Right-wing government takes shape in Austria

Markus Salzmann

The programme of the new Austrian government will be characterised by cuts to social spending, a strengthening of the internal and external repressive state apparatus, and an intensification of anti-refugee and anti-immigrant policies. Although the coalition talks between the conservative Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) and far-right Freedom Party (FPÖ) are taking place in secret and are yet to be concluded, it is already clear that agreement exists on the key issues.

It is now considered certain that a coalition will be established between the two parties. Immediately after the October 15 election, ÖVP leader Sebastian Kurz initiated talks with the right-wing extremists. Both parties have indicated over recent days that the talks are going well, and backed the initial results.

FPÖ leader Hans-Christian Strache praised the talks on Saturday as a “good process,” adding that “50 percent of the incoming government’s programme will bear the FPÖ’s deep blue signature.” The right-wing extremists’ participation in government has been interpreted by Strache as the “prelude to two to three terms in office.”

For its part, the ÖVP is also expecting a coalition with the FPÖ. ÖVP deputy parliamentary leader August Vöginger stated that he thinks the talks are on the right track.

A possible distribution of government posts is already under way. Kurz as chancellor is prepared to grant the FPÖ several key posts. FPÖ leader Strache is likely to become vice chancellor and interior minister, while former FPÖ presidential candidate Norbert Hofer could head the Foreign Ministry. This would put two of the most right-wing figures within the FPÖ in two of the highest government posts in Austria. Strache’s connections with fascist circles are well documented.

Other potential FPÖ candidates for ministerial posts include the 25-year-old leader of the party in Salzburg, Mallene Svazek, and Dagmar Belakowitsch. Svazek is to assume control of the Ministry for Social Services. Svazek was personal assistant and political adviser to Harald Wilimsky, a rabid anti-Semite.

Belakowitsch, a close Strache ally, regularly rails against foreigners and asylum-seekers. She called for the use of military vehicles to deport refugees, saying, “They can scream as loud as they want in there.” Belakowitsch is to lead the Health Ministry. The ministries of transport and sport will also go to the FPÖ.

The ÖVP is expected to take control of the defence, economy and finance ministries. An additional post is to be created for Josef Moser, who is to make Austria “fit for the future.”

A jurist, Moser has enjoyed a long career in the FPÖ. He was recruited to the party in 1991 by then-FPÖ leader Jörg Haider, and led its main office for a year. Between 1992 and 2002, he was the FPÖ’s parliamentary leader. In 2004, he switched to head the Austrian court of auditors and repeatedly made public appeals for drastic budget cuts.

He has now been elected to parliament as a non-party candidate in third place on the Sebastian Kurz List—i.e., the ÖVP. He will press ahead with the destruction of the social state, which big business has been demanding for some time. There is too much money stuck in state structures, said Moser. Austria has an “efficiency problem.”

A centrepiece of the government’s programme will be a drastic package of austerity measures. The current intention is to reduce the national debt from 82 percent of GDP to around 70 percent. To remove burdens from business, tax rates are to be cut from 43 percent to 40 percent. This measure alone will cost some €4 billion. The government wants “as little regulation as possible and the maximum amount of freedom,” Kurz announced.

This is to be achieved above all through cuts to social spending. There are rumours that foreigners and asylum seekers will only be able to claim benefits like social assistance and child care benefits after a five-year period. At the same time, nationwide rules for social assistance will be introduced. The model to be adopted in this regard is the so-called “social assistance light” for asylum seekers in Upper Austria and Lower Austria, where non-Austrians receive only a fraction of the benefit given to Austrians. This will be the first step to cutting benefits for all.

However, a government led by Kurz and Strache will go much further. Negotiators in Vienna are “fiercely determined,” to undermine the influence of interest groups, wrote the web site news.at recently in a piece headlined, “The end of social partnership.” The influence of trade unions and workers’ representative bodies will be reduced, so that the hollowing out of collective agreements and labour laws can proceed without their involvement.

Tens of thousands being dropped from US student loan relief program

J. Cooper 

October marked 10 years since the George W. Bush administration enacted the Public Service Loan Forgiveness (PSLF) program as an incentive to young college graduates to pursue careers as teachers, in government, or at non-profit institutions. The program was advertised as a way for some recent graduates to see an exit sign on their student loan debt.

In 2006, average student loan debt for undergraduates was just under $20,000. For graduate students it was nearly $40,000. For the class of 2016, average undergraduate debt had climbed to $37,172. For graduate students, the average is considerably higher. In that same period, college tuition has increased 63 percent.

Over the past 10 years over half a million graduates have signed up for PSLF. However, according to a recent article in Rolling Stone, more than half of those have been disqualified for myriad bureaucratic reasons. Last month a total of only 137 individuals were deemed eligible to have the balance of their student loans wiped clean. Thousands are just finding out that their years of paying on time won’t count under the federal forgiveness plan because they took out the wrong type of loan, their employer has been disqualified, or their original lender sold the loan to an unqualified institution. President Trump’s budget proposes eliminating the program entirely for borrowers after July 2018.

As many of these borrowers are now discovering, if your employer hasn’t provided the correct proof of employment in a qualifying position, if the loan you are carrying is not through the sole federal direct-loan program, if you have missed even one of the 120 payments required within the 10-year span, or if you paid extra in one payment and skipped the next, you can be disqualified.

A New York Times article from October 27 profiles a 46-year-old teacher who enrolled in the PSLF plan the year it was announced, thinking he had done everything according to the rules, only to discover in 2015 that he had been enrolled in a “particular type of ineligible payment plan and would need to start his decade of payments all over again.” One of the online comments from November 5 announces that several class action suits have been launched on behalf of borrowers who were not informed their loans were out of compliance.

Another commenter says: “By the time I’d learned that [one of the loans did not qualify], my loans had ballooned to $90k because I was only paying interest on them with 8.5 percent. … that nonsense impacted my career choices (deciding to stay in nonprofits to secure the forgiveness), my retirement funds, and my sanity. I will end up paying more than $55K in interest on my $60k loan. Truly criminal.”

