PAKISTAN'S TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Varun Sahni

 

 

Hatf IX (Nasr) is a Pakistani ballistic missile which can deliver a sub-kiloton nuclear warhead over a range of 60 km, or 37.3 miles. It is supposed to have entered service in 2013 and is believed to be fully integrated into Pakistan’s C3I (command, control, communications and intelligence). Its purported role is as a low-yield battlefield deterrent against mechanised columns. Should India – and the world – take Nasr seriously? 

 

The development and deployment of Nasr by Pakistan was inevitable and  the impact of this tactical nuclear weapon (tac nuke) on the emerging India-Pakistan deterrence relationship is inherently destabilising.

 

Defining Tactical Nuclear Weapons: The Pakistani Context

There are four different yardsticks by which tac nukes could be defined and classified. The first is the range of the missile: it must be short range, that is less than 80-100 km. The second is yield of warhead, conventionally benchmarked at less than 5 kilotons (kT) with reference to a 1994 US Congressional definition prohibiting R&D in US nuclear weapons laboratories below this yield. The third is function – Pakistan would use its tactical nuclear weapons in an anti-armour role; bunker busting is the primary role envisaged by US proponents of research into low yield nuclear weapons. The fourth yardstick is impact, which in the case of tac nukes is limited to the immediate battlefield, or in other words, the sub-theatre.

 

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Problem than a Solution?

Why are tac nukes usually seen as a problem rather than as a solution? In the first place, they lower the nuclear threshold by blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear war. Secondly, tac nukes accentuate the ‘always-never dilemma’ inherent in all nuclear weapons: they must always work when you want them to, yet never be used when you do not want them to be used. The possibility of unauthorised or accidental use increases significantly with tac nukes: unlike ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), whose commanders have delegative control, in the case of tac nukes delegative control may go down to subaltern/NCO levels under battlefield conditions. Thirdly, battlefield deployment of tac nukes, especially in situations of rapid armour movement, creates an enormous pressure to ‘use them or lose them’. Finally, there is a much greater possibility for tac nukes to fall into ‘wrong hands’ due to theft, pilferage or sabotage.

 

Given these problems, all of them well known for decades, why has Pakistan gone down the tac nuke route? In order to understand why, it is important to underline that Pakistan has, from even before South Asia’s overt nuclearisation, signalled a nuclear doctrine of not only first use but also early use. This doctrine has created problems for Pakistan, whose nuclear planners have had to grapple with the issue of nuclear thresholds, that is the point beyond which Pakistan would have no option but to use its nuclear weapons. As far back as 2002, the Landau Network–Centro Volta team (Cotta-Ramusino and Martellini) had identified four Pakistani thresholds: geographic (space threshold), military, political (domestic destabilisation) and even economic. Tac nukes are Pakistan’s solution to the military threshold.

 

Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Here to Stay

There are three essential features of Pakistan that suggest that its tac nukes are here to stay. Firstly, as the weaker power in the India-Pakistan dyad, Pakistan faces significant conventional asymmetries. Only nuclear weapons provide Pakistan with a sense of strategic parity with India. Faced with the possibility of an Indian armoured thrust in the plains or desert sectors, Pakistan is signalling that it will use its tactical nuclear weapons despite their escalatory potential. 

 

Secondly, Pakistan is a quintessential ‘homeland state’ with deep existential anxieties. Its entire national identity has been constructed as a homeland for an endangered people facing a historically implacable foe. No matter how many internal security challenges it faces, Pakistan will not drop its guard vis-à-vis India and will always give the external threat primacy. In such an identity construction, nuclear weapons give Pakistan and its people the assurance of national survival and civilizational certitude that they are second to none. Furthermore, they encapsulate the sense of ‘we will all go together when we go’ – akin to the Samson Option of that other nuclearised homeland state, Israel.

 

Finally, Pakistan is a revisionist power that has systematically pursued asymmetric strategies to overturn the territorial status quo. In this context, the nature of the ‘Kashmir issue’ comes into sharp focus. As a wise person once said of the Kashmir issue, ‘Kashmir is with India, the issue is with Pakistan.’ While admittedly a neat play on words, this observation identifies two core elements in the ‘shadow of the future’: (1) The Kashmir issue will be resolved only when Pakistan considers it resolved; (2) any change in the territorial status quo would be inimical to India. Pakistan’s dilemma is the nuclear weapons give it strategic parity but also buttress the territorial status quo. This explains why Pakistan has no compunction in deliberately shortening its nuclear fuse vis-à-vis India by deploying tac nukes.

 

An arms control agreement between India and Pakistan over tac nukes is unlikely: there is no incentive for Pakistan to remove a redline that begins at the international border (IB) itself. The strategic challenges that Pakistan’s tac nukes pose for India will be explored in a future column.

ANTI ROHINGYA ANTI MUSLIM SENTIMENTS IN MYANMAR

 Aparupa Bhattacherjee

 

 

Is there a cause and effect between the anti-Muslim sentiments and anti-Rohingya violence in Myanmar? Is the latter an expression of the former?

The violence against the Rohingyas appears to be a part of larger Islamophobia within Myanmar. The religious identity of the Rohingyas seems to play a larger role than their ethnic background, triggering violence from a section within Myanmar.

Islamophobia and Anti-Rohingya Riots: Five Causes

The strife between the Rohingya’s and the Rakhines is embedded in Myanmar’s history. The communal riots in the 1990s and later in 2001 and 2003 are the fallouts of this divide, though the June 2012 riot between the two communities attracted international attention. Until then, the existing religious tension was restricted only to some parts of the Rakhine state. Since 2012, there has been a rapid spread of the anti-Muslim sentiments to the rest of Myanmar which has also further escalated the existing tension between the Rakhines and the Rohingyas.  

Several reasons triggered the scepticism against the Muslims since 2012. First, the release of the radical Buddhist monk Ashin Wirathu and formation of the 969 movement under him provided an organised platform for promoting Islamophobia. Launched in 2012, the movement propagates that the Muslims (who are recorded to be four percent of the total population according to the 1983 census in Myanmar) eventually would become the majority and the largest group within Myanmar.  The members of 969 movement act as prime instigators of the anti-Muslim movement in all over Myanmar. 

Second, the withdrawal of the media censorship in 2011 by the newly formed quasi-civilian government has helped in disseminating hatred.  Uncensored media has opened the avenues of use and abuse of the social media, propagating anti Rohingya, anti Muslim speeches and messages.  The recent riot in July 2014 in Mandalay highlights the misuse of the media. A fabricated story in social media of molestation of a Buddhist girl by her Muslim employer triggered the whole violence. 

Third, the 9/11 attack in the US, had alarmed a section within Myanmar which fear being targeted by the Islamic terrorists. The Rohingya Patriotic Front (a militant group, renamed as the Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO) in the 1990s) and its union with Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) to evolve as the Arakan Rohingya Union (ARU) further exacerbated this fear.  The secessionist demands by these militant groups have only strengthened the fear and distrust among a section of Buddhist Myanmarese against the Muslims which was flared by the radical groups such as 969 movement. 

Fourth, the vulnerability of the Rohingya’s made them an easy target. The Rohingyas were stripped of their citizenship rights by the 1982 Constitution, and thus perceived as an outsider in the country. They are referred as ‘Bengalis’ from Bangladesh, and the growth of the militants amongst them, have created an image of the whole community as a bunch of reprobate. Although the Rohingyas are a minority in the Rakhine state but their population is substantial in number (one billion approximately out of the total three billion); this has supported the notion of Muslim takeover. Additionally certain villages were recognised as the Rohingya ghettos, made them easily accessible for the perpetrators. This could be substantiated by the fact that the Rohingyas living in other district in a more mixed community setup were never attacked. 

Fifth, the spread of violence to other states also indicates the anti-Rohingya hostilities are effect of the cause of Islamophobia in Myanmar. Although the June and October 2012 riots were restricted in the Rakhine state, several riots also took place across Myanmar, including the two big cities of Yangon and Mandalay. The February 2013 riot in Yangon, took place in Thaketa township comprising Muslims population of mix ethnic groups and insignificant number of Rohingyas.  According to the record, the number of people murdered, raped and displaced in both the June and October 2012 riots apart from the Rohingyas also includes other Muslims such as Kaman and Barmar Muslims too. Thus elaborating attacks in most of these riots lead by the group of Buddhists radicals were inflicted upon the Muslims irrespective of their ethnicity.  

The anti- Rohingya violence should not be treated separate from the problem of the rapid growth of anti-Muslim sentiments in Myanmar. Although the Rohingyas have faced the brunt of the growth of the anti-Muslim violence, the repercussion of the growth has impacted all Muslims in Myanmar irrespective of their ethnicity.  This implies that the solution to both the cause and its effect have to be addressed together, as one may again lead to other.  

AFGHANISTAN: THE NEW PRESIDENT AND A JOINT VENTURE GOVERNMENT

 Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

 

 

On 21 September 2014, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) of Afghanistan declared Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as the winner of the country’s presidential election that took place earlier this year, after a lengthy deal-making process with the other leading contender, Abdullah Abdullah.

