22 Aug 2017

Growing signs of constitutional breakdown follow repeal of corruption charges against Brazil’s President Temer

Miguel Andrade 

The Congressional negotiations put in place during the month of July by Brazilian President Michel Temer in order to repeal a Congressional authorization for corruption charges to be brought against him in the Supreme Court have highlighted the depth of the political and economic crises confronting Latina America’s largest country.
The rottenness of the month-long horse-trading in the Lower House overshadowed even the unprecedented situation of a president being taped by a billionaire former ally agreeing to buy the silence of another former ally and further recommending an associate to organize the rigging of anti-trust legislation in his favor.
Michel Temer took over the presidency after conspiring to bring down Workers Party (PT) president Dilma Rousseff on trumped-up charges of budget manipulation barely one year ago, after serving as her vice-president for one-and-a-half terms in office. The right-wing move, supported by every major business association, the entire bourgeois press and a collection of right-wing parties that had supported the Workers Party rule for 13 years, signaled a declaration of class war by the ruling class. It was organized in the face of the country’s worst economic crisis in a century and particularly the contraction of previously record profits from commodity exports that had for almost a decade financed token social reforms and political stability.
Workers Party rule, which represented a key ideological and economical factor in the so-called Pink Tide in Latin America, had already started to crumble with Rousseff’s narrow re-election victory in the 2014 election, which also brought in the most right-wing Congress since the end of the US-backed military dictatorship in 1985. The elections had seen a major growth of the so-called Beef, Bullet and Bible caucus, which comprises almost a third of the Lower House and is composed of retired or active duty military, evangelical and Catholic preachers and major agribusiness heads.
Under conditions of a two-year economic contraction that slashed GDP by 10, Temer came to power promising to boost the economy by decimating the social conditions of the working class through unprecedented labor and pension “reforms” and a 20-year budget freeze.
Amid the unwillingness of even the most right-wing congressmen to pass some of the toxic legislation, Temer was subjected to a sting operation in late May, with sections of the intelligence establishment and the justice system collaborating with meatpacking magnate Joesley Batista to tape the president agreeing to favor Batista in the country’s anti-trust CADE agency, and further authorizing him to set up a monthly pay to avoid the plea-bargain agreement of jailed former Lower House speaker Eduardo Cunha, Rousseff’s political hangman who had put the 2016 impeachment to a vote.
A trial of a sitting Brazilian president on criminal corruption charges has to be authorized by Congress, nonetheless, and a political operation was mounted to avoid authorization. The success of these machinations has further exposed the protracted breakdown of bourgeois-democratic forms of rule in Brazil, which had been signaled in the internecine warfare that resulted in the covert taping of Temer in first place.
In addition to agreeing to unfreeze more than 1.5 billion dollars from the 2017 budget to meet immediate demands of members of the special panel reviewing the charges in the Lower House in mid-July, Temer issued a July 11 decree to legalizing the private ownership by major agribusiness heads of invaded state-owned land all over the country, but specially in the so-called farming borderlands that surround the Amazon forest. A July 5 report on apublica.org estimates that the total size of this land grab would be equivalent to the area of the state of Rio de Janeiro, more than 16 thousand square miles, or a staggering 0.5 percent of the country’s territory.
Later, on July 25, seeking support from representatives of mining states, a decree was issued increasing the amount of royalties paid by companies, at the same time that special legislation was introduced in order to increase the participation of mining from 4 to 6 percent of GDP. Except for the southeastern Minas Gerais, where the collapse of a BHP Billiton mining waist dam killed 18 people and caused chemical poisoning of 230 towns along the 600km of the Doce river, most of the main mining regions overlap the farming borderlands, compounding the assault on some of the poorest and most oppressed communities in the country.
Another move, on August 1, the day before the vote to repeal the investigation, pardoned 80 percent of the 3.5 billion dollars major agribusiness heads owe to the country’s social security system in the form of delayed payments to finance the retirement of their employees. Furthermore, Temer has—by decree—slashed the amount that employers have to pay in terms of social security from 2 percent to 1.2 percent of wages.
The Brazilian edition of the Spanish El País estimated on August 15 that the major beneficiary of the pardon would be Joesley Batista, who had agreed to set up Temer for prosecution. The meatpacking executive is now freed from any corruption charges by the plea bargain agreement set up with the Attorney General’s office and plans to move the headquarters of his J&F meatpacking empire to the European Union or the United States, where the company employs more than 63,000 workers in 44 plants. The pardon on unpaid social security payments was specifically written not to exclude bosses charged with financial crimes or corruption.
The pardoning of the agribusiness bosses’ debts, known as Provisional Measure 793 (MP 793), nonetheless pales in comparison with the expected pardoning of 99 percent of the 543 billion reais (180 billion dollars) owed by major businessmen to the social security system, in exchange for the immediate payment of 1 percent, as a “refinancing.” Of this amount, 3 billion reais are debts held by companies owned by congressmen, according to an April 24 report by the daily Folha de São Paulo. The representative in charge of the law, known as Refis, alone owes 68 million reais, while senator Jose Perrella from Minas Gerais owes 1,7 billion reais.
This windfall for the employers has been implemented simultaneously with the imposition of a 3 percent increase in the social security taxes on 2 million federal level public servants and negotiations to impose a pension “reform” that will impose a minimum retirement age of 65 years and the creation of private pension funds for most workers.
The adoption of a self-serving string of measures by congressmen, a deepening of the long-standing practice of vote-buying in Brazilian politics that almost brought down the Workers Party’s first President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, is nonetheless only the most superficial feature of a government of class war, incompatible with even the bourgeois-democratic forms of rule established in the post-dictatorship 1988 constitution. This regime is taking shape with no opposition from within the bourgeois establishment.
The Workers Party and its associate pseudo-left milieu attack Temer’s government as an anti-national regime which speaks for a semi-feudal aristocracy, obsessively describing it as a slaveholder-like, “Big House” government, not least in order to court a petty-bourgeois layer that is increasingly fixated on US-inspired identity politics. The major presence of big landowners in the government’s right-wing congressional base and cabinet is held as the ultimate proof of this fact. The opposition of the Workers Party is oriented not to the working class or the oppressed rural communities on farming borderlands, but to dissatisfied layers of the bourgeoisie and privileged sections of the petty bourgeoisie. It is directed not against capitalism or the class war waged by the Temer government, but against the cutting across of the “national bourgeoisie’s” interests, supposedly in favor of “rentier” landowners.
A prime representative of this “national bourgeois” class would be none other than Joesley Batista, who was the beneficiary of endless favors offered by the federal government in name of “national competitiveness” throughout the years of Workers Party rule. The end result of the PT’s policy was the rise of a layer of increasingly internationalized, Wall Street-connected Brazilian capitalists, personified by Batista.
The Workers Party opposition has for more than a year now claimed that Temer’s government was cutting business opportunities for the “national” bourgeoisie, with a typical piece in the semi-official Workers Party mouthpiece Carta Capital claiming on August 8 that “neoliberals” like Temer’s Finance Minister Henrique Meirelles, who served under Lula as Central Bank president, “hate credit” for business.
For the Workers Party, the self-serving laws approved by congressmen expresses the interests of an anti-business parasite state bureaucracy. The revival of the Weberian 1930s Brazilian “anti-bureaucratic” sociologist Raymundo Faoro by Workers Party intellectuals in outlets like Carta Capitalserves the purpose of ideological justification of this pro-capitalist orientation.
The fact is, however, the Refis law and the labor and pensions “reforms” are expression of a generalized attack of capitalist bosses on the social conditions of the working class. The last string of laws favors congressmen because a huge number of them are actually capitalist bosses, not landed aristocrats. The driving force behind these laws is not land income, but production costs, that is, working class wages and social rights. The “reforms” are driven by the interests of agribusiness and mining bosses, and not feudal overlords, their increasing presence on national life being the result of a conscious Workers Party commodity-oriented strategy, which saw men like Batista take charge of key industrial infrastructure such as energy plants and even a bank, with his business growing 22-fold with the financial backing of the National Development Bank (BNDES).
The waging of class war amid the country’s worst economic crisis in a century is not the product of a feudal reaction, but the ruling class’ answer to shrinking world markets and the general offensive by the world bourgeoisie against the working class’ social conditions, not least the Trump administration’s own naked oligarchic rule and “nationalist” attacks on social rights, environmental protections and democratic rights.
The corrupt character of the internecine warfare being waged within the Brazilian ruling establishment is only a symptom of the urgency and desperation with which the Brazilian capitalists are seeking to reposition themselves on the world scene.

