20 Jul 2020

What Lies Ahead

Jack Rasmus

The US economy at mid-year 2020 is at a critical juncture. What happens in the next three months will likely determine whether the current Great Recession 2.0 continues to follow a W-shape trajectory—or drifts over an economic precipice into an economic depression. With prompt and sufficient fiscal stimulus targeting US households, minimal political instability before the November 2020 elections, and no financial instability event, it may be contained. No worse than a prolonged W-shape recovery will occur. But should the fiscal stimulus be minimal (and poorly composed), should political instability grow significantly worse, and a major financial instability event erupt in the US (or globally), then it is highly likely a descent to a bona fide economic depression will occur.
The prognosis for a swift economic recovery is not all that positive. Multiple forces are at work that strongly suggest the early summer economic ‘rebound’ will prove temporary and that a further decline in jobs, consumption, investment, and the economy is on the horizon.
A Second Wave of Permanent Job Losses 
Through mid-June to mid-July, the COVID-19 infection rate, hospitalization rate, and soon the death rate, have all begun to escalate once again. Daily infections consistently now exceed 60,000 cases—i.e. more than twice that of the earlier worst month of April 2020. Consequently, states are beginning to order a return to more sheltering in place and shutdowns of business, especially retail, travel, and entertainment services. The direction of events cannot but hamper any initial rebound of the economy, let alone generate a sustained economic recovery. Exacerbating conditions, a second wave of job layoffs is clearly now emerging—and not just due to economic shutdowns related to the resurging virus.
Reopening of the US economy in June resulted in 4.8 million jobs restored for that month, according to the US Labor Department. That number included, however, no fewer than 3 million service jobs in restaurants, hospitality, and retail establishments. These are the occupations that are now being impacted again with layoffs, as States retrench once more due to the virus resurgence underway. But there’s a new development as well: A second jobless wave is now emerging in addition to the renewed layoffs due to shutdowns not only of the resumed service and retail occupations, but reflecting longer term and even permanent job layoffs across various industries.
Household consumption patterns have changed fundamentally and permanently in a number of ways due to both the virus effect and the depth of the current recession. Many consumers will not be returning soon to travel, to shopping at malls, to restaurant services, to mass entertainment or to sport events at the levels they had, pre-virus.
In response, large corporations in these sectors have begun to announce job layoffs by the thousands. Two large US airlines—United and American—have announced their intention to lay off 36,000 and 20,000, respectively, including flight attendants, ground crews, and even pilots. Boeing has announced a cut of 16,000, and Uber,n just its latest announcement, a cut of 3,000. Big box retail companies like JCPenneys, Nieman Marcus, Lord & Taylor, and others are closing hundreds of stores with a similar impact on what were formerly thousands of permanent jobs. Oil & gas fracking companies like Cheasepeake and 200 other frackers now defaulting on their debt are laying off tens of thousands more. Trucking companies like YRC Worldwide, the Hertz car rental company, clothing & apparel sellers like Brooks Brothers, small-medium independent restaurant and hotel chains like Krystal, Craftworks—all are implementing, or announcing permanent layoffs by the thousands as well.
Reflecting this, since mid-June new unemployment benefit claims have continued to rise weekly at a rate of more than 2 million—with about 1.3 million receiving regular state unemployment benefits plus another 1 million independent contractors, gig workers, self-employed receiving the special federal government unemployment benefits. The latter group’s numbers are rising rapidly since mid-June.
As of mid-July no fewer than 33 million are receiving unemployment benefits, with another 6 million having dropped out of the labor force altogether and no longer even being counted as unemployed. Unemployment therefore remains at what will likely be a chronically high number, at around 40 million—with about 25% of the US labor force unemployed—as renewed service-retail sector layoffs, plus new permanent layoffs, both loom on the horizon.
Added to the growing problem of renewed service layoffs and the 2nd wave of permanent layoffs in the private sector is the growing likelihood of significant layoffs in the public sector, as states and cities facing massive budget deficits are forced to lay off several millions of the roughly 22 million public sector workers in the US. This potential public employee layoff wave will accelerate and occur sooner, should Congress in summer 2020 fail to bail out the states and cities whose budgets have been severely impacted by the collapse of tax revenues while facing escalating costs of dealing with the health crisis. Estimates as of last May are that the states and cities will need $969 billion in bailout funding this summer—roughly two-thirds for the states and the rest for cities and local governments.
The resurgence of layoffs from all these sources is a sure indicator that the economy’s rebound—let alone recovery—is in trouble. Rising joblessness means less wage income for households and therefore less consumption and, given that consumption is 70% of the economy, a slowing of the rebound and recovery. Problems in consumption in turn mean business investment suffers as well, further slowing the economy and recovery. Exacerbating the decline in personal income devoted to consumption due to unemployment is the evidence that even those fortunate enough to return to work after spring 2020’s economic shutdown are doing so increasingly as part time employed—which means less wage income for consumption compared to the pre-COVID period before March 2020.
Overlaid on these negative prospects for employment, consumption, business investment is the intensification of economic crisis-related problems.
Rent Evictions, Child Care & Education Chaos
There is an imminent crisis in rents affecting tens of millions. At the peak in April, it is estimated that roughly one-third of the 110 million renters in the US economy had stopped making rent payments due to the COVID-related shutdowns of the economy. The CARES ACT, passed in March, provided forbearance on rental payments, although perhaps as many as 20 states failed to enforce it. That forbearance directive expires at the end of July, with as many as 23 million rent evictions projected in coming months. A major housing crisis is thus brewing, as well as the second wave of job layoffs.
