Political Theater In Nepal is Driving Citizen Flight

B. Nimri Aziz

Photograph Source: Bijay Chaurasia – CC BY-SA 4.0

With unwelcome regularity, every few months Kathmandu Valley experiences a nationally watched theatrical production. This month’s will surely be unrivalled. Yet, each new production seems to outdo the last in commercial evaluations and the celebrity of its leading actors.

At the same time however, apart from eager journalists, the public does not attend. In fact, the Nepali public is largely focused beyond the valley, further than Everest, further than Darjeeling and Assam in N.W. India, the former go-to-destination for fleeing disenchanted youths and dreamers 3-4 generations ago. (Today, as we will see, they prefer to watch this drama from much further afield.)

Today’s dramas – offering commercial successes (for some), rich fodder for investigative journalists, and political accolades or disrepute for others – are an unending series of scandals. All have a similar theme – riches through corruption.

For the past decade, increasing as the national treasury of this new democracy swells, corruption and greed have grown at a rapid rate. It seeps into every corner of the nation, along newly-bulldozed roadways to once-remote nomad camps, into district headquarters in far flung provinces, and through engorged urban centers. It embraces a visa-and-passport racket; it spills over the gilded surfaces of the country’s holiest Hindu site; it entraps politicians of all political persuasions; it captures former ministers, members of parliament and their staff, a myriad of government agencies along with Nepal’s richest, most prominent merchants.

To review only the three most recent dramas: there’s the Bhutanese passport scandal. Almost 20 years ago, 100,000 ethnic Nepalese who’d been expelled from Bhutan where they’d been settled for generations, were sequestered in refugee camps within Nepal. Following international appeals, they were granted refugee status and could apply for asylum abroad. (The U.S. accepted more than 85,000.) But what about ordinary Nepalis? (Hadn’t thousands managed foreign visas from their fraudulent claims of lost homes in the 2015 earthquake?) It seemed unfair to the tens of thousands who wait more than two years even for a tourist visa to America, for example. Some aspiring-emigres who decided to claim Bhutanese refugee status won the sympathy of officials in relevant ministries who would furnish the necessary papers for 1-2 million rupees ($US 10,000- 18,000) each. When the racket was exposed, numerous culprits were identified and charged with treason, fraud and forgery; they included ministerial level officials, a police chief and a deputy prime minister along with lower-level clerks. (How any of the foreign embassies who might stamp these false papers responded to the exposé is unrecorded.) Nepal’s media had a field day publicizing the details, naming names; officials who had pursued the criminals were applauded. But how many of the named and accused were exempted, how many convicted, and how many of all of them are actually in jail today seem to be uncertain, or forgotten.

The obscurity that follows these exposés may be because, hardly a month later, a new political theater eclipses the last drama. Journalists excitedly pursue new celebrities. (Nepal’s press, a throng of papers, TV stations and online outlets, arose following the arrival of free speech – starting in 1990 and swelling after the blossoming of democracy in 2008. With so much corruption, between inter-and-intra-party scandals, press attention has increasingly turned in this direction, even as questions about the integrity of the nation’s young free press are raised.)

That Bhutanese ID drama follows a much discussed ‘gift’ of gold by Nepal’s former prime minister K.P. Oli and former president Mrs. B.D. Bhandari. Together, perhaps in search of spiritual merit after retirement, the pair committed government funds to purchase a massive quantity of gold (Jalahari) to adorn Nepal’s most sacred site Pashupatinath Temple in Kathmandu. An initial revelation that the funds were not their own, but from the State Treasury, reportedly resulted in the plates being exhumed and the engraved names of their esteemed benefactors removed. (As far as is known the Treasury still honored the cost of the gift.) The final act of that drama highlighted a supposed discrepancy (approximately 10 kilograms of gold) between the 100 kg weight of the reported gift and what was eventually recorded.

Sometime after or between these hot affairs was another equally serious production, a spectacular property deal. Called the Lalita Niwas land scandal. It too involved ministers and other officials, businessmen, and huge sums of money. Lalita Nawas is a tract of government property (about 15 hectares) in Baluwatar, one of the capital’s most elite suburbs.) Corruption charges were filed against 175 individuals upon discovery that plots there had been illegally transferred in the name of individuals through collusion with officials, among then land revenue personnel and the election commissioner. The sums involved are staggering. Investigations are ongoing (as jails fill, or trials are delayed).

The effect of this on the public is profound, and long-lasting. After less than two decades of democratic liberties most Nepalis are losing confidence in their modern republic. (Maoists who fought to end the dictatorship are among the most corrupt, it is believed.)

A deeper, more troubling consequence of the corruption is found among school graduates and in applications for foreign visas. “Education is now a means to escape the country”, observes secondary school director Bhagwan Shrestha. From his many years in the field, he sadly concludes that education for the sake of learning is of low priority: “We are producing educated Nepalis for outside”. Few want to stay. He also notes the difficulties simple families endure to pay increasingly high school fees, hoping this would open a path abroad for their children. “Their dream is for their children to escape”, Shrestha adds. “Education is simply a ticket out.” He also suggests that this condition lowers the appeal of teaching as a profession.

Youths who leave after the compulsory 10^th class have aspirations to find work as laborers in Malaysia and Gulf Cooperation Council states. Those able to complete university do so with their eyes on Australia, Europe and the U.S. and Canada, with the U.S. most preferred. One thirty-year-old who intends to stay in Nepal notes: “From my graduating class of 131 students, almost 90 are outside – working abroad”.