Among the thousands disqualified or affected are teachers, doctors, lawyers, even police. A lawsuit by the American Bar Association was filed earlier this year after the Department of Education (DoE) announced it had “rescinded without explanation the association’s status as a qualified employer under PSLF and notified ABA employees and others who had previously been approved for participation in the program that they no longer qualified,” according to the DoE website.

Most of those applying for the PSLF program are those with postgraduate degrees. Currently there is no limit on the amount a graduate student can borrow, and it is not uncommon for a graduate student to embark on their first job out of school with $100,000 in debt. To discover, after 10 years working at a public service job, known for low salaries, that you don’t qualify for the program after all, not only impacts the financial wellbeing of the individual, but can have serious psychological effects.

Jason Delisle, a resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, a conservative think tank, revealed that when the PSLF program was first created, it was intended to be small and unattractive. “Washington policymakers did not foresee the program growing to its current size. After all, 10 years is a long time to work in a qualifying job, so many experts thought people wouldn’t sign up,” he wrote in Politico in July. “They also thought borrowers were averse to making loan payments linked to their incomes, as hardly anyone enrolled in an earlier version of the government’s income-based repayment plan.”

In fact, Delisle speaks for that section of the ruling elite who are determined that not even a small segment of students in debt will get any relief. Delisle argues that the PSLF program should be eliminated because it encourages graduate students to maximize their debt load, since the larger amount will be forgiven after 10 years. It’s easy for him to ignore the dire consequences for those who get the reality check that they don’t qualify after they have made their regular payments and then face decades of additional payments when they thought they might be able to buy a house or start a family.

As of July this year, the interest rates for Direct Loans increased to 7 percent for graduate students, and 4.45 percent for undergraduates. Trump’s budget proposal includes a provision to eliminate entirely the federal Subsidized Stafford Loan, which has traditionally allowed students to defer payment while enrolled in a college or university, and had a somewhat lower interest rate upon graduation. Another provision proposed in the House version of the next budget would require that all tuition waived, either through a federal program, employer benefit or university tuition waiver, be counted as taxable income.

The overwhelming burden of student debt for borrowers at all levels is becoming worse every year. This past spring, total student loan debt surpassed $1.45 trillion, about $620 billion more than all US credit card debt. Among the 44 million borrowers, the average monthly payment is $351. Trump is proposing to abolish subsidized federal loans and institute a single program for all federal student lending as a single income-based repayment plan at 12.5 percent of adjusted gross income. Today’s recent graduate can look forward to at least half a lifetime of penury as the cost of an undergraduate degree. And for those who can’t afford more than the interest every month, it’s a lifetime.

Currently, 11.2 percent of student loan dollars are in default and another 11 percent are in forbearance (a temporary payment suspension granted at the discretion of the lender while interest continues to accrue). According to the September 28 Washington Post, “millions of people had not made a payment on about $144 billion in federal student loans for at least nine months as of June, a 12 percent increase in defaults from a year earlier.”

Although the default rate has declined slightly from its 14.7 percent peak in fiscal year 2010, it is still well above rates prior to the 2007-2008 mortgage collapse and Wall Street crash—from 8.8 percent in 2009 and 7 percent in 2007. The total number of borrowers in default is at an all-time high, with 1.1 million new borrowers defaulting in 2016.

According to the Department of Education’s latest figures, the third quarter of 2017 saw a major increase in loans going into default for at least a second time. Thirty-thousand borrowers defaulted on $64 million. This was a jump of 7,100 unique loans in just three months. The previous record was set in the first quarter of 2016, with 24,500 borrowers re-defaulting on $57 million.

College graduates face an increasingly bleak future, despite being told that a college education is a necessity to get a “decent” job today. As has been widely reported, Americans between the ages of 18 and 34 are more likely to be living with their parents, rather than a spouse or partner. Employer-paid health care and pension plans are a relic of the past, forcing millions of college graduates to foot the bill for thousands of dollars in expenses in addition to the student loans. The average net worth of the 2016 college graduate is a negative $33,984.

This crushing debt provides fertile hunting grounds for rapacious debt collectors. For the fiscal quarter ending in March 2017, more than $2 billion had been “successfully” recouped for the lenders by 30 national collection agencies. Of this, $182 million was the result of wage garnishment. It should come as no surprise that feelings of despair and suicidal thoughts are so prevalent today.

As the teacher interviewed by Rolling Stone explained, the debt collectors “called day and night.” Calculating his “rehabilitated” debt at over $100,000, he said, “Not one dollar goes toward principal. I will never be able to pay it off. My only hope to escape from this crushing debt is to die.”

Significantly, a recent report by Experian, the consumer credit reporting agency, notes that of the generation of borrowers now making payments, aside from students currently enrolled and thus just beginning to accrue loans, millennials have the highest percentage of past due amounts on loans in repayment (not deferred). Millennials also have the highest number of loans, 4.4 on average. This is also the generation that indicated, by a majority (51 percent) in a recent poll, that they would rather live in a socialist or communist society than under capitalism.

Warrantless spying on US citizens sanctioned by Pentagon, training documents indicate

Zaida Green

Policy and training documents from US intelligence agencies obtained by Human Rights Watch earlier this year authorize warrantless spying on US citizens with no connections to terrorists.

The documents, obtained through a Freedom of Information Act request submitted by Human Rights Watch in January, outline policies and procedures concerning surveillance, retention of collected data and the sharing of information among intelligence agencies.

According to one training module, US citizens and legal residents, even when they have “no specific connection to foreign terrorist(s),” may be categorized as “homegrown violent extremists” (HVEs) and be subjected to targeted warrantless surveillance. Federal law generally prohibits deliberate surveillance of the communications of US persons without a warrant, obtainable only if authorities can show probable cause that the target has committed or is about to commit a crime, or that the target is an agent of a foreign power.

