Government of Italy Bachelors, Masters, PhD Scholarships 2022/2023

Application Deadline: 31st August 2022

To be taken at (country): Italy

 Type: Bachelors, Masters, PhD

Eligibility: The scholarships are reserved to students having the status of refugees or subsidiary protection
belonging to the following categories:

•  Students with international protection, beneficiaries of this scholarship for the first time between the A.Y. 2017/2018 and the A.Y. 2021/2022 who have not yet obtained the degree title for the first course of studies carried out at Italian universities, and are entitled to get the scholarship in A.Y. 2022/2023 if they obtain the minimum number of CFUs indicated in art.4.
  This category does not include scholarship recipients who have completed the cycle of studies for which they received the benefit, obtaining the qualification, and who have continued their studies by enrolling in a new cycle of studies and who fall under letter c. of this Art.2;
• Students with international protection by 26 August 2022 obtained in Italy, enrolled for the first time in the Italian University system, in a bachelor (corso di laurea triennale), master degree (corso di laurea magistrale o magistrale a ciclo unico), or a PhD program without scholarship (corso di dottorato senza borsa) – A.Y. 2022/23, or who have obtained for the first time in the A.Y. 2021/22 registration with reserve from an Italian university.
• After the above categories and if resources are still available, may be evaluated students with international protection, beneficiaries of this scholarship for the first time between the A.Y. 2016/17 and the A.Y. 2020/21 who have completed the course of studies for which they received the scholarship and are enrolled in the A.Y. 2022/23 or have enrolled in the previous A.Y. to a course of studies at a higher level, where the requisites referred to in the following Art. 4 are met. Only students who have obtained a three-year degree and continue towards a master’s degree or have obtained a master’s degree and continue towards a PhD course will be considered. Other cases such as transfers between degree courses cannot be evaluated.

Number of Awards: 100

Value of Program: The scholarships are awarded by the University, possibly in cooperation with the Regional Authorities for the Right to Study, and entitle students to exemption from taxes and university contributions, accommodation services (house and meal), access to university facilities (centers, libraries). Any additional services may be offered by third parties.

Duration of Scholarship: Duration of Program

How to Apply: Both categories of candidates must apply from the web site http://borsespi.laziodisco.it, by August 31, 2022, midnight, Rome local time

Applicants are also required to attach the following documents:
1. Copy of an Italian identity document (ID);
2. Copy of the document certifying the international protection;
3. – Students referred to in art. 2, lett. a: list of exams taken;
– Students referred to in art. 2, lett. b: short CV (in Italian or English).

* Candidates are kindly requested to contact the University they wish to enroll BEFORE submitting their application, in order to verify the feasibility of enrollment. For information on University contact details, please write to refugees@crui.it

Visit Program Webpage for details

Swiss Government Excellence Scholarships 2023/2024

Application Deadline: Now Open (Deadline varies by country, but generally 30th November). Submission to Swiss Representation is from Sept to Dec. However, be sure to check the application deadline in your own country.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: International students from more than 180 countries.  See the official website for a complete list of eligible countries.

To be taken at any of the ten (10) Swiss Public Universities, the two (2) Swiss Federal Institutes of Technology, the public teaching and research institutes, and the Universities of applied sciences

Eligible Field of Study: All academic fields

About the Swiss Government Scholarship

The Swiss government, through the Federal Commission for Scholarships for Foreign Students (FCS), awards various postgraduate scholarships to foreign scholars and researchers:

The research scholarship is available to post-graduate researchers in any discipline (who hold a master’s degree as a minimum). Also, beneficiaries must be planning to come to Switzerland to pursue research or further studies at the doctoral or post-doctoral level.

Research scholarships are awarded for research or study at all Swiss cantonal universities, universities of applied sciences, and the two federal institutes of technology. Only candidates nominated by an academic mentor at one of these higher education institutions will be considered.

Art scholarships are open to art students wishing to pursue an initial master’s degree in Switzerland. Art scholarships are awarded for study at any Swiss conservatory or university of the arts. Only those who have already been awarded a place to study may apply. This scholarship is available to students from a limited number of countries only.

