UNSC RESOLUTION 2178: COMPROMISING DEMOCRATIC VALUES?

 Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

 

Over the course of this year, the threat of Islamist terror changed dramatically for the worse. 13,000 people who do not belong either to Syria, or Iraq, now fight for the terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) in its battles in Syria and Iraq. A multilateral approach to tackle and eliminate security issues arising from terrorism is therefore pressing.

In September 2014, the UN Security Council and its member states agreed on Resolution 2178. The resolution condemns violent extremism and urges international cooperation to prevent foreign fighters from travelling to and from conflict areas. It aims at preventing the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. It is a binding agreement that requires all member states to implement changes in their national laws. The changes are expected to make it possible for the said States to impose stricter border controls and restrain people – from travelling to or transit through their territories – if they have “credible information that provides reasonable grounds” to believe that the person is involved in terrorism activities.

The Resolution was passed unanimously without any debate. However, what does the Resolution actually entail? Is it possible to implement laws on foreign nationals without compromising democratic values?

Considering the numbers of foreign fighters and the fear they generate is a reason in itself to agree to Resolution 2178 because it would be counter-productive to veto a move that intends to combat international threats? Furthermore, whether or not Resolution 2178 will have successful outcomes depends on how anti-terrorism laws are enforced by every individual country.

What stands out among anti-terrorism laws in several countries is the restriction on travel to conflict areas and the increase in surveillance. How countries choose to respond to the legally binding agreements, varies. In order to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders, the Australian government has implemented strict travel laws. Suspected terrorists captured during their travel to what the Australian Bill refers to as `no-go-zones´, without a valid reason can result in imprisonment for 10 years.

The Bill also allows the police to detain suspects for 14 days with any specific charges as long as there is suspicion of criminal conduct. However, Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism. Thus, there is scope for racial profiling to take place, given how member states can relate criminal conducts and define potential terrorists according to their own preferences and national laws. According to Marina Portnaya, Correspondent, Russia TV, this allows countries to monitor and use more targeted surveillance against people in the name of international security.

The unclear wording of the Resolution leaves room for countries to be biased, and decide whom to target, based on their own preferences. This can result in excuses for countries to implement repressive measures. In addition to racial profiling, the Resolution can end up giving law enforcement officers new tools to deal with activists or separatist groups by labelling them as terrorists according to their thoughts and beliefs rather than their actions. Additionally, governments have the authority to block websites that defend or encourage terrorism, exclusive of court orders, with imprisonment as the consequence. Critics view this as an attack on democratic rights and that innocent people become stripped of their rights regarding freedom of expression.

Another critique of Resolution 2178 is about the freedom of movement. Increased surveillance allows the legalisation of the collection of photographs at airports, and airlines will be legally obliged to pass on information about passengers flying to/from conflict areas. One of the concerns expressed has been that the restrictions on travelling to `no-go-zones´ can lead to the criminalisation of innocent people who genuinely go to visit family or friends.

The French Senate and its anti-terrorism laws authorised in mid-October better prepare the authorities to impose restrictions on citizens when there is a reason to believe that people are partaking or planning acts of terror. Any suspicion results in the potential listing of names on the Schengen Information System, imprisonment up to three years, and a $58,000 fine. Immigrant support organisations and human rights groups are concerned that these laws will affect migration because the Bill allows the governments to deny foreign nationals viewed as “undesirable” access to the country. Human rights specialist Simon Slama argues that France´s fear of terrorism will be taken advantage of by the government as a means to strengthen border controls and decrease immigration into the EU, especially putting restrictions on people from eastern European countries.

Regardless of the critiques, countries have legal backing for their laws because Resolution 2178 is a binding agreement adopted by the UN Security Council, which means that violation of the Resolution would imply violation of international laws. Human rights organisations might find it frustrating, but the vaguely-worded language and flexible definitions allow countries to design anti-terrorism laws to their own advantage and implement laws that suit their national politics. What is surprising is the extent to which governments are willing to compromise democratic values for the sake of security, as long as they have an international law to fall back on.

JAMAAT-UL-MUJAHIDEEN BANGLADESH: DESIGNS AND NETWORKS IN INDIA

 N Manoharan

 

In the wake of Burdwan blast, the Indian Home Minister Rajnath Singh recently ordered an immediate neutralisation of the Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) terror modules in India. What is the JMB? What are its designs and network in India?
 

JMB, meaning ‘Assembly of Holy Warriors in Bangladesh’, is a Bangladesh-based terror outfit. Formed in 1998, the principal objective of the JMB is to establish an Islamic state in Bangladesh on the basis of Sharia laws. With a strong belief in Salafist ideology, it is opposed to modern principles of governance such as democracy, liberalism, socialism and secularism and considers them anti-Islamic. In the initial stages, funding to the JMB came from various sources: robbery, smuggling, donations, patronage, subscriptions and “taxations.” Very soon, it turned to more lucrative foreign sources and counterfeit currencies.

The then Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) government’s political patronage also helped in the JMB’s phenomenal growth and influence. The government did not realise the gravity of the JMB’s designs until the terror group triggered country-wide serial bombings in August 2005 (500 bombs in 63 of 64 districts of Bangladesh in a span of half-an-hour).

In the ensuing crackdown, many of the JMB’s leaders and cadres were arrested or killed, especially by the Rapid Action Battalion of Bangladesh. It was at this stage that the JMB decided to shift some of its operations to India. Abdur Rahman (alias Shahadat), who sneaked into India in 2006, was instrumental in building the outfit’s network across the India-Bangladesh border. Around the same time, the operational wing of the JMB in West Bengal was declared as the “65th Unit.” The JMB has been operating a bomb-making units in Burdwan, West Bengal, India, in which grenades have also been manufactured and transported to Bangladesh in consignments. The fact that bomb blasts at Chennai and Patna in May this year have had JMB signatures indicate that the IEDs might have been diverted within India as well.

India is being used by the JMB not just for hideouts, but for recruitment as well. Recruitment is done through madrasas, mosques and effective use of social media. The JMB’s network is especially active in West Bengal’s districts of Murshidabad, Malda and Nadia and in parts of Muslim-majority districts in Assam. These areas are closer to the JMB’s stronghold of northern and north-western Bangladesh. Also, the JMB’s traditional strategy of creating networks of matrimonial alliances across the border helped in easy establishment of bases in India. Going by call records and visits of those JMB members who have now been arrested, the outfit appears to have footprints in southern India and Jammu and Kashmir as well. There are an estimated 50 modules operating in India.