The documents cite persons who commit mass shootings, such as the Orlando nightclub shooting and the San Bernardino workplace shooting, as examples of HVEs, but do not specifically explain how a person is identified as an HVE. A senior Department of Defense (DoD) official who provided comments to Human Rights Watch on the condition of anonymity gave an example of an HVE as someone who was “self-radicalized via the Internet, social media, etc.” and then executed—or only planned—”terrorist acts in furtherance of the ideology or goals of a foreign terrorist group.” The official refused to disclose the government’s criteria for designating a person as an HVE.

Such a provision allows the US government to spy on citizens based “on their beliefs, or what the government thinks they believe, [instead of] specific evidence that gives sufficient reason to think a criminal offense is occurring or that the person is an agent of a foreign power,” pointed out Sarah St. Vincent, US surveillance and national security researcher at Human Rights Watch. “A secret determination that someone’s rights should be curtailed based on undisclosed criteria is incompatible with the rule of law. The government should explain what it’s doing as well as its legal basis for doing it.”

That training module, created for the Air Force Office of Special Investigations, outlines other “key changes” regarding DoD procedures made in August 2016. These include the addition of “shared repositories,” new retention timeframes and extensions for “incidentally” collected data, as well as provisions for “special circumstances collection.” The latter, informally referred to as “bulk data” or “big data” collection in the training module and other documents, points to the routine and institutionalized use of mass surveillance since 2016, when the Obama administration added the category to DoD procedures.

The revised DoD procedures empower intelligence agencies to share “large amounts of unevaluated”—that is, raw and unredacted—data about US persons with other intelligence agencies, security contractors and law enforcement bodies, including local police departments as well as the federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency.

The documents primarily concern the DoD’s interpretation of Executive Order 12333, signed into law by the Reagan administration and expanded officially via the enactment of other executive orders and unofficially via practice by subsequent presidencies. Executive Order 12333 authorizes US government intelligence agencies to collect any and all data from foreign sources they deem relevant to national security purposes, and includes provisions allowing the agencies to “incidentally” spy on US entities without a court order.

The National Security Agency (NSA) in particular has used the order to justify the trawling and storage of global communications and financial records from all over the world, including the American population, as revealed by the revelations of whistleblower Edward Snowden and investigative reports in the Intercept .

The training documents also authorize the warrantless surveillance of individuals, organizations and groups that are simply “in contact” with someone who US intelligence agencies “reasonably believe” is acting to support the goals of international terrorists to the detriment of national security. Another training module, in a broad interpretation of federal criminal law, defines “material support to terrorists” to include “humanitarian aid,” “services in almost any form” and “political advocacy.” (Federal criminal codes specifically exempt medicine and religious materials from constituting illicit material support.)

Another set of slides begins by explaining that procedure policies prohibit the satellite and aerial surveillance of specific US persons—and then sanctions said targeted surveillance so long as the collected data can be written off as falling into one of a dozen other categories of information, including foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, threats to safety, persons in contact with potential sources, and administrative purposes.

Physical stalking of non-US persons on US soil, such as undocumented immigrants and temporary visa holders, does not require a warrant if it occurs “under circumstances in which the person has no reasonable expectation of privacy”—circumstances the US government has not yet bothered to publicly define—and may be conducted so long as it is for “an authorized foreign intelligence or [counterintelligence] purpose.” Members of the military and present and former employees of defense industry contractors may also be subjected to such warrantless stalking.

Another slide reveals the scope of data obtained by US intelligence agencies through the issuing of national security letters, which are used to obtain financial and travel records without need for a warrant. Bank account and credit card transaction histories, and documents held by a variety of establishments from pawnbrokers to US Post Offices, can be obtained by any US intelligence agency; telecommunications records from telephone companies and Internet service providers may be obtained only by the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

“These documents point to just how thoroughly the public has been kept in the dark about warrantless surveillance under Executive Order 12333,” noted St. Vincent.

It has been well over one year since the US government revised the DoD’s intelligence-gathering procedures, and the US government has provided no explanations, legal justifications and precedents, or explanations of the scale of its blatantly anti-democratic, warrantless mass spying operations, both within US territory and without. The reins to this apparatus of state spying, expanded by the Democratic and Republican parties alike, are now gripped tightly by the hands of the most right-wing administration in American history.

Murder of US Green Beret by Navy Seals in Mali exposes criminal military operations in West Africa

Eddie Haywood

Two Navy Seals are under investigation for the June murder of Staff Sgt. Logan Melgar, a Green Beret, after he was found dead in a housing complex provided by the US embassy in Bamako, Mali. No charges have yet been filed against the two commandos, but the case is being investigated as a homicide.

The two Seals, Petty Officer First Class Tony E. DeDolph and Chief Petty Officer Adam C. Matthews, were flown out of the country to the United States and were placed on administrative leave.

While the circumstances are not yet completely known, several special operations sources told the Daily Beast that there was an altercation between Melgar and the two Seals at around 5 a.m. on June 4, where the three grappled, resulting in one Seal, believed to be DeDolph, choking Melgar to unconsciousness.

According to AFRICOM officials, the two Seals drove Melgar to a nearby clinic, where medical personnel declared him dead. The two Seals claimed that Melgar had been intoxicated at the time of the altercation, but Melgar’s autopsy examination report noted that no drugs or alcohol were found in his system.

Melgar, along with an unknown number of other elite commandos, were deployed to the West African nation to conduct intelligence and training operations against Al Qaeda-affiliated militants waging war against the US/French-backed government.

Reports from unnamed US officials indicate that the two Navy Seals were stealing cash from a “slush fund” set aside by the US embassy for the purpose of paying informants in the course of tracking down Islamist militants, and that Melgar had discovered the skimming operation and threatened to alert authorities. According to the source, the two Navy Seals offered Melgar a cut of the illicit funds, but Melgar declined.

In a telephone call to his wife in the States, Melgar expressed his suspicions of the two Navy Seals, saying that he had a “bad feeling” about the two, but declined to specify his misgivings, informing her that he would reveal the full story when he returned home.

AFRICOM told the media that officials immediately suspected foul play in Melgar’s death and had dispatched an investigator to Mali within 24 hours of the Green Beret’s death. A military medical examiner declared the death a “homicide by asphyxiation.”

