Wealth distribution in the United States and the politics of the pseudo-left

Eric London

A report published in December by University of California at Berkeley economists Thomas Piketty, Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman reveals unprecedented levels of social inequality in the United States.

The report documents an immense redistribution of wealth over a period of several decades from the working class to the rich. The bottom 50 percent’s pre-tax share of national income has fallen from 20 percent in 1970 to 12 percent in 2014, while the income share of the top 1 percent has almost doubled to 20 percent. The wealthiest 1 percent now owns over 37 percent of household wealth, while the bottom 50 percent—roughly 160 million people—owns almost nothing, a mere 0.1 percent.

Though the Piketty, Saez and Zucman report focuses on the top 1 percent, the underlying data sheds light on another phenomenon that is essential to understanding American society: the role of the 9 percent of the population that falls below the 1 percent (the “next 9 percent”). This layer consists, broadly speaking, of more affluent sections of the middle class.

Among the pseudo-left organizations that orbit the Democratic Party, it has become popular to refer to the need to build a “party of the 99 percent.”

The call for a party of the 99 percent conflates the interests of the 9 percent of the population that falls just below the top 1 percent with those of the bottom 90 percent. In fact, a chasm separates these two social layers. The World Socialist Web Site has defined the pseudo-left as denoting “political parties, organizations and theoretical/ideological tendencies which utilize populist slogans and democratic phrases to promote the socioeconomic interests of privileged and affluent strata of the middle class.”

The material position of the next 9 percent

The next 9 percent is comprised of privileged individuals who possess net wealth of between $1 million and $8 million and whose household incomes are between $155,000 and $430,000. They are business executives, academics, successful attorneys, professionals, trade union executives and trust fund beneficiaries. Their social grievances are the product of their privileged position. In every index of quality of life—access to health care, life expectancy, water and air quality, housing and home location, college degrees, vacation time, etc.—they live a different existence from the bottom 90 percent.

Data from the UC Berkeley report shows that the next 9 percent owns more wealth than the bottom 90 percent combined. The next 9 percent’s share of national income increased from 23.1 percent in 1970 to 27.6 percent in 2014. Over the same period, the national income of the bottom 90 percent decreased from 65.9 percent to 52.8 percent. The share of national income of the bottom 50 percent was cut in half over this period, from 19 percent to 10.3 percent. (These figures refer to “pre-tax factor income,” defined as the sum of all income flows before pensions, taxes and transfers. These are the only value sets for which data on the next 9 percent is available.)

In terms of net wealth (that is, total possessions, as opposed to annual income), the next 9 percent has also seen an increase since 1970. However, its share of household wealth is declining, but that is due entirely to the immensity of the increase in the share going to the top 1 percent. The share of household wealth of the next 9 percent has declined from 42.5 percent in 1970 to 34.9 percent today. Over this same period, the share of household wealth of the top 1 percent has increased from 22.5 percent to 37.2 percent. The bottom 90 percent’s share of wealth has declined to just over one quarter.

The next 9 percent acquires its wealth in a manner that increasingly parallels the parasitic and speculative methods of the top 1 percent. From 1970 to 2014, the next 9 percent’s share of total fiscal income increased from 24 percent to 28.6 percent.

This increase parallels the financialization of the top 1 percent’s earnings profile (though at a slower rate), but contrasts with the bottom 90 percent, which relies less and less on stocks and capital gains. While the top 1 percent owns about 40 percent of all stock, about 70 percent is owned by the top 5 percent. In contrast, 53 percent of households own no stock.

The economic foundation of pseudo-left politics

The political outlook of the next 9 percent is based on this economic reality. In aggregate, this social layer owes its position to rising share values, the exploitation of the working class and the dominant global position of American capitalism. At the same time, it regards the 1 percent as having acquired an unfair portion of the spoils. The ideology and politics of the next 9 percent dominate at the universities, where many members of this social layer serve as professors, administrators and department heads.

The extent of the chasm separating the bottom 90 percent from the top 10 percent endows the next 9 percent’s struggle for privilege with a ferocious character. Figures from prior studies show that in the United States, the gross income of a member of the 90th percentile (i.e., the lowest end of the next 9 percent group) is nearly 60 percent higher than a member of the 50th percentile. The gap in terms of net wealth is much higher. The margin in the United States has expanded significantly in recent decades and far outpaces similar statistics in other advanced countries.

