Coronavirus Education: Learning and Teaching from the Margins

Binoy Kampmark

The coronavirus student, a species brought forth in the world of education by a pandemic that has killed over 400,000 people in the United States and 100,000 in the United Kingdom, is a troubled creature.  When universities and schools across the globe were given varying and often contradictory messages on the safety of continuing in class teaching and participation, the seeds of confusion and fear were sown.  The broadest, most acceptable solution, at least in terms of safety, was moving learning to an online format.

One evident issue, notably in higher education, is the attractions offered by remote or virtual learning.  Finally, those championing cost saving measures by physically exiling the teacher from the classroom in favour of stale, pre-recorded sessions of lifeless content, had a pretext.  In consulting the literature on what is banally called “E-learning,” the following article in Quantity and Quantity suggests what it consists of: “technology-based learning through websites, learning portals, video conferencing, YouTube, mobile apps, and thousand [sic] type of free available websites for blended learning tools.”

All these platforms have undeniable uses.  A multifaceted technological environment contaminated by Google, YouTube and social media has found a way into pedagogical technique and learning.  But the tool so fashioned is never the complete human; true learning must have, on some level, a flesh and blood contact if it involves other humans, a connection by which the cerebral cortex can be stimulated and thrilled.

Without realising it, those who arrived at terms such as “remote learning” were accurate to a fault: learning in remote fashion is emotionally stripping and estranging, a learning experience forged on the dark side of the moon.  Glacial and discouragingly distant, the impression is one of being left abandoned in a garage without an understanding of the tools at hand and how they might best be used.  The poor abandoned sod is left to seek inspiration from elsewhere, in the process enriching the already obscenely wealthy tech giants of Silicon Valley.

Student responses to this change of learning circumstances have varied.  Anxiety and stress remain central, hindering any adaption to online education.  Nor is this helped by the unevenness of technological access of the global student population, occasioned by the often ridiculous assumption that each member of the human race is plugged into the weirdly wonderful Internet. “Although these inequalities existed earlier,” observe the authors of a study of student responses to online learning in an Indian university, the Netaji Subhas University of Technology, “the COVID-19 pandemic has exposed this digital divide.”

The response to online learning also varies depending on which authority you wish to consult.  But the impressiveness of learning in a physically tangible environment is clear.  The survey study of opinions from 358 students at the Netaji Subhas University of Technology found that 65.9% thought in-class learning more rewarding.  Some 68.1% of students did concede that academics had improved their online teaching abilities since the beginning of the pandemic, while 77.9% found it useful.

A more personal touch is offered by a highly sanitised student account in the University of Queensland’s Contact Magazine.  Such material should always be treated with due care, given the publishing outlet and the manicured, lipstick rich enthusiasm of the student.  But even here, the Bachelor of Engineering honours candidate can admit to “personal challenges around remaining motivated and up to date now that my schedule is more fluid”.  There was also the temptation to spend more time watching Netflix.  “Unfortunately,” she concedes, “many of my courses had a large practical component to them, which are no longer available.”

While forms of online learning have distinct advantages in, for instance, coping with COVID-19 restrictions and mitigating the risks of transmission, a bigger picture is always at play in the world of organisational management.  Motives are multiple, and rarely do they centre with absolute certainty upon protecting student welfare.

One driving motivation behind moving educational institutions to the online world is the replication of management even as teaching staff are reduced.  Academics have been made redundant as student enrolments fall, coaxed into providing recordings and content that can be endlessly reused.  There are threats of departmental amalgamation and a cancellation of courses.  But there is always more room for the addition of COVID-19 bureaucrats.  As ever, more individuals otherwise unconnected to the actual process of teaching and research will find a way to louse up matters.  These good sorts, with a brief of faux compassion, are charged with not inconsiderable surveillance and direction powers.  Their role is to keep a good wide eye on staff and students to ensure they are observing hygiene practices, undertaking re-education modules on how best to teach and learn in a “COVID-19 safe” way, and root out the deviants.

There are other, telling implications.  The pandemic crisis has been productive to aspiring razor gangs obsessed with trimming budgetary expenditure across entire entities.  The property paladins have been smacking their lips, keen to snap up more space needlessly occupied by instructors and their students.

What many institutions are doing is delivering an emaciated model of teaching and learning while keeping the costs of taking the subjects at the same, pre-coronavirus level.  The modern learning institution has become the clearing house for glorified correspondence courses.  By the time the vaccination drive has parked most of the world’s population into appropriate spots of security, the learning environment will have a permanently cold and mechanical sense to it.  Students of the future will be none the wiser.

Portugal records worst rate of Covid-19 cases in the world

Paul Mitchell

The people of Portugal are suffering the terrible fate of leading the world in terms of new coronavirus infections and deaths.

Around 15,000 new infections and 250 deaths per 1 million inhabitants occurred last month, compared to the European Union (EU) average of 4,200 and 103. A record 16,432 new cases and 303 deaths from the virus were reported on January 28.

In the month of January alone, nearly half of the 726,321 infections and 12,757 deaths since the start of the pandemic were reported.

Graph showing the increase in COVID-19 infections and deaths in Portugal as of February 2. (graph courtesy of World Health Organisation)

Hospitals across the country of just over 10 million people are reportedly on the verge of collapse, with ambulances queuing for hours due to the lack of beds. The Garcia de Horta Hospital in Almada is operating at more than 300 percent of its capacity. Socialist Party (PS) Health Minister Marta Temido admitted, “We are putting all means to work in all sectors, but there is a limit. And we are very close to the limit.”

