Jonah Goldberg
"Congressional investigators are fuming over
revelations that the Internal Revenue Service
has lost a trove of emails to and from a
central figure in the agency's tea party
controversy."
That's the opening sentence of the Associated
Press story on the IRS's claim that it lost an
unknown number of emails over two years
relating to the agency's alleged targeting of
political groups hostile to the president.
But note how the AP casts the story: The
investigators -- Republican lawmakers -- are
outraged.
Is it really so hard to imagine that if this were
a Republican administration, the story
wouldn't be the frustration of partisan critics
of the president? It would be all about that
administration's behavior. With the
exception of National Journal's Ron Fournier,
who called for a special prosecutor to bypass
the White House's "stonewalling," and former
CBS correspondent Sharyl Attkisson, it's hard
to find a non-conservative journalist who
thinks this is a big deal.
Let's back up for a moment. In 2013, IRS
official Lois Lerner planted a question from
an audience member at an American Bar
Association meeting. She used her answer to
apologize for -- and favorably spin -- the
agency's actions, and then later claimed that
the apology came as an unprompted response
to a question.
Lerner laid the blame for the inappropriate
targeting of tea party and other groups to a
few low-level bureaucrats in Cincinnati. That
was a lie. Senior officials in the IRS knew and
helped to coordinate the effort. She said she
only heard about the problem when tea party
groups protested. The targeting, in fact, had
already been under internal and external
investigation.
In short, Lerner worked hard at denying her
agency's tactics on applications for nonprofit
status from groups deemed to be hostile to
the president's agenda. According to IRS
officials' congressional testimony, agents
were told to "be on the lookout" for groups
that "criticized how the government is being
run." Lerner even joked to colleagues that she
should get a job at Obama's activist group
Organizing for Action.
President Obama insists he didn't know about
any of this until he was briefed on it the way
he's briefed on so many issues: from news
reports. Nevertheless, we've since learned
that White House officials were aware
earlier.
Lerner, who was forced to resign, took the
Fifth Amendment rather than clear the air.
In the June issue of Commentary, Noah
Rothman notes that the mainstream media
initially treated the IRS story as a very big
deal. ABC's Terry Moran dubbed it a "truly
Nixonian abuse of power by the Obama
administration." But as Rothman notes, the
media were just as quick to buy the story that
this was a minor bureaucratic screw-up being
whipped up into what the president called yet
another "phony scandal."
More recently, Obama proclaimed there was
not even a "smidgen" of corruption at the IRS,
despite the fact his administration's own
investigations are still underway. Obama's
assurance seemed good enough for most of
the media.
This is one of the great public relations
turnaround stories of all time. Liberal groups
successfully spun the incident as a well-
intentioned mistake by a government agency
trying to deal with a deluge of new
applications from right-wing crazies let loose
by the Supreme Court's Citizens United
decision. The "real" story was -- again --
Republican overreach.
Never mind that there was no evidence for
such an "uptick" in applications -- Lerner's
word. Indeed, evidence suggests that Lerner
went looking for that evidence as an excuse
for abuses she had already undertaken.
So now the IRS claims that a computer crash
has irrevocably erased pertinent emails (an
excuse I will remember when I am audited).
National Review's John Fund reports that the
IRS manual says backups must exist. If emails
-- which exist on servers, clouds and
elsewhere -- can be destroyed this way,
someone should tell the NSA that there's a
cheaper way to encrypt data.
The storied City News Bureau of Chicago
famously lived by the motto "If your mother
tells you she loves you, check it out." The
bureau closed down several years ago.
Perhaps that kind of skepticism died with it.
18 Jun 2014
ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND THE LEVANT MEDIA FORAY
Austin Bay
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's
bloody media foray into northern Iraq adds
another international dimension to Syria's
thoroughly internationalized civil war.
It is also a direct political challenge to the
Obama administration, one so stark that
unless the Administration acts decisively,
nations world wide that rely on U.S. security
support will severely question American
reliability.
"Media foray" is more apt than invasion, but
first internationalization.
Iran and Russia internationalized Syria's civil
war to save their own brutal cliques. Arab
Spring threatened authoritarians everywhere.
Tunisia's crony state fell quickly. Egypt's
oligarchy buckled. Libya's dictator faced
NATO-supported rebels. So Tehran and
Moscow rushed to the aid of their Syrian
client. Syria would be the dictators' political
firebreak where repression succeeded.
By fall 2011 Syria had become a war of
attrition, politically and militarily, and it
stayed that way until August 2013.
U.S. president Barack Obama told the Assad
regime that attacking the Syrian populace
with chemical weapons constituted a "red
line." Like, bad stuff would happen if Assad
used gas. On August 21, 2013, Assad's forces
murdered over 1,000 civilians with a rocket-
delivered nerve-gas attack. The Obama
administration responded with ... dithering.
Sunni militants opposed to the Assad regime
established bases in eastern Syria. Syria's
chaos, the porosity of a desert border and the
Iraqi state's unbridled cronyism provided
ISIL with an opportunity to re-energize
extreme Sunni Islamist militants dismayed by
Osama bin Laden's departure from planet
Earth. Hey, that is the propaganda pitch.
Eastern Syria and western Iraq will be the
core of the ISIL's new Global Caliphate. In
2001, bin Laden's caliphate core began in
Afghanistan. Bin Laden is dead, but the
grandiose utopian promise of a religious cure
for cultural fossilization and political failure
seduces the vulnerable souls of too many
alienated (and young) Muslim men.
Though it damns 12 years of calculated
Obama "political optics," Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld were right when they said
defeating militant Islamism would be a very
long struggle that had to be sustained by
action.
The strategic goal of ISIL's Iraq media foray
is global headlines that magnify ISIL's power
and question international resolve (especially
U.S. resolve) to confront the jihadi challenge.
If it sounds like 9/11's media goal, well, it is.
Strategypage.com called ISIL's attack "a mile-
wide and an inch deep." Why? "Right now the
local support for ISIL is just not there,"
Strategy Page reported June 16, though "the
Islamic radicalism that created centuries of
Islamic terrorism survives."
Bin Laden's al-Qaida was an information
power; it could not win on the battlefield.
ISIL does not have the fighters to sustain
attrition battles with Iraqi forces. Bribes to
crooked military and police officers have
spurred its successes. Sunni Arab tribes in
Iraq's Anbar Province have legitimate
grievances with Nouri al-Maliki's crony-
ridden Baghdad government, but Strategy
Page argued their support for ISIL's
internationalists is tepid.
The U.S. is the necessary actor; the ISIL
knows it, even if the Obama administration
doesn't.
The U.S. can meet ISIL's challenge by
returning to 2010. In 2010, the Iraqi security
forces, supported and mentored by the U.S.,
had inflicted a military and political defeat
on the various Sunni terror groups and
Iranian-backed Shia militant militias that had
attacked their nation.
In February 2010, on "Larry King Live" no
less, a grinning Vice President Joe Biden
proclaimed that Iraq "could be one of the
great achievements of this administration."
Wow. Less than three years after Sen. Harry
Reid (D., Global Caliphate.) declared the war
lost, and less than three years after then-Sen.
Barack Obama -- with his usual fierce moral
urgency -- opposed the Bush administration's
military surge, Obama's veep takes credit for
victory. Hey, doubters -- check the videotape.
At the strategic level, the U.S. and Iraq must
negotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement.
To stabilize, Iraqis need confidence; a long-
term U.S. security presence inspires
confidence.
At the military operational level: Iraqi forces
need U.S. airpower, now. They need U.S.
special operations forces teams to coordinate
air strikes and tap U.S. intelligence assets.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's
bloody media foray into northern Iraq adds
another international dimension to Syria's
thoroughly internationalized civil war.
It is also a direct political challenge to the
Obama administration, one so stark that
unless the Administration acts decisively,
nations world wide that rely on U.S. security
support will severely question American
reliability.
"Media foray" is more apt than invasion, but
first internationalization.
Iran and Russia internationalized Syria's civil
war to save their own brutal cliques. Arab
Spring threatened authoritarians everywhere.
Tunisia's crony state fell quickly. Egypt's
oligarchy buckled. Libya's dictator faced
NATO-supported rebels. So Tehran and
Moscow rushed to the aid of their Syrian
client. Syria would be the dictators' political
firebreak where repression succeeded.
By fall 2011 Syria had become a war of
attrition, politically and militarily, and it
stayed that way until August 2013.
U.S. president Barack Obama told the Assad
regime that attacking the Syrian populace
with chemical weapons constituted a "red
line." Like, bad stuff would happen if Assad
used gas. On August 21, 2013, Assad's forces
murdered over 1,000 civilians with a rocket-
delivered nerve-gas attack. The Obama
administration responded with ... dithering.
Sunni militants opposed to the Assad regime
established bases in eastern Syria. Syria's
chaos, the porosity of a desert border and the
Iraqi state's unbridled cronyism provided
ISIL with an opportunity to re-energize
extreme Sunni Islamist militants dismayed by
Osama bin Laden's departure from planet
Earth. Hey, that is the propaganda pitch.
Eastern Syria and western Iraq will be the
core of the ISIL's new Global Caliphate. In
2001, bin Laden's caliphate core began in
Afghanistan. Bin Laden is dead, but the
grandiose utopian promise of a religious cure
for cultural fossilization and political failure
seduces the vulnerable souls of too many
alienated (and young) Muslim men.
Though it damns 12 years of calculated
Obama "political optics," Dick Cheney and
Donald Rumsfeld were right when they said
defeating militant Islamism would be a very
long struggle that had to be sustained by
action.
The strategic goal of ISIL's Iraq media foray
is global headlines that magnify ISIL's power
and question international resolve (especially
U.S. resolve) to confront the jihadi challenge.
If it sounds like 9/11's media goal, well, it is.
Strategypage.com called ISIL's attack "a mile-
wide and an inch deep." Why? "Right now the
local support for ISIL is just not there,"
Strategy Page reported June 16, though "the
Islamic radicalism that created centuries of
Islamic terrorism survives."
Bin Laden's al-Qaida was an information
power; it could not win on the battlefield.
ISIL does not have the fighters to sustain
attrition battles with Iraqi forces. Bribes to
crooked military and police officers have
spurred its successes. Sunni Arab tribes in
Iraq's Anbar Province have legitimate
grievances with Nouri al-Maliki's crony-
ridden Baghdad government, but Strategy
Page argued their support for ISIL's
internationalists is tepid.
The U.S. is the necessary actor; the ISIL
knows it, even if the Obama administration
doesn't.
The U.S. can meet ISIL's challenge by
returning to 2010. In 2010, the Iraqi security
forces, supported and mentored by the U.S.,
had inflicted a military and political defeat
on the various Sunni terror groups and
Iranian-backed Shia militant militias that had
attacked their nation.
In February 2010, on "Larry King Live" no
less, a grinning Vice President Joe Biden
proclaimed that Iraq "could be one of the
great achievements of this administration."
Wow. Less than three years after Sen. Harry
Reid (D., Global Caliphate.) declared the war
lost, and less than three years after then-Sen.
Barack Obama -- with his usual fierce moral
urgency -- opposed the Bush administration's
military surge, Obama's veep takes credit for
victory. Hey, doubters -- check the videotape.
At the strategic level, the U.S. and Iraq must
negotiate a new Status of Forces Agreement.
To stabilize, Iraqis need confidence; a long-
term U.S. security presence inspires
confidence.
At the military operational level: Iraqi forces
need U.S. airpower, now. They need U.S.
special operations forces teams to coordinate
air strikes and tap U.S. intelligence assets.
MYANMAR'S NATIONAL CENSUS: FUELING ETHNIC CRISES
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
The nationwide census that was carried out from March
to May 2014 in Myanmar was an essential step in the
country’s preparation for the 2015 general elections.
The previous census was held 31 years ago in 1983,
under the military junta government. Thus, a new
census was essential. However, the census-conducting
process and the subsequent results may lead to the
already volatile social situation in Myanmar flaring up.
The census process has therefore led to severe criticism
of the government both from within and outside the
country.
Why is Myanmar’s 2014 census controversial? Why is
the process aggravating existing tensions in the
country’s society?
The Ethno-linguistic Mosaic of Myanmar's Society
The Myanmarese society is divided into several ethnic
and linguistic groups. Some ethnic groups belong to
specific regions – such as the Shan community of the
Shan province, the Kachin community of Kachin
province, and the Karen community of Karen province, to
name a few. These people are therefore referred to as
taingyinthar (literally sons of the geographical division)
in the Burmese language. These groups are further
divided into several other sub-groups. Sub-divisions
exist on the basis of clans, villages, languages, religious
groups, and other criteria. As a result, there are several
individuals who identify themselves with more than one
identity. For instance, an ethnic Kachin can also be a
’Maru’ or ’Rawang’ choosing their church groups.
Furthermore, internal migration and inter-ethnic
marriages have resulted in the blending of several ethnic
identities. Such a mix has led to the formation of
perceived identities. An ethnic a Karen by birth might
not identify himself/herself as Karen but with the
identity that the person has gained through marriage/
residence in a region for a long time – generating a
perceived identity. Children born of alliance between
people from two different ethnic groups might identify
themselves with both the ethnic groups, and or to the
region they have settled in.
The Census Fuel to the Ethnic Fire
The 2014 census has either failed to recognise the
complexity of the ethno-linguistic fabric of the
Myanmarese society or has tried to oversimplify it. The
census form allows a person to choose only one ethnic
identity. This has invited confusion and anger among
the citizenry due to the aforementioned reasons. This
issue will have political implications, given how many
supporters of ethnic political parties might choose their
sub-groups instead of their overarching ethnic identity in
the forms. This will affect the strength of the ethnicity-
based political parties.
Furthermore, the 2014 census form, like the one in 1983,
identifies 135 taingyinthar ethnic groups; and each
group is further divided into different categories.
However, different ethnic groups with no connections
have carelessly been clubbed together under one ethnic
group. For example, several groups in Shan provinces –
such as the Palaung, Lahu and Intha – are listed as
sub-groups of the Shan ethnic group; but they are
neither similar to the Shan group not to each other.
This carelessness has agitated the ethnic groups.
Additionally, the ongoing conflict in Kachin and Shan
provinces has disallowed the census from being
conducted in the whole of the former, and parts of the
latter. The conflict between the Kachin Independence
Army and the Tatmadaw has resulted in some residents
migrating to China and some having to shift to
Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps. This hence
fuels fears that that the census will be unfair. This has
also been inferred as ploy by the government that
comprises mainly of ethnic Barmars to misrepresent
percentage of the minorities. This will also lead to the
over-representation of the Barmars who are already the
majority 60 per cent (according to the previous census)
and the under-representation of those ethnic groups
whose members have either migrated to neighbouring
countries or settled in the IDP camps.
Several non-ethnic groups in Myanmar, such as the
Panthay Muslims, Gurkhas, people of Indian origin, and
those others who have lived in the country for centuries
and are in large numbers, did not find a mention in the
form. They had to register themselves either in the
‘others’ category or according to the country of their
origin – thus angering these groups. The situation is
the same for the Rohingyas. Earlier, in March,
Naypyidaw announced the prohibition on using the term
‘Rohingya’ and made them register as ‘Bengalis’ in the
census form. This action not only denied the Rohingyas
their identity but also ratified the Buddhist radicals’
demand that the term Rohingya should not be included
in the census form.
Ominous Implications
The census result that is scheduled to be declared in
early 2015 might lead to the further violence. According
to the previous census, there were only four per cent
Muslims in Myanmar, and any increase in this
percentage may lead to escalation of violence by
Buddhist radicals. Moreover, the result may also
highlight the gradual process of the ethnic cleansing of
the Rohingya people. A national census is essential for
the comprehensive development of every country.
However, in Myanmar, it appears to be ringing the
warning bells.
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
The nationwide census that was carried out from March
to May 2014 in Myanmar was an essential step in the
country’s preparation for the 2015 general elections.
The previous census was held 31 years ago in 1983,
under the military junta government. Thus, a new
census was essential. However, the census-conducting
process and the subsequent results may lead to the
already volatile social situation in Myanmar flaring up.
The census process has therefore led to severe criticism
of the government both from within and outside the
country.
Why is Myanmar’s 2014 census controversial? Why is
the process aggravating existing tensions in the
country’s society?
The Ethno-linguistic Mosaic of Myanmar's Society
The Myanmarese society is divided into several ethnic
and linguistic groups. Some ethnic groups belong to
specific regions – such as the Shan community of the
Shan province, the Kachin community of Kachin
province, and the Karen community of Karen province, to
name a few. These people are therefore referred to as
taingyinthar (literally sons of the geographical division)
in the Burmese language. These groups are further
divided into several other sub-groups. Sub-divisions
exist on the basis of clans, villages, languages, religious
groups, and other criteria. As a result, there are several
individuals who identify themselves with more than one
identity. For instance, an ethnic Kachin can also be a
’Maru’ or ’Rawang’ choosing their church groups.
Furthermore, internal migration and inter-ethnic
marriages have resulted in the blending of several ethnic
identities. Such a mix has led to the formation of
perceived identities. An ethnic a Karen by birth might
not identify himself/herself as Karen but with the
identity that the person has gained through marriage/
residence in a region for a long time – generating a
perceived identity. Children born of alliance between
people from two different ethnic groups might identify
themselves with both the ethnic groups, and or to the
region they have settled in.
The Census Fuel to the Ethnic Fire
The 2014 census has either failed to recognise the
complexity of the ethno-linguistic fabric of the
Myanmarese society or has tried to oversimplify it. The
census form allows a person to choose only one ethnic
identity. This has invited confusion and anger among
the citizenry due to the aforementioned reasons. This
issue will have political implications, given how many
supporters of ethnic political parties might choose their
sub-groups instead of their overarching ethnic identity in
the forms. This will affect the strength of the ethnicity-
based political parties.
