The German government’s “security package”: a further step towards a police state

Marianne Arens

Germany’s Scholz government is in the process of building a police state against the working class. This is demonstrated by the new “security package” from Interior Minister Nancy Faeser (Social Democrat, SPD). The package further undermines the right of asylum, tightens gun laws and gives the federal police and the domestic intelligence service more powers.

Minister of the Interior Nancy Faeser and her Polish counterpart Tomasz Siemoniak at the heavily guarded Polish border with Belarus [Photo by gov.pl / CC BY 3.0]

The package, which consists of two new laws—“Improving Internal Security and the Asylum System” and “Improving the Fight against Terrorism”—was adopted in the Bundestag (parliament) on October 18 with the votes of the coalition parties, the SPD, Liberal Democrats (FDP) and Greens. Minister Faeser commented that it was “the right answer to the current threats from Islamist terrorism, from antisemitism, from right- and left-wing extremism.”

However, the package was partially blocked on the same day by the Bundesrat (Upper Chamber), which objected to not providing biometric data matching for the security authorities. At the same time, the Christian Democrat (CDU/CSU) state premiers made it clear that the package did not go far enough for them, and the CDU interior minister of North Rhine-Westphalia, Herbert Reul, called on Deutschlandfunk radio for even more leeway for the police and the Office for the Protection of the Constitution, as Germany’s domestic intelligence agency is called.

Meanwhile, large parts of the package concerning the right of asylum and the law on firearms had already come into force at the end of October.

Attacks on refugees

The attacks on the right to asylum in particular are aimed at dividing and intimidating the working class. They expand the “major repatriation package” that the Scholz cabinet passed in June. The door is being opened to arbitrary actions, because in the future, the grounds for deportation will also include crimes with a “xenophobic or inhumane” motive, including “antisemitism, racism, sexism or queer hostility.”

The number of deportations, which has already increased significantly, is set to rise sharply again. Almost 10,000 people were deported in the first half of 2024. The government is now also in negotiations with Turkey about weekly mass deportation flights. Since August, deportations have also been taking place to Afghanistan, and Minister Faeser promises: “We are currently working on Syria.”

The asylum and residence laws are being increasingly restricted. For example, the aim is to withdraw all benefits from so-called “Dublin cases,” i.e., people who are already registered in another EU country, within two weeks. In addition, the double punishment of convicted criminals through deportation is to be enforced even more rigorously. In future, anyone entitled to asylum who briefly visits their home country will lose all protections.

The aggressive political agitation has led to a wave of protest letters and many people leaving the Green Party. According to Pro Asyl, the provisions are “obviously contrary to the German constitution and European law.” However, “it cannot be ruled out that some authorities will begin to try to implement the will of the legislature 1:1” and that “those affected will not have sufficient support for legal action.” As a result, “homelessness of people seeking protection, which has so far been unknown in Germany, could actually occur,” warns Pro Asyl.

A declaration against the new laws has thousands of signatures, including organisations such as Amnesty International, Pro Asyl, various charities including Der Paritätische, Deutsches Kinderhilfswerk, Internationaler Bund (IB), IPPNW, Kindernothilfe, Save the Children, Terre des Hommes, etc. The declaration states:

People who have fled to Germany are part of our society: they work and get involved here, raise their children here and belong here. The misconduct of individuals must never lead to the blanket stigmatisation, racialisation and labelling of certain groups of people as not belonging. We will not be divided.

Gun control and the police

In order to strengthen “internal security,” gun laws are also being tightened. Not only should the trustworthiness of gun owners be better checked in the future, the ban on knives is being extended and will in future apply to public festivals and other public events, as well as to public transport, train stations and all “crime hotspots.”

Clubs for hunters and marksmen are already opposing this, arguing that people who are about to commit terrorist acts like those in Mannheim or Solingen are hardly likely to care about such administrative offences.

Enforcing knife bans requires significantly more police officers, who must also be given more powers. For example, they must then be allowed to carry out checks without prior suspicion. This is exactly what the government intends to do, as it increasingly tramples on fundamental democratic rights such as freedom of expression and assembly.

In recent months, the police have been deployed with increasing frequency to suppress peaceful rallies, for example by environmental activists of the Last Generation or by people protesting against the Israeli massacre of Palestinians.

The consequences of this can be seen in a statistic recently published by the dpa news agency. It has evaluated police reports this year and concludes that police officers have already shot 17 people in 2024. This is significantly more than in the same period in all the years before. Police have very often shot and killed people “who were in an exceptional psychological situation or were already being treated for mental illness.”

Heated atmosphere

In public, almost all the voices to be heard from the media and political parties are those that support the government or call on it to enact even tougher laws.