One need only glance at the lines of aspirants at the gates of foreign embassies. From the airport, flights leave night and day ferrying mainly young men abroad. (800,000 are expected to be issued labor permits this year). They and their families consider themselves fortunate, despite tales of difficult conditions abroad. Their hardships, often exaggerated, may be sympathetically recorded in international papers. But however severe the stresses and risks abroad, Nepali youths view those as preferable to dim prospects at home where corruption is so invasive. With their overseas earnings they can leverage possibilities for themselves in their homeland. In fact, most return with sufficient savings to open a modest business, pay off mortgaged land, and afford school fees for their children to obtain a better education (and perhaps win a visa to a first-class destination!). Their remittances back to Nepal are not insubstantial. If Nepal’s government were really responsible, instead of the outflow generated by corruption and the lack of opportunities for citizens, it could foster local industry and agricultural innovation. What enterprise one finds in Nepal is in the private sector; this in a nation which, during its 15 years of democracy, has largely been led by socialist parties (Maoist, Marxist and Communist) with access to billions of rupees to offer fraudsters.

Foundations and Future of ‘INDIA’ Political Alliance

Bhabani Shankar Nayak

In the nine years that have passed since the BJP-led Modi government assumed office, there has been little or no opposition to the Hindutva fascist doctrine at work in India. This has allowed the government to implement most of its reactionary agendas and transformed India into a party state. The lack of political opposition has provided Hindutva with the opportunity to remain as a dominant political force, effectively concealing the glaring failures of the Modi government on every front. The Indian National Congress, as the main opposition party, has failed to counter the BJP effectively. Despite their ideological differences, their economic policies are indistinguishable from each other. Additionally, many regional political parties, apart from the left parties and RJD, have formed direct or indirect alliances with the BJP, further aiding the growth of Hindutva forces. After the 2019 general elections, the BJP managed to govern the country with just 37.4% of the votes, while the National Democratic Alliance, led by the BJP, secured nearly 45% of the vote. It is within this context that we need to analyse the foundations, sustainability, and future of the ‘Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance’ (INDIA).

The twenty-six opposition parties have come together to form the Indian National Developmental Inclusive Alliance (INDIA) with the goal of challenging the BJP in the 2024 general elections. This unity among the opposition parties is a much awaited and significant step towards safeguarding India’s present and future as a constitutional, secular, and liberal democracy. While the electoral alliance has the potential to defeat the BJP, it is essential for the opposition parties to establish an ideological core and coherence to effectively counter Hindutva politics. Currently, these opposition parties lack a common ideological foundation or common minimum programme to combat the BJP and its reactionary Hindutva agenda. Some of the political parties within the alliance hold outright reactionary stances, characterised by regional chauvinism and a lack of progressive principles. For the long-term viability of the INDIA as a political platform, it becomes imperative to establish a common ideological coherence based on Indian constitutional values. By doing so, the alliance can strengthen democracy in India and present a unified front against the divisive and authoritarian forces of Hindutva politics.

The future of the ‘INDIA’ alliance can draw its political missions, visions, and agendas from the Preamble of the Indian Constitution, which promises to transform India into a sovereign, socialist, secular, and democratic republic. It also pledges to secure social, economic, and political justice, liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith, and worship, equality of status and opportunities, and promote values of fraternity and dignity for all individuals. These values are central to the unity and integrity of India, as well as the deepening of its constitutional democracy and the protection of democratic rights for all citizens, irrespective of their backgrounds.

Indian sovereignty has been shaped by its freedom struggle, which vehemently rejected Yankee imperialism, European colonialism, and their racist ethnonationalism. For the ‘INDIA’ alliance as a political platform, it is imperative to reject Hindutva and its commitment to European ethnonationalism, as they clash with India’s multicultural ethos. Instead, the alliance should uphold the values of internationalism and demonstrate solidarity with the marginalised and persecuted, making them core values of Indian sovereignty. Furthermore, the ‘INDIA’ alliance should strive to expand the concept of sovereignty beyond just being a nation state, to encompass the sovereignty of its citizens. This means ensuring that all citizens have equal rights, opportunities, and representation, irrespective of their backgrounds, and guaranteeing their participation in the democratic process. By adopting such principles and values, the ‘INDIA’ alliance can pave the way for a more inclusive and just society, standing against divisive ideologies and promoting the true spirit of Indian sovereignty that is rooted in freedom, equality, and solidarity.

The BJP has not only adhered to but also expanded the neoliberal economic policies of the Indian National Congress. Additionally, most regional political parties and political outfits have also embraced neoliberalism as a means to achieve economic growth without critically examining its unequal outcomes for Indian citizens. However, these neoliberal policies have essentially facilitated a wealth transfer from the people to the crony capitalists associated with both the BJP and the Congress Party. Consequently, public resources have been diverted into the hands of Indian and global corporations, perpetuating income inequality. Furthermore, the implementation of neoliberal economic policies has had detrimental effects on various sectors in India. It has led to the destruction of agriculture, industry, and state-led educational and health infrastructure across the country. To ensure economic justice and uphold socialistic values that prioritize the welfare of all citizens, the ‘INDIA’ political alliance needs to unequivocally reject the neoliberal market economy. Instead, the alliance should advocate for a welfare state that works towards the betterment of all people in India, providing equitable access to education, healthcare, and economic opportunities. By rejecting neoliberalism and promoting a socialistic approach to economic policies, the ‘INDIA’ alliance can address the pressing issues of income inequality and foster a more inclusive and fair society for all.