These scholarships provide graduates from all fields with the opportunity to pursue masters, doctoral or postdoctoral research in Switzerland at one of the public-funded universities or recognized institutions. You can also go to our website to read more about related scholarships on our website.

Type: Masters (for the art scholarship), Ph.D. Postdoctoral and Research Scholarships

Selection Criteria and Eligibility

The FCS assesses scholarship applications according to three criteria:

a) Candidate profile

b) Quality of the research project or artistic work

c) Synergies and potential for future research cooperation

Applications are subject to preliminary selection by the relevant national authorities and/or the Swiss diplomatic representation. The short-listed applications are then assessed by the Federal Commission for Scholarships for Foreign Students (FCS) which subsequently takes the final decision.

The FCS is composed of professors from all Swiss public universities. Scholarship awards are decided on the basis of academic and scientific excellence.

Candidates for the University Scholarships must:

• Hold a university degree (Bachelors/Masters) on commencement of the scholarship.
• Be able to demonstrate their academic abilities and what they aim to achieve.
• Contact the institution and/or the professor supervising their period of research. Universities may request supplementary information and/or set certain additional conditions to determine whether or not you qualify for admission.
• Be under the age of 35 (born on or after 1 January 1987).
• Be suitably proficient in the language of instruction (French, German, Italian, or English) in order to draw full benefit from their studies in Switzerland.

Please refer to the country-specific fact sheets for general and specific eligibility criteria.

Number of Scholarships: not specified

Value of Scholarship: The scholarship covers a monthly payment, exemption of tuition fees, health insurance, airfare, special lodging allowance, etc. See the fact sheets for exact scholarship benefits.

Duration of Scholarship: for the period of study

How to apply for the Swiss Government Excellence Scholarship: See below

Visit the scholarship webpage and select your country for country-specific application instruction.

1,500 UK Chevening Scholarships 2023/2024

Application Deadline: 1st November 2022 at 12:00 (GMT)

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible African Countries: Developing countries

To be taken at (country): UK Universities

Eligible Fields of Study: Chevening Scholarships are awarded across a wide range of fields; including politics, government, business, the media, the environment, civil society, religion, and academia in any UK University.

About Chevening Scholarships: Applications for fully funded Chevening Scholarships to study for one-year master’s degrees at UK universities are now open.

Chevening enables outstanding emerging leaders from all over the world to pursue one-year master’s degrees in the UK.

There is no such thing as a ‘typical’ Chevening Scholar, but those who are successful tend to have ambition, leadership qualities, and a strong academic background.

We encourage you to apply if you meet our eligibility criteria and other requirements. Your gender, age (there is no upper age limit), sexual orientation, religion, marriage or parenthood status, caste, class, or other attributes do not matter to us. What matters is your ability to submit a strong application that demonstrates you are capable of excelling on an intense master’s course in the UK, and that you have a clear vision for your future – and maybe even that of your sector or your country.

Chevening Scholarships are awarded to individuals with strong academic backgrounds who also have demonstrable leadership potential. The scholarship offers financial support to study for a Master’s degree at any of the UK’s leading universities and the opportunity to become part of an influential global network of 44,000 alumni. There are approximately 1,500 Chevening Scholarships on offer globally for the2018/2019 academic cycle. These scholarships represent a significant investment from the UK government to develop the next cohort of global leaders.

Prior to starting your application for a Chevening Scholarship please ensure you have the following ready:

• Essential: Three different UK master’s course choices
• Optional: English language test results (if you’ve already met the requirements) 
• Optional: UK master’s university offer (if you’ve already met the requirements)

Scholarship Offered Since: 1983

Eligibility: To be eligible for a Chevening Scholarship you must:

• Be a citizen of a Chevening-eligible country
• Return to your country of citizenship for a minimum of two years after your award has ended
• Have an undergraduate degree that will enable you to gain entry onto a postgraduate programme at a UK university. This is typically equivalent to an upper second-class 2:1 honours degree in the UK.
• Have at least two years’ work experience (this may be up to five years for fellowship programmes, so please refer to your country page for further details)
• Apply to three different eligible UK university courses and have received an unconditional offer from one of these choices by 15 July 2022.