Diplomatic row escalates tensions as US limits visa services in Russia

Niles Niemuth

The US Embassy in Moscow announced Monday that it will curtail the issuance of nonimmigrant visas in response to the Russian government’s decision to expel hundreds of US diplomats and contractors late last month. The Russian move came after the US Congress, by an overwhelming majority, passed a new sanctions bill targeting the country.
A statement published on the embassy website of the US Mission to Russia announced that the curtailment of staff will result in the suspension of nonimmigrant visa operations from August 23 until September 1.
Nonimmigrant visa interviews are set to resume in September at the US Embassy in Moscow. However, these services will be suspended indefinitely at US consulates in St. Petersburg, Yekaterinburg and Vladivostok.
Thousands of Russian citizens are expected to be impacted by the curtailment of the visa approval process. The US Embassy and its consulates issued 190,000 visas in 2016. Tourists, students and other travelers from outside Moscow who wish to visit the US will have to make the long trip to the capital for their visa interview.
The changes will also impact those applying for immigration visas, potentially delaying long scheduled interviews, extending the amount of time between the application and approval or denial by US authorities.
“You now have an entire nation’s work coming through one office with far fewer staff,” Matthew Morely, an American immigration attorney in Moscow, told Reuters. “This scenario would be like all of America suddenly only having one office in Los Angeles to process (visa applications from) New York, Chicago, DC, Boston and Miami.”
At a press conference in Moscow Monday, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov denounced the visa restrictions as an effort to foment opposition in order to overthrow the government of President Vladimir Putin.
“The American authors of these decisions have come up with another attempt to stir up discontent among Russian citizens about the actions of the Russian authorities,” Lavrov said. “Their logic is well known—the logic of those who organize ‘color revolutions’—and it is the inertia of the Obama administration, pure and simple,” he concluded.
The latest diplomatic maneuver by the US sets the stage for a response from the Russian government that can be framed as unjustifiably aggressive and used as justification for a further escalation of tensions between the world’s two largest nuclear-armed powers.
Russian Senator Igor Morozov, a member of the Federation Council’s International Affairs Committee, had warned at the end of July that a move by the US to limit visa approvals would be met by reciprocal measures impacting US citizens seeking approval to travel to Russia.
However, on Monday Lavrov seemed to rule out the possibility of a response that would involve limiting the visa process. “As for our countermeasures, as I’ve said, we should take a closer look at the decisions that the Americans have announced today,” he told reporters. “We’ll see. I can only say one thing: We won’t take it out on American citizens.”
US President Donald Trump begrudgingly signed the sanctions legislation, which also targets Iran and North Korea, into law earlier this month. Trump objected in two signing statements to the fact that the bill limited the administration’s ability to negotiate any changes to the sanctions imposed on Russia by the Obama administration in December 2016 over Moscow’s alleged interference in the US election.
While Moscow repeatedly denied any intervention in the election, Obama ordered the expulsion of 35 Russian diplomats from the United States and closed two diplomatic compounds. This has been connected to the anti-Russia campaign that has been used to pressure Trump and ensure that tensions between the two countries remain high.
The anti-Russia campaign has been the all-consuming focus of the Democratic Party as it has sought to maintain the aggressive footing the Obama administration maintained towards Russia. Trump had made clear in his campaign and as president that he hoped to develop better relations with Putin, in order to focus attention on preparing for war with China.
To the sections of the American ruling class with which the Democrats are aligned, Russia is seen as the main barrier to US hegemony over the Eurasian land mass and the Middle East, particularly Syria, where Russian military intervention has frustrated American efforts to overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad.
Significantly, the sanctions that Trump signed into law impact not only Russia, but also the European Union, straining diplomatic ties between the US and its ostensible allies. French, British, Dutch, Austrian and German firms all could face financial penalties for their involvement in the Nordstream2 pipeline, which transmits Russian natural gas to Germany. EU officials have warned that they are preparing countermeasures if the sanctions impact their economies.

