Washington prepares to deploy “usable” nuclear weapons

Bill Van Auken

A Nuclear Posture Review that the Trump administration plans to roll out after the US President’s State of the Union address later this month will introduce a significant break with past policy in proposing the development of a new class of low-yield, “usable” nuclear weapons, those familiar with the document report.

While a massive $1.3 trillion, 30-year scheme to refurbish all the elements of the US nuclear “triad”—intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and strategic bombers—was introduced under the Obama administration, it had long been stated US policy not to build new types of nuclear warheads.

The former special assistant to the Obama administration on arms control and nonproliferation Jon Wolfsthal has told the media that he has seen what appeared to be a final draft of the review, which calls for the development and deployment of a modified version of the Trident D5 submarine-launched missile.

While the D5 missiles—which each cost approximately $66 million—carry warheads with over 30 times the destructive power of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945, the new weapons would include only the primary fission section of existing thermonuclear warheads, with a lower explosive yield.

The development of the new tactical nuclear weapons would represent a direct violation of the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty reached between Washington and Moscow in 1987. The Pentagon is justifying the breach of the treaty with the claim that the Russian military is already in violation of the treaty because of its development of a new ground-launched cruise missile.

The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) would be the first such revision of US policy on the use of the world’s most horrific weapons of mass destruction to be carried out in eight years.

Like the one carried out under Obama, the new review does not rule out a US nuclear first strike. The new NPR, however, also raises the prospect of the US using nuclear weapons in response to nonnuclear attacks.

In this regard, it merely makes explicit the position put forward in the National Security Strategy released last month which called for the preparation for conflict with China and Russia, which it defined as “revisionist powers” seeking to challenge US global hegemony. The document stated, “While nuclear deterrence strategies cannot prevent all conflict, they are essential to prevent nuclear attack, non-nuclear strategic attacks, and large-scale conventional aggression.”

Last September, Rob Soofer, the deputy assistant defense secretary for nuclear and missile defense policy, outlined an even broader range of triggers for a US nuclear attack, stating that the new review was considering how Washington could use nuclear weapons to “deter new non-nuclear attacks that could have strategic effects: catastrophic mass casualties, cyberattacks against US infrastructure, chemical or biological attacks, or attacks against US critical space capabilities.”

Soofer added that the new strategy under consideration envisioned “a broad range of forces of various ranges, various yields, some deployed in the theater, others employed from the United States, which can defeat Russia’s and China’s nuclear strategy.”

The overriding rationale for the development of the new “usable” Trident submarine-based cruise missiles is reportedly the Pentagon’s contention that should the increasingly tense situation created by NATO’s buildup of military forces on Russia’s western border boil over into an armed conflict, Moscow would use low-yield tactical nuclear weapons with the expectation that the US would not respond with an all-out thermonuclear attack. The theory, apparently, is that the new missile would allow the US military to respond in kind.

There has been no evidence produced by anyone that Moscow is committed to a wildly adventurist policy of launching tactical nuclear weapons against US forces based on the assumption that Washington would not unleash its nuclear arsenal in response.

Rather, the turn in US policy is toward developing weapons that would allow Washington to initiate a so-called “limited” nuclear war in pursuit of its global aims. The effect of the use of even a small number of such weapons would be catastrophic and, in all likelihood, would unleash a global nuclear conflagration.

The turn toward preparations for nuclear war with Russia is all the more extraordinary in that it is unfolding in the context of the ongoing investigation by special counsel Robert Mueller into allegations of “collusion” between the Trump campaign and Moscow in the 2016 election along with a virulent campaign by the Democratic Party to indict the Trump White House as too soft on Russia.

The Democratic caucus on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Tuesday released a minority report describing Russia as a “complex and growing threat” and accusing the Putin government of engaging in a “relentless assault to undermine democracy and the rule of law” in the US and Europe.

It continued by indicting Trump for failing to respond to Russia in the manner his predecessors in the White House had “following attacks like Pearl Harbor and 9/11.” The clear implication is that the Democratic Party is demanding a more aggressive preparation for a military confrontation between the world’s two largest nuclear powers.

Mass protests against unemployment shake Tunisian regime

Alex Lantier

Protests against unemployment and austerity that started this week in impoverished industrial areas of southern Tunisia are spreading nationwide. Protesters oppose the 2018 austerity budget, agreed with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), that cuts subsidies and raises fuel and food prices, amid stagnant wages and unemployment of 15 percent (over 30 percent for university graduates).

Masses of people recall how such protests escalated in 2011, ultimately toppling Tunisian President Zine El Abedine Bin Ali and triggering revolutionary struggles of the working class in Egypt. Protests are called for today in the capital, Tunis.

On Wednesday and Thursday, protests continued in southern Tunisia and reached working-class suburbs of the capital, Tunis. Youth stormed the city courthouse in Siliana and set up roadblocks in Kasserine, clashing violently with police. In Thala, protesters burnt the town’s national security building and forced police to retreat from the area. Protests erupted in Tebourba, a city 30km west of Tunis, after the burial of a man killed during a police crackdown on protests Monday night.

Clashes with police also broke out in the Ibn Khaldun neighborhood of Tunis. Ahmed, a youth who protested Wednesday night in Tunis, told RFI: “The cost of living in Tunisia is too high. It’s a catastrophe. There are two types of people: the rich and the poor.”