The Brahminical social order, built on a rigid caste hierarchy, not only serves as the foundation of Hindutva politics but also poses a significant obstacle to achieving social justice in India. This caste-based society marginalizes a majority of the population and undermines the very idea of political justice that should be based on equal citizenship rights for all, which is essential for the advancement of democracy and economic justice in the country. For the ‘INDIA’ political alliance to create a more just and inclusive society, it must develop policies with unwavering commitment to combat caste discrimination. This entails reinforcing and expanding affirmative actions at every level of state and government functioning. Such actions are crucial to achieving social, economic, and political justice, fostering the deepening of democracy, and ensuring equal citizenship rights for all individuals in India. By actively addressing the issues of caste-based discrimination and implementing affirmative measures, the ‘INDIA’ alliance can work towards dismantling the violently oppressive caste system and fostering a society that values and upholds the principles of equality and social justice. This approach will not only strengthen democracy in India but also create an environment where every citizen can thrive and contribute to the nation’s progress, regardless of their caste or social background. The patriarchal Hindutva is detrimental to the empowerment of women. It is central to uphold gender justice and equality to mainstream gender in development. Equal accessibility and availability of resources and opportunities are central to egalitarian and sustainable development of India as a country.

The exclusionary and divisive nature of Hindutva politics has severely eroded the foundational ideals of fraternity, liberty, individual dignity, and solidarity in India. By promoting a monolithic linguistic, cultural, social, and religious outlook, Hindutva politics undermines the rich diversity that defines India’s national identity. The notions of Hindu, Hindi, and Hindutva can never serve as unifying forces for the nation’s unity and integrity. Instead, they exacerbate divisions and hinder the country’s progress. To ensure the survival of India as a diverse and inclusive nation, it is essential to confront and defeat the monolithic ideology propagated by Hindutva politics. For the ‘INDIA’ political alliance to have a sustainable future, it must unequivocally reject the monolithic ideology of Hindutva. Embracing diversity, promoting inclusive policies, and upholding the principles of pluralism and secularism are essential for the alliance’s success and the well-being of the nation. By standing against divisive ideologies and fostering an environment that celebrates India’s diversity, the ‘INDIA’ alliance can lay the foundation for a more united and prosperous future for the country. This approach is critical for safeguarding the core values of India and sustaining the alliance as a force for positive change and progress in the nation.

Coalition electoral politics can play a significant role in strengthening the processes of decentralization and deepening of democracy in India. By forming alliances across regional, religious, cultural, social, and sexual orientation lines, coalition politics can empower citizens and ensure their voices are heard in the governance of the country. This approach promotes inclusivity and equal representation for all, aligning with the ideals outlined in the Preamble to the Constitution of India. To defeat Hindutva and its ideological foundations, the ‘INDIA’ political alliance must avoid falling into the trap of opportunistic and populist politics solely for electoral gains. Instead, it should focus on using coalition politics as a tool for social, political, and economic transformation, advocating for policies that prioritize the welfare and development of all citizens.

The potential for transformation lies in the ability of the ‘INDIA’ alliance to address the root causes of Hindutva and challenge the divisive ideology espoused by the BJP. To achieve this, the alliance must maintain an unwavering commitment to inclusivity, peace, and egalitarian development for all, fostering a society that values diversity and upholds the principles of social justice. The future and sustainability of the ‘INDIA’ political alliance depend on its ability to remain true to these core principles, working collectively towards an inclusive and progressive India that benefits both its people and the planet. By doing so, the alliance can pave the way for positive change and advancement in the country, transcending divisive ideologies and creating a more harmonious and prosperous society for everyone.

The electoral defeat is the first step to halt the forward march of Hindutva and its crony capitalism in India. India and its citizens eagerly await the ‘INDIA’ political alliance’s promises and commitments to put an end to the despairs caused by Hindutva and its fascist upheavals.

Rents soaring to record levels in Australia

Oscar Grenfell

Amid a general cost of living crisis which is acute across all essentials, including food and utilities, rising housing costs are pushing hundreds of thousands or possibly even millions to the financial brink.

Suburban housing in Hobart, the Tasmanian capital, Australia. [Photo by Graeme Bartlett / CC BY-SA 3.0]

Successive interest rate rises over the past year have driven up average monthly mortgage repayments by more than a thousand dollars. A protracted property boom means that house prices remain at unprecedented highs, with the median house price in Sydney, the country’s most-populous city, now pushing $1.5 million. With stagnant or falling wages, home ownership is out of the reach of broad layers, especially younger people.

Rents, however, are also skyrocketing. Figures released by the property group Domain for the June quarter and the last financial year show unprecedented annual increases, as well as a continuing acceleration of rental costs.

Across the country’s capital cities, median asking rents for houses increased by 11.5 percent over the 2022–23 financial year. Slight falls in smaller cities, such as Hobart and Canberra, masked far greater increases in larger population centers.

In Perth, the Western Australian capital, median asking house rents increased by 16 percent, from $500 a year ago to $580 now. In Melbourne, the increase was 13 percent, Sydney 12.9, Adelaide 12.5 and Brisbane 11.5 percent. Some 6.1 percent of the yearly increase in Sydney occurred in the June quarter alone.

The hikes were even starker in apartments. That is significant because the apartment market caters to lower-income people who cannot afford to rent a house.