Trump gives military green light to escalate Afghanistan war

Patrick Martin

President Donald Trump announced a major escalation of the US war in Afghanistan in a nationally televised speech Monday night, although he gave no details either about the number of additional troops that will be sent or the extent or duration of the military commitment. Trump also made menacing threats against Pakistan in remarks clearly crafted in close coordination with the top military generals who dominate his administration.
While Trump pleaded military necessity as the reason for not disclosing how many troops will be added to the 8,400 already deployed in Afghanistan, or how long they will remain there, his goal was not to keep these facts secret from the Taliban—who will know soon enough, since they have sympathizers throughout the Afghan government and in every district of the country.
Trump is mainly concerned about keeping the extent of the escalation secret from the American people, who, he admitted, 16 years after the 9/11 attacks and the US invasion of Afghanistan, were “weary of war.”
Secretary of Defense James Mattis, a former general in the Marine Corps, has been authorized since June to send up to 4,000 additional US troops to Afghanistan, but the action has been postponed while top officials conducted what was described as a comprehensive review of American strategy in South Asia.
The troops are expected to move quickly into position now, so that they can participate in an ongoing series of bloody battles across Afghanistan, seeking to blunt the traditional summer offensive by Taliban insurgents.
In the past month, five district capitals have fallen to the insurgents, who now control 48 of the 407 districts. The government-controlled districts number barely 100, less than one quarter of the total, while the remainder are contested, in some cases government-run by day and Taliban-run by night.
Aside from a brief reference to the 9/11 attacks, which were the pretext for the initial US invasion and overthrow of the Taliban regime in Kabul, Trump made no attempt to provide an explanation, let alone a justification, for the longest war in US history.
In fact, the sheer length of the war and the thousands of casualties suffered by US forces were one of Trump’s arguments for continuing and expanding the conflict. The first conclusion of the administration’s review of the war was the necessity of “an honorable and enduring outcome worthy of the tremendous sacrifices that have been made, especially the sacrifices of lives.” Death justifies more death.
The number of dead and maimed among the Afghan population is many hundreds of thousands, together with millions of refugees. This colossal toll will rise rapidly as the scale and ferocity of US military operations increase.
The war in Afghanistan will take on an even bloodier character under the new policies announced by Trump. “Micromanagement from Washington, DC does not win battles,” he declared, announcing that he is lifting all restraints on military operations, giving on-the-ground commanders the green light to use force as they see fit. This means rescinding restrictions established under the Bush and Obama administrations after well-documented atrocities, such as the bombing of Afghan wedding parties and helicopter gunship attacks that wiped out hospitals and entire villages.
Even more reckless and inflammatory is the US shift in policy towards Pakistan, which Trump denounced for “continuing to harbor criminals and terrorists.” He complained, “We have been paying Pakistan billions and billions of dollars, at the same time they are housing the same terrorists that we are fighting. But that will have to change. And that will change immediately.”
Trump is not speaking merely about the continuation of the illegal US drone missile strikes against Taliban and other Afghan militias hiding out in Pashtun tribal areas of western Pakistan. He is threatening an openly hostile stance by the United States toward to a nuclear-armed country with a population of 190 million people, beginning with a possible cutoff of US financial and military aid.
The US president menaced Pakistan with the specter of Washington further developing its “strategic partnership with India,” which he called “a key security and economic partner of the United States.” Washington has cultivated military-diplomatic ties with India over the past two decades, seeking to transform India into a front-line state in the US strategy of surrounding and isolating China. Trump’s speech was a warning to Pakistan that the US is prepared to openly side with India against Pakistan in the longstanding conflict between the two nuclear powers in South Asia.
Trump also touched briefly on the material interests that underlie the US intervention in Afghanistan, saying, “As the prime minister of Afghanistan has promised, we are going to participate in economic development to help defray the cost of this war to us.”
Behind this vague language is naked imperialist plundering. Trump has recently cited studies showing that Afghanistan possesses at least $3 trillion in natural resources, more than four times the estimated $714 billion in US military spending and reconstruction in the country since 2001. As CNBC reported Saturday, “Trump is seeking a military win in Afghanistan, but American efforts there may yet reap financial gains. Afghanistan possesses rare minerals crucial for industrial manufacturing, including copper, gold, uranium and fossil fuels …”
Trump’s announcement of a more aggressive stance in Afghanistan is the first major policy decision by the White House since Trump began a reshuffle of senior White House staff, replacing Chief of Staff Reince Priebus with former Marine General John Kelly, and sacking his chief political strategist Stephen Bannon.
In discussions within the administration going back at least to the spring, Bannon had opposed sending more troops to Afghanistan, clashing with both Defense Secretary Mattis and National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster, a serving Army general. He has opposed most US military actions in the Middle East as a diversion from the US-China conflict, declaring in an interview last week, “the economic war with China is everything.”
The top generals in the Trump administration were also furious over Bannon’s statement last week that there were no viable military options for the US in North Korea. Following Bannon’s departure, the New York Times carried a front-page article Monday reporting that discussions over “preemptive war” against North Korea are “rising in the White House.” The newspaper reported that “General McMaster and other administration officials have challenged the long-held view that there is no real military solution to the North Korean problem,” and that the administration is seriously considering a first-strike on North Korea, an action that would lead to the deaths of tens of millions of people.
Trump’s speech Monday night, announced only 24 hours in advance, was clearly an effort to cement his relations with the Pentagon brass in the wake of the Bannon firing and the political crisis that erupted after Trump’s declaration of sympathy for the neo-Nazis who rioted August 11 in Charlottesville, Virginia, leading to death of one anti-Nazi protester.
The speech began with a lengthy declaration by Trump that there was no place for bigotry or racism within the military. The language was taken straight from the declarations of members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who all issued statements after Charlottesville deploring racists and white supremacists and presenting the military as a model of unity across race and gender lines.
Trump’s speechwriter combined the disavowal of racial hatred with a paean to the armed services as the model for American society as a whole, using language that would not be out of place in a military dictatorship. In the men and women of the military, Trump said, “our country has produced a special class of heroes whose selflessness, courage and resolve is unmatched in human history.”
Throughout the Trump administration, and in the aftermath of the events in Charlottesville, the Democrats have attempted to subordinate and redirect all opposition to Trump behind the military and intelligence agencies, hailing figures like Kelly and Mattis for providing “stability” to the administration. The announcement of a new stage in the bloody war in Afghanistan is the fruit of their efforts.