The clashes in Tunisia are the focal point of an international wave of protests against austerity measures dictated by international finance capital and imposed by governments across the region. Last year, mass protests erupted when the Egyptian regime agreed to IMF calls to slash food subsidies and briefly tried to hike bread prices. Now in Algeria, thousands of medical students are boycotting exams and marching to protest cuts to funding and supplies in the country’s hospitals.

And yesterday in Sudan, protests continued over bread price hikes, after the regime agreed to IMF demands to float the country’s currency against the dollar. Police attacked Khartoum University students who chanted, “No, no, no to price rises!” amid growing anger after a video emerged of an Ahfad University dean beating female students protesting high food prices.

This comes, moreover, amid a global escalation of class conflict—with strikes by pharmaceutical and municipal workers in Israel, autoworkers in Romania, rail workers in Britain, and metal workers in Germany—as the banks prepare explosive attacks on the European working class.

The Tunisian political system is discredited, and the ruling class is desperately trying to block a new revolutionary explosion. The government—a coalition of Nidaa Tounes, the rebranded version of Ben Ali’s old ruling party, and the Islamist Nahda party—is pledging repression and slandering protesters as saboteurs.

Tunisian army units are deploying to cities including Thala, Kebili and Bizerte, and the tourist resort of Sousse to hold government buildings against the population. The army is rounding up hundreds of people each night; approximately 600 people were arrested as of yesterday.

The ruling class is still terrified, however. Yesterday, Tunisia’s Le Temps wrote: “Mystery and confusion grow day to day and speeches, whether they be official or partisan, bring virtually nothing new... The widespread fear raises several questions including, essentially, that of identifying what is the miracle that will bring us peace.”

In a press conference Wednesday, Tunisian Prime Minister Youssef Chahed tried to reassure the bourgeoisie: “The State is still standing. We will guarantee the protection of all our institutions and corporations thanks precisely to the mobilization and surveillance by our military and police units, who have shown, as usual, a high sense of patriotism and unwavering devotion to the defense of the superior interests of the nation.”

Chahed denounced protesters as “destroyers paid for by networks of corruption, embezzlement and smuggling against which the government has decided to wage a ruthless war. Unfortunately, the thugs are being incited by certain irresponsible politicians.”

Yesterday in El Guettar, police arrested members of the Tunisian General Labor Union (UGTT), the pro-Ben Ali trade union, and of the petty-bourgeois Popular Front coalition—including Labor Party member Habib Tebas, UGTT official Jemal Cheaïcha, and Popular Front member Talal Tabassi. This repression is reactionary; those arrested should be released.

The fundamental issue, however, is that the working class needs to build a new revolutionary leadership, in Tunisia and internationally. Since 2011, the nationalist strategy of the UGTT and the Popular Front has been exposed as counterrevolutionary and bankrupt. Seeking a deal with Nidaa Tounes underwritten by the banks, they proved hostile to an international, revolutionary struggle of the working class. They succeeded only in tying workers in Tunisia to a rebranded version of the Ben Ali regime, to imperialism as it waged war in Libya and Mali, and to poverty.

The UGTT, a pillar of the Ben Ali regime, is hostile to protesting workers and youth. UGTT leader Noureddine Taboubi has denounced protests as “dubious,” declaring: “We will not accept under any pretext that demonstrators turn under cover of night into raiders of state property.” He demanded that any political party calling protests “control the demonstrators.”

Now, however, the UGTT has joined calls for protests in Tunis today.

Popular Front leader Hamma Hammami is not retracting calls for protests while youth are still fighting police and the army. But he is making clear he opposes a revolutionary overthrow of the Nidaa Tounes regime by the working class. He appealed yesterday to Chahed to “find solutions” to unemployment and select “an independent commission of national personalities known for their integrity and competence, to investigate the protests,” according to Tunisie Numérique .

Broad sections of the Tunisian bourgeoisie, and behind them their allies in the imperialist capitals, are hoping that these forces will control the situation, block a struggle for state power by the working class, and strangle the movement—as they did in 2011. In a column titled “The UGTT, the voice of reason,” Le Temps wrote: “While our country undergoes a new bout of social fever, this powerful trade union, whose capacity to control protests is well established, continues to exhibit the greatest patriotism.”

This new upsurge urgently raises the political lessons of the previous struggle. None of the problems that drove Tunisian workers to revolution in 2011 could be solved under capitalism. Poverty and social inequality grew, as imperialist wars devastated the region. The task now is a break with the old, nationally based organizations and a turn towards revolutionary struggles that are emerging internationally. The perspective laid out by the International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) during the initial revolutionary struggles in Tunisia has been vindicated.

It wrote, “The only viable program for the working class and oppressed masses of Tunisia and the entire Maghreb and Middle East is the program advanced by the International Committee of the Fourth International of socialist revolution. … This struggle cannot be conducted simply on a national scale. Trotskyist parties must be built throughout Northern Africa and the Middle East to unite the working masses under the banner of the United Socialist States of the Middle East and the Maghreb, as part of the world socialist revolution.”

Can India Complement and Gain from China’s Belt And Road Initiative?

