The Hunger Crisis in Guatemala

Yanis Iqbal

A report released by Oxfam in July 2020 states, “COVID-19 is deepening the hunger crisis in the world’s hunger hotspots and creating new epicentres of hunger across the globe. By the end of the year 12,000 people per day could die from hunger linked to COVID-19, potentially more than will die from the disease itself.” Like other regions in the world, Latin America, too, is set to witness the intensification of an already-existing hunger crisis with the number of people facing severe food insecurity increasing from 4.3 million in 2019 to 16 million in 2020, an increase of 269%.

Unprotected from the various global setbacks, Guatemala is also experiencing the pain of a hunger crisis exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. In June 2020, the World Food Programme (WFP) wrote the following about Guatemala: “With 2.3 million people in food insecurity nation-wide…and an additional 2.3 million people directly affected by the COVID-19 crisis, it is estimated that in the next 4 months, 800,000 people will be in severe food insecurity and need of food assistance”. In June 2020, 1.2 million people were in need of emergency food aid, an increase of 570,000 from the beginning of the year. At the end of May 2020, more than 15,000 cases of acute malnutrition were reported among children, exceeding the total number for the year 2019. In urban and peri-urban areas, the number of people requiring food assistance will double or triple in 2020. In Chiquimula, for example, there are 221 children with acute malnutrition, an increase of 56.6% from the last year. In the municipality of Camotán, there are 67 cases of malnutrition, an astronomic increase from 18 cases the previous year.

Angela Naletilic, Deputy Director for Action Against Hunger in Central America, says that

“More than half of Guatemalan households are having difficulty accessing markets and four out of ten families are using coping strategies that leave them worse off, such as depleting their savings or selling some of their assets,”.

Due to disruptions in supply chains, there has been a spike in food prices in Guatemala, further pushing the country into a 2008-like food price crisis where a 34% increase in the price of yellow maize plunged 450,000 Guatemalans into poverty. As a result of the aggravating hunger pandemic in Guatemala, protests have been staged and according to an agitator,

“We are dying not only from the virus but also from hunger, poverty, forgetfulness of the state, exploitation by businessmen, and corruption by politicians and the military”.

The present-day hunger crisis in Guatemala is a result of long-term, neoliberal policies, oriented towards the economic subordination of the country as a stable periphery for the global imperialist empire. Beginning roughly from the 1980s and 1990s, the country has witnessed the large-scale economic entrenchment of a neoliberal food system characterized by the growth of agro-export crops (mainly palm oil and sugarcane), decreasing land for domestic food crops and a grotesque land concentration in the hands of the few. In Guatemala, two-thirds of the agricultural land is dominated by 2.5% of the country’s farms, less than 1% of landowners hold 75% of the best agricultural land, 90% of rural inhabitants live in poverty, 27% of rural dwellers do not own land and more than 500,000 campesino families live below the level of subsistence. The average minimum landholding necessary for family subsistence in the country is between 4.5 and 7 hectares. In 1979, “88 percent of productive farm units were less than family subsistence size, holding 16 percent of arable land, while 2 percent of units held 65 percent of arable land…Between 1964 and 1979 the number of farms of less than 3.5 hectares doubled; between 1950 and 1979, the average farm size among those with less than 7 hectares fell from 2.4 to 1.8 hectares.” Through this drastic decrease in the size of landholdings, approximately 96% of farm units (comprising 20% of all agricultural lands) fell into the subsistence or below-subsistence categories in 1998.

Export-oriented Agro-industrialization in Guatemala

The undermining of subsistence and food security by land concentration has been accompanied by the destabilization of maize-self sufficiency and the concomitant substitution of food crops with agro-export crops. Maize in Guatemala is grown on one-third of the agricultural land and accounts for 91 per cent of the total cereal area in the country. It is also used in the making milpa, an ancient polycultural system of beans, maize and a variety of native greens. In the 1961-1990 period, maize imports had accounted for less than 4% of total consumption. Since then, imports have increased exponentially, accounting for one-third of the domestic supply. Whereas 98% of Guatemala’s total maize consumption during the 1980s was domestically produced, the proportion has declined to an average of 76% since 1990. This undermining of domestic maize production capabilities has occurred through reductions in agricultural expenditures and credits. Between 1983 and 1987, state credit for maize, beans and rice fell by 40%.

Withdrawal of state support for traditional maize farmers combined with the introduction of the Dominican Republic-Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement (DR-CAFTA) of 2004 to disrupt traditional agricultural practices. The free trade agreement allowed “US agribusiness to flood the markets with subsidized grains, further undermining local production. Extreme poverty spiked by 10 percentage points between 2006 and 2014”. While Guatemala farmers stopped receiving any support from the state, American corn farmers continued to “receive both direct subsidies (an average of $28,000 per farmer, which is more than five times Guatemala’s per capita GDP)…and indirect supports (like cheap water for irrigations and cheap oil made into fertilizers)”. As a result of this serious disparity, U.S. imports to Guatemala grew by 90 percent in less than a decade after DR-CAFTA, the sales of American produce in maize, wheat, and soy reaching $1.1 billion in 2014. From 649 Metric Tons (MT) in 2004, Guatemala’s maize imports have grown to 1600 MT in 2019. Currently, 4 of the top 5 exports of Guatemala are agricultural products, an indication of the economic extensiveness of DR-CAFTA.

The systematic dismantling of domestic maize production has paved the way for the installation of an export-oriented agricultural model comprising predominantly of palm oil and sugarcane. In 2008, the government of Guatemala considered 1,101,604 hectares, or thirty-seven per cent of the country’s total farmland, to be suitable for sugarcane and oil palm cultivation. In 2010, 102,000 hectares had been planted with oil palms and the area expansion from 2000 to 2010 was 590%. Between 2000 and 2016, palm oil production in Guatemala climbed six-fold, making it the second-largest oil palm producer in Latin America. The expansion of sugar-cane plantations in Guatemala occurred between 2001 and 2012, leading to a 55% increase in production area and a 46% increase in production volume. Total production in 2012 reached 2.5 million tons of sugar, of which 61 per cent were exported, and the total area amounted to 256,000 hectares. Annually, Guatemala produces over 2.7 million MT of sugar, ranking as the second largest sugar exporter in Latin America and fourth in the world.

Through the expansion of oil palm and sugarcane, food insecurity has heightened. The planting “of oil palm and sugarcane over lands previously dedicated to peasant and small-scale capitalist farming is eroding local wage labor opportunities because it is much less labor-intensive…oil palm and sugarcane require 52 and 36 working days per hectare/year respectively, while, for instance, the two annual maize harvests require 112 and chili cultivation 184 working days.” Substitution of food crops “by the corporately owned plantations [of palm oil and sugarcane] diminishes the employment and income opportunities of small-scale corn producers, regional traders and micro-entrepreneurs. These losses are not sufficiently compensated by the jobs and incomes offered by the agribusiness companies. The assertion that the highly capitalized agribusiness is a source of additional incomes and employment is not true in the case of Guatemala.”