Brookings Senior Fellow Richard Reeves noted in his September 2015 article titled “The dangerous separation of the American upper middle class”:

“The American upper middle class is separating, slowly but surely, from the rest of society… For many, the most attractive class dividing line is the one between those at the very, very top and everybody else. It is true that the top 1 percent is pulling away very dramatically from the bottom 99 percent. But the top 1 percent is by definition a small group. It is not plausible to claim that the individual or family in the 95th or 99th percentile is in any way part of mainstream America.” Two further studies co-authored by Reeves provide insight into how this social distance has produced a high degree of social anxiety among the privileged next 9 percent:

“America is becoming a more class-stratified society… This separation of the upper middle class by income, wealth, occupation and neighborhood has created a social distance between those of us who have been prospering in recent decades, and those who are feeling left behind, angry and resentful, and more likely to vote for To-Hell-With-Them-All populist politicians,” one report notes.

Another study titled “Why rich parents are terrified their kids will fall into the ‘middle class’” explains: “As the income gap has widened at the top, the consequences of falling out of the upper middle class have worsened. So the incentives of the upper middle class to keep themselves, and their children, up at the top have strengthened.”

Identity politics and the next 9 percent

In the face of these powerful pressures, identity politics becomes an important mechanism for increasing status and financial position.

The main impact of racial politics, including affirmative action, has been the elevation of a small layer of minority groups into the next 9 percent and the top 1 percent. A study from the Pew Research Center showed that from 2005 to 2009, the share of total wealth held by the top 10 percent of households among different racial groups increased drastically across races. The concentration of wealth is most acute among Hispanics, where the share of wealth controlled by the top 10 percent rose from 56 percent to 72 percent over this period, and among blacks, where the figure rose from 59 percent to 67 percent.

The Piketty, Saez and Zucman report also shows that among the top 10 percent, the share of women has risen steadily over the past four decades to roughly 27 percent. But women make up only about 16 percent of the employed population in the top 1 percent. Among the most affluent, the authors write, “the glass ceiling is not yet close to being shattered.” This helps explain why women in the next 9 percent saw Hillary Clinton’s pro-war, pro-Wall Street presidential campaign as a vehicle for advancing their own struggle for wealth and privilege.

The party of the 99 percent vs. socialism

The pseudo-left opposes any politics based on an analysis of economic class. This is the political basis for the call by pseudo-left organizations for a “party of the 99 percent.” Socialist Alternative, for example, has called for the building of a “multi-class” party. It published an article in the aftermath of the US presidential election titled “We need mass resistance to Trump and a new party of the 99 percent,” which read: “We must start today to build a genuine political alternative for the 99 percent against both corporate dominated parties and the right so that in 2020 we will not go through this disaster again.”

The International Socialist Organization (ISO) has also called for “a mass, left alternative” comprised of “unions, movements and left parties.” It regularly advances the slogan of the “99 percent,” writing in 2014: “[W]e need a new party for the 99 Percent to confront the two parties of the 1 percent.” Other pseudo-left groups and publications like Jacobin and New Politics have echoed these slogans.

The use of this language is not accidental. The pseudo-left’s call for a “party of the 99 percent” serves two interrelated purposes.

First, the pseudo-left is seeking to subordinate the working class to the interests and grievances of the most affluent sections of the middle class, closest to the bourgeoisie. They are opposed to a socialist reorganization of society and even any measures that would significantly impact the distribution of wealth. Second, by employing empty “left” phraseology devoid of class content, the next 9 percent attempts to politically disarm the working class and channel social opposition behind the Democratic Party.

The pseudo-left’s orientation toward the Democratic Party is an essential component of its fight to advance its social interests. The Democratic Party is receptive to the use of race, gender and sexual orientation because it has rejected any program of social reform and instead appeals to the roughly 21 million people who comprise the next 9 percent as the constituency for a broader base. 

Clearly, the vast majority of the population does not have the same economic interests as those whose net worth is over $1 million. The wealthiest 10 percent has acquired its wealth through the exploitation of the working class in the US and internationally. Vast levels of social inequality are not the product of an accidental process, but of definite policies implemented by both the Democratic and Republican parties and by their bourgeois counterparts around the world. Private profit is the product of the exploitation of the working class, and this is the rule under capitalism.

Extreme social polarization is an international phenomenon. A report published January 16 by Oxfam shows that eight billionaires own the same amount of wealth as the poorest half of the world’s population, some 3.6 billion people. The wealthiest 1 percent own more wealth than the bottom 99 percent combined. A November 2016 Credit Suisse report showed that the top 10 percent controlled 89 percent of international wealth.