For example, Sahra Wagenknecht criticises the Interior Minister from the right. The BSW chairwoman writes: “For years, Interior Minister Faeser has slowed down the fight against uncontrolled migration … Her failures are being paid for by citizens, local authorities and the police every day.” According to Wagenknecht, in the evenings, train stations “have become no-go areas, especially for women.”

The mainstream media (not only the tabloid Bild) carry reports almost daily on “foreign criminals,” “integration refuseniks” and the “failure of the asylum system,” etc.

In this heated atmosphere, observers from charities Diakonie and Caritas at Frankfurt Airport have reported an increasing number of truly brutal deportations. People are taken to the flights without the barest of necessities, “in slippers and flip-flops,” and often handcuffed. In most cases, those affected have had no opportunity to pack or withdraw money from their accounts beforehand.

One terrible example is the deportation of 18-year-old Aysu on September 12 from Hesse, where she could have started training as a nursing assistant. She was deported to Azerbaijan, where she has no family or friends. This happened completely unexpectedly for her foster family.

While the daily life of the population is becoming increasingly insecure in terms of work, family and finances, the coalition government’s “security package” is playing into the hands of growing fascism and the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD), whose programme of “remigration” it is effectively adopting.

This can only be understood in the context of the current attacks on wages and jobs. The railways, public services and car industry (most recently at VW) are cutting jobs, closing plants, privatising and cutting wages, while the costs of the pro-war policy are exacerbating the situation. This is provoking explosive class struggles. That is why the government is striving for more “security” in an almost panicked manner—not for working people, but for the ruling class and the capitalist state.

The foreign policy of the bourgeois politicians shows what they are capable of. All the establishment parties, from the coalition government and the opposition, support Israel’s genocide in Gaza. In Ukraine, they are arming the Zelensky regime, which openly relies on fascists.

Faeser’s idea of “security” was demonstrated this week in Poland: she visited the border with Belarus, which is guarded by metres-high border fences, barbed wire, an electronic surveillance system and heavily armed security guards, where she suggested that EU Frontex forces should also be deployed in the future.

Which Countries Are on the Brink of Going Nuclear?

John P. Ruehl

Photo by Burgess Milner

Following Israel’s October 26, 2024, attack on Iranian energy facilities, Iran vowed to respond with “all available tools,” sparking fears it could soon produce a nuclear weapon to pose a more credible threat. The country’s breakout time—the period required to develop a nuclear bomb—is now estimated in weeks, and Tehran could proceed with weaponization if it believes itself or its proxies are losing ground to Israel.

Iran isn’t the only nation advancing its nuclear capabilities in recent years. In 2019, the U.S. withdrew from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF), which banned intermediate-range land-based missiles, citing alleged Russian violations and China’s non-involvement. The U.S. is also modernizing its nuclear arsenal, with plans to deploy nuclear weapons in more NATO states and proposals to extend its nuclear umbrella to Taiwan.

Russia, too, has intensified its nuclear posture, expanding nuclear military drills and updating its nuclear policies on first use. In 2023, it suspended participation in the New START missile treaty, which limited U.S. and Russian deployed nuclear weapons and delivery systems, and stationed nuclear weapons in Belarus in 2024. Russia and China have also deepened their nuclear cooperation, setting China on a path to rapidly expand its arsenal, as nuclear security collaboration with the U.S. has steadily diminished over the past decade.

The breakdown of diplomacy and rising nuclear brinkmanship among major powers are heightening nuclear insecurity among themselves, but also risk spurring a new nuclear arms race. Alongside Iran, numerous countries maintain the technological infrastructure to quickly build nuclear weapons. Preventing nuclear proliferation would require significant collaboration among major powers, a prospect currently out of reach.

The U.S. detonated the first nuclear weapon in 1945, followed by the Soviet Union (1949), the UK (1952), France (1960), and China (1964). It became evident that with access to uranium and enrichment technology, nations were increasingly capable of producing nuclear weapons. Though mass production and delivery capabilities were additional hurdles, it was widely expected in the early Cold War that many states would soon join the nuclear club. Israel developed nuclear capabilities in the 1960s, India detonated its first bomb in 1974, and South Africa built its first by 1979. Other countries, including Brazil, Argentina, Australia, Sweden, Egypt, and Switzerland, pursued their own programs.

However, the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), enacted in 1968 to curb nuclear spread, led many countries to abandon or dismantle their programs. After the end of the Cold War and under Western pressure, Iraq ended its nuclear program in 1991, and South Africa, in a historic move, voluntarily dismantled its arsenal in 1994. Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine relinquished the nuclear weapons they inherited after the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1996, securing international security assurances in exchange.

Nuclear proliferation appeared to be a waning concern, but cracks soon appeared in the non-proliferation framework. Pakistan conducted its first nuclear test in 1998, followed by North Korea in 2006, bringing the count of nuclear-armed states to nine. Since then, Iran’s nuclear weapons program, initiated in the 1980s, has been a major target of Western non-proliferation efforts.