According to the New York Times, military officials said that cash from such slush funds “have a way of going missing.” The officials also said that in Mali’s case, the amount stolen can be as much as $20,000 at any given moment, and that it is relatively easy to skim from the fund as many instances of stealing involve the faking of receipts.

The housing complex in Bamako where Melgar was staying was shared by three other elite soldiers, including the two Seals. While the number of elite commandos in Mali are not disclosed by AFRICOM, the contingent deployed to the country is estimated to be smaller than the 800 elite soldiers in neighboring Niger, and are part of a wider contingent of around 2,000 special forces overall deployed to several countries in West Africa.

For his part, Melgar was officially assigned to provide security for US Ambassador to Mali Paul Folmsbee. His “security” duties included providing intelligence on militant groups directly to Folmsbee, as well as protecting the embassy and other US personnel, and coordinating training exercises with Malian forces.

The murder of a Green Beret by two of his confederates highlights and exposes the broader criminal character of the American military offensive being waged in West Africa.

Far reaching US special operations conducted across the continent are shrouded in secrecy, and were only brought to public attention last month when an ambush by Islamist militants resulted in the deaths of four Green Berets in neighboring Niger.

The special forces troops deployed to West Africa are drawn from elite military units, including Green Berets, Navy Seals and Delta Force, and have conducted some of American imperialism’s worst crimes against humanity. The list of often illegal duties these forces carry out include assassinations, counterterrorism operations, unconventional warfare, psychological operations, and training of foreign forces that Washington desires to utilize as a proxy force for regime change operations.

In Vietnam, elite American troops engaged in torture and mass execution of civilians, including children, and the razing of entire villages. In the recent period, these forces have engaged in torture, rape and murder in Iraq and Afghanistan.

The two Navy commandos currently under investigation for Melgar’s death are drawn from Seal Team Six, the elite unit which was involved in the 2011 raid and assassination of Osama Bin Laden at his compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.

The backdrop to the American military offensive in West Africa is the 2011 US/NATO war conducted in Libya to remove Muammar Gaddafi from power. Enlisting and utilizing Al Qaeda-affiliated fighters to conduct a regime change operation that resulted in Gaddafi’s removal and assassination, the Obama administration oversaw the complete destruction of Libyan society. The Islamist fighters spilled out from the ruins of Libya and scattered across northern African and down into the Sahel.

Washington has its military forces arrayed across West Africa not to “fight terrorism” but to secure by military force the region’s vast economic resources and working class for the profit of American corporations. West Africa possesses enormous quantities of minerals, including gold, diamonds, ore, uranium, and gas and oil deposits.

Washington is also seeking to neutralize the increasing economic influence of China on the continent, with Beijing securing investment deals in nearly every economic sector, including mining, oil and gas, agriculture and infrastructure.

With the Trump administration loosening the restrictions on the rules of engagement for US special forces in Africa, which constitutes an official absolution of any crimes committed by its soldiers, the offensive conducted in West Africa by the American military threatens to consume the region with ever great levels of violence.

May deploys anti-Russian propaganda to distract from Brexit crisis

Julie Hyland

Prime Minister Theresa May used her speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet—a gathering of the City of London—Monday evening to launch an attack on Russian President Vladimir Putin.

Describing Russia as a threat to “open economies and free societies,” she accused the Putin regime of “seeking to weaponise information” and planting “fake stories” so as to “sow discord in the West and undermine our institutions.”

A Downing Street source acknowledged that she was not responding to “any specific event” and May herself gave no evidence to back up her assertions.

Her claims underscore how unsubstantiated allegations of Russian “interference” and “fake news” have become the refuge of choice for crisis-ridden politicians the world over.

May’s Mansion House speech was made on the eve of the return of the European Union Withdrawal Bill to parliament. Eight days of “line by line” examination of the bill—aimed at incorporating EU legislation into British law—will take place between now and Christmas, in what has been likened to “guerrilla warfare” as each clause is bitterly contested.

Her tirade against Russia must be seen in this context. Its aim was to conceal the divisions within the British bourgeoisie over Brexit, which threaten the downfall of her own government, and to direct social and political tensions outwards, against “foreign” powers.

May did not accuse Moscow of interference in the 2016 EU referendum, which returned a narrow Leave majority. To do so would contradict her repeated claim that Brexit is the “will of the people”—a self-serving mantra that reflects the dominance of hardline Brexiteers within the Tory Party and her own cabinet.

A majority of the ruling elite, however, including substantial sections of the City, are gravely concerned at the impact of EU withdrawal on the interests of British imperialism. Represented politically by the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party—especially its Blairite wing—these layers are toying with trumped up allegations of Russian meddling to overturn the referendum result.

For May to play fast and loose with anti-Russian propaganda, despite its potential damage to her own cause, illustrates the scale of the crisis she confronts. Having lost two cabinet ministers to scandals in the space of a week, May announced Friday she would put an amendment enshrining in law the date Britain leaves the EU—at 11 p.m., March 29, 2019.

It became clear that this move was in line with demands of leading Brexiteers when a secret letter from Environment Secretary Michael Gove and Foreign Secretary Boris Johnson to May, marked “for your eyes only,” was leaked at the weekend.

The joint by-line is significant given that it was Gove who publicly torpedoed Johnson’s bid for Tory party leadership last June. With the clock ticking on Brexit, they have joined forces to oppose any retreat from or dilution of EU withdrawal.

Their letter, EU Exit—Next Steps, complained of “insufficient energy” on Brexit in parts of the government, demanded that any transition period be concluded by June 2021, and pressed May to ensure maximum support for this among the UK’s negotiating team by “clarifying their minds” and helping them “internalise the logic.”

The result has been to fuel the cross-party, pro-Remain opposition. Led by Labour and the Liberal Democrats, some 300 amendments have been tabled to the bill, including a number by Tory rebels.

These centre on the use of so-called Henry VIII clauses giving ministers executive powers to force through legislation, the role of the European Court of Justice during any transition period and the constitutional position of the devolved administrations after Brexit—especially in Scotland and Northern Ireland which voted to Remain.