The class analysis made here with regard to the “party of the 99 percent” applies to similar populist appeals by the pseudo-left in countries all over the world.

The working class comprises the vast majority of the world’s 7 billion inhabitants and produces all of the world’s wealth. It possesses immense potential power. But it can advance its own interests only if it is armed with an anticapitalist and socialist program based on the class struggle. In advancing the slogan for a party of the 99 percent, the pseudo-left is perpetrating a fraud aimed at preventing the development of such a struggle and preserving the capitalist system.

Donald Trump's Counter-Terrorism Policy

Angshuman Choudhury & Husanjot Chahal

US President-elect Donald Trump proposed counter-terrorism (CT) policy is as vociferous in its tone as it is imprecise in its content. On this, Trump’s orientation and preferences can be drawn from his own statements and those of his emerging advisory-ministerial council on security and defence. So far, Trump's CT agenda appears to be an amorphous assortment of politico-military choices: tough border controls, affirmative community action, hard military offensives, multilateral security cooperation and an ideologically-framed war.

On a macro level, Trump's CT agenda rests on the singular idea of fighting “radical Islamic terrorism,” which he often uses interchangeably with 'Radical Islam'. In doing so, he directly analogises the proposed fight against ‘Radical Islam’ with the US’ global fight against communism during the Cold War.

While this outlook marks a discursive departure from the Bush administration's broad-spectrum 'War on Terror' and the Obama administration's war on specific terror groups, the particulars of Trump's plan bear strong elements of continuity. A closer look at his CT policy for home and overseas is in order.

COUNTERING TERRORISM AT HOME
In keeping with his ideological frame, and manifest through his rhetoric, Donald Trump has been offering a variety of suggestions to counter terrorism on US soil. Many of his ideas are neither new nor are they likely to represent a break from existing practices. They are however embedded in ill-defined logic and inconsistent statements.

ImmigrationOne of Trump's most widely discussed proposals was on restricting immigration. By linking past terror attacks on US soil to Muslim immigrants, Trump has called for new screening procedures that involve Cold War era-type ideological testing, extreme vetting, and even temporary suspension of immigration from the most “dangerous and volatile regions of the world.”

While these seem to indicate dramatic changes under the new government, not much is expected to change on the ground. To begin with, a host of ideological restrictions on entering or remaining in the US already exist. Even if the administration does manage to bring in new kinds of ideological questions, to what extent they would make a difference is debatable. For instance, few immigrants were actually barred from the US because of ideological screening, even at the height of fears over Communism. Additionally, with US visa and refugee application procedures already facing intense scrutiny, what comprises ‘extreme vetting’ remains to be seen. Even the idea of “dangerous and volatile regions” is vague and impractical.

Quantitatively speaking, if Trump’s recent stance on immigration is weighed against Obama’s deportation record , the numbers are not any different. The president-elect recently indicated that he would deport about 2 to 3 million undocumented refugees with criminal records, which is roughly similar to President Obama’s 2.7 million deportations. Additionally, the US Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) immigration enforcement priorities target national security threats, those with criminal records, and recent arrivals, for removal – a focus shared by the Trump administration. A shift from these vital activities is unlikely.

Commission on Radical IslamIn his August 2016 speech, Trump said that warning signs before a terror attack “were ignored because political correctness has replaced common sense in society.” As a measure, he has proposed to establish a Commission on Radical Islam, comprising of “reformist voices from the Muslim community” to “build bridges and erase divisions.” The Commission’s goal will be to “explain the core convictions and beliefs of Radical Islam, identify warning signs of radicalisation, and expose networks in society that support radicalisation.”

What Trump appears to propose is to directly outsource the work that various agencies within the US government are already pursuing under the Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) policy, to the American Muslim community. However, the Commission’s raison d’être overestimates the nexus between community centres and violent extremism, assuming these centres to be primary sources of radicalisation. This linkage automatically lays the onus of exposing radicalised individuals on the Muslim community; this not only sows greater distrust in the community, but also negates the fact that a majority of those who have carried out terror activities so far have been radicalised online or in small, cloistered groups, with little contact with the wider community.

In addition to the above are other throwaway remarks by Donald Trump and his transition team, like reinstating the ‘Muslim registry’ (initially hinted as a database of Muslim US citizens). Such an approach risks perpetuating the very problem it sets out to solve - straining the government’s relations with Muslims in the US and alienating instead of building bridges. Additionally, it is fraught with the danger of polarising opinions in the US Muslim community between those in favour and those against the government.