What does the creation of ‘Chief Executive Officer’ (CEO) mean for Afghanistan? Does the end of the political deadlock automatically spell good times for the country? 

Deal-making and the Emergence of the Unity Government

The 2014 Afghan presidential election – the first transfer of power to a whole new leadership – was precariously prolonged and fraught with several strong opposing stances and allegations. After the tense flux and indecision that followed the elections, which led to an UN-overlooked and US-funded audit of the ballots, the results were finally declared three months after the run-off concluded. The IEC declared Ashraf Ghani as the president-elect, and runner-up Abdullah Abdullah as the CEO – a post that was created to facilitate power-sharing and to end the electoral deadlock.

 

The IEC and the candidates simply announced the results without declaring the vote statistics. In fact, the deal-making between Abdullah and Ghani that took months to finalise, ended on the condition that the vote statistics won’t be made public.

This does not bode well for a country that is on its path towards democracy after years of civil war and strife. A decision on the leadership was extremely pressing and the Sunday announcement comes as a relief for the political stability of the country at the moment. However, the means to reach that end was not ideal, and has potential to lead to problems in the future. The decision for deal-making was agreed upon and took place between the parties and the declaration of results were stalled and delayed due to intransigence on the part of the contenders, thereby making the candidates and not the IEC the real decision-makers. The deal-making between the candidates undermines the credibility and significance of the IEC – which emerged as a toothless tiger. It indicates the lack of authority on the IEC’s part to ensure the writ of the state – in terms of election processes as mandated by the constitution of Afghan state – as it is supposed to do. This points towards the urgent need for reforms in the IEC and other state institutions – especially given how the 2015 parliamentary election is fast approaching.

 

An Assessment of the Election Process

An interesting trend that emerged over the course of the electoral process was the blending of Afghan cultural characteristics with the concept of democracy.  Negotiations – an extremely prominent aspect of the Afghan culture – continually took place between various players during various stages of the polls. This demonstrates to an extent the adaptation of the concept of democracy into the pre-existing Afghan system.

 

At present, the president is the head of the government, and the constitution does not include space for a prime ministerial post.  According to the National Unity Government Agreement, until such time as the post of a prime minister will be created, the post of a CEO (a role with the essence of an executive prime minister’s post) will be created to accommodate Abdullah Abdullah or his nominee in the government. 

 

However, the Agreement, states that “On the basis of Article 2 of the Joint Statement of 17 Asad 1393 (August 8, 2014) and its attachment (“…convening of a Loya Jirga in two years to consider the post of an executive prime minister”), the President is committed to convoking a Loya Jirga for the purpose of debate on amending the Constitution and creating a post of executive prime minister.” The text of the Agreement makes no explicit commitment towards the creation of a prime minister’s post and/or a deadline to carry the said task out.  The text only speaks of the president’s commitment towards calling for a Loya Jirga meeting on amending the constitution, without specific mention of commitment towards the creation of the post itself. It is important to note that nomenclature isn’t the focus of the debate. The skepticism stems from the fact the post of the CEO will be created by a presidential decree – that isn’t difficult to revoke.

Furthermore, the IEC’s decision to withhold voting statistics did not go well with the Afghans – who had defied terrorist threats and turned up in large numbers to cast their ballots. This is not unfounded, for they now feel that their votes were of no consequence given how decisions on leadership were taken by two opposing candidates who co-opted each other and eliminated the purpose of votes altogether.  As one Afghan police officer was quoted saying, the newly-formed government is a “Joint Venture” between two politicians. 

Looking Ahead

In essence, this is essentially a hastily cobbled government whose creation was extremely important for the moment, but one that brings baggage of potential instability for the immediate years. Decision-making – especially on issues of security and foreign policy – will become a complicated process given the likelihood of divergent interests and objectives of the two leaders. Furthermore, given the limited maneuvering space both leaders will enjoy, the likelihood of large-scale changes seems bleak at the moment. If this trajectory continues, the cracks may lead to instability, inactions and/or delays in several matters, providing fertile ground for non-state actors to make inroads.

SOUTHEAST ASIA: ANSWERING THE CALL FOR JIHAD

 Aparupa Bhattacherjee


On 23 July 2014, a video was posted on YouTube showed Isnilon Hapilon, a senior member of the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), and other members, pledging their support to the Islamic State (IS) through both financial and manpower support. Similarly, Mochammad Achwan, the chairman of Jemmah Anshorut Tauhid (JAT) has delivered the message of their founder Abu Bakar Ba’asyir’s support for IS and its self-proclaimed Caliphate of the State of Islam. There are already records of huge numbers of Southeast Asians - approximately like 12,000 - travelling to Iraq and Syria to fight for the IS.

Why are the numbers of Southeast Asians trying to join the IS growing? Why are the Southeast Asian terrorist organisations supporting IS?

Motives
The terrorist organisations have claimed that the reason for their support is that the war is being led by their Muslim “brothers” in Iraq and Syria. Another reason as claimed by these groups is the fact that the establishment of a Caliphate of the Islamic Kingdom is more or less a common goal. However the real motive for the support to the IS could also be the resurrection of their credibility and hold in Southeast Asia. ASG in was formed as a splinter group from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is based in Philippines. Their collaboration with Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and al Qaeda led to the establishment of this group as one of the most violent separatist groups in that region. Heavy crackdowns through the joint efforts of Singaporean, Malaysian and Indonesian anti-terrorist squads have led to the disintegration of the JI into numerous smaller and less powerful splinter groups and weakened the ASG whose terror attacks since 2005 have been limited to extortion and looting of local foreign tourists. Thus supporting the IS could be perceived the ASG an opportunity for them to revives their claim to fame.

The video that was posted on YouTube began with still photos of Isnilon Hapilon on US’ ‘most wanted’ posters in addition to the symbolic black flag. This suggests that Hapilon was trying to establish their notoriety. They have already kidnapped two German tourists and demanded that the German government not support the US in their war against the IS. JAT, founded by one of the initial founders of the JI, Abu Bakar Ba’asyir, is one of the most powerful splinter group of JI in comparison to other groups such as Hisbah, Tawid Wal Jihad and the Negara Islam Indonesia (NII). JAT is considered a jacket for JI and for some as a re-emergence of JI.  However, JAT did not gain the stature of JI had attained till 2005. Support for the IS could thus be visualised by Ba’asyir to attain that stature. 

Employment Opportunities
Both unemployment and poverty are factors for the growing number of Southeast Asian youth who are joining the IS. Muslim youth in rural Malaysia, Indonesia, southern Thailand and Philippines are mostly educated in the pasentrens or madrassas (Islamic schools), and many of them are unable to get mainstream jobs due to the poor standards of education. Fighting for the IS is therefore a job opportunity as they are provided with both salaries and food.  Further, many of the pasentrens in Indonesia are generally schools run by the former JI and members of other terrorist organisations preaching war strategies in the name of Islam.

Ideological Impact
Not all Southeast Asians joining the IS are doing so for money - for example, there are reports of a Malaysian navy officer travelling to Iraq to join the IS. Many Southeast Asians are spurred by the idea of fighting a war for the self-proclaimed Caliph and also to fight against the Shia majority (Shias are a minority in all the Southeast Asian countries). Recurring recruitment videos on YouTube also has an ideological impact on some Southeast Asian Muslims. In fact use of social media for recruitment is one of the biggest factors for the large numbers of Muslims from all over the world joining the IS.

Whatever may be the reasons, the fallout could be alarming. Both JI and ASG were organised by the Southeast Asian veterans of the Afghanistan war who had received training at al Qaeda camps. These organisations had not only developed these terror networks but had also contributed to the spread of a radical form of Islam - then a new phenomenon in Southeast Asia. History might repeat itself, and the return of the soldiers from Iraq and Syria might again lead to a development of the same pattern.

ISLAMIC STATE: STRAINING THE US DEFENCE BUDGET

Vivek Mishra

 

 

The most recent estimation vis-à-vis the US’ military campaign against the Islamic State (IS) has it that the cost of Washington’s war against the IS has surpassed $780 million. This comes at a time when the Pentagon has hinted at request for more support. Essentially, the US military is spending up to $10 million a day. While air strikes might seem to be a safe option, the costs incurred are heavy. Besides, there is increasing chorus for involvement of ground troops, as isolated air strikes are not believed to be adequate. Amidst this seemingly intractable involvement of the US in Iraq and Syria, will the US will be able to sustain budgetary allowances for its campaign, against the IS in particular and its other foreign military presence in general?

Engaging the Islamic State: A Folly?

With its newly announced campaign against the IS, the US again stands at crossroads, divided between three strenuous military commitments – Asia-pacific, Ukraine and West Asia – and a reduction in budgets back home. Although the extent of the US military involvement differs in each case, the cumulative budgetary toll on the country’s defence budget has necessitated a rethink.