Guatemala’s Annual Agricultural Survey of 2013 has found that a continuous growth of agro-export land surface in ten years, from 2003 to 2013, has coincided with a 26% decrease in the total agricultural employment. When income decreases, people are unable to afford food items and presently, half of the population is not able to afford the basic food basket. In addition to the loss of income, sugarcane and palm oil cultivation have “contributed to the disappearance of certain nutritious foods…compromised ecological resources (e.g. water, forest, and soils), and heightened the region’s exposure to external shocks (e.g. oil palm price fluctuations). Furthermore, food insecurity is exacerbated by the scalar incongruence between (beyond-community) food system threats, shocks and stresses, and (primarily within-household) adaptation strategies in relation to self- and market- provisioning of food.”

Violence, Securitization and Environmental Disaster

Palm oil and sugarcane plantations, apart from leading to market-oriented de-peasantization, also cause displacement, environmental disasters, economic uncertainty and consequently, food insecurity. In the Polochic Valley, for example, negotiations between campesino communities, state agencies, and the Chabil Utzaj sugar cane company fell apart in March 2011 “as at least 14 violent evictions were carried out between January and March 2011 on land claimed by the company. Community corn fields were destroyed in Canlún during the blitz, and private security guards returned to attack campesinos from the group on 21 May, killing Oscar Reyes with 12 gunshots and wounding at least three others”.

Through the use of violence against campesinos cultivating maize and other food crops, the sugar cane company was able to displace the peasants from their own lands, eliminate domestic food production in the region, force the campesinos into being dependent on imported food for consumption and exploit the rising food prices of the 2007-2008 period. Not having any disposable income as a result of crop destruction, the evicted campesinos were left in a state of intense food insecurity wherein the rising food prices disallowed them from achieving a basic subsistence level.

Like sugarcane, palm oil monocultures, too, are associated with environmental disasters, violence and food insecurity. A farmer settled in southwest Peten talks about how palm oil companies, through their securitization and militaristic regulation of agricultural lands, create barriers for food production: “When I want to go to my land, they don’t let me; I have to ask permission to harvest my corn or take out firewood or construction wood. I have to give accounts of what I take. This is what the company has done. They made it private property and planted palm on both sides of the road and don’t let anyone pass anymore. The security guards inspect what I carry in my bag when I go to my field in the morning; they write down my name and my identification number and they repeat this in the afternoon, too.” Many a times, palm oil companies don’t have the consent of the community and operate without any governmental licenses. According to a person living in the Polochic Valley,

“In 1996 the palm [cultivation] began [here], without the consent of the communities … they just came, planted their palm, and put up their factory. They didn’t ask if it’s okay or what the communities think about it …. At first, they said it is going to bring development and it’s a good process. But the truth is, there’s no development – rather, it’s a disaster.”

Along with securitized regulation and the violation of free, prior and informed consent, palm oil production is also linked to environmental disasters and the contamination of the Río la Pasió River in the Sayaxché municipality is a paradigmatic example of such catastrophes. In May 2015, the oxidation lagoons (containing wastes from oil mills and chemicals for fertilizers and pesticides) of the company Reforestadora de Palma S.A. (REPSA), a subsidiary of the biggest producer of palm oil in Guatemala, the Olmeca group, overflowed due to heavy rains and spilled their contents (mainly malathion) into the surrounding areas. As a result of this spillover, four severe effects were produced: “1) an at least 150 km-long section of the [Río la Pasió] river damaged; 2) between 13 to 17 communities [of the Sayaxché municipality]directly affected (more than 12,000 persons) along with, indirectly, the whole department [of Petén] ; 3) fish populations of at least 23 species identified by a government institution decimated as a result of the toxic spill; and 4) the possibility that the river’s ecosystem would never recover”.

Out of the 23 species decimated by the spillover, six were endangered species and six had economic value for the communities. With the deaths of the economically valuable fishes, there has been a concomitant loss of 8 million euros. In addition to ecological-economic loss, the malathion overflow has heavily impacted the communities living in the department of Peten since exposure to the chemical “interferes with the normal functioning of the nerves and the brain; and exposure to very high levels in air, water, or food for a short time can cause shortness of breath, chest tightness, vomiting, cramps, diarrhea, blurred vision, excessive sweating, dizziness, unconsciousness, and death.” Melding and synchronizing the all-pervasive effects of the malathion spillover, Saúl Paau, a community Leader, characterizes it as a crime against humanity:

“We can categorize the case as a crime against humanity, because not only are various species of our rivers being killed, but the river is also part of our historical culture, it is part of our territory, we feed on it, and with pollution and fish mortality today the food security of each and all the 116 thousand inhabitants that live in the municipalities of Sayaxché is violated…The issue of the breakdown of the ecosystem and the environment is not only water and fish, it is air, is human health, environmental health ”.

The ecological catastrophe in the Sayaxché municipality was in the making for many years since the palm oil project of REPSA did not have an approved Environmental Impact Study (EIS) and despite this the Guatemalan state allowed the company to carry out its operations. Américo González López, Mayor of the Manos Unidos Cooperative, talks about how the RESPA palm oil project in the Sayaxché municipality was flawed from the beginning and had state protection for whatever plunder it did in the region: “This case [contamination of Río la Pasió] proves that MARN [Ministry of the Environment and Natural Resources] has failed and that the municipality has failed. The people of the area were not consulted about the project in spite of the fact that it was a project with a huge environmental impact. How is it possible that this type of situation was not foreseen? Or that now the government doesn’t know what to do to mitigate the harm done? This shows that the EIS were not real. They monopolize the water. They divert the river water to their greenhouses or for watering the palm trees, and the rivers are drying up. In the 48 years I have lived here, I have never seen river levels so low. The watering holes in our pasturelands have dried up and that has never happened before. They took down too many trees, and now they are using too much water.” The disruption of hydrological dynamics by palm oil companies is not an isolated event and the destruction of water balances is a part and parcel of palm oil production which has an extremely high water requirement of 5500 m3 /ton of crop yield – about five times that of maize.

Various organizations have attempted to protest the unencumbered pillage of REPSA and to bring attention to the irreparable ecological damage being done by the company.  A local community group called the Commission for the Defense of Life and Nature, for instance, took legal action and won a court ruling that called the spill as an “ecocide” and asked the company to suspend operations for six months at the Sayaxché palm plantation in Petén. But these judicial decisions have been overturned by violence linked to RESPA. Subsequent to the court ruling, three environmental defenders were kidnapped and a fourth activist, named Rigoberto Lima Choc, a 28-year-old schoolteacher from Champerico who had filed the complaint, was killed. After this spate of violence, REPSA continued with its palm oil business. Along with overt violence, REPSA is also utilizing informational platforms, confrontational tactics and securitization strategies to quell long-term resistance against its environmentally disastrous operations. Lorenzo Pérez, Coordinator of the National Council of Displaced Persons of Guatemala, says,

“Other companies sit down at the dialogue table and are more respectful, but REPSA doesn’t want to meet with the people. They have security personnel who take videos and photos of journalists. They are currently harassing journalists and have an ongoing REPSA radio campaign to convince people of their good image. People are aware of the impact they are having, but in order to keep their job, they don’t say anything. Some time ago when 15 workers tried to form a union, they were fired.”