Number of Scholarship: 1,500

Value of Scholarship: A full Chevening Scholarship award normally comprises:

• payment of tuition fees;
• travel to and from your country of residence by an approved route for you only;
• an arrival allowance;
• a grant for the cost of preparation of a thesis or dissertation (if required);
• an excess baggage allowance;
• the cost of an entry clearance (visa) application for you only;
• a monthly personal living allowance (stipend) to cover accommodation and living expenses. The monthly stipend will depend on whether you are studying inside or outside London. It is currently £917 per month outside London and £1134 per month inside London (subject to annual review).

Duration of Scholarship: One year

How can I Apply?

• All Chevening applicants must submit their education documents, references, and one unconditional UK university offer. The deadlines for these required documents are in the Chevening application timeline. Use the ‘update my application’ button above to upload them.
• If you are conditionally selected for a Chevening Scholarship, it is essential that you submit these documents in order to remain in the process.

It is important to go through the application instructions on the scholarship webpage before applying.

Sponsors: Chevening Scholarships are funded by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), with further contributions from universities and other partners in the UK and overseas, including governmental and private sector bodies.

Important Notes: The process of selecting Chevening Scholars takes a minimum of eight months from the application deadline to when scholars are conditionally selected for an award.

FAQ on the CHEVENING SCHOLARSHIPS

Will the UK COVID-19 Guidelines make my application difficult? Definitely not. Chevening Scholarships welcome students even from COVID-19 blacklisted countries. All scholars entering the UK from a blacklisted country will have the option to book the quarantine package through Diversity Travel after you have booked your incoming flight. Chevening will pay for quarantine packages booked through Diversity Travel. 

Can I stay back in the UK at the end of my course? No, Chevening Scholars cannot stay back or apply for a Graduate route visa. When you accept a Chevening Award, you agree to return home for two years at the end of your scholarship.

Visit Award Webpage for Details

Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme (CADFP) 2023/2024

Application Deadline: 30th September 2022

Offered annually? Twice in the year

Eligible Countries: African-born academics currently living in the United States and Canada and working in higher education.

To be taken at (country): Fellows will engage in educational projects proposed and hosted by faculty of public or private higher education institutions in the following CCNY partner countries: Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, South Africa, Tanzania and Uganda

About the Award: The Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme (CADFP) is a scholar fellowship programme for educational projects at African higher education institutions for African researchers in diaspora. Offered by IIE in partnership with the United States International University-Africa (USIU-Africa), the programme is funded by a grant from Carnegie Corporation of New York (CCNY). In the first two years of the programme, the CADFP supported 110 short-term faculty fellowships for African-born academics. The programme exemplifies CCNY’s enduring commitment to higher education in Africa. IIE manages and administers the programme, including applications, project requests and fellowships.

Eligible Project Activities: 

• curriculum co-development
• research collaboration
• graduate student mentoring and training

Type: Research, Fellowship

Eligibility: To be eligible for the Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme , a scholar must:

1. Have been born in any African country, as evidenced by the biographical data in the scholar’s passport;
2. Live in the United States or Canada;
3. Hold a terminal degree; and
4. Be employed at an accredited college or university.

Scholars may hold any academic rank, but postdocs are not eligible.

As part of the application, scholars submit personal statements and information about their academic qualifications, disciplinary expertise and administrative experience.  A letter of recommendation from a Dean (or from an administrator of equal or higher level) from the scholar’s current institution is required.

Selection Criteria of Project: 

• Specific activities are proposed to collaborate on research, curriculum co-development and/or graduate student teaching, training and mentoring.
• Strong project concept and rationale are provided; project demonstrates innovation.
• Project Request clearly indicates what has been done by the institution on the proposed topic(s), the resources of the host institution, the problem to address, the goals of what to change or improve, the gaps and the anticipated specific role of the Diaspora Fellow in the proposed activities.
• Clear mission of what the host institution wants to accomplish through project visit is articulated, and justification is provided on reasons to partner in the effort with a Diaspora scholar.
• The proposed scholar’s discipline, subfields, areas of expertise, experience and motivation for applying are well-suited to the success and impact of the project.
• Evidence of relevant experience by the proposed scholar in each requested project activity is demonstrated.
• The proposed project must have the potential for impact
• If potential impact of longer term project will take more time to be realized or evaluated, explanation is provided on how initial impact of project visit will be measured or how it is expected to contribute to larger goals.