Furthermore, the 2014 census form, like the one in 1983,
identifies 135 taingyinthar ethnic groups; and each
group is further divided into different categories.
However, different ethnic groups with no connections
have carelessly been clubbed together under one ethnic
group. For example, several groups in Shan provinces –
such as the Palaung, Lahu and Intha – are listed as
sub-groups of the Shan ethnic group; but they are
neither similar to the Shan group not to each other.
This carelessness has agitated the ethnic groups.
Additionally, the ongoing conflict in Kachin and Shan
provinces has disallowed the census from being
conducted in the whole of the former, and parts of the
latter. The conflict between the Kachin Independence
Army and the Tatmadaw has resulted in some residents
migrating to China and some having to shift to
Internally Displaced People’s (IDP) camps. This hence
fuels fears that that the census will be unfair. This has
also been inferred as ploy by the government that
comprises mainly of ethnic Barmars to misrepresent
percentage of the minorities. This will also lead to the
over-representation of the Barmars who are already the
majority 60 per cent (according to the previous census)
and the under-representation of those ethnic groups
whose members have either migrated to neighbouring
countries or settled in the IDP camps.
Several non-ethnic groups in Myanmar, such as the
Panthay Muslims, Gurkhas, people of Indian origin, and
those others who have lived in the country for centuries
and are in large numbers, did not find a mention in the
form. They had to register themselves either in the
‘others’ category or according to the country of their
origin – thus angering these groups. The situation is
the same for the Rohingyas. Earlier, in March,
Naypyidaw announced the prohibition on using the term
‘Rohingya’ and made them register as ‘Bengalis’ in the
census form. This action not only denied the Rohingyas
their identity but also ratified the Buddhist radicals’
demand that the term Rohingya should not be included
in the census form.
Ominous Implications
The census result that is scheduled to be declared in
early 2015 might lead to the further violence. According
to the previous census, there were only four per cent
Muslims in Myanmar, and any increase in this
percentage may lead to escalation of violence by
Buddhist radicals. Moreover, the result may also
highlight the gradual process of the ethnic cleansing of
the Rohingya people. A national census is essential for
the comprehensive development of every country.
However, in Myanmar, it appears to be ringing the
warning bells.
MODI'S THIMPU VISIT: DEEPENING INDIA-BHUTAN RELATIONS
Roomana Hukil
Research Officer, IRES, IPCS
In his maiden foreign visit as premier, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, recently went to Bhutan to strengthen
development cooperation and further enhance economic
ties. Although there are no big agreements on the anvil,
the prime minister's short visit marks his high regard
for the South Asian neighbourhood over the extended
international community. Prime Minister Modi stated
that India and Bhutan are 'made for each other',
considering the historical and traditional linkages
between the two.
Why is Bhutan Vital for India Today?
The visit to Bhutan exemplifies India’s strategic effort to
enhance cooperation with the country. Nepal, Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh were the other countries that were
considered for the prime minister’s first foreign tour.
However, trans-boundary issues and bilateral concerns
hindered the PM from visiting the aforementioned
places.
India and Bhutan have shared the friendliest ties in the
past years when compared to India’s other South Asian
neighbours. The country’s economies are closely related
to each other despite pressure and resistance from
powerful countries. China, for instance, has been trying
to win Bhutan over and reduce India’s growing
influence. However, Bhutan has made a conscious effort
to avoid taking any decision contrary to India’s national
interests, which India is cognisant of. Significantly, fuel
subsidies to Bhutan were temporarily rolled back by
India in 2013. Although the decree was later revoked,
the roll-back somewhat soured bilateral relations. The
PM’s visit may help to bring these ties back on track.
Both India and Bhutan are interdependent States. India
is Bhutan’s largest trading partner (99 per cent imports
and 90 per cent exports), and Bhutan is an important
partner because India’s economy significantly relies on
Bhutan for hydropower, besides other socio-political and
economic overlaps. Bhutan is set to be a major source
of power for India in the upcoming years. India is
expected to reap dividends worth US$2 billion by
investing in the construction of three hydro-electric
projects in Bhutan with a combined installed capacity of
1400 megawatts (MW) and from three other projects,
totalling 3000 MW.
Moving Beyond Rhetoric
Power sector engagement has been the primary avenue
for India and Bhutan in taking their relationship forward.
Power diplomacy with Bhutan has been India’s most
successful story. However, there is a deepening divide
within Bhutan on India that is hindering bilateral
relations.
Besides offering to intensify cooperation on the
hydropower front, Modi emphasised the essence of
greater educational contacts and stated that India will
double the present number of scholarships for the
Bhutanese in India, worth approximately US$ 3 million.
Modi stated that India will also assist Bhutan in the
setting up of a digital library that will provide access to
over two million books and periodicals. He also
inaugurated the Supreme Court building that was built
with Indian aid. The PM promised to help Bhutan in its
science and technology sector. He noted that India's
satellite technology was a model that could be used by
Bhutan. Besides this, he encouraged a sports meet to
enhance people-to-people contact in the region.
The India-Bhutan hydropower cooperation is a classic
example of successful bilateral cooperation; however,
the two countries face a range of other challenges that
have been straining the ties. The PM’s recent visit did
make a strategic mark because he covered most of the
short and long-term issues that point towards further
development and cooperation between the two States.
However, a vital factor that was left out of the PM’s
agenda was the Siliguri corridor in India. The area is
vital for India as it is the sole link between the Indian
mainland and the Northeast. The Chumbi Valley that
connects Bhutan, India and the China border is of
immense geostrategic importance to the three nations
for trade and commerce.
The Indian delegation should have sought to address
the Siliguri corridor since road and railway connectivity
is a major hindrance that disengages the border states
in this region. A free trade agreement between India,
China, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh is another
promising avenue that was not articulated in the
meeting.
The PM is set to lay the foundation stone of the 600
MW Kholongchu hydropower project, however, his visit
exemplifies that India does not regard Bhutan’s
hydroelectric sector as the prime vantage point for
future India–Bhutan relations. Both India and Bhutan
comprehend that trust and public diplomacy are the
primary leverages that can take the relationship forward.
Research Officer, IRES, IPCS
In his maiden foreign visit as premier, Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, recently went to Bhutan to strengthen
development cooperation and further enhance economic
ties. Although there are no big agreements on the anvil,
the prime minister's short visit marks his high regard
for the South Asian neighbourhood over the extended
international community. Prime Minister Modi stated
that India and Bhutan are 'made for each other',
considering the historical and traditional linkages
between the two.
Why is Bhutan Vital for India Today?
The visit to Bhutan exemplifies India’s strategic effort to
enhance cooperation with the country. Nepal, Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh were the other countries that were
considered for the prime minister’s first foreign tour.
However, trans-boundary issues and bilateral concerns
hindered the PM from visiting the aforementioned
places.
India and Bhutan have shared the friendliest ties in the
past years when compared to India’s other South Asian
neighbours. The country’s economies are closely related
to each other despite pressure and resistance from
powerful countries. China, for instance, has been trying
to win Bhutan over and reduce India’s growing
influence. However, Bhutan has made a conscious effort
to avoid taking any decision contrary to India’s national
interests, which India is cognisant of. Significantly, fuel
subsidies to Bhutan were temporarily rolled back by
India in 2013. Although the decree was later revoked,
the roll-back somewhat soured bilateral relations. The
PM’s visit may help to bring these ties back on track.
Both India and Bhutan are interdependent States. India
is Bhutan’s largest trading partner (99 per cent imports
and 90 per cent exports), and Bhutan is an important
partner because India’s economy significantly relies on
Bhutan for hydropower, besides other socio-political and
economic overlaps. Bhutan is set to be a major source
of power for India in the upcoming years. India is
expected to reap dividends worth US$2 billion by
investing in the construction of three hydro-electric
projects in Bhutan with a combined installed capacity of
1400 megawatts (MW) and from three other projects,
totalling 3000 MW.
Moving Beyond Rhetoric
Power sector engagement has been the primary avenue
for India and Bhutan in taking their relationship forward.
Power diplomacy with Bhutan has been India’s most
successful story. However, there is a deepening divide
within Bhutan on India that is hindering bilateral
relations.
Besides offering to intensify cooperation on the
hydropower front, Modi emphasised the essence of
greater educational contacts and stated that India will
double the present number of scholarships for the
Bhutanese in India, worth approximately US$ 3 million.
Modi stated that India will also assist Bhutan in the
setting up of a digital library that will provide access to
over two million books and periodicals. He also
inaugurated the Supreme Court building that was built
with Indian aid. The PM promised to help Bhutan in its
science and technology sector. He noted that India's
satellite technology was a model that could be used by
Bhutan. Besides this, he encouraged a sports meet to
enhance people-to-people contact in the region.
The India-Bhutan hydropower cooperation is a classic
example of successful bilateral cooperation; however,
the two countries face a range of other challenges that
have been straining the ties. The PM’s recent visit did
make a strategic mark because he covered most of the
short and long-term issues that point towards further
development and cooperation between the two States.
However, a vital factor that was left out of the PM’s
agenda was the Siliguri corridor in India. The area is
vital for India as it is the sole link between the Indian
mainland and the Northeast. The Chumbi Valley that
connects Bhutan, India and the China border is of
immense geostrategic importance to the three nations
for trade and commerce.
The Indian delegation should have sought to address
the Siliguri corridor since road and railway connectivity
is a major hindrance that disengages the border states
in this region. A free trade agreement between India,
China, Bhutan, Nepal and Bangladesh is another
promising avenue that was not articulated in the
meeting.
The PM is set to lay the foundation stone of the 600
MW Kholongchu hydropower project, however, his visit
exemplifies that India does not regard Bhutan’s
hydroelectric sector as the prime vantage point for
future India–Bhutan relations. Both India and Bhutan
comprehend that trust and public diplomacy are the
primary leverages that can take the relationship forward.
INDIA'S NORTHEAST: AN AGENDA FOR DoNER
Ruhee Neog
Senior Research Officer, NSP, IPCS
In interviews conducted post his appointment as the
head for the Ministry for the Development of the
Northeastern Region (DoNER), General (Retd) VK Singh
identified certain areas for the “overall development” of
the Northeast. This article will seek to discuss and give
substance to two of these areas, which have thus far
been mentioned preliminarily, and suggest a third.
The very first priority, which is probably already in the
works, must of course be a review of the performance of
the ministry - whether it has been able to fulfil its remit,
and most crucially, where it might have gone wrong.
This is primarily because the goals of the ministry are
going to roughly be the same as before, and the
changes will most likely be in the processes employed –
not the ‘what’ but the ‘how’. An assessment therefore
will be of immense help in identifying how past mistakes
can be avoided and in structuring the list of priorities.
Connectivity and Economic Growth
Connectivity is essential for trade, and trade for
economic growth. For this, comprehensive backward
and forward links with the rest of India and across the
region’s massive international borders are essential.
Currently, connectivity on all three counts - between the
Northeast states, with the rest of India, and abroad – is
dismal.
General Singh also holds the portfolio of Minister of
State of External Affairs, which is very interesting
because the development of the Northeast necessitates
to a large part the proper implementation of India’s
Look East Policy (LEP). There have long been
complaints about how, in the enthusiasm for the LEP’s
success, the Northeast would merely be a spectator of
the development that would pass through it without
necessarily doing any good to the region itself. The dual
role that General Singh has taken on is therefore a
welcome move, and it is hoped that this would lead to
the DoNER and the Ministry for External Affairs (MEA)
working complementarily where required.
In terms of cross-border trade, the trade conducted at
Moreh in Manipur and Tamu in Myanmar is instructive.
It is noted that while the essential institutions are in
existence, their performance leaves a lot to be desired.
For instance, Moreh has both Land Customs and
Currency Exchange Centres, but they are under-staffed
and do not function well. Additionally, despite there
being a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between
Myanmar and India, which is meant to ensure that
taxation occurs only in a company’s country of
permanent residence, tax irregularities continue to
persist. Business is therefore sought to be conducted
through seaports in Kolkata, Mumbai and Singapore,
even though a land access point with (theoretically)
hugely reduced transport costs is available.
Another major problem is air connectivity. Proposals for
Greenfield airports in the Northeast have been bandied
about but come to naught, with the exception of the
airport at Pakyong, Sikkim, and the future of an Open
Skies Policy as introduced by the ASEAN-India Aviation
Cooperation Framework, which could be a trade
multiplier, is uncertain.
Infrastructure Facilitation and Investment Promotion
The problem here is not of insufficient funds but that of
funds not funnelling through to their targeted
beneficiaries.
The most practicable investment model for the
Northeast is the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model.
However, it is difficult to chart a clear trajectory in the
advancements that have apparently been made, and
political imperatives often mean that these projects
extend indefinitely beyond their deadline or come to a
halt altogether with declarations of being revived at
some point in the future. The lethargic implementations
of ambitious plans and inter-state politicking have held
these projects back.
Image Management and Accountability
The popular perception of DoNER in the Northeast is
more negative than positive. It is seen as a region-
specific ministry whose perspective is unfortunately
informed more by the Centre, from which it emerges,
rather than the region whose interests it seeks to
represent. Added to this is its lacklustre performance
and apparent inaction, which has much to do with the
lack of public dissemination of information.
The deficiency in public knowledge of the DoNER’s
activities becomes especially important in light of the
reactions to DoNER’s new avatar. In particular, much
has been said about the appointment of a former Army
man, General (Retd) VK Singh, as the Minister in charge
of this portfolio. Many have expressed their concerns
about the practice of looking at the Northeast through a
‘combative’, military lens. To quell such misgivings, it
becomes imperative for the ministry to corroborate its
work to safeguard the interests of the region through
active and regular dissemination of information.
Controlled transparency would allow accountability,
which in turn would help inspire regional confidence in
DoNER’s workings.
What can be most unambiguously said about this
change of guard is that above all else, DONER needed
an injection of fresh blood. Whether this will be to the
detriment of the region or its gain cannot be deduced in
the first few days of the new ministry’s existence.
Senior Research Officer, NSP, IPCS
In interviews conducted post his appointment as the
head for the Ministry for the Development of the
Northeastern Region (DoNER), General (Retd) VK Singh
identified certain areas for the “overall development” of
the Northeast. This article will seek to discuss and give
substance to two of these areas, which have thus far
been mentioned preliminarily, and suggest a third.
The very first priority, which is probably already in the
works, must of course be a review of the performance of
the ministry - whether it has been able to fulfil its remit,
and most crucially, where it might have gone wrong.
This is primarily because the goals of the ministry are
going to roughly be the same as before, and the
changes will most likely be in the processes employed –
not the ‘what’ but the ‘how’. An assessment therefore
will be of immense help in identifying how past mistakes
can be avoided and in structuring the list of priorities.
Connectivity and Economic Growth
Connectivity is essential for trade, and trade for
economic growth. For this, comprehensive backward
and forward links with the rest of India and across the
region’s massive international borders are essential.
Currently, connectivity on all three counts - between the
Northeast states, with the rest of India, and abroad – is
dismal.
General Singh also holds the portfolio of Minister of
State of External Affairs, which is very interesting
because the development of the Northeast necessitates
to a large part the proper implementation of India’s
Look East Policy (LEP). There have long been
complaints about how, in the enthusiasm for the LEP’s
success, the Northeast would merely be a spectator of
the development that would pass through it without
necessarily doing any good to the region itself. The dual
role that General Singh has taken on is therefore a
welcome move, and it is hoped that this would lead to
the DoNER and the Ministry for External Affairs (MEA)
working complementarily where required.
In terms of cross-border trade, the trade conducted at
Moreh in Manipur and Tamu in Myanmar is instructive.
It is noted that while the essential institutions are in
existence, their performance leaves a lot to be desired.
For instance, Moreh has both Land Customs and
Currency Exchange Centres, but they are under-staffed
and do not function well. Additionally, despite there
being a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement between
Myanmar and India, which is meant to ensure that
taxation occurs only in a company’s country of
permanent residence, tax irregularities continue to
persist. Business is therefore sought to be conducted
through seaports in Kolkata, Mumbai and Singapore,
even though a land access point with (theoretically)
hugely reduced transport costs is available.
Another major problem is air connectivity. Proposals for
Greenfield airports in the Northeast have been bandied
about but come to naught, with the exception of the
airport at Pakyong, Sikkim, and the future of an Open
Skies Policy as introduced by the ASEAN-India Aviation
Cooperation Framework, which could be a trade
multiplier, is uncertain.
Infrastructure Facilitation and Investment Promotion
The problem here is not of insufficient funds but that of
funds not funnelling through to their targeted
beneficiaries.
The most practicable investment model for the
Northeast is the Public Private Partnership (PPP) model.
However, it is difficult to chart a clear trajectory in the
advancements that have apparently been made, and
political imperatives often mean that these projects
extend indefinitely beyond their deadline or come to a
halt altogether with declarations of being revived at
some point in the future. The lethargic implementations
of ambitious plans and inter-state politicking have held
these projects back.
Image Management and Accountability
The popular perception of DoNER in the Northeast is
more negative than positive. It is seen as a region-
specific ministry whose perspective is unfortunately
informed more by the Centre, from which it emerges,
rather than the region whose interests it seeks to
represent. Added to this is its lacklustre performance
and apparent inaction, which has much to do with the
lack of public dissemination of information.
The deficiency in public knowledge of the DoNER’s
activities becomes especially important in light of the
reactions to DoNER’s new avatar. In particular, much
has been said about the appointment of a former Army
man, General (Retd) VK Singh, as the Minister in charge
of this portfolio. Many have expressed their concerns
about the practice of looking at the Northeast through a
‘combative’, military lens. To quell such misgivings, it
becomes imperative for the ministry to corroborate its
work to safeguard the interests of the region through
active and regular dissemination of information.