May’s exit deadline only added another bone of contention to this list, with pro-EU Tory MP Dominic Grieve describing it as “thoroughly stupid” for limiting Britain’s room for manoeuvre in EU negotiations. Labour, for its part, wants “exit day” to be after an unspecified transition period of several years, while the Liberal Democrats favour a second referendum.

Should any of the amendments get the support of more than 11 Tory MPs the government faces defeat. The prospect of this is reinforced by reports that 40 Tory MPs have put their name to demands for May to resign—just eight short of the number needed to force a leadership challenge.

It was to forestall a Tory rebellion that Brexit Secretary David Davis announced a last-minute concession Monday—just prior to May’s Mansion House speech—that parliament could vote on a final deal between the UK and the EU. But this is a take-it-or-leave-it vote, with rejection meaning the UK will exit without agreement—precisely what the Remain faction fears most of all.

As a result, Davis’ “olive-branch” only ratcheted up tensions further, with Tory MP Anna Soubry describing it as “insulting,” “meaningless” and only adding to the government’s “grave difficulty” over Brexit.

While Britain’s parliament tears itself apart over whether it can vote on a final deal, there is no guarantee that the EU is even prepared to offer one. Last week the EU’s chief negotiator, Michael Barnier, again ruled out any progress to talks on future UK-EU trade relations without agreement on the “divorce” terms.

The EU summit on December 14/15 will decide whether “real and sincere progress” has been made regarding the UK’s outstanding financial contributions—estimated at about €60 billion (£53 billion), the border between Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic and the rights of EU citizens in Britain.

May’s weakness is only strengthening the resolve of Germany and France that no concessions can be made. They are not prepared to help a prime minister in hock to a hardline anti-EU faction, especially when she—and indeed her government—might not be around for much longer.

Barnier acknowledged that the EU was making “technical preparations” for a collapse of negotiations, while on Tuesday Manfred Weber, a key ally of Germany’s Chancellor Merkel, warned “the clock is ticking.” Speaking in advance of talks requested by May in London today, Weber said it did not look as if the EU would be “entering into the second phase” of negotiations in December, adding “we need to warn the British government… to put proposals on the table.”

Sections of the EU are recklessly stoking the factional infighting within British political circles—nowhere more so than regarding the Irish border. The EU has suggested that Northern Ireland could remain in a customs union or the single market after the UK exits, obviating the restoration of a “hard border” between north and south.

This was rejected by Davis who said it would only create another new border instead, this time within the UK, between Northern Ireland and the mainland. Britain would not accept any arrangement that cost the UK’s “constitutional and economic integrity,” he said.

Dublin denounced Britain for trying to dictate Ireland’s future, while leading EU officials accused May of placing her political survival—her government is kept in power by the Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland—above the interests of the Irish people.

In the Observer Sunday, European parliament’s Brexit coordinator Guy Verhofstadt referred to the 1998 Belfast agreement that ended The Troubles in Northern Ireland by bringing Sinn Fein into a power-sharing executive. He warned that avoidance of a hard border was “crucial to safeguard peace and to preserve the Good Friday Agreement, which was brokered with the active participation of the European Union. … I hope the British government will do what is right for all the people of Northern Ireland. The peace process should transcend domestic party politics.”

Unpacking the Unprecedented Churning in Saudi Arabia

Ranjit Gupta

Saudi Arabia's King Salman bin Abdulaziz Al Saud (King Salman) has presided over unprecedented churning on both the domestic political and foreign policy fronts during his short reign of less than three years. Norms that have been the foundation of the Kingdom's governance for the past eight decades; hallowed principles of consensus; discretion and balance of power within the royal family - all have been brazenly discarded.

 

Internal Dynamics

No past Saudi king has been as blatantly nepotistic as King Salman. On his accession to the throne on 23 January 2015, amongst the first decrees he issued was the appointment of his favourite son, Prince Mohammad bin Salman (MbS) - then only 28 years old and possessing no governmental experience - as Saudi Arabia's minister of defence. MbS was also appointed to the powerful position of the chief of the royal court, who controls all access to the king. On 29 January 2015, MbS was also appointed as the chairman of the newly established Council for Economic and Development Affairs and thus became the economic Tsar of the country. On 29 April 2017, he was named deputy crown prince and deputy prime minister. On 1 May 2015, a new 10-member Supreme Council under the chairmanship of the deputy crown prince was created to manage the state-owned oil company, Saudi Aramco - the country’s crown jewel, which was detached from Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Energy, Industry and Mineral Resources.

 

In a foretaste of things to come, although Prince Miteb continued as commander and minister of the National Guard, three other sons of King Abdullah's - Prince Mishaal and Prince Turki, governors of the politically significant Mecca and Riyadh provinces respectively; and Deputy Foreign Minister Prince Abdulaziz - were removed from their posts on the first day of King Salman’s reign.

 

No one appointed as crown prince had ever been removed. However, King Salman appointed and removed two, ignoring King Abdullah’s decree prohibiting such removal. First, Prince Muqrin, the crown prince under King Abdullah, was reconfirmed in the position but sacked less than three months later. He was replaced by the very experienced, widely respected interior minister, Muhammad bin Nayef (MbN) - the first member of the next generation to be deservedly so elevated.

 

However, MbN was removed from both posts in June 2017 and replaced by MbS as crown prince with the little known and light weight 34-year-old Prince Abdulaziz bin Saud bin Nayef bin Abdulaziz Al Saud being appointed interior minister, who will clearly function as an MbS acolyte and loyalist. Under another decree, Saudi Arabia’s prosecution and criminal investigation system was removed from the purview of the Ministry of Interior and a newly-named Office of Public Prosecution was created to report to the king, obviously through the Chief of the Royal Court, MbS.

 

In one of his first televised interviews after being appointed Crown Prince, MbS pledged to tackle endemic corruption in Saudi Arabia. "No one who got involved in a corruption case will escape, regardless if he was a minister or a prince," he warned. On 4 November 2017, King Salman issued a decree to constituting a new Anti-Corruption Committee under MbS' chairmanship. This Committee's functioning is exempted from "laws, regulations, instructions, orders and decisions" while performing its tasks of identifying "offenses, crimes, persons and entities involved in cases of public corruption…." and is empowered to issue "arrest warrants, travel ban, disclosure and freezing of accounts and portfolios, tracking of funds, assets" as well as taking other "precautionary measures."