Behind the political warfare in the US: Rising fears of financial collapse, social unrest

Nick Beams

There are growing concerns in US and global financial circles that the rise in the US stock market that accelerated with the election of Donald Trump is heading for a major downturn. These concerns shed a revealing light on some of the underlying forces driving the virtual civil war in the US political establishment.
The growing view among Wall Street speculators and corporate executives is that the “Trump trade”, which sent the Dow Jones and other market indexes to record highs, has run its course, with the president increasingly becoming an economic liability. The tipping point in business sentiment came in the wake of the conflict over the Charlottesville Nazi rampage. Trump’s remarks defending neo-Nazis were seen as undermining the interests of American imperialism internationally and threatening to unleash social and political instability at home.
However, concerns over the instability caused by Trump reflect deeper fears. The American ruling class confronts problems that extend far beyond the current occupant of the White House.
In a comment published yesterday, Ray Dalio, the head of Bridgewater, the world’s largest hedge fund, said that politics was now set to “probably play a greater role than we have experienced before in a manner that is broadly similar to 1937.” Whether the US was able to overcome political conflicts would have a greater effect on the economy than “classic monetary and fiscal policies.”
The reference to 1937 is significant. The first half of that year saw a major downturn in the US economy—the decline took place at an even faster rate than in 1932, in the midst of the Great Depression. The year also saw the eruption of the class struggle in the auto and steel industries.
Dalio wrote that the economic and social divisions in the US are similar to the revolutionary upheavals of this previous period. “During such times conflicts (both internal and external) increase, populism emerges, democracies are threatened and wars can occur.” He added that he could not say how bad it would get, but he was not encouraged. “Conflicts have now intensified to the point that fighting to the death is probably more likely than reconciliation.”
Almost 170 years ago, in his work The Class Struggles in France, Marx noted that the eruption of the class struggle has a major impact on the financial system because it calls into question confidence in the very viability of the economic system over which the ruling class presides.
In his comment, Dalio wrote that, when one looked at average figures, “one might conclude that the United States economy is doing just fine, yet when one looks at the numbers that comprise those averages, it’s clear that some are doing extraordinarily well and others are doing terribly, with gaps in wealth and income being the greatest since the 1930s.”
Dalio and others couch references to the growing social and political divide in terms of “populism,” but their real fear is the emergence of overt class conflict. “The majority of Americans,” he wrote, “appear to be strongly and intransigently in disagreement about our leadership and the direction of our country” and were “more inclined to fight for what they believe in than to try to figure out how to get beyond their disagreements to work productively based on shared principles.”
In other words, the nostrums of the “American dream” and America as the “land of economic opportunity,” which functioned historically as a kind of political glue, have disintegrated. What terrifies the ruling class is that the working class will intervene, under conditions in which all signs point to a collapse of the financial bubble created by the world’s central banks since the financial crisis of 2008.
The complete disintegration of financial markets nine years ago was only prevented by the injection of trillions of dollars into the global financial system—the US Fed alone poured in more than $4 trillion. But the chief effect of these measures has not been to stimulate a significant recovery in the “real” economy—investment rates in the US and other major economies remain at historically low levels—but to facilitate a financial market boom.
The latest expression of the speculative mania is the rise of the crypto currency Bitcoin. After taking more than 3,000 days to reach a level of $2,000, the currency, which is used in Internet trading, went from $2,000 to more than $4,000 in just 85 days. The overall market valuation of Bitcoins has expanded to $140 billion, as major investors, including Goldman Sachs, move in.
This is only one expression of bubbles that have developed in virtually every financial asset.
With the provision of ultra-cheap money by the Fed and other central banks, one of the chief mechanisms by which companies have been able to maintain share values is by using borrowed funds to organise share buybacks. But this process is reaching its limit, as already over-leveraged companies cannot borrow more to sustain their share values.
As the Financial Times noted in a comment yesterday, based on longer term historical valuations, US stocks “appear more expensive than at any time bar the months before the great crash of 1929, and the bursting of the dotcom bubble in 2000.”
Under what were once considered to be “normal” circumstances, money would move into bond markets to take advantage of higher rates of return. However, bond markets are also in a bubble, trading at historical highs, with interest rates (which move in an inverse relationship to the price) at record lows.
In 2008, the American ruling class responded to the financial collapse through political and economic mechanisms. On the one hand, they installed Obama to the US presidency—proclaiming the “audacity of hope” and “change you can believe in”—with the support of the trade union bureaucracy and the various organisations of the privileged middle class, who hailed his election as a “transformative” moment.
On the other, they undertook the greatest injection of money into the financial system seen in economic history to finance an orgy of speculation and organize a massive transfer of wealth from the working class to the rich. Far from resolving the contradictions, these measures have reproduced them at a higher level.
While sections of the ruling class are terrified of the growth of class conflict, they can propose no measures to address the conditions that are leading inexorably toward social explosions. While Trump has pursued a policy of developing an extra-parliamentary movement of the extreme right, his critics within the ruling class are working to reorganize his administration to place it even more firmly under the direction of the military and the financial elite.
A new period of economic and political convulsion is emerging, for which the working class must prepare through the building of a revolutionary leadership, based on an internationalist and socialist program, to resolve the historic crisis of the capitalist profit system in its interests.

Stabilising Deterrence: Doctrines Score Over Numbers

Manpreet Sethi


In answer to the criticism from non-nuclear weapon states on lack of movement towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear weapon states, the latter often highlight the reductions in their stockpiles as one step showcasing their commitment to this objective. Indeed, nuclear weapon numbers have reduced significantly in the case of the US and Russia. However, fewer numbers do not signify disarmament and eve more importantly do not automatically translate into strategic stability between nuclear-armed states.