A combined education-child care crisis is about to occur almost simultaneously. The K-12 public education system is approaching chaos, as school districts plan to introduce remote learning on a major scale in order to deal with the renewed COVID-19 infection and hospitalization wave. The heart of the crisis is that tens of millions of US working class families dependent on two paychecks to survive economically cannot afford to accommodate school district practices for remote learning—especially for young children in the K-6 grade levels. Even if such families could afford to pay for expensive child care, the current US child care system is far from being able to accommodate them. Many minority and working class households, moreover, lack the computers and networking equipment, or even the requisite skills to set it up, to enable their children participate in remote learning.
Several forces are driving the shift to remote learning: school district fears of liability actions by parents if children become ill, the significant cost of ensuring disinfected classrooms, the lack of classroom space to allow distance learning on site, and the growing concern of teachers regarding their own exposure to infection. At least 1.5 million public school teachers are over age 50 and have health conditions that put them at greater risk of serious infection, should they attend closed-in classroom environments.
The child care plus K-12 education crisis will likely erupt within months on a major scale. Chaos in education is around the corner.
This fall, higher education—colleges and universities—will also experience chaos of their own kind. While distance learning will not be as serious an implementation problem as it will in K-12 levels, costs from the pandemic will force many smaller, private colleges into bankruptcy, consolidation or closure. Public colleges’ funding problems will require them to sharply reduce available services. Remote education will create a two-tier system of higher education—educational services delivered remotely and those of a more traditional nature on campus; or a hybrid of both.
However, demand for higher education services will likely decline sharply in the short term, during which higher education will experience a devastating decrease in tuition and other sources of college revenues. Some estimates show a third of freshmen plan to take what’s called a ‘gap year’: i.e. accept entrance but not attend for a year. That’s a massive revenue loss. Some estimates foresee a 15%-30% decline in new student attendance, with another 5%-10% decline in transfer students, and a similar decline of 5%-10% in continuing students. In addition, the attendance by international students, the ‘cash cow’ for most colleges, will also decline sharply due to the Trump administration’s new rules.
Still other developments will sharply reduce college revenues. Students forced to attend classes via remote learning will demand lower tuition. One can expect a wave of legal suits as students seek to ‘claw back’ full tuition expenses. Other secondary sources of college revenues—from fees, on-campus room and board, endowment earnings and gifts, and sports revenues—also spell a looming revenue crunch.
A wave of college consolidations and closures is inevitable. And with student loan debt at $1.6 trillion it is unlikely that the federal government will introduce new aid through that channel. Nor will States increase their subsidization of public colleges, given the severe state budget deficits on the horizon.
In short, the economic crisis is about to assume more socio-economic dimensions and character: rent, child-care, education chaos will soon overlay the continuing unemployment problem and worsening recession. Social and political discontent, frustration, and anxiety are almost certainly to rise in turn in coming months as a consequence.
Global Recession & Sovereign Debt Defaults
The weakness of the global economy is yet another factor likely to ensure the US economy’s W-shape trajectory. As noted previously, with 90% of other countries in recession, global demand for US exports will remain weak or declining. In addition, global supply chains have also been severely disrupted by the health crisis, or even broken, and will not be restored soon. The global economy is suffering from deep problems of both demand and supply. This too is a unique historical event. Never before have demand and supply problems occurred congruently. Together, they increase the potential for a global depression.
Commodity producing economies have been hard hit, especially oil and metal producing countries. Many were in a recession well before the COVID health crisis. Global trade in general had stagnated, registering little to no growth in 2019, for the first time since modern records were kept. Many countries had over-extended their borrowing, expanding their sovereign debt loads during the last decade. This was money capital borrowed largely from western banks and capital markets (i.e. shadow banks).
Now, with global trade flat and declining, and prices for their export goods deflating in price as well, these debt-extended countries cannot earn sufficient income from exports in order to pay the principal and interest on their debt. As a result, several countries in the worst shape may soon default on their debt payment to western banks, hedge funds, private equity firms, and so on. Debt defaults potentially mean the same western financial institutions that loaned the funds now experience financial crises in turn. In such a manner, financial instability events abroad are often transmitted to the domestic US economy through its banking system. It would not be the first time, moreover, that foreign bank crashes have spilled over the US and rest of the world economy and in the process significantly exacerbated a recession already underway.
Theoretically, countries experiencing severe sovereign debt crises could borrow from the International Monetary Fund. However, the IMF has nowhere near the funds to accommodate multiple large sovereign defaults that occur simultaneously. Nor is it likely that the US and Europe will increase the IMF’s funding to enable it to do so. Once it becomes clear the IMF cannot handle a crisis of such potential dimensions, the global capitalist economy will slip even further toward global depression.