The pressure on Washington was evident when US President Barack Obama announced an open-ended “broad coalition” to fight the IS, instead of taking it forward unilaterally. The US restricted itself from committing fully to the anticipated long-drawn war against the IS through a combination of “no boots on ground” and “light military footprint.” However, both these strategies will depend on how cooperative other allies and friends of the US, particularly those in the region, are. So far, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Jordan, Bahrain, and Qatar have pledged support to the US against the IS. Whether the campaign against the IS remains to be not “America’s war alone” will be contingent on the nature of support the US gets from these countries.

At least two suggestions imply that the US could get further embroiled in its fight against the IS; Gen. Martin E. Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, suggested that more US ground forces could be needed in its fight against the IS and the further expansion of airstrikes by the US inside Iraq. The US wanted to disentangle from wars in West Asia but ended up redeploying troops to Iraq and expanding air operations in Syria. The nature of the threat emerging from the IS has required the US to enter deeper in the region than initially anticipated. Apart from these, the Pentagon-White House rift, on whether the US campaign against the IS will succeed, adds to its bane.

Impact on Defense Budget

These military commitments have taken a huge toll on the US defence budget. The first five weeks of US airstrikes in northern Iraq has cost $262.5 million. The military offensive planned against the IS is likely to bite off a massive $500 billion into Pentagon’s spending cuts planned over the next decade. Since these are mandatory cuts mandated by the 2011 Budget Control Act (also called Sequestration), it would mean a resource-depleted US force over the next decade.

This is anticipated in a Department of Defence (DoD) paper released in April 2013, titled ‘Defense Budget Priorities and Choice-Fiscal Year 2014.’ The report mentions drawdown of forces and resource depletion as two important strategies planned in the roadmap for the US military. The paper categorically mentions that the DoD estimates a 20 per cent drop in the overall defence budget from 2010 to 2017. Sequestration, if not amended through an amendment, will lead to further cuts in the defense budget ($50 billion each year, through 2021). Unfortunately, all of these coincide with the US’ foreign military engagements.

This is a massive cut the DoD is talking about and will likely have an impact on the number of troops, overseas operations, ammunitions, military intelligence and defence research, among other things. Specifically, the US will have to do a reduction of approximately 50, 000 active-duty soldiers, do away with a navy carrier and its mid-air refuel tankers KC-10s, apart from similar reductions. If the US might have to choose between strength reduction and ammunition reduction, the latter would be a harder choice. Obama, in the past, has held the relation between technology and success as directly proportional. To that extent, defence research and production are likely to continue with the current pace, or even higher. Truth, then, might be on the side of the Republican hawks when they argue that the IS has revealed the US’ incapacity to cut military spending.

The beheading of two US journalists by the IS militants has garnered the necessary domestic support to carry out military strikes against these militants, which seems to have shrouded the defence budget cut debate for now. But could this only be a temporary lull?

THE ISLAMIC STATE: NO COUNTRY FOR THE OLD WORLD ORDER

Ranjit Gupta


Following spectacular successes in routing government forces and other opponents in both Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) announced the establishment of an Islamic State (IS) on June 30, 2014 to the absolute astonishment of a stunned world. The IS controls 2/5ths of the Syrian territory and 2/5ths of Iraqi territory. It holds assets worth over $2 billion – cash taken from banks and government treasuries of the towns it has taken over in Syria and Iraq; ransom money from those kidnapped (including almost $135 million reportedly paid by European governments or companies to secure the release of their kidnapped nationals); revenues of about $2 million per day from sale of oil from the four oilfields in Syria and one in Iraq that it controls; from fees and taxes; from funding from
entities and individuals in Gulf countries, and looting from businessmen and common citizens in territories that it controls etc. It is virtually self-sufficient, economically and financially. It is very well-equipped militarily, having captured huge amounts of
sophisticated weaponry. It has about 10-12,000 fighters in Iraq, mostly Iraqi, and perhaps thrice as many in Syria, majority Syrian, with at least one-third being
foreigners, including many from Western countries. The world has not seen any terrorist entity like the IS. There is no option but to defeat the IS. Otherwise Iraq
and Syria will unravel and instability will cascade throughout West Asia with disastrous consequences for
the world at large. Positive omens are emerging in Iraq. The formation of a
national unity government is finally under way and once Sunnis start being given their rightful role, objectives publicly supported by both Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani and radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, the Sunni population will almost surely reject the IS’s medieval ideology and brutal rule and defeat them as they had done earlier in 2008, in Anbar Province routing the Al
Qaeda in Iraq – the IS’s original avatar. The Baa’thist and other Saddam era army officers and personnel who had temporarily allied with the IS are beginning to leave. The IS cannot be sustained without the support of the Sunni population at large. The US air strikes enabled the Kurdish Peshmerga and Iraqi Special Forces, who, unprecedentedly, worked together for the first time, to recover control of the Mosul dam, and on August 31,
the town of Amerli that had fallen to IS control in June. Even the traditional enemies of the Kurdistan Regional Government's leader Masoud Barzai, the Syrian Kurdish Democratic Union Party, pitched in to help, and escorted the Yazidis to safety. The Sadrists, who had fought
bitterly against the Americans, have publicly requested US help and cooperation but without putting their troops into Iraq.
Significantly, GCC countries that have in the past, with considerable justification, been accused of financing the spread of Islamic extremism, have finally accepted that this virus is the greatest existential danger to them. It is significant that the Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, had an excellent visit to Saudi Arabia last week. Repeatedly affirmed by King Abdullah, Saudi Arabia has made it clear that the Islamic State is now its and the GCC’s preeminent enemy and defeating it is their top strategic priority. A variety of proactive measures have been initiated.
For the first time since the end of World War II, countries that have held opposing views on most regional issues in West Asia are all together, without exception, strongly opposing the IS. There are hundreds of US military advisers in Iraq and more will be deputed; US airstrikes have been increasing. Significantly, traditionally non-interventionist Germany, other EU countries, and Australia and Canada have announced weapons supply to the Kurds. Russia has provided Sukhoi fighters and a lot of other weaponry. Extensive help has been available from Iran – not merely weapons and funds but officers and small units of the Al Quds Force. Iran, for the first time, is supplying weapons to the Kurds. Iran and the US are cooperating although
there is understandable defensiveness for both sides about admitting it publicly.
Though there is a lack of clarity on how exactly the US intends to prosecute the war against the IS, on Aug 29, US Secretary of State John Kerry publicly announced
intentions of proactively leading an effort to establish a truly multinational coalition of states and entities against the IS and seeking UN Security Council endorsement.
Though the US, French and British leaders publicly maintain that they will not cooperate with the Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in combating the IS, in due time, ways will be found around current anti- Assad reservations. Meanwhile the US has started reconnaissance flights over Syria. Encouragingly, supplying arms to ‘moderate’ rebels by Western and GCC countries and Turkey is under review as these arms have in the past fallen in the hands of the IS. The Assad regime has also started confronting the IS more assertively.
Having said all this, the world must brace up to the reality that far more brutality, death, destruction and violence in West Asia lies ahead than has already been
witnessed as the war against the IS truly gets under way.