The three nuclear-armed countries of relevance to South Asia have declared 'minimum deterrence' as an attribute of their doctrines. This means that none is likely to build the kind of runaway stockpiles that the superpowers had. The arsenals would remain relatively low, though each is maintaining the number as a closely guarded secret based on its own determination of the threats. Do low numbers automatically help generate strategic stability? Or could they actually foster instability since with small nuclear forces, the temptation to launch a disarming first strike would be high because of ‘use them or lose them’ compulsions? 
Interestingly, as important as nuclear arsenals are for deterrence, numbers of nuclear weapons alone do not have a significant impact on strategic stability. This is, in fact, more a function of four other criteria:
• Role ascribed to nuclear weapons in national security strategy: Does a state perceive the utility of its nuclear weapons to undertake offensive revisionist actions, or in a defensive deterrent role narrowly defined against an adversary’s nuclear weapons?

• Modus of imposing deterrence: Does a state seek to achieve deterrence through projection of high or low nuclear thresholds? This, then, reflects in the desire - or lack thereof - for instruments to establish deterrence stability. For instance, since Pakistan derives its deterrence from projecting a low threshold and instability in use of nuclear weapons, it has little interest in strong instruments that promote deterrence stability.

• Nature of doctrine: Does a state prefer a doctrine that seeks enhancement of deterrence through ambiguity or clarity? Further, is it interested in projecting an offensive/first use or defensive/no first use doctrine as a means of deterrence?

• Nature of command and control: Does a state have a centralised or delegative system of command and control? Projection of battlefield use of nuclear weapons presupposes a delegative command and control in order to establish the credibility of first use a means of deterrence.
The primary objective that a state seeks from its nuclear weapons determines the kind of doctrine it articulates and the kind of command and control it establishes for credible deterrence. These manifestations allow for, or inhibit strategic stability in a nuclear dyad. For instance, a state that hopes to alter the status quo with a nuclear-armed adversary is prone to use its nuclear weapons to guard against a response by indicating a quick propensity to use nuclear weapons. It, therefore, can afford only a first use doctrine. If the other side, too, has a similar approach and doctrine, then crisis instability is inevitable. In South Asia, Pakistan is the only one of the three countries to profess such a doctrine. India and China share a greater sense of nuclear stability owing to the doctrinal consonance of their no first use (NFU) doctrines. In fact, the India-Pakistan dyad, too, is granted a certain level of stability because of India's commitment to NFU. 
Doctrines, therefore, have a huge impact on strategic stability and this is best exemplified by the NFU - a concept that is inadequately understood or accepted in the West and inadequately explained by the two countries that do profess it. In modern times, every nuclear-armed state has a secure second strike capability that rules out the possibility of a decapitating or a disarming first strike. In such a situation, then, the first user cannot hope to escape nuclear retaliation, and it certainly cannot hope to come out looking better after its first use of nuclear weapons. Indeed, first use may actually turn out to be suicidal. NFU, on the contrary, has the potential to lessen inter-state tensions, increase mutual confidence, and thus reinforce a cycle of positives. In fact, NFU allows even the first user to have a relatively relaxed posture since it is not under pressure to use nuclear weapons early lest it was to lose them to preemption. At low nuclear numbers, in fact, an NFU is even more relevant to avoid any temptations for oneself and for the adversary.

Stability at low numbers, therefore, also requires that are suited to stability. An NFU doctrine is one such candidate. If all nuclear-armed states were to accept this, it would over time lead to a fall in the value of nuclear weapons. Who would want to retain or obtain a weapon that was under a universal NFU norm/treaty? This decrease in salience of the weapon could then enable its elimination. In fact, a focus on numbers alone would mean little unless the overall salience of nuclear weapons is addressed, too. 

Trump's Afghanistan Strategy

Rana Banerji


After procrastinating for almost five months, US President Donald Trump chose the symbolically significant platform of Fort Myers, Arlington to announce a shift from a “time-based to a conditions-based” strategy to support the Ashraf Ghani government in Afghanistan. No additional troop numbers have been specified though it is expected that Trump would endorse the consensus figure of roughly around 4,000 more as suggested by his generals on the field, to supplement their “train, assist and advise” role in support of the Afghan National Army (ANA). These numbers could provide more teeth in terms of artillery and air support to drive back the Afghan Taliban from newly gained territories around district centres like Sangin and Lashkargah in Helmand and other areas near Kunduz.

Trump justified the turnaround from his election campaign stance favouring early and complete withdrawal of US troops by indirectly blaming his predecessor, President Obama, for setting a timetable for their withdrawal, which enabled “the enemy to wait us out.” Instead, the expectation would be to move to a position of strength before holding out hope for “a political settlement, someday” when Afghans could themselves deal with this thorny issue of reconciliation.

Trump talked of integrating all elements of US power - military, diplomatic and economic - to help the existing Afghan government to deal with the Taliban. He did qualify, though, that the US’ “commitment was not unlimited,” “not a blank cheque,” and the Afghan government would have to undertake its share of the burden and reform. The US military would “no longer be responsible for building democracies abroad.”

There also appears to be a change of approach towards Pakistan. While acknowledging Pakistan as a valuable US partner in the past and noting that Pakistanis have suffered from the scourge of terrorism, Trump said that the US could no longer remain silent on Pakistan continuing to shelter the same terrorists killing US forces while "we have been paying them billions." He said that this would "have to change immediately" and it was "time for Pakistan to demonstrate" their willingness to be in the same fight and against the same enemy. Trump added that it was time to "further develop" the strategic partnership with India but expected India "to do more for the economic development of Afghanistan." He mentioned that the possibility of a confrontation between the two nuclear-armed powers in South Asia remained a US concern.

In effect, Trump has chosen to depend on the advice of his military experts to opt for the 'containment' or 'stabilising' option in Afghanistan without going into the nitty-gritty of how, eventually, political reconciliation with the Afghan Taliban would be approached. Earlier, speaking at the Stimson Centre in Washington, DC, in April 2017, former Special Envoy and Ambassador to Pakistan, Richard Olson had suggested opening a line to the Taliban through their office in Doha. Taking note of increasing Taliban fragmentation lately, with commanders like Mullah Rahim not taking orders from the anointed leader, Haibatullah Akhund, other Western commentators like Theo Farell and Michael Semple have suggested sending out peace feelers to individual commanders but the current US administration has chosen to be silent in this regard.