Sreejith Nair

China will eventually embark on its vision of building roads, railways and pipelines across Eurasia, irrespective of India's endorsement of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This attempt to lay foundations of a Sino-centric Asia provides India opportunities and challenges alike. An obstructionist approach does not favour India’s interests. It would be more advantageous to complement BRI, providing key low cost links in the greater Chinese jigsaw to optimise competition for strategic space.

Where can India complement Chinese efforts in a way that benefits its own economic and strategic interests? The Central Asia-West Asia corridor is a branch of the BRI where India can reap significant gains. The corridor runs horizontally (east-west) across Asia from western China to Turkey. The connectivity project, North-South Transport Corridor (NSTC), which India is a part of, is a perfect economic complement to the BRI, because it runs vertically across Asia: from Mumbai to Moscow via Iran. Once interconnected, the two initiatives can boost intra-regional connectivity leading to a unified energy market in Asia, allowing for energy price rationalisation. Asia’s natural gas prices are currently the highest globally, almost twice the market price in Europe, and three times the market price in the US (World Energy Council Report, 2016). Greater regional connectivity pushes the bargaining power more in the buyer's favour - enabling lower prices - which are certainly in India's economic interests.

Moreover, India does not have to be a member of BRI to benefit from it. China has already signed transportation, customs cooperation, and quality assurance agreements with several BRI member countries. For India to be able to tap into the opportunities created by linking NSTC to BRI, it is important to pursue Free Trade Agreements (FTA) under an India-Central Asia FTA framework and an India-Eastern European Union FTA. These FTAs not only remove tariff barriers but also ensure competitiveness of Indian goods. The recent accession of India to the United Nations Transports Internationaux  Routiers (TIR) convention is a promising step in this direction. The TIR convention, which all Central Asian countries are signatories to, allows Indian traders to have access to fast, reliable, and hassle-free border transit across 70 countries.

In the long-term, the NSTC-BRI linkage coupled with FTAs have the potential to change Eurasia's trade and energy dynamics. This can be strengthened further through the integration of the strategic Chabahar port with the NSTC. Such a link up allows India to benefit from Chinese-constructed access to major markets and resource supplies in Central Asia, West Asia, and Europe by investing capital only in the last mile connectivity to Chabahar. Peripheral projects such as upgrading the NSTC's existing rail and road infrastructure and setting up satellite hubs for trade can act as value additions to complement the BRI architecture as and when required. The BRI-NSTC linkage thus helps Indian economic interests without making India directly dependent on China or requiring India to subsume its political interests within China's.  It is important to point out that linking NSTC to BRI is not equivalent to India joining BRI. Providing external connectivity to the BRI through complementary value additions is different from signing up as its member. A careful distinction such as this allows enough room for diplomatic manoeuvre. India can thus connect to BRI from the outside, while still abstaining from formally endorsing it.

These opportunities do not come without challenges. In evaluating the threats, it is imperative to factor in Chinese military presence in the Indian Ocean. In this context, connectivity between BRI and NSTC and its integration with Chabahar port, increase the stakeholders in trade through the Indian Ocean region. It allows the five Central Asian Republics and Russia the cheapest and the fastest access to the Indian Ocean, opening up new markets in ASEAN and Africa. The more countries depend on Indian Ocean-centric trade, with last mile connectivity provided by India, the less China will succeed in its attempts to militarise the Indian Ocean. This also opens up new balancing opportunities through forums like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (OIRA) on the soft side of the spectrum, graduating all the way up to the India-Australia-Japan-US Quad on the hard power end in the Indo-Pacific.

While economically countering China's USD 1.3 trillion investments in the region is not feasible, piggybacking on it for economic and political gains, with minimal, carefully planned supplements to it, is not only feasible but also strategically wise. Essentially, this would mean China investing  a lion’s share in BRI, and India adding to it marginally from the outside but reaping significant benefits. This 'complement and compete' strategy can seamlessly fit within a larger Indian counter strategy towards a China-centric Asia. This approach requires a comprehensive and holistic revaluation of the current strategy by Indian policy-makers.

Paid 5 Months Traineeship at the European Commission. Travel, €1,159 monthly stipend – 2018

Application Deadline: 31st January 2018

Offered annually? Twice in a year (Bi-annually)

Eligible Countries: All

To be taken at (country): Any allocated country in Europe within the EU

Eligible Field of Study: None. Interested candidate can only apply for one type of traineeship at a time – administrative or translation.

About the Award: A traineeship at the European Commission is much more than just a professional experience. Each batch of trainees organises a huge range of non-formal learning, social activities, from football to wine-tasting and much in between – in true bureaucratic fashion, each with its own organising committee. There are usually 40-50 of such activities to choose from.

The main social committee is the Trainees’ Committee, which organises parties and social events in Brussels and Luxembourg. Among the most popular events are the Job Fair, which is meant to help you work out your next steps in your professional life, and the prestigious Euroball.

Type: Internships/Jobs

Eligibility: The traineeship programme is open to university graduates, from all over the world who have a:

1. Degree of at least 3 years of study (minimum a Bachelor);
2. Very good knowledge of English or French or German (C1/C2 level in accordance with the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages);
3. Very good knowledge of a second EU official language (required for nationals of EU countries).

Candidate must have completed at least 3-years of study with a degree to apply for a Blue Book traineeship. Only if you have a certificate or an official confirmation from your university that you have at least a 3-year degree will you be eligible to apply.