Nationally, the increase in rents for the apartment market in capital cities exceeded 26 percent. That was driven above all by a 27.6 percent increase in Sydney, where median asking apartment rents went from $525 a week in June 2022, to $670 a year later. Over the June quarter alone, the increase was more than 8 percent, the highest quarterly rise recorded by Domain in the 20 years it has kept records.

Taken together, the figures indicate that house and unit rents in Sydney, Melbourne, Brisbane, Adelaide and Perth have reached their highest levels ever. While house rents in Darwin, historically a lower income city in northern Australia, are also at unprecedented heights.

The rental increases are affecting a broad range of the population. Separate data from property analysts at CoreLogic at the beginning of June found that more than 40 percent of renting households across the country had experienced an increase in rents of 10 percent or more.

The increases are inevitably having their greatest impact on poor and working-class households, along with lower sections of the middle-class, that do not have a substantial financial buffer.

In Sydney, for instance, the Domain figures showed apartment rents were up 36.4 percent annually in the inner south-west, 33.3 percent in the Parramatta region and city and inner south, and 30.8 in the inner-west. The first two areas include many working-class families. The inner-west, though increasingly more gentrified, has a large younger population including substantial numbers of students.

In Parramatta, the median weekly asking rent for a unit is now $600, while even in the solidly working-class outer south-west of Sydney it has reached $450.

The sharp increases in rents contrast starkly with the state of wages. The wage price index for the year to March increased by just 3.7 percent, far below inflation which has been running at around 7 percent. For the year to March, national apartment rents had increased six times faster than the 3.7 percent wage figure, and housing rents three times faster. Together with the broader inflation crisis, that means a vast cut to workers’ real disposable incomes.

An April report by the housing advocacy organization, Everybody’s Home, tabulated the incomes of various cohorts deemed to be essential workers, and compared them with average rents. The findings were of indicative value only, given that they were based upon average figures of wages and rental prices. They did not take into account cohabitation arrangements, including with marital and de facto partners, or savings and other background information.

The figures are nevertheless stark. The average net pay of an aged care worker, as of March, for instance, was just $747. If they were to rent an average dwelling alone, at $572, they would be spending 77 percent of their weekly take home pay on housing costs. For a meat packer, the percentage of weekly wages was 81 percent, as it was for hospitality workers. It was over 70 percent for postal workers, retail workers, delivery drivers, childcare workers and for other groups.

The study looked at how many days’ pay would be required for the different cohorts to fund average rental increases over the three years since March 2020. A hospitality worker and meat packer would have lost the equivalent of 41 days of pay to finance their rent rises, with over 30 days for most of the other sections of workers examined.

The impact of the price rises in the largest capital cities, such as Sydney, has presented an impossible situation for these essential, but generally low-paid sections of the working class. If they were to live alone in an average rental, a childcare worker would be paying 89 percent of their weekly income on housing, an aged care worker 87 percent, an ambulance officer 72 percent.

Everybody’s Home noted: “Our calculations suggest that essential workers in single households are likely to be in serious financial stress with little or no savings buffer, while workers in coupled households are likely to be financially dependent on a partner’s income.”

That was demonstrated by Nine Media polling this week, which found that 51 percent of all adult Australians said they would struggle to meet any unexpected expense, a figure up from 41 percent in February.

Rental vacancies remain at very low levels, especially in the capital cities where the figure is in many instances near or even less than one percent. Landlords with a mortgage are undoubtedly passing on increases resulting from the interest rate hikes, as well as the more general impacts of inflation.

The corporate media, many of whose outlets have a direct stake in the property market, have tended to present a sympathetic portrait of landlords themselves “doing it tough.” The picture they present is one of small-time investors who own one rental property and are making scarcely any money.

This is, however, not the reality. Data from the Australian Taxation Office, released in June but collected in 2020–21, found that 51.1 percent of rental properties belonged to an individual who owned at least 2.6 rental properties. That was 20 percent higher than two decades before, demonstrating an ever-greater concentration of investment housing ownership. For that year, 53 percent of landlords made a profit from their tenant, with a taking across the board of more than $10 billion.

Analysts cite general supply issues. They are, however, a product of the domination of the property industry by the most powerful financial interests, whose housing construction is based solely on concerns of private profit.

The broader issue of supply finds its starkest expression in the absence of affordable housing. Decades of underinvestment and privatisation has caused a precipitous drop in social housing stock, government-subsidised dwellings that are supposed to be affordable—from 7.1 percent of properties in 1991 to 4.2 percent by 2018.

Studies suggest that Australia’s social housing shortfall is already the equivalent of 524,000 properties and is set to reach 671,000 over the next decade.

That underscores the criminal character of government housing policies, which, combined with a rising population and growing financial distress, are calculated to worsen the situation. The federal Labor government’s stalled housing legislation was aimed at creating just 30,000 social and affordable dwellings over the next five years. Similarly pitiful proposals have been floated by the various state governments.

In New South Wales, the newly-elected Labor administration is centering its housing policies on a campaign for the further watering down of restrictions on property development. Premier Chris Minns has outlined a vision of more and more high-rise apartment buildings, especially in inner-city areas.

The transparent aim of this, and other policies, is not to increase housing supply so that rents go down. Instead the purpose is the opposite: to do everything possible to ensure property developments and high-end investors continue to rake in profits on the back of deepening social misery.

Can Thailand End Military Rule?