Last Friday, Portugal’s air force flew three critically ill COVID-19 patients from Lisbon to the island of Madeira, where there are spare hospital beds. On Sunday, Austria agreed to take Portuguese intensive-care patients and Germany agreed to airlift military medics, paramedics and equipment. International flights have been curtailed and Portugal's sole land border with Spain closed.

The newly re-elected conservative President of the Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, warned that the lockdown announced in mid-January in response to the surge in infections and deaths would probably last until the end of March and possibly into the summer.

PS Prime Minister, António Costa, told reporters that the situation was not just “bad” but “terrible”: “There’s no point in feeding the illusion that we are not facing the worst moment. And we’ll face this worst moment for a few more weeks, that is for sure.”

Costa said the reason for the surge in infections was his government's relaxation of restrictive measures at Christmas and the appearance of a more infectious COVID-19 variant first detected in Britain. In a de facto warning to the working class throughout Europe, experts estimate the British variant accounts for up to 40 percent of all new cases. There has also been an increase in a new variant from Brazil, a former colony, the people of which still have close connections with Portugal.

But Costa sought to shift his government's responsibility for continuing the chronic underfunding of Portugal's public health system (SNS), saying it was down to his confusing “messages”.

“There were certainly errors: often the way I transmitted the message to the Portuguese... and, when the recipient of the message did not understand the message, then it is the messenger’s fault, I have no doubt about it,” he said.

Last year, the country avoided the worst of the devastation caused by COVID-19, largely due to the Portuguese population abiding by restrictive measures including social distancing, the wearing of masks and limiting travel. According to Alexandre Lourenço, the president of the Portuguese Association of Hospital Administrators, Portugal also got through the first wave last year by delaying 120,000 operations and more than 10 million appointments, most of which have still not been carried out.

Stay At Home For Us. Director General of Health poster

However, as was the case internationally, in the pursuit of a murderous herd immunity policy pressure mounted from big business, especially from the tourism sector which represents 20 percent of Portugal's GDP, to reopen the economy.

The PS duly obliged. It rejected the closure of schools and non-essential production, and refused to pay full wages to quarantined workers, to prevent the transmission of the virus. This was because such policies would impact on the profits of major corporations. Its priority was the protection of corporate profits, not lives.

Schools started and normal working resumed in the autumn. Inevitably, infections began to increase. By November there was a new state of emergency and new restrictive measures in place, including a 1pm weekend curfew.

However, claiming that infections were declining in early December, the government announced that it would “save Christmas.” For three days, Portuguese citizens were allowed to travel freely across the country, curfews were relaxed and family gatherings allowed. Many Portuguese workers living in the UK and British expats entered the country without having to present a negative Covid test or be tested at Portuguese airports.

As COVID-19 surged, the PS government was forced to announce another lockdown in its ninth state of emergency on January 15. Even then it was sold as a “softer” version allowing schools, churches and 52 types of businesses to continue operating. With the pandemic continuing to spike and public anger mounting, schools were told to close on January 22. But by then the damage was done.

As Algarve regional health official, Ana Cristina Guerreiro, explained, “Since the beginning of the school season, many cases have arisen, which came from family transmission. And the epidemiological investigation caused many of the classes to go home in preventative isolation. This caused, in the whole country, a very large number of cases at home and a high number of cases that had not existed before; such a large number of school children with a positive test.”

The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) has singled out Portugal as “lagging behind” in the rolling out of vaccines, exacerbated by the European Union’s (EU) vaccine distribution debacle. By the end of January just 70,000 people had been fully vaccinated with two doses and it was only this Monday that those over 80 start getting their shots.

Portugal is one of the countries that has made the least extra expenditure on health during the pandemic. According to the report “Health at a Glance Europe 2020”, which measures expenditure on specialized medical equipment, personal protective equipment (PPE), track and testing capacity, hiring of additional workers, support for hospitals and the development of vaccines, Portugal spent 57 euros per person—half the EU average of 112 euros.

The COVID-19 disaster facing Portugal is a result of more systemic reasons. The public health sector has been under constant attack since the global banking crisis of 2008 under the dictates of the “troika” financial institutions. A prime objective of governments has been compliance with EU imposed austerity programmes. In its five years in power, Costa's PS administration produced an unprecedented 0.3 percent budget surplus.

As a result, Portugal continues to suffer from one of the smallest hospital capacities per capita in the EU. There are just 4.2 critical care beds per 100,000 people, the lowest in the EU, compared to Spain (over nine such beds per 100,000) and Germany (nearly 30). Promises to implement a National Health Plan and hire more health professionals have failed to materialise.

Swathes of public health services have been privatised. The PS government has refused to invoke powers under the State of Emergency to requisition services from the private health companies, which refused to receive COVID-19 patients in the first wave. Their “help” now is limited to contracting just 80 beds for COVID-19 patients and 800 for non-COVID-19 patients.

At the same time as the National Health Service (SNS) is at the point of collapse, the PS government is pressing ahead with its plans to inject up to €474 million for Novo Banco, the so-called “good bank” rescued from the collapse of Banco Espirito Santo in 2014 and now owned by the US Lone Star vulture fund. Over €4 billion has already been pumped into Novo Bank. This is part of the 18 billion euros used to prop up the financial system over the last decade, even prompting right-wing president, de Sousa, to confess, “It's tempting to say 'why didn't it go to housing, why didn't it go to health, why didn't it go to social security, why did it not go to the homeless?"

Mario Draghi to head Italy’s new government

Peter Schwarz

Former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi is to head Italy’s new government. Italian President Sergio Mattarella tasked the 73 year old with taking the reins of power on Wednesday, after efforts to revive the previous governing coalition of Five Star, Democrats and two smaller parties failed.

Draghi will now assemble a cabinet of technocrats and seek a majority in parliament. That he will get it is not certain but likely. So far, only the fascist Fratelli d’Italia have spoken out clearly against Draghi and for the immediate holding of new elections.