Interrogation TechniquesTrump has often stated his intention of reviving enhanced interrogation techniques (EITs), along with keeping the Guantanamo Bay facility open. This was reinforced by his recent choice for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) director, Mike Pompeo, an army veteran who has defended the Bush administration’s interrogation techniques such as waterboarding. Given that CIA chiefs can overturn presidential orders on interrogation techniques in practice, Pompeo’s selection seals Trump’s support on the issue of EITs.

On the other hand, several former and current CIA officials have doubted the efficacy of EITs, indicating that they are futile and have detrimental effects on national security, even drawing a correlation between torture and greater recruitment for extremist groups. Many, including former CIA director Michael Hayden, doubt whether anyone in the agency would volunteer to do it. This, coupled with the legacy of harm left by the controversial treatment of captives, indicates that Trump will find it hard to resume such tactics.

COUNTERING TERRORISM OVERSEAS
Trump's global CT policy is hinged on a much-touted fight against the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria through a set of strategic choices that are not entirely new. In this, he largely appears to equate 'radical Islamic terrorism' with the IS, a conflicting throwback to Obama's 'group identification' CT doctrine.

Islamic State: The Usual SuspectsThe primary subject of Trump’s proposed overseas CT design is the IS, which he presents as the single greatest threat to the US. He proposes neutralising the group through aggressive “joint and coalition military operations” and degrading its networks of mobilisation, including its cyber channels, through greater international cooperation and intelligence sharing. In this, he plans to collaborate with US allies in the Middle East, particularly Israel, Jordan, and Egypt. He also seeks some degree of cooperation with Russia to defeat the IS in Syria through the pursuit of common objectives.

The above plan mirrors Washington's current set of tactical choices: coalition offensives, strategic collaborations with regional allies, and the pursuit of collaboration with Russia. Having said that, Trump’s anti-IS military blueprint in Iraq-Syria could be more expansive in reach and direct in capacity: more airstrikes, US ground troops in core combat capacities, and force multipliers in offensive modules.

In terms of micro tactics, there is little indication that Trump would veer away from current choices, at least qualitatively: targeted killings through drone strikes, covert offensives in both core and ‘non-battlefield’ theatres (like Yemen and Somalia) through the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), and an air campaign against the IS. Even his strategy to bomb IS-controlled oil facilities is no different from the existing tactic of precision strikes against enemy-controlled critical infrastructure.

However, it remains to be seen whether Trump would actually deploy combat troops in Iraq-Syria to fight the IS. Notably, he has highlighted US failure at reaching a Status of Forces (SoF) Agreement with the Iraqi government. He has also argued, obliquely, for wresting control of Iraqi oil assets to accrue economic benefits. If accomplished, these would automatically entail the deployment of US troops, at least in Iraq.

It is too early to conclude if Trump would wholly replace Obama’s 'limited war doctrine' with a broader and more visibly offensive design.

Beyond Islamic StateTrump’s CT plan does not move beyond the Iraq-Syria conflict theatre and the IS as a blanket target. Even then, he is unclear on how to push the organisation back on other active fronts like Afghanistan and Libya. Notably, he has not presented a clear strategic plan to fight the Taliban and Haqqani Network, the anti-US groups operating in the Afghanistan-Pakistan theatre, and the oldest anti-US transnational terror group, al Qaeda.

Although Trump has stated his willingness to retain troops in Afghanistan, it is yet uncertain whether the number would be cut down from the current 8,000.

Trump has now proposed a closer collaboration with NATO, changing his stand from his electoral campaigns. This could mean a substantial degree of US presence in both Iraq and Afghanistan where NATO is engaged in training and capacity-building, and in auxiliary COIN support missions. Such interventionist engagements belie Trump’s vision of retracting US’ longstanding policy of ‘nation-building and regime change’.

The Privy CouncilTrump’s choice of advisors for security-defence hints at certain early presumptions. Both General Michael T Flynn (National Security Advisor) and General James Mattis (Secretary of Defence) come from hard military backgrounds and hold largely similar views on global terrorism. Both have served in forward roles in Iraq and Afghanistan and directly dealt with key groups like al Qaeda and Taliban. Their careers reflect a strong leaning toward aggressive battlefield tactics, both covert and overt.