Kheetanat Synth Wannaboworn & Walden Bello

The next few days leading up to July 13 will probably be the most decisive days in Thailand after nearly a decade of military rule. The key question on everyone’s mind is: “Will the conservative forces allow the young leader of the Move Forward Party (MFP), Pita Limjaroenrat, to become the next prime minister?”

Naturally follows the second question, which is, if Pita is blocked, what will happen? Will people go out to the streets in protest?  Will soldiers be sent to disperse them? Will the violence of over 10 years ago, which led to the military’s ouster of a civilian government installed by popular vote, return to Bangkok?

A Very Fluid Situation

Optimism and pessimism, hope and fear co-exist among Thais these days, but with hope definitely on the ascendant. A sense of a new dawn for the country became unstoppable after the MFP unexpectedly won the most votes in the parliamentary elections on May 14.  It won 151 seats, besting its coalition partner, the Thaksin family-controlled Pheu Thai party, which raked in 141 seats. Left in the dust were the parties controlled by the ruling military regime, which gathered a measly 76 seats.

The MFP’s rise was nothing short of miraculous. Founded just five years ago, in 2018, it came in third in the 2019 parliamentary elections. Then, coming in first in 2023, it won 14 million votes, or 40 percent of votes cast, up from 13 percent in 2019.  The MFP frustrated every legal maneuver that the military-controlled Constitutional Court threw at it. The Court disqualified Future Forward founder Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit from serving in Parliament, along with several other winners in the 2019 elections. The Court followed this up by dissolving Future Forward and banning its executives from politics for 10 years in February 2020, only to see it resurrected as Move Forward a month later, with a new leader, Pita, who declared that “Move Forward is the new chapter of Future Forward.”

Viewed in retrospect, however, these earlier hurdles were not as big as the challenge Move Forward now faces, which is to enforce recognition of the right to form the government and enact promised reforms to the country’s entrenched power structure. To be prime minister, Pita must get 376 votes from the 750 members of the bicameral National Assembly. He already has 312 votes and needs 64 more from either rival parties in the Lower House or from the 250-person Senate whose members were appointed by the military. Pita says he already has the necessary 64 votes, but this may be part of the psychological warfare leading up to July 13.

The Dilemma of the Thai Establishment

The military, though discredited, remains a powerful force. Other rival parties, such as the formerly influential Democrats that suffered a stunning collapse to only 25 seats, may refuse to come to the aid of what they see as an upstart party. Another party, the Bhumjaithai Party, which fancies itself as a kingmaker, asserted that its 71 seats would not go to “the party that has a proposal to amend or abolish Article 112” of the Thai criminal code, the notorious lese majeste law. The most decisive force that will shape the outcome of July 13 is the Senate, whose members were appointed by the military. The senators consider their role as the old guard of the Kingdom’s three pillars—”Nation, Religion, and the King.” Although some senators have declared they will vote for the will of the people, others have announced that they could not support the Party that advocates the “overthrow the monarchy.”

The issue is the MFP’s position on the lese majeste law.  Although sympathetic to the youth-led protest movement’s demand that the royal defamation law be abolished, during the election campaign and after the May election, the MFP came out with a position that explicitly seeks reform rather than abolition of the draconian law that imposes long-term jail sentences on those judged to be insulting or defaming the royal personality. According to MFP MP Rangsiman Rome, the party’s position is to “reform the law, for instance, by stipulating that one cannot accuse a person of lese majeste simply by running to the police; this has to be done through a legal process handled by one government agency that carefully assesses the charge.”

Not surprisingly, some supporters of MFP have been critical of its retreat from the abolitionist position, while others have seen this as evidence of its pragmatic side, one that is necessary for it to govern a complex, fractured polity. It is likely that the party debate leading up to the new position was intense.

But whether the MFP’s position is to abolish or to reform the law, the royal palace, with its strong influence on the unelected, some observers contend that the hand-picked senators will be the real kingmaker on July 13.

A New Era in Thai Politics

Whatever happens on July 13, Thailand has already stepped into a new era. The significance of the MFP’s stunning victory at the polls has a number of dimensions.

+ The youth vote, that is, Gen Z and Millennials, made the difference in the electoral outcome. In this connection, it must be pointed out that opposition in the streets spearheaded by young people who defied the military, sporadically at first but more massively since 2017, created the context for the emergence of an electoral party whose parliamentarians have an average age of 39.

+ The extremely poor performance of the government coalition, along with that of traditional parties like the Democrats that cooperated with the generals, represented a decisive repudiation of military intervention in politics and a call for the generals to return to the barracks and stay there.

+ The MFP’s outstripping its coalition partner Pheu Thai as the country’s leading party, along with the extremely poor performance of the Democrats, may mean that at last the citizenry has moved beyond the “Red” versus “Yellow” divide that wracked Thailand before the coup of 2014. Pheu Thai had mobilized mainly the rural masses of the North and Northeast in support of Thaksin Shinawatra’s populist politics, while the Democrats had agitated Bangkok’s middle classes in support of the country’s traditional elites. During the May 2023 elections, in many areas, notably the north, northeast, and Bangkok, significant numbers of former red and yellow antagonists found themselves together in the orange MFP camp. Observers cited many instances of families that had split for years into red and yellow factions uniting under the MFP banner. “There are no longer any reds or yellows in our family,” one Bangkokian told us happily.  “We all voted for MFP.”