Mario Draghi in 2013 (Source: World Economic Forum)

The Democrats and ex-premier Matteo Renzi, whose minority party had triggered the crisis with its withdrawal from the government, are fully behind Draghi. “Now is the time for the constructive,” Renzi cheered on Twitter. “Now all people of goodwill must heed President Mattarella’s call and support Mario Draghi’s government. Now is the time for sobriety. Zero polemics. Viva l’Italia.”

The other parties are maneuvering. The Five Stars, the largest group in parliament, is in a dilemma. Draghi embodies the political establishment they once claimed to fight. Since the Five Stars have been in government, however, they have proved to be a reliable pillar of capitalist rule. Added to this is the fear of losing their seats. As a result of falling poll ratings and a reduction in the size of parliament, three-quarters of the Five Star MPs would lose their seats in the event voters go to the polls anew.

The leader of the far-right Lega, Matteo Salvini, is calling for early elections, but with little conviction. Less than a year ago, he had proposed Draghi as head of government. Now, too, he attests that the former ECB chief is “estimable.” The problem is not Draghi, “but what he does and for whom he does it.”

Silvio Berlusconi’s Forza Italia is expected to support Draghi. Berlusconi had already said in advance that he would respect Mattarella’s decision.

With Draghi, a man is taking the reins of Italian politics who embodies European finance capital like no other. Born in Rome in 1947, he studied economics in his hometown and earned his doctorate at MIT in Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1977. Since then, he has taught at several universities and held leading positions in state and private banks. He was executive director of the World Bank, director general of the Italian Ministry of Finance and vice president of the US investment bank Goldman Sachs International in London (2002-05). He then took over as head of Italy’s central bank and then the European Central Bank (2011-19).

As head of the ECB, Draghi’s name became synonymous with the implementation of policies that provided unlimited funds to the financial markets, even as the living standards of the working class continued to fall because of the European Union’s austerity dictates. Draghi’s phrase, “Whatever it takes,” with which he opened the money tap in 2012 when the euro came under pressure on the financial markets, is legendary. Since then, the ECB has bought up several trillion euros’ worth of securities, made the unlimited refinancing of banks possible through low interest rates and thus enabled the stock markets to record continuous highs.

Draghi takes over the leadership of the Italian government at a time when the country is in a deep economic, social and health care crisis and on the eve of a social explosion. It has one of the highest coronavirus infection rates in the world, with 2.6 million infected and 90,000 dead. Unemployment figures are rising, and the national debt, at 160 percent of GDP, is almost three times as high as that allowed by the EU.

Now, Draghi is to ensure that the €209 billion due to the country as grants and loans from the EU’s Coronavirus Fund are used to trim the Italian economy to boost profitability at the expense of the working class—that is, not to alleviate the devastating social consequences of the pandemic.

The Neue Zürcher Zeitung, which does not mince words on such issues, commented, “Tasks await the 73-year-old Draghi that were not tackled or at least not completed during two decades. Now, reforms are unequivocally demanded by the European Union, because without them, Italy threatens to become a systemic risk for the entire political and economic constitution of Europe.”

Such policies cannot be achieved by democratic means. President Mattarella made a dramatic appeal to Italy’s political parties and their deputies to “give, immediately, life to a new government, adequate to deal with the serious emergencies present: health, social, economic, financial.

“Elections—i.e., giving citizens a say—are not something the country can afford at the moment,” the president stressed. “They were too big a gamble at this time due to the pandemic. Italy could not afford to go into election campaign mode for months, with all the risks that entailed.” The coming months were crucial, he said, stressing, “This requires a government in full functioning mode.”

Such a government will be a dictatorship of the banks. It will intensify the policies of austerity and herd immunity, giving further impetus to fascist forces.

Only the independent intervention of the working class can stop the turn of the ruling class toward dictatorship and fascism in Italy and throughout Europe. The anger and willingness of the working class to fight are enormous. But it lacks a political perspective and leadership. The Democrats, their pseudoleft periphery and the trade unions have suppressed all social struggles since the 1990s and pursued policies in the interests of capital. The most right-wing forces have benefited from this. Lega and Fratelli d’Italia are together polling 40 percent in the latest surveys.

Eight years ago, the Five Stars filled the political vacuum. With loud rants about the corruption of the political elites, they immediately won a quarter of all votes. Five years later, the Five Stars allied with the far-right Lega and formed a joint government. And now they are likely to help Draghi to power.

Hundreds already deported from the US under Biden despite executive orders

Kevin Martinez

Despite pledging to reverse the Trump administration’s anti-immigrant policies, President Joe Biden has overseen the deportation of hundreds of immigrants and refugees since assuming office on January 20. Last week saw Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) deport 15 people to Jamaica on Thursday and 269 people to Guatemala and Honduras on Friday. More deportation flights are scheduled for next Monday.

After a much hyped 100-day moratorium on deportations was announced by theWhite House a federal judge in Texas ruled on January 26 that it could not be enforced. The ruling, however, did not require the government to actually schedule them. The judge was appointed by President Donald Trump and approved a challenge brought by the state’s attorney general, Ken Paxton, who drafted a lawsuit challenging the 2020 presidential election results on behalf of Trump.

Immigrants await word on their status (Source: Democracy Now!)

“Within 6 days of Biden’s inauguration, Texas has HALTED his illegal deportation freeze,” Paxton tweeted following the decision. “*This* was a seditious left-wing insurrection. And my team and I stopped it.”

US District Judge Drew Tipton granted the temporary restraining order against enforcing the 100-day moratorium that went into effect on January 22. Tipton said the Biden administration had violated the federal Administrative Procedure Act and did not make clear why a pause in deportations was necessary.