The harder line against Pakistan, though expected, has not really been spelt out. Constraints remain obviously due to dependence on the ground lines of communication (GLOC) to send supplies to US and NATO troops in Afghanistan, mainly through Pakistan. The leverage that Pakistan enjoys in this regard was used for bargaining in the past. Simultaneous increase of pressure on Pakistan could lead Islamabad to block transit again. The US risks provoking a blockade of its own forces, though there is some thinking in the Pentagon about exploring alternate routes such as the 'Lapis Lazuli corridor' through Central Asia. However, continuing sanctions against Russia and Iran limit US' manoeuvrability.

Though curtailment of US financial support especially for the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) may hurt, Pakistanis are likely to take in their stride this renewed US pressure 'to do more' against elements like the Haqqani network. Pakistan remains obsessed with Indian influence in Afghanistan. Some time ago, in a jointly authored article for The New York Times, Dr Moeed Yusuf, a Pakistani analyst at the United States Institute of Peace (USIP) in Washington, DC, and former US National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley stressed that "the Pakistani security establishment sees the Taliban as a check on Indian activity in Afghanistan and has doubled down on its efforts to counter deepening Afghan-India ties." They suggested an approach that links efforts to enlist Pakistan’s support in Afghanistan to a strategy aimed at improving India-Pakistan ties. When American analyst Dr C Christine Fair cried foul, stating that "Pakistan’s anxieties are incurable, so stop trying to cure them," Dr Yusuf took a softer line, asking Pakistan to come to terms with the reality of continuing Indian presence.

Trump’s speech at Arlington did not elaborate on the role of other regional stakeholders in Afghanistan or the need to explore joint approaches to reconciliation with Russia, Iran or China. These powers may continue to play spoilers to prevent lasting peace or stability in Afghanistan.

China’s Nuclear Programme: Modernising or Multiplying?

Allyson Rimmer


China, one of five countries allowed to possess nuclear weapons by the Treaty for the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), has been accused of expanding the number of nuclear warheads at its disposal. It is believed to be the only NPT Nuclear Weapon State (NWS) that is doing so. In contrast, some analysts claim that China is not expanding its nuclear arsenal but rather modernising it. If the latter is the case, then there is nothing unique about China’s actions. The US, Russia, France and the UK are all engaging in qualitative upgrades to both warheads and their delivery systems in response to technological advances and changing operational requirements.
Currently, it is estimated that China has a nuclear stockpile of approximately 270 warheads. It is believed by some to be in the process of fabricating more. With such advancements, China's proliferation pattern is more akin to what other Asian nuclear states (India, Pakistan and North Korea) are doing. Unlike these non-NPT nuclear weapons possessors, China is obligated under the NPT to reduce its nuclear weapons. Accusations concerning China’s expansion, if true, mean that China’s nuclear strategy is in direct conflict with the goals of nuclear abolition. An article published in 2014 by the South China Morning Post claimed that a Chinese military document had announced an increase in the number of warheads in their arsenal, both nuclear and conventional. Other reputable sources - Carnegie Endowment, the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute , Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, and the Nuclear Threat Initiative expressed similar opinions about China’s nuclear weapons, though all contend that accretions to the warhead stockpile are happening at an extremely slow pace. These assertions are based largely on China’s known ability to generate nuclear weapons due to their domestic access to fissile material. Although these claims do have circumstantial basis, they are still inference.
Though the aforementioned sources appear to be confident of China’s vertical proliferation, others hesitate to make such a claim outright. The US government adheres to a more conservative approach. The 2017 Annual Report to Congress pertaining to Chinese security developments discusses China’s shifting nuclear policy, the expansion of such weapons' delivery systems, and their desire to bolster a nuclear triad to ensure a successful land, air and sea-based nuclear strategy. There is no mention of nuclear warhead expansion, only reference to what equates to nuclear modernisation. Similar assessments conducted by third party experts come to the same conclusion. However, this cautious approach could have more to do with avoiding diplomatic confrontation than with a realistic assessment of nuclear proliferation. The US has a history of underplaying such issues. Throughout the late 1970s, the US willingly turned a blind eye to Pakistan’s development of nuclear weapons in order to focus its attention on Afghanistan, and, therefore, global non-proliferation concerns took a backseat to US Cold War imperatives. Similarly, in the case of present-day China, UN reports accusing the state of facilitating nuclear collaboration between North Korea, Pakistan and Iran have not generated any follow-up. China’s “grandfathering” of nuclear plants in Pakistan, too, has gone uncontested. This denial of the likely increase in Chinese nuclear warheads may be another instance of politics trumping non-proliferation.
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Though the conversation is certainly nuanced, there is general agreement surrounding China's shifting nuclear posture, which focuses aggressively on bolstering its triad capabilities. With its ever-increasing naval presence, China has made it no secret that it plans to alter and strengthen its nuclear doctrine through significant investment in its naval nuclear strike capabilities. China has also dedicated vast resources to the deployment of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) in response to advances in US and Indian missile defences. China’s increased naval focus reportedly faces continued setbacks concerning the reliability of its Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBM). Despite these technical difficulties, there is little doubt surrounding China’s end goal of reinforcing all facets of its nuclear capability.
In its 2017 White Paper, China reaffirmed its commitment to non-proliferation, conflict de-escalation, and also stressed the importance of Beijing’s continuing role in regional and global efforts towards peace. The state professes, “China...takes an active part in international arms control...non-proliferation efforts, and stands for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons.” Considering this statement and the inferential nature of the data surrounding Chinese nuclear expansion, concern over such claims may seem hyperbolic. However, if assertions regarding increased Chinese nuclear warheads are correct, any sense of hyperbole quickly shifts to hypocrisy. Regardless of disagreement regarding vertical proliferation, China is undoubtedly modernising its nuclear arsenal.