Iran has a strong reason to persist. Ukraine’s former nuclear arsenal might have deterred Russian aggression in 2014 and 2022, while Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi, who dismantled the country’s nuclear program in 2003, was overthrown by a NATO-led coalition and local forces in 2011. If Iran achieves a functional nuclear weapon, it will lose the ability to leverage its nuclear program as a bargaining chip to extract concessions in negotiations. While a nuclear weapon will represent a new form of leverage, it would also intensify pressure from the U.S. and Israel, both of whom have engaged in a cycle of escalating, sometimes deadly, confrontations with Iran and its proxies over the past few years.

An Iranian nuclear arsenal could also ignite a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. Its relations with Saudi Arabia remain delicate, despite the 2023 détente brokered by China, and Saudi officials have previously indicated they would obtain their own nuclear weapon if Iran acquired them. Saudi Arabia gave significant backing to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, with the understanding that Pakistan could extend its nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, or even supply the latter with one upon request.

Turkey, which hosts U.S. nuclear weapons through NATO’s sharing program, signaled a policy shift in 2019 when President Erdogan criticized foreign powers for dictating Turkey’s ability to build its own nuclear weapon. Turkey’s growing partnership with Russia in nuclear energy could meanwhile provide it with the enrichment expertise needed to eventually do so.

Middle Eastern tensions are not the only force threatening non-proliferation. Japan’s renewed friction with China, North Korea, and Russia over the past decade has intensified Tokyo’s focus on nuclear readiness. Although Japan developed a nuclear program in the 1940s, it was dismantled after World War II. Japan’s breakout period, however, remains measured in months, but public support for nuclear weapons remains low, given the legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, where nuclear bombings in 1945 killed more than 200,000 people.

In contrast, around 70 percent of South Koreans support developing nuclear weapons. South Korea’s nuclear program began in the 1970s but was discontinued under U.S. pressure. However, North Korea’s successful test in 2006 and its severance of economic, political, and physical links to the South in the past decade, coupled with the abandonment of peaceful reunification in early 2024, has again raised the issue in South Korea.

Taiwan pursued a nuclear weapons program in the 1970s, which similarly ended under U.S. pressure. Any sign of wavering U.S. commitment to Taiwan, together with China’s growing nuclear capabilities, could prompt Taiwan to revive its efforts. Though less likely, territorial disputes in the South China Sea could also motivate countries like Vietnam and the Philippines to consider developing nuclear capabilities.

Russia’s war in Ukraine has also had significant nuclear implications. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky recently suggested to the European Council that a nuclear arsenal might be Ukraine’s only deterrent if NATO membership is not offered. Zelensky later walked back his comments after they ignited a firestorm of controversy. Yet if Ukraine feels betrayed by its Western partners—particularly if it is forced to concede territory to Russia—it could spur some factions within Ukraine to attempt to secure nuclear capabilities.

The war has also spurred nuclear considerations across Europe. In December 2023, former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer endorsed a European nuclear deterrent. A Trump re-election could amplify European concerns over U.S. commitments to NATO, with France having increasingly proposed an independent European nuclear force in recent years.

Established nuclear powers are unlikely to welcome more countries into their ranks. But while China and Russia don’t necessarily desire this outcome, they recognize the West’s concerns are greater, with Russia doing little in the 1990s to prevent its unemployed nuclear scientists from aiding North Korea’s program.

The U.S. has also previously been blindsided by its allies’ nuclear aspirations. U.S. policymakers underestimated Australia’s determination to pursue a nuclear weapons program in the 1950s and 1960s, including covert attempts to obtain a weapon from the UK. Similarly, the U.S. was initially unaware of France’s extensive support for Israel’s nuclear development in the 1950s and 1960s.

Smaller countries are also capable of aiding one another’s nuclear ambitions. Argentina offered considerable support to Israel’s program, while Israel assisted South Africa’s. Saudi Arabia financed Pakistan’s nuclear development, and Pakistan’s top nuclear scientist is suspected of having aided Iran, Libya, and North Korea with their programs in the 1980s.

Conflicts involving nuclear weapons states are not without precedent. Egypt and Syria attacked nuclear-armed Israel in 1973, and Argentina faced a nuclear-armed UK in 1982. India and China have clashed over their border on several occasions, and Ukraine continues to resist Russian aggression. But conflicts featuring nuclear countries invite dangerous escalation, and the risk grows if a nation with limited conventional military power gains nuclear capabilities; lacking other means of defense or retaliation, it may be more tempted to resort to nuclear weapons as its only viable option.