On Friday, Titpon said he would extend his order until February 23. The Biden Justice Department has not issued an appeal to Tipton or a federal court to block the order.

It is unclear how many deported immigrants fell under new guidelines given to the Department of Homeland Security and its agencies that took effect Monday.

In El Paso, Texas, officials deported a woman who witnessed the 2019 massacre at a Walmart which left 23 people dead. According to her lawyer, she had agreed to be a witness against the shooter and met with the local district attorney’s office.

Rosa, who was only identified by her first name for fear of her life in Juarez, Mexico, a city rife with gangs and violence, was pulled over last Wednesday for a broken brake light and was detained based on previous traffic warrants. She was then handed over to ICE and deported before she could reach her attorney.

ICE had issued a detainer, a means by which immigrants are detained for immigration violations on the same day they are arrested. The district attorney’s office in El Paso confirmed that they had given Rosa’s attorneys the needed documents to request a US visa for crime victims, but in a statement also said that Rosa “is not a victim of the Walmart shooting case.”

Honduran officials also confirmed that 131 people landed on Friday on a deportation flight from the US. A flight that landed in Guatemala had 138 people arrive on Friday, with another 30 people expected to arrive the following Monday, according to officials there.

President Biden signed three executive orders on Tuesday that he claimed would create a more “fair, orderly, humane” immigration system. Biden also declared a task force that would supposedly reunite migrant children separated from their families for crossing the US-Mexico border.

Biden’s choice for homeland security secretary, Alejandro Mayorkas, the first Latino to head the repressive agency, was also confirmed by the Senate this week.

“There’s a lot of talk, with good reason, about the number of executive orders that I’ve signed. I’m not making new law—I’m eliminating bad policy,” said Biden when speaking to reporters in the Oval Office as he signed the three orders.

Biden called the separation of children at the border a “moral and national shame.” It should be noted that this policy was upheld for all eight years of the previous Obama-Biden administration, which deported and broke up more immigrant families than any other administration in US history. Shocking images of children held behind fences were taken in 2014, when Biden was vice president.

The changes contained in Biden’s order are thoroughly cosmetic, intended to do away with the most politically embarrassing aspects of the last administration’s anti-immigrant policies while still retaining, and in some cases expanding, the government’s vast deportation machine.

The task force for separated children will not enforce anything but merely provide recommendations on how to reunite families and issue a report within 120 days and every 60 days thereafter on its progress.

A statement from American Civil Liberties Union attorney Lee Galernt to NPR said, “What we need now is an immediate commitment to specific remedies, including reunification in the U.S., permanent legal status and restitution for all of the 5,500-plus families separated by the Trump administration.”

He added, “Anything short of that will be extremely troubling given that the U.S. government engaged in deliberate child abuse.”

Biden’s second order rescinded the Migrant Protection Protocols program, or the “Remain in Mexico” program, as dubbed by Trump. The protocol condemned migrants and refugees to stay in Mexico while their asylum cases played out in the US indefinitely, essentially denying them sanctuary.

The exact details of Biden’s plan and how it will assist migrants stuck in squalid camps at the border was unclear. White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki told reporters to lower their expectations of immediate immigration reform, saying: “That’s going to take some time. It’s not going to happen overnight.”

Immigrant advocates have expressed disappointment with Biden’s new executive orders, including Linda Rivas, an immigrant attorney and director of the Las Americas Immigrant Advocacy Center, who represents people caught up in the “Remain in Mexico” program.

She told CNN how she has been trying to console her clients over the last week, including a Honduran mother who was raped while waiting in Mexico under Trump’s policy and is now worried about her 11-year-old son. Rivas explained the current situation for asylum seekers: “Definitely a loss of hope. The trauma they are enduring is unimaginable.”

The third order requires a “top-to-bottom review of recent regulations, policies and guidance that have set up barriers to our legal immigration system.” This included revoking Trump’s “public charge” rule, which prevented immigrants from getting a green card, or permanent residence, if they had or were even just likely to receive public assistance, such as housing subsidies.

Meanwhile, the Biden administration has made clear it will be expanding the number of detained immigrant children held in camps along the US-Mexico border by reopening a facility in Carizzo Springs, Texas, designed to hold upwards of 700 children and perhaps more if needed.

The camp will jail unaccompanied children over age 13 who are medically cleared from COVID-19 quarantine, according to the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), the agency under the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) which is responsible for immigrant children.

Currently, there are some 4,730 children held by the ORR. The agency has been also dealing with COVID-19 infections among children and staff, with a total of 1,748 confirmed cases among children. According to the agency, more than 21,000 coronavirus tests have been given and the “majority” of infected have recovered and been moved from quarantine.

The Department of Homeland Security under Biden is also poised to expand its processing capacity with Customs and Border Protection (CBP) building soft-sided structures in Donna, Texas, near the Rio Grande Valley, because a nearby processing center is being closed for renovation.

The continued deportations and expansion of detention camps under Biden make a mockery of those who claimed a Democratic administration would reverse Trump’s anti-immigrant policies and provide humane and immediate sanctuary for refugees and asylum seekers. Only the most superficial changes have been announced, and hardly enforced at that, while much of the same policies have been kept.

Bangladesh government begins to forcibly remove Rohingya refugees

Wimal Perera

The Bangladesh government has started shipping Rohingya refugees to the isolated and unsafe Bhasan Char island, 34 kilometres from the mainland. At the same time, as the result of an intervention by China, Dhaka is again also seeking to send Rohingyas back to Myanmar, from where they fled the regime’s genocidal violence.

There are over one million Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheik Hasina’s government considers them a burden to the country, and has branded them a “security” threat. They are treated inhumanly, condemned to live under miserable conditions.