Meanwhile, the people of Sayaxché continue to suffer from the ecocide and the statement of María Margarita Hernández de Herrera, a 45-year-old Q’eq’chi Mayan woman, living with her husband and three children in the village of Canaán, in Sayaxché, Petén, expresses the long-term repercussions of the river contamination for the livelihoods of many:

“This [river contamination] is the most difficult thing for a community that lives surrounded by [palm oil]plantations, because we’ve lost the lands where we used to cultivate our crops; and with the contamination of the river, we can no longer fish and prepare the catch alongside the river to eat with our beans. The entire environment is contaminated because now we have constant infestations of flies in our food, on our fruits, so we have to take special care that the children don’t get sick. We see that the color and the smell of the river has changed; our water sources have diminished; and when we wash our clothes and bathe our children in the river, we get skin lesions, diarrhea, nausea.”

In its 1989 annual report, the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) had blamed the structural adjustment policies of the 1980s for the death of hundreds of thousands of children in the Global South. Instead of using bland, benumbed and bureaucratic jargon, it had used unequivocal terms to condemn the cruelty of structural adjustment programs:

“It is essential to strip away the niceties of economic parlance and say that what has happened is simply an outrage against a large segment of humanity. The developing world’s debt, both in the manner in which it was incurred and in the manner in which it is being ‘adjusted to’ is an economic stain on the second half of the twentieth century. Allowing world economic problems to be taken out on the growing minds and bodies of young children is the antithesis of all civilized behavior. Nothing can justify it. And it shames and diminishes us all.”

The words used by UNICEF back then in 1989 resonate loudly with the current situation in Guatemala. In this country, the prevalence of stunting in children under 5 is one of the highest in the world at 46.5% nationally. The stunting rate rises to 70% in some departments and 90% in the hardest hit municipalities. In 2019, food insecurity had worsened as more than 78% of the corn and bean harvest was lost in the year, affecting 250,000 people. Child malnutrition also increased from 60% in 2016 to 69% in 2019. Silveria Pérez, a mother of four living in a rural Guatemalan community, says,

“You’re told your child is malnourished. You get scared and wonder if your child is going to die. You can’t sleep because you’re thinking about what you can do. But as you have no money, there’s no way he’ll get better.”

All this is slated to aggravate in the coming months as neoliberal capitalism, unable to look beyond the narrow horizons of profit maximization, fails to tackle the hunger crisis and becomes “an outrage against a large segment of humanity”.

Tentacles of an Octopus; the Pride and Prejudice of Nationalism

Madhu Bhaduri

Nationalism is like a jellyfish that can take on new forms, but of late in India it has become more like an octopus, spreading its menacing tentacles, arbitrarily declaring some as ‘anti national’ others more intimidating, for being a threat to ‘national security’ which invariably ends up in slapping of law of sedition against the person whose only offence might have been to criticize the government. A declared threat to national security has deprived the people of Kashmir from access to internet connectivity for more than a year. Today India ranks first among nations in the world for most frequently cutting off internet connectivity in the name of national security.  This hallowed term Nationalism, is it like the Holy Cow above all criticism, beyond the right to freedom of expression, or in more extreme cases of arbitrary imprisonment of people without trial for years; denying them freedom to life? It is imperative to dig deeper into why and how the concept of nationalism is prone to be turned and twisted.

The emergence of nations is a relatively recent development in history. It began in Europe around the mid nineteenth century when large sized monarchies and dynasties began to crumble to be replaced by nation states on the basis of ethnic, racial and cultural affinities. Even before the disintegration of the Ottoman and Habsburg empires, two nations Germany and Italy were formed by integration of small princely states.

Along with these changes in political geography, there was a clamor by people for participation in governance. The slogans of the French revolution calling for ‘equality, justice and fraternity’ still resonated in the air.

The emergence of nations evoked feelings of pride for the ethnic, racial and cultural affinity which became the basis of nation states. The other side of this Pride was a feeling of being distinct and ‘other’ than neighbouring nations and of ‘other’ racial and ethnic groups. As a consequence aggression towards other nations often in the name of defence became an integral part of nationalism. This otherness bred prejudices which naturally extended towards ethnic and religious minorities who lived within the national boundaries. Identity based nationalism often turns into manufactured hatred for those who are not the same. In other words nationalism is based in equal measure on feelings of Pride for national identity and Prejudice towards others who do not share the same identity on some ground or the other. Einstein, whose Jewish origin compelled him to leave his native Germany, when asked about his views said: “nationalism in my opinion is nothing more than an idealistic rationalization for militarism and aggression.” What in normal times can be regarded as prejudice, can it turn into aggression and militarism as German nationalism descending into Nazi barbarism had shown? Einstein among many other Jewish intellectuals had personal experience of it.

Rabindranath Tagore like Einstein suffered the pride and prejudices of colonial British administration. He saw an irreconcilable contradiction between humanism and nationalism. In a famous lecture on Nationalism delivered in America in 1917, he said: “there is only one history …..Not on the basis of nationalism but of humanism.” Tagore was explicit in saying that it was his conviction that “my countrymen will truly gain their India by fighting against the education that teaches them that a country is greater than the ideals of humanity.”  Many other thinkers also viewed nationalism as being opposed to humanism; George Orwell and H G Wells are also well known for their views.

Our immediate concern is not the idea or philosophy of nationalism but how it drives national policies based on ‘national interest’. Its most obvious fall out is an increasing number of  people being charged with being anti national while others being held in prison indefinitely for being a security risk to the nation. These are all actions by the government which defines national interest, often in contradiction to the constitutional rights of citizens. The right to freedom of speech is its first victim. Professors and journalist including one with 90% disability confined in a wheel chair are considered dangerous. Indeed, such a danger to national security that even a humane one time gesture of allowing a meeting with a dying mother is not allowed. An 80 year old poet whose only weapon all along his life has been his pen is such a security threat to the nation that even after he contacted covid19 virus and was in a delirious state, his wife and daughter were not allowed to see him. The evidence against them is usually not in public domain until the matter comes up in the courts, and the system allows this to be an indefinitely long period. In the mean time a manufactured notion of national security allows the government to use force to silence dissidents who critique government policies. Unfettered freedom of speech is now the right enjoyed only by the supporters of the government. Some members of the ruling party including a minister in the central government repeatedly made hate speeches inciting violence against religious minorities. They have full freedom of speech even if it incites violence and riots. This is not considered anti national, because hate and violence are accepted and rationalized towards minorities in the name of nationalism, as Einstein had said.