Candidate can apply once per session but as many times as you want until you are finally selected. If you do not pass the pre-selection, or you are in the Blue Book but not selected for a traineeship, you will have to submit again your application. It will undergo again the pre-selection with no guarantee that you will successfully pass it and be in the Blue Book again.

Selection Criteria: Candidates are anonymously evaluated in the assessment phase by two different evaluators, on the basis of following criteria:

• Level of education (a full university degree of at least three years of studies is mandatory);
• Language level in one of the three European Commission working/procedural languages (English, French, German) other than your mother tongue/s (mandatory);
• Language level in the remaining European official languages and/or non EU-languages, if applicable;
• Relevance of work experience, if applicable;
• International profile – experience of living/working abroad (mobility);
• Motivation and quality of reasoning;
• IT Skills, organisational skills, publications and rare domains of study.

If they successfully pass the first phase of the pre-selection, candidates are “pre-identified” and admitted to the second phase of the pre-selection, i.e. verification of supporting documents/eligibility check.

For the level of education, candidates can send:

• the certificate/s with the final grade/s clearly mentioned;
• the Europass Diploma Supplement, if available;
• university transcripts.

Up to three relevant work experiences can be mentioned in the application. Only work experience that is related to the profile that is selected and lasted, uninterruptedly, more than 6 weeks should be declared. Traineeships made during university courses are already assessed as part of the education and shall not be mentioned as work experiences.

Number of Awardees: Not specified. Every year, there are about 1,300 places available.

Value of Traineeship: 

• You will receive a monthly grant of 1,159.40 € as of 1st March 2017 and reimbursement of travel expenses. Accident and health insurance can also be provided.
• hands-on experience in an international and multicultural environment. This can be an important enrichment for your further career.
• Visa costs and related medical fees may be reimbursed together with the travel expenditures.

Duration of Traineeship: October 2018-February 2019

How to Apply: Go here for more details

Visit Traineeship Webpage for details

Award Provider: The European Commission

ICFJ Reporting Fellowship on Early Childhood Development 2018

Application Deadline: 4th March, 2018

Eligible Countries: Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania.

About the Award: The International Center for Journalists (ICFJ), in partnership with the Children’s Investment Fund Foundation (CIFF) and Fundação Maria Cecilia Souto Vidigal, is recruiting for 8 Early Childhood Development Reporting Fellows. The goal of the fellowships is to improve news coverage of child health and form a global network of reporters covering this critically-important issue.

This is the third of three groups of fellows that will participate in the program between 2017 and 2019. The fellowship term for this second cohort will run from March 2018 – March 2019.

During the year-long program, the fellows will receive virtual training, mentoring and financial support to produce regular stories on nutrition and early-childhood development, relevant to their home countries.

The program will begin with a virtual orientation (webinar) after which each fellow will be assigned a mentor who will work with them as they produce stories on early childhood development issues. ICFJ will conduct regular webinars during the year of the fellowship.

ICFJ and its partners are currently working on selecting the dates and destinations for both trips. ICFJ will cover all of the fellowship expenses.

Eligiblility: The Fellowship is open to journalists covering issues of child health and development for news outlets based in Bangladesh, Brazil, India, Kenya, Nigeria and Tanzania. An ideal candidate will have previous experience covering early childhood development issues, but journalists who currently cover health or nutrition-related topics and are interested in increasing their coverage of children’s issues are welcome to apply.

Successful applicants must be employed by a news outlet or have a commitment to publish/broadcast from a news outlet to participate. Applicants must be proficient in English.Stories submitted may be written in your native language; however, reporting project proposals must be submitted in English.

Type: Fellowship

Selection Process: The winners will be selected by an international panel of judges that includes media professionals and representatives from ICFJ and CIFF.

Selection will be based on professional qualifications, relevant experience, previous reporting on childhood development, and demonstrated impact on policy or development issues.

Value of Fellowship:

•  ICFJ will cover all of the fellowship expenses.
• During the year-long program, the fellows will receive virtual training, mentoring and financial support to produce regular stories on nutrition and early-childhood development, relevant to their home countries.
• The program will begin with a virtual orientation (webinar) after which each fellow will be assigned a mentor who will work with them as they produce stories on early childhood development issues. ICFJ will conduct regular webinars during the year of the fellowship.
• The program also includes two reporting trips. ICFJ will send all fellows to a country that is implementing a successful and innovative approach to supporting childhood development. The fellows will meet with early childhood development experts in the field and will produce stories with the help of their mentors.

Duration of Fellowship: March 2018 – March 2019.

How to Apply: To become an ECD Reporting Fellow, candidates must complete a Fellowship application. Applicants should include:

• A resume or CV
• Examples of stories produced on early-childhood development
• A reporting-project proposal that outlines story ideas the Fellow will pursue and a reporting and publishing/broadcasting plan.

Entries must be submitted by 11:59p.m. U.S. Eastern time on Sunday, March 4, 2018. Apply here.

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details

Award Provider: The International Center for Journalists

DAAD Scholarships For Master of Research And Public Policy for sub-Saharan African Students 2018/2019

Application Deadline: 16th February, 2018

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: African countries

To be taken at (country): University of Nairobi; Maseno University; Egerton University; Uganda Christian University; Uganda Martyrs University; University of Dar es Salaam; and Mzumbe University.