Hamida, 22, (center) and her son Mohammed, aged one, wait to receive food aid along with hundreds of other Rohingya refugees, at Kutupalong Refugee Camp, in Bangladesh. © UNHCR/Andrew McConnell

They are currently housed in 34 squalid refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar, Ukhiya and Teknaf Upazilas, about 350 kilometres from Dhaka. These encampments—the most densely overcrowded refugee camps in the world—have no adequate water supply, sanitation and sewage facilities, constantly threatening the asylum seekers with the spread of various diseases.

The government plans to move some 100,000 refugees to Bhasan Char, an unstable, cyclone-prone island formed by the accumulation of silt where the River Meghna enters the Bay of Bengal. Prior to 2006, the mud island did not exist.

Hasina’s government was forced to halt a previous attempt to relocate Rohingyas to Bhasan Char because of domestic and international criticism. About 300 asylum seekers were sent to the island last May after they tried to escape to Malaysia on a boat.

Dhaka has rejected those criticisms, now insisting the island is safe enough and began the new relocation in early December. Human rights activists told the media the authorities have used both cash enticements and coercion to send batches of people.

The government has so far sent about 6,700 refugees—two groups in December totalling 3,446 people and two groups in January with 3,254. The fourth group was removed on January 30, with 1,466 refugees taken in four ships from Chattogram port.

Meanwhile, China launched an initiative to arrange a January 19 tripartite agreement with Bangladesh and Myanmar for the “repatriation” of refugees back to Myanmar. Myanmar “agreed” to accept some 42,000 refugees, but that tentative agreement contained no guarantees that it will be met.

Two previous repatriation attempts, in November 2018 and August 2019, failed. Refugees refused to go, fearing further atrocities by the Myanmar military and Buddhist supremacists.

In 2017, the Myanmar government’s military brutality in Rakhine State, joined by Buddhist thugs, forced some 750,000 Rohingyas to flee across the border to Bangladesh. They joined about 300,000 refugees who had fled previous persecution.

China’s intervention is significant. Myanmar’s continued refusal to take back refugees has heightened tensions with Bangladesh. It appears that China sought to use the issue to strengthen its influence on Dhaka by prevailing on the Myanmar authorities to accept an agreement.

China was the source of $US1,159 million foreign direct investment in Bangladesh during the fiscal year 2019, or 30 percent of Bangladesh’s total.

During the January 19 meeting, Bangladeshi Foreign Secretary Masud Bin Momen insisted that repatriation of the refugees should start from the first quarter of this year. But Myanmar’s Deputy Minister for International Cooperation U Hau Do Suan said they could start only in the second quarter of this year.

Reflecting the Bangladeshi government’s frustration, the country’s media has cast renewed doubts over the implementation of the agreement because Myanmar’s military seized control of the country in a coup on February 1.

Bangladesh Enterprise Institute president M. Humayun Kabir told the Daily Star on February 2: “I think the Rohingya repatriation process will slow down because the military government will be more involved in its administrative and internal issues.”

The Bangladeshi government’s own brutal treatment of the Rohingyas was exposed when 300 refugees housed on Bhasan Char staged a hunger strike last September, demanding to join their families in Cox’s Bazar, because of the terrible conditions on the island.

Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch, last October accused naval officers of assaulting refugees, saying they “beat Rohingya refugees, including children, who were protesting their detention and begging to return to their families in Cox’s Bazar.”

One refugee reported: “Navy personnel used tree branches and black rubber sticks to beat us.”

The country’s human rights organisation Odhikar accused the authorities of killing more than 100 Rohingya refugees in extrajudicial executions between August 2017 and July 2020, purportedly in crackdowns on the illegal drug trade.

The government used the COVID-19 pandemic to impose a “complete lockdown” in the camps last April. Crackdowns were carried out, shops run by refugees closed, internet services were blocked and mobile phones were confiscated.

In reality, the refugees have been left exposed to COVID-19. The first coronavirus death in Cox’s Bazar was reported in late May when Bangladesh’s total death toll stood at around 700 and cases exceeded 50,000. Because of the government’s low testing rates, the situation in the camps remains unclear.

The World Health Organisation reported in early December that among the refugees: “A total of 363 COVID-19 cases have been reported out of 19,651 samples tested. The total number of deaths stood at 10.”

Now the pandemic is spreading rapidly throughout the country. As of Tuesday, total deaths stood at 8,149 and cases at 536,107, but both figures are under-statements because of the low rate of testing.

UNICEF last August said the pandemic had disrupted life for more than 460,000 Rohingya children, whose education facilities in the camps had been closed since March. The government has provided no alternative methods of education.

In fact, the Bangladesh government’s callous attitude toward the refugees mirrors that of the Myanmar regime. In October, Human Rights Watch criticised Myanmar for accommodating about 130,000 Rohingyas in camps “under squalid and abusive conditions, which are like ‘open prisons’” for “eight years, cut off from their homes, land, and livelihoods.”

New York’s COVID-19 nursing home deaths severely undercounted while Cuomo forced out public health officials

Josh Varlin

A recent report from New York Attorney General Letitia James followed by new data from the state Department of Health (DOH) confirm that nursing home deaths due to the pandemic have been drastically undercounted by nearly 50 percent. The new information, revealing more than 4,000 additional deaths of nursing home residents due to COVID-19, combined with a New York Times report about nine senior public health officials resigning over the past year paints a portrait of the criminality of the ruling elite’s response to the pandemic in New York.