What is more concerning is the JMB’s linkage with other terror groups in India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and even beyond. The common thread that connects all these groups is their anti-Indian, anti-democratic and pro-Salafist ideology. It is difficult to operate in India without the assistance of Indian militant groups. Some of the JMB’s known collaborators are the Indian Mujahideen, al Jihad, al Ummah and the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI). In the case of Pakistan, the JMB has a good network with the Lashkar-e-Taiba and Harkat-ul Jihad-al Islami (HuJI); and with the Taliban and al Qaida in Afghanistan. For its operations in Myanmar, the JMB relied on Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), based in the Rohingya refugee camps in southern Bangladesh. Going by the latest slogan of JMB – “Jihad from Bangladesh to Baghdad” – such a wide network is obvious. The scope of the engagement among these terror groups ranges from training, recruitment, funding, information-sharing, arms procurement, operational assistance, manpower, and logistics. Funding to the JMB has been traced to NGOs based in countries of West Asia and Europe. This shows that the JMB’s network involves a section of the Bangladeshi Diaspora and other jihadi groups.

Bangladesh-based terror groups acting against India is not a new development. What is new is that the this is a Bangladeshi terror group based in India acting against both India and Bangladesh. This is a serious development. It is of utmost concern that the activities of the JMB in India have gone unnoticed for over half a decade. It would have remained so for long had blasts at Burdwan not taken place accidentally. Vote bank and communal politics, lack of capability of the state police forces, lack of proper of coordination between the Centre and the States, and lack of cooperation between India and Bangladesh are few reasons for the JMB’s successful hiding. These issues have to be addressed on an urgent basis.

Border guarding cannot afford to be slacked off on, and requires attention. A substantial amount of the JMB’s purpose is lost, if its cross-border activities are curtailed. This aside, India could consider strengthening Bangladesh’s counter-terrorism capabilities, especially in dealing with radical groups. The present government in Dhaka has been helpful in stifling North-east India-based militant groups that took shelter in Bangladesh. A weak and pro-Islamist regime in Bangladesh is not in the interest of India. Robust counter-terrorism cooperation between India and Bangladesh is imperative to tackle common enemies like the JMB.

ISLAMIC STATE: EFFICACY OF COUNTER-STRATEGIES

 Ranjit Gupta

 

The efficacy of the US strategy to defeat the Islamic State (IS) can only be meaningfully evaluated in the context of the current regional and international geopolitical configurations. It should be self-evident that there is no possibility at all of any political approach to successfully confront and overcome the challenge posed the IS. If the IS is not defeated, the whole system of nation states in West Asia will almost surely crumble. At the present critical juncture, given the ground realities in Iraq, Syria and the Arab world in general – and internal divisions amongst Arab states and between Arab states and non-Arab states such as Iran and Turkey – it should also be clear that there is no possibility of any regional military coalition being forged to take on the IS.

Therefore, countries of the region have little or no choice but to have the US lead the fight against the IS even though Washington’s military entanglements in the Arab and Muslim worlds have greatly adversely affected its credibility, influence and standing in the region; and have in fact been one of the primary causes of the rise of Islamic extremism. After all, the US has been the preeminent regional security architect for the past several decades and remains the major weapons supplier to regional countries barring Iran and Syria.

No other Western or non-regional country can do it or will even be willing to attempt to do it by themselves; even their involvement is predicated only on the US leading the war. Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Netherlands and UK too have joined in conducting airstrikes in Iraq. In a break from the traditional policy of not supplying arms to countries in zones of conflict, Germany will be supplying arms to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq. Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have carried out airstrikes in Syria. There are varying accounts of Qatar’s involvement. After doggedly refusing to allow any support for any military action in Iraq or Syria against the IS despite intense personal efforts by US President Barack Obama and the secretaries of state and defense, Turkey has reluctantly allowed the Free Syrian Army fighters and the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga to transit its territory en route to Kobani to dislodge the IS from there.  

The central feature of the strategy is to carry out airstrikes both in Iraq and Syria initially to stop the heretofore irresistible advance of the IS and to degrade its capabilities. This has happened in many sectors if not everywhere. The US and its partners have by now carried out a few thousand airstrikes. However, Obama has made it clear that there will be no American boots on the ground, meaning Americans in the tens of thousands will not be there as in the past. Such involvement will only exacerbate extremism. Another caveat is that combat activity must absolutely include the active involvement of regional countries. This is what the US has been implementing. Even though it is clear that the war cannot be won through via air strikes alone, the reality is that the world has no better alternative to this approach for the present.  

So far, however, a Shiite coalition, of Iran, Hezbollah, Iraqi Shia militias and the Iraqi and Syrian governments, has been the main force arrayed against the IS on the ground apart from particularly valiant contributions by the Kurdish Peshmerga. Thus we have the strange scenario of seeing the US and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Shia ruled Iraq, the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it – Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US and assorted Islamist extremist groups, Kurds of different nationality groups and factions perpetually at loggerheads with each other, all in the same camp warring against the IS, tacitly cooperating with each other even if they more often than not publicly deny any open explicit collaboration. This is a part of the ground reality even if not a formal part of US strategy.

However, the fight against the IS cannot be compartmentalised. It occupies 2/5ths of the total territory of Syria and 2/5ths of the total territory of Iraq and is actually stronger in Syria; the border between the two countries has been erased. The IS cannot be defeated in Iraq without being defeated in Syria and therefore it will have to be confronted in Syria also. Despite recognising this as exhibited by the airstrikes in Syria, countries opposed to Assad are maintaining that they will not cooperate with Assad in fighting the IS and will continue supporting so called ‘moderate’ rebels by supplying arms. Such distinctions are completely arbitrary and subjective and have proven to be counterproductive. The US has promised $500 million worth of arms and training is going to be provided to the rebels in Saudi Arabia. This will only exacerbate and prolong Syria’s civil war and undermine the dire need of a united response to the IS.

The coalition’s policy approach in Syria maybe alright as a temporary tactic, but strategically, it is completely counterproductive.

THE FUTURE OF SAARC IS NOW

 Pramod Jaiswal

 

The 18th South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Summit is taking place in Kathmandu at the historic moment when South Asia is going through massive transformation. India elected Narendra Modi as its prime minister with an overwhelming majority. Nepal voted for the second Constituent Assembly after the first failed to deliver the constitution within the stipulated time. Afghanistan, the newly inducted member of SAARC voted for Ashraf Ghani as its president. Sheikh Hasina and Nawaz Sharif were elected to the prime minister’s positions in Bangladesh and Pakistan respectively. The King of Bhutan devolved powers to his country-people who aspired for democracy.