+ The MFP ran a strikingly unique campaign by focusing on issues and policies instead of appealing to people’s traditional personal or party loyalties. Unlike the other parties, it did not buy votes, and this was not only because it had no money to do so but out of principle and a conviction that people were tired of the old personalistic, clientelist politics. Leading up to the May elections, the party assembled a program based on 300 policy positions, from military reform to LGBTQ rights to animal rights, seeking to show the electorate that it was a large tent that had a place for every voter’s special concern.

“We won the soldiers’ votes,” MP Rome told us at a briefing at the party’s headquarters, commenting on one of the more interesting electoral outcomes. “It showed that enlisted men and women agreed with our platform for military reform, which sought to create a truly professional army, where recruits would not be hazed and people would advance by merit rather than by connections.” Former MP Kunthida Rungruengkiat, who now heads the MFP’s Progressive Movement Foundation, added, “I still remember one forum where one personality of a traditional party said, ‘MFP’s brand of politics is a threat to all of us old parties, whether of the government or opposition.’ He was right.”

The Thai establishment is caught on the horns of a very big dilemma. It knows that depriving Pita of the prime ministership on July 13 will be a very costly move, with unpredictable but uniformly negative consequences. But even if it does manage to do this, it seems impossible for it to resist for long the momentum of the Move Forward Party. It hears loud and clear the overwhelming message from the electorate: to get out of the way of change.

It is a message that is reinforced in everyday life. It used to be that all moviegoers stood when the royal anthem flashed on the screen. Now most people remain seated, waiting impatiently for the main feature to begin.

European Parliament Approves Vicious Anti-Cuba Resolution

W.T. Whitney Jr.

Photograph Source: Diliff – CC BY-SA 3.0

Signs were evident. Touring Spain in May, the Cuban musical duo Buena Fe (Good Faith) had their concerts disrupted by thugs; some were canceled.  A month later in Paris, protests orchestrated by a Cuban émigré university professor forced a prestigious poetry festival to withdraw the honorary presidency it was going to award Cuban poet Nancy Morejón.

On July 12, Cuba’s unstable relations with European governments went downhill fast. The European Parliament approved a “Resolution on the state of the EU-Cuba PDCA in the light of the recent visit of the High Representative to the island.” There were 359 votes in favor, 226 against, and 50 abstentions.

The PDCA is the Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement that, facilitated by the European Council and signed in 2016, was supposed to encourage individual countries to downplay differences with Cuba in favor of European consensus and “constructive engagement.” It was to have “supported the process of economic and social modernization in Cuba.”

The PDCA replaced the EU’s “Common Position” that, from 1998 on, promoted relationships that Cuba regarded as “unilateral, interventionist, selective and discriminatory.”

Josep Borrell, the top EU diplomatic representative, had indeed visited Cuba in May on behalf of the PDCA. He was offering “support for the increasingly important Cuban private sector” and collaboration “in expanding economic reform taking place” in Cuba.

The resolution’s scope, with 60 themes, is vast, with lies sprinkled throughout. The flavor is apparent with these items:

• “Whereas … the Cuban Criminal Code … [allows for] ‘thousands of people [to be] sentenced to between one and four years of imprisonment every year, without there being any attributable crime …”

• “Whereas on 11 July 2021, the largest protests in Cuba since the 1994 ‘Maleconazo’ took place; whereas numerous protesters have been detained in Cuba since the July 2021 protests…”

• “The EP condemns the use of torture and ill treatment by the Cuban authorities …”

• “… Condemns the Cuban regime’s support for the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine and its defense of Russia and Belarus.

• “… Reiterates its call on the Council to … adopt sanctions against those responsible for the persistent human rights violations in Cuba, starting by sanctioning [President] Miguel Díaz-Canel …”

The European Parliament’s action signaled for Cuba that relations with the EU will likely turn stormy and no longer be merely inconvenient and unpredictable. That’s surely the goal, especially if there’s substance to a commentator’s charge that many of “these parliamentarians” have links “with CIA officers and diplomats stationed at the U.S. embassy in Brussels and Luxembourg”.

The result, according to Spanish EP delegate and Communist Party member Manuel Pineda, is that,  “this Parliament has become a loudspeaker for the most reactionary and extreme right-wing positions, contaminating and clouding what should be the house of Europe’s sovereignty.”

The EP’s “Euroskeptic and anti-federalist” European Conservatives and Reformists Group (ECR) had introduced the resolution.  ECR “shadow rapporteur” Herman Tertsch, a member of Spain’s rightwing Vox Party, explained that, “The resolution is a further step towards ending the EU’s intolerable complicity with the Cuban dictatorship and that of its High Representative, Josep Borrell.”

“The Cuban communists, like communists all over the world,” he observed, “will hopefully end up in the dustbin of history as wretches, murderers and failures.” He denounced “their accomplices in the democracies of America and Europe.”

The European Union is by far Cuba’s biggest trading partner and most foreign investment in Cuba comes from EU countries, as do more than one third of the tourists visiting Cuba. Having contributed €100 million over many years, as of 2021, the EU has donated most of the developmental assistance that Cuba has received.

The timing of the EP’s anti-Cuban resolution was significant. The vote missed by one day the two-year anniversary of the large anti-government protests occurring in Cuba on July 11, 2021.  U.S. Secretary of State Blinken took the occasion to insist that “The United States stands in solidarity with those in Cuba who continue to desire a free democracy.”