THE MILITARY'S SCRIPT AND ENDGAME

Suba Chandran


Is there a coup imminent in Pakistan? Or has it already taken place behind the scenes and the military is well embedded?
Javed Hashmi, the President of the PTI who has now distanced from Imran Khan has made few important statements hinting a script authored by the Establishment on the current political crisis in Pakistan.
What is this script and what is Pakistan military’s endgame in the current crisis? Does the military want the political crisis to escalate further and finally take over, justifying the inability and incompetence of the elected leadership to provide governance, and more importantly stability?
Though the ISPR statements from the military have distanced from such an intention, there is enough to suspect that the Establishment has a script, and is
enacting a political play in carefully calibrated steps. There are three major actors in this script; Nawaz Sharif
– the Prime Minister and the leader of the PML-N;
Imran Khan – the leader of PTI; and Tahirul Qadri – the leader of PAT.
The ISPR statement dated 31 August was a crucial hinting two salient points. The release after the Corps Commanders meeting stated that “the conference
reviewed with serious concern, the existing political crisis and the violent turn it has taken, resulting in large scale injuries and loss of lives. Further use of force will only aggravate the problem. It was once again
reiterated that the situation should be resolved politically without wasting any time and without recourse to violent means.” The two parties to the crisis-government led by Sharif and the protesters led by Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, have been following two different approaches. The government has been trying to maintain the status quo at the political level, and ensure there is no violence in the streets. The protesters, right from day one have been trying to upset the status, demanding nothing less than the resignation of an elected Prime Minister. More importantly, they were willing to use force to occupy the red zone and blast into government buildings including the office of the Prime Minister. Clearly, there is a section trying to maintain status quo
(the government in this case); and another trying to upset the equilibrium and create anarchy. By clearly telling that “the situation should be resolved politically…
without recourse to violent means” the ISPR statement has affected the position of the government and strengthened that of the protesters. If there is one party that could use force constitutionally, it is the State. And the ISPR Statement clearly equates both at the same length.
Majority in Pakistan, though are not satisfied with the performance of Sharif’s government ever since it took over, they are also highly critical of Imran Khan – Tahirul Qadri interference, which is not only
undemocratic, but also is a political blackmail. Javed Hashmi’s statements hint about a possible understanding between the Establishment and the two protesters.
Back to the original question, what is military’s script?
And what is its Endgame?
In retrospect, it appears to have started with the political trial of Musharraf. Though the military then under Gen Kayani and now under Gen Sharif did not make any overt references to the trial process, it is obvious no military could see their former COAS being dragged by the court. It also appears, again in retrospect, that Nawaz Sharif could have gone slow in
pursuing the case against Musharraf. Sharif wanted to return the favour and wanted Musharraf to go through what he underwent after the previous coup in the late 1990s. A section within Pakistan even discussed the need for reconciliation and avoiding any vendetta politics. Sharif could have avoided the trial and let Musharraf disappear into oblivion. Given the electoral
process and the performance of Musharraf’s clique in 2013 elections and the popular anger against him, he posed no threat to Sharif and his government. He
should have let Musharraf alone. And that is what the military also wanted. To be fair to Sharif, it was not only him who was
against Musharraf, but the entire judicial structure starting from the former Chief Justice – Iftikhar Chaudhry to the lawyers in district court were keen to prosecute him. In fact the lawyer movement which was
instrumental in dethroning Musharraf worked over time to ensure the trial process became intense. At the popular level, Musharraf became the scapegoat for
whatever had gone wrong during his tenure. The print, electronic and social media joined the chorus; the result was the “hang Musharraf hand” slogan became the
dominant political discourse during 2013-14.Though there was a popular sentiment against Musharraf, Sharif today is reaping the whirlwind.
Differences between Nawaz Sharif and the military have started expanding ever since. The Hamid Mir and Geo TV incidents only strengthened this divide. Nawaz Sharif was seen by the Establishment as an actor behind the Hamid Mir affair in which the military and its ISI was projected and targeted by a section publicly within Pakistan. While targeting of Musharraf could be tolerated, the Establishment would never like to see it being hounded by the media in public; when the serving ISI Chief became the target and his picture shown
continuously, that too live over the attack on Hamid Mir, the military and its intelligence agencies would have decided to strike back. Then came a short interregnum – Modi’s election and the invitation to his swearing in ceremony in New Delhi.
According to reports, the military was not too keen in Sharif taking part in the ceremony. Earlier, Sharif has made numerous statements during the election
campaign to improve the Indo-Pak dialogue process. For Sharif, better Indo-Pak relations would give him better leverage internally within Pakistan, and give him
more space to manoeuvre vis-a-vis the Establishment. The decision to strike back at Sharif should have been taken place immediately after the Musharraf trial, and
then during Hamid Mir/Geo incidents. The sudden return of Tahirul Qadri to launch a revolution and Imran Khan finding faults with the 2013 election process in 2014 is
no coincidence. It would be a different issue, whether the Establishment is using these two protesters to teach Sharif a lesson, or the Imran and Qadri using the
military’s support to achieve their own Endgame. So what would the military warn to achieve? Look at what is has achieved so far. There is complete chaos in the capital. Reports in print, electronic and social media would highlight the popular anger against the political leadership and their inability to co-habit. The first major
achievement for the Establishment in the entire process would be the thorough discrediting of elected leaders and the democratic process. Second, according to a report in the Wall Street Journal, the Establishment is attempting to reach an agreement with Sharif to diffuse the situation, which would ensure that the military would be in charge with Pakistan’s
policies towards US, Afghanistan and India.
Third, irrespective of coup, the political leadership both at the ruling and opposition sides know clearly who the real boss is. When the judiciary asked the protesters to
vacate, there was no response; but both Qadri and Imran went to meet the military leaders, when they were summoned. The government, though armed with
Constitutional provisions and even a support within the Parliament have been reluctant to take action. Certainly – neither the Parliamentary nor the Judiciary is
supreme. The GHQ is.

RELIGIOUS RADICALISATION IN XINCHIANG: IS CHINA'S GAME-PLAN TO BLAME?

Bhavna Singh


The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post-
Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of
the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to
become-energy independent and hence cares little about the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War. However, this domination ended after the collapse of the
Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where
the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.

OF INQUILAB AND THE INQUILABIS

Salma Malik


The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market? The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in
addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.

CHANGING GLOBAL BALANCE OF POWER: OBAMA'S RESPONSE

Chintamani Mahapatra


The term ‘unipolar world order’ has slowly been erased from the lexicon of current debates on world affairs. While the Obama Administration appears determined to keep the flag of Pax Americana flying around the world, events in Latin America, Europe, Asia and West Asia have begun to challenge the US-led global order. China and Russia have successfully penetrated Latin America by spreading their economic and military
presence hitherto completely dominated by the US. While Japan has been seeking in vain to chase the Chinese into Latin America, the Obama Administration has been accused of neglecting its own backyard. Many analysts raised eyebrows when US President Barack Obama promised considerable assistance to Africa last month but had little to offer to Latin America.
China already has a robust presence in Africa and has replaced the US as the principal trading partner of many Latin American countries. The US financial assistance has always been conditional to protection of human rights or promotion of democracy, but China imposes no strings; and thus, an increasing number of countries in Africa and Latin America are looking up to Beijing for assistance.
Notably, China has little to offer to strife-torn West Asia. It has taken a back seat in the game of diplomacy and has not even attempted to restore order in Libya, Egypt, Palestine, Syria or Iraq. The US on the other
hand has directly or indirectly remained a high profile actor in this region. The reigning superpower, however, has failed to contain, manage, and let alone resolve, the
ongoing violence in West Asia. The credibility of the US as a world leader has been questioned in view of Washington’s alleged mishandling of the Syrian civil war; the delayed response to the threat posed by the Islamic State (IS); the lack of
satisfactory steps to re-establish order in the post- Gaddafi Libya; and the inability to arrive at an agreeable solution to the Iranian nuclear issue. Critics have pointed to the US’ hasty withdrawal from Iraq before restoration of socio-political stability and its planned exit from Afghanistan despite the resurgence of the Taliban as indicative of the US’ diminished ability
and willingness to sustain its hegemonic world order. While some argue that the US is on the march to become-energy independent and hence cares little about
the West Asian muddle, the region remains critical to global energy security. Can the US economy sustain itself, if there is instability in the global energy market?
The US’ recent decision to seek NATO assistance in addressing the threat from the IS is but one among several examples that testify the US’ declining power to maintain world order on its own. There was little doubt that the US dominated the NATO during the Cold War.
However, this domination ended after the collapse of the Soviet Union and despite NATO’s geographical expansion.
The support received by the US from NATO in the wake of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 vanished in 2003 when the Bush Administration prepared to militarily intervene in Iraq. In the recent NATO summit in Poland, Obama persuaded some NATO members to expand its activities
to other parts of the world with the creation of rapid deployment force. The first such step would be to tackle the terror threat from IS. However, it signifies the US’
weakness than strength in managing the IS threat. The jerky balance of power in today’s world, however, is more discernible in Europe and the Asia Pacific where the resurgence of Russian power and the emergence of China as a potential global power has put to the test the resilience of the US-led global order. American threats, sanctions, and/or even diplomacy failed to
prevent Russia from spreading its control over to Abkhazia and South Ossetia in 2008 and Crimea in 2014. Over the past several months, Ukraine has emerged as a new cold war battleground between the Obama and the Putin administrations. After Putin brandished his nuclear arsenal, his proposal for a cease-fire became effective in Eastern Ukraine. Similarly, the US seems ineffective in stemming the expansion of Beijing’s influence in the Asia Pacific both
due to China’s rising military prowess and vast economic muscle. China has occupied several islands in the South China Sea, harassed smaller neighbours, challenged the US’ naval vessels and surveillance ships
risking potential confrontation, declared Air Defence Identification Zones and patrolled in waters close to the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in East China Sea. The US has issued statements warning China and assuring its allies, but there is no manifestation of its effect. Significantly, China and Russia have been forging closer
economic and military ties to alter the global power structure, making it difficult for the US to stop the erosion of its global influence.