A few hours after the decree was issued, 11 princes and several particularly prominent members of the Saudi elite were placed under detention. They included: two of King Abdullah's sons - Commander of National Guard, Prince Miteb, and Prince Turki; King Fahd's son, Prince Abdel Aziz bin Fahd, who is a major shareholder in the company that runs the well-known TV channel Al Arabiya; Saudi Arabia’s richest citizen and respected philanthropist, Prince Alwaleed bin Talal, who is an internationally renowned billionaire investor in dozens of high profile global brands and Saudi Arabia’s Rotana TV; billionaire Saleh Kamel, who headed one of the largest business conglomerates in West Asia; Chairman of the Saudi Bin Ladin Group (Saudi Arabia's largest construction company), Bakr bin Laden; Ibrahim al-Assaf, who was  Saudi Arabia's minister of finance for 20 years until 2016; Amr al-Dabbagh, who was very successful as the governor of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority from 2004 to 2012; Khalid al-Tuwayjri, the enormously influential ‘gatekeeper’ to King Abdullah’s Royal Court; Waleed al-Ibrahim, head of the MBC media empire and a brother-in-law of the late King Fahd; and, surprisingly, also Adel Fakieh, who, as minister of economy and planning, was intimately involved in preparatory work for Saudi Arabia’s sweepingly ambitious multi-dimensional Vision 2030 socio-economic transformation plan - MbS’s flagship reform platform. 

Through these arrests, the prominent privately owned media is also sought to be brought under government control. A few weeks earlier, many prominent clerics and intellectuals too were detained. Dissent is being steadily and systematically silenced. Ever since burgeoning oil revenues triggered an absolutely massive construction and business boom, all princes and most of the Saudi political elite have been engaged in business which inevitably involved kickbacks, shady deals, influence peddling, etc. Given the Anti-corruption Committee’s draconian powers, any individual in the country can now be targeted without a possibility of challenge. Given the timeline and sequence of events, it is abundantly clear that this ‘night of the long knives’ was deliberately played out as a meticulously pre-planned ‘game of thrones’, which is intrinsically about consolidation of power and targeting of political rivals and opponents rather than combating corruption per se. 

Prince Khalid bin Abdulaziz bin Mohammed bin Ayyaf Al Muqrin has been appointed minister/commander of the National Guard and he too, like the new minister of interior, will clearly function as an MbS acolyte and loyalist. With the new detentions, MbS has acquired de facto control over all three Saudi security services: the Army, the National Guard, and internal security services. For decades, these three branches had been distributed among the branches of the House of Saud clan to preserve a balance of power. MbS now controls all levers of patronage and power and all aspects of the citizens’ daily life, prompting The Economist to write “at the age of just 32, he has become the most powerful man in Saudi Arabia since King Abdul Aziz bin Saud, who founded the State.” MbS should be aware that he has created many enemies across the political spectrum.

Foreign Policy

Saudi Arabia's foreign policy has long been marked by considered restraint and moderation in word and deed. MbS has transformed it into a recklessly muscular one. Two months after he became the defence minister, he launched the (still continuing) unwinnable war in Yemen through daily aerial attacks, devastating the poorest Arab country. This war is primarily responsible for making Iran a significant player in Yemen's internal political dynamics. He has imposed an entirely unnecessary blockade of Qatar, making imperious demands that no self respecting sovereign country can concede, and has in the process, gravely undermined the Gulf Cooperation Council. Active support to rebels in Syria failed to dislodge President Bashar al-Assad. The unprecedented detention and apparently forced resignation of Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri, a Saudi protégé, while on an official visit to Saudi Arabia because of Hariri's unwillingness or inability to rein in Hezbollah could lead to new civil war in Lebanon. 

Despite his relatively rather low protocol status, on 14 March 2017, Prince Mohammed bin Salman, then still only deputy crown prince and defence minister, became the first Arab and Muslim leader that US President Donald Trump chose to receive in the White House and, exceptionally, honoured him by hosting a lunch too. To everyone’s surprise, Trump chose Saudi Arabia as the first country to visit as the US president - which laid out an unprecedentedly lavish and spectacular welcome, which really tickled his vanity. MbS and Trump’s son-in-law and senior advisor Jared Kushner, have established a particularly close personal relationship. King Salman's youngest son, 29-year-old Prince Khalid, was appointed as Saudi Arabia's ambassador to the US, adding yet another significant personal dimension to the Washington-Riyadh relationship. 

Kushner spent four days in Saudi Arabia the immediate run-up to the ‘night of long knives’; and Trump promptly and explicitly supported all that happened in tweets, even as he was on his important first Asia-Pacific tour - clearly establishing the US' collusion in these events. In fact, Trump has strongly backed all of MbS' policy initiatives, according very high priority to relations with Saudi Arabia and embracing it more passionately than any past US president has. 

Looking Ahead

This enthusiastic endorsement has served as considerable encouragement to MbS’s domestic and foreign policy adventurism. MbS does not seem to realise that the US' ability to shape its desired outcomes in West Asia has never been less than it is today. Given their shared deep-rooted, pervasive hatred of Iran, there is much well founded speculation of an Israel-Saudi-US axis emerging. A miscalculation can lead to a war between these heavily armed West Asian giants, which would be utterly disastrous for the already deeply conflict scarred region and also have tremendous adverse consequences for the world at large, particularly for India. Absent some dramatic changes soon Saudi Arabia under MbS seems headed for Armageddon. 

EU: Prospects of Reform Post the 2017 German Election

John Schabedoth

The European Union (EU) and its institutions are at a crossroads. The Euro and refugee crises have revealed that its countries have different views on intra-community solidarity and the future of the EU as a whole. With Brexit, for the first time, a country wants to leave the EU altogether. There are also worrisome developments in individual member states regarding their respect for rule of law. In the elections of many member states, Euro-sceptic parties are on the rise. The refugee crisis is only paused due to a questionable deal with Turkey and is currently breaking out again in the Libyan Sea.