As I write this, a leading advocate of the Supreme Court has been convicted for contempt of court for posting two tweets which were critical of the court. The restriction of freedom of speech has now spread beyond the executive to the highest court of the country which is of the view that its ‘majesty and dignity’ have been diminished by two tweets! Concern and what is more, expression of concern by citizens about the way nationalism is being (mis)used by the government is likely to spread. Will the heavy hand of the powers that be see this writing on the wall? As things stand today, dissidents alone are a threat to the security of the nation.

Nations are defined within territorial boundaries and like everything else national boundaries also change from time to time and so must territorial nationalism. After World War II European countries got divided between East and West Europe. Germany as a nation got divided. Some decades later after the death of President Tito, the proud nation of Yugoslavia which along with Egypt and India was the founder of the non aligned movement broke (after violent struggles) into seven nations. In 1991 the Soviet Union turned into 14 different nations. In the Soviet case there was no struggle and no violence in the emergence of so many new nations. The Soviet regime caused its own easy demise by not allowing freedom of expression and movement and for having imposed authoritarian controls on its people who welcomed the end of authoritarianism. The collapse of Soviet control was welcomed with much jubilation in the nations of East Europe. Soviet nationalism turned in to the expression of several nationalisms only 30 years ago.

An Egyptian friend once said to me: isn’t it strange that we have one race and one language and even one religion but we are 22 different Arab countries. In India you have 22 different languages in addition to many ethnic, racial and religious differences, yet you are one country. Indeed it is something to ponder over. Close to us in history and geography we have seen a young nation created on religious solidarity falling apart under the weight of unfair imposition of political control by West Pakistan on East Pakistan in 1971.

So, is nationalism just a mobilizing slogan?  Is authoritarianism in the name of nationalism a last dangerous twist of the knife, shredding our humanism, our shared history and culture?

New Zealand election date postponed as COVID-19 cases rise

John Braddock

New Zealand’s Labour Prime Minister Prime Jacinda Ardern announced on Monday that she had decided to shift the date of the forthcoming national elections from September 19 to October 17.

The near month-long postponement takes place amid a second outbreak of COVID-19 cases, centred in South Auckland. After 102 days with no evidence of community transmission, the country’s biggest city is now under a “level three” lockdown, at least until August 26.

In just over a week, 80 cases of COVID-19 have been identified in the community, not including 21 infections among people who have arrived from overseas. Almost all positive cases are in hotels that have been turned into quarantine facilities run by the military. Six patients have been hospitalised. Two of the community cases have no known link to the South Auckland cluster, including one hotel maintenance worker.

Ardern and Health Minister Chris Hipkins admitted to a breakdown of COVID-19 testing for frontline workers at borders and quarantine facilities, blaming public officials for failing the government’s “expectations.” Ardern announced Wednesday that some 500 additional NZ Defence Force staff will guard quarantine hotels, bringing the total military involvement to over 1,000 personnel.

The country’s second coronavirus outbreak continues to grow every day, and the source of the main cluster is unknown. It has spread to a number of workplaces, including a cold storage facility, a NZ Post centre, the Ports of Auckland, two tertiary institutions and several schools. Thousands of people have been tested as “close contacts” of infected persons.

The election delay highlights the increasing political instability triggered by the pandemic. It is only the fourth such postponement in New Zealand’s history. The previous occasions were during World Wars I and II and in response to the upsurge of working-class opposition to capitalism during the 1930s Great Depression.

Ardern said her decision was based on public health concerns and was “in the best interests of voters and our democracy.” In fact, it was a political compromise in response to demands from the opposition National Party, which has been lagging in the polls, and the right-wing nationalist NZ First Party, which is part of the government. National claimed that the Auckland lockdown meant it could not properly campaign, and that Ardern gained an “unfair” advantage from her daily COVID-19 briefings.

Significantly, Ardern’s announcement came the day after Deputy Prime Minister Winston Peters, leader of coalition partner NZ First, revealed he had written to Ardern stating his preference for a delay. He publicly released the letter, he said, to make sure the governor-general knew a majority of parliament, including NZ First and National, wanted a delay. It amounted to a threat to break up the coalition and cast doubt on the legitimacy of the election, if Ardern did not accede.

Ardern publicly rejected suggestions that she had been swayed by Peters’ letter. Her decision, however, effectively throws NZ First a lifeline, giving the party more time to campaign. It is currently polling below the 5 percent threshold required to re-enter parliament.

NZ First is a right-wing nationalist party, notorious for its racist and anti-immigrant agitation against Chinese, Indian and Muslim people. It advocates a strong military and police force. Labour gave NZ First a major role in the coalition government, despite the party receiving only 7.2 percent of the votes in 2017. With Peters embedded as foreign minister, the Labour-NZ First-Greens coalition has further integrated New Zealand into the US military preparations against China in the Asia-Pacific region, and implemented harsh anti-immigrant policies.

Peters decided to form a coalition with the Labour Party, despite the National Party gaining more votes in 2017, because Labour’s anti-immigrant and anti-Chinese policies were more closely aligned with NZ First.

Ardern’s change of date received widespread support from the corporate media. Right-wing columnist Matthew Hooton described it in the New Zealand Herald as a “masterful” move, while the Canterbury Employers’ Chamber of Commerce said it gave “some surety in uncertain times.”

Ordinary people, however, were less enthusiastic. According to a Herald poll on August 17, before the announcement, 60 percent supported a postponement, mostly in Auckland. Elsewhere there was stronger support for the original date, with 53 percent in Wellington saying it should go ahead as planned, and 43 percent in Canterbury saying the same.

Behind the political turmoil there are rising social tensions. The pandemic has already led to tens of thousands of job losses. The tourism industry, which accounts for one in 10 jobs, has been devastated, and there have been major redundancies in retail and manufacturing. Thousands of people are struggling to sustain rent and mortgage payments.

Having been glorified by the world’s media for its response to the pandemic, including a relatively early and strict lockdown in March-April, New Zealand is now one of many countries, including Australia, experiencing serious new outbreaks. This underscores the falsehood of the conception—promoted by the trade unions, pro-Labour Party pundits and pseudo-left groups—that the global pandemic could be defeated through national isolationism.

Finance Minister Grant Robinson was forced this week to announce a two-week extension to the government’s “wage subsidy” scheme, covering approximately 470,000 jobs. The scheme, originally due to expire on September 1, is in fact a subsidy for employers who can show a revenue drop due to COVID-19 of 40 percent, and has already paid out more than $NZ13 billion.

The Child Poverty Action Group, Salvation Army, Lifewise and Auckland Action Against Poverty have all warned that welfare benefits are not sufficient to survive on. Treasury is forecasting unemployment to more than double to 10 percent this quarter.

The surge in cases is hitting the working class the hardest, particularly Pacific and Maori communities in impoverished and overcrowded areas of South Auckland. The Guardian reported on Wednesday that of the new cases linked to public transmission, Pacific Islanders make up 74 percent while Māori account for 16 percent. “It’s nothing to do with the virus, it’s the socioeconomic conditions,” Dr Colin Tukuitonga of Auckland University said.