Value of Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme: For the fellowship, the African Diaspora Fellow will receive

1. a $150/day stipend
2. visa costs (if required)
3. supplemental health insurance coverage
4. round-trip international air travel and ground transportation costs to and from the scholar’s home to the North American airport
5. potential opportunities to apply for supplemental funding to cover knowledge production activities and workshop attendance.

Duration of Fellowship: Fourteen to Ninety days (January 1, 2023 to November 30, 2023. )

How to Apply for Carnegie African Diaspora Fellowship Programme: Go here to apply

Please visit Review Process and Criteria and How to Apply for African Institutions for more information on how the program operates.

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

McLarty Africa Fellows Programme 2022

Application Deadline:

Ongoing

Tell Me About Award:

McLarty Associates is seeking a bright, resourceful individual for a paid, entry-level internship/graduate fellowship to support our Africa Practice. We are seeking an individual who can work part-time (approx. 20 hours/week) from September through December 2022. This position will be performed remotely, with the option to work periodically from McLarty’s Washington D.C. office contingent on vaccination status.

What Type of Award is this?

Internship, Fellowship

Who can apply?

As an intern/graduate fellow, you will work on a variety of projects with different engagement teams. The program aims to give you exposure to the breadth of our services and client work. You will work closely with our professionals – Associate through Director – and gain first-hand experience in consulting. Your assignments may involve work in news tracking, policy analysis, memo writing, and/or note-taking at client meetings.

Essential Duties and Responsibilities:

• Conducting extensive research of public policy, international, and business issues;
• Writing memos, compiling biographies, preparing presentations;
• Monitoring regional news outlets;
• Attending and reporting on speeches, panel discussions, and policy forums of interest to the firm and clients;
• Assisting professional staff with general office and administrative support; and
• Other duties as assigned.

We are seeking individuals who are:

• Accomplished researchers;
• Excellent writers;
• Exceptionally organized with an independent and creative nature;
• Strong critical thinkers;
• Inclined to take initiative and anticipate the needs of the team;
• Attentive to details;
• Able to operate in a fast-paced work environment while maintaining a high level of professionalism and confidentiality;
• Able to remain poised under pressure and juggle multiple projects at a time;
• Proficient with PowerPoint, Excel, Office 365, and other business applications and media platforms. 

Ideal candidates for this position possess an understanding of international politics, economics, trade, technology, government relations, business, culture, and entrepreneurship. Applicants should also have a robust background, demonstrated interest, and/or experience living or studying in sub-Saharan Africa. Regional language proficiency strongly preferred, but not required. Candidates must be legally authorized to work in the US.

Which Countries are Eligible?

African countries

Where will Award be Taken?

Remote

How Many Positions will be Given?

Not specified

What is the Benefit of Award?

Paid

How to Apply for Program?

Interested applicants must submit an application that includes: 

• Cover Letter highlighting relevant experience and skills;
• Resume; and
• Short Writing Sample (no more than 3 pages) demonstrating strong research and concise writing on issues related to sub-Saharan Africa, international politics, or political economy.

Please compile all application materials into one PDF document. We require all our employees to be vaccinated against COVID-19 if you opt to perform this position in-person. You will be required to provide proof of vaccination on your first day of work if you opt to perform this position in-person. We will be accepting applications on a rolling basis until late August 2022. Applying early is strongly encouraged.

Apply Now

Visit Award Webpage for Details

US-Saudi Relationship: Beyond the Obvious

Sam Husseini

Photograph Source: Saudi Press Agency – CC BY 4.0

An adage favored by Claud Cockburn as well as Otto von Bismarck advises “Never believe anything in politics until it has been officially denied.”

Indeed, it should be a clear tenet of political analysis

that stated goals are frequently not actual goals. US war planners used rhetorical concerns over non-existent Iraq WMDs as a pretext for invasion. Alleged human rights preoccupations were falsely heralded as the rationale for NATO bombings in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan and Libya.