Additionally, a long-anticipated heads-of-state summit meeting between the EU and the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC) took place soon after the vote, on July 17-19 in Brussels. The CELAC alliance includes all Western Hemisphere nations except the United States and Canada,

Preceding this summit were EU meetings with pre-CELAC regional alliances and CELAC-EU summit meetings in 2013 and 2015. The recent hiatus resulted from EU displeasure with “popularly elected governments and leaders” in Latin America. Now the object is to foster “respectful interchange” and to “acknowledge mutual interests.”

Chinese competition with Europe in Latin America and the Caribbean over trade, access to natural resources, and investment opportunities may have provided further encouragement.

Reflecting official sentiment ahead of the summit, journalist Claudia Fonseca Sosa stated that, “For Cuba, it’s important that … dialogue in Brussels be serious, participative, and diverse.”  But aspirations she expressed of  “consensus and bridge-building” are the very ones being stymied by the EP’s resolution.

The Foreign Relations Commission of Cuba’s National Assembly charged that, “The EP Resolution represents harassment of European businesses investing in Cuba or seeking to do so. It also expresses the will of extreme rightwing political forces to deprive the EU of its own independent policy toward Cuba … [and] contributes to the U.S. effort to isolate Cuba internationally and justify its genocidal blockade.”

In fact, “Adoption of this resolution singling out one … country violates principles of respect, inclusion and cooperation that were basic to the Third EU-CELAC Summit and casts doubt on EU intentions to restore relations with the region.”

Rightwing elements in the EP tried to undermine the EU-CELAC summit. They hit at the Cuban government’s perennial efforts to overcome isolation and gain a measure of protection against U.S. assaults.

As these two inter-related happenings pile on new grief for Cuba, the impression emerges of the shifting nature and operating methods of Cuba’s counter-revolutionary opposition, changes that are in line with how rightwing extremists are causing trouble elsewhere.

Cuban political analyst Iramís Rosique Cárdenas refers to the traditional rightwing current with “known liberal discourse of private property, market fundamentals, a minimum state … and with social democratic cooperation.” But another one operates through “a series of movements and organizations of the right and extreme right.” Their ideas, “held in common,” include: national chauvinism, reliance on strong states, economic protectionism, provincialism instead of multi-culturalism, xenophobia, “centrality of the traditional family,” discrimination against excluded minorities, nationalism, and religious fundamentalism.

He adds that, “The rightwing extremism active in the West displays virulent hostility against Latin American progressivism, especially the Bolivarian process, and against movements and states viewed as ‘remnants’ of 20th century communism or that, like China and Cuba, answer back to European and North American centers of power. The weakness of the left, especially in most industrialized countries, has contributed to its rise.”

Netherlands: Rutte’s resignation further emboldens the far-right

Parwini Zora & Daniel Woreck

On July 7, Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands since 2010, resigned. Three days later, he announced that he would not lead his People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD) in the upcoming elections in November. Until then he will head a caretaker government.

Rutte is, after Hungary’s Viktor Orbán, the longest serving prime minister in the European Union. His ability to cobble together various coalitions in a parliament divided into more than ten parties gave him the nickname “Teflon-Mark”.

Mark Rutte (centre) with Geert Wilders (right) and Maxime Verhagen (left) in 2010 [Photo by Minister-president Rutte / CC BY 2.0]

In 2010, Rutte’s first minority government relied on the parliamentary support of Geert Wilders’ neo-fascist Party For Freedom (PVV), which until then had been considered taboo. In 2012 he formed a coalition government with the Labor Party (PvdA). In 2016 he brought together a shaky four-party coalition with the Christian Democrats (CDA), the liberals (D66) and the Calvinists of the Christian Union (CU).

Rutte’s third government collapsed shortly before the 2021 election, because it had falsely accused thousands of families of social fraud and forced them to make repayments. As a result, 26,000 families were facing bankruptcy. After ten months of negotiations behind the scenes, the same coalition was reestablished. It only lasted eighteen months.

While Rutte’s coalition partners changed, his political agenda was moving steadily further to the right. His thirteen years in office were marked by pro-business policies, severe austerity, militarism and abetting the far-right.

Faced with a looming vote of no confidence in his deeply unpopular government, Rutte provoked its demise in a way that will put refugee policy at the center of the campaign and again benefit the far-right in the upcoming election. He insisted on a two-year waiting period before children of “recognised refugees” living in the Netherlands could join their parents, knowing full well that his Christian coalition partners would not accept this.

At a press conference on Friday night, Rutte said, “It’s no secret that the coalition parties think very differently about asylum policy and today we unfortunately need to draw the conclusion that the differences are unbridgeable. The fall of a government is never good. But it is sometimes impossible in a coalition country like the Netherlands to come to one agreement.”

The far-right has systematically scapegoated migrant workers and asylum seekers, accusing them of responsibility for all social evils, especially the acute housing crisis. While the Netherlands received only 46,000 asylum applications last year, the longstanding and accumulated housing shortage is the result of decades of relentless cuts to social housing. Currently, the nationwide shortage of homes is at least 390,000 with predictions for a shortage of nearly a million by the year 2030.

Rutte was only able to stay in office for 13 years and to weather various scandals because all parties, from the so-called “left” to the far right, support his reactionary agenda. Faced with a deep social and political crisis the entire Dutch political establishment is maneuvering to divert social discontent from questions such as the rising cost of living, deteriorating working conditions and the war in Ukraine, into anti-immigrant hatred and support for a draconian asylum policy.

When Rutte announced his resignation in parliament all parties in the official opposition, including the nominal left, showered him with praise.