There are signs of unrest. Some 3,200 nurses and other health workers at medical centres across the country are due to walk off the job on September 3 as part of a long-running struggle for pay parity with their counterparts employed by District Health Boards.

While the Labour Party remains the business elite’s preferred option to lead the next government, the deepening social crisis, the coronavirus outbreak and the election delay could hinder its re-election campaign. At Labour’s launch on August 8, Ardern confidently declared that the campaign would be fought as a “COVID election,” based on her government’s purportedly successful record leading the country’s so-called “team of five million” through the pandemic.

Whatever tactical adjustments are now made, Ardern has made it clear that there will be no repeat of Labour’s 2017 election campaign, which falsely promised “transformative” action to reduce child poverty and solve the housing crisis. None of this has come to fruition, as Labour has run a right-wing government imposing austerity and anti-immigrant measures at home, along with pro-US militarism abroad.

Tensions rise as Zimbabwe’s economy implodes

Stephan McCoy

President Emmerson Mnangagwa’s ZANU-PF government faces mounting opposition as economic and social tensions rise.

Zimbabwe’s currency is in free fall, with inflation running at 800 percent, leading to severe food, fuel, medicine, and currency shortages.

With salaries worth just 10 percent of what they were two years ago, poverty has risen by a third. More than 70 percent of the population live below the poverty line and 34 percent live in extreme poverty. Power outages and water shortages compound their misery.

The income required for a family of five to obtain “both food and non-food items” has risen by 33 percent over this year, making many basic goods out of reach for most Zimbabweans. The food poverty line, in a country that was once the continent’s breadbasket, has reached 40 percent.

Zimbabwe has recorded just under 5,000 confirmed cases of the coronavirus, and over 120 deaths. This is believed to be a significant underestimate, with some of the country’s leading figures becoming infected, including several legislators and Mnangagwa’s son.

The healthcare system, already limited and starved of resources, is on its knees, struggling to respond to the pandemic which is disrupting other healthcare services.

Fifteen thousand nurses, at the forefront of the struggle against the pandemic, have been on strike for nearly two months, vowing not to return to work—despite government threats and intimidation—until their demands for personal protective equipment (PPE) and the payment of their wages in US dollars are met. Their lives are being put at risk by the lack of PPE.

On July 28, the Zimbabwe Association of Doctors for Human Rights said that 200 health workers had tested positive for COVID-19. According to CGTN Africa, at least 10 percent of confirmed cases are healthcare workers, with the total number of infected healthcare workers reaching 480.

Nurses began their strike over two months ago and have periodically been joined by doctors. The government employer, the Health Services Board, has declared the strike illegal and taken the striking nurses off the payroll. Last month, 13 nurses and union representatives were arrested in Harare after they staged a demonstration demanding better wages and working conditions.

Despite the widespread poverty and the nurses’ strike, the ZANU-PF government has agreed to pay $3.5 billion to more than 4,000 white farmers evicted from their land after 2000, in a bid to placate US and European imperialism. To fund the interest payments on the bond, the government is considering selling an international bond, using commodity exports such as gold, diamonds and platinum, and municipal land around the nation’s biggest cities.

Mnangagwa appointed his vice-president, Constantino Chiwenga, as health minister after being forced to sack the previous minister, Obadiah Moyo, due to corruption in the awarding of a $20 million contract for COVID-19 testing kits. The corruption was exposed by investigative journalist Hopewell Chin’ono, who is now in prison facing charges of inciting violence against the government. Moyo was arrested and is awaiting trial.

According to Bloomberg , relations between Mnangagwa and Chiwenga are acrimonious, which is why he has now been given the poisoned chalice of the health ministry. Mnangagwa accused Chiwenga during a “heated exchange” in a politburo meeting of attempting to use the July 31 protests to embarrass him. Chiwenga, a former general with strong support in the military, is seen as a possible rival for the presidency.

While Chiwenga played a prominent role in the 2017 coup that ousted longtime ruler Robert Mugabe and brought Mnangagwa to power, Mnangagwa has attempted to undermine his influence by reassigning those seen as being loyal to Chiwenga to other posts or outside the country.

Such is the economic turmoil that last June, in an unprecedented move, the Joint Operations Command (JOC) made up of officials from the military, police and secret service, intervened to order the closure of the stock exchange and to ban large mobile-money transfers in a bid to avert collapse. Military leaders denied they were planning a coup.

Mnangagwa’s accusations come after Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation seized fliers from the home of Cleveria Chizema, a member of ZANU-PF’s politburo, denigrating him and calling for ZANU-PF supporters to join the opposition protest on July 31, while praising Chiwenga. ZANU-PF has now suspended Chizema for plotting against Mnangagwa.

According to Africa Confidential, several within this group are in favour of either Chiwenga or General Sibusiso Moyo taking over from Mnangagwa in a palace coup and the formation of a National Transitional Authority, including opposition Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance (MDC-A) leader Nelson Chamisa, who lost the widely criticised 2018 election to Mnangagwa.

The euphoria that accompanied Mnangagwa’s ouster of his longtime ally Mugabe in a military coup, when he advanced himself as the strongman required to restore order necessary and secure international investment, soon evaporated. His August 2018 election victory was marred by allegations of irregularities and the killing of at least six protesters. A few months later, his government deployed the army to suppress protests over the deteriorating economic conditions, killing at least 18 people.

The imperialist powers imposed sanctions on Zimbabwe in 2003, targeting specific individuals and 56 companies and other organisations, making it difficult for Zimbabwe to obtain loans. They initially backed Mnangagwa in the hope of weaning him off relations with China. Beijing had for decades supported Mugabe, investing heavily in the country’s extractive industries, agriculture, telecoms, and hydropower.

Earlier this month, the US Treasury sanctioned Mnangagwa’s wealthy business ally Kudakwashe Tagwirei, chief executive of Sakunda Holdings and majority owner of Landela Mining Ventures. He is widely seen as a proxy for Mnangagwa, whose personal fortune is estimated at $500 million, thanks to his stakes in several banks, mines, agribusiness, and transport companies.

This indicates that any international loan will be dependent upon clearing out the corrupt circle of plutocrats around Mnangagwa, including the president himself. Mnangagwa has accused Washington and the major powers of inciting the opposition to his government.

In the wake of the attempted coup, the government reimposed lockdown restrictions and flooded the streets of the capital Harare with police and military to prevent the July 31 protests over the deteriorating economic situation. The protests had been called by the MDC-A, which seeks to normalize Zimbabwe’s relations with the imperialist powers, and some smaller oppositional parties.

The security forces used checkpoints and roadblocks set up during the COVID-19 lockdown to stop protesters reaching the city. At least 60 people were arrested, including novelist Tsitsi Dangarembga and MDC-A spokesperson, Fadzayi Mahere.