Controlled transparency would allow accountability,
which in turn would help inspire regional confidence in
DoNER’s workings.
What can be most unambiguously said about this
change of guard is that above all else, DONER needed
an injection of fresh blood. Whether this will be to the
detriment of the region or its gain cannot be deduced in
the first few days of the new ministry’s existence.
INDIA-PAKISTAN: THE MFN-NDMARB DEBACLE
Sushant Sareen.
Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation.
In the irrational exuberance that is invariably on display
in the media every time leaders of India and Pakistan
meet, the subtlety of some of the signals that are sent
out is often lost. Something similar happened after the
Indian Foreign Secretary briefed the media about the
meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi with his
Pakistani counterpart who, along with other South Asian
leaders, had been invited to the swearing-in ceremony of
the new Indian government. The media latched on to
the words ‘the two countries could move immediately
towards full trade normalisation…’ and went overboard
in talking about the prospects of Indo-Pak trade taking-
off. But in the process they missed the significant rider
that India had put, viz. ‘…on the basis of the September
2012 roadmap’. This rider effectively reopens the entire
trade deal between India and Pakistan and nullifies the
agreement that had been reached between the
Manmohan Singh government and Nawaz Sharif
government in February 2014. The message that the
Modi government seemed to be sending was that it will
not accept the constant shifting of the goalposts on the
trade issue by Pakistan.
The first big breakthrough on the trade front came in
2011 after India withdrew its objection to the trade
concessions offered by the EU to Pakistan as part of an
aid package to help Pakistan get over the damage
caused by the 2010 mega-flood.
Apparently, India’s ‘gesture’ was part of a back room
deal with Pakistan which, in return for India withdrawing
its objections at WTO, agreed to a roadmap to open
trade and grant India the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
status in a time-bound manner. The way India looked at
it, the damage caused to India’s exports by the EU
package for Pakistan would be adequately
compensated, both politically and economically, by the
fillip that India-Pakistan trade would receive as a result
of a trade agreement between the two countries.
Following negotiations between the then Pakistan
People’s Party-led government in Pakistan and the
United Progressive Alliance-2 government in India, a
roadmap was agreed in 2012. Under this roadmap, in a
time bound manner Pakistan would first replace the
positive list of tradable items with a negative list. This
would be followed by according full MFN status to
India. Some items would remain on the sensitive list
and this list would steadily be pared down. Pakistan’s
concerns about non-tariff barriers and trade access
were also addressed and three trade-related agreements
were struck. But Pakistan reneged on the roadmap and
apart from replacing the positive list with a negative list,
there was no further movement.
After the Nawaz Sharif government assumed office, a
new round of negotiations commenced between the two
countries. By February 2014, a new deal was worked
out which significantly altered the terms of trade
engagement. Instead of the MFN status, Pakistan now
offered a ‘Non-Discriminatory Market Access on
Reciprocal Basis’ (NDMARB). While this new
arrangement gave everything that India would get under
MFN, it was not quite MFN. This was a bilateral trading
arrangement as opposed to MFN which is a multilateral
arrangement under the WTO. Because this was a
bilateral arrangement, Pakistan was free to walk out of
it if it felt it did not serve its interests or if the gains it
anticipated from trading with India were not according
to expectation. Pakistan’s commerce minister said so in
a number of interviews he gave after striking this
agreement with his then Indian counterpart, Anand
Sharma. Since it was a bilateral arrangement, the
dispute resolution mechanism under this arrangement
would not be under WTO rules, which in turn meant that
whims and fancies of Pakistan's real rulers (who
thankfully scuttled this deal) would continue to impinge
and impose themselves on the bilateral trade.
Frankly, the February 2014 deal was an unequal bargain
loaded almost entirely in Pakistan’s favour. Sectors in
which India enjoyed a comparative advantage were
blocked while those which were of interest to Pakistan
were made part of the deal. There was no give by
Pakistan on other issues of interest to India, such as
transit rights to Afghanistan and beyond. While Pakistan
agreed to opening up trade via Wagah, this again served
Pakistan more than India. After all, if Pakistan expected
to increase its exports to India by an estimated $ 2
billion and wanted its Punjab to benefit from trade with
India, then opening Wagah was a no brainer.
Additionally, Pakistan wanted India to open banking
channels and liberalise visas but was unwilling to
address India’s serious concerns on export of terrorism
into India. The unkindest cut of all was that, in spite of
the fact that on practically every issue, it was India and
not Pakistan that has made concessions, Pakistan
waved the trade deal as a major concession that they
have given to India to kick-start the normalisation
process!
While negotiating the trade deal with Pakistan, the India
probably forgot that political or diplomatic dividend that
accrues on account of trade between two countries that
don’t share the best of relations is, or should be, at
best a by-product and not the primary motive of
normalising trade. When concessions are given which
tend to introduce distortions by undermining the
comparative and competitive advantage of one country
to protect the inefficient sectors of another country then
the logic of trade is turned on its head. India's biggest
is that it mixed politics with trade; and that was hardly
a sensible thing to do especially since the political
benefit remained iffy and the trade benefit was marginal.
Even if trade with Pakistan increased by 100%, it would
be less than 1% of India’s total foreign trade.
Fortunately, despite the extremely favourable terms
offered by India, the Pakistan army prevented the
Nawaz Sharif government from grabbing the deal.
With a new government in India, it appears that the best
possible deal that Pakistani could get is no longer on
offer, and trade negotiations will have to restart,
practically from square one.
Senior Fellow, Vivekananda International Foundation.
In the irrational exuberance that is invariably on display
in the media every time leaders of India and Pakistan
meet, the subtlety of some of the signals that are sent
out is often lost. Something similar happened after the
Indian Foreign Secretary briefed the media about the
meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi with his
Pakistani counterpart who, along with other South Asian
leaders, had been invited to the swearing-in ceremony of
the new Indian government. The media latched on to
the words ‘the two countries could move immediately
towards full trade normalisation…’ and went overboard
in talking about the prospects of Indo-Pak trade taking-
off. But in the process they missed the significant rider
that India had put, viz. ‘…on the basis of the September
2012 roadmap’. This rider effectively reopens the entire
trade deal between India and Pakistan and nullifies the
agreement that had been reached between the
Manmohan Singh government and Nawaz Sharif
government in February 2014. The message that the
Modi government seemed to be sending was that it will
not accept the constant shifting of the goalposts on the
trade issue by Pakistan.
The first big breakthrough on the trade front came in
2011 after India withdrew its objection to the trade
concessions offered by the EU to Pakistan as part of an
aid package to help Pakistan get over the damage
caused by the 2010 mega-flood.
Apparently, India’s ‘gesture’ was part of a back room
deal with Pakistan which, in return for India withdrawing
its objections at WTO, agreed to a roadmap to open
trade and grant India the Most Favoured Nation (MFN)
status in a time-bound manner. The way India looked at
it, the damage caused to India’s exports by the EU
package for Pakistan would be adequately
compensated, both politically and economically, by the
fillip that India-Pakistan trade would receive as a result
of a trade agreement between the two countries.
Following negotiations between the then Pakistan
People’s Party-led government in Pakistan and the
United Progressive Alliance-2 government in India, a
roadmap was agreed in 2012. Under this roadmap, in a
time bound manner Pakistan would first replace the
positive list of tradable items with a negative list. This
would be followed by according full MFN status to
India. Some items would remain on the sensitive list
and this list would steadily be pared down. Pakistan’s
concerns about non-tariff barriers and trade access
were also addressed and three trade-related agreements
were struck. But Pakistan reneged on the roadmap and
apart from replacing the positive list with a negative list,
there was no further movement.
After the Nawaz Sharif government assumed office, a
new round of negotiations commenced between the two
countries. By February 2014, a new deal was worked
out which significantly altered the terms of trade
engagement. Instead of the MFN status, Pakistan now
offered a ‘Non-Discriminatory Market Access on
Reciprocal Basis’ (NDMARB). While this new
arrangement gave everything that India would get under
MFN, it was not quite MFN. This was a bilateral trading
arrangement as opposed to MFN which is a multilateral
arrangement under the WTO. Because this was a
bilateral arrangement, Pakistan was free to walk out of
it if it felt it did not serve its interests or if the gains it
anticipated from trading with India were not according
to expectation. Pakistan’s commerce minister said so in
a number of interviews he gave after striking this
agreement with his then Indian counterpart, Anand
Sharma. Since it was a bilateral arrangement, the
dispute resolution mechanism under this arrangement
would not be under WTO rules, which in turn meant that
whims and fancies of Pakistan's real rulers (who
thankfully scuttled this deal) would continue to impinge
and impose themselves on the bilateral trade.
Frankly, the February 2014 deal was an unequal bargain
loaded almost entirely in Pakistan’s favour. Sectors in
which India enjoyed a comparative advantage were
blocked while those which were of interest to Pakistan
were made part of the deal. There was no give by
Pakistan on other issues of interest to India, such as
transit rights to Afghanistan and beyond. While Pakistan
agreed to opening up trade via Wagah, this again served
Pakistan more than India. After all, if Pakistan expected
to increase its exports to India by an estimated $ 2
billion and wanted its Punjab to benefit from trade with
India, then opening Wagah was a no brainer.
Additionally, Pakistan wanted India to open banking
channels and liberalise visas but was unwilling to
address India’s serious concerns on export of terrorism
into India. The unkindest cut of all was that, in spite of
the fact that on practically every issue, it was India and
not Pakistan that has made concessions, Pakistan
waved the trade deal as a major concession that they
have given to India to kick-start the normalisation
process!
While negotiating the trade deal with Pakistan, the India
probably forgot that political or diplomatic dividend that
accrues on account of trade between two countries that
don’t share the best of relations is, or should be, at
best a by-product and not the primary motive of
normalising trade. When concessions are given which
tend to introduce distortions by undermining the
comparative and competitive advantage of one country
to protect the inefficient sectors of another country then
the logic of trade is turned on its head. India's biggest
is that it mixed politics with trade; and that was hardly
a sensible thing to do especially since the political
benefit remained iffy and the trade benefit was marginal.
Even if trade with Pakistan increased by 100%, it would
be less than 1% of India’s total foreign trade.
Fortunately, despite the extremely favourable terms
offered by India, the Pakistan army prevented the
Nawaz Sharif government from grabbing the deal.
With a new government in India, it appears that the best
possible deal that Pakistani could get is no longer on
offer, and trade negotiations will have to restart,
practically from square one.
17 Jun 2014
PRISONERS EXCHANGE: OBAMA VS GEORGE WASHINGTON
Last week, I spoke about how President
Barack Obama justified his prisoner swap of
five senior Taliban leaders for U.S. Army Sgt.
Bowe Bergdahl by saying former military
leaders and presidents, including George
Washington, have engaged in prisoner of war
exchange, too.
Obama's exact words were: "This is what
happens at the end of wars. That was true for
George Washington; that was true for
Abraham Lincoln; that was true for FDR;
that's been true of every combat situation --
that at some point, you make sure that you try
to get your folks back. And that's the right
thing to do."
From that statement alone, I revealed how
Obama's made grievous errors in judgment
by concluding that 1) the war is over and 2)
he was engaging in a prisoner exchange like
George Washington -- to take just a single
example among his list of stellar leaders.
What Obama didn't tell you regarding
Washington and prisoner exchange during
the Revolutionary War is that both countries
-- England and the U.S. -- exchanged
prisoners of war because both had "few
facilities to accommodate large numbers of
prisoners," according to the Mount Vernon
Ladies' Association, whose mission it is "to
preserve, restore, and manage the estate of
George Washington to the highest standards
and to educate visitors and people throughout
the world about the life and legacies of
George Washington."
As far as buying Americans back from
captivity at the price of enemy combatants,
Obama needs to follow the example of Gen.
Washington, who "made sure that no states
holding military prisoners should trade a
British soldier for an American citizen.
Washington believed that this would have
legitimized the British capture of more
citizens, most of whom were largely
defenseless."
Though no one is minimizing the
understandable elation of Bergdahl's family
over his release, George Washington would
not have traded for him, because he didn't
believe in trading prisoners of war until after
the war was in fact over, treaties were signed
and hostilities ceased, lest he risk the capture
of further American people for ransom.
Here are my two additional grievances with
Obama's prisoner of war exchange:
3) As the commander in chief, George
Washington wouldn't have completely
undermined the very heart and soul of the
military as Obama did with his prisoner
exchange, especially in light of how it is a
cardinal sin in military culture to abandon
one's post and platoon during war.
A little over a week ago, The Washington Post
reported, "Ralph Peters, a retired lieutenant
colonel and intelligence officer, wrote in
National Review that a 'fundamental culture
clash' exists between the president's team
and those in the armed forces, as reflected by
(national security adviser Susan) Rice's
remarks on Bergdahl's honor."
"Both President Obama and Ms. Rice seem to
think that the crime of desertion in wartime
is kind of like skipping class," Peters wrote.
"They have no idea of how great a sin
desertion in the face of the enemy is to those
in our military. The only worse sin is to side
actively with the enemy and kill your
brothers in arms. This is not sleeping in on
Monday morning and ducking Gender Studies
101."
Maybe a key here as to why Obama could so
easily discard military code and culture is he
really doesn't regard America's battleground
in the world as a war on terror in the first
place.
Remember the 2009 explanative memo from
the White House to Pentagon staff members
via the Defense Department that said that
"this administration prefers to avoid using
the term 'Long War' or 'Global War on
Terror.' Please use 'Overseas Contingency
Operation'"?
Of course, while the White House plays with
semantics, our courageous U.S. military
personnel are continuing to fight and die on
the battlefield. While the war diminishes in
Obama's fairy tale mind, he just gifted the
real war on terror and the Taliban with their
greatest boost in years.
4) George Washington would not have
emboldened America's greatest enemies
around the world and put at greater risk not
only U.S. military personnel but also
American citizens by increasing their
captivity value in the eyes of our enemies.
And what are the odds that Obama had
another political ulterior motive for prisoner
exchange -- namely, the turning of the
American mind and media from his Veterans
Affairs battlefield? For his "never waste a
crisis"-saturated administration, is this
hypothesis really a stretch?
On June 5, veteran newsman and CEO of
WorldNetDaily Joseph Farah wrote in a
column titled "What Motivates Obama?": "Is it
possible that part of the calculated political
motivation underlying Obama's decision was
just that -- getting the VA out of the nation's
headlines? At first glance, it seems counter-
intuitive: Can you escape one scandal by
creating another? The answer is, of course.
It's called the old 'wag the dog' strategy."
The bottom line, as President Obama recently
said to cadets at the United States Military
Academy, is that "for the foreseeable future,
the most direct threat to America, at home
and abroad, remains terrorism."
Yet his actions as commander in chief say just
the opposite. Indeed, last June, he said
America needed to draw down its war footing
and bring it to an end.
The truth is that Obama is too conciliatory a
leader to be the commander in chief of the
greatest military force in human history. He
says terrorism is the "most direct threat to
America" to cadets yet calls the war on terror
an overseas contingency operation.
He doesn't even know how to announce
victory. He confessed to ABC News in 2009,
"I'm always worried about using the word
'victory,' because, you know, it invokes this
notion of Emperor Hirohito coming down and
signing a surrender to MacArthur."
So how does one add up the following Obama
conclusions? 1) The war, which is not really a
war at all, is over, so much so that we're
exchanging the release of final prisoners of
war. 2) Victory won't be announced, yet the
end of combat missions and the withdrawal
of American troops have been.
There can be only one conclusion, at least in
Obama's mind: America has lost the war on
terror, particularly in the Middle East.
Facts unfortunately point to the tragic event
that Sgt. Bergdahl went AWOL on his post
and platoon. But even worse, facts point to
the catastrophic event that President Obama
just went AWOL as our commander in chief.
And George Washington is rolling in his
grave.
Barack Obama justified his prisoner swap of
five senior Taliban leaders for U.S. Army Sgt.
Bowe Bergdahl by saying former military
leaders and presidents, including George
Washington, have engaged in prisoner of war
exchange, too.
Obama's exact words were: "This is what
happens at the end of wars. That was true for
George Washington; that was true for
Abraham Lincoln; that was true for FDR;
that's been true of every combat situation --
that at some point, you make sure that you try
to get your folks back. And that's the right
thing to do."
From that statement alone, I revealed how
Obama's made grievous errors in judgment
by concluding that 1) the war is over and 2)
he was engaging in a prisoner exchange like
George Washington -- to take just a single
example among his list of stellar leaders.
What Obama didn't tell you regarding
Washington and prisoner exchange during
the Revolutionary War is that both countries
-- England and the U.S. -- exchanged
prisoners of war because both had "few
facilities to accommodate large numbers of
prisoners," according to the Mount Vernon
Ladies' Association, whose mission it is "to
preserve, restore, and manage the estate of
George Washington to the highest standards
and to educate visitors and people throughout
the world about the life and legacies of
George Washington."
As far as buying Americans back from
captivity at the price of enemy combatants,
Obama needs to follow the example of Gen.
Washington, who "made sure that no states
holding military prisoners should trade a
British soldier for an American citizen.
Washington believed that this would have
legitimized the British capture of more
citizens, most of whom were largely
defenseless."
Though no one is minimizing the
understandable elation of Bergdahl's family
over his release, George Washington would
not have traded for him, because he didn't
believe in trading prisoners of war until after
the war was in fact over, treaties were signed
and hostilities ceased, lest he risk the capture
of further American people for ransom.
Here are my two additional grievances with
Obama's prisoner of war exchange:
3) As the commander in chief, George
Washington wouldn't have completely
undermined the very heart and soul of the
military as Obama did with his prisoner
exchange, especially in light of how it is a
cardinal sin in military culture to abandon
one's post and platoon during war.