The further deterioration now already occurring in economic relations between the US and China may also potentially impact the Great Recession in the US, and ensure its continued W-Shape recovery. Trump’s trade pact with China signed December 2019 has proven thus far a colossal failure. The president declared at the deal’s signing it would mean $150 billion in China purchases of US goods in 2020—especially farm products, oil & gas, and manufactured goods. At mid-year, China has purchased only $5 billion of the agreed $40 billion in farm products and only $14 billion of $85 billion in US manufactured goods. Trump’s promised $150 billion was never agreed to by China, even before the Covid pandemic struck the US economy in 2020. China never agreed to a dollar value of purchases of US exports, but announced it would purchase based on conditions in 2020-21. Trump’s $150 billion was typical Trump misrepresentation of a deal never made. At best China would purchase perhaps $40 billion in agricultural goods—i.e. about the level of it purchases before Trump launched a trade war with it in March 2018. Failure to deliver his exaggerated public promise in 2020 Trump turned on on China and embraced further his anti-China hard line advisors on trade and other matters. The former ‘trade war’ with China will likely transform now, in the wake of Covid, into a broader economic war with China. Furthermore, the deterioration of relations with China, set in motion by the current recession and the collapse of global trade, shows signs of spilling over to other political and even military affairs.
Permanent Industry Transformations
The COVID health crisis is accelerating the transformation of entire industries and sectors of the economy, US and global. As noted above, household consumption patterns are already changing fundamentally and will continue as changed even after the health crisis passes. Entire industries will shrink as a consequence. Company consolidations and downsizing are inevitable in airlines, cruise lines, and even public land transport. So too will companies fail, consolidate and restructure in the hospitality, leisure and hotel industries, in mall-based retail establishments, inside entertainment (movies, casinos, etc.) to name but the obvious. Sports and public entertainment companies are struggling to redefine their business models and how they bring their ‘product’ to the public for consumption. Even education—public and private—is undergoing a radical shift. Not so obvious is similar fundamental change in oil & energy industries, and later as well in manufacturing as supply chains are slowly returned to the US economy.
Not only will these changes significantly (and often negatively) impact employment levels and wage incomes, but business practices as well. Already businesses are instituting new cost cutting practices under the pressure of the health crisis and shutdowns. These practices will become permanent. And since much of the practices and cost cutting will focus on workers’ pay and benefits, more of what economists call ‘long term structural unemployment’ will result—in addition to the current ‘cyclical unemployment’ occurring due to the current recession.
An historic consequence of the current Great Recession precipitated by the COVID-19 health crisis is the accelerating introduction underway of what some call the Artificial Intelligence revolution. AI is about cost-cutting. It’s about new data accumulation, data processing and statistical evaluation, to allow software machines to make decisions previously made by human beings. AI will eliminate millions of low level decision-making by workers in both services and manufacturing. A 2017 report by the business consulting firm, McKinsey, predicted no less than 30% of all workers’ occupations will be severely impacted by AI by the end of the present decade. 30% of jobs will either disappear or have their hours reduced significantly. That means less wage income and less consumption still.
The important linkage to the current Great Recession 2.0 is that the introduction of AI by businesses will now speed up. What McKinsey formerly predicted for the late 2020s decade will now take place by mid-decade. The economic consequences for the next generation of US workers, the late Millennials and the GenZers will be serious, to say the least. After decades of the permeation of low pay, low benefits ‘contingent’ part time and temp jobs since the 1990s, after the impact of the 2008-09 crash and aftermath on employment, after the acceleration of ‘gig’ jobs with the Uberization of the capitalist economy since 2010, and after the even more serious negative economic effects of the current Great Recession 2.0, the tens of millions of US workers entering the labor force today and in coming years will have to face the transformation of another 30% of all occupations. The future does not portend very well for the 70 million millennials and GenZers. US neoliberal economic policies and the Great Recession 2.0 is accelerating the long term structural unemployment crisis of both the US and the global capitalist economy.
Return of Fiscal Austerity
The US federal budget deficit under Trump averaged more than a trillion dollars annually during his first three years in office. The federal national debt at the end of 2019 was $22.8 trillion. As of July 2020 it has risen to $26.5 trillion—and rising. Earlier projections in March were that it would increase by $3.7 trillion in 2020. That has already been exceeded. So, too, will projections for 2021, or another $2.1 trillion. The deficit and debt will likely rise to more than $4 trillion in this fiscal year and another $3 trillion in 2021. That means the current national debt within 18 months will reach $30 trillion. And that’s not counting the debt level rise for state and local governments, already $3 trillion; nor the debt carried on the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, balance sheet which is scheduled to rise another $3 trillion at minimum.
The point of presenting these statistics is that the US elites, sooner or later, will introduce a major austerity program. It will likely come later in 2021. And it will make little difference whether the administration that time is headed by Democrats or Republicans. It will come and it will target social security, Medicare, Medicaid, Obamacare, education, housing, transport and other social programs.
The first Great Recession provides a historical precedent. Obama’s recovery program in January 2009 provided for $787 billion in stimulus. But the joint Republican-Democrat austerity agreement introduced in August 2011 took back nearly twice that stimulus, or $1.5 trillion, in 2011-13. That austerity contributed significantly to the W-shape recovery from the 2008-09 economic crash and contraction—i.e. the first Great Recession. With the current deficit surge of $6 trillion to date, likely to increase to $9 to $10 trillion, the US economic elites will no doubt pursue a new austerity regime at some point within the next few years. That austerity will, like its predecessor, ensure at best a W-shape recovery typical of Great Recessions. At worst, it may prove the final event that pushes the US economy into another Great Depression.