Media reports suggest that three agreements – SAARC Railway Agreement, SAARC Motor Vehicle Agreement and SAARC Framework Agreement on Energy Cooperation – might be signed during the 18th SAARC Summit, scheduled for 26-27 November.

Formation of the SAARC

The SAARC was formed by Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka to actualise their common goals, economic cooperation being one of them. Afghanistan was introduced as the newest member, in 2007.

Regionalism began and flourished around the world after World War II with the aim of liberalising trade among the member states of respective blocs. The end of the Cold War further strengthened their commitments towards greater economic cooperation via free trade agreements, such as in the European Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, the Caribbean Community, the Common Southern Market, and the Southern African Development Community. With the EU’s success story, there has been a rise in the number of such regional organisations. Founded in 1985, SAARC was a late arrival in following the growing trend of regionalism.

Opportune Moment  for SAARC
South Asia can have tremendous opportunity as the economy of the region has great impact on the global economy. The epicenter of global economy is gradually shifting towards the east with the emergence of China and India as the largest economies. Economic integration within South Asia region possesses great opportunity; China’s inclusion can change the game altogether. It is possible that China applied for observer status in the SAARC due to this potential. The challenge facing the leaders of SAARC member countries is to materialise the enormous potential for the betterment of the people of the region. South Asia is the least integrated region in the world with the lowest intra-regional trade. There is a pressing need for a speedy implementation of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement.

Challenges 

South Asian regionalism has been suffering due to bilateral tensions and differences between the member countries. The region has a long history of conflicts, especially between India and Pakistan – who have fought four wars since 1947. Though the India-Pakistan rivalry is often blamed for SAARC’s failure, the reasons are in fact deeper and structural in nature. The geographical, ethnic, historical and political factors have gridlocked SAARC and will persist unless India adopts proactive confidence-building measures.

One of the major reasons for the failure of SAARC is that one of its members is much larger than all of its other members put together. India accounts for over 60 per cent of SAARC’s geographcical area, population, GDP, foreign exchange, gold reserves and armed forces. The huge resource and power imbalance generates an acute sense of insecurity among the member countries. Moreover, its relationship with the second largest member, Pakistan, causes polarisation instead of regional harmony owing to their historical conflict. Similarly, India shares boundaries (land and/or maritime) with all the member countries while they, (barring Pakistan and Afghanistan) do not share boundaries with each other. The existing unsettled border disputes and increasing conventional conflicts with India has increased a sense of insecurity among its neighbours.

Another important factor that hinders regional cooperation is the variation in their political beliefs. South Asia has witnessed all types of political systems – democracy, monarchy and dictatorship. India being the matured democracy and propagator of democracy in the region created asymmetry in political dealings among the member countries. Insecurity and distrust among the member countries forced smaller member countries to bandwagon with external powers (or other member countries) to balance India – thus hampering regional cooperation.

Modi’s invitation to the heads of governments of the SAARC member-states to his swearing-in ceremony was perhaps a signal that under his tenure as the prime minister, India would prioritise its neighbourhood. He visited Bhutan and Nepal and shared India’s desire to establish a SAARC satellite. One has to wait and watch if Modi would be able to fulfill those promises.

In order to revive the SAARC, one or more member countries can take initiatives to reduce distrust and insecurities among the member countries. Similarly, like-minded SAARC countries can form a sub-regional group and enjoy the benefits of regional cooperation. But cooperation in the sub-regional group which includes India will have limited cooperation within SAARC, while a sub-regional group that does not include India will suffer from a lack of contiguity and capacity constraints. India, being the largest economy of South Asia should show its benevolence and bear the cost of rejuvenating the SAARC for promoting regional cooperation in the region. Despite of the discouraging past, there is optimism among the member countries as all the South Asian countries have adopted democracy and are realising the benefits of regionalism.

" BRITAIN BELONGS TO ALLAH":ANJEM CHOUDARY AND HIS SUPPORTERS

 Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

“We don’t abide by British rule.” “Sharia is the law of God, and should be implemented in the whole world.” “The ‘flag of Sharia’ will eventually fly over Downing Street.” These are statements voiced by the radical preacher, Anjem Choudary, in the UK.

What do Choudary and his supporters seek?

Anjem Choudary, a 47 year-old British Muslim of Pakistani descent born in England, is a former lawyer and founding member of proscribed Islamist groups like al-Muhajiroun and Islam4UK. These groups were banned based on government evidence of them operating as terrorist organisations with links to al Qaeda. According to Hope Not Hate, Choudary represents “the single biggest gateway to terrorism in recent British history.”

His support base is prominent. According to a recent poll by ICM Research, 40 per cent of 500 Muslim families that were surveyed expressed support for the establishment of strict Sharia laws in the UK. Policy Exchange reveals that one-third of the domestic Muslim youth would happily succumb to Sharia. According to Henry Jackson Society, 18 per cent of people linked to acts of terror have had associations with Choudary´s banned organisations. Hope Not Hate reveals that 200-300 supporters from Choudary’s European network have left to fight in Syria. His guidance has resulted in an indoctrination of vulnerable youth who have devoted themselves to terrorism in the UK and abroad.

The shared views of Choudary and sections of the British Muslim population who are his supporters have been well documented by the media. However, whether these supporters extend solidarity to Choudary because they genuinely believe in him or whether it is because of the cause he represents, is unclear. Jihad is considered a just war, and like Choudary, his supporters believe that the IS will surface as the winning power. They may not directly believe in Choudary as a person, but they seek the same end: a worldwide Islamic Caliphate.

If Sharia offers such an exceptional way of living, why is Choudary still living in Britain? When confronted with whether he should leave Britain, Choudary says, “Why should I? I was born here.” It is this supposedly oppressive apartheid system that, according to Choudary, impedes him from leaving: apparently if he decides to go, he will be arrested and his passport confiscated. “Muslims are imprisoned over here. We can’t travel abroad,” says Choudary. How then does he travel to Spain and France for Islamic conferences?

Choudary cheers for Muslims to quit their jobs and request unemployment benefits. He despises the country he lives in, but contentedly receives welfare benefits provided by the state. UK’s Terrorism Act 2000 categorises terrorism as the use of threat to intimidate or influence the government, organisations or the public with “the purpose of advancing a political, religious or ideological cause.” Choudary somehow seems to stay on the right side of law. On occasions where he has been linked to convicted terrorists like Habib Ahmed (convicted for membership with al-Aqeda), Choudary has proclaimed that these people left his groups prior to the conviction, and he cannot therefore be held responsible for their actions. Thus, as a former lawyer, Choudary probably knows his way around British law so as to avoid prosecution for his provocative views on race relations and religion. However, there have been debates on whether his hate speeches should be met with resistance by law enforcement officers.