One reason it was clear in real time that the US establishment was putting forward false pretexts in those cases was the contrast with the US relationship with Saudi Arabia and Israel.

But stated goals are not always false.

The bulk of the discussion over Biden’s visit to Saudi Arabia framed it as an attempt to get some relief for US consumers paying $100 to fill up their gas tanks.

Interestingly, that largely contradicted what Biden was actually saying: “The commitments from the Saudis don’t relate to anything having to do with energy. … And it has to do with national security for them — for Israelis. … It has to do with much larger issues than having to do with energy.”

But that was frequently ignored in the media discussion. That is, on a rare occasion when a US politician was indicating that he was focusing on geopolitical goals rather than working for the benefit of US consumers, this very real possibility was remarkably marginalized.

For example, Mehdi Hasan on MSNBC stated: “Whatever we’re getting from this meeting [with Saudi leader MBS] maybe, maybe a slight fall in gas prices, is it really worth selling out the family of Jamal Khashoggi, the people of Yemen, and our own moral authority and values?”

The end of Hasan’s statement highlights a certain strain of US victimology, wherein the US government — which has illegally invaded country after country with horrific results, as indicated above — is deemed to have “moral authority.” Biden himself backed the Iraq invasion and has lied about it for years on the rare occasions he’s been asked.

In fact, the US establishment has lots of other motives for working closely with the Saudis: It wants to sell billions of dollars in weapons, something Trump was almost refreshingly honest about; normalize Arab states’ relations with an expansive Israel, as symbolized by Biden flying directly from Israel to Saudi Arabia; ensure lots of financial and political and media relations with Saudi Arabia.

One obvious “benefit” is that oil profits are used largely to finance Wall Street and Big Tech at the expense of funding reasonable regional development — Silicon Valley is awash with Saudi money while countless are compelled to live in cemeteries in Cairo. The late scholar activist Eqbal Ahmad frequently commented on how the Arabs were separated from their wealth.

The US establishment also wants to ensure its primacy with respect to Russia and China in the region of course. It has been long argued that US control — not just access — to oil from the Mideast gives it leverage over Europe, something all the more important as the US seeks to block Russian oil. Indeed, Biden’s visit helped pave the way for MBS’s subsequent trip to Europe.

The US, Saudi Arabia and Israel also have a shared interest in squashing any moves toward independent states and movements.

But all those things may not be as appealing to the US public as cheaper gas. Accepting the notion that the motive is cheap gas for the benefit of the US consumer makes the twisted US-Saudi relationship seem more decent than it actually is.

Additionally, if cheaper gas were the actual US government goal, couldn’t Biden do lots of other things — like lift sanctions on Iran, Venezuela (which may be modestly occurring), and (even) Russia?

Biden could also address oil company profits.

Sen. Bernie Sanders has proposed the latter, but has often played a role regarding the US-Saudi relationship that may be unexpected to some.

In 2019 he urged a Senate override to Trump’s veto of a congressional resolution to end US involvement in the Saudi-led war in Yemen — described by many as genocidal. But his movement against the Saudi war slowed when Biden came to office.

He finally introduced another resolution to end the US support for the Saudi war on July 14, while Biden was in Israel. But remarkably, when Sanders got on “This Week” on ABC, just after the infamous fist bump, he made absolutely no mention of the war in Yemen. The word “Yemen” literally does not appear in the transcript.

So, when Sanders was given the mic by the major media he was silent — even though he had just — finally! — introduced a resolution on the Yemen war. This indicates that Sanders’ alleged opposition to the Saudi war is not even rhetorical when it matters most.

Indeed, in 2015, after the Saudis began their horrific attack on Yemen, Sanders actually proposed a larger Saudi role in the region, arguing against increased US intervention in Syria because what was needed was a force: “led by the Muslim countries themselves! Saudi Arabia is the third largest military budget in the world, they’re going to have to get their hands dirty in this fight” he told former AIPAC employee Wolf Blitzer.

Sanders’ lack of scrutiny allows the US government to continue its machinations regarding Yemen, as Biden and MBS issued a one-sided statement regarding Yemen, laying the foundation for more war.