Financial Instability
Those who deny that the US and global economy have already entered a second Great Recession offer the argument that the 2008-09 crash and recession was caused by the banking and financial crash of 2008-09, and therefore, since there has not yet been a financial crash, the economy at present is not in another Great Recession. But they are wrong.
Great Recessions are always associated with a financial crisis, but that crisis need not precede the deep contraction of the real, non-financial economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has played the role of a financial crash in driving the real economy into a contraction that is both quantitatively and qualitatively worse than a ‘normal’ recession. Furthermore, a subsequent banking system-financial crash is not impossible in the coming months, although not yet likely in 2020.
The preconditions for a financial crisis are in development. It won’t be precipitated by a residential mortgage crisis, as in 2007-08. But there are several potential candidates for precipitating a financial crash once again. Here are just a few:
• The commercial property sector in the US is in deep trouble. Commercial property includes malls, office buildings, hotels, resorts, factories, and multiple tenant apartment complexes. Many incurred deep debt obligations as they expanded after 2010 or just kept operating by accruing more high cost debt when they were unprofitable. Today they are unable to continue servicing (i.e. paying principal and interest) on their excessive debt load. Many have begun the process of default and chapter 11 bankruptcy reorganization. Banks and investors hold much of the commercial property debt that will never be repaid. Excess derivatives (credit default swaps) have been written on the debt. A debt crisis and wave of defaults and bankruptcies in 2020-21 in the commercial property sector could easily precipitate a subprime mortgage-like debt crisis as occurred in 2008-09. And derivatives obligations could transmit the crisis throughout the banking system—as it did in 2009. Regional and small community banks in the US are particularly vulnerable.
• The oil and gas fracking industry, where junk bond and leverage loan debt had already risen to unstable levels by the advent of the COVID crisis. The collapse of world oil and gas prices—which began before the COVID-19 impact and continues—will render drillers and others unable to generate the income with which to service their debt. Already more than 200 companies in this sector are in default and bankruptcy proceedings. Again, regional banks that financed much of the expansion of fracking in Texas, the Dakotas, and Pennsylvania will be impacted severely by the defaults. Their financial instability could easily spread to other sectors of banking and finance in the US.
• State and local governments, should Congress fail to appropriate sufficient bailout funding in its next round of fiscal spending in July 2020. State and local governments are capable of default and bankruptcy—unlike the Federal government, which is not. The US has a long history of state defaults associated with the onset of Great Depressions. This time around, state financial instability will quickly spill over to public pension funds, and from public to private pensions, and from there to the municipal bond markets with which state and local governments raise revenue by borrowing to fund deficits.
• Global sovereign debt markets, as previously noted. Defaults on massive debt accumulated since 2010 by many countries could result in serious contagion effects on the private banking systems of the advanced economies, including the US, Europe, and Japan. Should the IMF fail to contain a chain of sovereign debt crises that could follow in the wake of the current Great Recession, a chain reaction of defaults across emerging market economies in particular has the potential to precipitate a global financial crisis.
History shows that financial crises often originate from unsuspected corners of the economy. The above candidates are the ‘known unknowns’. There may also lurk in the bowels of the capitalist global financial system still more ‘unknown unknowns’—i.e. what are sometimes called ‘black swan’ events.
Political Instability
The US and other countries are on new ground in terms of potential political instability. The piecemeal curtailment of democratic and civil rights has been progressing at least since the mid- 1990s. In the 21st century it has been accelerating, both in the US and across the globe. Recent years have seen a growing public confrontation between contending wings of the capitalist elites and their political operatives. Institutions of even limited capitalist democracy are under attack and atrophying. And now political instability is growing as well at both the institutional and grass roots levels. One should not underestimate the potential for even more intense political confrontation among elites, or between segments of the US population itself, from having a negative impact on the current economic crisis and 2nd Great Recession. A Trump ‘October Surprise’ or a November 2020 constitutional crisis are no longer beyond the realm of the possible, but even likely.
The expectations of both households and business may serve as transmission mechanisms propagating political instability into more economic and financial instability. Political instability has the effect of freezing up business investment and therefore employment recovery. It has the further effect of causing households to hoard what income they have and raise the savings rate—at the expense of consumption. It also leads to government inaction on the policy necessary to provide stimulus for recovery.
On a global front, political instability may even assume a global dimension. History in general, and US history in particular, reveals that US presidents seek to divert public attention from domestic economic and social problems by provoking foreign wars. Targets for US attack, in the short term, are Iran and Venezuela—especially the latter, which is more susceptible to US military action. But tomorrow, in 2021 and after, it could well be Russia (Ukraine or Baltics US provocations), North Korea (a US attack on its nuclear facilities) or China (a US naval confrontation in the South China sea)—irrespective of the unlikely success of such ventures.
Like another financial-banking crash, a major political instability event—domestic or foreign—could easily send an already weak US economy struggling in the midst of a Great Recession into the abyss of the first Great Depression of the 21st century.