In 2010, the Terrorism Act led to the banning of Islam4UK, based on accusation of the group’s controversial statements about the 9/11 attacks and the 7/7 bombings. Choudary openly condemned the act, saying, “We are now being targeted as an extremist or terrorist organisation and even banned for merely expressing that. I feel this is a failure of the concept of democracy and freedom.” On the contrary, Choudary said in an interview with Iranian Press TV: “As Muslims, we reject democracy, we reject secularism, and freedom, and human rights.” However, it is this democracy that allows Choudary to use his freedom of speech and make controversial statements. 

On 25 September, Choudary and eight other radicals were arrested in an anti-terror raid, based on the accusation of their support for banned organisations and for encouraging terrorism. However, Choudary was later released on bail. According to Choudary, the arrest was nothing more than a politically motivated move for the government to gain votes on Iraqi airstrikes, and went as far as to say that this bloody war will eventually “manifest itself on the streets of London.” In a multicultural society like Britain, views similar to Choudary’s have proved difficult to silence. An interesting question to ask is: if Britain were to adopt Sharia, how would people like Choudary react to hate speech against its state, and would the same rights to protest that radical Muslims enjoy today be granted in such a state?

THE ISLAMIST STATE AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS: JIHADIST FROM CENTRAL ASIA

 Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy

As violent jihadist activities in Syria and Iraq intensify, the number of foreign nationals enrolling to fight for the Islamic State (IS) is witnessing an exponential growth. The case of Central Asian jihadists - fighters who are nationals of Tajikstan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan - joining the Islamic State (IS) is interesting, especially given the political history of the region’s neighbourhood. Despite the involvement of Central Asian-origin people in the insurgency in Afghanistan over the past few years, several Central Asian radical Islamists have chosen to travel to Syria and Iraq instead of the former. There is a need to understand why nationals of Central Asian countries are joining the IS.
Central Asian Jihadists in Syria and Iraq
Today, there are an estimated 31,500 jihadists who fight under the IS’s banner in Syria and Iraq. Approximately 15,000 of them are estimated to be foreign fighters and 2000 of them are pitted as from Western countries. While the numbers of nationals of Western countries joining the IS are easier to find, the numbers of their Central Asian counterparts are comparatively difficult to obtain and/or ascertain. Some recent estimates pit the number at anywhere between 3000-4000, with Tajiks constituting the largest chunk. According to reports, there are about “250 Kazakh citizens, 100 Kyrgyz, 190 Tajiks, 500 Uzbeks, and about 360 Turkmens fighting alongside ISIS extremists,” that have been identified, with Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan being the most vulnerable to IS influence, especially via Ferghana Valley. However, these numbers too are difficult to confirm.
Motivations for Joining the IS
Some motivations for joining the IS are common between Western jihadists and Central Asian jihadists. Among those are the organisational and administrative capabilities of the IS; the quality of life assured for IS fighters (that is comparatively higher than what the Afghan Taliban or al Qaeda ever provided); the chance to be on the ‘winning side’; and the potential to settle instead of having to run for cover (as opposed to the Taliban’s experience in Afghanistan). Another reason is the relative failure of al Qaeda in comparison to the Islamic State to hold territory.
More importantly, the 1300 year old prophecy in the Hadith about a ‘malahim’ (day of reckoning) speaks about the clash of Islam and the ‘infidels’ in Dabiq, Syria, is doing the rounds in the jihadist social media. The IS has in fact been using this Hadith to legitimise its actions in Iraq and Syria, and the historical religious significance of the prophecy has managed to draw more radical Islamists towards this insurgency. So strong is this prophecy’s influence on the group, that their official magazine is called Dabiq.
To this end, the war in Afghanistan is a jihad with nationalistic contours, but the war in Syria and Iraq is transnational in nature and does not aim to end at national borders. It is about something on a much larger scale - the recreation of the world as a single world order. And coming from the present-day territories of historical Khurasan - as also emphasised by the IS - these radicalised Central Asian fighters feel obligated to join.

Noticeable Trends
This sentiment could also have been augmented by the nature of news reports that are made available in these countries. The outrage over the humanitarian crisis in Syria, Israel’s offensives in Gaza, the flux in the Egyptian political environment, and the mistreatment of Muslims on various occasions across the globe have found ample space in their media. As Christian Bleuer states in the recent Afghanistan Analysts Network report, “…this author has very rarely seen in the media, or heard in local discussions, concerns over Uyghurs, Rohingyas, Chechens, Dagestanis or Afghans.” The argument about motivations depending on the call for universal jihad to protect Muslims everywhere therefore becomes complex here. There appears to be a general tendency to know and to be concerned more with what is happening in West Asia - Arab areas in particular - than other neighbouring areas with considerable Muslim populations. This means, in many ways, the primary driver is still the attraction to the status of the Arab world than just the cause of rallying for the global Ummah.
Furthermore, it is important to note that the IS’s anti-Shia policies that otherwise do not find much resonance in the Central Asian society have begun to attract the younger generation of Kazakhs, Tajiks, Uzbeks and Kyrgyz. This is a shift from the trend followed by Central Asian recruits when they joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Al Qaeda’s policies have not been the elimination of Shias altogether, whereas, the IS’s policies are as much about the elimination of Shias as their goal to expand the borders of the ‘Islamic Caliphate’.
This indicates a trend of gradual Salafisation of the societies in the Central Asian republics. Ironically, the rise of al Qaeda over the past two decades has laid the groundwork for legitimising the IS’s (whom they disowned in February) agenda.

THE U.S, SYRIA AND IRAQ: THE SUCCESS OF AIRSTRIKES SO FAR

 KP Fabian

 

The battle for Kobane, the Kurdish town on the Syrian side of the border with Turkey, is still raging, though indications are that the US’ airstrikes have so far failed to make a decisive impact and reverse the advance of the Islamic State (IS) fighters. The US’ airstrikes on the IS have been ongoing for almost a month in Syria and for two months in Iraq. Yet, Ramadi, the capital of the huge Anbar province in western Iraq might fall to IS soon. The question arises on whether or not US President Barack Obama’s strategy – military and political – against the IS will work.

On September 10, he announced that the US would “degrade and ultimately destroy” the IS. At present, it is clear that the US strategy is not working. But, the key question to raise is whether there is a coherent, consequential, and consistent US policy to deal with the crisis in Iraq and Syria. The answer is in the negative.