21 Aug 2017

HEC Paris-Forté Foundation for International Women Scholars 2017/2018

Application Deadline: Ongoing.
Offered annually? Yes
Eligible Countries: International
To be taken at (country): France
About the Award: As part of the school’s partnership with the Forté Foundation, the HEC Paris MBA Program will offer exceptional women significant scholarships per graduating class. By opening educational pathways, the HEC Forté scholarships will help improve leadership opportunities for women in business.
Essay – “Please explain in 1,500 words why you should be the Forté Scholar at the HEC MBA Program”.
Type: MBA
Eligibility: 
  • Only admitted candidates can apply for this scholarship. 
  • Candidates should have demonstrated a commitment to women via personal mentorship or community involvement.
  • Candidates should please note that unfortunately, they cannot apply for this scholarship if admitted after June 15th for the September intake, and after November 26th for the January intake.
Selection Criteria:  Recipients of the Forté Scholarship are high-quality candidates who meet the school’s standard selection criteria and have demonstrated exemplary leadership skills in:
  • Academics
  • Team building
  • Community work
  • Creative activity
Amount of Award: Variable, up to €15,000
Number of Awardees: A minimum of 3 scholarships for the September intake, a minimum of 1 for the January intake.
How to Apply: Once admitted into the HEC Paris MBA Program, candidates will have the opportunity to apply for HEC MBA Scholarships. Candidates will receive guidance in applying for a scholarship from the Admissions Officer
Award Provider: HEC MBA School

UNESCO Travelling to Learn Arts and Crafts Scholarships+Internships for Students 2017

Application Deadline: 20th October 2017
Eligible Countries: France and Developing Countries
To Be Taken At (Country): France and Developing Countries
About the Award: The programme aims to enable arts and crafts students coming from disadvantaged backgrounds to complete a study tour abroad. It allows young French scholarship students nearing the end of their studies to discover the know-how of craftspeople in developing countries; and it allows students from developing countries to discover the know-how of French craftspeople.
This programme helps students launch their professional career by enabling them to work in a professional environment; acquire new skills and cultural experiences abroad; design and create innovative products; develop a professional network; and participate and present their work at international fairs.
Type: Training/Short courses
Eligibility: Applicants must meet all the following criteria:
  • Level of study of at least 2 years equivalent to an Arts & Crafts Diploma,
  • Enrolled in Arts & Crafts schools/institutes/universities,
  • Recipient of scholarships and awards (and being able to give proof of it)
  • Speaking French and English
Applicants must be students and not senior artists
Number of Awards: Not specified
Value of Award: 
  • Applicant’s round-trip plane ticket; logistic support as well as a monthly financial support  covering all the expenses relative to the four months stay in France, the journeys and the purchase of material linked to the study tour will be covered.
  • An internship agreement will be signed between the student, the school and the hosting professional organization.
  • A scholarship agreement will be signed between the student and the Fondation Culture & Diversité.
Duration of Program: 4 months. Feb-June
  • December 2017: Selection of the laureates and communication of results.
  • From February 2018: Study tours in France.
  • June-July 2018: Certificate Presentation.
How to Apply: Application Form.  
Award Providers: UNESCO

Get 3 million naira for your Business – Apply for Diamond Bank’s Building Entrepreneurs 2017 (BET7) Business Grant Today

Application Deadline: 29th September 2017
Offered Annually? Yes
About the Award: BET – Building Entrepreneurs Today – marks another great opportunity for entrepreneurs all over Nigeria in education, health and agriculture to present their businesses and innovation and have the opportunity of being selected as one of the top 50 businesses that will be provided with extensive training, mentoring and advisory by the Enterprise Development Centre with the top 5 businesses winning 3 Million naira each.
The first phase of the BET programme commenced in 2010 with Diamond Bank empowering 5 entrepreneur with growth capital of N3 million each after they emerged the top 5 from rigorous business training at the Enterprise Development Centre (EDC) of the Pan African University.
Type: Entrepreneurship
Selection Criteria
  • Applicant must have a fully functional business (at least 3months in operations)
  • Applicant MUST not have attended any entrepreneurial Management program at EDC.
  • The business must have high growth potential.
How to Apply:
Create and upload your 60 secs video
Fill your BET online application and include your YouTube link
Once you have successfully submitted your entry, get all your friends to vote.
The top 300 entries will be contacted.
How to Apply: Interested and qualified candidates should Click Here to Apply

University of Michigan Society of Fellows International Fellowship for Early Career Researchers 2018

Application Deadline: 26th September, 2017
Offered annually? Yes
Eligible Countries: All
To be taken at (country): USA
Eligible Field of Study: Social, physical, and life sciences, the humanities, and in the professional schools.
About the Award: Each Fellow has a three-year appointment as Assistant Professor in an affiliated department of the University and a three-year appointment as a Postdoctoral Scholar in the Society of Fellows. This appointment is not tenure-track.  Each fellow is expected to teach the equivalent of one academic year, i.e., a total of two terms during the period of the fellowship. Any subsequent appointment of a Fellow to a position at the University of Michigan would be subject to the rules governing new appointments.
Fellows are expected to be in residence in Ann Arbor for the academic years of appointment (September to May) and to participate in the activities of the Society of Fellows. Off-campus research leave during academic terms will be permitted only in rare cases, only for brief periods of time, and only upon written application to the Chair of the Society well in advance of the proposed leave. Any leave granted will count as part of the fellowship tenure.
Type: Fellowship
Eligibility: 
  • The Society invites applications from qualified candidates who are at the beginning of their academic careers, having received the Ph.D. or comparable professional or artistic degree between June 1, 2015 and September 1, 2018.
  • Applications from degree candidates and recipients of the Ph.D. from the University of Michigan will not be considered.
  • Non-US citizens may apply.
  • Only online applications will be considered.
  • It is not necessary to send a transcript of graduate courses or grades.
  • Applicants who have previously applied for the Society of Fellows’ postdoctoral fellowships may re-apply but must complete a new application.
Number of Awardees: Not specified
Value of Fellowship: The current annual stipend is $60,000. Fellows are eligible for participation in the University health, dental, and life insurance programs.
Duration of Program: Each Fellow has a three-year appointment as Assistant Professor in an affiliated department of the University and a three-year appointment as a Postdoctoral Scholar in the Society of Fellows.
Award Provider: University of Michigan
Important Notes: At the end of each fellowship year, Fellows are asked to submit a written report on their activities and accomplishments during the year.