About the Award: PASGR invites applications from eligible candidates for the DAAD In-Country/In-Region Scholarships for the MRPP.  The Partnership for African Social and Governance Research (PASGR) is an independent, non-partisan pan-African not-for-profit organisation working to enhance research excellence in governance and public policy that contributes to the overall wellbeing of women and men.

In its Higher Education Programme, PASGR works with twelve universities across seven African countries to implement a collaborative Master of Research and Public Policy (MRPP) programme. Seven of the twelve universities are located in East Africa.

Type: Masters

Eligibility: Eligible candidates must be citizens of a country in sub-Saharan Africa, admitted to study the Master of Research and Public Policy (MRPP) programme at any of the universities listed above. Applicants must hold a Bachelor’s and / or Master’s degree qualification with at least a second class honours upper division from any accredited university. The last university degree must have been completed less than six years ago at the time of application.

Female candidates and candidates from less privileged regions or groups as well as candidates with disabilities are especially encouraged to apply.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: The scholarships include tuition fees to the university according to the submitted fees structure, a monthly stipend to cover living costs and accommodation (at DAAD rates), as well as an annual study and research allowance.

Duration of Scholarship: Scholarships are available for up to a maximum of two years. The scholarship will be initially granted for one year and may be extended upon individual request and receipt of a complete application using using a form that DAAD will avail on its portal around March 2019.

How to Apply: 

1. Fully filled and signed PASGR Scholarship Application Form;
2. Signed curriculum vitae scanned in PDF. Please use the Europass CV template: http://europass.cedefop.europa.eu
3. Certified scanned PDF copies of all university degree certificates;
4. Certified scanned PDF copies of all university transcripts;
5. Proof of admission to the Master of Research and Public Policy, which may be a temporary admission letter including fee structure of the course (scanned PDF copy);
6. Letter of motivation (maximum 2 pages in PDF);
7. Academic reference from senior lecturer and proof of employment if applicable (scanned PDF copy); and,
8. A signed and scanned copy of this document: DAAD Scholars information sheet 2018

A complete application form must be sent to PASGR – scholarships@pasgr.org – together with all the application documents listed above by Friday, February 16, 2018 at 1700hrs.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Award Provider: Partnership for African Social and Governance Research, DAAD

Important Notes: Potential candidates who are not enrolled in the programme are advised to contact any of the universities listed above directly for admission first. Prospective students may request admission at a university within or outside their home country.

Mawazo PhD Scholars Programme for African Women 2018

Application Deadline: 2nd February 2018

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Citizens from any African country

To be taken at (country): Kenya

Field of Study: Any field of study, at the PhD level

About the Award: The goal of this programme is to build a strong pipeline of future researchers who are prepared to ask insightful questions about African development, and effectively communicate their results to both government and industry leaders and the general public.  We welcome applications from women in any academic discipline, with a preference for research projects focused on development-related topics, and using social science research methods. Mawazo PhD Scholars are expected to achieve the following goals during their fellowship year:

• Make substantial progress in collecting data for and/or writing up their current research project
• Develop a plan for identifying suitable journals and submitting their article for publication once it’s complete
• Identify outside research grants or post-docs, and submit at least two grant applications
• Participate in at least one academic conference
• Regularly attend training sessions and networking events in Nairobi (travel funding is available for Scholars who are based outside Nairobi)
• Publicise their work by speaking at public lectures arranged by Mawazo, writing blog posts and op-eds, and (if possible) making radio or TV appearances

Type: PhD

Selection/Eligibility Criteria: You should apply for the Mawazo PhD Scholars programme if you are:

• A woman under the age of 40 (as of 1 January 2018)
• A citizen of an African country
• Enrolled in a PhD programme at a Kenyan university, in any department
• Working on or about to begin working on an academic research project which is related to African development, and which is intended for publication
• Predominantly using social science research methods, rather than carrying out lab-based research.  (“Social science research methods” include archival research, interviews, surveys, quantitative analysis, machine learning, etc.   We draw this distinction for purely logistical reasons, as Mawazo is not equipped to support laboratory research)
• Currently living in Kenya, or otherwise able to travel to Nairobi at least two times per month for the rest of 2018

Value of Scholarship: Mawazo PhD Scholars receive the following benefits:

• A research grant worth Ksh 500,000 on average (precise value will vary depending on the amount needed for each Scholar’s research)
• Training in research methods, academic writing, grant writing, public engagement, and the publication process
• Research and editorial support from the Mawazo staff
• Travel grants for participation in regional or international conferences
• Connections to mentors, and industry and government leaders, in their field
• A dedicated desk at Mawazo’s office at Ikigai, Spring Valley, Nairobi

Duration of Scholarship: One year

How to Apply: The application for the 2018 PhD Scholars cohort is now open. All applications must be submitted through the online portal.

Visit Program Webpage for Details

Award Provider: Mawazo Institute

 Important Notes: Applications are only accepted through our online portal

PTDF Scholarships for Masters & PhD in Nigeria & Overseas 2018/2019

Application Deadline: 10th February 2018

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Nigeria

To be taken at (Universities): Germany, France and China

Eligible Fields of Study: Mainly engineering, technology and engineering management courses

About Scholarship: The Strategic Partnership Scholarship was developed to improve the Funds’ Overseas Scholarship Scheme by offering candidates the opportunity to benefit from a diversified pool of knowledge and the facilities offered by world-class institutions across the globe.