Washington’s policy has been vitiated by misjudgments and incoherence. In August 2011, President Obama, after a fortnight-long consultations with his counterparts in UK, France, and Germany, announced that there should be a regime change in Syria; President Basher al-Assad had forfeited his legitimacy and it was abundantly clear that he had to go. One might have reasonably concluded that Obama spoke out on the basis of a political assessment made by his intelligence agencies and diplomats, corroborated by their counterparts in the other three countries.

Obviously, the assessment was deeply flawed. UN officials who visited Syria to prepare the ground for the Kofi Annan mission that started in February 2012 found no reason to conclude that Assad was on his way out. How did Obama come to his conclusion? It appears that Saudi Arabia and Qatar had conveyed to US that their intelligence agencies had, after investigations, come to that conclusion. Perhaps, because Assad is close to Iran, and the US wants to weaken Iran, Washington might have uncritically accepted the Saudi-Qatar inputs.

In August 2012, Obama revealed the ‘red lines’ Assad should not cross, referring to moving or using chemical weapons. In August 2013, when Assad used chemical weapons and Washington consulted its allies, there were loud signals that the US and France were about to attack Syria. However, Russia picked a hint thrown by US Secretary of State John Kerry and made Assad agree to destroy his chemical weapons. While the decision to get the weapons destroyed without air attacks on Syria was reasonable, the fact remains that Saudi Arabia was deeply disappointed by what it read as Obama’s vacillation.

It has been argued by Obama’s critics, including former Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, that, right at the beginning if the US  had  armed the moderate Syrians, extremist groups such as the al Qaeda and the IS would not have established themselves in the latter. Obama was reluctant to send arms as the US worried the arms would land up in wrong hands. But, in that case, Obama should not have made the August 2011 statement and given the impression that Washington would arm and support the rebels. The US-initiated Geneva process with Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi as Special Envoys for Syria, both eminent diplomats, was an elaborate charade.

The airstrikes are unlikely to destroy the IS but degrade, they might. Obama has virtually declared an open-ended war on the IS. His repeated pledge not to send ground troops is understandable, but his own defence team has made it clear that airstrikes are not enough. Obama’s plan to get about 5000 Syrians trained in Saudi Arabia and send them to Syria is rather fanciful. The 5000 cannot make much impact either on Assad or on the IS that has about 30,000 fighters. By the time they reach Syria, the IS might have expanded its hold.

In the longer term, the US might not mind Iraq’s breaking into three or more, a Kurdistan, a Shiastan, and one or more Sunnistans. The US’s long-term interest is to see an independent Kurdistan that holds about 40 per cent of Iraq’s oil – and where US companies are deeply engaged in. Perhaps, even Iran might not mind the breakup of Iraq if the Shiastan with its oil wealth will remain an obedient satellite. Turkey has plans to acquire territory from Syria – which is why it is asking for a buffer zone and a no-fly zone. However, if an independent Kurdistan is established in Iraq, it will ignite the Kurds in Turkey and Syria, and even Iran, to work towards independence. Assad’s support from his Alawite base is declining and his photos are no longer shown at the burials of dead soldiers. He might hold what he has and the IS and others hold what they have, marking the end of Syria.

All told, it is the beginning of the end of the political boundaries set by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement to serve the interests of UK and France. But, much more is at stake. When and how will the region recover peace and tranquility?

CHINA'S END GAME IN HONG KONG

 Teshu Singh

China has two Special Administrative Regions (SAR) - Hong Kong and Macau - that were reunified with the mainland in 1997 and 1999 respectively. Both SARs are a part of China under a unique system famously known as ‘one country, two systems’. Article 31 of the constitution of China provides for such an arrangement: “The state may establish special administrative region when necessary.” Hong Kong became a part of China after 156 years of British occupation. Today, it is economically prosperous with limited universal suffrage only in district council elections and parts of the legislative council. Up until now it has had five Chief Executives, three elected and two acting.

As the next elections for the Chief Executive are due in 2017, there has been widespread protest demanding the right to freely choose their representative themselves, as outlined in the “mini constitution” of Hong Kong, the system that implemented through the Basic Law of Hong Kong. Currently, China shortlists/screens the candidates first for the position of the Chief Executive position by a committee that is mostly comprised of pro-China elites appointed by the central government. Evidently, this defeats the real purpose of ‘one country two systems’. However, it does have an independent judiciary and the citizens definitely have more civil liberty than the mainlanders. Earlier China had promised free elections in 2017 but it is now resisting open nomination of the candidates. Unhappy with these arrangements the citizens have resorted to various means of protesting; two students groups, Hong Kong Federation and Scholarism, have been prominent in asking for uiversal adult franchise. In fact, the protest overshadowed the 65th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and has famously come to be known as the ‘Umbrella Revolution’.

Why China is resisting change? What is its end-game in Hong Kong?

Political Motivations
The new leadership is laying great emphasis on domestic politics and wants to tighten its grip over any growing struggle as well as all state apparatus. Xi Jinping has emerged as one of China’s ‘greatest Communist leaders’. His leadership is defined by the term ‘China Dream’; it represents ‘patriotism, innovation and unity’. For him, all developments should lead to the fulfilment of China’s drea. This has been reaffirmed by him: “For Chinese people both at home and abroad, a united Chinese nation is our shared root, the profound Chinese culture is our shared soul, and the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation is our shared dream.” Eventually, this aspiration was adopted by the entire CCP. Therefore, China will not loosen its hold on any part of its territory. Recently, China has also taken tough stands on all it boundary disputes: the South China Sea, the East China Sea and Sino-Indian borders. Agreeing to any such demand would lead to further fissiparous tendencies within China, for example, the conflict in Xinjiang where the Uighur are demanding an East Turkestan.

Economic Interdependence
Hong Kong is indispensable for China; it connects China to the rest of the world in numerous ways. Hong Kong was the first country to follow the neoliberal model. As per the SAR regulations Hong Kong is free to make economic regulations and participate in international economic organisations under the name Hong Kong China. The economy of Hong Kong during 1970-80 was a success story with an unbeatable per capita income.

At present the Chinese economy is passing through a difficult phase and there have been issues with the full convertibility of the RMB. On the other hand, the currency of Hong Kong is legally issued by three major banks and the interest rates are driven by individual banks, giving a free hand to the market. Hong Kong has become a key hub for Chinese investment and provides Chinese companies with access to global capital markets for bond and loan financing. China has used Hong Kong for various economic experiments, for example, in 2007, it issued dim sum bonds. It is a bond issued outside China but in RMB instead of the local currency and until 2010 only Chinese and Hong Kong banks could issue it. The bond allows foreign investors to buy China-listed shares via the Hong Kong stock exchange. According to UNCTAD, October 2014, China’s outward direct investment in 2013 was USD 101 billion and it ranked third after the US and Japan in terms of outbound investment. As China's outward foreign direct investment grows, companies and economists see more opportunities for Hong Kong to become the launch pad to support China's "going out."