This followed the arrest of around 100 oppositionists, journalists, and other prominent critics in recent weeks. Journalist Hopewell Chin’ono was one of the protest’s organisers and has spent the last four weeks in prison on charges of inciting public violence. Last week, he appeared in court to make his third appeal for bail wearing leg irons.

While the magistrate ordered the removal of his leg irons, he refused to allow his claims about the harsh treatment he has received in jail—including lack of warm clothing, suitable food for his medical condition, and personal protective equipment—to be heard in public because it could “jeopardize prison security.”

Lawyers say that Transform Zimbabwe party leader Jacob Ngarivhume has reported similar treatment and has been denied bail twice.

UK government demands universities slash “low-value” courses in return for financial aid

Stephen Hunter

Education Secretary Gavin Williamson announced last month that government “bailouts” for universities in financial crisis will be conditional on slashing dozens of courses deemed “low-value.”

This marks a new stage in the government’s assault on higher education and presages a fundamental restructuring of the sector.

The coronavirus pandemic has dealt a staggering blow to universities, already weakened by years of marketisation and privatization. A quarter of institutions were in deficit in early March this year, with several teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. Now, according to analysis by the Institute for Fiscal Studies, 13 universities face “a very real prospect” of going bust, while the sector more broadly could see losses of between £3 billion and £19 billion in the long term.

Students in UK lecture hall (credit: ©Jirka Matousek via Flickr)

Williamson has responded by announcing that government loans will be granted to struggling institutions on a “case by case basis,” provided they meet a list of demands. These conditions are geared towards closing off access to university education for working class students by axing dozens of courses and allowing the bankruptcy of poorer universities.

The education secretary explained, “We need our universities to achieve great value for money—delivering the skills and a workforce that will drive our economy and nation to thrive in the years ahead.” Higher education providers, he said, would only receive assistance “as a last resort” and would be required to focus on providing subjects that result in better job prospects for graduates. Even with the cull of “low-value” courses, and despite the threat of whole universities going bankrupt, the plans state that “There is no guarantee of support.”

By “low-value courses,” Williamson means degree programs with low graduate earnings. This criterion specifically targets courses taken by poorer students at predominantly working-class universities. Graduates from lower income backgrounds earn less than those from higher income backgrounds—an average of 30 percent less than those from the wealthiest one fifth of families. Degrees from less prestigious universities (with much higher proportions of working-class students) command significantly lower salaries. A sociology degree from Bradford University, for example, sees graduates earning £17,500 three years after graduation, whereas the same degree from Cambridge earns graduates an average of £29,000.

Working class youth will therefore have the range of courses they can access slashed, particularly in the arts and social sciences, whose graduates are especially poorly paid. Some poorer communities will lose entire universities. In 2019, according to the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service, 28.75 percent of the most disadvantaged four-fifths of 18-year-olds began a full-time degree, compared to 57.7 percent of the most advantaged fifth. This disparity will grow as whole sections of higher education are cut away.

The demand that universities axe “low-value” courses is part of a long-developed plan. In 2018, the Augur Review was established by Theresa May’s Tory government to address “low value, low quality” degrees, with a focus on promoting further education training as an alternative to universities. At the time, Education Secretary Damian Hinds called on universities to “drop or revamp” courses that don’t give “value for money” and Robert Halfon, chair of the education select committee, argued that “Existing universities that do not provide a good return on academic courses could reinvent themselves as centers of technical excellence.” The 2019 Tory manifesto pledged to find ways “to tackle the problem… of low-quality courses.”

With the onset of the crisis in higher education triggered by the pandemic, these elitist ideas have been kicked up a gear. The Policy Exchange think tank has submitted a report to the Department for Education which argues, “The UK is unusual in that universities are private charities and not subject to direct state control but current bail out conditions provides Government short term leverage to weed out weaker courses.” The Institute of Economic Affairs also asks ministers to consider “closing many institutions and courses” and “offering the assets and staff to people and organizations who wish to try something new.”

The key motivation for these arguments is the fact that huge numbers of graduates cannot repay their student loans as repayments start only when a graduate begins earning more than £26,575 a year. Around 45 percent of the value of these loans will never be recouped by the government—adding £12 billion to its deficit, rising to £17 billion in three years’ time—because wages are so low. Now, the government and its advisors intend to use these same low wages to justify gutting young people’s already severely limited educational opportunities—considered a financial sinkhole by the ruling class.

This is the culmination of a bi-partisan policy of marketisation in higher education. The process began with the introduction of tuition fees by the Labour Party in the late 1990s and early 2000s, with the specific intention of making universities reliant on private sources of income. It reached an inflection point with the Conservative Party’s 2017 Higher Education and Research Act which established the Office for Students, whose mandate was to act as a “market regulator” and “competition authority.” The result is a destructive cycle of competition amongst universities for student numbers and private investment, driving the “losers,” overwhelmingly those institutions catering for poorer students, towards bankruptcy.

In the next months and years, the working class, already relegated to bottom-tier universities in the market system, will either be kicked out altogether, crammed into overcrowded bare-necessities courses, or moved into a second-class further education and vocational system. High quality, well-rounded education will be reserved for the elite. On July 9, Williamson officially junked Tony Blair’s target of sending 50 percent of young people to university—itself an entirely fraudulent promise of “social mobility.”

The consequence of these attacks will be the cultural impoverishment of the working class and the loss of essential skills. Whether a course is kept or discarded will not be based on its value to an individual and their development, or the broad social, political, and cultural needs of wider society, but on whether or not it serves the interests of the super-rich.

Chancellor Rishi Sunak’s “Kickstart Scheme,” a cheap labour programme announced as part of the government’s multibillion-pound bailout package, shows the “alternatives” which the Tories have in mind for young people. Under the scheme, under-18s are taken “under the wing” of massive companies (including McDonalds, Costa, Tesco, and Aldi) and labelled “apprentices” before being paid a pitiful £4.15 per hour, £6.45 once they reach 18 and eventually peaking at just £8.20 for 21-24 year olds. The firms are incentivized with £2,000 for every “additional” apprentice they take on.

As with government bailouts of the banks and big business, and corporate “restructuring” programs costing thousands of jobs, the ruling class has seized on the pandemic to advance its reactionary objectives in higher education. It is given a free hand to do so by the Labour Party and the University and College Union (UCU), who for years have limited university workers and students to ineffective strikes over single issues.

The campaign for universal high-quality and well-rounded education must base itself on the independent struggle of the working class for socialism. The pandemic has brought to the surface the complete irreconcilability of the bankrupt capitalist system with the needs of society. A political offensive must be waged against the profit system as the only viable means to protect the interests and welfare of the working class and young people.

Johnson government scraps Public Health England, accelerating break-up of National Health Service

Robert Stevens

The Conservative government has announced the scrapping of Public Health England (PHE) and its replacement with a new body, the National Institute for Health Protection (NIHP).

NIHP will bring together several organisations, PHE, NHS Test and Trace, and the Joint Biosecurity Centre, as the “first step towards becoming a single organisation.”