Trump Administration Wants to Deprive Cubans of Food

W.T. Whitney Jr.

Food availability was the top concern of 21 percent of Cubans responding to a recent opinion survey. The question thus comes to the fore of how the U.S. economic blockade affects the supply of food that Cubans eat.
The U.S. State Department liked the idea of a blockade in 1960 because it would lead to deprivation and suffering. That happened in 1992 with the so-called Cuban Democracy Act. Under that law, which is still in effect, foreign partners of U.S. companies are prohibited from exporting goods to Cuba, including food and agricultural supplies.
Food supply in Cuba is precarious now, along with Cuba’s economy. What’s going to happen will depend on how the government manages agriculture and the economic toll of the COVID-19 pandemic. But the U.S. economic blockade is the crucial factor.
There’s no quick fix for some problems. Sugarcane monoculture took a toll on soil fertility. The woody marabou plant, useful only for making charcoal and requiring heavy machinery to remove, has invaded 4.2 million acres of Cuban land – 18 % of the total. Cuba has recently experienced severe drought conditions interspersed with intense rains and flooding; 60 percent of the land is at risk of desertification. The agricultural sector accounts for 40 percent of the financial losses due to hurricanes.
According to one report, disempowerment of women in rural areas “impedes progress in the agricultural sector.” Agricultural work lacks appeal for many of Cuba’s highly-schooled young people. More Cubans live in cities these days – 77 percent of the population – and the burden of feeding them has increased accordingly.
Cuba has long had to import 60-80 percent of food that is consumed there – at an annual cost of $2 billion.
Beginning in 2008, Cuba’s government instituted economic changes affecting the entire society, agriculture included. The government and Communist Party fashioned ambitious documents that outlined comprehensive reforms.
In 2008, private individuals and collectives gained long-term usage rights to small tracts of land. Now some 500,000 new, independent farmers work 4.9 million acres of agricultural land. The 5.93 million acres worked by these and other private farmers account for almost 80 percent of Cuba’s domestically produced food.
The largest class of farmers, the UBPC cooperatives, heirs of the dismembered state farms, control 8.42 million acres of Cuba’s total of 15.56 million acres of arable land; 1.16 million acres remain idle and unfarmed.
The new private farmers ought to be producing “even more food,” says one observer. Supplies, equipment, spare parts, fertilizers, and seeds provided by state agencies are often unavailable, delayed, or of low quality. Access to credit and insurance may be limited.
Cuban farmers face gasoline and diesel fuel shortages, mainly because of drastically reduced shipments from Venezuelan oil producers, the result of U.S. anti-Venezuela sanctions. The resulting decrease in food production in May 2019 led the authorities to bolster food rationing.
Food distribution is inefficient. The National Union of [food] Collection, otherwise known as the “Acopio,” is the Agriculture Ministry’s agency that is in charge of distributing food. Problems include delayed payments to producers, inadequate storage facilities, transportation delays, regional variations in service, and “cumbersome" criteria for defining food quality.
The Acopio operates 400 state agricultural markets and 1200 other food-selling facilities. Consumers experience long wait times, variable quality, and frequent non-availability of desired food products. Vendors setting their own prices often reserve higher-quality food for consumers who pay with the convertible currency used by tourists. Cubans relying on rationed food may be left with lower quality food and smaller amounts, and then face high prices for food they still need.
Some government efforts at bolstering food supplies for urban populations recall the ecologically-oriented initiatives introduced after the fall of the Soviet Bloc, during the Special Period. They bear names like “Program for Municipal Self-supply;” “the Program of Urban, Suburban, and Family Agriculture” (for growing food in small spaces), and the “Program of Local Support for Agricultural Modernization,” for 37 municipalities.
Speaking in February, President Miguel Díaz-Canel called for local self-sufficiency and for the Acopio to collect farm products promptly and thoroughly. With more food arriving at markets, he suggested, the state could regain control over food sales and prices and thus push out speculators and black marketeers. Later Díaz-Canel spoke approvingly of producers bypassing the Acopio and selling at local markets. Discussion is taking place about the “participation of other state and non-state actors” in the Acopio system.
Citing the examples of Vietnam and China – socialist countries that export food – reformers are proposing that remittances from Cubans living abroad be invested in food production and that way promote farmers’ autonomy. Díaz-Canel recently advocated greater involvement of scientists and academicians in food production, just as with the coronavirus pandemic.
The official response to food-supply problems may at times lack focus and coherence. To the extent that such is the case, it has to stem largely from a regimen of shortages cemented in place, courtesy of the U.S. economic blockade. To learn that planners are often stymied would be no surprise.
While government officials deliberate and farmers and consumers complain, a U.S. presence hovers, specter-like, in the background. It’s there as officials look abroad to transfer money, secure credit, import food, and seek foreign investment. It’s in the room when they want to import farm machinery, tools, spare parts, premium seeds, fertilizers, pesticides, purebred livestock. and hydrocarbon fuels.
U.S. pressures on foreign financial institutions are unrelenting. Foreign suppliers face merciless penalties if they ship agricultural supplies to Cuba, particularly if they are associated with U.S. companies or if their goods contain some tiny U.S. component.
One imagines, moreover, that recriminations and even animosities crop up whenever agricultural ventures end up badly or when food is short. An undercurrent of anti-government ideas may develop. That would be precisely the object of what the U.S. government does.

The UK and US are Starting a New Cold War with Russia and China, So What are These Governments Trying to Hide?