Prior to the report’s January 28 release, the state’s count of deaths at nursing homes was 8,711. Within hours of James’ report being released, the DOH updated its website to show 12,743 deaths. The state had been excluding people who died in a hospital from the nursing homes’ death tally. Health Commissioner Dr. Howard Zucker said that day that the DOH website had indicated that the tally did “not include deaths outside of a facility.”

Andrew Cuomo (Zack Seward/Flickr.com)

Democratic New York Governor Andrew Cuomo responded by dismissing the focus on nursing home deaths as originating in “a political attack.” He also pointed to the fact that nursing home resident deaths make up a slightly smaller proportion of overall deaths in New York than nationally. Given that New York is still the hardest-hit US state due to the traumatic impact of the “first wave” in the spring of 2020, with over 42,000 deaths, this is a product less of policies that protected nursing home residents and more of policies that led to millions of people outside of homes getting infected and tens of thousands dying.

In a particularly callous response, Cuomo said: “Who cares [if they] died in the hospital, died in a nursing home? They died.”

Above all, the new DOH data make clear that the pandemic has been a disaster for elderly and disabled New Yorkers. The report from Attorney General James also sheds light on other aspects of the failure of the state and nursing homes to protect residents, including a “[l]ack of compliance with infection control protocols,” “[i]nsufficient personal protective equipment (PPE) for nursing home staff” and “[i]nsufficient COVID-19 testing for residents and staff in the early stages of the pandemic.”

The report also includes among its preliminary findings that “[l]ack of nursing home compliance with the executive order requirement communication with family members caused avoidable pain and distress” and that “[g]overnment guidance requiring the admission of COVID-19 patients into nursing homes may have put residents at increased risk of harm in some facilities and may have obscured the data available to assess that risk.”

The latter point—that state guidance declared that “[n]o resident shall be denied re-admission or admission to the nursing home solely based on a confirmed or suspected diagnosis of COVID-19,” in the words of the DOH—has been much-discussed in relation to Cuomo’s culpability in the high death toll. This guidance was in place from March 25 until May 10 last year, during which time over 6,000 people were admitted into nursing homes.

Because of the very nature of the guidance, which did not require testing for COVID-19 before admission, it is difficult to determine what role this played in the nursing home deaths. Both Cuomo and James note that the state’s guidance was consistent with contemporary guidance from the federal Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC).

Significantly, the report indicates that Cuomo’s executive order granting immunity for nursing homes likely contributed to the high death toll and general worsening of conditions inside the homes, including by admitting residents without sufficient healthy staff to care for them.

Cuomo’s actions during the pandemic—including providing immunity for nursing homes, keeping schools and businesses open, and reopening the state early—combined with his actions disparaging of scientific expertise to create an environment which public health officials have found impossible. According to the New York Times, nine top public health officials have resigned in recent months, with many citing Cuomo as a particular cause.

Analogous to former President Donald Trump’s attacks on scientists such as Dr. Anthony Fauci and scientific evidence, as well as New York City Mayor Bill de Blasio forcing out city Health Commissioner Dr. Oxiris Barbot, Cuomo declared the day after the attorney general’s report was issued: “When I say ‘experts’ in air quotes, it sounds like I’m saying I don’t really trust the experts. Because I don’t. Because I don’t.”

Cuomo’s Trumpian disdain for scientific expertise extended to his decision to rely on hospital systems for the state’s vaccination program rather than using preexisting vaccination plans involving the state DOH cooperating with city and county health departments. A task force with independent vaccination experts was largely for show, whereas a lobbyist for Northwell Health was given an office inside the DOH from which to work. Changes in regulations were announced at news conferences, leaving health officials to scramble to implement them. Cuomo’s much touted “microcluster” strategy, which is wholly inadequate for controlling the pandemic, was also evidently designed with the DOH playing a secondary role, according to the Times .

One former health official told the Times, “Morale certainly was and continues to be at an all-time low.” Whereas past public health emergencies made DOH personnel feel valued and necessary, this time, “the opposite happened,” according to that official.

As a result, the deputy commissioner for public health, director of the communicable disease bureau, medical director for epidemiology, and state epidemiologist have all left the DOH since the summer. Dr. Jill Taylor, head of the Wadsworth Center laboratory, which has been testing for virus variants, has also left recently.

That so many public health officials have felt compelled to leave just as the state embarks on an unprecedented—and so far substandard—vaccination effort bodes poorly for the next stage of the pandemic, which will also see a further reopening, with indoor dining resuming in New York City on February 14.

Cuomo’s own political health is uncertain. On February 3, the state Supreme Court ordered that the DOH release additional information on nursing home deaths within five days in response to a lawsuit from a right-wing think tank. Meanwhile, White House Press Secretary Jen Psaki said that the federal Department of Justice (DOJ) may decide to pursue charges in relation to nursing home deaths, implying that President Joe Biden would let the DOJ make its decision independently. The DOJ was already investigating the nursing home situation in New York under the Trump administration.

Australian central bank expands quantitative easing program

Nick Beams

There is a glaring contradiction at the centre of the decision by the Reserve Bank of Australia on Tuesday to step up its quantitative easing (QE) bond-buying program and to keep its base interest rate at virtually zero for at least the next three years.

On the one hand, according to RBA governor Philip Lowe, the outlook for the global economy has improved over recent months. In Australia, “the economic recovery is well under way and has been stronger than was earlier expected” with gross domestic product predicted to increase by 3.5 percent over both 2021 and 2022.

Reserve Bank of Australia Governor Philip Lowe (Credit: Wikimedia)

However, on the other hand, the RBA decided that it would expand its emergency bond buying program by $100 billion, to be carried out at the rate of $5 billion a week, and to keep its base interest rate at just 0.1 percent—far below what it was in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008–2009.

