Mathew Gray
The spectacular emergence of ISIS – the
acronym stands for “the Islamic State
in Iraq and Syria” or, more precisely,
“the Islamic State in Iraq and al-
Shams,” “al-Shams” effectively meaning the
Levant – appears remarkable at first glance.
Seemingly out of nowhere, it has overrun
several key towns and cities in the central-
north and central-west of Iraq, including
Iraq’s second-largest city, Mosul. As they
advance, ISIS fighters have brutally abused
their enemies and imposed their extreme
interpretation of an Islamic state on local
populations. They seem to combine the
fervour of an ideologically driven terrorist
group and the strength of a well-organised
militia, and few people appear willing to
resist them.
But these are early days in this newest battle
for Iraq’s future. ISIS may prove to be much
less potent than it appears; certainly, it speaks
for very few Iraqis. It faces formidable
challenges in holding territorial gains and
transforming into anything close to a
functional government. And it has a lot more
enemies than friends among the foreign
governments with a stake in Iraq’s future.
ISIS’s dramatic rise is not so much a
reflection of its capabilities as it is of the
weak opposition it has encountered thus far.
Its forces are highly motivated, for sure, and
its leadership has “sold” ISIS very skilfully on
social media and deftly created local sources
of revenue in Syria. Many of its fighters have
extensive combat experience in Iraq or Syria.
This sounds ominous, especially since around
800 ISIS fighters overran some 30,000 Iraqi
army soldiers and took Mosul on 10 June. But
in Mosul, the Iraqi soldiers probably fled out
of surprise and because of an unwillingness to
fight for an unpopular government and prime
minister in Baghdad, not just out of ineptness
or cowardice. Because many of the soldiers
were Sunni, moreover, they are less
threatened by ISIS than the Shiites, who are
seen as apostates by ISIS’s Sunni extremists.
And Mosul, while certainly a mixed Sunni–
Shiite city, is disproportionately Sunni and
has long been in violent disarray. In other
words, it was an easy target for a group like
ISIS.
On the same day, the Iraqi army also fled
from Kirkuk in disarray, this time in the face
of Kurdish peshmerga militia who took the
chance to seize the disputed city. The lesson
here is that the peshmerga is a strong, very
disciplined and well-trained fighting force,
far superior to most units of the Iraqi army.
These events do not mean that ISIS is about to
take Iraq as a whole, or even the Arab parts of
it. There is even a chance that they will
defeated on the battlefield – although what is
left of them would almost certainly regroup in
the future as a new group, just as ISIS is the
successor of al Qaeda in Iraq.
The challenges to ISIS in the longer-term are
several. Perhaps most obviously, the
organisation is extreme and small in number.
It probably has no more than two or three
thousand fighters in Syria and perhaps 7000
in Iraq, although these figures are little more
than guesstimates. Any higher number,
however, would probably include like-minded
or opportunistic Sunni militias. Weak as it is
in many respects, the 270,000-strong Iraqi
army is so much larger, and among its ranks
are many Shiites who see ISIS as a grave
threat to themselves and their families. More
importantly, ISIS would have little chance
against up to 200,000 well-organised and
well-trained peshmerga from the Kurdish
north.
As several observers have noted, ISIS has
proven effective at taking territory, but
holding it is another matter. To control,
exploit and govern a territory, it would need
a sympathetic (preferably ideologically
supportive) population, almost certainly
Sunni. Only a few places in Iraq will give it
that base – the mostly Sunni provinces of
Anbar and Salahuddin, and corners of a few
other provinces; otherwise, it will have to
operate in unfriendly areas, perhaps even
outright hostile ones in areas where there are
sizeable Shiite populations.
Finally, ISIS has few friends and plenty of
opponents beyond its own territory. It has
been quite effective at taxing the population
in areas of Syria under its control, for
example, and it might attract a few donations
from sympathisers abroad. But it has no real
external sponsor. As much as some Gulf
monarchies might prefer ISIS to Iraq’s Shiites,
they are not likely to openly support it if that
means clashing with the United States. Above
all, ISIS is opposed by Iran, which would go to
great lengths to support the Iraqi prime
minister, Nouri al-Maliki. It is noteworthy,
and bad news for ISIS, that one of the few
things on which Washington and Tehran
agree is the need for ISIS to be stopped.
The fall of Mosul to ISIS and Kirkuk to the
Kurds means that, although Iraq is not
necessarily lost to the central government, it
has now changed significantly and
irreversibly. Even if ISIS doesn’t gain
substantial control in Iraq – say, by capturing
several provinces and establishing themselves
there – it might still prove to be a spoiler. It
could also end up controlling a small,
unhappy corner of the country, using it as a
base to create wider mischief in Iraq or
elsewhere.
ISIS could be defeated and all but destroyed as
a military force, but this would probably only
come through US or Iranian intervention. If
Iran intervenes, it would exacerbate Sunni
grievances; in saving al-Maliki and his
colleagues from the immediate ISIS threat, it
would thoroughly undermine him as prime
minister.
US intervention is now looking quite likely,
but the exact nature of any support is being
very vigorously debated in Washington – and
with good reason. Not only do many
policymakers equate Iraq with past policy
failure and an eight-year quagmire – meaning
that the chance of ground troops being sent to
Iraq in any significant number can be ruled
out – but the United States will also limit its
actions so as to avoid handing Tehran any
advantages. If al-Maliki stays as prime
minister – which is looking less likely by the
day – he’s close enough to Tehran that
American intervention will focus not on
helping him, but on defeating ISIS.