Flynn, specifically, with his stark views on ‘radical Islam’ and former top role in JSOC, fit well with Trump’s proposed CT meta-narrative and the judgment that the new administration will continue to rely on covert strikes across a broadly defined conflict theatre. Mattis, with his in-depth familiarity of COIN operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, is expected to make up for Trump’s lack of strategy against localised insurgent networks.

CONCLUSION

Under a Trump presidency, a major tactical shift in US' CT policy, either at home or overseas, cannot be rationally anticipated. However, a normative revision of the overall counter-terror discourse appears to be on its way. Despite telling signs of a polarising CT vision that could cause divisions at home and legitimise terror agendas globally, it remains to be seen how the new administration deals with security threats from non-state entities.

DAAD Scholarships For Master Of Research And Public Policy 2017/2018 for African Students

Application Deadline: 20th February, 2017

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: African countries

To be taken at (country): University of Nairobi; Maseno University; Egerton University; Uganda Christian University; Uganda Martyrs University; University of Dar es Salaam; and Mzumbe University.

About the Award: PASGR invites applications from eligible candidates for the DAAD In-Country/In-Region Scholarships for the MRPP.  The Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR) is an independent, non-partisan pan-African not-for-profit organisation working to enhance research excellence in governance and public policy that contributes to the overall wellbeing of women and men.

In its Higher Education Programme, PASGR works with twelve universities across seven African countries to implement a collaborative Master of Research and Public Policy (MRPP) programme. Seven of the twelve universities are located in East Africa.

Type: Masters

Eligibility: Eligible candidates must be citizens of a country in sub-Saharan Africa, admitted to study the Master of Research and Public Policy (MRPP) programme at any of the universities listed above. Applicants must hold a Bachelor’s and / or Master’s degree qualification with at least a second class honours upper division from any accredited university. The last university degree must have been completed less than six years ago at the time of application.

Note: Potential candidates who are not enrolled in the programme are advised to contact any of the universities listed above directly for admission first. Prospective students may request admission at a university within or outside their home country.

Female candidates and candidates from less privileged regions or groups as well as candidates with disabilities are especially encouraged to apply.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: The scholarships include tuition fees to the university according to the submitted fees structure, a monthly stipend to cover living costs and accommodation (at DAAD rates), as well as an annual study and research allowance.

Duration of Scholarship: Scholarships are available for up to a maximum of two years. The scholarship will be initially granted for one year and may be extended upon individual request and receipt of a complete application using this form.

How to Apply: 

1. Fully filled and signed PASGR Scholarship Application Form;
2. Signed curriculum vitae scanned in PDF. Please use the Europass CV template: http://europass.cedefop.europa.eu
3. Certified scanned PDF copies of all university degree certificates;
4. Certified scanned PDF copies of all university transcripts;
5. Proof of admission to the Master of Research and Public Policy, which may be a temporary admission letter including fee structure of the course (scanned PDF copy);
6. Letter of motivation (maximum 2 pages in PDF); and,
7. Academic reference from senior lecturer and proof of employment if applicable (scanned PDF copy).

A complete application form must be sent to PASGR – scholarships@pasgr.org – together with all the application documents listed above by Monday, February 20, 2017 at 1700hrs.

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Award Provider: Partnership for African Social and Governance Research, DAAD

KAAD Germany Research Fellowship Programme (and Masters) for Developing Countries 2017/2018

Application Deadline: 30th June 2017 for the September academic session.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America. Countries in Africa include: Ghana, Ethiopia, Zimbabwe and Kenya.

To be taken at (country): Germany.  There is also the possibility for Master-scholarships at local universities.

Eligible Field of Study: There is no specific subject-preference. However, the selection board has often given preference to courses and subjects that they felt to be of significance for the home country of the applicant. This holds true especially for subjects of PhD-theses. There is therefore a certain leaning towards “development oriented” studies – this does however not mean that other fields (cultural, philosophic, linguistic, etc.) can not be of significance for a country and are ruled out.

About the Award: The KAAD Scholarship Program is addressed to post-graduates and to academics living in their home countries who already gained professional experience and who are interested in postgraduate studies (or research stays) in Germany. This program is administered by regional partner committees, staffed by university professors and church representatives. Normally documents are submitted to the committee of the applicant’s home country.