A little over a week ago, The Washington Post
reported, "Ralph Peters, a retired lieutenant
colonel and intelligence officer, wrote in
National Review that a 'fundamental culture
clash' exists between the president's team
and those in the armed forces, as reflected by
(national security adviser Susan) Rice's
remarks on Bergdahl's honor."
"Both President Obama and Ms. Rice seem to
think that the crime of desertion in wartime
is kind of like skipping class," Peters wrote.
"They have no idea of how great a sin
desertion in the face of the enemy is to those
in our military. The only worse sin is to side
actively with the enemy and kill your
brothers in arms. This is not sleeping in on
Monday morning and ducking Gender Studies
101."
Maybe a key here as to why Obama could so
easily discard military code and culture is he
really doesn't regard America's battleground
in the world as a war on terror in the first
place.
Remember the 2009 explanative memo from
the White House to Pentagon staff members
via the Defense Department that said that
"this administration prefers to avoid using
the term 'Long War' or 'Global War on
Terror.' Please use 'Overseas Contingency
Operation'"?
Of course, while the White House plays with
semantics, our courageous U.S. military
personnel are continuing to fight and die on
the battlefield. While the war diminishes in
Obama's fairy tale mind, he just gifted the
real war on terror and the Taliban with their
greatest boost in years.
4) George Washington would not have
emboldened America's greatest enemies
around the world and put at greater risk not
only U.S. military personnel but also
American citizens by increasing their
captivity value in the eyes of our enemies.
And what are the odds that Obama had
another political ulterior motive for prisoner
exchange -- namely, the turning of the
American mind and media from his Veterans
Affairs battlefield? For his "never waste a
crisis"-saturated administration, is this
hypothesis really a stretch?
On June 5, veteran newsman and CEO of
WorldNetDaily Joseph Farah wrote in a
column titled "What Motivates Obama?": "Is it
possible that part of the calculated political
motivation underlying Obama's decision was
just that -- getting the VA out of the nation's
headlines? At first glance, it seems counter-
intuitive: Can you escape one scandal by
creating another? The answer is, of course.
It's called the old 'wag the dog' strategy."
The bottom line, as President Obama recently
said to cadets at the United States Military
Academy, is that "for the foreseeable future,
the most direct threat to America, at home
and abroad, remains terrorism."
Yet his actions as commander in chief say just
the opposite. Indeed, last June, he said
America needed to draw down its war footing
and bring it to an end.
The truth is that Obama is too conciliatory a
leader to be the commander in chief of the
greatest military force in human history. He
says terrorism is the "most direct threat to
America" to cadets yet calls the war on terror
an overseas contingency operation.
He doesn't even know how to announce
victory. He confessed to ABC News in 2009,
"I'm always worried about using the word
'victory,' because, you know, it invokes this
notion of Emperor Hirohito coming down and
signing a surrender to MacArthur."
So how does one add up the following Obama
conclusions? 1) The war, which is not really a
war at all, is over, so much so that we're
exchanging the release of final prisoners of
war. 2) Victory won't be announced, yet the
end of combat missions and the withdrawal
of American troops have been.
There can be only one conclusion, at least in
Obama's mind: America has lost the war on
terror, particularly in the Middle East.
Facts unfortunately point to the tragic event
that Sgt. Bergdahl went AWOL on his post
and platoon. But even worse, facts point to
the catastrophic event that President Obama
just went AWOL as our commander in chief.
And George Washington is rolling in his
grave.
A BITTER AFTER TASTE
The news from Iraq that Islamic terrorists
have now taken over cities that American
troops liberated during the Iraq war must
have left an especially bitter after-taste to
Americans who lost a loved one who died
taking one of those cities, or to a survivor
who came back without an arm or leg, or with
other traumas to body or mind.
Surely we need to learn something from a
tragedy of this magnitude.
Some say that we should never have gone into
Iraq in the first place. Others say we should
never have pulled our troops out when we
did, leaving behind a weak and irresponsible
government in charge.
At a minimum, Iraq should put an end to the
notion of "nation-building," especially nation-
building on the cheap, and to the glib and
heady talk of "national greatness"
interventionists who were prepared to put
other people's lives on the line from the
safety of their editorial offices.
Those who are ready to blame President
George W. Bush for everything bad that has
happened since he left office should at least
acknowledge that he was a patriotic
American president who did what he did for
the good of the country -- an assumption that
we can no longer safely make about the
current occupant of the White House.
If President Bush's gamble that we could
create a thriving democracy in the Middle
East -- one of the least likely places for a
democracy to thrive -- had paid off, it could
have been the beginning of a world-changing
benefit to this generation and to generations
yet unborn.
A thriving free society in the Muslim world,
and the values and example that such a
society could represent, might undermine the
whole hate-filled world terrorist movement
that is seeking to turn back civilization to a
darker world of centuries past.
But creating such a society, if it is possible at
all, cannot be done on the cheap, with
politicians constantly calling for us to
announce to the world -- including our
enemies -- when we are going to leave. The
very idea is silly, but everything silly in not
funny.
We haven't yet announced when we are
going to pull our troops out of Germany or
Japan, and World War II was over more than
60 years ago. Turning those militaristic
countries around was one of the great
achievements in human history. Their
neighboring countries have been able to
enjoy a peace and security that they had not
known for generations.
Perhaps what was achieved in Germany and
Japan made it seem that we might achieve
something similar in Iraq. But "the greatest
generation" that had fought and survived the
horrors of war around the world was under
no illusion that trying to turn our defeated
enemies around would be easy, quick and
cheap.
Creating democracy in Germany and Japan
was a goal, but not a fetish. Creating a stable
and viable government amid the ruins and
rubble of war was the first priority and a
major responsibility. You cannot create
instant democracy like you are making
instant coffee.
There are prerequisites for a free society, and
the foundations of democracy cannot be built
on chaotic conditions with widespread
uncertainty and fear. To hold elections for
the sake of holding elections is to abdicate
responsibility for the sake of appearances.
The biggest danger is that you will create a
government that will work at cross purposes
to everything you are trying to achieve -- a
government you cannot rein in, much less
repudiate, without destroying your own
credibility as representatives of democracy.
That has happened in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
By contrast, in both Germany and Japan
power was turned over to elected officials at
such times and in such degree as conditions
seemed to indicate. Eventually, both countries
resumed their roles as sovereign nations. But
we didn't publish a timetable.
Today, with terrorists threatening to at least
fragment Iraq, if not take it over, it is a
sobering thought that Barack Obama and his
key advisers have a track record of having
been wrong about Iraq and other foreign
policy issues for years, going back before they
took office -- and no track record of learning
from their mistakes.
have now taken over cities that American
troops liberated during the Iraq war must
have left an especially bitter after-taste to
Americans who lost a loved one who died
taking one of those cities, or to a survivor
who came back without an arm or leg, or with
other traumas to body or mind.
Surely we need to learn something from a
tragedy of this magnitude.
Some say that we should never have gone into
Iraq in the first place. Others say we should
never have pulled our troops out when we
did, leaving behind a weak and irresponsible
government in charge.
At a minimum, Iraq should put an end to the
notion of "nation-building," especially nation-
building on the cheap, and to the glib and
heady talk of "national greatness"
interventionists who were prepared to put
other people's lives on the line from the
safety of their editorial offices.
Those who are ready to blame President
George W. Bush for everything bad that has
happened since he left office should at least
acknowledge that he was a patriotic
American president who did what he did for
the good of the country -- an assumption that
we can no longer safely make about the
current occupant of the White House.
If President Bush's gamble that we could
create a thriving democracy in the Middle
East -- one of the least likely places for a
democracy to thrive -- had paid off, it could
have been the beginning of a world-changing
benefit to this generation and to generations
yet unborn.
A thriving free society in the Muslim world,
and the values and example that such a
society could represent, might undermine the
whole hate-filled world terrorist movement
that is seeking to turn back civilization to a
darker world of centuries past.
But creating such a society, if it is possible at
all, cannot be done on the cheap, with
politicians constantly calling for us to
announce to the world -- including our
enemies -- when we are going to leave. The
very idea is silly, but everything silly in not
funny.
We haven't yet announced when we are
going to pull our troops out of Germany or
Japan, and World War II was over more than
60 years ago. Turning those militaristic
countries around was one of the great
achievements in human history. Their
neighboring countries have been able to
enjoy a peace and security that they had not
known for generations.
Perhaps what was achieved in Germany and
Japan made it seem that we might achieve
something similar in Iraq. But "the greatest
generation" that had fought and survived the
horrors of war around the world was under
no illusion that trying to turn our defeated
enemies around would be easy, quick and
cheap.
Creating democracy in Germany and Japan
was a goal, but not a fetish. Creating a stable
and viable government amid the ruins and
rubble of war was the first priority and a
major responsibility. You cannot create
instant democracy like you are making
instant coffee.
There are prerequisites for a free society, and
the foundations of democracy cannot be built
on chaotic conditions with widespread
uncertainty and fear. To hold elections for
the sake of holding elections is to abdicate
responsibility for the sake of appearances.
The biggest danger is that you will create a
government that will work at cross purposes
to everything you are trying to achieve -- a
government you cannot rein in, much less
repudiate, without destroying your own
credibility as representatives of democracy.
That has happened in both Iraq and
Afghanistan.
By contrast, in both Germany and Japan
power was turned over to elected officials at
such times and in such degree as conditions
seemed to indicate. Eventually, both countries
resumed their roles as sovereign nations. But
we didn't publish a timetable.
Today, with terrorists threatening to at least
fragment Iraq, if not take it over, it is a
sobering thought that Barack Obama and his
key advisers have a track record of having
been wrong about Iraq and other foreign
policy issues for years, going back before they
took office -- and no track record of learning
from their mistakes.
UKRAINE GAS TALKS BREAKS DOWN
Ukraine gets half of the natural gas it uses
from Russia. However, it's not an evenly
distributed half. Ukraine needs far more gas
in winter, and far less in Summer. Ukraine
has enough gas now to last until September.
Politics being politics, resolution of the
dispute could be another two months away
before anyone panics. Thus, it should be no
surprise that Russian Gas Payment Talks Fail .
Ukraine risks the cutoff of natural-gas
supplies from Russia after overnight talks
to resolve a pricing dispute between the
two countries ended without a deal less
than eight hours before a payment
deadline.
Ukraine must pay $1.95 billion to partially
settle its debt to the Russian-owned
natural gas exporter OAO Gazprom for
past deliveries by 10 a.m. Moscow time
today, said Sergei Kupriyanov, a company
spokesman, by phone. He said the
deadline won’t be waived.
“The Russian side has stated that if there
will be no upfront payment, it will start
limiting gas,” said Ukraine Energy
Minister Yuri Prodan.
Russian negotiators rejected a compromise
proposal by the European Union,
according to EU Energy Commissioner
Guenther Oettinger, who has been
involved in the trilateral talks since they
started in May.
The EU, dependent on Russian gas piped
through Ukraine for about 15 percent of its
supplies, is trying to broker a deal to
maintain shipments amid the fuel
payments conflict. In Ukraine, government
forces and rebels claiming allegiance to
Russia continue to clash in the east of the
country.
“For the moment our Russian partners
didn’t accept my proposal,” Oettinger said.
“We have no common understanding.”
Ukraine was ready to accept the EU
proposal of a price range between $300
and $385 per 1,000 cubic meters, still
above the $286.5 that the country paid in
the first quarter, Kobolyev said today.
Gazprom’s final offer was $385, the
company said last week.
Ukraine, which relies on Gazprom (GAZP)
for about half its gas, is able to survive
without Russian fuel until the middle of
September as its current gas consumption
almost matches domestic output due to low
seasonal demand and the stalling of
production at its chemical plants in the
east, according to a Concorde Capital, a
Kiev, Ukraine-based investment company.
The last paragraph above explains all you
need to know. The setup in Ukraine is quite
like debt ceiling negotiations in the US,
typically solved at the last moment with
huffing and puffing and overblown reporting
of consequences if a deal is not reached.
Given that Russia needs the income and
Ukraine and Europe needs the gas, the odds
of a deal "in due time" are at least 95%.
from Russia. However, it's not an evenly
distributed half. Ukraine needs far more gas
in winter, and far less in Summer. Ukraine
has enough gas now to last until September.
Politics being politics, resolution of the
dispute could be another two months away
before anyone panics. Thus, it should be no
surprise that Russian Gas Payment Talks Fail .
Ukraine risks the cutoff of natural-gas
supplies from Russia after overnight talks
to resolve a pricing dispute between the
two countries ended without a deal less
than eight hours before a payment
deadline.
Ukraine must pay $1.95 billion to partially
settle its debt to the Russian-owned
natural gas exporter OAO Gazprom for
past deliveries by 10 a.m. Moscow time
today, said Sergei Kupriyanov, a company
spokesman, by phone. He said the
deadline won’t be waived.
“The Russian side has stated that if there
will be no upfront payment, it will start
limiting gas,” said Ukraine Energy
Minister Yuri Prodan.
Russian negotiators rejected a compromise
proposal by the European Union,
according to EU Energy Commissioner
Guenther Oettinger, who has been
involved in the trilateral talks since they
started in May.
The EU, dependent on Russian gas piped
through Ukraine for about 15 percent of its
supplies, is trying to broker a deal to
maintain shipments amid the fuel
payments conflict. In Ukraine, government
forces and rebels claiming allegiance to
Russia continue to clash in the east of the
country.
“For the moment our Russian partners
didn’t accept my proposal,” Oettinger said.
“We have no common understanding.”
Ukraine was ready to accept the EU
proposal of a price range between $300
and $385 per 1,000 cubic meters, still
above the $286.5 that the country paid in
the first quarter, Kobolyev said today.
Gazprom’s final offer was $385, the
company said last week.
Ukraine, which relies on Gazprom (GAZP)
for about half its gas, is able to survive
without Russian fuel until the middle of
September as its current gas consumption
almost matches domestic output due to low
seasonal demand and the stalling of
production at its chemical plants in the
east, according to a Concorde Capital, a
Kiev, Ukraine-based investment company.
The last paragraph above explains all you
need to know. The setup in Ukraine is quite
like debt ceiling negotiations in the US,
typically solved at the last moment with
huffing and puffing and overblown reporting
of consequences if a deal is not reached.
Given that Russia needs the income and
Ukraine and Europe needs the gas, the odds
of a deal "in due time" are at least 95%.
IRAQ IS ON ITS OWN!
"It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the
great task remaining before us -- that from
these honored dead we take increased
devotion to that cause for which they gave the
last full measure of devotion -- that we here
highly resolve that these dead shall not have
died in vain..." (The Gettysburg Address)
No life is more wasted than one lost in vain.
After the U.S. military battled heroically to
liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's
dictatorship and to eliminate the possibility
that it might become a staging area for
terrorist attacks, the Obama administration
has created a vacuum now being filled by the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an al-
Qaida affiliate, which has overrun Mosul and
Fallujah, cities liberated by American
soldiers. ISIS now threatens Baghdad.
The administration's nonpolicy policy
proclaiming the war over, has given ISIS a
green light to establish another terrorist state
in the Middle East. Following the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, al-Qaida will
likely have two states from which it can plan
and execute new assaults on America, Israel,
Britain and other "infidel" nations. Having
declared the war(s) over and al-Qaida "on the
run," President Obama responds with empty
rhetoric about his national security team
studying what to do, then leaves for a trip
that will end on a golf course in Palm
Springs.
Vice President Biden once called Iraq one of
the president's "great achievements."
On Friday, the president announced the U.S.
would not send military forces back to Iraq
unless the Iraqi government finds a way to
bridge sectarian differences. Even then, he
suggested, military power alone won't bring
stability to the country. Basically, the
president said, "Iraq, you're on your own."
Imagine what the families of dead and
wounded U.S. soldiers think about the sudden
resurgence of al-Qaida in Iraq. They were
told their sons and daughters died in a noble
cause. According to "The Costs of War
Project" at Brown University's Watson
Institute for International Studies, "The wars
begun in 2001 have been tremendously
painful for millions of people ... each
additional month and year of war adds to
that toll." The Rock River Times writes,
"Coalition deaths in Iraq totaled more than
4,700, with the United States sustaining more
than 4,480 deaths through the Iraq War's
official end Dec. 15, 2011. More than 32,000
other U.S. troops were wounded in Iraq,
while more than 134,000 Iraqi civilians were
killed during the course of the official war."
The monetary cost is in the trillions of
dollars. Are we now saying, "Never mind"?
The U.S. has no serious counterintelligence
operation in Iraq, because it refuses to
perceive a commensurate threat from a
global enemy or to see the deadly purpose
and scope of this enemy. It does not
appreciate the scale of the upheaval among
the world's 1.3 to 1.6 billion Muslims, and
the money, motives, power and near-total
information control held by the Islamists who
are committed to the destruction of their
enemies and the subordination, forced
conversion and re-education of those they
allow to live. The jihadists in Iraq recently
looted $429 million from Mosul's central
bank, according to the regional governor,
making them possibly the richest terrorist
group ever.
Our focus under this administration is
unimaginatively constrained largely to the
Middle East, but the growing threat of Islamic
terrorism is not just there. The Islamist
infiltration of schools in Birmingham,
England, is an example for what is to come
there and in the U.S. if they are not stopped.
The administration and much of the media
try to separate "fanatical Muslims" from
"peaceful" ones, but the distinction is
meaningless when the fanatics have the
weapons and are willing to die for their
cause.
This war for the future of the planet is not
over and is unlikely to be for generations to
come. While it's true we can't be the
policemen of the world, we can be its
prisoners in a world ruled by Islamic
fundamentalists. If Western nations don't
combine to use their moral, monetary,
religious, intelligence and, yes, military
power to stop this onslaught against freedom,
we will lose it and never get it back.