It is therefore needless to mention that Hong Kong is fully integrated with the global economy and is vital for China. China’s end-game in Hong Kong is to reap the benefits of its economy with a firm control on its state apparatus. But the ‘Umbrella Revolution’ is gaining a significant mass base and the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident might be repeated in Hong Kong if timely measures are not taken.

IRAN: AN IMPERFECT NUCLEAR DEAL BETTER THAN NONE AT ALL?

Ruhee Neog

In the desperate scramble for a conclusive nuclear agreement, would an imperfect deal with Iran be better than no deal at all? An imperfect deal would imply a trade-off between political negotiations and technical verification, especially in the context of Iran’s so-called possible military dimensions (PMD). In this, how important is it to resolve the PMD issue? Would it be detrimental or useful for the conclusion of a final deal?
PMD here refers to covert indigenous work carried out in the past, whether design or research-oriented, towards an Iranian nuclear weapon. The environment seems ripe for a less than ideal deal, and as has been previously argued, for the sake of pragmatism, what is achievable trumps what could be the most ideal compromise between the P5+1 and Iran. There have been reports from both parties that the negotiations are moving forward very slowly; concern has also been expressed about not meeting the 24 November deadline and the subsequent future of a deal in that event. It has also been suggested by Iranian President Hasan Rouhani that Iran would be open to the idea of cooperating with the US in combating the ‘Islamic State’ only once some sort of understanding on the lifting of sanctions that is agreeable to Iran is reached. This could make the situation more urgent than it already is, and prove that despite pronouncements about conducting the talks in isolation and without subjecting it to the pressures of the external environment, the situation on the ground cannot be kept insulated.
Negotiations with Iran are being conducted at two levels; one is political in nature – with the P5+1 – and the other, technical – with the IAEA. In September, reports of Iran’s inability to deliver information on certain aspects of its PMD to the IAEA emerged, which led many to question whether this intractability would hold up the negotiations process. Indeed, it has been established that given the overarching political nature of the West-Iran rapprochement, the domestic political constituencies of the US and Iran will have significant leverage in okaying a final deal. Members of the US Congress have already expressed their displeasure by saying that it is imperative for the PMD issue to fully cleared by the IAEA before a deal can be struck. Iran, on the other hand, has rubbished the PMD claims, made public in an IAEA Board of Governors report released in 2011, by calling them “mere allegations.” In this environment, the P5+1 may choose to sideline the PMD issue to expedite the negotiations. However, given its increasing prominence owing to domestic political demands to see its full clearance, the P5+1 may not be able to eclipse it completely.
In the event that the IAEA and Iran manage to reach a compromise and details about the possible military dimensions of the latter’s nuclear weapons programme are revealed, to what extent would it be useful for a final deal? As Jeffrey Lewis argues in “We don’t want to see Iran’s Full Monty” (Foreign Policy), Iran “very likely” carried out some covert work on nuclear weapons in the past, which have since come to a halt. If Iran discloses these details, it could quite possibly derail the negotiations process. It will be a very hard sell for the Obama administration to convince the tough customers of the US Congress, who have already laid many obstacles in the path of the interim agreement, that a final deal that trades sanctions relief for a capped nuclear programme is in the best interest of the US, especially after Iran’s past activities come to light. Proof of weaponisation work can create an environment not conducive to rapprochement, and that these activities were conducted in the past will be irrelevant as popular sentiment quickly turns against Iran.
Therefore, while a detailed understanding of Iran’s past nuclear activities may be considered somewhat essential to guaranteeing a full scope verification agreement, a full disclosure by Iran has the potential to preclude any deal whatsoever. Stubbornly clinging to the ‘nothing is agreed until everything is agreed’ maxim would completely obliterate the diplomatic momentum built since November 2014. All things considered, an imperfect deal would be better than no deal at all.

MARITIME TERRORISM: KARACHI AS A STAGING POINT

Vijay Sakhuja

The recent attempt by the Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), the new wing of the Al Qaeda, to take control of PNS Zulfiqar, a Pakistan Navy frigate berthed in Karachi harbour and use it to attack US Navy warships has showcased the continued vulnerability of naval platforms to terrorists. The purported plan was to take control of the frigate and use other militants who would embark the ship by boat and stay onboard as ‘stowaways’ and sail out. When on the high seas, the ship would ‘get close to the U.S. ships…..and then turn the shipboard weapon systems on the Americans.’
The unsuccessful AQIS raid left 10 terrorist dead including a former Pakistan Navy officer Awais Jakhrani, who is reported to have had links with Jihadi elements. Further interrogations have led to the arrest of three other Pakistan Navy personnel in Quetta in Baluchistan who were attempting to escape to Afghanistan.

The attack exposed chinks in Pakistan’s naval defences particularly strategic infrastructure which host millions of dollars worth of naval hardware such as ships, submarines and dockyards. It is important to mention that this is not the first time that terrorist groups have managed to penetrate Pakistan’s naval defences. In the past there have been at least two other attacks on highly sensitive naval platforms and on foreign naval personnel. In 2002, 14 persons including 11 French naval engineers working on the submarine project were killed and 23 others were injured when an unidentified man blew himself up with his car after ramming it into a 46-seater Pakistan Navy bus outside the Karachi Sheraton Hotel.

The second attack was on Pakistan’s naval air base Mehran and was the handiwork of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a coalition of militant groups based in the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan.  As many as 15 attackers from the ‘Brigade 313’ of the Al Qaeda-Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami group led by Ilyas Kashmiri, took part in the operation which left 18 naval personnel killed, 16 wounded and two US built P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft destroyed. Significantly, the attackers had good knowledge of the naval base including security arrangements, exit and entry points, and the details of the hangers and aircraft.

These attacks showcase that Karachi is a staging point for maritime terrorism particularly for those groups who have taken a liking for naval targets. In fact, Karachi has been labeled as the ‘terror capital’ and is a paradise for terrorists, gunrunners, and drug smugglers. The city is rife with ethnic strife and home to crime syndicates particularly Dawood Ibrahim who is wanted in India for a number of crimes including the 1993 Mumbai blasts. The city is also known for the ‘point of departure’ for the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks by the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) who sailed from Karachi on three boats and later hijacked the Kuber an Indian fishing off Porbandar, on the Gujarat coast and landed on unsecured waterfronts in south Mumbai.