Wilders said, “We have excellently worked together politically, including in the first two years of the Rutte I administration… Your choices were not ours, but you brought them with conviction and that deserves an awful lot of respect.”

He went on to briefly outline to the media how closely the two party leaders have been, commenting, “We have known each other for a very long time. We were once colleagues in the VVD. I was even his mentor.” In a further tweet, Wilders said that Rutte’s resignation would make the Netherlands a “beautiful country again, with fewer asylum seekers and crime, more money and housing for our own people.”

The leader of the Green Left Party (GroenLinks), Jesse Klaver responded, “What I would like to say to you, Mark, is: what I have appreciated in all those times that we have crossed swords is that we never made it personal, that we have always kept it substantive.”

Lilian Marijnissen from the former Maoist Socialist Party (SP) characterized Rutte’s departure as a “sensible decision” and as “good for the Netherlands.”

While the official “left” praised Rutte, his government was deeply hated among broad sections of the working class. Following his resignation an opinion poll conducted by the popular TV program EenVandaag found that almost three in four respondents said it would be “unacceptable” for Rutte to return as prime minister after November’s election.

His resignation came against a backdrop of fierce class struggles across all sectors. Particularly since the beginning of 2023, the Netherlands has been shaken by a wave of strikes in the public and private sector, as thousands of Dutch workers entered into struggles for better wages, working and living conditions. These struggles coincided with mass protests and strikes in France against President Macron’s pension reform.

Rutte’s four successive governments were responsible for policies of severe austerity both in the Netherlands and the European Union. After the 2009 Euro crisis he was, together with German Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble, the main advocate of imposing severe austerity measures on Greece, Portugal, Spain and other countries. He increased the budget for the state apparatus – from police, surveillance and secret service to prisons and judiciary – entrenched institutional racism and stepped-up systematic oppression of the socially marginalised and vulnerable.

With 60 percent of Dutch households having struggled to pay their utility bills last year, nearly 5 percent of the population lives below the official poverty line, with an additional 220,000 considered as working poor, 320,000 officially unemployed, 32,000 homeless and 120,000 depending on food banks that grew by a third during the last quarter of 2022.

Given this grim record of deliberate social devastation, the number of households living below the poverty line is expected to shoot up to one million out of a population of just 17.8 million by 2024, according to the Dutch Centraal Planbureau (CPB), which will mean an increase of childhood poverty to 7 percent.

Rutte was also responsible for the criminal handling of the pandemic, carrying out “herd immunity” policies from the outset which have cost over 22,000 deaths officially and at least 375,000 Long Covid patients.

One of the most critical aspects of the current socio-political crisis in the Netherlands is the rapid escalation of NATO’s proxy war against Russia. A few hours after Rutte’s resignation, Ukrainian President Zelensky tweeted thanking Rutte for the “steadfast principled stand of the Netherlands regarding the Russian invasion and for recognizing the Holodomor as genocide by the House of Representatives.”

Since the 2014 far-right coup in Kiev, orchestrated by the US and its NATO allies, brought to power a pro-NATO government in Ukraine, the Dutch government has played a significant role in inciting anti-Russian sentiment. Rutte played a leading role in blaming Russia for the crash of Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17 in July 2014. The crash killed 298 passengers and crew.

Ever since, Rutte’s government has stoked anti-Russian hysteria. The total value of the military support that the Netherlands has supplied to Ukraine stands at a staggering €1.9 billion, at the cost of further inroads to already meagre social spending. The Dutch “support package” to Ukraine includes weapons, ammunition, vehicles, maritime vessels, de-mining equipment, bridges, fuel, medical supplies and rations.

As Politico noted, Rutte, notwithstanding his right-wing trajectory, was “described by colleagues and friends as a manager, rather than a visionary leader, who succeeded in getting rival parties to talk and find compromises. He was the incarnation of Dutch consensus culture: pragmatic, flexible — and visionless”.

In view of the escalation of the NATO war with Russia and class war at home, the Dutch ruling elite has concluded that a “manager” is no longer enough. In the absence of an independent political movement of the working class, the former colonial power seeks to install an even more right-wing government.

The emergence of the right-wing populist party BBB (Farmer-Citizen Movement) that gained senate power at the recent provincial elections, is a warning. Despite its presentation as a pro-peasant movement by the media, the BBB, founded in 2019, has exploited protest votes directed against the Rutte government for far-right political ends.

According to polls at the end of June, Rutte’s VVD and the BBB were neck and neck, with 18 percent of the vote, followed by Wilders’ PVV with 10 percent, the GreenLeft, D66 and the social democratic Labour Party (PvdA) trailed with 8 percent each and the Socialist Party with 6 percent.

The responsibility for this shift to the right lies squarely with the parties of the nominal “left”. The PvdA, GreenLeft and the Socialist Party have supported Rutte’s “herd immunity” policies and are complicit in the stoking of xenophobic and Islamophobic sentiments against immigrant workers. In the absence of an independent revolutionary leadership of the working class, the far-right has been able to exploit the anger and frustration of desperate middle-class and impoverished layers for its reactionary ends.

The PvdA, once a major party of government in the Netherlands, and GreenLeft are so discredited that they plan to field a combined manifesto and candidates list for the upcoming general election. The SP will run its own slate.

What is happening in the Netherlands is part of an international development. In Spain, the ruling class is returning to its fascistic roots linked to the Franco regime, on the backs of the social democrats and the pseudo-left. The bourgeoisie in Germany too is reviving its fascist traditions and is engaged in an unprecedented military rearmament.