INDIA-AUSTRALIA NUCLEAR AGREEMENT: BESPEAKING OF A NEW AGE

Sheel Kant Sharma


The conclusion of a nuclear cooperation agreement between India and Australia last week is indeed a landmark achievement for their bilateral relations. Before leaving for his India visit, Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott was confident of reaching an agreement with India as he stated in Canberra that “We ought to be prepared to provide uranium to India under suitable
safeguards.” Considering the chasm that separated their positions twenty years ago on the main issues in the global nuclear mainstream, Abbot’s statement bespeaks
of a coming of age. He declared in India that “…there is a very high level of trust between us, and that is why we are signing this agreement.” Australia has provided
full assurance that it will be a long-term reliable supplier of uranium to India. Australia also supports India’s joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) as a member. The agreement will also cover other key areas in nuclear technology such as supply of isotopes and cooperation in regard to nuclear safety. Although Australia does not run nuclear power plants, it has an extensive nuclear enterprise comprising not only mining but also research in diverse areas including, for example, on making the
safeguards system more effective. It is to the credit of India’s nuclear program that it receives recognition from Australia in unequivocal terms, like “trust” and
scrupulous adherence to international laws “regardless of the ups and downs of the political situation in New Delhi.” This level of understanding and confluence of mutual interest takes the relationship to a truly strategic scale of cooperation; energy being central to it.
Looking at Australia’s immense natural resources and the vast unpolluted continent that lies at its disposal, Canberra’s role and profile in international arena in the coming decades will certainly grow much bigger. So far, it has played a modest role in the Asia Pacific compared to its potential albeit as a dependable and steadfast US ally and a robust economic partner for ASEAN and
China. India and Australia, as the Joint Statement issued after the prime minister’s visit demonstrates, are set to do a whole lot of things together for mutual benefit. The nuclear accord encapsulates and symbolises that coming together just as the seminal agreement between India and the US did in 2006. In recent years, a definitive sense has emerged in the Australian worldview that a strong and prosperous India will be a factor for peace and stability in Asia and the world.
Coming to the uranium metal, its fortunes fluctuate wildly depending on the temperamental swings of the mass psychosis about “radiation” on the one hand and the inexorable push of nuclear power as a relatively cleaner and sustainable energy option for the energy
hungry planet. From its highs in the short years of nuclear renaissance in the middle of last decade, uranium prices have come down to nearly half that peak post the Fukushima disaster and subsequent sharp
retardation in nuclear power prospect – not only in Japan and Germany but also in liability-obsessed India. India’s vacillation on nuclear power projects is particularly shocking since its power needs today exceed its production by figures that approach a 100000 Megawatt and even coal fired thermal plant capacity languishing in shortfalls as big as 90000 Megawatt due
to fuel crunch, according to some estimates. It is significant that Australia has come forward as a reliable supplier not only for nuclear fuel but also for coal. An uninterrupted supply of uranium and its
augmentation to meet the requirements in Indian nuclear power plants will also raise their capacity factors to record highs.
As it is the global openings since the US deal have brought enormous improvements in fuel situation and the Rawatbhata nuclear power plant units today can boast of achieving a global peak in continuous,
unbroken running of a plant. Australia has, along with its neighbour, New Zealand,
considerable moral clout in the realm of global nuclear and advanced technology. India should benefit from the Australian leverage for its entry in the NSG – Australia
has kept the nuclear option out for meeting its power needs despite its vast uranium resources.
So, its support may hopefully carry greater clout with conscientious objectors of nuclear power like New Zealand, Austria and Ireland that are not easily persuaded to relax the rules for India. The commercial
factor in uranium deals, while important for the Australian mining industry, is hardly so big as to be accused of driving its government’s stance in the energy debate. The environmentalists, as Prime Minister Abbott has stated, are a highly significant lobby in Australia – that constantly oversees the mining industry to ensure that the green standards are observed to the utmost
level of satisfaction. It now remains for the company representatives from both sides to thrash out the details of contract terms for
supply of uranium. India’s Nuclear Power Cooperation Limited has been keen to build lifetime inventories for suitably safeguarded nuclear plants and would naturally want to obtain long-term supply guarantees. This should not pose a problem to arrive at, given the India’s record commitment to its safeguards obligations.

MYANMAR'S POLITICAL TRANSITION:CHALLENGES OF THE 2015 ELECTION

Shankari Sundararaman


Recent changes shaping Myanmar’s transition process have highlighted the tenuousness of the Process in that country. Even as the upcoming 2015 election is set to
be one of the most important indicators of this democratic transition, events transpiring in the country are worrisome. The gains made over the past four years
– since the reform process began in 2011 – may be affected by several recent developments that have raised anxieties vis-à-vis the trajectory the transition will follow.
What are the indicators of changes shaping Myanmar?
What is their significance in the context of the 2015 elections?
Since the 2010 elections and the announcement of the reform process in 2011, Myanmar has seen some credible changes that have altered the perceptions of both regional countries and the international community. The 2012 by-election – where the National League for
Democracy (NLD) won 43 seats of 45 seats – was seen as a watershed moment in the Process and was heralded as a marker of the shift shaping Myanmar. However, the past few months have seen challenges to
the reform process. They highlight the complex issues that need to be resolved to ensure the free-ness and fairness of the 2015 elections. They include constitutional reforms; greater freedom and space for
the media; management of ethnic conflicts and communal violence; and viable political space for all minorities within Myanmar.
The Constitution Conundrum
First on the list is the debate for the amendment of Myanmar’s 2008 Constitution – that has ensued for the
past few years. This Constitution strongly endorses a role for the military through the implementation of the National Defence and Security Council (NDSC) – that clearly visualises a role for the armed forces in two
capacities:
a. in the administration of the country via reservations
in the parliament, and
b. in the protection and preservation of the state
This allows for one fourth of the parliamentary seats to be reserved for the armed forces – and is seen as crucial to the stability of the state. Additionally, there
exists a provision under Article 436 that currently demands over 75 per cent votes in the parliament to make amends to the Constitution – an impossible task given that 25 per cent of seats reserved for the military allows for the right to veto any move to reframe the charter. In July 2014, Aung San Suu Kyi led a signature campaign towards amending this caveat; it still shows
no signs of progress.
The second debate relates directly to Suu Kyi’s role with regards to Article 59 (f) that debars any person from the presidency on account of being related to foreigners.
This directly impinges on Suu Kyi’s chances to lead her party to victory in the 2015 elections. Given how the NLD does not have a second rung of leadership to carry on the party mantle in the absence of Suu Kyi’s
influential and charismatic guidance, this directly undermines the party’s effectiveness in the upcoming elections.
The Tense State-Media Relationship
Furthermore, there exists the challenge of managing relations with the media. Last month there were reports that five journalists had been arrested and charged with violation of the 1923 Burma State Secrets Act for allegedly leaking sensitive information in the press. In another incident, journalists were booked under violation of the 1950 Emergency Act for allegedly giving unverified statements in the media. One visible indicator of change
since the announcement of the reform process was the lifting of restrictions that had been imposed on the press. The aforementioned incidents have once again
highlighted the tenuousness of State-media relations. In the aftermath of these two incidents, President Thein Sein’s resolve to meet with the Press Council was a sound move; and the media was asked to play the role of a stronger stakeholder in the reform process, and to show greater responsibility in its approach towards reporting of incidents that were sensitive.
Ethnic Conflict and Reconciliation Efforts
A key challenge facing the country is the nature of shape the peace process with ethnic minorities will take. Today, after nearly 60 years of armed conflict between
the state and its ethnic nationalities, there is a move towards a National Ceasefire Agreement that is being coordinated by the Nationwide Ceasefire Coordination Team. While individual ethnic groups have already signed ceasefire agreements, most of them are very fragile and have been unable to move towards any political resolution. More importantly, political
negotiations that will follow the ceasefire will be the crux of any resolution. Bringing major changes to both sides’ perceptions will be a greater challenge. Compounding the ethnic challenge is the levels of religious violence that have been evident in recent times. Although, lately, there has been some discussion on moving towards some form of a federal structure, the discourse is still vague and undefined. The Thein Sein government has made credible headway
on the roadmap to a democratic transition, in the past four years. The challenge to any transitional phase is more evident when it comes to issues of institutional change and consolidation. This will be a critical phase
Naypyidaw will have to address in the coming days.