World Bank Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI) Preventing Gender-Based Violence Innovation Grants in Developing Countries 2017

Application Deadline: 6th October 2017
Eligible Countries: Low- and middle-income countries
About the Award: SVRI and the World Bank Group will disburse more than US$1 million to advance evidence-based interventions to prevent gender-based violence (GBV) in low- and middle-income countries.
The World Health Organization (WHO) estimates 35% of women worldwide have experienced physical or sexual partner violence or non-partner sexual violence, or roughly 938 million women.
The costs of gender-based violence are substantial. Violence against women and girls impedes their full participation in society, limits access to education and economic participation, and hinders efforts to achieve gender equality broadly. Selected country estimates suggest that in out-of-pocket expenditures, lost income, and reduced productivity, intimate partner violence alone can cost up to 4% of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP)—more than many governments spend on primary education.
In April 2017, the Bank Group and SVRI awarded 10 teams from around the world a total of US$1.14 million. The winners, chosen from more than 200 submissions by research institutions, NGOs, and aid and other organizations, were from Jordan, Egypt, Peru, Solomon Islands, Kyrgyzstan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Swaziland, Uganda and Dollo Ado Refugee Camp in Ethiopia.
Type: Grants
Selection Criteria: An expert panel will select winners engaged in research, interventions, or other activities related to GBV prevention based on overall merit, research/project design and methods, significance, project manager/team, and ethical considerations.
Number of Awards: Not specified
How to Apply: Applications must be received here
Award Providers: World Bank Group, Sexual Violence Research Initiative (SVRI)

The Woman Question in South Asia

Nyla Ali Khan

As I contemplate the significance of International Women’s Day, I wonder about the plight of women, not just in the developing world but in the developed world as well, who have been socialized to play second fiddle, demure, passive, and not seek either political or cultural empowerment.
I ask myself and my readers the following questions:
Can women play an important role in establishing a more inclusive democracy and new forums for citizen cooperation? Can female leaders lead the way by offering new ideas, building broad-based political coalitions, and working to bridge organizational divides? Should women active in politics must aim not just to improve the position of their particular organizations but also to forge connections between the group’s agendas for revival of democracy and reconstruction of society with the strategies and agendas of other groups in the population, who have also been deprived of empowerment? Can women’s groups, in this way, pave the way for sustainable peace, universal human rights, and security from violent threats of all kinds?
It is the peripheralized, of whom women form a large portion, that are concerned about structural changes that would enable transformations within entrenched structures and appropriate the peace building mission from the elitist national security constituency.
In contemporary Kashmiri society, the question of the role of women in the nationalist scenario remains a vexed one. Women, as evidenced by the work of constructive and rehabilitative work undertaken by political and social women activists in the former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir during both turbulent and peaceful times, have more or less power depending on their specific situation, and they can be relatively submissive in one situation and relatively assertive in another. Assessing women’s agency requires identifying and mapping power relations, the room to maneuver within each pigeonhole and the intransigence of boundaries (Hayward 1998: 29).
The level of a woman’s empowerment also varies according to factors such as class, caste, ethnicity, economic status, age, family position, etc. Also, structural supports that some women have access to bolster their commitment to action. In 1950, the government of J & K developed educational institutions for women on a large scale, including the first Government College for Women. This institution provided an emancipatory forum for the women of Kashmir, broadening their horizons and opportunities within established political and social spheres. Higher education in the state received a greater impetus with the establishment of the Jammu and Kashmir University (Misri 2002: 25–26). The mobilization of women from various socioeconomic classes meant that they could avail themselves of educational opportunities, enhance their professional skills, and attempt to reform existing structures so as to accommodate more women. The educational methods employed in these institutions were revisionist in nature, not revolutionary. But the militarization of the political and cultural discourse in the state in 1989–90 marginalized developmental issues and negated the plurality of ideologies through a non-negotiable value system.
I reinforce that in Kashmir there has been a dearth of secular women’s organizations working toward structural change that would enable gender equity.
Why is gender violence such a consistent feature of the insurgency and counterinsurgency that have wrenched apart the Indian subcontinent for decades? The equation of the native woman to the motherland in nationalist rhetoric has, in recent times, become more forceful. In effect, the native woman is constructed as a trough within which male aspirations are nurtured, and the most barbaric acts are justified as means to restore the lost dignity of women.
In one instance, the crime of a boy from a lower social caste against a woman from a higher upper caste in Meerawala village in the central province of Punjab, Pakistan, in 2002, was punished in a revealing way by the “sagacious” tribal jury. After days of thoughtful consideration, the jury gave the verdict that the culprit’s teenage sister, Mai, should be gang-raped by goons from the wronged social group. The tribal jury ruled that to save the honor of the upper-caste Mastoi clan, Mai’s brother, Shakoor, should marry the woman with whom he was accused of having an illicit relationship, while Mai was to be given away in marriage to a Mastoi man. The prosecution said that when she rejected the decision she was gang-raped by four Mastoi men and made to walk home semi-naked in front of hundreds of people. The lawyer for one of the accused argued the rape charge was invalid because Mai was technically married to the defendant at the time of the incident (“Pakistan Court Expected to Rule on Gang-Rape Case,” Khaleej Times, 27 August 2002).
Such acts of violence that occur on the Indian subcontinent bear testimony to the intersecting notions of nation, family and community. The horrific stories of women, in most instances attributed to folklore, underscore the complicity of official and nationalist historiography in perpetuating these notions. I might add that the feminization of the “homeland” as the “motherland,” for which Indian soldiers, Kashmiri nationalists in Indian-administered Kashmir and in Pakistan-administered Kashmir are willing to lay down their lives, serves in effect to preserve the native woman in pristine retardation. Although this essentialist portrayal of the Kashmiri woman in J & K is clearly suspect, it is embedded more deeply in quasi-feudal cultures of South Asia. Such cultures have been fiefdom of feudal lords whose only concern is with the impregnability of their authority and the replenishment of their coffers. Women in the quasi-feudal cultures and societies of South Asia are still confined within the parameters created by the paternalistic feudal culture that disallows the creation of a space for distinct subjectivities.
An increase in female representation, not just token women, in the Parliament, Legislative Assembly, Legislative Council, and Judiciary would facilitate a cultural shift in terms of gender role expectations, legitimizing a defiance of the normative structure. The intrusion of women into traditionally male domains would cause a perceptible erosion in the structural determinants of gender violence. Such a form of empowerment would “frame and facilitate the struggle for social justice and women’s equality through a transformation of economic, social and political structures” (Bisnath and Elson, “Women’s Empowerment Revisited”).
In the present scenario in Jammu and Kashmir, no thought is given either by the state authorities or by the insurgent groups to the pain of women who have been victims of the paramilitary forces and/or militant organizations.