Perhaps the most discomforting issue of the attacks is that Jihadi groups have dared the Pakistan Navy and caused enormous damage to its reputation, morale and material. They have penetrated the rank and file of the Pakistan Navy and the attacks on PNS Mehran and PNS Zulfiqar were planned and executed with the help of naval personnel. Referring to the PNS Zulfiqar attack, Pakistan Defence Minister Khawaja Asif made a statement in the Parliament that the attack could not have taken place “Without assistance from inside, these people could not have breached security,” The entry of Jihadi elements is sure to cause suspicion among the other multinational partners with whom the Pakistan Navy works closely, particularly the United States. It is believed that some elements in the Pakistan Navy were upset with the US its raid deep into Pakistan which led to the killing of Osama bin Laden.

The above attacks also have a bearing on the safety and security of Pakistan’s nuclear installations. In the absence of a nuclear submarine, the Pakistan Navy has drawn plans to build a rudimentary sea-leg of the nuclear triad with ships and conventional AIP-submarines fitted with nuclear weapons. Any attempt to attack or hijack these platforms and use them as ‘bargain chip’ for any Jihadi agenda would cause grave damage to global security. 

However, it is fair to say that the Pakistan Navy is a responsible force and has taken part in a number of multinational operations in the Arabian Sea-Gulf of Aden fighting pirates and terrorists under the US led multinational coalition force TF-151. It has also been the force commander of the coalition forces during these operations and its professionalism has received accolades. The Pakistan naval authorities would have to sanitize the force and rebuild its image of a highly professional fighting force free of radical elements and jihadi thought with a strong commitment to serve national interests and Pakistan’s international commitments to ensure order at sea.

WAR AGAINST THE ISLAMIC STATE: POLITICAL AND MILITARY RESPONSES FROM THE REGION

Ranjit Gupta

Strange things are happening in West Asia. Those who created the modern jihad in an extremely misguided and immature tactical response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan are today at war with its most extremist manifestation, the Islamic State. The latter has also succeeded in bringing about the almost impossible - uniting countries and regimes deeply antagonistic and hostile to each other in a common war against a common enemy. The US and Iran, Saudi Arabia and Iran, Saudi Arabia and a Shia government in Iraq, the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it - Saudi Arabia, Turkey and the US and assorted Islamist groups, all in the same camp warring against the Islamic State.

The Islamic State (IS), an extremist Sunni entity, is a particularly serious existential threat to the regimes of the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, as its religious roots and those of Wahhabism are broadly the same. The rulers of the GCC countries know that if the IS succeeds in Iraq, a spillover into their countries is inevitable. The IS is thus a direct, immediate and strong existential challenge to the continuing rule of these regimes, something that has not happened before. After agonizing for weeks they have become active participants in a war against a Sunni entity in Shia ruled states. This is unprecedented and something that simply could not have even been imagined only a few months ago.
The IS is fanatically anti Shia; it is also the most potent threat to the pro-Iranian regimes in Iraq and Syria and to the territorial integrity of Iraq and Syria. For these three reasons the IS is now the single most active and potent direct threat to Iran’s influence and standing throughout West Asia. Iran is Iraq’s ally and is the first and only regional country that has provided actual assistance on the ground.
The IS thus simultaneously poses the biggest strategic threat to both Iran and Saudi Arabia, though for entirely different reasons. For the first time since the Islamic Revolution in Iran these two countries face a common threat. They are the two key players if the war against the IS is to succeed. They have to find a way to cooperate. This is going to be difficult particularly as Saudi Arabia continues to attach priority to regime change in Syria which is absolutely unacceptable to Iran. A particularly important meeting was held between the Saudi and Iranian Foreign Ministers in New York on 21 September 2014. Statements made by them indicate that both countries recognize that they have to work together to confront the common enemy.

The Iraqi central Government has been opposed to the Barzani run Kurdish regional government and Iran has traditionally been opposed to the Barzani faction of the Iraqi Kurds. Shia militias have been fighting against the Kurds. The Kurds in Iraq, Syria and Turkey have never managed to put up a single united overall Kurdish front; indeed in Iraq they are divided in two rival groups. But in recent weeks all of them are now fighting together in many theatres against the Islamic State.

On 22 September, the United States launched air strikes against the ISIL in Syria and aircraft from Bahrain, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the UAE also took part in the airstrikes while Qatar “played a supportive role”. Arab states have continued to be involved in such air strikes since then. Iraq welcomed these airstrikes with great excitement and enthusiasm.

President Assad reacted by saying that Syria “supports any international effort in the fight against terrorism”; Syrian Foreign Minister was supportive saying that “Syria had been informed before the strikes by the United States”. Analysts on Syrian State television said that these “air strikes did not constitute aggression as Syria was informed in advance.” They have other reasons for feeling rather pleased because the US airstrikes inflicted significant casualties on the Khorasan group and the Jabhat Al Nusra, also fighting against the Syrian regime. Significantly, Syrian opposition National Coalition President Hadi Al Bahra said “tonight the international community has joined our fight against the ISIS in Syria.”

Syria is very keen to be formally a part of the coalition against the IS but unfortunately the US and GCC countries are adamantly opposed to this even as they are tacitly cooperating with the regime directly and through Iran, in coordinating the airstrikes against the IS. Iran would have been happy to attend the meeting in Jeddah on September 11 and in Paris on September 15 to join the international coalition to fight the Islamic State but was not invited due to US opposition. There was no blistering condemnation from Iran which would have been the automatic reaction in the past. Iran has merely said that such actions do not have international legality.

After doggedly refusing to allow any support for any military action in Iraq or Syria against the Islamic State despite intense personal efforts by President Obama and the Secretaries of State and Defense, hours after the first airstrikes in Syria Erdogan said in New York that Turkey was now considering a role that "includes everything. Both military and political…Of course we will do our part." The next few days should see greater clarity about Turkey’s involvement.

CHINA IN NEPAL: INCREASING CONNECTIVITY VIA RAILWAYS

Pramod Jaiswal

China is steadily extending its reach into South Asia with its growing economic and strategic influence in the region. It has huge trade surpluses with all South Asian countries and it reciprocates these surpluses with massive investment in infrastructural development, socio-economic needs and energy production in those countries. It also provides them with low-cost financial capital. The largest beneficiaries of such economic assistance are Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Nepal.