The United States only has a few safe options.
In the short term, to stop ISIS and then roll it
back, the Americans could provide the kind of
intelligence that the Iraqi army has little
capability to collect. Unmanned aircraft could
help collect this material, and could also
conduct limited but opportunistic strikes as
ISIS targets are identified. More extensive
airstrikes are possible, as are a special forces
commitment on the ground.
Washington is reportedly considering both of
these options: airstrikes, of course, would be
easiest to sell to American voters, but would
not be very effective without better tactical
intelligence on ISIS locations, movements and
key figures. For that, they need either Iraqi
human intelligence, which is probably not
available, or their own special forces on the
ground helping gather information and
coordinate Iraqi army operations. It is not
surprising, therefore, that as the United States
considers its options more closely, it is
reportedly leaning increasingly towards
special forces (although if they do choose this
option, it may not become public until well
after the fact).
Washington probably has no choice but to
intervene somehow. If Iraq collapses, it will
pose new threats, both as a base for terrorism
and to the stability of other states in the
region. If Iran steps in instead, the United
States risks handing Tehran a victory, or at
least greater influence in the region. Many
American allies in the region will be
unnerved by a lack of US action against ISIS.
At the same time, doing something requires a
delicate balance and a great deal of care to
avoid getting dragged into supporting Iraqi
security or serving Iran’s interests.
he only real winner from these events so
far has been Iraq’s Kurds. They have
long had semi-autonomy, administering
three of Iraq’s northern provinces
through the Kurdish Regional Government, or
KRG. Almost a quasi-state, the KRG has its
own parliament and makes many of its own
laws, and its peshmerga militia as, in effect,
its army. It has been the only part of Iraq that
has been stable and safe over the past decade.
Under Iraq’s 2005 constitution, the KRG is
promised 17 per cent of Iraq’s oil income,
although it has started trying to supplement or
replace this with oil contracts of its own in
recent years: in fact, the news about ISIS has
obscured the other major event related to Iraq
in the past week, the KRG’s attempt to sell oil
directly on the international market. A tanker
with one million barrels of oil is currently
sitting in the Mediterranean while the KRG
and Baghdad argue over whether the Kurds
have the right to sell it.
Events since the rise of ISIS have strengthened
the Kurds’ position but also increased the risk
of Iraq fragmenting and falling apart. The
KRG’s leadership must be quietly satisfied
with events. The Iraqi army’s flight from
Kirkuk has shown the peshmerga to be, by far,
the superior military force, an assessment
arguably endorsed by the fact that ISIS has
been careful not to engage the peshmerga in
fighting. The KRG will not let Kirkuk go:
expect to see the KRG integrate it into the rest
of their territory as quickly as possible.
Reportedly the Kurds have already connected
the main Kirkuk oilfield up to their own
pipeline, letting them drill and export to
Turkey. The KRG now will almost certainly
meet its goal of exporting 400,000 barrels of
oil a day by the end of the year, which would
come close to equally the revenues it is
promised from Baghdad under the
constitution. If it can expand and secure its
pipelines the Kirkuk superfield could produce
1.4 million barrels a day or more. If the KRG
can fully exploit this field, or even develop it
further, they would do so at Baghdad’s
expense. Iraq’s planned daily 2014
production rate of four million barrels, with
up to one-sixth going to the KRG, would
instead see the KRG produce about half of this
figure and Baghdad the other half. The
impacts on Iraq’s central government and its
capabilities would be substantial, and would
be a further incentive for the Kurds to seek
full independence.
The challenge for the Kurds remain
significant, however, and include significant
opposition to them formally becoming
independent and breaking up Iraq, as well as
practical concerns in Turkey especially that
this would motivate Turkey’s own Kurdish
population to seek independence from
Ankara. The Turks have enormous power over
the KRG, since Kurdish oil has to travel
through Turkey, along pipelines and out of
Turkish ports, and they could yet use this
power if they thought Iraq’s Kurds were
pushing for independence and saw this as a
threat.
In other respects, however, the current crisis
is probably a boon for the Kurds. Few other
Iraqis would take any joy in events, however.
Iraq has a violent modern history, but its last
decade has been especially horrid. Sectarian
and ethnic identities have become
entrenched, politics has become fragmented,
and a weak state has given often-extreme
groups, ISIS among them, the chance to gain a
foothold.
To avoid yet further catastrophe, a number of
things probably need to happen. Prime
minister Nouri al-Maliki needs to withdraw
from politics; he has become too divisive, too
pro-Shiite, and too authoritarian to unite
Iraqis against ISIS. This is becoming
increasingly likely. Far less likely, a longer-
term reconciliation effort needs to be made,
including a final agreement over the control
and exploitation of Iraq’s enormous oil
wealth, but also a program to give all the
main groups in Iraq a stake in its stability.
And least likely of all, the United States, Iran
and Saudi Arabia need to agree on what roles
they will play long-term in Iraq.
Otherwise, Iraq’s future is bleak, and there
will continue to be extremists who will fight to
control the country or a part of it. If ISIS does
not succeed this time, another group will
quickly succeed it, exploiting the same fears
and grievances and soon posing just as much
of a threat to its security and that of the
region. •
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