The move was at variance with market predictions. “The market appeared to have been preparing for a taper signal,” Alvin T. Tan, a strategist at RBC Capital Markets in Hong Kong told Bloomberg. “So the additional QE is definitely against those expectations,” he said, adding that the “message was also more dovish.”

While pointing to a strong recovery, the RBA said wage and price pressures remained subdued. The consumer price index rose by only 0.9 percent in the year to December. Wages were increasing “at the slowest rate on record” and any rise in the future would be only gradual.

What this means in effect is that any increase in the output of the Australian economy will be virtually entirely appropriated in the form of profit, further contributing to the long-term decline of wages as a proportion of national income.

Lowe said the RBA remained committed to maintaining “highly supportive monetary conditions” until its goals were achieved and, given the current outlook for inflation and jobs, “this is still some way off.”

“The Board will not increase the cash rate until actual inflation is sustainably within the 2 to 3 percent target range. For this to occur, wages growth will have to be materially higher than it is currently. This will require significant gains in employment and a return to a tight labour market. The Board does not expect these conditions to be met until 2024 at the earliest.”

There was another notable feature of the RBA decision: an explicit reference to the exchange rate of the Australian dollar in international currency markets. The major economic powers have all committed themselves not to use monetary policy to lower the value of their currencies lest this set off a destructive currency war. But the commitment is increasingly being honoured in the breach.

Since its fall to US55 cents in the financial markets freeze last March, the Australian dollar has surged by 33 percent against the US currency.

This is largely the result of an overall fall in the US dollar due to the massive increases in US debt and the stimulus measures of the US Federal Reserve. It has expanded its balance sheet by around $4 trillion in the past 10 months and is purchasing $120 billion worth of financial assets every month—a rate of $1.4 trillion per year.

Lowe noted that the exchange rate for the Australian dollar had appreciated significantly. It was in the upper end of the range for recent years and the RBA’s latest measures would contribute “to a lower exchange rate than otherwise.”

Commenting on the currency implications of the latest decision, Bloomberg noted: “Lowe’s QE announcement reflects Australia’s small stature in the global monetary marketplace, requiring it to remain in the slipstream of major central banks. If the RBA were to step outside that line, it would risk sending the currency soaring and damage exports and jobs.”

A key aim of the current QE program, which has seen the RBA expand its balance sheet by around $160 billion since the start of 2020, is “to restrain the currency,” it said.

The QE program is set to continue. According to Westpac chief economist Bill Evans, the RBA will spend at least another $100 billion in two separate tranches later this year and in 2022. The chief economist at the financial firm EY, Jo Masters, told the Sydney Morning Herald the RBA was on track to expand its balance sheet to around 30 percent of GDP.

The RBA announcement came the day after Prime Minister Scott Morrison delivered an address to the National Press Club in which he made clear his Liberal-National Coalition government would press ahead with measures to slash unemployment benefits and other critical social spending.

He said the government would exercise “fiscal discipline”—code for attacks on the social position of the working class. After providing billions to support corporations under COVID-19 economic support measures, Morrison said the government was not running a “blank-cheque budget.”

Taken together, the two announcements reveal the essential class agenda being pursued at the highest levels of economic policy making. Both the government and the RBA promote the fiction their decisions are made in the interests of the “economy” and the “nation.” However, their latest actions reveal the essential class divide.

The government’s measures will push up unemployment, impose increased poverty on broader sections of the working class and youth, forcing them into lower paid jobs.

At the same time, the RBA uses these conditions as the justification for its decisions to pump still more money into the financial system for the benefit of major corporations and the financial elite.

Such measures—the maintenance of ultra-low interest rates for the indefinite future and bond purchases—do nothing to boost either employment or wages. But what the RBA acknowledges are “highly accommodative” financial conditions boost the bottom line of corporations and facilitate lucrative speculation in shares, real estate and other financial assets.

Cooperation and Contestation in East Asia

Sandip Kumar Mishra

East Asia has seen significant changes this past decade: both domestically within the countries of the region, as well as in their relations with each other. Three broad trends can be flagged to make sense of the many developments that have taken place. One, East Asia has become more economically and strategically salient in global politics. Two, we have seen the rise of strong leaders across the domestic political landscapes of most of these countries. Three, the parallel tracks of economic cooperation and strategic contestation along which inter-state relations were earlier conducted have been increasingly blurred, with political dissonances impacting the flow and frequency of economic exchanges.      

East Asia’s Increasing Salience in Global Politics

In October 2011, then US Secretary of State Hilary Clinton wrote a Foreign Policy article titled America’s Pacific Century, in which she argued that “the future of politics will be decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq,” and outlined a US ‘pivot to Asia’ policy. This was a clear indication of American intention to invest more in the region—diplomatically, strategically, economically, and otherwise. It drew from a 2011 development: of China overtaking Japan as the world’s second largest economy with a valuation of around US $ 5.88 trillion (Japan was US$ 5.47 trillion). China was estimated to overtake the US by 2027. Early on in the decade, East Asia became a site of interaction for the world’s three biggest economies.

Further, China’s ‘assertive’ rise became more overt. This was a challenging development for the regional order, and tracking Beijing’s changing course was an important consideration for all actors. It also posed a challenge to the US' regional and global primacy. US-China bilateral contestation, which is strategically the most important variable in global politics, has unraveled most prominently in Asia.

Japan’s changing posture under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe drew further attention to East Asia. Tokyo has actively articulated and pursued its Indo-Pacific strategy, which has had a bearing on its exchanges with Beijing. An ‘assertive’ Japan, as seen over the past decade, will have implications for regional as well as global politics.