Nevertheless, 2017 also brought some developments that could strengthen the EU. In France, Emmanuel Macron won the presidential election with a strict pro-EU agenda. After the September 2017 German elections, the next election in a larger member state - Italy - is scheduled to take place only in May 2018. The intermediate period is ideally suited to tackle a basic EU reform.

In a September 2017 speech at Sorbonne University in Paris, Macron proposed several partially extensive reforms for the Eurozone, the EU and the relationship between France and Germany, to be implemented by 2024.

According to Macron, the Eurozone should be provided with a common budget equipped with an amount of several percentage points of the European GDP (in comparison, the EU budget is equipped with 1 per cent of the European GDP). This budget, managed by a mutual minister of finance, could provide help for individual countries in crises. Macron also wants to expedite the plans for a common European defence union. For this purpose, a joint defence budget will be provided, which would fund a mutual high readiness unit.

Additionally, Macron proposed a common European asylum authority, which could coordinate and align asylum procedures in Europe. He also suggested a European tax policy, particularly a common minimum tax rate for companies and a financial transaction tax. Ambitiously, Macron wants to establish a Europe-wide uniform minimum wage and a common unemployment agency. Macron also called on Europe to cooperate more closely in the areas of counter-terrorism, environmental protection and digitisation. Furthermore, Macron has called for Germany and France to completely adapt their legislations on companies, by 2024.

Macron wants to implement these ambitious plans only with an agreeing "coalition of the willing" among the member states if necessary. He thereby refers to the concept of a multi-speed Europe, according to which individual member states work together more closely in certain areas, while other states maintain status quo.

Macron certainly chose the timing for his speech - two days after the German elections - deliberately. German Chancellor Angela Merkel and her center-right party Christian Democratic Union of Germany (CDU) are currently in coalition negotiations with the regional center-right Christian Social Union (CSU), the economic liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) and the left-liberal Alliance 90/The Greens (Green party). At present, it seems that these parties will form a governing coalition. By the cleverly chosen time of the speech, Macron's proposals inevitably became points of discussion in the coalition negotiations.

Principally, Merkel is open to Macron's plans. However, at the moment she cannot give a binding statement for future government policies. Before the elections, the FDP expressed reluctance to any European reform that would lead to a stronger German financial contribution. A separate budget of the Eurozone would therefore not be possible for the FDP. The CSU and parts of the CDU are also sceptical about these plans. Only the Greens are principally in favour of Macron's ideas.

In 2013, the FDP lost so many votes that it was no longer represented in the German parliament. Many of their politicians attribute this to the fact that the FDP had previously entered a coalition with Merkel's CDU, in which they could not enforce their campaigned goals. Insofar, it is expected that they will strongly resist compromises on this issue, one which is important to them.

Other proposals raised by Macron, such as a uniform minimum wage throughout Europe, are politically unviable. A Europe-wide paid unemployment benefit also arouses the fear of setting false migration incentives in the richer states. Many useful proposals are rejected at least by individual states. For example, countries like Hungary and Poland refuse to accept any asylum seekers. They would also reject a European asylum authority, which could impose on these countries to admit asylum applicants.

Other countries will then have to decide, if they want to form a "Coalition of the Willing" to enforce the respective plans. This multi-speed Europe is being rejected by many eastern EU countries. They fear being generally left behind as well as the weakening of the EU's central institutions.

Nonetheless, Macron's proposals show his enthusiastic drive to reform the EU, which is extraordinary for a domestic politician nowadays. With his courageous determination on concrete steps and a timeframe, he can and will be measured by the results. The political style of Merkel - who has been the German Chancellor since 2005 - however, is characterised by a policy of pragmatic, small steps. Europe needs both styles. Finally, Macron's visions could bring the European project forward, while Merkel's balancing and non-dogmatic style could take as many states as possible along.

At the EU summit in late October 2017, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk developed a roadmap for further talks. By the end of 2017, the basics for a common defence policy will be presented. Its implementation is considered to be likely, as its necessity was fundamentally denied only by the UK. By mid-2018, there will also be an agreement on migration and a common asylum policy, albeit the countries will not have to give up their decision-making powers on asylum applications. Additionally, concrete measures will be submitted by then to make the Eurozone more stable in times of economic crises.

It seems that the furthering of the European integration process will continue in a typical European fashion - through small-scale compromises. With such diverse members and interests, this might not be a bad thing for Europe.

Postdoctoral Fellowships on Innovative Methods and Metrics for Agriculture and Nutrition Actions (IMMANA) for Developing Countries 2018

Application Deadline: 1st February 2018

Eligible Countries: Low and middle-income countries (LMICs).

About the Award: The Friedman School of Nutrition at Tufts University and the London School of Hygiene & Tropical Medicine are pleased to announce the third of four planned rounds of Post-Doctoral Fellowships for Emerging Leaders in Agriculture, Nutrition, and Health Research (IMMANA Fellowships), funded with UK aid from the UK government through the Department for International Development (DFID).

Postdoctoral Fellowships on Innovative Methods and Metrics for Agriculture and Nutrition Actions (IMMANA Fellowships) aim to create a cadre of emerging leaders in agriculture, nutrition, and health research.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 

• Eligible candidates will have completed a doctoral degree (PhD, DPhil, DPH, MD, DVM or similar terminal degree) in any field related to agriculture, nutrition or health research and practice, and are seeking a career in research, education, and engagement at the intersection of two or more of these fields.
• Eligible candidates should have no more than 3 years of post-PhD experience prior to their proposed Fellowship start date.
• We anticipate that IMMANA Fellows will bring diverse perspectives to leadership in agriculture, nutrition, and health. IMMANA Fellowships will aim for equal representation of women and men, and we particularly welcome applications from citizens of LMIC countries.
• Applicants must propose to conduct fieldwork or other research under the joint supervision of two mentors, one from the applicant’s current or previous employer or academic institution, and one from a host institution where the applicant proposes to advance their work.
• At least one of the two mentors must be physically located in Africa or Asia.
• The two mentors need not have equal roles in the project, but having both be involved should help accelerate research and sharing of ideas between the Fellow’s home and host environments.

