Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
On 21 September 2014, the Independent Election Commission (IEC) of
Afghanistan declared Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai as the winner of the
country’s presidential election that took place earlier this year, after
a lengthy deal-making process with the other leading contender,
Abdullah Abdullah.
What does the creation of ‘Chief Executive Officer’ (CEO) mean for
Afghanistan? Does the end of the political deadlock automatically spell
good times for the country?
Deal-making and the Emergence of the Unity Government
The 2014 Afghan presidential election – the first transfer of power to a
whole new leadership – was precariously prolonged and fraught with
several strong opposing stances and allegations. After the tense flux
and indecision that followed the elections, which led to an
UN-overlooked and US-funded audit of the ballots, the results were
finally declared three months after the run-off concluded. The IEC
declared Ashraf Ghani as the president-elect, and runner-up Abdullah
Abdullah as the CEO – a post that was created to facilitate
power-sharing and to end the electoral deadlock.
The IEC and the candidates simply announced the results without
declaring the vote statistics. In fact, the deal-making between Abdullah
and Ghani that took months to finalise, ended on the condition that the
vote statistics won’t be made public.
This does not bode well for a country that is on its path towards
democracy after years of civil war and strife. A decision on the
leadership was extremely pressing and the Sunday announcement comes as a
relief for the political stability of the country at the moment.
However, the means to reach that end was not ideal, and has potential to
lead to problems in the future. The decision for deal-making was agreed
upon and took place between the parties and the declaration of results
were stalled and delayed due to intransigence on the part of the
contenders, thereby making the candidates and not the IEC the real
decision-makers. The deal-making between the candidates undermines the
credibility and significance of the IEC – which emerged as a toothless
tiger. It indicates the lack of authority on the IEC’s part to ensure
the writ of the state – in terms of election processes as mandated by
the constitution of Afghan state – as it is supposed to do. This points
towards the urgent need for reforms in the IEC and other state
institutions – especially given how the 2015 parliamentary election is
fast approaching.
An Assessment of the Election Process
An interesting trend that emerged over the course of the electoral
process was the blending of Afghan cultural characteristics with the
concept of democracy. Negotiations – an extremely prominent aspect of
the Afghan culture – continually took place between various players
during various stages of the polls. This demonstrates to an extent the
adaptation of the concept of democracy into the pre-existing Afghan
system.
At present, the president is the head of the government, and the
constitution does not include space for a prime ministerial post.
According to the National Unity Government Agreement, until such time
as the post of a prime minister will be created, the post of a CEO (a
role with the essence of an executive prime minister’s post) will be
created to accommodate Abdullah Abdullah or his nominee in the
government.
However, the Agreement, states that “On the basis of Article 2 of the
Joint Statement of 17 Asad 1393 (August 8, 2014) and its attachment
(“…convening of a Loya Jirga in two years to consider the post of an
executive prime minister”), the President is committed to convoking a
Loya Jirga for the purpose of debate on amending the Constitution and
creating a post of executive prime minister.” The text of the Agreement
makes no explicit commitment towards the creation of a prime minister’s
post and/or a deadline to carry the said task out. The text only speaks
of the president’s commitment towards calling for a Loya Jirga meeting
on amending the constitution, without specific mention of commitment
towards the creation of the post itself. It is important to note that
nomenclature isn’t the focus of the debate. The skepticism stems from
the fact the post of the CEO will be created by a presidential decree –
that isn’t difficult to revoke.
Furthermore, the IEC’s decision to withhold voting statistics did not go
well with the Afghans – who had defied terrorist threats and turned up
in large numbers to cast their ballots. This is not unfounded, for they
now feel that their votes were of no consequence given how decisions on
leadership were taken by two opposing candidates who co-opted each other
and eliminated the purpose of votes altogether. As one Afghan police
officer was quoted saying, the newly-formed government is a “Joint
Venture” between two politicians.
Looking Ahead
In essence, this is essentially a hastily cobbled government whose
creation was extremely important for the moment, but one that brings
baggage of potential instability for the immediate years.
Decision-making – especially on issues of security and foreign policy –
will become a complicated process given the likelihood of divergent
interests and objectives of the two leaders. Furthermore, given the
limited maneuvering space both leaders will enjoy, the likelihood of
large-scale changes seems bleak at the moment. If this trajectory
continues, the cracks may lead to instability, inactions and/or delays
in several matters, providing fertile ground for non-state actors to
make inroads.
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