INDIA-NEPAL HYDROELECTRICITY DEAL: MAKING IT COUNT

Pramod Jaiswal


With just two weeks left to seal the deal, the
government of Nepal has formed a seven-member task force headed by Energy Secretary of Nepal to finalise the Power Trade Agreement (PTA) with India, and the
Project Development Agreement (PDA) with Indian company GMR for Upper Karnali. The meeting of the Council of Ministers has authorised the team to hold dialogues with political parties of Nepal and forge consensus on the issue. The team has the drafts of the agreement presented by both the sides, as well as their reservations. The final agreement will be prepared after
considering both drafts. The authorised team arrived New Delhi for negotiations on 3 September. The PTA and PDA were expected to be signed during Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to
Nepal from 3-4 August. Citing the lack of enough deliberation, Nepal and India bilaterally decided to finalise the deals within 45 days. Unfortunately, not
much progress has been seen in last one month. On 18 August, the Nepalese parliament’s Water Resources Committee asked the Energy Ministry to produce every document related to PTA, together with
Nepal government’s June 2014 response to an earlier Indian proposal. The Committee also instructed the energy minister to present a progress report on the proposed agreement in the parliament. Media reports
state that India had refused Nepal’s proposal – in PTA draft – for allowing investors from Nepal, India and other countries to trade power without any obstruction in both India and Nepal, as well as the permission to sell electricity generated in Nepal to the third countries
through India. If the project is completed on time, the 900 MW Upper Karnali Hydroelectric Project would generate dividends worth approximately $33 million from equity, royalty and free electricity throughout the concession period of 25
years. It is being constructed by the GMR Group, an Indian company, and will be handed over to the state- run Nepal Electricity Authority (NEA) after 25 years.
Since it is being constructed on BOOT (build, own, operate and transfer) basis, the NEA will not have to share the project’s financial burdens. The Investment Board Nepal, the government body overseeing the implementation of the Upper Karnali
Project, has been negotiating the PDA with the GMR since April 2013. Additionally, a 13-member high-level committee that was formed under the National Planning
Commission to deliberate on the draft PDA, raised two major concerns: First, the impact of the Upper Karnali project on the Rani-Jamara-Kuleriya and the Rajapur- Surya Patawa irrigation projects that are being
constructed in Bardiya downstream of the project; and second, providing the cash incentive of approximately $51000 for every megawatt of electricity the project
generates. The first issue was addressed after the committee members agreed to deploy a team to conduct a study within six months of signing the PDA. But there some of the members of the committee held apprehensions on the proposal of giving cash incentives to an export- oriented project like Upper Karnali. They opposed on the grounds that such incentive should only be given to projects that generate electricity for domestic consumption.
Nepal should not get entangled in the issue of whether any sort of incentive should be given to an export- oriented hydropower project. Even if such a one-time incentive of $51000 is provided for every megawatt of
electricity the Upper Karnali will produce, the government will lose only $400 million – which is an insignificant amount compared to the huge benefits the project will bring by harnessing the country’s water resources. The government must not waste time and energy on such minor issues that will ultimately be detrimental to the development of the Upper Karnali – and that will also set a precedent for other projects to be built with foreign direct investment. Besides the PDA on the Upper Karnali, the government should also accelerate the process of signing a deal on
the proposed PTA with India at the earliest, so that both Nepal and India can benefit mutually. Nepal has to sign this deal to send positive signals to the international market and to create an appropriate atmosphere to
attract investments in the hydropower sector – crucial for the development of the country’s energy sector. The PTA will allow Nepal to import as much electricity as it
needs when production falls and export power when there is surplus. Similarly, the signing of the PDA would demonstrate Nepal’s openness to investors who want to
build export-oriented hydroelectric projects and pave the way for the government to generate income through royalties.
There are minor dissensions against the deal from the small leftist parties such as the CPN-Maoist. Reports also state that some senior leaders of the CPN-UML are
against the deal but they have not made any comment – thereby giving tacit approval. India should also demonstrate a flexible approach to the deal. Signing immature deals in the past has not served any purpose.
Hence, it should address Nepal’s genuine concerns whereby a conducive atmosphere for such similar future deals is created. The formation of a taskforce headed by the energy secretary is a welcome step towards the signing of a power trade agreement with India.

DRUG SMUGGLING ACROSS THE INDIAN OCEAN: IMPACT OF INCREASING INTERCEPTION

Vijay Sakhuja


Is there an increasing cooperation in the Indian Ocean to curb drug smuggling today? After piracy and terrorism, are the drug smugglers and their network being targeted now in the Indian Ocean? What is the nature of counter actions so far, and what needs to be done further?
The Kenyan Operations, August 2014
Last month, President Uhuru Kenyatta flew in a Kenyan Air Force helicopter escorted by two Russian made MI 17 helicopters to personally oversee the destruction of the ship MV Bushehr Amin Darya alias Al Noor with its cargo of about 370 Kilograms of heroin worth US $ 11.4 million in international market. The vessel was escorted out of the harbour by three Kenyan naval ships and sunk 18 nautical miles from the coast by using explosives. Significantly, the President acted despite the Kenyan High Court ruling that the destruction of the vessel should be delayed till the trial of the accused (9 foreigners and 3 Kenyans) is completed. Also, the court
admitted the defense counsel’s plea that the sinking of the vessel had safety and environmental risks. President Kenyatta’s initiative should be seen as a strong message to the drug mafia, smuggling ships and agents both in Kenya and overseas about his country’s commitment to prevent labeling Kenya as a transshipment hub of illicit global trade in narcotics. In recent times, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited ‘Kenya as a transit point for re- packaging and trans-shipment of drugs to Europe and America’. Perhaps what is more disturbing is that east
coast of Africa is also popular among drug smugglers from Colombia.
Countering the Drug Network: Actions in 2014
In the first half of 2014, a number of boats / dhows carrying drugs have been intercepted by the ships of Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 operating under the
Combined Maritime Forces (CMF). In January 2014, HMCS Toronto, a Canadian warship intercepted a vessel carrying 280 kilograms of heroin packed in 265 bags
about 40 nautical miles off the coast of Tanzania. A few months later, a British Royal navy ship HMS Somerset intercepted a fishing boat carrying 60 kilograms of drugs. This was followed by Australian Navy’s HMAS Darwin intercepting a dhow carrying 1032 kilograms of heroin in 46 sacks concealed in the consignment of bags
of cement. Apparently, the drugs were to be transferred on the high seas to three dhows, bound for Zanzibar and Malindi which is known to be a haven for drug smugglers and money launderers. It has been the policy of the Combined Maritime Forces
to destroy the contraband at sea and allow the crew and the dhows to continue on their voyage. Apparently, this is due to operational constraints since escorting the
captured vessel back to home countries would entail long legal processes. Further, this approach could be attributed to the absence of onboard ‘mechanism to enable drug trafficking prosecutions.’ The UNODC is of the view that the drug smugglers should be prosecuted and not allowed to escape with impunity. The above intercepts off the east coast of Africa suggest that the drug consignments may have originated in
South Asia (Afghanistan / Pakistan / India), Southeast Asia (Thailand / Myanmar) and Latin America (Colombia). Further, East African coast (Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia and Tanzania) has emerged as the
transshipment hub and some reports suggest that on an average, nearly 24 tons of drugs valued at US $ 190 million are smuggled annually from the region. The easy availability of drug in East Africa appears to have encouraged Al Shabaab which is most active in Somalia, to have links with drug cartels and the drug business helps the organization to acquire weapons and other logistics.
What Next?
After the attacks on USS Cole, MV Limburg and the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks, maritime security analysts were able to impress upon policy makers that robust
maritime capabilities were critical to address terrorism in the littorals and at sea. Likewise, over the past five years, the Combined Maritime Forces have successfully controlled the Somali piracy and according only ten incidents of attack on shipping have been reported in waters around Gulf of Aden-Red Sea- Somalia coast
which is a welcome sign. Apparently the strategic community has got ‘locked’
into counter terrorism and anti piracy. The drug hauls illustrated above clearly showcases that maritime security has several dimensions and the policy-makers
would have to understand the complex nature of security in the maritime domain. Although the threat of maritime terrorism may have reduced and piracy off Somalia contained, the Indian Ocean littorals would
need to develop capacities to address new forms of threats and challenges. In that context, EUNAVFOR and NATO decision to extend operations until the end of 2016 in the Indian Ocean is a welcome development.