Withdrawal from this war is a policy of
surrender. What we need is a unified
approach to fighting Islamic extremism by us
and other allied nations. What we need is a
policy that works.
great task remaining before us -- that from
these honored dead we take increased
devotion to that cause for which they gave the
last full measure of devotion -- that we here
highly resolve that these dead shall not have
died in vain..." (The Gettysburg Address)
No life is more wasted than one lost in vain.
After the U.S. military battled heroically to
liberate Iraq from Saddam Hussein's
dictatorship and to eliminate the possibility
that it might become a staging area for
terrorist attacks, the Obama administration
has created a vacuum now being filled by the
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), an al-
Qaida affiliate, which has overrun Mosul and
Fallujah, cities liberated by American
soldiers. ISIS now threatens Baghdad.
The administration's nonpolicy policy
proclaiming the war over, has given ISIS a
green light to establish another terrorist state
in the Middle East. Following the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, al-Qaida will
likely have two states from which it can plan
and execute new assaults on America, Israel,
Britain and other "infidel" nations. Having
declared the war(s) over and al-Qaida "on the
run," President Obama responds with empty
rhetoric about his national security team
studying what to do, then leaves for a trip
that will end on a golf course in Palm
Springs.
Vice President Biden once called Iraq one of
the president's "great achievements."
On Friday, the president announced the U.S.
would not send military forces back to Iraq
unless the Iraqi government finds a way to
bridge sectarian differences. Even then, he
suggested, military power alone won't bring
stability to the country. Basically, the
president said, "Iraq, you're on your own."
Imagine what the families of dead and
wounded U.S. soldiers think about the sudden
resurgence of al-Qaida in Iraq. They were
told their sons and daughters died in a noble
cause. According to "The Costs of War
Project" at Brown University's Watson
Institute for International Studies, "The wars
begun in 2001 have been tremendously
painful for millions of people ... each
additional month and year of war adds to
that toll." The Rock River Times writes,
"Coalition deaths in Iraq totaled more than
4,700, with the United States sustaining more
than 4,480 deaths through the Iraq War's
official end Dec. 15, 2011. More than 32,000
other U.S. troops were wounded in Iraq,
while more than 134,000 Iraqi civilians were
killed during the course of the official war."
The monetary cost is in the trillions of
dollars. Are we now saying, "Never mind"?
The U.S. has no serious counterintelligence
operation in Iraq, because it refuses to
perceive a commensurate threat from a
global enemy or to see the deadly purpose
and scope of this enemy. It does not
appreciate the scale of the upheaval among
the world's 1.3 to 1.6 billion Muslims, and
the money, motives, power and near-total
information control held by the Islamists who
are committed to the destruction of their
enemies and the subordination, forced
conversion and re-education of those they
allow to live. The jihadists in Iraq recently
looted $429 million from Mosul's central
bank, according to the regional governor,
making them possibly the richest terrorist
group ever.
Our focus under this administration is
unimaginatively constrained largely to the
Middle East, but the growing threat of Islamic
terrorism is not just there. The Islamist
infiltration of schools in Birmingham,
England, is an example for what is to come
there and in the U.S. if they are not stopped.
The administration and much of the media
try to separate "fanatical Muslims" from
"peaceful" ones, but the distinction is
meaningless when the fanatics have the
weapons and are willing to die for their
cause.
This war for the future of the planet is not
over and is unlikely to be for generations to
come. While it's true we can't be the
policemen of the world, we can be its
prisoners in a world ruled by Islamic
fundamentalists. If Western nations don't
combine to use their moral, monetary,
religious, intelligence and, yes, military
power to stop this onslaught against freedom,
we will lose it and never get it back.
Withdrawal from this war is a policy of
surrender. What we need is a unified
approach to fighting Islamic extremism by us
and other allied nations. What we need is a
policy that works.
THE MUSHARRAF TRIAL AND BEYOND
On January 2, General Musharraf ended up at the Armed
forces institute of cardiology in Rawalpindi, a rather long
detour from his residence to the court, which had made
a third unsuccessful attempt to summon the ex-
president on charges of treason.
With speculations ranging from whether there was a
deliberateeffort afoot to prevent the general from
reaching the court to how smartly once gain a court
appearance had been avoided, the General remains
hospitalized. After the initial hoopla about the whys and
whats of the event, it is just another news item, till the
next big audience. However, one wonders what if
instead of the quiet yet highly professional new chief
justice Jillani, it was the media’s darling Justice
Chaudhry still holding the office, could these deferments
be possible? Every word uttered by the Chief Justice
would make proverbial breaking news across the
television channels, and for many the trial appeared
more on the personal grid than its merit.
An unfortunate situation, as very often public weds itself
to popular sentiments and opinions about what the truth
should be, than what it actually is. Should Musharaf be
handed out the guilty verdict on high treason? For
some, the answer is in affirmative, as it would prove a
deterrent for future khaki interventions and perhaps
cosmetically redress the civil-military imbalance. Yet a
review of the state of affairs, indicates problems where
the military appears least zealous given the
circumstances than civilian administers, who need to do
their necessary bit.
While the media remains preoccupied on providing
situational updates on Musharaf, the most urgent and
pressing concern in the first two weeks of the new year
has been the rising number of terrorist bombings. Not
less than fifty people, including civilians and law
enforcement officials have perished as a result. Yet
again, there has been a divided house when it comes to
dealing with the non-state terrorist elements. Where the
KPK provincial government under the PTI prefers
dialogue with the “disillusioned brethren” over direct
military action, the federal government appears totally
ambivalent about how to tackle this critical and most
pressing issue.
Both the provincial and federal governments seem to
disregard the drawdown of foreign troops from
Afghanistan and a different politico-military
arrangement, which appears nightmarish for Pakistani
security forces. The forces have been preoccupied
domestically for more than a decade, and the non-state
elements, have a bigger playfield and target practicing
to carryout.
The social and traditional media cannot get enough out
of the deaths of Aitzaz Ahmed a young school boy, who
bravely lost his life by thwarting a suicide attack on his
school mates and that of Chaudhry Aslam, a daredevil
policeman, who for long led a charmed life and stood
out as a symbol of defiance and destruction for terrorist
elements in the troubled port city of Karachi. These two
brave sons of the soil are not the only one lost in this
brutal war against terrorism and militancy. There have
been many who precede them and unfortunately many
who would gladly follow their footsteps, but is this a
fair price to pay.
What is required is an actual implementation of the
anti-terrorism act, the draft bill already prepared by
NACTA (the purpose built National Counter terrorism
Agency), with a zero-tolerance approach and full inter-
agential coordination as well as cooperation. Dialogue
can only work, if the government and not the militants
are at a superior footing with adequate deterring
physical capacity. The latter is actually not a problem,
although the law enforcement agencies remain lacking
in their capacity, but (at the cost of disregarding
security sector balance) the military somehow fills the
vacuum. It is the will and determination of the decision-
makers that matters. At any religious festivity, a
complete lockdown of major cities, with a total blockade
of communication and road access can temporarily
manage the problem, but is no way a long term to
permanent solution to a menace, which cannot be
addressed symptomatically alone.
The PML-N government emphasized on “3-E’s” during
and after the elections, Energy, Extremism and
Economics. With regards energy sector, the pipelines
and alternate energy sources are being worked on, but it
would take several years before a true relief is brought
about. Extremism as mentioned above needs an iron
fisted approach with no appeasement and political
patronizing of any sorts. With regards economics, unless
there is adequate energy and safe environment,
commercial and industrial output will be affected
drastically. The PML-N, a party which comprises of
feudal and industrialists more than any other should be
aware of this.
As part of better economic opportunities, the
government has in its traditional manner been more
proactive on improving relations with New Delhi, the
January 16-18 agreement between the trade ministers a
positive indicator, but one can only hope that the
relations between the two countries do not remain
focused on one issue area alone, but equal investment
and positive output be made on contentious issues
without preconditions and time delaying tactics.
forces institute of cardiology in Rawalpindi, a rather long
detour from his residence to the court, which had made
a third unsuccessful attempt to summon the ex-
president on charges of treason.
With speculations ranging from whether there was a
deliberateeffort afoot to prevent the general from
reaching the court to how smartly once gain a court
appearance had been avoided, the General remains
hospitalized. After the initial hoopla about the whys and
whats of the event, it is just another news item, till the
next big audience. However, one wonders what if
instead of the quiet yet highly professional new chief
justice Jillani, it was the media’s darling Justice
Chaudhry still holding the office, could these deferments
be possible? Every word uttered by the Chief Justice
would make proverbial breaking news across the
television channels, and for many the trial appeared
more on the personal grid than its merit.
An unfortunate situation, as very often public weds itself
to popular sentiments and opinions about what the truth
should be, than what it actually is. Should Musharaf be
handed out the guilty verdict on high treason? For
some, the answer is in affirmative, as it would prove a
deterrent for future khaki interventions and perhaps
cosmetically redress the civil-military imbalance. Yet a
review of the state of affairs, indicates problems where
the military appears least zealous given the
circumstances than civilian administers, who need to do
their necessary bit.
While the media remains preoccupied on providing
situational updates on Musharaf, the most urgent and
pressing concern in the first two weeks of the new year
has been the rising number of terrorist bombings. Not
less than fifty people, including civilians and law
enforcement officials have perished as a result. Yet
again, there has been a divided house when it comes to
dealing with the non-state terrorist elements. Where the
KPK provincial government under the PTI prefers
dialogue with the “disillusioned brethren” over direct
military action, the federal government appears totally
ambivalent about how to tackle this critical and most
pressing issue.
Both the provincial and federal governments seem to
disregard the drawdown of foreign troops from
Afghanistan and a different politico-military
arrangement, which appears nightmarish for Pakistani
security forces. The forces have been preoccupied
domestically for more than a decade, and the non-state
elements, have a bigger playfield and target practicing
to carryout.
The social and traditional media cannot get enough out
of the deaths of Aitzaz Ahmed a young school boy, who
bravely lost his life by thwarting a suicide attack on his
school mates and that of Chaudhry Aslam, a daredevil
policeman, who for long led a charmed life and stood
out as a symbol of defiance and destruction for terrorist
elements in the troubled port city of Karachi. These two
brave sons of the soil are not the only one lost in this
brutal war against terrorism and militancy. There have
been many who precede them and unfortunately many
who would gladly follow their footsteps, but is this a
fair price to pay.
What is required is an actual implementation of the
anti-terrorism act, the draft bill already prepared by
NACTA (the purpose built National Counter terrorism
Agency), with a zero-tolerance approach and full inter-
agential coordination as well as cooperation. Dialogue
can only work, if the government and not the militants
are at a superior footing with adequate deterring
physical capacity. The latter is actually not a problem,
although the law enforcement agencies remain lacking
in their capacity, but (at the cost of disregarding
security sector balance) the military somehow fills the
vacuum. It is the will and determination of the decision-
makers that matters. At any religious festivity, a
complete lockdown of major cities, with a total blockade
of communication and road access can temporarily
manage the problem, but is no way a long term to
permanent solution to a menace, which cannot be
addressed symptomatically alone.
The PML-N government emphasized on “3-E’s” during
and after the elections, Energy, Extremism and
Economics. With regards energy sector, the pipelines
and alternate energy sources are being worked on, but it
would take several years before a true relief is brought
about. Extremism as mentioned above needs an iron
fisted approach with no appeasement and political
patronizing of any sorts. With regards economics, unless
there is adequate energy and safe environment,
commercial and industrial output will be affected
drastically. The PML-N, a party which comprises of
feudal and industrialists more than any other should be
aware of this.
As part of better economic opportunities, the
government has in its traditional manner been more
proactive on improving relations with New Delhi, the
January 16-18 agreement between the trade ministers a
positive indicator, but one can only hope that the
relations between the two countries do not remain
focused on one issue area alone, but equal investment
and positive output be made on contentious issues
without preconditions and time delaying tactics.
INS ARIHANT: A 'GIANT STRIDE FOR INDIA
When the INS Arihant’s nuclear reactor went critical in
August 2013, India not only joined the blue-water navy
club of countries with the capability to build nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines, but also picked on
a major doctrinal headache. This, apart from the
specification concerns and limited intended utility, puts
the Indian Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV)
programme in a quagmire. With the Indian Navy
expecting to acquire and deploy the vessel in the first
quarter of 2015, certain aspects of this project must be
discussed to gauge New Delhi’s capability to field and
utilise such technology.
Manufacturing
The ATV project is believed to have been started with
the objective of manufacturing SSNs –fast moving
deep-diving nuclear powered attack submarines –
largely based on the K-43 Charlie class vessel, leased
from the Soviet Union at a time when India did not
overtly possess nuclear capability. The project since
then has been covertly developing in the backdrop of
India conducting the Pokhran-II tests, declaring an
ambiguous nuclear strategy, and making impressive
strides in the development of Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs). The Arihant class seems to be a
derivative of the Charlie class, with the specifications
scaled up to the Akula class to accommodate a Vertical
Launch System (VLS) for ballistic missiles. Although
this would not hamper the general functioning of the
vessel, as per reports of the sea trials, the full
implications of this tweak will only emerge when the
Sagarika SLBMs are integrated into the of the INS
Arihant in early 2015. Furthermore, the inclusion of sail
planes and a towed array pod are surprising, as they are
generally avoided to counter limitations to speed and
fragility.
The pressurised water reactor (PWR) aboard the vessel
has also been developed with considerable assistance
from the Russians, contradicting New Delhi’s claims of
the Arihant being an indigenously developed submarine.
With no word on the progress of a domestic generator in
India, the Arihant class’s core component still uses
Russian intelligence and technology. The initial vessel
consumed more than a decade to be rolled out for
primary tests, as opposed to the average five years
taken for the development of vessels of the same class/
category by the five other navies that possess this
technology.
With the first vessel of the Arihant class still undergoing
final trials, India’s decision to start work on subsequent
vessels is a little hurried. An ideal strategy would have
been to concentrate on finishing the INS Arihant and
observing it in a deployed state and then diverting time
and resources on the succeeding vessels. If the claims
of the INS Aridhaman (second vessel in the Arihant
class) being built with ‘bigger and better’ specifications
is true, then the Indian government has not taken any
pointers from this endeavour and embarked on a new
project without successfully completing the first. In any
case, the US$ 2.9 billion per unit price of the vessel
does not justify its results, especially in comparison with
other navies building the same submarine at a
significantly lower price.
Utility: Intended Vs. Delivered
Former Naval Chief Nirmal Verma described the INS
Arihant as primarily a ‘technology demonstrator’.
However, it remains to be seen as to what ‘technology’
the vessel will be demonstrating. A simple comparison
of the Arihant with other submarines of comparable
class/category will reflect this issue. The Arihant has an
advertised maximum speed of only 24kts (submerged),
as opposed to the average 30kts afforded by all the
other classes. Not only does this reflect poorly on
India’s – DRDO and BARC’s – technological
capabilities, but also impedes the operational capability
of the vessel. Once discovered, the propellant potential
becomes the deciding factor for the survivability of a
submarine.
Also, the armament capacity of the INS Arihant is
acutely inferior, with the vessel only fielding 12 K-15
short-range SLBMs. In contrast, the Astute, the Virginia
and the Akula class all have provisions for at least 40
missiles.
With its slow speed and limited strike range, INS Arihant
does not contribute significantly to India’s second-
strike capability, with both China and Pakistan fielding
advanced anti-missile and early warning systems.
Doctrinal Shortcomings
The INS Arihant poses a new dilemma for the Modi
government. For ‘credible minimum deterrence’, New
Delhi is believed to have kept its nuclear weapons in a
‘de-mated’ state with the civilian authority exercising
absolute control. For a ballistic nuclear submarine, the
government will not only have to increase the readiness
of the weapons, but also relinquish their command to
naval officers on board the vessel. This increases the
possibility of an unauthorised/erroneous launch. Also
absent are well-defined protocols to dictate the steps to
be taken in the event of a communications failure with
the central command authority, or dealing with a hostile
take-over. The INS Arihant is a classic example of
governments going into the production stage of
weapons without developing concomitant doctrines.
The INS Arihant maybe a landmark achievement, but it
cannot stand up to China’s newest Jin class vessels,
reported to be one of the current best. Similarly, the
implication of inducting a nuclear submarine in the
Indian Navy on Pakistan remains to be seen. There are
already talks of Beijing selling submarines and
technology to Pakistan. In that case, the INS Arihant
has only initiated another arms race in the region.
August 2013, India not only joined the blue-water navy
club of countries with the capability to build nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines, but also picked on
a major doctrinal headache. This, apart from the
specification concerns and limited intended utility, puts
the Indian Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV)
programme in a quagmire. With the Indian Navy
expecting to acquire and deploy the vessel in the first
quarter of 2015, certain aspects of this project must be
discussed to gauge New Delhi’s capability to field and
utilise such technology.
Manufacturing
The ATV project is believed to have been started with
the objective of manufacturing SSNs –fast moving
deep-diving nuclear powered attack submarines –
largely based on the K-43 Charlie class vessel, leased
from the Soviet Union at a time when India did not
overtly possess nuclear capability. The project since
then has been covertly developing in the backdrop of
India conducting the Pokhran-II tests, declaring an
ambiguous nuclear strategy, and making impressive
strides in the development of Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs). The Arihant class seems to be a
derivative of the Charlie class, with the specifications
scaled up to the Akula class to accommodate a Vertical
Launch System (VLS) for ballistic missiles. Although
this would not hamper the general functioning of the
vessel, as per reports of the sea trials, the full
implications of this tweak will only emerge when the
Sagarika SLBMs are integrated into the of the INS
Arihant in early 2015. Furthermore, the inclusion of sail
planes and a towed array pod are surprising, as they are
generally avoided to counter limitations to speed and
fragility.