In recognition of the fact that the best education can be found on numerous shores, the Fund has sought out strategic partnerships in Germany, France and China where candidates are offered the opportunity to study in English-taught classes and conduct research in world-class facilities where they will also have the opportunity of experiencing new cultures and work environments.

Under this scheme, candidates are invited to apply through PTDF to specific programmes at the partner institutions in any of the three countries (full list of sponsored courses is available below). The award includes the provision of flight tickets, payment of health insurance, payment of tuition and bench fees (where applicable) as well as the provision of allowances to meet the costs of accommodation and living expenses. The programmes will also include language classes to aid scholars settle into their new environments. Please note that the Fund will be responsible for obtaining admissions for the candidates to their selected programmes.

Type: Masters, PhD scholarships

Selection Criteria and Eligibility: PTDF scholarships are highly competitive and only candidates who are outstanding across the board are selected. A selection committee will be constituted to assess applications using the following criteria;

• Academic merit as evidenced by quality of degrees, full academic transcripts, other professional qualifications acquired, and relevant publications to be referenced by applicant (PhD applicants only)
• Membership of professional bodies
• The viability of the study/research plan.

• Applicants are required to make a case for their scholarship by submitting a statement of purpose (maximum 500 words) stating the reason(s) they want to undertake the study, the relevance of the proposed study to the industry and its expected impact on national development.

Requirements

1. MSc
2. A minimum of Second Class Upper (2.1) qualification in their first degree or a Second Class Lower (2.2) with relevant industry experience
3. Must have completed the mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC)
4. Must be computer literate
5. Possession of 5 O/level credits including English Language.

1. PhD
2. Must have completed the mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC)
3. Must be computer literate
4. A minimum of Second Class Lower (2.2) in their first degree and a good second degree certificate;
5. Must submit a research proposal relevant to the oil and gas industry (of not more than 5 pages) to include: Topic, introduction, objective, methodology and mode of data collection;
6. Applicants must also include their masters degree project

Number of Scholarships: Several

Value of Scholarship: Full scholarship

Duration of Scholarship: for the duration of the degree programme

How to Apply: Application forms can be accessed online here. However applicants are advised to read through the requirements below before applying.

Visit Scholarship webpage for details to apply

Sponsors: The Petroleum Technology Development Fund (PTDF)

Bin Laden’s Murder Payment to Pakistan?

L. Ali Khan

This commentary explores whether the U.S. paid any money to Pakistan for the assassination of Osama Bin Laden. As the graph demonstrates, the U.S. paid over $500 million to Pakistan as counter-terrorism funds in 2011, the year Bin Laden was murdered in Abbottabad, a small city located 75 miles north of Islamabad.  This amount stands out on the chart as compared to the counter-terrorism funds paid to Pakistan before and after 2011.  The chart furnishes an intriguing indicator that something special was cooking in the enhanced partnership between the U.S. and Pakistan.

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009

On assuming the presidency in 2009, Barack Obama refocused on the 2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and agreed to draw in Pakistan more strongly to defeat the Al Qaeda operatives mounting fierce opposition to the U.S. occupying forces, a venture known as the AfPak policy. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee under the joint leadership of Senators Kerry and Lugar had proposed a significant increase in aid to Pakistan as a quid pro quo for measurable results to root out terrorism in the AfPak region.

In October 2009, Congress passed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act (The Act).  The Act defines counterterrorism “as efforts to defeat al Qaeda and other foreign terrorist organizations … or other individuals engaged in terrorist activity.” The Act recognizes that Pakistan “has been a valuable partner in the battle against al Qaeda … but much more needs to be accomplished.” The Act further notes: “Despite killing and capturing hundreds of al Qaeda operatives, such as Khalid Sheikh Muhammad,” Pakistan remains a sanctuary for al Qaeda and other terrorists.

The Act promises assistance in various fields and for various purposes. Assistance for each purpose is categorized and separated.  For example, the monies allocated for health, girls’ education, civil liberties, and other democratic, economic, and development purposes are separated from monies allocated for counterterrorism. Furthermore, counterterrorism is distinguished from counterinsurgency, a militant phenomenon attempting to overthrow the government and institutions of Pakistan. Accordingly, the security-related assistance provided for counterinsurgency must not be confused with the monies allocated for counterterrorism.

Murder Money

Therefore, under the Act’s classification logic, $500 million for 2011 were allocated exclusively for counterterrorism purposes, such as capturing and killing of al Qaeda operatives, including Osama bin Laden. We do not know how much money the U.S. spent in launching the operation carried out by the CIA and the Navy SEALs. The $500 million were disbursed to the government of Pakistan and this money should not be confused with the money that the U.S. spent in planning and executing the assassination operation, code-named Operation Neptune Spear.

Likewise, the $500 million for 2011 must not be confused with the other assistance provided for the suppression of counterinsurgency and for the displaced residents of Swat and other tribal areas. The successful Swat operation was conducted in May 2009, exactly two years before the May 2011 murder of Bin Laden. Furthermore, the Swat operation falls under the Act’s definition of counterinsurgency, and not counterterrorism, because the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) was striving to overthrow the control of Islamabad and establish its own writ in the area.