Patrick Cockburn

The new Cold War launched by the West against China and Russia is escalating by the day. In a single week, the Kremlin has been unmasked trying to discover the secrets of Britain’s pursuit of a vaccine against coronavirus and revelations are promised about covert Russian interference in British politics. Boris Johnson made a U-turn on Huawei, announcing that it is to be kicked out of participation in the 5G network because it poses a threat to British security, though a curiously slow-burning one since they will only be evicted over seven years.
The US may put the widely-used Chinese video app TikTok on a blacklist that would prevent Americans from using it. The administration is considering using the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act in order to penalise TikTok as “an unusual and extraordinary threat” to US security. President Trump says he is considering banning the app in response to the way China handled the coronavirus epidemic.
This is a clue to the prime motive for Trump to ramp up the Cold War against China, which is his determination to win a second term in the White House by diverting voters’ attention from his catastrophic handling of the pandemic. “Don’t defend Trump – attack China,” is the advice of a leaked 57-page memo circulated among Republican Senatorial candidates in April. It suggested that Republican politicians should blame China for starting the epidemic by allowing the virus to escape from a laboratory in Wuhan, lying about it and hoarding medical equipment needed to treat the sick.
A striking feature of the US and British diplomatic offensive against China is how little criticism or even discussion it has provoked in any quarter in the US and Britain, even from those whose normal knee-jerk reaction is to denounce anything said or done by Trump or Johnson. This may be because these critics are genuinely horrified by undoubted Chinese oppression of the Uighurs, proposed imposition of dictatorial rule in Hong Kong, and assertions of military power in the South China Sea and on the Chinese-Indian frontier.
As during the original Cold War in the late 1940s and 1950s, critics can be conveniently dismissed as Communist sympathisers or dupes. Unsurprisingly, Democratic presidential candidate Joe Biden is responding to the confrontation with China by demanding that the US should take an even tougher stance towards Beijing, while the Democratic Party establishment are ever hopeful that their prolonged campaign to portray Trump as the creature of Vladimir Putin’s Russia will take fire and do him serious damage at the polls.
As with Trump’s claim that China is ultimately responsible for the lethal debacle of America’s handling of the coronavirus epidemic, I have always thought that Hillary Clinton’s’ claim that she lost the 2016 presidential election because of Russian interference was absurd. Every history of her disastrous campaign shows that she lost for obvious self-inflicted reasons such as not campaigning enough in key northern states like Wisconsin, Pennsylvania and Michigan – states that Trump won by a whisker.
The explanation for Boris Johnson’s U-turn over Huawei is simply explained by his inability to withstand American pressure as Britain leaves the EU and becomes even more dependent on the US. The kowtow to Washington over Huawei is the first of many such humiliations that come as an inevitable consequence of Brexit. Instead of getting back control of its destiny, Boris Johnson’s Britain will be more like Little Red Riding Hood lost in the global forest and menaced by every passing wolf.
There may be enough Chinese and Russian misbehaviour to justify retaliation, but threat-inflation has the great advantage of diverting attention from the British government’s incompetence in coping with the pandemic, a failure only excelled by the US and Brazil. Quite possibly Russian intelligence in the shape of cybergroup Cozy Bear has devoted great efforts to stealing secrets from western academia and pharmaceutical companies seeking to produce a vaccine against coronavirus. Less clear is why such information should be secret, unless these institutions and companies are planning to keep monopoly control over any vaccine produced, unlike the polio vaccine which the US made available to the world when first developed by American scientists at the height of the previous Cold War in the 1950s.
The heads and former heads of British intelligence agencies have been giving solemn interviews about how British security is threatened by Russian and Chinese machinations. The nature of this threat is never spelled out and intelligence chiefs can always claim that to do so would compromise confidential information that must not be disclosed.
I have always had doubts over the exalted claims about the excellence of British intelligence, which has become part of the British national myth. The saga of the breaking of the German Enigma codes in the Second World War has replaced the defeat of the Spanish Armada as a source of national pride and self-confidence.
Yet I have always wondered about those great British secrets that hostile foreign powers hunger to learn and must be protected at all costs.
British officials I encountered over the years during wars in the Middle East never seemed strikingly well-informed, but it was always possible that they were being singularly discreet or they were outside the loop of those privy to such vital information. Yet when the exhaustive Chilcott enquiry into British actions during the Iraq War was finally published in 2016, it concluded that Britain was poorly informed about almost everything that was going on in Iraq before and after it joined the US-led invasion. On the Libyan war in 2011, a scathing report by the House of Commons select committee on foreign affairs concluded that Britain lacked “accurate intelligence” or much idea of what was happening.
Four years later, the British government launched a bombing campaign against Isis in Syria amid much angry debate in which all sides took it for granted that Britain was in a position to do more than military posturing. But nine months into the much-debated bombing, a report of the House of Commons defence committee chaired by Dr Julian Lewis revealed that only 65 air raids had taken place over nine months because the RAF did not know where Isis was hiding. Nor was the government able to identify the 70,000 armed anti-Assad fighters on whose behalf Britain was supposedly intervening. No wonder that Johnson was so dismayed by the election of the experienced and critical Lewis as the new chairman of the House of Commons intelligence and security committee, instead of Chris Grayling, his own notoriously blunder-prone nominee.
It is just possible to forget amid the threats and counter-threats of the new Cold War – and the intention is certainly that we should forget – that the world is failing to contain a pandemic that has killed half a million people. Never has global unity of effort been more necessary, whatever differences there may be, and its fragmentation more damaging. “How is it difficult for humans to unite and fight a common enemy that is killing people indiscriminately?” asked the director general of WHO, Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, wiping away tears of frustration earlier this month. “Can’t we understand that the divisions and the cracks between us are an advantage for the virus?”
He got his answer from the Cold War warriors the world over this week, and it was a resounding “no”.