PHE, established by the Cameron led-Tory government in 2013, is the national public health body and executive agency of the Department of Health and Social Care. Its scrapping seven years later is part of efforts by the Tories to scapegoat PHE for the government’s catastrophic response to the coronavirus pandemic that has cost tens of thousands of lives. But its replacement by NIHP has a broader aim as well, accelerating the privatisation of the National Health Service (NHS).

Health Secretary Matt Hancock announced the new body “will work seamlessly to harness the capabilities of academia and groundbreaking and innovative private companies with whom we must work so closely to get the best result.”

For months, Boris Johnson’s government has been trailing the “failures” of PHE, but these were the direct outcome of government policy. This included its decision to bury a 2016 report exposing the unpreparedness of the NHS for a flu pandemic, the gutting of emergency stockpiles of personal protective equipment (PPE), the downgrading of COVID-19 from a High Consequence Infectious Disease, and the denial of full PPE to frontline health workers.

Throughout the early months of the pandemic, PHE insisted repeatedly that COVID-19 posed a “low risk” to the public. This was in line with the government’s “herd immunity” strategy, which it was forced to temporarily abandon only due to massive public pressure, leading to the March 23 announcement of a national lockdown.

The PHE’s method of calculating COVID-19 deaths, later found to have possibly inflated the figure by just over 5,000 when compared with the method used by other European countries, was seized on by Johnson to press the case for disbandment. Downing Street’s own systematic efforts at minimising the death toll, which involved excluding deaths in care homes during the peak of the pandemic, were swept aside.

The Daily Telegraph has led the attacks on PHE as part of an orchestrated campaign by the right-wing media and think-tanks. Among those demanding PHE’s scrapping were former Telegraph editor Charles Moore and Matthew Lesh, head of research at the Adam Smith Institute. Lesh’s Telegraph headlines included: “Public Health England can’t meet the challenge it faces from coronavirus” (April 17); “Public health bureaucrats must face a reckoning for their catastrophic coronavirus failures” (May 10); “Public Health England’s exaggerated death statistics are a scandal that has fed fear” (July 17); “PHE has been a public health catastrophe” (August 16).

But the main “crime” of PHE was that it was part of a “bloated” NHS that was still not sufficiently responsive to the expertise and “flexibility” of the private sector. In a Telegraph editorial April 4 headlined, “The inflexibility of our lumbering NHS is why the country has had to shut down,” Moore complained of the “reluctance of the health service, and of Public Health England, to look outside their own spheres for help. In a culture almost proudly hostile to the private sector and mistrustful of independent academic work, the NHS’s first instinct is to defend bureaucratic territory.”

On Sunday, the Telegraph editorialised on the government’s imminent announcement with, “Farewell to Public Health England, and good riddance.” It began, “For weeks this newspaper has called for Public Health England to be abolished, and today we are pleased to report a victory.” Every failure of the Tories, from the country being utterly unprepared for the pandemic to there being no systematic testing of the population, was blamed on PHE. It repeated Lesh’s criticism that PHE had exaggerated the COVID-19 death toll.

Former Tory leader Sir Iain Duncan Smith who had said in June that he would “abolish PHE tomorrow” said, “The one thing consistent about Public Health England is that almost everything it has touched has failed.”

There is no doubt that PHE has presided over a massive failure but the architects of this are Hancock and Johnson.

Over the weekend, PHE Chief Executive Duncan Selbie told the Times, “The UK had no national diagnostic testing capabilities other than in the NHS at the outset of the pandemic. PHE does not do mass diagnostic testing. We operate national reference and research laboratories focused on novel and dangerous pathogens, and it was never at any stage our role to set the national testing strategy for the coronavirus pandemic. This responsibility rested with [the Department of Health and Social Care].” He added, “Any suggestion that PHE monopolised, centralised and controlled pandemic testing and even stopped others from developing tests or conducting them is not true.”

Over the past decade, PHE has been subjected to brutal austerity, its budget slashed by 40 percent in the seven years since its formation. When the pandemic hit Britain there were just 290 contact tracers in PHE for the whole of England, with a population of over 50 million people.

That Dido Harding is Johnson’s choice to lead the NIHP reveals everything about the direction of travel for the dyed-in-the-wool Thatcherites who head government.

Baroness Harding of Winscombe

Diana Mary “Dido” is Baroness Harding of Winscombe, daughter of Lord Harding, granddaughter of Field Marshal John Harding, 1st Baron Harding of Petherton. It was Harding who in May was selected by Hancock to be put in charge of governments “Track, Test and Trace” system.

Harding has no qualifications to take on such a crucial role, a former CEO of telecommunications company TalkTalk and still a non-executive director on the Court of the Bank of England after being appointed in 2014. In 2017, she became Head of NHS Improvement, a role devoted to the privatisation and break-up of the NHS. Harding later joined the board of the horseracing’s Jockey Club.

While PHE was being denounced for not being able to provide a working track and trace system—by a government that abandoned any systematic COVID-19 testing in March—Harding’s record overseeing track and testing was disastrous. Upon taking control of the Track and Trace system, she outsourced to private firms including Serco and Sitel who made a killing. Serco received £108 million for a 13-week deal. The companies failed to reach almost 40 percent of people in close contact with those who tested positive for COVID-19 in the week to August 5. This month, the contracts were renewed, with Serco set to receive £410 million and Sitel £310 million.

Harding is spearheading the ruling elite’s demands for full-scale privatisation of the NHS. She is married to Tory MP John Penrose, board member of the rabidly Thatcherite 1828 think tank. 1828 describes itself as “a neoliberal opinion website. With the recent resurgence of socialist ideas, 1828 provides a platform for individuals to encourage the alternative: political and economic freedom. We believe that all our lives have been positively changed by the spread of free-market capitalism.”

The group advocated that PHE be abolished and the entire NHS be scrapped in favour of a “social health insurance system”, adding “you don’t need the state to own or subsidise hospitals, or to control policy from the centre; you simply need it to regulate the system to a satisfactory degree.”

Penrose serves as Johnson’s “Anti-Corruption Champion” but the stench of corruption in the appointment of his wife as head of the National Institute for Health Protection is overwhelming.

Prior to Harding’s appointment, a secretive US artificial intelligence firm, Palantir, was handed access to the private personal data of millions of British citizens. The deal has dire implications for democratic rights, with Palantir receiving just £1 to provide its services, with a clear eye to reaping massive rewards ahead. Faculty, which won a £1 million contract to provide AI services to the NHS, is a start-up firm headed by Mark Warner. He is the brother of Ben Warner who ran the data operation for the Vote Leave campaign led by Johnson’s now chief advisor Dominic Cumming.

A decisive move has been made by the government towards flogging the NHS wholesale to private corporations. In July, the Tories voted down an amendment to its Trade Bill aimed at exempting the NHS from any future free trade deals post-Brexit.

Johnson’s widely despised government can only get away with such crimes because it faces no opposition to its agenda from any section of the political establishment. Throughout the pandemic, Labour leader Sir Keir Starmer has repeatedly stressed that his party will “work constructively with the government.”

