declared a war against a faction of Syrian opposition: that is, the Islamic State.

Additionally, such Syria “experts” also try to find the roots of Islamic State in al-Qaeda in Iraq; however, the insurgency in Iraq died down after “the Iraq surge” of 2007. Al-Qaeda in Iraq became an impotent organization after the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in June 2006, and the subsequent surge of troops in Iraq by the Bush Administration.

The re-eruption of insurgency in Iraq has been the spillover effect of nurturing militants in Syria against the Assad regime, when the Islamic State overran Fallujah and parts of Ramadi in January 2014 and subsequently captured Mosul in June 2014. The borders between Syria and Iraq are quite porous and it’s impossible to contain the flow of militants and arms between the two countries. The Obama Administration’s policy of providing money, arms and training to Syrian militants in the training camps located in the border regions of Turkey and Jordan was bound to backfire sooner or later.

Regarding the rebranding of al-Julani’s Nusra Front to “Jabhat Fateh al-Sham” in July 2016 and supposed severing of ties with al-Qaeda Central, it’s only a nominal difference because al-Nusra Front never had any organizational and operational ties with al-Qaeda Central and even their ideologies are poles apart.

Al-Qaeda Central is basically a transnational terrorist organization, while al-Nusra Front mostly has regional ambitions limited only to fighting the Assad regime in Syria and its ideology is anti-Shi’a and sectarian. In fact, al-Nusra Front has not only received medical aid and material support from Israel, but some of its operations against the Shi’a-dominated Assad regime in southern Syria were fully coordinated with Israel’s air force.

The purpose behind the rebranding of al-Nusra Front to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham and supposed severing of ties with al-Qaeda Central was to legitimize itself and to make it easier for its patrons to send money and arms. The US blacklisted al-Nusra Front in December 2012 and pressurized Saudi Arabia and Turkey to ban it too. Although al-Nusra Front’s name has been in the list of proscribed organizations of Saudi Arabia and Turkey since 2014, but it has kept receiving money and arms from the Gulf Arab States.

Notwithstanding, excluding the western Mediterranean coast and the adjacent major urban centers controlled by the Syrian regime and the Kurdish-controlled northeastern Syria, I would divide the Syrian theater of proxy wars into three separate and distinct zones of influence:

Firstly, the northern and northwestern zone along the Syria-Turkey border, in and around Aleppo and Idlib, which is under the influence of Turkey and Qatar. Both these countries share the ideology of Muslim Brotherhood and they provide money, training and arms to Sunni Arab jihadist organizations, such as al-Tawhid Brigade, Nour al-Din Zenki Brigade and Ahrar al-Sham, in the training camps located in the border regions of Turkey in collaboration with CIA’s MOM (a Turkish acronym for military operations center).

Secondly, the southern zone of influence along the Syria-Jordan border, in Daraa and Quneitra and as far away as Homs and Damascus. It is controlled by the Saudi-Jordanian camp and they provide money, weapons and training to the Salafist militant groups, such as al-Nusra Front and the Southern Front of the so-called “moderate” Free Syria Army (FSA) in Daraa and Quneitra, and Jaysh al-Islam in the suburbs of Damascus.

Their military strategy is directed by a Military Operations Center (MOC) and training camps located in the border regions of Jordan. Here, let me clarify that this distinction is quite overlapping and heuristic, at best, because al-Nusra’s jihadists have taken part in battles as far away as Idlib and Aleppo.

And finally, the eastern zone of influence along the Syria-Iraq border, in al-Raqqa and Deir al-Zor, which has been controlled by a relatively maverick Iraq-based jihadist outfit, the Islamic State, though it had received funding and weapons from Turkey and the Gulf Arab States before it turned rogue and overran Mosul and Anbar in Iraq.

Thus, leaving the Mediterranean coast and Syria’s border with Lebanon, the Baathist and Shi’a-dominated Syrian regime has been surrounded from all three sides by hostile Sunni forces: Turkey and Muslim Brotherhood in the north, Jordan and the Salafists of the Gulf Arab States in the south and the Sunni Arab-majority regions of Mosul and Anbar in Iraq in the east.