Pharma Tries to Cash in on Covid Shutdowns With Its Best-Selling Drug

Martha Rosenberg

Stuck at home? Watching a lot of TV? Pharma’s way ahead of you.
In April, TV ad expenditures for the top 10 prescription drugs increased to $183 million from $156 million in March according to FiercePharma. Topping the list was AbbVie’s rheumatoid arthritis drug Humira which, along with six other drugs, accounted for a $5.1 billion jump in U.S. medical spending last year, according to Doc Wire news.
AbbVie increased Humira’s price by 15.9% in 2019, which equated to a $1.857 billion increase in the health care dollars it rakes in despite “no new research or evidence over the past three years [that] has supported these increased prices,” says the site, The price of the aggressively advertised Humira vaulted from $19,000 a year in 2012 to $38,000 in 2018 says the Huffington Post.
According to FiercePharma AbbVie spent $52.9 million advertising Humira in April, as the nation locked down. The figure was double the ad budget of its next closest competitor and included a voice-over telling Covid cash-strapped viewers that AbbVie “may be able to help” with drug prices.
Humira is the poster child for Pharma’s profit party of extreme priced, liquid “biologic” drugs like Enbrel, Remicade and Cimzia that require injections. Wall Street loves biologics which make thousands per patient per year, Enbrel, for example, netting $67,000 per year per patient.
Biologics also represent less competition than lowly pills since their generics, called biosimilars, do not have the clear and easy path to market as pill generics. Since the Biologics Price Competition and Innovation (BPCI) Act of 2009 only 18 biosimilars have been approved for U.S. marketing with few available on the market and none approved as interchangeable with biologics says Health Affairs.
How lucrative is Humira? It enabled its original company, Abbott, to create an entire new company, AbbVie, dedicated to Humira sales only in 2013.
Price Is Only One Humira Issue
If price were the only objection to the $20 billion a year Humira franchise, it would be no different from the many specialty and cancer drugs that also raise our taxes and health care costs while lining Pharma’s pockets. Think Novartis’s cancer drug, Kymriah which costs $475,000 per patient, Actimmune, for chronic granulomatous disease, priced at $52,321.80 for one month, and the gallstone drug Chenodal priced at $42,570 for one month. We all know the price of Hep C drugs.
But Humira is also a dangerous drug whose risks are occluded by “go on–be happy” advertising. For example, the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel reported last year that “Humira has been linked to 169,000 reported serious adverse events and 13,000 reports of deaths,” despite the saccharine ads. It is linked to life-threatening fungal infections and sepsis, it adds.
According to the Journal Sentinel, since 2000, the FDA has issued more than “25 warnings and safety communications” for Humira and similar biologic drugs–all after the drugs were approved for use in patients. “The Journal Sentinel review found warnings for various fungal and bacterial infections, as well as a rare viral brain infection. Other warnings included tuberculosis, a flesh-eating bacteria, various neurological conditions, liver failure and heart failure, as well as lymphoma and other cancers.”
Drugs like Humira “are not selling on the merits alone, otherwise they wouldn’t need all the advertising,” said Dr. Rita Redberg, editor of the journal JAMA Internal Medicine, and a professor of medicine at the University of California, San Francisco.
Sleazy Marketing, Conflicts of Interest
While AbbVie was still a gleam in Abbotts eye, it enlisted the public relations giant Edelman, and Pharma ad agency Harrison and Star to create buzz. Abbott gave out free samples of Humira to seniors in 2003 while lobbying Congress to get the drug paid for by Medicare–a maneuver that worked. Abbott announced it would “provide its recently approved rheumatoid arthritis drug free to Medicare patients without drug coverage until the government agrees to pay for the medicine,” said the Chicago Tribune. As meth dealers say, “first taste free.”
Financial arrangements with medical associations didn’t hurt sales. For example, between 2013 and 2017, the American Academy of Dermatology received $2 million in grants and donations from AbbVie, reports the Journal Sentinel.
AbbVie’s “nurse ambassador” program, that began in 2012, was especially sleazy. Registered nurses were paid to go to the homes of people taking Humira but, according to a lawsuit, they downplayed the risks of cancer and serious infections and were instructed to avoid directly answering patient questions about such serious side effects. If nurses must be sent to homes, the drug is certainly not “selling on the merits alone.”
“Through the program, doctors allegedly got kickbacks in the form of cash, meals, drinks, gifts, trips, even patient referrals,” wrote the Journal Sentinel. “One court document indicates the national program reached 179,000 patients.”
A California lawsuit alleges the program began as a pilot effort in 2012, developed a presence in California in 2013 and soon became “wildly successful in this state and others. California Insurance Commissioner Ricardo Lara told the Journal Sentinel private insurers in California alone likely “paid out $1.2 billion in Humira claims from 2013 to 2018, making it potentially the largest insurance fraud case in the department’s history.”
Indication Creep and Opportunism
Humira was approved by the FDA in 2002 for moderate to severe rheumatoid arthritis only. Once approved, it experienced “indication creep” and was approved for psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis, Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis.
Despite its attempt to capitalize on a Covid-quarantined audience, AbbVie advertising did not increase web visits that would drive sales. “The number of monthly visits to the Humira.com site stayed relatively stable, decreasing very slightly from 518,000 visits in March to 502,000 visits in April,” reported Pharmaceutical-technology. People may have been more concerned about Covid the site speculates.