The pressurised water reactor (PWR) aboard the vessel
has also been developed with considerable assistance
from the Russians, contradicting New Delhi’s claims of
the Arihant being an indigenously developed submarine.
With no word on the progress of a domestic generator in
India, the Arihant class’s core component still uses
Russian intelligence and technology. The initial vessel
consumed more than a decade to be rolled out for
primary tests, as opposed to the average five years
taken for the development of vessels of the same class/
category by the five other navies that possess this
technology.
With the first vessel of the Arihant class still undergoing
final trials, India’s decision to start work on subsequent
vessels is a little hurried. An ideal strategy would have
been to concentrate on finishing the INS Arihant and
observing it in a deployed state and then diverting time
and resources on the succeeding vessels. If the claims
of the INS Aridhaman (second vessel in the Arihant
class) being built with ‘bigger and better’ specifications
is true, then the Indian government has not taken any
pointers from this endeavour and embarked on a new
project without successfully completing the first. In any
case, the US$ 2.9 billion per unit price of the vessel
does not justify its results, especially in comparison with
other navies building the same submarine at a
significantly lower price.
Utility: Intended Vs. Delivered
Former Naval Chief Nirmal Verma described the INS
Arihant as primarily a ‘technology demonstrator’.
However, it remains to be seen as to what ‘technology’
the vessel will be demonstrating. A simple comparison
of the Arihant with other submarines of comparable
class/category will reflect this issue. The Arihant has an
advertised maximum speed of only 24kts (submerged),
as opposed to the average 30kts afforded by all the
other classes. Not only does this reflect poorly on
India’s – DRDO and BARC’s – technological
capabilities, but also impedes the operational capability
of the vessel. Once discovered, the propellant potential
becomes the deciding factor for the survivability of a
submarine.
Also, the armament capacity of the INS Arihant is
acutely inferior, with the vessel only fielding 12 K-15
short-range SLBMs. In contrast, the Astute, the Virginia
and the Akula class all have provisions for at least 40
missiles.
With its slow speed and limited strike range, INS Arihant
does not contribute significantly to India’s second-
strike capability, with both China and Pakistan fielding
advanced anti-missile and early warning systems.
Doctrinal Shortcomings
The INS Arihant poses a new dilemma for the Modi
government. For ‘credible minimum deterrence’, New
Delhi is believed to have kept its nuclear weapons in a
‘de-mated’ state with the civilian authority exercising
absolute control. For a ballistic nuclear submarine, the
government will not only have to increase the readiness
of the weapons, but also relinquish their command to
naval officers on board the vessel. This increases the
possibility of an unauthorised/erroneous launch. Also
absent are well-defined protocols to dictate the steps to
be taken in the event of a communications failure with
the central command authority, or dealing with a hostile
take-over. The INS Arihant is a classic example of
governments going into the production stage of
weapons without developing concomitant doctrines.
The INS Arihant maybe a landmark achievement, but it
cannot stand up to China’s newest Jin class vessels,
reported to be one of the current best. Similarly, the
implication of inducting a nuclear submarine in the
Indian Navy on Pakistan remains to be seen. There are
already talks of Beijing selling submarines and
technology to Pakistan. In that case, the INS Arihant
has only initiated another arms race in the region.
CHINA'S 'SALAMI SLICING ': WHAT'S NEXT?
It has been over a month since China installed an oil rig
in the disputed South China Sea (SCS). Ever since,
China has shifted the location of the rig thrice. The
installation of the rig appears to be a well calibrated
move. Evidently, China has adopted a ‘salami
slicing’ (step-by-step approach) in the SCS. It took
over Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995;
established Sansha city on the Yongxing Island/Woody
Island a few kilometres from its Hainan Province; cut
the cables of the Vietnamese vessels; occupied
Scarborough Shoal; and is now constructing a runway
on Johnson South Reef. The rig appears to be their next
move in the region.
Subsequent to the installation, China issued an official
document titled ‘The operation of HYSY 981 grilling rig:
Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position’ on the 8
June, reaffirming its position. It has also taken the issue
to the UN. Chinese Deputy Ambassador Wang Min sent
a ‘position paper’ on the rig to the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon and asked the UN chief to circulate it to
the 193 members of the General Assembly. This is in
sharp contrast to China’s previous gestures. During the
Shangri La Dialogue, Lt. General Wang Ghuanzhong of
the People’s Liberation Army reiterated China’s position
that territorial disputes should be settled bilaterally
between the claimants with clear indication that the US
should keep away from the disputes. Until now China
stood for bilateral solution of disputes and was against
any arbitration. By issuing the statement and sending a
‘position paper’, China is itself internationalising the
issue.
These developments have further increased the tension
in the SCS dispute making it further complicated. It is
hence perplexing to understand as to why China issued
a ‘position paper’ on the rig in the disputed area. What
is China’s end game in the region?
Rig HYSY 981 in the Disputed Area
The rig is placed between the Paracel Islands occupied
by China and the Vietnam. Since 1974, China occupied
the Paracels (Xisha/Hoangsa Island).The problem arises
with the different interpretation of the position of the rig.
According to Vietnam, the rig is operating within 200
nautical miles of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
on its continental shelf but China says that it is
operating in its own territory. China and Vietnam have
already signed the agreement on the delimitation of the
territorial seas; EEZs and the continental shelf in the
Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin); and the agreement on the
fishery cooperation in the region in 2000. Till date, this
is the only maritime boundary agreement that China has
had with any other country.
There are two reasons for China establishing the rig;
energy security and the strategic concerns in the region.
Since 1993, China has been a net importer of oil and is
heavily dependent on supply from abroad. Thus, to
reduce the dependence on foreign oil, China is in the
process of exploring different plausible locations; and
the SCS has approximately 11 billion barrels of oil
reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. On
the strategic front, there is an increasing role of external
powers in the region. China Daily reported that “the
United States was the real threat…pointing to U.S.
cyber-warfare and missile defence capabilities and the
fact that U.S. defence spending far exceeded China‘s.”
Nevertheless, the most likely rationale for the
installation of the rig is that it is China’s response to
the changing strategic environment of the SCS.
China's Endgame in the Region
China has realised that the SCS is vital for both
solidifying its influence in the Southeast Asia, as well as
for its regional aspirations. China aspires to play an
important role in the region with minimum US influence
and has thus turned towards multilateral solution to the
dispute. Perhaps it has realised that if it continues
defying international laws and UN mandates, it will give
more space for the US to interfere in the region as is
evident in the case of the enhancing US-Philippines
alliance.
Yet, another reason for putting forward the ‘position
paper’ is to stop the discussion for a ‘Code of Conduct’
in the region which is already due after the ‘2002 code
of Conduct’. By putting forward the ‘position paper’,
China is trying to make its own stand clear and thereby
putting the blame on the Vietnam.
At this juncture, China’s strategy in the region appears
to be a combination of tactical timing and ambiguity.
Thus the installation of the rig has taken the dispute to
a multilateral forum. However, its solution remains
uncertain.
in the disputed South China Sea (SCS). Ever since,
China has shifted the location of the rig thrice. The
installation of the rig appears to be a well calibrated
move. Evidently, China has adopted a ‘salami
slicing’ (step-by-step approach) in the SCS. It took
over Mischief Reef from the Philippines in 1995;
established Sansha city on the Yongxing Island/Woody
Island a few kilometres from its Hainan Province; cut
the cables of the Vietnamese vessels; occupied
Scarborough Shoal; and is now constructing a runway
on Johnson South Reef. The rig appears to be their next
move in the region.
Subsequent to the installation, China issued an official
document titled ‘The operation of HYSY 981 grilling rig:
Vietnam’s Provocation and China’s Position’ on the 8
June, reaffirming its position. It has also taken the issue
to the UN. Chinese Deputy Ambassador Wang Min sent
a ‘position paper’ on the rig to the UN Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon and asked the UN chief to circulate it to
the 193 members of the General Assembly. This is in
sharp contrast to China’s previous gestures. During the
Shangri La Dialogue, Lt. General Wang Ghuanzhong of
the People’s Liberation Army reiterated China’s position
that territorial disputes should be settled bilaterally
between the claimants with clear indication that the US
should keep away from the disputes. Until now China
stood for bilateral solution of disputes and was against
any arbitration. By issuing the statement and sending a
‘position paper’, China is itself internationalising the
issue.
These developments have further increased the tension
in the SCS dispute making it further complicated. It is
hence perplexing to understand as to why China issued
a ‘position paper’ on the rig in the disputed area. What
is China’s end game in the region?
Rig HYSY 981 in the Disputed Area
The rig is placed between the Paracel Islands occupied
by China and the Vietnam. Since 1974, China occupied
the Paracels (Xisha/Hoangsa Island).The problem arises
with the different interpretation of the position of the rig.
According to Vietnam, the rig is operating within 200
nautical miles of its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and
on its continental shelf but China says that it is
operating in its own territory. China and Vietnam have
already signed the agreement on the delimitation of the
territorial seas; EEZs and the continental shelf in the
Beibu Gulf (Gulf of Tonkin); and the agreement on the
fishery cooperation in the region in 2000. Till date, this
is the only maritime boundary agreement that China has
had with any other country.
There are two reasons for China establishing the rig;
energy security and the strategic concerns in the region.
Since 1993, China has been a net importer of oil and is
heavily dependent on supply from abroad. Thus, to
reduce the dependence on foreign oil, China is in the
process of exploring different plausible locations; and
the SCS has approximately 11 billion barrels of oil
reserves and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. On
the strategic front, there is an increasing role of external
powers in the region. China Daily reported that “the
United States was the real threat…pointing to U.S.
cyber-warfare and missile defence capabilities and the
fact that U.S. defence spending far exceeded China‘s.”
Nevertheless, the most likely rationale for the
installation of the rig is that it is China’s response to
the changing strategic environment of the SCS.
China's Endgame in the Region
China has realised that the SCS is vital for both
solidifying its influence in the Southeast Asia, as well as
for its regional aspirations. China aspires to play an
important role in the region with minimum US influence
and has thus turned towards multilateral solution to the
dispute. Perhaps it has realised that if it continues
defying international laws and UN mandates, it will give
more space for the US to interfere in the region as is
evident in the case of the enhancing US-Philippines
alliance.
Yet, another reason for putting forward the ‘position
paper’ is to stop the discussion for a ‘Code of Conduct’
in the region which is already due after the ‘2002 code
of Conduct’. By putting forward the ‘position paper’,
China is trying to make its own stand clear and thereby
putting the blame on the Vietnam.
At this juncture, China’s strategy in the region appears
to be a combination of tactical timing and ambiguity.
Thus the installation of the rig has taken the dispute to
a multilateral forum. However, its solution remains
uncertain.
ISIL, IRAQ AND SECURING INDIA'S INTERESTS
The rabbit hole of Iraq springs up bizarre and
devastatingly new challenges for the US even a decade
after its invasion of the country. The embarrassment
does not end there. The US is now forced to re-enter
the quagmire and may fight alongside its arch-enemy
Iran, much to the chagrin of its most ardent allies in the
region – the Arab Gulf states and Israel.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a new
virulent strain of Wahhabi militancy, recently took
control over the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit and
according to some regional commentators threatens to
rejig the region’s entire post-Ottoman shebang.
Strangely, a large part of the ISIL’s forces comprises
remnants of Saddam’s so-called secular regime –
particularly the Naqshbandi Army operating under the
command of the fugitive Ba’ath Party leader Izzat al-
Douri. In response, Shiite militants have answered the
call to arms by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in their
thousands, raising fears that Iraq might soon
disintegrate on sectarian lines.
These unforeseen events in Iraq follow other
extraordinary developments that are fast transforming
the geopolitical landscape of the region. Signs of a
possible détente in relations between the US and Iran
have taken the world by surprise. The six oil-rich Gulf
monarchies that constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) have been particularly outraged by the so-called
US ‘double-cross’, with Saudi Arabia being so incensed
that it refused to take the UN Security Council seat to
which it was elected. The country has even warned of a
major shift away from the US and is seeking to build an
Asian pivot for a new security architecture.
The US-GCC relationship first came under strain in
2011, when Washington sided with democratic forces
that deposed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and then
recognised the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president
Mohamed Morsi. Fissures widened following the US’
inaction in Syria and its ‘neutrality’ during the Bahrain
uprising, which confirmed GCC fears that Washington
was no longer the guarantor of Gulf security. The last
straw was the surreptitious nuclear deal with Iran last
November, which apparently did not consider taking Gulf
countries into confidence.
Thus, the trust is breached and the 40-year-long ‘oil-
for-security’ pact seems past its sell-by date. The
phenomenal increase in the US’ shale oil and gas
production has helped the superpower outgrow its
‘addiction to Middle East oil’, allowing it to act more
independently in the region. This has impaired
confidence in regional security arrangements, which
could have far-reaching implications for West Asia and
the world.
For its part, India would have to continue walking a
diplomatic tightrope between Iran and the GCC, building
on the trust and goodwill it has earned among all sides
in a volatile region. Interestingly, the early signs of thaw
in the US-Iran relations augur well for New Delhi, as this
had been a major point of contention in Washington-
New Delhi relations. India has maintained diplomatic
ties with Iran and both have shared geostrategic
interests, particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A
breakthrough in the US-Iran negotiations could also
allow India to increase its oil imports from the Gulf
country – which are currently limited by the sanctions
regime. There is also ample scope for trade and cultural
exchanges.
Still, a wide gulf exists between Washington and Tehran
as the present thaw could dissipate any moment.
Moreover, any changes in regional relations should not
come at the expense of India’s historic and strategically
important ties with the GCC states. West Asia supplies
over 62 per cent of India’s oil imports, most of which
come from Arab Gulf countries. Moreover, the over 6
million-strong Indian Diaspora in the GCC states has
created deep human links between the two societies.
While 70 per cent of Indian expatriates in the GCC are
blue collar workers, over 20 per cent are professionals.
They remit about $30 billion to India every year.
Additionally, the GCC countries view the emergence of
Indian economy with great interest. With the rise of
major non-OPEC oil producers such as Russia and the
US, the Gulf is looking toward the Indian and Chinese
markets for sustainable demand. Again, following 9/11
and the 2008 global recession, Gulf capital is
increasingly seeking investment out of the West. A
significant degree of cultural comfort and confidence in
India’s property rights protection and rule of law (unlike
China’s) makes India an attractive investment
destination. However, the policy paralysis that dogged
India’s previous administration proved disappointing for
some corporations. It is hoped that with the coming of a
strong, new leadership in New Delhi, India may finally be
able to meet expectations.
However, the security architecture of the Gulf remains a
major concern for India. With the US influence in retreat,
India needs to actively engage with the GCC, Iran and
Iraq to secure its vital trade and energy interests. In
cooperation with other Asian powers such as China,
Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, it should
initiate building a durable, non-hegemonic security
architecture which ensures stability and peace in the
region.
devastatingly new challenges for the US even a decade
after its invasion of the country. The embarrassment
does not end there. The US is now forced to re-enter
the quagmire and may fight alongside its arch-enemy
Iran, much to the chagrin of its most ardent allies in the
region – the Arab Gulf states and Israel.
The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), a new
virulent strain of Wahhabi militancy, recently took
control over the Iraqi cities of Mosul and Tikrit and
according to some regional commentators threatens to
rejig the region’s entire post-Ottoman shebang.
Strangely, a large part of the ISIL’s forces comprises
remnants of Saddam’s so-called secular regime –
particularly the Naqshbandi Army operating under the
command of the fugitive Ba’ath Party leader Izzat al-
Douri. In response, Shiite militants have answered the
call to arms by Grand Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani in their
thousands, raising fears that Iraq might soon
disintegrate on sectarian lines.
These unforeseen events in Iraq follow other
extraordinary developments that are fast transforming
the geopolitical landscape of the region. Signs of a
possible détente in relations between the US and Iran
have taken the world by surprise. The six oil-rich Gulf
monarchies that constitute the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) have been particularly outraged by the so-called
US ‘double-cross’, with Saudi Arabia being so incensed
that it refused to take the UN Security Council seat to
which it was elected. The country has even warned of a
major shift away from the US and is seeking to build an
Asian pivot for a new security architecture.
The US-GCC relationship first came under strain in
2011, when Washington sided with democratic forces
that deposed Hosni Mubarak in Egypt and then
recognised the Muslim Brotherhood-backed president
Mohamed Morsi. Fissures widened following the US’
inaction in Syria and its ‘neutrality’ during the Bahrain
uprising, which confirmed GCC fears that Washington
was no longer the guarantor of Gulf security. The last
straw was the surreptitious nuclear deal with Iran last
November, which apparently did not consider taking Gulf
countries into confidence.
Thus, the trust is breached and the 40-year-long ‘oil-
for-security’ pact seems past its sell-by date. The
phenomenal increase in the US’ shale oil and gas
production has helped the superpower outgrow its
‘addiction to Middle East oil’, allowing it to act more
independently in the region. This has impaired
confidence in regional security arrangements, which
could have far-reaching implications for West Asia and
the world.
For its part, India would have to continue walking a
diplomatic tightrope between Iran and the GCC, building
on the trust and goodwill it has earned among all sides
in a volatile region. Interestingly, the early signs of thaw
in the US-Iran relations augur well for New Delhi, as this
had been a major point of contention in Washington-
New Delhi relations. India has maintained diplomatic
ties with Iran and both have shared geostrategic
interests, particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia. A
breakthrough in the US-Iran negotiations could also
allow India to increase its oil imports from the Gulf
country – which are currently limited by the sanctions
regime. There is also ample scope for trade and cultural
exchanges.