Type: Postgraduate(Masters and PhD) scholarship

Eligibility: To be eligible,candidates must:

• come from a developing or emerging country in Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America and are currently living there
• have a university degree and professional experience from their home country
• want to acquire a master’s degree or a PhD at a German university or do a post-doctoral research project (2-6 months for established university lecturers) at a German university
• be Catholic Christian (or generally belong to a Christian denomination). Candidates from other religions can apply if they are proposed by Catholic partners and can prove their commitment to interreligious dialogue
• possess German language skills before starting the studies (KAAD can provide a language course of max. 6 months in Germany)

Selection Criteria: 

• KAAD’s mission is to give scholarships mainly to lay members of the Catholic Church. This means, that – There is a preference for Catholic applicants.
• However, among the scholars, there is a limited number of: Protestant Christians, Orthodox Christians (especially from Ethiopia)and Muslims.
• Catholic priests and religious people are eligible only in very rare cases.

Expectations from KAAD: 

• Above-average performance in studies and research
• The orientation of your studies or research towards permanent reintegration in your home region (otherwise the scholarship is turned into a loan),
• Religious and social commitment (activities) and willingness to inter-religious dialogue.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: Not stated

Duration of Scholarship: Duration of research

How to Apply: Interested graduates can fill an online questionnaire, which they find on the application webpage www.kaad-application.de. For detailed information about application requirements and procedures, we recommend to read the FAQs.

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Award Provider: Katholischer Akademischer Ausländer-Dienst, Germany

University of Twente Kipaji Masters Scholarship for Students from Developing Countries 2017/2018 – Netherlands

Application Deadline: 1st February, 2017

Eligible Countries: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea,Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kenya, Kiribati, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

To be taken at (country): The Netherlands

About the Award: The Kipaji Scholarship Fund was founded by a couple of alumni and relations of the University of Twente and is also supported by the staff and alumni of the University of Twente. With an annual fundraising campaign alumni and employees are asked to support this scholarship fund.

Type: Master

Eligibility: In order to qualify for Kipaji Scholarship, applicants should meet all requirements of University of Twente Scholarship. Additionally, applicants must

• have the nationality of one of the DAC countries (Least Developed Countries & Other Low Income Countries)
• receive a (partial) University of Twente Scholarship. The Kipaji Scholarship can ensure that they receive a full scholarship.
• have achieved good grades for their pre-master programme (average of 8).
• add to their motivation letter for University of Twente Scholarship how they intend to use their studies at the University of Twente to increase/enhance the scientific level or for entrepreneurial purposes in their home country.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: up to € 12,000

Duration of Scholarship: two years

How to Apply: You need to apply for University of Twente Scholarship (UTS) in order to be eligible for Kipaji Scholarship. For the specific requirements of UTS, have a look at the UTS website.

Add to your motivation letter for University of Twente Scholarship how you intend to use your studies at the University of Twente to increase/enhance the scientific level or for entrepreneurial purposes in their home country. Please indicate in your motivation letter that you also apply for Kipaji Scholarship. No additional steps have to be taken.

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Award Provider: University of Twente

University of Twente Joint Japan/World Bank Masters Scholarship for Developing Countries 2017/2018

Application Deadline: Applications will open on 25th January 2017

Deadline: 10th March 2017

Eligible Countries: World Bank Member countries (See list of countries in link below)

To be taken at (country): The Netherlands

Fields of Study: Development in fields such as economics, health, education, environment, natural resource management, or other development‑related subject.

About the Award: The mission of the World Bank Group is to reduce poverty and improve living standards through sustainable development and investment in people. The World Bank Institute (WBI) is at the forefront of the Bank’s efforts to promote learning and deliver to the stakeholders, the best thinking and experience emerging from around the world on issues crucial to reform and socio-economic development.

Type: Master

Eligibility: To qualify for this scholarship, applicants must fulfill the requirements below.

Applicants must:

• be a national of a developing country;
• not be a dual citizen of any developed country;
• hold a Bachelor’s degree (or equivalent university degree) earned before 2013
• have at least 3 years of development-related experience since earning a Bachelor’s degree.
• commit to returning home to their country on graduation in order to use your enhanced knowledge and skills towards your community’s, country’s or region’s development.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: 

• economy class air travel between your home country and the host university at the start of your study program and immediately following the end of the scholarship period. In addition to the two-way air travel, you will receive a US $500 travel allowance for each trip.
• tuition for your graduate program and the cost of basic medical insurance usually obtained through the university.
• a monthly subsistence allowance to cover living expenses, including books, while you are on campus studying at the preferred masters program. The amount of the allowance varies depending on the host country.