Meanwhile, the German press reported that “Rumors of a new Middle Eastern military alliance are flying. They’re significant because an ‘Arab NATO’ may include Israel, signaling next steps in better ties between Israel and Arab neighbors. But are the rumors real?” The Wilson Center reported with less speculation that despite their glaring headline — “America’s Arab Partners Show No Interest in Biden’s Cold War” — they are “secretly increasing their participation in an air defense system arrayed against Iranian missiles in partnership with Israel and the United States.”

Such apparent US goals show a remarkable continuity of US policy over the decades, which formed CENTO in the 1950s (also known as the Baghdad Pact) which was to be NATO’s southern flank. The organization became moribund after the Iraq revolution of 1958 which overthrew the monarchy and collapsed altogether with the 1979 ousting of the Shah. Thus, smaller monarchies have become pillars of “security” for US policymakers.

Saudi apparent designs to acquire nuclear weapons may thus seem more plausible. That is, one would think that US planners — and especially the Israelis — would be adamantly opposed to a possible Saudi bomb, but it might not be so clear cut when one considers that a nuclear arsenal might be seen as an anchor to Saudi rule. This may help explain the Biden administration’s rejection of renewing the “Iran Deal” since an alleged Iranian nuclear weapons program may provide a sufficient pretext. Meanwhile, even “The Squad” refuses to acknowledge Israel’s massive nuclear weapons arsenal.

Of course, it’s not inconceivable that the US and Israeli establishments could turn on Saudi Arabia at some point as they did against Iraq when it has outlived its usefulness to them. Interestingly, a new profile of MBS in the sophisticated establishment outlet the Economist repeatedly likens MBS to Saddam. The Saudi role in 9/11 has largely been pushed down the memory hole, but could be revived at any time by the US establishment.

Notably, the Saudi assault on Yemen escalated last year and a truce was put in place shortly after the Ukraine invasion. This truce may have been partly motivated by the obvious public relations problem of having the US helping bomb Yemenis while decrying the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This raises a complex question: Did the Saudi escalation indicate some foreknowledge of the coming Ukraine invasion — that Saudi Arabia needed to get their licks in while they could?

Scrutinizing the timing of Biden’s trip itself [which had been delayed] may also offer a window into the actual decision making process by US planners. It was announced to substantial media attention just as gas prices for US consumers peaked in June at over $5.00 for the first time ever. In the time since — and since the trip itself — gas prices have gone down significantly — I just saw gas at $3.99 for the first time in ages. There’s no evidence this was related to anything the trip accomplished, but it may well have been an effective mechanism of public relations. That is, the trip may have been timed to coincide with a predictable slide in price. The US public hears of the trip, sees the fist bump and gets relief at the pump. This indicates a great deal of planning by the US establishment to manage the public consciousness on such issues.

The timing of the Israeli assassination of Shireen Abu Akleh in May, while derided in some quarters, may also have had a very serious silver lining for US planners. Since virtually no one with access to major media and the US establishment would argue that Israel is a “pariah”, the Israeli killing likely helped relieve pressure on Saudi Arabia. The Saudis themselves pointed to the assassination of Abu Akleh (as well as US torture at Abu Ghraib) to defuse criticism. Of course, this too is hypocritical, since Saudi Arabia is facilitating other Arab states recognizing Israel as it continues its onslaughts upon the Palestinian people, most recently with the so-called Abraham Accords — part of a long-standing pattern. Additionally, the Saudis are now apparently pushing Pakistan to follow suit, particularly since that country may be even more malleable with the de facto coup against Imran Khan.

For the time being, each of the Saudi crimes as recognized by the US establishment was overcome: 9/11 was memory-holed and replaced by the Khashoggi killing and that in turn was somewhat diffused thanks to Israel’s killing.

Thus, there’s a perverse cycle at play wherein tyrannical forces from these states effectively absolve each other of their respective oppression by engaging in their own. They pose as critics of the other while in fact colluding together against their respective publics and professed principles.