Questionable Spike in the Chart

As a legal professional, I understand that this commentary does not provide proof beyond reasonable doubt (a criminal law standard) or even with the preponderance of the evidence (a civil law standard) that $500 million were disbursed to Pakistan for facilitating the assassination of Bin Laden. The proof turns even more questionable because the Operation Neptune Spear was supposedly a secret operation conducted to the complete surprise of Pakistan armed forces and the civilian government of Asif Ali Zardari. There was no reason to bless Pakistan with $500 million if Pakistan delivered no help in the operation.

There are many possible (though not probable) reasons to explain the 2011 spike in the chart. Might be, the spike is simply a typographical error or a data provider’s mistake. Might be, there is a reason other than assassination for the extraordinary amount of counterterrorism money given to Pakistan in 2011. Might be, the 2011 counterterrorism money was planned but not actually spent.  There are several other mightbes.

Unless explained otherwise, the chart is eerie. It’s telling. It raises suspicion. It reveals a secret, as money trails do. As a legal professional, I ponder over the spike in the chart. I sit back and see it over and over again. My legal instincts are vexed and I wonder why such a hefty bag of counterterrorism money has not been donated to Pakistan either before or after the assassination of Osama bin Laden.

The Politics of the Cold War Between Iran and Saudi Arabia

Sohail Mahmood

Saudi Arabia and Iran are bitter rivals for power and influence in the Middle East and are engaged in a cold war in which proxy warfare is the preferred mode of conflict. Earlier, in 2008 Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah had famously called for the United States to “cut the head off the snake” by bombing Iran.

Today, Saudi Arabia and Iran back opposing sides in wars and have rival interests and alliances across the Middle East. Iran seeks leadership of the minority Shias, while Saudi Arabia considers itself as the natural leader of the majority Sunnis. Very often these regional conflicts see Sunni Saudi Arabia and Shia Iran supporting different factions that are often split down sectarian lines. Clearly, the tensions between Saudi Arabia and Iran are also a struggle for religious authority in the Middle East.

Today, relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran have deteriorated to a new historic low.

Very recently, Prince Mohammad Bin Salman, Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince called the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “the new Hitler of the Middle East”, suggesting Iran’s expansion needed to be confronted. Earlier, Prince Mohammad said that the kingdom would make sure any future struggle between the two countries “is waged in Iran”.

The current unrest in Iran is adding to the tension between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The protests began on Dec. 28, 2017 after the Iranian government announced plans to raise fuel prices and cut monthly cash handouts to lower-income Iranians.  These protests had initially focused on economic issues but later turned into wider anti-government sentiment. Clearly, Iran’s foreign interventions, along with falling oil prices, have tightened the flow of cash needed to support the national economy, which already suffered from high youth unemployment. Undoubtedly, Iran has its own domestic challenges to contend with. The current unrest has led to the death of 22 people. On January 7, 2018 Iran’s powerful Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said that the regime has ended the wave of unrest linked to the protests which has led to the death of 22 people.

As expected, Iran’s leaders are blaming Saudi Arabia, among others, for the current unrest in the country Iranian Attorney General Mohammad Jafar Montazeri said on January 4, 2018 that the CIA and Israel’s Mossad were backing the protests as part of an alleged Saudi-financed plot to destabilize Iran. On January 5, 2018 Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif accused Saudi Arabia and the United States of colluding with the Islamic State militant group (ISIS) to “endorse violence, death and destruction in Iran.” Zarif stated on January 8, 2018 that the Saudi-led military invasion of Yemen is “one of the key factors creating tension in the region,” adding that after engaging in 33 months of futile warfare, the invaders should have come to the realization that Yemen’s crisis will require a political solution, and that negotiation and consensus alone can contribute to the ultimate resolution of the situation.

Meanwhile, confrontation with Iran is a popular cause in Saudi Arabia and most of its allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council. Undoubtedly, recent Iranian expansionism has rattled Saudi Arabia. Iran has gained influence in the region as a Shia zone of influence was successfully established in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen which stretches from the Mediterranean Sea to Tehran. Russia has assisted Iran in this development. Earlier, in 2016, Saudi Arabia’s strongman, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had sounded the alarm and talked of the danger of the rise of the Shia zone and further warned of Iran’s influence in Sudan, Pakistan and Djibouti.

Meanwhile, French President Emmanuel Macron has accused the U.S., Israel and Saudi Arabia of instigating a war as their mutual foe, Iran, was rocked by protests. On January 3, 2018 he called for dialogue with Tehran and criticized three of his international partners for pursuing what he considered bellicose policies toward a country the trio have increasingly sought to isolate and undermine in recent years.

Though Saudi Arabian media has eagerly carried news of the unrest in Iran, the government has kept its silence on the matter. Undoubtedly, Saudis are quietly acting through their proxies to combat Iran. Saudi Arabia, along with the United States is attempting to isolate Iran diplomatically and is very supportive of Trump admiration’s attempts to place Iran with new sanctions over its missile program and backing for groups designed as foreign terrorist organizations.

Earlier, Saudi Arabia convened its Arab League allies in Cairo for an emergency meeting to discuss what it said were “violations” in the region. The group criticized Iran and its Lebanese Shi’ite ally Hezbollah and called for a united front to counter Iranian interference. “The kingdom will not stand by and will not hesitate to defend its security,” Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel Al-Jubeir told the assembly.