AL QAEDA IN SOUTH ASIA: ZAWAHIRI WILL FAIL IN INDIA

San


Ayman al-Zawahiri leader of the al Qaeda (AQ) has recently announced his intention to “raise the flag of jihad” in the Indian sub- continent. Will Zawahiri succeed in establishing AQ roots in India?
Muslims constitute around 13 percent of India's population and do not appear sympathetic towards the AQ's ideology. Despite waving of black flags of the
Islamic State (IS) in certain parts and the presence of few Indian youths in the conflict theatres of Syria and Iraq, the possibility of AQ gaining a foothold in India and turning into an organisation of redemption for Muslims is remote.
Following four reasons substantiate the assertion.
Faith in democracy and secularism
Firstly, the Indian Muslims have faith in notions of democracy and secularism. Even while their social mobility has been slow and has remained a cause for concern, they do see a sign of hope for socio- economic
parity with the majority. Muslim personal law is seen by them as a recognition of and respect for their distinct identity and religious freedom. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s pledge to treat all Indians as equals regardless of religion can also be an
additional source of optimism if followed by positive actions. Thus, the use of religion-inspired violence and destruction in the name of liberation of Muslims is
unacceptable to them. Statements renouncing Zawahiri's statement by several leading Muslim organisations is a pointer towards that direction. The most powerful statement came from the Darul Uloom Deoband which categorically asserted, "Indian Muslims would never be convinced by un-Islamic and false arguments of the Al Qaeda."
Lack of Violent Societal Cleavages
Secondly, Al Qaeda in South Asia has benefited from the existing societal cleavages, especially in the Af-Pak region. Further, it has used the existing jihadi and
sectarian groups to ferment trouble. As much as it has assisted and been a magnet for groups like the Tehrik- i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
activities of anti-Shia groups like the Lashkar-e- Jhangvi (LeJ) has further helped it spread the Shia versus Sunni vitriol in Pakistan and Afghanistan. As a result, besides the foreign fighters of the AQ in the Af- Pak region, local Afghans as well as Pakistanis have joined the group.
In India, it is highly unlikely that any such vehicle for hire would be available for Zawahiri who is attempting to revolutionise the minds of the Sunni Muslims in India.
Both the Indian Mujahideen (IM) and its predecessor, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) who could possibly have played a second fiddle to AQ, are in their weakest points. Arrests of a number of IM leaders and cadres have pushed these organisations to the brink of collapse.
Unlikely Mass Movement favouring the AQ
Thirdly, in the absence of a vehicle for hire, AQ's objective to find a foothold in India would require developing operational capacities among the Indian
Muslims youth. Despite few recent cases of
radicalisation among the Muslim youth, the possibility of a engineering a movement favouring the AQ is unlikely. The Indian political and social systems have multiple checks and balances mechanisms in place to prevent any such eventuality.
Moderate Nature of Islam in India
Fourthly, the moderate nature of Islam in India act as the most crucial shield against radicalization which could be exploited by the AQ. Islam in India has a long history, led by the Sufis who integrated the multiple
communities of India sharing common cultural practices. Unlike other countries, Sufism has remained an integral part of the Indian cultural tradition. Amity exists among India's Shias and the Sunnis, in spite of a division along ideological lines.
Cultural ethos can effectively hedge against an extremist rampage is clear from the experience of India's neighbour, Bangladesh. Once touted as the next
Afghanistan, Bangladesh has remained free of AQ's influence. India's ability to weather the challenges is equally robust. In India, the official approach of involving the ulemas in framing a counter-narrative to
AQ's appeal has immensely helped in maintaining a divide between Islam in India and its radical stream.
However, be prepared to prevent the unforeseen 
Even with this positive outlook, there is a need for caution, as even handful of cases of radicalisation, if not a fully networked AQ base, could pose significant threats to India. To prevent such a scenario, certain
precautionary measures should be taken. Muslims in India do have grievances of marginalisation, state- discrimination, and sense of alienation, which may get exploited. Concerns like these needs to be tackled through affirmative actions. Experts believe that reinforcing multiculturalism is the need of the hour. Bringing communities together will serve as the best way to prevent radicalisation of youths. Inclusive and affirmative programmes must be undertaken so that India can never become a playground for the AQ and its violent agenda. For this, the government, NGOs, and religious organizations have to work together.

DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA

Ellen Bork


At this writing, it seems that the hundreds of trucks sent by Moscow with supplies for the residents of Eastern Ukraine will be delivered without further incident. For over a week, the long convoy wended its way toward the Ukrainian border, carrying with it the prospect for a spike in tensions between Moscow and Kiev. Concerns over the trucks’ contents—were they humanitarian supplies, or was the convoy a Trojan Horse, filled with weapons and munitions?—have been resolved. Even so, the drama over the convoy is unlikely
to be the last in Moscow’s months-long campaign to sow instability in Ukraine. After all, the Russian president’s main objective is to prevent the consolidation of a modern, democratic state in Ukraine, with economic prospects and political freedoms exceeding those he allows his own people. For him, hiving off Crimea in March to redeem a revanchist Russian claim wasn’t enough. By destabilizing Ukraine, Putin hopes to prevent its newly elected government from providing an attractive model for Russia’s citizens. It wasn’t so long ago that Putin faced a similar challenge from within his own country. Just a few years back, stunning demonstrations in Moscow and other cities prompted predictions that Putin would soon leave power. Despite government control of television and the electoral administration, and obvious signs of fraud, Putin’s ruling United Russia party failed to clear the 50
percent mark in the December 2011 Duma elections that ignited the protests. Exit polls and independent monitors suggest that the real result might have been considerably lower.
Putin, however, was determined to stay in power. In March 2012 he reclaimed the presidency in elections also tainted by fraud, and set about using vindictive
prosecutions and repressive laws to destroy the political opposition and civil society.
This has continued, even while the Kremlin sponsors subversion in Ukraine. In April, with the world’s attention focused on Ukraine, the Duma paved the way for the
abolition of direct elections for mayors and legislative councils in dozens of cities. Prohibitive requirements for ballot access have effectively sidelined a leading,
registered opposition party, the Republican Party of Russia–People’s Freedom Party (RPR-PARNAS, by its Russian acronym). Among other things, the party’s legal status enabled Alexei Navalny, an anticorruption
campaigner who shot to prominence during the protest movement, to make a strong showing in the 2013 Moscow mayoral election. For the upcoming Moscow Duma (city council) election this September, the
authorities have used signature requirements to disqualify a number of popular independent candidates.
In July, several respected organizations dedicated to human rights and rule of law were formally labeled “foreign agents,” making it difficult if not impossible for
them to continue their work. Even so, Putin has reason to worry. Aside from revealing
significant dissatisfaction with him and his clique, the protests unleashed sentiments common to democracy movements everywhere, regardless of culture or history. Protesters described themselves as motivated by a hunger for “decency,” “honesty,” and “conscience.”
Tracking Navalny’s campaign for mayor, the British writer Peter Pomerantsev observed that campaign workers cared “less about the man himself and more about a desire for personal dignity and clear rules of the game. ‘I don’t want to live in lies’ was a common phrase, as was ‘There must be an alternative to this system.’ ”
Such values are inimical to the exclusive Russian culture, hostile to individual rights and universal values, that Putin promotes to stoke tensions with the West and
distract attention from his misrule. It also puts him at odds with the liberal opposition, says Max Trudolyubov, opinion editor at the business daily Vedomosti , who
dismisses Putin’s cultural determinism as “wrong science.” “Rules and institutions change culture,” he says, not the other way around.
In recent years, Putin hasn’t had to worry that the West feels the same way. Writing about the West’s policies of “reset” and “partnership” with the Kremlin in the
American Interest in 2012, Lilia Shevtsova, a Russian political scientist, asked why the West no longer emphasizes liberal principles in its approach to Russia.
Perhaps, she ventured, it is because of the
disappearance of the Soviet Union as an ideological competitor, a backlash against the Bush era, or even the lure of “sweet deals.” “I can tell you how it looks from
the outside,” Shevtsova wrote. “It looks, first and foremost, like doubt that liberal democracy could appeal to the nondemocratic world, and secondly, like a
condescending attitude toward nations supposedly unable to accept liberal democratic principles.”
Leaders of Russia’s democratic opposition see the connection between Putin’s aggression abroad and his domestic agenda. They reject as “flimsy” the pretext—
protecting ethnic Russians—on which the Ukraine aggression is based. “The main reason” for the aggression in Ukraine, said Mikhail Kasyanov and Boris Nemtsov, co-chairmen of PARNAS at the outset of
Putin’s assault on Ukraine, “is the reluctance of the Russian authorities to recognize the Ukrainian people’s
sovereign right to its own fate. .  .  . Putin is trying to stifle freedom not only in Russia, but also in a neighboring country.”
Western governments have yet to appreciate this. Announcing new U.S. sanctions against Russia’s banking, energy, and arms industries on July 29, President Obama cast the measures as addressing only the “very specific issue of Ukraine.”
The West should seek more than just an “off-ramp” for Putin in Ukraine. Russia is already committed to free elections and human rights through its membership in
the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe. Restoring these principles to
a central role would begin to address the link between Putin’s domestic agenda and his foreign adventurism, now on display in Ukraine, later perhaps elsewhere.
Neglecting them will allow Putin to exempt Russia from universal values and make the work of Russia’s democrats much harder. Until the West takes these principles—and the Russians who want to live under them—seriously, it will treat only the symptoms rather than the cause of Putin’s aggression.

JAMES FOLEY (1973-2014)

David Devoss


In the end, Jim Foley died just as he wanted to live, pursuing a story that mattered on the front line of hard news journalism. In Afghanistan, Libya, and finally Syria he recorded the horror, chaos, and occasional
compassion that define the war on terror. But it was his gruesome killing on the barren sands of a foreign land that truly conveys the evil that envelops the Islamic
Caliphate’s hooded assassins.
I got to know Jim Foley in 2009 when both of us worked on USAID-funded development projects in Baghdad. A former Teach for America instructor, Foley helped organize conferences and training seminars for a program designed to rebuild Iraq’s civil service, crippled by decades of isolation and autocratic administration.
We lived in a Red Zone compound guarded by African mercenaries and surrounded by concrete T-walls topped with razor wire. It was possible to see the surrounding Mansour neighborhood by climbing to the roof of a bombed-out building once used by Saddam’s intelligence service. But for the most part Jim Foley’s Iraq was an aural experience punctuated by nightly small arms fire, daily calls to prayer, and nearby car bombs that would blow out office windows and leave his apartment carpeted with glass.
Foley’s job took him “outside the wire,” but his glimpses of Baghdad came through the thick windows of an armored car that would drive as fast as possible directly to a government ministry. Put in place in early
2004 after al Qaeda beheaded several Westerners involved in the rebuilding effort, the tight security prevented further kidnappings. But the restrictions also
made it difficult for private contractors hired to implement development programs to really get to know Iraq.
Foley chafed under these restrictions. He wanted to understand the passions driving the conflict and meet the people whose lives had been upended by war. So in 2010 he left Iraq and moved to Afghanistan to become a freelance journalist.
Foley had been in Afghanistan for about six months when I called him on Skype. The company I worked for had an opening in Kabul for a communications director.
Would he be interested in the job? “I know it will pay more than you’re earning as a freelance journalist,” I hinted. “Try it for six months.” Foley laughingly said no thanks. “I’m finally doing what I want,” he said. “Yeah, the money’s not great, but I think I’m making a difference. Somebody needs to
report what’s going on here.”
In 2011, Foley moved to Libya, where he was captured and held along with two other journalists for 44 days. Following his release he briefly returned to the United
States and visited Northwestern University’s Medill School of Journalism. There he tried to explain to students the attraction of war zones. “The honest fact
is that when you see something really violent, it does a strange thing to you,” he confided. “It doesn’t always repel you; it draws you closer. Feeling like you’ve
survived something—it’s a strange sort of force that you are drawn back to. I think that’s the absolute reality.”