Sri Lanka’s Political and Economic Crisis

Kenneth Surin

2022 Sri Lankan economic crisis, people wait for long time to refill liquefied petroleum gas cylinders. Photograph Source: AntanO – CC BY-SA 4.0

Sri Lanka, an island of 22 million people, continues to be in the grip of its worst economic and political crisis since independence on 10 February 1948.

Since April there have been protests against extensive shortages of food and fuel, as well as a profound crisis of trust in Sri Lanka’s political institutions, primarily parliament and the presidency (both have faced repeated charges of corruption and nepotism for decades, a situation unable to be surmounted by a cowed judicial system).

The heart of the anti-government movement, at this point, was a demand for the resignation of the strongman president Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a member of a successional political family.

This demand was a success. In the middle of July Rajapaksa fled Sri Lanka for the Maldives during the night on an air force plane, and announced a couple of days later that he was stepping down from the presidency. Gotabaya is now said to be in Singapore.

What precipitated Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s flight was the massive scale of his family’s corruption and venality.

The rule of the Rajapaksas began in 2005 when the older brother Mahinda was elected president. A sectarian, he became a hero with his Sinhalese Buddhist majority community for ending the brutal three-decade civil war with Hindu Tamil separatists.

At the same time, the Tamil minority regarded him as a mortal enemy for the viciousness of the war, where Tamils were killed in their tens of thousands, and even more “disappeared” when the war was supposedly over.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa was Mahinda’s defence secretary and head of the armed forces, and has repeatedly been accused of war crimes and of being personally incriminated in the killings of journalists and the enforced disappearances and the unidentifiable “white van abductions” of Tamils, human rights campaigners, and political opponents.

Mahinda lost the presidential election in 2014, brought down by widespread corruption allegations, but the stranglehold of his family on Sri Lanka’s politics meant that neither these allegations nor those of war crimes were investigated.

The president from 2015 to 2018 was the placeholder Maithripala Sirisena.

Supposedly “non-affiliated”, Sirisena turned out to be a stooge of the Rajapaksa family. Promising to serve only one term, he made Ranil Wickremesinghe (the current president) his first prime minister.

Ranil Wickremesinghe lasted until 2018, when Sirisena sacked him and appointed the former President Mahinda Rajapaksa (his erstwhile supposed rival) as prime minister.

Sirisena then prorogued Parliament, violating the Sri Lankan constitution in the process, and precipitating a constitutional crisis.

In November 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, the former defense secretary who presided over the last phase of the civil war, was elected president, and appointed his brother (the former president) Mahinda as prime minister.

Parliamentary elections were held in August 2020. The brothers’ party, Sri Lanka People’s Front– campaigning on a platform of Sinhala-Buddhist chauvinism and governmental militarism– achieved a supermajority in these elections. This put them in a position to amend the constitution and remove curbs on presidential powers.

Assurances given to the international community by Maithripala Sirisena and the Rajapaksa brothers that there would be investigations into war crimes perpetrated during the civil war have always come to naught— at the same time as they mouthed these bromides to the international community, the Rajapaksas were telling their domestic audience that such measures would never be taken against the country’s “war heroes”.

Despite this, the US Ambassador to the United Nations Samantha Power in 2016 called Sri Lanka a “global champion of human rights and democratic accountability” (sic).

Ms Power was voicing what had become conventional wisdom in the international community, namely, that Sri Lanka merely “needs time” to heal the wounds of the civil war, and was somehow already embarked on that curative trajectory. Sri Lanka therefore needed encouragement rather the horsewhip. This was a grievous miscalculation.

As a result of this blunder, pervasive in international political circles, the Rajapaksas always knew they were in for an easy ride from the international community, and could use this impunity to ride rough-shod over ordinary Sri Lankans.

Mahinda and Gotabaya weren’t the only Rajapaksa players in Sri Lankan politics. Another brother, Basil, who was finance minister, as well as several other Rajapaksas who held cabinet posts, are said collectively to have bankrupted the country by engaging in widespread corruption, economic mismanagement, reckless borrowing, drastic and unnecessary tax cuts (which increased the national debt), profligate spending on vanity projects, and the already-mentioned militarization of government (the US now supplies military equipment to Sri Lanka), and a conflict-riven Buddhist-Sinhalese racist politics.