Duration of Scholarship: 2 years

How to Apply: Students will be able to apply for this scholarship when applications open on 25th January 2017. In the meantime you may begin gathering documents needed for application for this scholarship.

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Award Provider: JJ/WBGSP

Yokohama National University Masters in Infrastructure Management (IMP) Scholarships 2017/2018 for Developing Countries – Japan

Application Deadline:  10th March 2017.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Citizens of low and middle income World Bank member countries are eligible for the scholarships.

To be taken at (country): Japan

About the Award: The Master’s Degree Program in Infrastructure Management at Yokohama National University (YNU) was established with a special fund from the Government of Japan, administered by the World Bank, for the purpose of training government officials from developing countries who have engineering backgrounds. The program focuses on such areas as economics, management, specialized engineering and law related to the development and management of infrastructure.

In a changing global situation, if the government officials who are engaged in planning and implementing their nations’ infrastructure development policies are to make decisions consistent with the welfare of the people of their countries, it is vital that those officials have advanced knowledge of and experience in management, technological fields and macro-economics.

The YNU program, which is specifically designed to meet the needs of students from developing countries under a scholarship program funded by the World Bank, offers lectures and laboratory work in the fields of engineering, economics, management and law. Students are also provided with the opportunity to learn practical Japanese, mathematics, computer techniques and other basic subjects. After the initial six months of schooling, students engage in internship programs related to their area of study.

In applying for admission to the program, applicants should note that the IMP is oriented to training government officials with present or future management responsibility and an academic background in the field of engineering. Women are encouraged to apply.

Type: Masters

Eligibility: Applicants must:

• Be a national of a Bank member country that is eligible to receive Bank financing and not be a national of any country that is not eligible to receive the Bank financing;
• Be in good health with respect to the capacity to be a productive scholar for the duration of the Graduate Program, as certified by a medical doctor;
• Hold a Bachelor’s degree or its equivalent with superior academic achievement earned more than three (3) years before the Scholarship Application Deadline;
• Not have received any scholarship funding to earn a Graduate degree or its equivalent from any other sources funded by the Government of Japan;
• Be employed in a paid and fulltime position at the time of the Scholarship Application Deadline unless the applicant is from a country identified in the World Bank’s “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations”;
• Have, by the time of the Scholarship Application Deadline, at least three (3) years of recent fulltime paid professional experience acquired in development-related work after a Bachelor’s Degree or its equivalent in the applicant’s home country or in another developing country; If the applicant is from a country in “Harmonized List of Fragile Situations” at the time of the Scholarship Application Deadline, the recent professional experience does not have to be fulltime or paid; and
• Be under the age of forty-five (45) at the time of the Scholarship Application Deadline.

※ Priority Consideration will be given to applicants who:

• Are 35 years or younger;
• Can receive an official leave of absence during the period of study;
• Are planning to return to the equivalent position (including the current one) in their home country after s/he completes the program;
• Are recommended by appropriate government agencies; and
• Submit Official English proficiency Test Scores ,(TOEFL/IELTS)

Selection: Interested persons should apply for admission to the Graduate School of Urban Innovation (GSUI), Yokohama National University by 10 March 2017. After screening the records of qualified candidates, the GSUI Selection Committee will select 20 nominees for admission to the program. The 20 nominees should apply for final screening by the Word Bank (“Scholarship Application”) and 10 final passers will be accepted as IMP students and receive World Bank scholarships. Successful candidates will receive notification to that effect before July 2017 at the latest.

Value and Number of Scholarships: Approximately 10 scholarships are allocated to the YNU program by the World Bank. Each scholarship provides a monthly allowance of JPY152, 000 and a round-trip air ticket to Japan plus a travel allowance of USD 500. The scholarship also covers tuition fees, the entrance examination fee and the admission fee.

Duration of Scholarship: October 2017 – September 2019

How to Apply: When applying, applicants must submit the following documents listed in the Scholarship Webpage link below to the Infrastructure Management Program Office, Graduate School of Urban Innovation

It is important to go through the application requirements of this scholarship before applying.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Joint Japan/World Bank Graduate Scholarship Program (JJWBGSP)

Dancing on the Edge Scholarship Program 2017 for Talented Dancers from MENA Countries

Application Deadline: 15th February 2017

Eligible Countries: Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti,Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, West Bank and Gaza, and Yemen.