DERANGEMENT IN MOSCOW

Cathy Young


"Maybe it’s all a matrix and we’re all like programs written by somebody else. .  .  . And none of us really exists, just the matrix. The program works, you live your life and think everything’s fine. Here you are drinking coffee right now. But there is no coffee—it doesn’t exist.” So mused Fyodor Berezin, the middle-aged sci-fi writer turned “deputy defense minister” of the Donetsk People’s Republic—the self-proclaimed state of the Russian-speaking insurgents in eastern Ukraine—in an
August interview with a reporter for the still-surviving independent Russian newspaper Novaya Gazeta . “The matrix,” the concept from the 1999 cult film of the
same name in which reality turns out to be an illusion generated by human-enslaving computers, was a recurring theme in Berezin’s conversation with Novaya Gazeta’s Pavel Kanygin. Berezin even deflected queries on the whereabouts of suddenly elusive rebel commander Igor Strelkov-Girkin with the deadpan suggestion that Strelkov-Girkin might not actually exist —though he grew testy when Kanygin countered by asking whether the Donetsk Republic might not exist, either.
This bizarre exchange encapsulates the surreal quality of the war in eastern Ukraine, where Russia’s undeclared involvement is the world’s biggest open
secret. Russian soldiers are already getting killed in what official reports describe as accidents during military training. But the local separatist insurgents have been led mostly by Russian citizens—notably a
battle-reenactment hobbyist (Strelkov-Girkin) and a political spin doctor (former Donetsk Republic prime minister Alexander Borodai). The theater of the absurd has even spread to Russia itself, where “the matrix” is a rather apt metaphor for the virtual reality propounded by the official media and uncritically absorbed by much
of the population.

The Russian media landscape in the last six months has been dominated by nearly wall-to-wall coverage of Ukraine—or, rather, lurid propaganda masquerading as

coverage. Writing in the independent online journal EJ.ru , Moscow journalist Anton Orekh noted with amazement that a major subway accident in Moscow in mid-July—a train derailment that killed 24 people and injured dozens more—did not rate a single mention in the weekly news wrap-up on Rossiya, the country’s

leading news television channel, just days later: Once again, it was all Ukraine.

The grotesque pseudo-journalism that has become the norm in the official Russian media was starkly illustrated by the sensational story of the crucified boy.

On July 12, a week after the previously rebel-controlled city of Slavyansk was taken by Ukrainian troops, Russia’s TV-1 aired an interview with a refugee named Galina Pyshnyak, who told a bloodcurdling tale about the execution of an insurgent’s child before a crowd of Luhansk residents in the city’s main square. “They took a little boy, 3 years old .  .  . and nailed him to a billboard like Jesus,” Pyshnyak told the reporter; the

child’s mother, she said, was forced to watch and listen to his screams until she fainted, then was herself tied to a tank and dragged unconscious around the square. The story was widely ridiculed by Russian bloggers and debunked by Novaya Gazeta reporter Evgeny Feldman, who interviewed Slavyansk locals and found that no one

had heard of this horrific deed. Pyshnyak was later identified as the wife of an ex-member of Berkut, the special security squad of the deposed pro-Russian president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovych. TV-1 never

retracted the story. Even token dissenters are now gone from Russian TV, where the spectrum of opinion ranges from patriotic

fervor to patriotic derangement. The latter is reliably represented by member of parliament Vladimir Zhirinovsky, who, in a recent appearance on the popular TV-1 talk show Sunday Evening with Vladimir Solovyov, capped a rant about the world’s eternal war on Russia with the declaration that “Hitler only killed Russians.”

On another Sunday Evening , Solovyov himself not only lobbed the standard charge of “genocide” at the Ukrainian government but claimed that Ukrain-ian

president Petro Poroshenko had “frankly declared that he is under the direct control of the USA.” One of the guests, political analyst Semyon Bagdasarov, stressed that helping the separatists in Ukraine was a

life-and-death priority for Russia: “After all, [Kiev’s] goal is very specific—it’s not just to crush Donbass [the Donetsk region], it’s to destroy the Russian Federation by bringing down its government and dragging us into

civil war. That’s what’s at stake!” The other panelists nodded approval, while the studio audience burst into applause.

The derangement extends beyond current events. EJ.ru ’s media watch columnist Igor Yakovenko notes that TV commentary on the World War I anniversary was so heavy on rhetoric blaming the war on American

machinations that the uninformed viewer could easily assume that the United States was Russia’s main adversary in that conflict. TV-1 also aired a “documentary” exploring the “alternative” theory that

Archduke Ferdinand was actually killed by a British sniper acting at the behest of an international conspiracy of Freemasons bent on world domination, which later also engineered the Russian Revolution to

prevent Russia from emerging as one of the war’s victors.

In this toxic climate, the free media live on as small and embattled enclaves. Chief among these is the radio station Ekho Moskvy, which remains an outlet for

dissenting viewpoints and censored news despite being owned by Gazprom Media, an arm of the state- controlled natural gas giant. In case Ekho’s editors were not aware of their precarious position, they got a recent reminder from Gazprom Media chairman Mikhail Lesin.

In an interview with the Russian edition of Forbes , Lesin complained about the “rude” and “snarky” tone of Ekho’s liberal commentators but allowed that, at least

for now, he did not regard the station as a “problem asset.” If that changed, he concluded, “it would be overhauled tomorrow, and there would be a music

station called Ekho Moskvy. They’d sing, and that’s it— what’s the problem?”

Open calls to shut down the Russia-haters are now part of the mainstream. In early August, Izvestia columnist Sergey Roganov wrote that Russia was getting fed up

with “all the empty chatter in the social networks and the mass media” and generously offered to sacrifice his

own freedom of speech for a strong hand that would put an end to this “Russophobic babble.” The very next day, the paper ran a guest column by writer Vladimir Lowenthal, who opined that Russia’s “Maidan-type” dissenters were clearly impervious to reason and should

therefore be treated like sick people or members of dangerous cults—that is, stopped from preaching or spreading the virus to others.

So far, the Kremlin hasn’t acted on these threats; but while Ekho and other islands of dissent are allowed to exist, they are regularly and openly assailed as traitors.

In late June, a news program on the NTV channel aired an interview with a masked, armed insurgent in Donetsk who said that the insurgency was setting up a “chapter”

in Moscow in order to fight the “fifth column,” particularly Ekho Moskvy, which was spreading “lies” about eastern Ukraine. In comments liberally peppered with bleeps and accompanied by menacing gestures, the insurgent told Ekho’s staffers that their days were numbered and that they would soon be looking death in the face. More recently, NTV aired a program titled 13

Friends of the Junta, in which prominent Kremlin critics including novelist Dmitry Bykov, satirist Victor Shenderovich, and singer Andrei Makarevich were depicted as Judases ready to sell their souls for

Ukrainian or American money.

From such rhetoric, it is a short step to physical intimidation. In late August, an Ekho Moskvy reporter was assaulted while covering a pro-Ukraine rally in St.

Petersburg; a few days later, journalists from Novaya Gazeta and the struggling independent news channel TV Rain were attacked and threatened while covering the

funeral of two Russian soldiers apparently killed in Ukraine.

Today, polls by the independent Levada Center find that 70 percent of the Russian population gets all of its news from television and trusts the official media. Vladimir Putin’s approval rating, meanwhile, stands at 84 percent. Will this change if Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions start causing real pain to the population—and if more Russian draftees start dying in mysterious accidents? Or will the “zombie box,” as

Russian dissenters call state television, persuade them to blame the perfidious West and the domestic “fifth column”?

While many dissenters cautiously hope that Putin’s support is not as widespread or as deep as the polls suggest, one would be hardpressed to find optimists among them. In a verse commentary in Novaya Gazeta

inspired by Berezin’s interview, Bykov wondered with bitter sarcasm if the post-Communist “Russian spring” had ever been real. For Russians who greeted the fall of

the Soviet Union almost a quarter-century ago, the free country they welcomed is now gone, replaced by a bizarre would-be hybrid of a smaller Soviet Union and the czarist Russian empire. Virtual reality, indeed.