Basil Rajapaksa, a US citizen, is nicknamed “Mr Ten Percent” as a result of his habit of demanding a 10% personal commission from local and foreign companies on their receipt of government contracts.

Basil, and the eldest Rajapaksa, Mahinda, remain in Sri Lanka on the orders of the supreme court. Also subject to this order is Mahinda’s nephew Namal Rajapaksa, said to be the family’s political heir apparent.

Sri Lanka ran out of foreign currency to pay for imports. The ensuing fuel and food shortages, months of lengthy power blackouts, and record inflation (39.1% in May), prompted Sri Lankans to take to the streets in April.

These protests were met with teargas attacks, draconian surveillance, travel bans, death threats, and imprisonment of protesters without charge.

The protesters stormed the presidential palace, took dips in the absconded Gotabaya’s swimming pool, and worked out in his gym.

There is no confidence that current president Ranil Wickremesinghe can, or will, do anything significant about this critical situation. Ranil is expected to seek a bail-out deal with the IMF, which of course will demand its usual hardline “conditionality” that will hit the poorest hardest.

Like the 2015-2018 placeholder president Maithripala Sirisena, the wily and opportunistic deal-making Ranil Wickremesinghe (nickname “Deal Ranil”) seems to have been earmarked for a similar role by the Rajapaksas.

The Rajapaksas may be a family, but their record shows they are also Sri Lanka’s foremost cartel.

Soon after being made president, Wickremesinghe declared a state of emergency, and called the protesters “fascists” while cracking down on the demonstrations.

The state of emergency continues, allowing security forces to arrest leaders of the protest movement, conduct searches without warrants, limit public gatherings, and to demolish the main anti-government protest camp in a violent pre-dawn raid that caused consternation in foreign embassies and among human rights advocates.

A government spokesman said last week that Gotabaya will return to Sri Lanka— he only has a short-term visa for his stay in Singapore, and has not so far applied for asylum there.

However, last week Sri Lanka’s supreme court posted a call for Gotabaya Rajapaksa to make submissions by 1 August in response to various petitions seeking accountability for those deemed responsible for the country’s economic collapse.

This step by the supreme court may encourage Gotabaya to prolong his foreign travels, taking care of course to avoid those countries which have extradition agreements with Sri Lanka.

Instead of walking away with their tails between their legs for turning a long and steady blind eye to the Rajapaksas’ excesses and crimes, western governments and media saw Sri Lanka’s economic collapse as yet another opportunity to target bogeyman China.

Western political leaders and media have consistently depicted China’s Belt and Road initiative as a “debt trap” for the countries benefitting from it.

Sri Lanka is now alleged to be the latest “victim” of this “debt trap”.

Alas for purveyors of this “debt trap” narrative, the vast majority of Sri Lankan foreign debt is owed to the West.

It turns out that (as of 2021) a massive 81% of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt was owned by US and European financial institutions, as well as western allies Japan and India.

According to statistics released by Sri Lanka’s Department of External Resources, as of April 2021, the bulk of its foreign debt is owned by Western venture capitalists and banks, who own 47% of the debt.

The top holders of Sri Lankan foreign debt, in the form of international sovereign bonds (ISBs), are the following:

BlackRock (US)
Ashmore Group (Britain)
Allianz (Germany)
UBS (Switzerland)
HSBC (Britain)
JPMorgan Chase (US)
Prudential (US)

The Asian Development Bank and World Bank, which are arms of the US’s Washington Consensus, own 13% and 9% of Sri Lankan foreign debt (respectively).

Japan owns 10% of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt, while India own’s another 2% as of April 2021.

China, by contrast, owns !0% of Sri Lanka’s foreign debt.

Most of my information regarding Sri Lanka’s debt is taken from Ben Norton’s excellent piece (posted on 13 July) on MRonline.

To quote Norton: “Western media reporting on the economic crisis in Sri Lanka, however, ignores these facts, giving the strong, and deeply misleading, impression that the chaos is in large part because of Beijing”.

Meanwhile the people of Sri Lanka continue to suffer, with the prospect of a Rajapaksa return to power somehow looming over them.