Leadership change in North Korea following the death of its leader, Kim Jong-il, and the destabilising impact of Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons and missile capabilities also occupied much of the international relations limelight. The global security implications of North Korea’s frequent nuclear and missile tests were granted more serious consideration than before. It led, among other things, to US President Donald Trump proposing a summit meeting with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Three such meetings were held.

In 2018, the US attempted to address China’s unfair trade practices by setting tariff barriers. This gradually evolved into a bilateral trade war. In tandem with the economic fallout of the COVID-19 pandemic, it will have important consequences for global supply chains.

Rise of Strong Leaders and Nationalist Domestic Polities

East Asian domestic politics also saw considerable changes in the first half of the decade. This shaped not only the internal nature and course of individual countries, but also of the region. ‘Strong’ leaders assumed office, and the popular mood in most of these countries favoured such change. Xi Jinping, who became president of China in March 2013, showed his intent to change Beijing’s “hide your strength” strategy. This has led to China becoming increasingly assertive under his rule. Xi has augmented and centralised power through anti-corruption moves and removing the two-term presidential limit.

Shinzo Abe became prime minister of Japan in December 2012. This was his second term as PM, and his resignation in late 2020 made him Japan’s longest serving leader of the post-War period. Abe began with ‘Abenomics’: a set of policies to revitalise Japan’s economic stagnation and stabilise domestic politics, which was witness to frequent leadership changes. He also sought to make critical defence posture changes by revising Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. In December 2013, Abe introduced the concept of ‘proactive pacifism’ and a five-year plan for military expansion. In July 2014, Tokyo reinterpreted the constitutional provision of ‘collective self-defence’ and allowed Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to aid and defend an ally under attack, which was not allowed earlier.

North Korean politics witnessed generational change in the beginning of the decade. The power transition to the third generation of the Kim family was relatively smooth. Kim Jong-un swiftly assumed power and consolidated his position. Between 2012 and 2017, North Korea conducted more nuclear and missile tests than in all the previous years combined, which were a total of four. North Korea halted testing in 2018 and initiated summit meetings with the US in the hope of sanctions relief. These meetings didn’t produce the desired results.

Things were eventful in South Korea as well. Conservatives such as Lee Myung-bak and Park Geun-hye, or the progressive Moon Jae-in, are all seen as strong leaders. Attempts by conservative leaders to restrict the country’s democratic space resulted in a non-violent democratic protest. This led to Park Geun-hye’s impeachment in 2017—the first instance in South Korean history of a president being successfully ousted from office through impeachment. Current President Moon Jae-in has tried to restore democratic space, and has made efforts to engage North Korea.

Taiwan has demonstrated a similar domestic political tendency. It has become less compromising towards China, which was reflected in the 2016 change of guard from Ma Ying-jeou to Tsai Ing-wen. The new leadership claims Taiwan as an independent country; a reality that it would like China to accept.

Interstate Strategic Contestation’s Impact on Economic Amity

Interstate relations in East Asia have historically been conducted on dual tracks. Countries of the region were earlier able to isolate their growing economic relations from disagreements in other domains, especially those of a strategic and political orientation. This separation has increasingly thinned.

In the beginning of 2010-2020, China and Japan faced-off in the East China Sea over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which negatively affected their economic exchanges. China-South Korea relations showed positive trends at the beginning of the decade, with the top leaders of both countries meeting over 2013, 2014, and 2015. Seoul also joined the Beijing-led Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a founding member despite reservations from its ally, the US. Relations however began deteriorating when South Korea allowed the US to install the Terminal High Altitude Aerial Defense (THAAD) system on its territory. Once again, the economic dynamic suffered as a result.

The China-North Korea relationship has also gone through two phases in this decade: one of discordance, followed by one of reconnection. As leaders, Kim Jong-un and Xi Jinping did not meet until 2018. High-level exchanges between the two countries were quite rare, and it was assumed that Pyongyang was not happy with Beijing toeing the international community’s line on sanctions on North Korea. Earlier, gaps in national policy priorities did not have a similar economic fallout.

The most glaring example of political spill-overs onto economic considerations is the Japan-South Korea relationship. This is especially true of the past two years, which has seen both Seoul and Tokyo impose tit-for-tat trade restrictions in response to political one-upping. When South Korea announced its intention to review the agreement on the comfort women issue, and its courts ordered Japanese companies to pay reparations for wartime forced labour, Tokyo removed Seoul from its trade ‘white-list’. This meant that certain Japanese exports to South Korea were removed from the automatic approval list. The annual trilateral dialogue on trade and economic issues between China, Japan, and South Korea that began in 2008 has also become irregular. The most recent one scheduled to be held in Seoul did not take place because of Japan’s dissatisfaction with the forced labour matter.

However, the global pandemic, which has inevitably affected all economies, may prove to be a surprisingly positive catalyst in inducing some political rapprochement in the region. There are indications that regional capitals may be willing to restore the separation of political and economic engagement. One indicator of such a trend is China, Japan, and South Korea signing the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) in November 2020 despite strategic friction.

Looking Ahead

Any future prognostication will have US President Joe Biden’s approach towards China and US allies in East Asia as the most crucial variable of analysis. While the US will probably continue down the path of tensions and confrontation with China, it is likely to be more principled. Washington will also be less transactional in its relations with Japan and South Korea, and seek to build more trust into alliances. The Tokyo-Seoul relationship is presently at its nadir, but this may look up in the coming years. Both countries are aware that any further deterioration in ties will be detrimental to both. North Korea’s nuclear programme will continue to be unpredictable and a cause for serious concern. Pyongyang is unlikely to denuclearise, even though it may formally continue to have talks with Washington and Seoul on the issue.

As in 2010-2020, East Asia will continue to be—and perhaps become even more—central to global politics. As a site of regional and global cooperation and contestation, it will have ramifications that will ring beyond its political boundaries.