The costs of maintaining nuclear arsenals are already steep. In 2023, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states spent an estimated $91.4 billion managing their programs. But what incentive do smaller countries have to abandon nuclear ambitions entirely, especially when they observe the protection nuclear weapons offer and witness the major powers intensifying their nuclear strategies?

Obtaining the world’s most powerful weapons may be a natural ambition of military and intelligence sectors, but it hinges on the political forces in power as well. In Iran, moderates could counterbalance hardliners, while continued support for Ukraine might prevent more nationalist forces from coming to power there.

Yet an additional country obtaining a nuclear weapon could set off a cascade of others. While larger powers are currently leading the nuclear posturing, smaller countries may see an opportunity amid the disorder. The limited support for the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, in effect since 2021, as well as the breaking down of other international treaties, reinforces the lingering allure of nuclear arms even among non-nuclear states. With major powers in open contention, the barriers to nuclear ambitions are already weakening, making it ever harder to dissuade smaller nations from pursuing the ultimate deterrent.

Volkswagen demands 20 percent wage cut

Peter Schwarz

Volkswagen wants to cut the wages of its 120,000 employees in Germany by almost 20 percent, thereby saving €2 billion a year. This became known on Wednesday evening after the second round of negotiations on the VW company wage agreement.

VW factory gate in Wolfsburg

Finance daily Handelsblatt had already reported on the proposed cuts in advance:

• Wages will be reduced by 10 percent (instead of the demanded 7 percent increase) and frozen for the years 2025 and 2026.
• Supplementary payments, bonuses and gratuities will be cancelled without replacement.
• Older workers who have been able to reduce their weekly working hours to between 25 and 33 hours (on the assembly line) or 26 and 34 hours (in administration) since the “Future Pact” contract of 2005 will have to work a full 35 hours again.
• Temporary workers will no longer be paid according to VW’s own wage scales, but rather according to the lower industry scales.
• The number of apprentices will be reduced from 1,400 per year.

The threat of mass layoffs and the closure of entire plants is still on the table with this provocative offer. Volkswagen wants to save a total of almost €4 billion a year. But management has indicated that it would be willing to discuss the preservation of production locations if the IG Metall union and the works council agree to massive wage cuts, whereby maintaining a location does not mean that all jobs will remain.

A wage reduction, as provocatively being demanded by the VW management, is unprecedented in post-war German history. For many VW workers who have families, houses to pay for and other obligations to meet, it would be financially devastating. Nevertheless, the IG Metall and the works council have already signaled their willingness to compromise.

Since the head of the works council, Daniela Cavallo, went public on Monday with the warning that VW intended to close three plants and lay off tens of thousands, all statements by the works council and IG Metall officials have focused on the demand to maintain all locations. They did not question the company’s cost-cutting targets, nor did they call for a fight against them.

Instead, they demanded management work very closely with them on the cuts and job losses, as it has in the past. IG Metall negotiator Thorsten Gröger, for example, declared that a “viable future concept for all locations” was the “entry ticket” for further negotiations.

By a “viable future concept,” Gröger means—just as VW boss Oliver Blume and the shareholder families Porsche and Piëch do—a concept that yields at least a 6.5 percent return.

Stephan Weil (Social Democrat, SPD), State Premier of Lower Saxony, which holds a 20 percent stake in the VW Group and where the company headquarters and main plant are situated, also stated that it was crucial “to maintain the industrial substance of the automotive industry in Lower Saxony,” and that all sides would have to contribute to this.

Coinciding with the second round of contract bargaining, Volkswagen reported a 64 percent drop in profits for the third quarter compared to the same period last year. But if one takes a closer look at the figures, the shareholders and managers are continuing to make massive profits.

In 2023, the group as a whole, which also includes brands such as Škoda, Seat, Audi and Porsche, posted record sales of €332 billion and a profit of €22.6 billion. It paid out €4.5 billion in dividends, more than is now to be saved on the VW brand in one year.

The VW Group was thus in line with the trend. The 40 most valuable German companies listed on the DAX stock index distributed a total of €54 billion in dividends in 2023–also a historic record. The front-runner was the Mercedes-Benz car company, which gave its shareholders €5.5 billion.

The Volkswagen brand, which has the lowest return on investment in the VW Group, is still in the black despite the slump in profits. It generated a surplus of €1.6 billion in the third quarter of 2024.

The austerity programme, for which the workers at VW are to pay with their jobs and incomes, is a consequence of the bitter global struggle for market share and profits, which is being fought on the backs of the international working class and is increasingly taking the form of trade wars and outright war.

Volkswagen is rapidly losing market share, especially in China, where it sold one in three cars until recently. Last spring, Volkswagen lost its position as market leader there to the Chinese electric carmaker BYD. BYD now sells more cars in China than all VW brands–Volkswagen, Audi, Porsche, Skoda, Jetta and Sehol–combined.