SCIENCE BY WOMEN Visiting Senior Research Fellowships 2020 for African Women (Fully-funded to Spain)

Application Deadline: 30th September 2020

Eligible Countries: African Countries

To Be Taken At (Country/university): Spain
In this 6th edition our associated research centres are:
  • Institute of Photonic Sciences (ICFO)
  • Vall d´Hebron Institut de Recerca (VHIR)
  • Institute for Neuroscience (IN)
  • Kronikgune Research Center
  • Biocruces Bizkaia
  • DeustoTech
  • Spanish National Cancer Research Centre (CNIO)
  • Institute of Health Carlos III (ISCIII)
  • Donostia International Physics Center
  • Spanish National Center of Biotechnology (CNB)
  • Institute of Mathematical Sciences (ICMAT)
  • Centre for Genomics Regulation (CGR)
  • Barcelona Graduate School of Economics (BGSE)
  • Instituto de Astrofísica de Canarias  (IAC)
  • Oceanic Platform of the Canary Islands (PLOCAN)
  • Biomedical and Health Research Institute at the University of Las Palmas de Gran Canaria (ULPGC)
  • The Basque Center for Applied Mathematics – BCAM
  • Basque Center for Macromolecular Design and Engineering POLYMAT Fundazioa
  • Materials Physics Center (MPC-CFM)
About the Award: Each of these centres will host 1 senior woman researcher with at least 3 years of post-doctoral experience for a six-month fellowship. Applications will be subjected to a rigorous selection process, evaluating the academic merits and leadership of the applicants as well as the scientific quality and expected impact of their research projects. Selected candidates will receive training and integration in a dynamic, multidisciplinary and highly competitive working team, where they will be able to develop their research projects and acquire complementary skills, empowering them to transfer their research results into tangible economic and social benefits.
The main goal is to enable African women researchers and scientists to tackle the great challenges faced by Africa through research in Health and biomedicine, agriculture and food security, water, energy and climate change,  mathematics, Information and Communication Technologies as well as Economic Sciences.

Eligible Fields of Study: The preferred areas of research include:
  1. Health and Bio-medicine
  2. Energy, Water and Climate Change
  3. Agriculture and Food Safety
  4. Mathematics, Information and Communication Technologies
  5. Economic Science
Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 
  • Being a woman
  • Nationality of an African country.
  • PhD with at least 3 years of post-doctoral professional experience
  • Contractual relationship with a university or a public or private non-profit organization based in Africa dedicated to significant scientific research in the areas indicated
  • Excellent academic record and proven track of relevant research experience
  • Solid working knowledge of English
  • Proven experience leading a research group
Beneficiaries of first and second edition are not eligible. Candidates must have already contacted and identified research groups in the host centres to confirm that their proposed research can be carried out in collaboration with those research groups and, when needed, in their laboratories.

Selection Criteria: Applications will be subjected to a highly competitive selection process by the Women for Africa Foundation’s Scientific Committee. The jury will evaluate the following criteria:
  • The candidate’s research career, curriculum vitae and experience as independent research group leader.
  • The project’s scientific -technical quality and innovative potential.
  • The expected and measurable economic or social impact of the research project.
  • The candidate’s plan to communicate and disseminate the project’s results.
  • The proper consideration of ethical issues where appropriate.
Successful applicants will present innovative research projects that respond to the needs of African populations and that are likely to be transferred into products or patents for commercial exploitation, or services and public policies which have a social impact in terms of people’s welfare and quality of life, as well as an economic impact in terms of companies’ productivity and competitiveness.

Number of Awards: 19

Value of Award: Successful candidates will have access to the following benefits:
  • Flight from their centre of origin to the host institution and back
  • Living allowance of 2.400 Euros gross per month to cover accommodation, personal expense and health and occupational accident insurance coverage.
Duration of Program: 6 months

How to Apply: Only applications submitted in English via the Science by Women microsite at www.mujeresporafrica.es will be accepted. They must include the following documents:
  • Letter of Interest (max. 1 page)
  • Full curriculum vitae • Fully filled form
  • Brief but concise description of the project to be developed in the Spanish
  • host centre (max. 2 pages)
  • A letter of the prospective host group’s stating its interest to support the project proposed by the candidate.
APPLICATION FORM

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Deutsches Museum Scholar-in-Residence Scholarship Programme 2021 for International Researchers

Application Deadline: 16th October 2020

Eligible Countries: International

To Be Taken At (Country): Germany

About the Award: Applicants are invited to base their projects on the collections of the Deutsches Museum and to cooperate closely with museum staff on site when formulating their research proposals. Projects involving innovative approaches to artefact-oriented research are especially welcome.
During their stay, visiting scholars will have daily contact with the museum´s curators, archivists and librarians (approx. 50 staff members) as well as members of the Münchner Zentrum für Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte (Munich Center for the History of Science and Technology; approx. 50 staff members).
Scholarship holders will have their own workplace with a desktop computer and telephone, and the opportunity to reside temporarily in subsidized apartments of the museum complex insofar as these are available. They will present their research projects to colleagues at the beginning of their stay and will be expected to participate regularly in the museum’s and the Munich Centre’s Monday colloquium series and workshops.

Type: Research

Eligibility:
  • Scholars at any level of seniority are eligible to apply, provided they have at least one university degree.
  • There are no restrictions regarding nationality.
  • All scholars are requested to make their own provisions for health insurance.
  • The ability to read German is a prerequisite for the application (passive language skills).
Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: Pre-doctoral stipends: € 7,500 (six months) / € 15,000 (full year). Post-doctoral stipends: € 15,000 (six months) / € 30,000 (full year).

Duration of Program: 6 or 12 months

How to Apply:

Please send applications, including:
  • curriculum vitae
  • project description (3 to 5 pages)
  • two confidential references (can be sent directly by the referees)
to the following address:
Andrea Walther
Coordinator of the Research Institute
Deutsches Museum
80306 Munich
Tel.: 00 49 (0) 89 2179-280
Fax: 00 49 (0) 89 2179-239
E-Mail: a.waltherdeutsches-museum.de

Detailed information available upon request:
Prof. Dr. Elisabeth Vaupel


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Award Providers: Deutsches Museum