Selection Criteria: Selection will give preference to applicants who have research or faculty appointments in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, but applicants may be of any nationality and have earned their doctorate anywhere.

Number of Awardees: 6

Value of Scholarship: During the  12 month period, Fellows will receive the following financial support:

• A fixed stipend of £34,000 paid in quarterly instalments against satisfactory completion of programme milestones.
• A research allowance of £7,500 to cover travel and other fieldwork expenses, also paid as lump sums for achievement of programme milestones.
• An honorarium of £1,750 to each of the mentors paid in two instalments at mid-term and end of the year, on submission of a satisfactory mentorship report.

Duration of Scholarship: 12 months. Applicants must submit a full proposal by 1 March 2018. IMMANA Fellows must then begin their 12-month projects between the dates of 1 June and 31 December 2019.

How to Apply: Applications are submitted in a two-stage process.

Applicants are welcome and encouraged to submit a concept note to confirm eligibility and receive valuable feedback. Concept notes should be submitted as soon as possible, and will be accepted on a rolling basis until 1 February 2017.

Applications are submitted in a two-stage process. Applicants are welcome and encouraged to submit a concept note to confirm eligibility and receive feedback. Concept notes are accepted on a rolling basis from 20 September 2017 until 1 February 2018.

Application forms are available online.

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Department for International Development (DFID).

(CIMI) Masters Fellowships in Mathematics and Computer Studies for International Students 2018/2019

Application Deadline: 4th February 2018 (22H00 Paris time).

Eligible Countries: International

To be taken at (country): France

Eligible Field of Study: Maths and Computer studies

About the Award: Every year CIMI (Centre International de Mathématiques et d’Informatique) in Toulouse provides a number of fellowships for students enrolled in a Master course in Mathematics or Computer Science in one of the programs associated with CIMI.

Type: Masters

Eligibility: 

Those fellowships are open, on a competitive basis, to French and foreign students and awarded on the basis of the quality of the academic records.
First year (M1) applicants: Applicants must have obtained a degree corresponding to the European Bachelor’s degree.
Second year (M2) applicants : Applicants must have successfully completed the first year of a European Master’s degree, or an American Bachelor’s degree, or any equivalent level.
The CIMI LabEx applies an equal opportunity policy in selection.

Selection: Fellowships applications will be examined by the LabEx CIMI Executive Committee  and Prospective Committee. Grants will be awarded on the basis of the quality of the academic records.

Number of Awardees: 4 fellowships for students starting on the first year of a Master’s degree M1 and 10 fellowships for those starting on the second year of a Master’s degree M2 will be available.

Value and Duration of Scholarship: The level of funding will be competitive and sufficient to cover tuition fees and part of living expenses in Toulouse :

• 600€ per month over 10 months for applicants starting in the first year M1
• 1 000€ per month over 10 months for applicants starting in the second year M2

How to Apply: 

1.    Curriculum Vitae (max. 2 pages)
2.    Details of the grades obtained at University from the 1st year to present
3.    Details of the courses attended in the year 2017-2018
4.    Two recommendation letters : do not forget to mention (step 4 of the application process) the e-mail address of the professors wishing to send recommendation letters. They will receive an automatic e-mail to upload their letter.
5.    Applicant’s motivation letter : applicants for a Master 2 fellowship MUST clearly state in their letter the M2 programme (M2R, IMAT,…) they are applying for.
6.    Information about current level of French language skills (only applies to foreign students from non French speaking countries applying for a M1 fellowship).  All Master 1 courses will be taught in French.

To apply please CLICK HERE.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Centre International de Mathématiques et d’Informatique (CIMI)

Important Notes: Students applying for a Master course combining work and training (“formation en alternance”) are not eligible for CIMI fellowships.

Zonta International Young Women in Public Affairs Award 2018

Application Deadline: Applications for the 2018 Young Women in Public Affairs Award must be received by the assigned deadline that is declared by the applicant’s local Zonta club. The 2018 recipients will be chosen by 1 July 2018.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Countries with an operational Zonta clubs

To be taken at (Region): Zonta clubs, districts/regions and international.

About the Award: Though about 40 percent of the world’s workforce is women, according to data from the Inter-Parliamentary Union, only 22.7 percent of all national parliamentarians were female as of 1 June 2016.

Established in 1990 by Past International President Leneen Forde, Zonta has given 804 awards (includes international awards), totaling US$764,750, to 692 young women representing 54 countries.

The program operates at the Zonta club, district/region and international levels. Zonta clubs provide awards for club recipients, and district/region and international awards are funded by the Zonta International Foundation. District recipients receive US$1,000, and 10 international recipients are selected from the district/region recipients to receive awards of US$4,000 each.

Type: Award

Eligibility: Women, ages 16-19 on 1 April each year, living in a Zonta district/region, or a citizen of a Zonta country, who demonstrate evidence of the following, are eligible to apply.

• Active commitment to volunteerism.
• Experience in local government, student government, or workplace leadership (paid or unpaid).
• Volunteer leadership achievements.
• Knowledge of Zonta International and its programs.
• Support in Zonta International’s mission of empowering women worldwide through service and advocacy.

Applicants from geographic areas within a Zonta district/region where no clubs are located will be considered and eligible to apply for the district/region Award. Z and Golden Z club members are also eligible to apply. Classified members and employees of Zonta International and Zonta International Foundation, and their family members, are not eligible to apply for the Awards.

How to Apply: The application must start with a Zonta club. All application materials must be received at a Zonta club by the printed deadline. Zonta clubs select one application to send to the district governor/region representative. A district/region evaluating committee reviews the applications and selects one applicant per district/region to submit to Zonta International Headquarters.

Locate a club

Visit Award Webpage for details

Award Provider: YWPA Awards are made possible by generous contributions to the Zonta International Foundation Young Women in Public Affairs Award Fund.