To be taken at (country): Amsterdam, The Netherlands

About the Award: Dancing on the Edge (DOTE) is the only organization in the country devoted to stimulating artistic exchange in the fields of contemporary dance, theater, and multi-media with the Middle East and North Africa. The scholarship program is offered in collaboration with Henny Jurriëns Foundation (HJS). HJS is the most prominent dance training institute for professional-level dancers in The Netherlands. DOTE and HJS have been collaborating since 2012 to offer scholarships.

Type: Training

Eligibility: Dancers applying:
• must come from (and at least partly based in) the Middle East/North Africa
• must have at least some (and preferably substantial) training and performance experience in contemporary dance
• must be no older than 30 years old
• must be capable of travelling and living independently for this period
• must have enough resources to pay for food and other living expenses that may occur in this period
• must have or be able to acquire health/travel insurance for this period
• are responsible for attaining a visa if necessary (with the help of the organizing parties)

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Duration of Scholarship: 3 weeks. 8-28 July 2017

Value of Scholarship: The scholarships cover travel and visa costs, accommodation, program fees, and some performance tickets. There is no per diem; participants are expected to pay for their own living and other expenses. They should also purchase their own travel/health insurance.

How to Apply: The application form is available at the following link: Online FormYou will be asked to give a motivation, short biography, dance video (digital link), and an indication of eligibility.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Dancing on the Edge (DOTE), Henny Jurriëns Foundation (HJS)

International Court of Justice (ICJ) University Traineeship Programme 2017/2018 – The Hague, Netherlands

Application Deadline: 15th February 2017.

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: All

To be taken at (country): The Hague, Netherlands

About the Award: The programme was established in 1999 in order to enable recent law graduates to gain experience working at the ICJ. It aims to improve participants’ understanding of international law and of the Court’s processes by actively involving them in the work of the Court and allowing them to build on their experience under the supervision of a judge.

The University Traineeship programme is intended to give recent law graduates experience working at the International Court of Justice in The Hague. Candidates are nominated and sponsored by universities from which they have graduated.

Type: Internship

Eligibility: 

• The Court looks in particular for candidates who have excellent results in their law studies, and who have studied, published or worked in international law.
• Candidates will usually be in the early stages of their legal careers (e.g., within three years of graduation). Some have practical experience in private or public practice, including work at another court or international organisation, and/or post-graduate studies in international law.
• The Court seeks diversity of nationality in making the selection.
• The official languages of the Court are English and French, and participants must have excellent reading, writing and speaking skills in at least one of these. A working knowledge of the second official language will be an asset.
• The application should indicate the trainee’s abilities in respect of both official languages

Selection: While it is possible to nominate a single candidate, the Court encourages universities to propose more than one. Universities are also strongly encouraged to limit applications to candidates who have excellent results in their law studies and who have demonstrated an interest in international law through their studies, publications or work experience. The Court does not accept applications from individuals.

The Court will make its selection on the basis of the candidates’ application documents. It is expected to reach its final decision in March/April 2017. Nominating universities will be notified accordingly.

Number of Awardees: The programme is highly selective. The Court accepts up to 15 participants a year – not more than one from each nominating university

Value of Program: Each nominating university must accept the responsibility to provide the stipend, health insurance and travel costs to its candidate, if selected. The stipend should be sufficient to provide for a minimum standard of accommodation and subsistence in The Hague and should be set at a level that ensures that trainees can benefit fully from their experience at the Court without the burden of financial hardship. The Traineeship is not a self-funded internship and candidates without adequate financial support through their sponsoring university will not be eligible. The Court will facilitate visas if necessary and provides working facilities, but it does not provide financial support.

How to Apply: Universities are encouraged to nominate one or more graduate student from their school

Universities should submit at least two letters of reference for each candidate, preferably from individuals who can attest to the candidate’s abilities in the field of international law.

Universities are requested to submit a sample of each candidate’s written work of no more than 15 typewritten pages that has either been submitted for publication or is of similar publishable quality. The Court sets great store by this part of the application and would appreciate the nominating university making every effort to enable the Court to consider written work produced directly by the candidate.

Universities are kindly requested to submit the application documents in Word or PDF format in the following order:

(a) letter from the university sponsoring the candidate;
(b) letter of Application from the candidate;
(c) completed ICJ University Trainee Application Form in one of the official languages of the Court;
(d) curriculum vitae of the candidate;
(e) copy of the candidate’s official academic record;
(f) letters of reference; and
(g) candidate’s writing sample.

Applications should be submitted by e mail to secretariatdeputyregistrar@icj-cij.org.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: International Court of Justice (ICJ)