Iran’s increasing support for Shiite militias is well-documented. Lebanese Hezbollah has evolved into a central pillar of Iran’s capability against Israel. The Hezbollah even provides ground forces to bolster the Assad regime in Syria. Iran has played a vital role in helping Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his allies overcome a 2011 uprising by jihadis and rebels, some of whom were backed by Saudi Arabia.

Iran’s support for mostly Shiite Muslim militias in Syria and Iraq helped put an end to the territorial expansion of the Islamic State militant group (ISIS), but also gave Iran a larger foothold across the region, stretching from Tehran through Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut.

In Iraq the Iranian-backed militias have been provided with Iranian air support, artillery, electronic warfare equipment and medical support. Badr, the main Shiite militia in Iraq, fought as a military division in the Iranian order of battle during the Iran-Iraq War. Badr now leads Iraq’s largest security institution, the half-million Ministry of Interior, and the Shia militias are being formed into a proto-ministry that resembles their patron, IRGC.

In a surprising move Saudi Arabia reached out to Israel to thwart the rising power of Iran, which they both fear and resent. On January 7, 2018, Israel’s energy minister confirmed that there had been what he called “covert” contacts between Saudi Arabia and Israel amid concerns over Iran but suggested that Saudi Arabia had wanted to keep “the ties quiet,”

Israel views Saudi Arabia as a natural ally due to their mutual enmity for Iran. Israel has labeled Iran an existential threat. Regional developments are now establishing an informal axis between the United States, Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Both countries were vicious critics of former President Barack Obama’s 2015 nuclear deal with Iran and have been proponents of President Donald Trump’s efforts to scrap it. Also, both Israel and Saudi Arabia have opposed Iranian support for foreign political and militant movements across the region. Iran was crucial in creating and supporting the powerful Lebanese Shia Muslim movement Hezbollah, which twice forced Israel into a stalemate in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, the conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia is destabilizing the region as it now involves the United States and Russia backing opposite sides. In Syria, Iran and Russia have consistently backed Assad; while Saudi Arabia is supporting rebel groups.  While, the United States fought against the Islamic State, it did not oppose the Assad regime in any meaningful manner. In Yemen, Saudi Arabia has waged war against the country’s Houthi rebels, complete with a blockade of the country and airstrikes. The United States backs Saudi Arabia in its Yemen intervention.  More than 10,000 civilians have died in the conflict. In Iraq, the Saudi Arabia and Iran are at odds over efforts to rebuild after the collapse of the Islamic State.

In Lebanon, Saudi Arabia opposes Iran’s ally Hezbollah, which has wide influence in the country. However, the Saudis have failed in their attempt to contain the Hezbollah and Iranian influence in the country. Seemingly, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry has become the organizing principle for future Mideast alliances, with the United Sates backing Saudi Arabia and Russia backing Iran, and others taking sides.

The Iranian hardliners wish to continue their expansionist policy in the region. Further Iranian advances shall translate into an escalation of the confrontation with Saudi Arabia.  The conflict in Yemen between forces loyal to the government of President Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, a Sunni, and those allied to the Shia Houthi rebels is largely a proxy war between Saudi Arabia and Iran.

Earlier, in 2009, Riyadh had launched a short, failed military campaign against the Houthi rebels in Yemen. This led to Saudi Arabian, Jordanian and UAE support for the anti-Houthi militias in Yemen. The Saudi Coalition airstrikes began in March 2015 in response to Houthi rebels’ seizing control of much of Yemen in late 2014. The Houthi uprising forced Hadi to flee abroad in March 2015 which led to the start of Saudi airstrikes. Saudi Arabia desires to restore the Hadi government while Iran backs the Shia Houthi rebels loyal to the country’s former President Ali Abdulla Saleh, who was killed very recently by Houthi rebels.  Today, the Houthis are inflicting heavy damage on the Saudi military, seizing terrain in southern Saudi Arabia and firing missiles at military bases deep within the kingdom. Saudi Arabia accuses Iran of backing the Houthis. Now the Gulf States are building up new proxy forces in Yemen to assist in the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis.

Meanwhile, Yemen’s destitute civilian population has been caught in the middle of the conflict.  The starved population has been pushed to the brink of famine and is facing the world’s worst cholera epidemic. Since March 2015, the Yemen war has claimed 10,000 victims with 20 million more in dire need of assistance. The Yemen intervention is proving costly for Saudi Arabia. Given the lack of a credible alternative, the Yemeni conflict shall continue..

Saudi Arabia also accuses Iran of intervention in majority-Shia Bahrain, where the pro-Saudi Sunni Muslim royal family blames Iran-backed militants for fermenting unrest in the past and also recent terrorist incidents.

The rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran will continue unabated in the future, leading to further regional chaos. Iran is bent on a costly military buildup and is projecting its influence in the region. It has largely accomplished a decrease in Saudi Arabia’s regional influence and therefore thwarted a direct attack from its rival. Overall, the region will be further destabilized. Most likely, the current battlegrounds in Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, Pakistan and Lebanon shall continue to exist in the future. While, the existing pattern of proxy warfare between Iran and Saudi Arabia shall intensify, the possibility of a direct clash remains unimaginable.