MAS, trade unions and coup regime strike deal to quell revolt by Bolivian workers

Tomas Castanheira

After more than 10 days of blockades and protests by Bolivian workers and peasants, the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS, the party of ousted president Evo Morales), reached a pact with the coup regime of Jeanine Áñez.

Last Thursday, Áñez signed a law requiring that elections take place by October 18. The MAS and the organizations officially heading the protests, the Bolivian Workers Federation (COB) and social movements within the Unity Pact, then called for the demobilization of the blockades, over the opposition of the workers and peasants who had taken to the streets.

The demonstrations broke out on July 28, in rejection of the announcement by the Supreme Electoral Court (TSE) of a third postponement of the general elections, then scheduled for September. In a massive rally in El Alto, a district with militant working class traditions in the region of La Paz, demonstrators voted for erecting blockades if the TSE did not reverse its ruling.

Cooperative miners join Cochabamba-Oruro road blockade. Poster reads: "Áñez, Murillo, we want your head". [Credit: Twitter]

The Áñez government ignored the warning, and the blockades of the country’s main roads began the following week, on August 3. Provocatively, on the same day, the TSE signed a bill setting the elections for October 18.

The government’s cynical and violent response to the protests, denying political responsibility while promoting an escalation of repression, sparked even greater unrest among the population.

The second week of blockades witnessed an escalation of the social and political crisis. The state militarized the main Bolivian cities, arrested demonstrators and gave criminal cover to the violent attacks by fascist gangs against the protesters. At the same time, new social sectors were entering the struggle, and the demand for the immediate downfall of the regime gained increasing popularity.

On Tuesday and Wednesday, August 11 and 12, it was reported that thousands of miners joined the blockades of roads connecting Oruro to Cochabamba, demanding the downfall of Áñez. At other points, workers, peasants and youth prepared to resist the armed attacks against the protests.

Also on August 12, a struggle broke out by the workers of the Municipal Garbage Collection Company (EMSA) of the city of Cochabamba, where more than 50 blockades remained erected. They opposed the nomination of a new management and threats to privatize the company.

The sanitation workers attempted to occupy City Hall and were repressed by the police. According to El Debra, a confrontation broke out in which “flaming brooms were flying on one side while the cops responded with tear gas.”

The continuation of these demonstrations threatened not only the de facto government, but the bourgeois order in Bolivia itself. Acting to demobilize the masses in the streets, the MAS proved once again to be a direct representative of the interests of the ruling class.

At the same time, Morales and Luis Arce, the presidential candidate for the MAS, publicly attacked the popular demand for the fall of Áñez as a policy that would benefit the right wing.

The elections law drafted in the Legislative Assembly by the MAS, Unidad Demócrata and Partido Demócrata Cristiano, and signed the next day by Áñez, was seen by Bolivian workers and peasants as a dirty deal. This was clearly expressed in the desperate response of the unions and social organizations, which tried to conceal their complicity in betraying the mass protests.

The COB and Unity Pact, which had announced on the previous day that if the elections were brought forward by one week, to October 11, “we will immediately demobilize ourselves,” feigned surprise at the agreement signed by the MAS “behind our backs.”

In the words of the executive secretary of the COB, Juan Carlos Huarachi: “The COB and the Unity Pact have never betrayed and will never betray their people. Today we have suffered a betrayal and that is what the people and those who are mobilized must understand. ... You cannot confuse this social struggle with a political electoral struggle.”

They didn’t have the courage to confront the ranks and declare an immediate suspension of the blockades. However, that night, the COB headquarters in La Paz suffered a terrorist bomb attack. Six suspects were arrested by police, allegedly carrying explosive materials. There was no one at the scene and the damage was apparently minor.

On Friday, August 14, using the justification of avoiding attacks by the extreme right against the demonstrators, Huarachi declared a “temporary truce,” calling for the demobilization of the protests. He also sought to dispute with Áñez credit for the “pacification” of the country, stating that, as during the coup of November 2019, the COB leadership were the “true peacemakers.”

With this statement, the COB leadership was asking for recognition by the ruling class of its role in containing the mass movement and blocking an independent political response by the working class.

The COB recognized the legitimacy of the coup against Morales, providing a civilian cover for the military’s actions, and sabotaged a general strike of the working class, which wanted to resist the rise of the new regime, thus opening the path to power for the most right-wing forces of the Bolivian bourgeoisie supported by US imperialism.

A similar role was played by the MAS itself. Faced with the demands of the military, Morales meekly withdrew from the presidency and sought to open discussions with the coup regime mediated by the Catholic Church, the European Union and the UN. The masses, resisting in the streets, were asked by the MAS to “abandon their positions” in the name of pacifying the country and seeking new elections, as they were being massacred by the troops commanded by the coup leaders.

The most recent betrayal of the MAS and COB has further discredited them in the working class, leading to a massive demonstration in their absence in El Alto last Friday, which was accompanied by other peasant movements and unions that sought to maintain a certain legitimacy with the ranks.

The thousands of demonstrators present at the rally announced their willingness to continue the struggle to overthrow Áñez. Until this Tuesday, isolated blockades were seen in Cochabamba, challenging successive orders from different “authorities” within the movement.

In contrast to what Huarachi said, leaving the streets will not protect the workers from the attacks of the extreme right-wing forces, but will make them even more vulnerable to them.

A bill presented in the last few days by the head of the MAS legislative caucus, Betty Yañiquez, to protect blockade leaders from being criminally charged, was ridiculed by the bourgeois parties as a whole, including representatives of the MAS itself. The ruling class is not preparing amnesty, but an escalation of repression.

Twenty-three people arrested during the protests are being held in pre-trial detention, being investigated for sedition, armed uprising and terrorism. According to vice minister of the Interior, Javier Issa, the public prosecutor will summon many more people and the ranks of prisoners will swell.

The government intends to charge these people, as well as the leadership of the COB, and MAS itself, including Morales and Arce, for the deaths of about 40 COVID-19 patients, allegedly produced by the shortage of oxygen in hospitals caused by the blockades.

At the same time, Issa declared that the “time of tranquility” inaugurated by the lifting of the blockades will serve to implement an economic reactivation and “overcome the damage that these measures caused.” This reactivation includes plans to relax labor laws and implement mass layoffs, while threatening to deepen the COVID-19 crisis.

According to official figures, there are already more than 100,000 infections and 4,000 deaths. Given Bolivia’s mass poverty, the backward state of its health care system and one of the lowest rates of testing in Latin America, the real toll is undoubtedly far higher.

The explosion of new social conflicts in Bolivia in the next period is inevitable. The success of the Bolivian working class depends on their mobilization as an independent political force, openly hostile to the unions and organizations that seek to subordinate them to the bourgeoisie and impose a nationalist agenda upon their movement. They will find powerful support among their fellow workers in Latin America and all over the world, who are entering into direct struggle against capitalism.