Still, a wide gulf exists between Washington and Tehran
as the present thaw could dissipate any moment.
Moreover, any changes in regional relations should not
come at the expense of India’s historic and strategically
important ties with the GCC states. West Asia supplies
over 62 per cent of India’s oil imports, most of which
come from Arab Gulf countries. Moreover, the over 6
million-strong Indian Diaspora in the GCC states has
created deep human links between the two societies.
While 70 per cent of Indian expatriates in the GCC are
blue collar workers, over 20 per cent are professionals.
They remit about $30 billion to India every year.
Additionally, the GCC countries view the emergence of
Indian economy with great interest. With the rise of
major non-OPEC oil producers such as Russia and the
US, the Gulf is looking toward the Indian and Chinese
markets for sustainable demand. Again, following 9/11
and the 2008 global recession, Gulf capital is
increasingly seeking investment out of the West. A
significant degree of cultural comfort and confidence in
India’s property rights protection and rule of law (unlike
China’s) makes India an attractive investment
destination. However, the policy paralysis that dogged
India’s previous administration proved disappointing for
some corporations. It is hoped that with the coming of a
strong, new leadership in New Delhi, India may finally be
able to meet expectations.
However, the security architecture of the Gulf remains a
major concern for India. With the US influence in retreat,
India needs to actively engage with the GCC, Iran and
Iraq to secure its vital trade and energy interests. In
cooperation with other Asian powers such as China,
Japan, South Korea, Indonesia and Malaysia, it should
initiate building a durable, non-hegemonic security
architecture which ensures stability and peace in the
region.
16 Jun 2014
TACKLING NAXAL VIOLENCE
In a way the challenge of left-wing extremism the new
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New
Delhi faces bears close resemblance to the situation
that confronted the United Progressive Alliance regime
in its second tenure in 2009. However, given that the
Congress party-led government failed to contain the
threat, the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party
government needs to revisit the overall approach and
not repeat the past polices that contributed to the
survival of the extremist outfit.
In 2009, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-
Maoist) was in the upswing with a dramatic spike in the
deaths of civilians and security forces. Extremism-
related incidents and fatalities among the civilians and
the security forces increased by 41 per cent and 25 per
cent respectively, in 2008. States such as Maharashtra
and West Bengal contributed significantly to this
upswing, with the eastern Indian state becoming the
third most extremism-affected state of the country, in
2009, with 255 incidents and 158 fatalities. The CPI-
Maoist was indeed looking at expanding its sphere of
influence.
The UPA government sought to tame the rise of
extremism with an iron hand.. The change of guards in
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) following the
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks led to a series of brain
storming sessions, and a new policy aiming to
annihilate the CPI-Maoist, titled ‘Operation Green Hunt’
took shape. However, hope expressed by the then Home
Secretary that security forces would be able to liberate
the areas quickly and the civil administration would
kick-start development work in those areas met an early
end in 2010 with the Central Reserve Police Force
receiving a series of setbacks at the hands of the
extremists.
Over the next four years, the UPA government
experimented with a cocktail of force-centric and
development-oriented approach. However, even with
improvements in the overall situation, the CPI-Maoist
continues to remain a formidable adversary. As per the
official data, each day of the year recorded over three
Maoist-related violent incidents resulting in the death of
at least one civilian or a security force personnel, in
2013. An identical situation has prevailed over the first
six months of 2014 as well. Maoists might have been
prevented from expanding their area of operations into
newer territories, but the old theatres such as
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, parts of Odisha and
Maharashtra continue to report significant violence. The
number of attacks carried out by the CPI-Maoist and
close to 50 deaths in the days preceding and following
the parliamentary elections underlines the military
capacities of the extremists.
Three significant deficiencies, among many, that have
marked India's response to the challenge of left-wing
extremism are: first, there is no national consensus on
ways to meet the challenge. States and ministries have
debated on whether to pursue a social development or a
force-centric model of conflict resolution. Second,
although the security forces have made some advances
vis-Ã -vis the extremists, the civil administration
continues to be a reluctant partner in reintegrating the
former Naxal hotbeds through development
administration. Third, there is an acute leadership crisis
at the political as well as the security establishment
levels, hindering success. These deficiencies must be
addressed by the new government in New Delhi in order
to make a substantial impact in the extremist-
dominated areas.
Policy Prescriptions to Deal with the Red Menace
First, the unity of purpose is a key element for success
in any counter-insurgency campaign. The lack of
success vis-Ã -vis the Naxals is predominantly rooted in
the diverse as well as conflicting prescriptions made not
just by the states, but also by the various departments
within the UPA government. Annual meetings of the
chief ministers organised by the government merely
provided platforms for airing diverse opinions, but made
little progress in terms of arriving at a common
approach. The new government must find a way to
bridge the divide between the prescriptions. The prime
minister as well as the home minister must not be seen
as detached actors expressing helplessness at the
state-of-affairs, but should lead from the front.
Second, contrary to the common perception that
periodic military setbacks suffered by the security forces
are the primary reasons for the continuing extremist
domination, the lack of enthusiasm of the civil
administration is a bigger reason for areas freed from
the extremists relapsing into chaos. Development
projects planned for the Saranda region in Jharkhand is
an example of this malaise. A solution must be found to
make the bureaucracy both at the centre as well as in
the states sensitive and participatory in the development
projects.
Third, small achievements would remain critical for the
state's campaign against the CPI-Maoist. A leaf must
be taken from the book of the Maoists, who persevered
for years to find support among the tribal population
and subsequently dominate the areas. The state must
attempt incremental and non-reversible progress
against the extremists.
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New
Delhi faces bears close resemblance to the situation
that confronted the United Progressive Alliance regime
in its second tenure in 2009. However, given that the
Congress party-led government failed to contain the
threat, the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party
government needs to revisit the overall approach and
not repeat the past polices that contributed to the
survival of the extremist outfit.
In 2009, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-
Maoist) was in the upswing with a dramatic spike in the
deaths of civilians and security forces. Extremism-
related incidents and fatalities among the civilians and
the security forces increased by 41 per cent and 25 per
cent respectively, in 2008. States such as Maharashtra
and West Bengal contributed significantly to this
upswing, with the eastern Indian state becoming the
third most extremism-affected state of the country, in
2009, with 255 incidents and 158 fatalities. The CPI-
Maoist was indeed looking at expanding its sphere of
influence.
The UPA government sought to tame the rise of
extremism with an iron hand.. The change of guards in
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) following the
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks led to a series of brain
storming sessions, and a new policy aiming to
annihilate the CPI-Maoist, titled ‘Operation Green Hunt’
took shape. However, hope expressed by the then Home
Secretary that security forces would be able to liberate
the areas quickly and the civil administration would
kick-start development work in those areas met an early
end in 2010 with the Central Reserve Police Force
receiving a series of setbacks at the hands of the
extremists.
Over the next four years, the UPA government
experimented with a cocktail of force-centric and
development-oriented approach. However, even with
improvements in the overall situation, the CPI-Maoist
continues to remain a formidable adversary. As per the
official data, each day of the year recorded over three
Maoist-related violent incidents resulting in the death of
at least one civilian or a security force personnel, in
2013. An identical situation has prevailed over the first
six months of 2014 as well. Maoists might have been
prevented from expanding their area of operations into
newer territories, but the old theatres such as
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, parts of Odisha and
Maharashtra continue to report significant violence. The
number of attacks carried out by the CPI-Maoist and
close to 50 deaths in the days preceding and following
the parliamentary elections underlines the military
capacities of the extremists.
Three significant deficiencies, among many, that have
marked India's response to the challenge of left-wing
extremism are: first, there is no national consensus on
ways to meet the challenge. States and ministries have
debated on whether to pursue a social development or a
force-centric model of conflict resolution. Second,
although the security forces have made some advances
vis-Ã -vis the extremists, the civil administration
continues to be a reluctant partner in reintegrating the
former Naxal hotbeds through development
administration. Third, there is an acute leadership crisis
at the political as well as the security establishment
levels, hindering success. These deficiencies must be
addressed by the new government in New Delhi in order
to make a substantial impact in the extremist-
dominated areas.
Policy Prescriptions to Deal with the Red Menace
First, the unity of purpose is a key element for success
in any counter-insurgency campaign. The lack of
success vis-Ã -vis the Naxals is predominantly rooted in
the diverse as well as conflicting prescriptions made not
just by the states, but also by the various departments
within the UPA government. Annual meetings of the
chief ministers organised by the government merely
provided platforms for airing diverse opinions, but made
little progress in terms of arriving at a common
approach. The new government must find a way to
bridge the divide between the prescriptions. The prime
minister as well as the home minister must not be seen
as detached actors expressing helplessness at the
state-of-affairs, but should lead from the front.
Second, contrary to the common perception that
periodic military setbacks suffered by the security forces
are the primary reasons for the continuing extremist
domination, the lack of enthusiasm of the civil
administration is a bigger reason for areas freed from
the extremists relapsing into chaos. Development
projects planned for the Saranda region in Jharkhand is
an example of this malaise. A solution must be found to
make the bureaucracy both at the centre as well as in
the states sensitive and participatory in the development
projects.
Third, small achievements would remain critical for the
state's campaign against the CPI-Maoist. A leaf must
be taken from the book of the Maoists, who persevered
for years to find support among the tribal population
and subsequently dominate the areas. The state must
attempt incremental and non-reversible progress
against the extremists.
TIME FOR CHINA-INDIA NUCLEAR SPEAK
It is significant that the first international call that
Narendra Modi received soon after taking oath as Prime
Minister was from Premier Li Keqiang of China. This has
been quickly followed up with the visit of the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, within weeks of the new
government assuming charge in New Delhi. While there
is no denying that such visits are planned well ahead
and would have taken place irrespective of the
government in power, the tone and tenor of the meeting
has been distinct. The nuclear issue did not come up for
discussion, but the implications of how India-China
relations develop under the new Indian government will
be felt in the nuclear domain too.
The installation of every new government provides an
opportunity for a productive new beginning in inter-State
relations. Of course, India has since independence
largely followed a broadly pre-set foreign policy that has
never seen major swings or deviations. Changes have
largely been confined to shifts in focus and priorities.
But, as Mr Wang Yi said during his visit to India, China
wanted to "cement our existing friendship and explore
further cooperation."
The exploration of this further cooperation must include
the nuclear dimension too. Until now China has been
closed to this idea on the ground that India is an
illegitimate nuclear weapons power. However, over the
last sixteen years, now that India has consolidated and
operationalised its nuclear strategy, its 'legal' status is
really a non-issue. Slowly, India will have to 'chip away'
at traditional Chinese objections on this front and
convince it of the benefits of starting a nuclear dialogue
that can gradually explore the possibilities of nuclear
confidence-building measures and even arms control at
a later date.
Of course, India would first have to convince itself of the
need for these. As a State under denial from Western-
crafted arms control regimes, India is itself wary of this
concept. However, it would be foolish to eschew the
possibility of India being in the driver's seat on nuclear
CBMs and arms control. These are effective tools that
are used by nuclear-armed countries to stabilise their
deterrent relations and avoid situations of crisis and
arms race instability. India should find ways of doing
the same. Prime Minister Modi made a statement in a
completely different context when he said, "If India has
to compete with China, the focus should be on skill,
scale and speed." The same could be equally applied to
the nuclear context too. We need to skilfully find areas
of nuclear CBMs and arms control (a joint no-first use
agreement, an anti-ballistic missile treaty, control over
multiple independently retargetable vehicles could be
some ideas worthy of being explored) and do it with
speed. It would be in India's interest to find ways of
avoiding being sucked into an offence-defence nuclear
arms race.
It has been evident for a while that a relatively well-
armed and economically powerful China is in an
increasingly assertive mood and is looking to play a
larger role in Asia. India is well conscious of this.
However, it is essential that India shows assertion of its
own on issues that are of supreme national interest.
Unfortunately, the previous government, despite the
many good tasks that it undertook in strengthening
India's nuclear capability and position, suffered from the
perception of being low in resolve. Modi's personality
type is different and it reflects positively on the aspect
of political resolve, at least in case of India's foreign
policy. China respects this and it is not surprising that
the Chinese Foreign Minister praised Prime Minister
Modi for showing the world “resolve and courage” by
setting an agenda to push reforms and development and
for injecting “vigour and vitality” immediately after
taking charge.
India has many issues that can serve as useful
leverages in its relations with China. The consistent
upswing in bilateral trade, totalling close to US$70
billion, is a positive development even though New Delhi
has to work towards reducing its trade deficit with
China. Terrorist incidents in China have exposed the
dangers of extremist radicalism that continue to brew in
the country that Beijing claims as its close friend. It
would be naïve to believe that China will let go of its
special friendship with Pakistan, given that both
perceive this relationship as useful to keep India
unsettled. But, it would still be in India's interest to try
and expose the nuclear dangers for all if Pakistan
continues down the path of sponsoring and supporting
terrorism and China continues to shield its
misbehaviour. China must be 'made to understand' that
it cannot escape from existential nuclear dangers such
as an unauthorised or mistaken nuclear launch or one
caused by miscalculation.
Wang Yi was consistent in reminding India to follow a
"one-China" policy. Sushma Swaraj nattily retorted with
the need for China to respect a "one-India" policy. Both,
however, must equally recognise the fact that nuclear
dangers bring another kind of one-ness to the
neighbourhood that we would all ignore at our own
peril. It behoves the two largest nuclear armed countries
of Asia to join hands in reducing nuclear dangers to the
extent they can. The new government must seize the
opportunity to initiate nuclear-speak with China.
Narendra Modi received soon after taking oath as Prime
Minister was from Premier Li Keqiang of China. This has
been quickly followed up with the visit of the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, within weeks of the new
government assuming charge in New Delhi. While there
is no denying that such visits are planned well ahead
and would have taken place irrespective of the
government in power, the tone and tenor of the meeting
has been distinct. The nuclear issue did not come up for
discussion, but the implications of how India-China
relations develop under the new Indian government will
be felt in the nuclear domain too.
The installation of every new government provides an
opportunity for a productive new beginning in inter-State
relations. Of course, India has since independence
largely followed a broadly pre-set foreign policy that has
never seen major swings or deviations. Changes have
largely been confined to shifts in focus and priorities.
But, as Mr Wang Yi said during his visit to India, China
wanted to "cement our existing friendship and explore
further cooperation."
The exploration of this further cooperation must include
the nuclear dimension too. Until now China has been
closed to this idea on the ground that India is an
illegitimate nuclear weapons power. However, over the
last sixteen years, now that India has consolidated and
operationalised its nuclear strategy, its 'legal' status is
really a non-issue. Slowly, India will have to 'chip away'
at traditional Chinese objections on this front and
convince it of the benefits of starting a nuclear dialogue
that can gradually explore the possibilities of nuclear
confidence-building measures and even arms control at
a later date.
Of course, India would first have to convince itself of the
need for these. As a State under denial from Western-
crafted arms control regimes, India is itself wary of this
concept. However, it would be foolish to eschew the
possibility of India being in the driver's seat on nuclear
CBMs and arms control. These are effective tools that
are used by nuclear-armed countries to stabilise their
deterrent relations and avoid situations of crisis and
arms race instability. India should find ways of doing
the same. Prime Minister Modi made a statement in a
completely different context when he said, "If India has
to compete with China, the focus should be on skill,
scale and speed." The same could be equally applied to
the nuclear context too. We need to skilfully find areas
of nuclear CBMs and arms control (a joint no-first use
agreement, an anti-ballistic missile treaty, control over
multiple independently retargetable vehicles could be
some ideas worthy of being explored) and do it with
speed. It would be in India's interest to find ways of
avoiding being sucked into an offence-defence nuclear
arms race.
It has been evident for a while that a relatively well-
armed and economically powerful China is in an
increasingly assertive mood and is looking to play a
larger role in Asia. India is well conscious of this.
However, it is essential that India shows assertion of its
own on issues that are of supreme national interest.
Unfortunately, the previous government, despite the
many good tasks that it undertook in strengthening
India's nuclear capability and position, suffered from the
perception of being low in resolve. Modi's personality
type is different and it reflects positively on the aspect
of political resolve, at least in case of India's foreign
policy. China respects this and it is not surprising that
the Chinese Foreign Minister praised Prime Minister
Modi for showing the world “resolve and courage” by
setting an agenda to push reforms and development and
for injecting “vigour and vitality” immediately after
taking charge.
India has many issues that can serve as useful
leverages in its relations with China. The consistent
upswing in bilateral trade, totalling close to US$70
billion, is a positive development even though New Delhi
has to work towards reducing its trade deficit with
China. Terrorist incidents in China have exposed the
dangers of extremist radicalism that continue to brew in
the country that Beijing claims as its close friend. It
would be naïve to believe that China will let go of its
special friendship with Pakistan, given that both
perceive this relationship as useful to keep India
unsettled. But, it would still be in India's interest to try
and expose the nuclear dangers for all if Pakistan
continues down the path of sponsoring and supporting
terrorism and China continues to shield its
misbehaviour. China must be 'made to understand' that
it cannot escape from existential nuclear dangers such
as an unauthorised or mistaken nuclear launch or one
caused by miscalculation.
Wang Yi was consistent in reminding India to follow a
"one-China" policy. Sushma Swaraj nattily retorted with
the need for China to respect a "one-India" policy. Both,
however, must equally recognise the fact that nuclear
dangers bring another kind of one-ness to the
neighbourhood that we would all ignore at our own
peril. It behoves the two largest nuclear armed countries
of Asia to join hands in reducing nuclear dangers to the
extent they can. The new government must seize the
opportunity to initiate nuclear-speak with China.
BANGLADESH: A NEW THRUST TOWARDS EAST ASIA
The Prime Minister of Bangladesh, Sheikh Hasina’s
back-to-back visits to Japan and China provide a
diplomatic bonanza to the government bedeviled by
legitimacy crisis at home and abroad following the 5
January general elections this year. Hasina took the
opportunity to silence her critics by making substantive
gains in bilateral relations with the two East Asian
countries. Japan is generally known as a committed
development partner of South Asian countries – as
reflected in volumes of official development assistance
(ODA) pumped into the region every year. Japanese
investment and bilateral trade volume between Tokyo
and Dhaka have been seen a rise, especially over the
past decade. Japan has remained the largest bilateral
donor to Bangladesh for the past fifteen years. Both
countries have developed a strong development
partnership with growing activity by Japanese investors
in Bangladesh.
The 21 point Japan-Bangladesh Comprehensive
Partnership signed by the respective prime ministers
during Hasina’s May 2014 visit is a demonstration of
strong commitment to engage Japan more substantively
in Bangladesh’s development process. In the past seven
years, the number of Japanese companies operating in
Bangladesh has nearly tripled – from 61 in 2007 to 176
in 2013; and the total grants and aid from Japan stood
at $11 billion in 2013. Japan’s strategic intention was
to combine two oceanic regions – the Pacific Ocean and
the Indian Ocean – for what the Japanese ambassador
in Dhaka called a larger space for Japan’s economic
activities.
He added that it looks like a “butterfly” in which
Bangladesh and Myanmar occupies the “lynchpin
position” to connect these oceanic regions. Apart from
appreciating the strategic importance of Bangladesh,
Tokyo would also be happy to receive Dhaka’s support
in its bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC – and also
to the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals by
North Korea. Recently, the Bangladeshi government
recognised a number of foreign friends, including a few
Japanese, for their contribution during the Bangldesh
Liberation War.
As a result, the prime minister’s Japan visit has
contributed to an agreement on a range of specific
projects vis-Ã -vis, inter alia, the construction of Ganges
Barrage, a multi-modal tunnel under Jamuna River, a
dedicated Railway Bridge over Jamuna River, a multi-
modal Dhaka Eastern Bypass, and the ecological
restoration of four rivers around Dhaka. A Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Japan
External Trade Organization and the Bangladesh Export
Processing Zones Authority that reserves important
facilities in 5 EPZs in Bangladesh for Japanese
investors. Japan has also committed its support for
capacity building in nuclear safety and security. In an
unprecedented gesture, Japan committed an ODA of $6
billion over the next five years that is crucial for
infrastructure development in Bangladesh.
In a rare show of diplomatic moves, Hasina made a six-
day official visit to China in early June with a 70-
member business delegation immediately after she
visited Japan. With these back to back visits, Hasina
scored high points in diplomatic maneuvering both for
her new government and the state. The much discussed
China visit resulted in five deals, including Chinese
assistance in the construction of a power plant in
Patuakhali and building a multi-lane road tunnel under
the Karnaphuli River. Chinese President Xi Jinping
described Bangladesh as an important country along the
maritime Silk Road project that he has been
championing, and which envisages enhancing
connectivities, building ports and free trade zones, and
boosting trade with littoral countries in the Indian Ocean
region and in Southeast Asia. China made it clear that it
attaches great importance to the Beijing-Dhaka
relationship and regards Bangladesh as an important
development partner and cooperative partner in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
Bangladesh is an important country along the Maritime
Silk Road for China, and Beijing welcomes Dhaka’s
participation in the development of the cooperation
initiatives of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road. The issue of constructing
the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM)
economic corridor also garnered the interest of both
leaders as part of efforts towards enhancing connectivity
between China and eastern South Asia. However, the
absence of any deal on construction of the Sonadia
deep sea port was conspicuous. The diplomatic circles
in both countries had widely expected a deal on this
mega project. As revealed by Bangladesh’s State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Shahriar Alam, “Bangladesh
has decided to take time to pick the best offer over the
construction of a deep seaport at Sonadia in Cox’s
Bazar as a number of countries have shown interest in
the lucrative mega project.”
High level visits often turn out ceremonial and
declaratory in substance. But these two visits of
Bangladesh’s prime minister have been a diplomatic
breakthrough for Dhaka in cementing its foreign policy
thrust towards the east. The diplomatic overtures by
Japan and China have emboldened the Hasina
government in Bangladesh to strengthen her position
domestically and internationally. Although Japan and
China are traditional friends of Bangladesh, there has
always been a gap in their economic engagement,
particularly in the context of Bangladesh’s growing
economic and social performance. The outcomes of the
recent visits might lead to reduction in the gap,
especially amid the new matrix of external roles in
Dhaka’s domestic politics.
back-to-back visits to Japan and China provide a
diplomatic bonanza to the government bedeviled by
legitimacy crisis at home and abroad following the 5
January general elections this year. Hasina took the
opportunity to silence her critics by making substantive
gains in bilateral relations with the two East Asian
countries. Japan is generally known as a committed
development partner of South Asian countries – as
reflected in volumes of official development assistance
(ODA) pumped into the region every year. Japanese
investment and bilateral trade volume between Tokyo
and Dhaka have been seen a rise, especially over the
past decade. Japan has remained the largest bilateral
donor to Bangladesh for the past fifteen years. Both
countries have developed a strong development
partnership with growing activity by Japanese investors
in Bangladesh.
The 21 point Japan-Bangladesh Comprehensive
Partnership signed by the respective prime ministers
during Hasina’s May 2014 visit is a demonstration of
strong commitment to engage Japan more substantively
in Bangladesh’s development process. In the past seven
years, the number of Japanese companies operating in
Bangladesh has nearly tripled – from 61 in 2007 to 176
in 2013; and the total grants and aid from Japan stood
at $11 billion in 2013. Japan’s strategic intention was
to combine two oceanic regions – the Pacific Ocean and
the Indian Ocean – for what the Japanese ambassador
in Dhaka called a larger space for Japan’s economic
activities.
He added that it looks like a “butterfly” in which
Bangladesh and Myanmar occupies the “lynchpin
position” to connect these oceanic regions. Apart from
appreciating the strategic importance of Bangladesh,
Tokyo would also be happy to receive Dhaka’s support
in its bid for a permanent seat at the UNSC – and also
to the issue of the abduction of Japanese nationals by
North Korea. Recently, the Bangladeshi government
recognised a number of foreign friends, including a few
Japanese, for their contribution during the Bangldesh
Liberation War.
As a result, the prime minister’s Japan visit has
contributed to an agreement on a range of specific
projects vis-Ã -vis, inter alia, the construction of Ganges
Barrage, a multi-modal tunnel under Jamuna River, a
dedicated Railway Bridge over Jamuna River, a multi-
modal Dhaka Eastern Bypass, and the ecological
restoration of four rivers around Dhaka. A Memorandum
of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the Japan
External Trade Organization and the Bangladesh Export
Processing Zones Authority that reserves important
facilities in 5 EPZs in Bangladesh for Japanese
investors. Japan has also committed its support for
capacity building in nuclear safety and security. In an
unprecedented gesture, Japan committed an ODA of $6
billion over the next five years that is crucial for
infrastructure development in Bangladesh.
In a rare show of diplomatic moves, Hasina made a six-
day official visit to China in early June with a 70-
member business delegation immediately after she
visited Japan. With these back to back visits, Hasina
scored high points in diplomatic maneuvering both for
her new government and the state. The much discussed
China visit resulted in five deals, including Chinese
assistance in the construction of a power plant in
Patuakhali and building a multi-lane road tunnel under
the Karnaphuli River. Chinese President Xi Jinping
described Bangladesh as an important country along the
maritime Silk Road project that he has been
championing, and which envisages enhancing
connectivities, building ports and free trade zones, and
boosting trade with littoral countries in the Indian Ocean
region and in Southeast Asia. China made it clear that it
attaches great importance to the Beijing-Dhaka
relationship and regards Bangladesh as an important
development partner and cooperative partner in South
Asia and the Indian Ocean region.
Bangladesh is an important country along the Maritime
Silk Road for China, and Beijing welcomes Dhaka’s
participation in the development of the cooperation
initiatives of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st
Century Maritime Silk Road. The issue of constructing
the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar (BCIM)
economic corridor also garnered the interest of both
leaders as part of efforts towards enhancing connectivity
between China and eastern South Asia. However, the
absence of any deal on construction of the Sonadia
deep sea port was conspicuous. The diplomatic circles
in both countries had widely expected a deal on this
mega project. As revealed by Bangladesh’s State
Minister of Foreign Affairs Shahriar Alam, “Bangladesh
has decided to take time to pick the best offer over the
construction of a deep seaport at Sonadia in Cox’s
Bazar as a number of countries have shown interest in
the lucrative mega project.”
High level visits often turn out ceremonial and
declaratory in substance. But these two visits of
Bangladesh’s prime minister have been a diplomatic
breakthrough for Dhaka in cementing its foreign policy
thrust towards the east. The diplomatic overtures by
Japan and China have emboldened the Hasina
government in Bangladesh to strengthen her position
domestically and internationally. Although Japan and
China are traditional friends of Bangladesh, there has
always been a gap in their economic engagement,
particularly in the context of Bangladesh’s growing
economic and social performance. The outcomes of the
recent visits might lead to reduction in the gap,
especially amid the new matrix of external roles in
Dhaka’s domestic politics.
THE ENIGMATIC CASE OF BOWE BERGDAHL
Sgt Bowe Bergdahl was serving with the US Army in
Afghanistan’s Paktika province when he was captured
on 30 June 2009 by the Taliban’s Haqqani faction. After
protracted negotiations, Bergdahl was released on 31
May 2014 in a deal brokered with the Taliban by the
governments of the US, Afghanistan and Qatar. In terms
of this deal, five Taliban detainees, currently
incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), were
transferred to Qatari custody for one year, after which
they would be free to go wherever they wished. Bergdahl
was treated after his release at a Regional Medical
Centre in Germany, and has now been transferred to a
medical facility in Texas for further physical and
psychological treatment. Incidentally, the five Taliban
detainees exchanged to secure Bergdahl’s liberty
include the former Taliban army chief of staff, a Taliban
deputy minister of intelligence, a former Taliban interior
minister, and two other senior Taliban figures. Eyebrows
have been raised in the US political and military
establishments, especially among Republicans and
conservative Democrats, apart from the veterans’
community, over whether too high a price has been paid
to secure Bergdahl’s release. These hardened terrorists,
their argument goes, are bound to return to active duty,
and complicate the on-going war on terror by the US.
President Obama, who took the decision to proceed with
this exchange, has justified it on humanitarian grounds,
citing the American tradition of not leaving anyone
behind on the battlefield. A further wrinkle was added
because the prior approval of Congress had not been
sought before the release of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees, which is a procedural and statutory necessity
under American law. But the Obama administration has
justified its bypassing of Congress by claiming that the
window of opportunity to obtain Bergdahl’s release was
limited and dilatory procedures could have endangered
his life. There is also the legal argument that the
Presidential system of governance in the US gives
absolute discretion to the Chief Executive to take
appropriate decisions in matters involving the supreme
national interests. Detractors, however, have found
these justificatory arguments unconvincing, if not glib.
Some versions of Berghdahl’s capture have also
become controversial. He had confessed to being
captured when he fell behind on a patrol. The Taliban
alleged that Bergdahl was ambushed after he got drunk
off base. Other sources said that Berghdahl walked off
the base after his shift. The US Defense Department had
attributed his disappearance to his walking off his base
with three Afghans when he was taken prisoner. Critics
allege that Bergdahl was a deserter, and swapping him
for notorious Taliban leaders was most unwise,
especially since general American policy eschews
bargaining with militants for freeing hostages.
Why then did President Obama - an intensely political
leader - undertake this manoeuvre? Obviously, he
wanted to bolster his sagging political image, which has
been severely dented in the recent past. Clearly, the
American economy is showing no signs of recovery,
unemployment has reached historical heights, and the
Obamacare health programme is going nowhere.
Furthermore, foreign policy disasters centering on
Ukraine, Syria and, now, Iraq are staring Obama in the
face. He might have calculated that securing the release
of Bowe Bergdahl would deflect attention from these
depressing realities. Unfortunately, this affair became
hugely controversial and divisive. Apropos, the latest
Obama public approval ratings have dropped to an all-
time low of 44 per cent.
What are the lessons to be learnt from this episode that
have universal applicability? No doubt, domestic political
realities like the strength of the government, importance
of the hostage, or even their numbers are relevant
considerations for deciding on how to deal with hostage
crises. But, the most obvious lesson to be learnt is that
nations should have a hostage policy. Should they
negotiate with abductors and hijackers to secure the
release of citizens? Or, pursue a firm policy of not
dealing with abductors and hijackers? The worst policy
would, of course, be to have a hostage policy and make
exceptions when crises arise, which is the choice
preferred by President Obama.
India’s experience is instructive here. The abduction of
the Sukma Collector in Chattisgarh in 2012 by Naxalites
led to a high-level official team of interlocutors being set
up; it negotiated his release after 12 days in captivity.
No Naxalites, it seems, were released in return. But a
high-level review of all pending cases was promised and
the release of all arrested Naxal suspects against whom
no specific charges had been levelled. The Chief Minister
had made an impassioned plea at that time requesting
a national hostage policy being devised for the guidance
of the states. That policy has not yet been drafted, and
the states remain adrift on how to handle such hostage
cases if they occur in future.
Perhaps the Modi government, which has emphasised
governance, should devise a hostage policy before the
next crisis occurs. Even deciding on not having a policy
and proceeding in an ad hoc fashion requires a policy
decision.
Afghanistan’s Paktika province when he was captured
on 30 June 2009 by the Taliban’s Haqqani faction. After
protracted negotiations, Bergdahl was released on 31
May 2014 in a deal brokered with the Taliban by the
governments of the US, Afghanistan and Qatar. In terms
of this deal, five Taliban detainees, currently
incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), were
transferred to Qatari custody for one year, after which
they would be free to go wherever they wished. Bergdahl
was treated after his release at a Regional Medical
Centre in Germany, and has now been transferred to a
medical facility in Texas for further physical and
psychological treatment. Incidentally, the five Taliban
detainees exchanged to secure Bergdahl’s liberty
include the former Taliban army chief of staff, a Taliban
deputy minister of intelligence, a former Taliban interior
minister, and two other senior Taliban figures. Eyebrows
have been raised in the US political and military
establishments, especially among Republicans and
conservative Democrats, apart from the veterans’
community, over whether too high a price has been paid
to secure Bergdahl’s release. These hardened terrorists,
their argument goes, are bound to return to active duty,
and complicate the on-going war on terror by the US.
President Obama, who took the decision to proceed with
this exchange, has justified it on humanitarian grounds,
citing the American tradition of not leaving anyone
behind on the battlefield. A further wrinkle was added
because the prior approval of Congress had not been
sought before the release of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees, which is a procedural and statutory necessity
under American law. But the Obama administration has
justified its bypassing of Congress by claiming that the
window of opportunity to obtain Bergdahl’s release was
limited and dilatory procedures could have endangered
his life. There is also the legal argument that the
Presidential system of governance in the US gives
absolute discretion to the Chief Executive to take
appropriate decisions in matters involving the supreme
national interests. Detractors, however, have found
these justificatory arguments unconvincing, if not glib.
Some versions of Berghdahl’s capture have also
become controversial. He had confessed to being
captured when he fell behind on a patrol. The Taliban
alleged that Bergdahl was ambushed after he got drunk
off base. Other sources said that Berghdahl walked off
the base after his shift. The US Defense Department had
attributed his disappearance to his walking off his base
with three Afghans when he was taken prisoner. Critics
allege that Bergdahl was a deserter, and swapping him
for notorious Taliban leaders was most unwise,
especially since general American policy eschews
bargaining with militants for freeing hostages.
Why then did President Obama - an intensely political
leader - undertake this manoeuvre? Obviously, he
wanted to bolster his sagging political image, which has
been severely dented in the recent past. Clearly, the
American economy is showing no signs of recovery,
unemployment has reached historical heights, and the
Obamacare health programme is going nowhere.
Furthermore, foreign policy disasters centering on
Ukraine, Syria and, now, Iraq are staring Obama in the
face. He might have calculated that securing the release
of Bowe Bergdahl would deflect attention from these
depressing realities. Unfortunately, this affair became
hugely controversial and divisive. Apropos, the latest
Obama public approval ratings have dropped to an all-
time low of 44 per cent.
What are the lessons to be learnt from this episode that
have universal applicability? No doubt, domestic political
realities like the strength of the government, importance
of the hostage, or even their numbers are relevant
considerations for deciding on how to deal with hostage
crises. But, the most obvious lesson to be learnt is that
nations should have a hostage policy. Should they
negotiate with abductors and hijackers to secure the
release of citizens? Or, pursue a firm policy of not
dealing with abductors and hijackers? The worst policy
would, of course, be to have a hostage policy and make
exceptions when crises arise, which is the choice
preferred by President Obama.
India’s experience is instructive here. The abduction of
the Sukma Collector in Chattisgarh in 2012 by Naxalites
led to a high-level official team of interlocutors being set
up; it negotiated his release after 12 days in captivity.
No Naxalites, it seems, were released in return. But a
high-level review of all pending cases was promised and
the release of all arrested Naxal suspects against whom
no specific charges had been levelled. The Chief Minister
had made an impassioned plea at that time requesting
a national hostage policy being devised for the guidance
of the states. That policy has not yet been drafted, and
the states remain adrift on how to handle such hostage
cases if they occur in future.
Perhaps the Modi government, which has emphasised
governance, should devise a hostage policy before the
next crisis occurs. Even deciding on not having a policy
and proceeding in an ad hoc fashion requires a policy
decision.
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