Due to China’s rising interest and influence in South Asia, India appears perplexed. Hence, it has changed its foreign policy gesturing. With the election of Narendra Modi as the Indian prime minister, New Delhi has given highest priority to its South Asian neighours. Inviting the heads of the South Asian countries during his swearing-in ceremony and making his first foreign visit to Bhutan and later to Nepal are the clear indications in those directions.

China’s Inroads in Nepal

Given the claims that Nepal may be used by the US for its larger strategy of encircling China, Beijing is concerned about Kathmandu being manipulated by other external powers. Security experts on China state that Beijing increased its interest in Kathmandu due to the perceived threat to Tibet via Nepalese territory – particularly due to the prolonged state of instability and transition in Nepal.

Ever since the March 2008 uprising, when the Tibetans strongly started the global anti-China protests on the eve of the Beijing Olympic Games, there has been a major shift in China’s policy towards Nepal.

The Nepalese King, the then Commander-in-Chief of the Nepalese army, used to be China’s trustworthy partner and served Beijing’s security interests. However, after Nepal became a republic in 2008, China found it expedient to cultivate the Maoists to do the same. They wanted to curb underground activities of the approximately 20,000 Tibetan refugees settled in Nepal. Ideological affinities made Maoists in Nepal cast sympathetic eyes on China. China accepted the friendly hand extended by the Maoists when they were in dire need of support from a strong power. The former Prime Minister of Nepal, Prachanda’s, acceptance of China’s invitation to attend the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics not only made him the first prime minister to break the tradition of making India the destination for the first foreign visit following assuming office, but also proved his inclination towards China.

Maoists view India and the US as ‘imperialist powers’ and have stated that they were fighting against their interference in Nepalese politics.

India expressed serious concern over Prachanda’s action. The Indian media went overboard stating that India has lost Nepal from its sphere of influence and that it would affect India’s security in the long run. Interestingly, China supported the Maoist Party only after they emerged as the single largest party in the Constituent Assembly election of April 2008, while, it was the only country to supply arms to King Gyanendra to suppress the Maoist insurgents at a time when India, the US and the UK had refused to provide help of such nature.

Linking Via Railways

China is planning to extend the Qinghai-Tibet Railway to Nepal by 2020. The rail link is expected to be extended to the borders of India and Bhutan as well. Through Qinghai-Tibet Railway, China connected its existing railway system to Tibet’s capital Lhasa in 2006 – which passes through challenging peaks on the Tibetan highlands, touching altitudes as high as 5,000 meters as part of government efforts to boost economic development in the neglected region. In August 2008, six additional rail lines were proposed to connect to Qinghai-Tibet railway – such as the Lhasa-Nyingchi and Lhasa-Shigatse in the Tibet Autonomous Region, the Golmud (Qinghai province)-Chengdu (Sichuan province), Dunhuang (Gansu province)-Korla (Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region), and the Xining (Qinghai Province)-Zhangye (Gansu). The project is expected to be completed before 2020 while the Lhasa–Shigatse segment was completed in August 2014.

The Lhasa-Shigatse segment extends over 253 kilometers, carrying trains at 120 kmph through valleys and over three bridges that run across the Brahmaputra River. The opening of this segment has reduced the travel time from Lhasa to the remote border towns of Tibet by half. This particular railway line is to be extended to Rasuwagadhi in Nepal via the Shigatse-Kerung stretch. Rasuwagadhi is about 500 kilometers from Shigatse. It is also reported that the link will have two separate extension points, one with the Nepal border and the other with the borders of India and Bhutan.

Shigatse is an important monastery town, home to the Tashilhunpo monastery that has been the seat of the Panchen Lamas, and is an important centre of pilgrimage for many Tibetans.

In response to the Chinese attempt to extend the railway link from Tibet to the Nepalese border, Kathmandu has drafted a plan to extend its railway links to Nepal. Simultaneously, India has announced assistance worth Rs. 10.88 billion for the expansion of railway services in five places along the India-Nepal border.

Though Chinese claims that the rail network expansion will be crucial in economic, cultural, and tourism promotion in South Asia, it has alarmed New Delhi because of its strategic implications. While Nepal is shares a common dream of extending the railway line to Lumbini, the birth place of Lord Buddha, through Kathmandu, there is sign of nervousness among the Indian government due to the possible threat. Such fear might gradually fade after Modi’s invitation to the Chinese to fulfill his ambitious bullet train plan.

STRONGER DEMOCRATIC VALUES FOR A BETTER TOMORROW

Asanga Abeyagoonasekera

In the last few months, geopolitical instability has resurfaced in Eurasia and the Middle East. The Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan addressing the World Economic Forum special meeting on Unlocking Resources for Regional Development in Istanbul stated: “Terrorism is not regional its global now and it has threaten the entire global peace.” He strongly condemned the ISIS for the current tumorous situation in Iraq and Syria.
Moussa Mara, Prime Minister of Mali said, “Islam is a religion of peace and must not be seen as an instrument of terror.” Calling for a concerted international response to the global cancer of terrorism, he urged for greater efforts by Islamic countries to explain Islam’s underlying precepts. Many speakers emphasised the importance of creating a stable and peaceful region. The author of this article was a participant at this important regional forum.
The battle against ISIS is escalating with aerial bombing by the US forces in Iraq and Syria. According to the Turkish President nearly 1.5 million refugees have entered the Turkish border for shelter and protection. Turkey with its geostrategic location surrounded by Europe, Middle East, North Africa and Eurasia has been experiencing significant growth over the past decade of about 5 per cent annually despite the global financial crisis. Structural reforms and macroeconomic stability have sustained the growth and the rising living standards. Additionally, the Turkey will be the forthcoming G20 Chair. The ongoing ISIS crisis in Middle East region could affect its economy and impact global trade. The ISIS threat is a serious threat to world peace. The international community needs to support the campaign against this extremist group.
Terrorism in any part of the world should be considered a serious threat. The Sri Lankan military battled for three-decades with one of the most brutal terrorist organisations, the LTTE, and was successful in defeating them. The country has lived through the threat of terrorism and has felt the bitter pain of dealing with the terrorist issue. The Sri Lankan economy has grown since 2009, which is when the war ended. The growth of GDP and new infrastructure such as highways, ports and airports could be seen. However the individual per capita increase is a cause for concern among the public who have not experienced it due to a rise in the cost of living.
In the last few months in Sri Lanka several provincial elections were held and the entire nation focused on elections and political talk shows, but the voter turn-out at was less than 50 per cent; in some provinces an even lower percentage was evident. This indicates the trust deficit between the public and the politicians or the lack of interest in the overall system, which could surface to become a serious issue. According to the 2014 Edelman trust barometer there is rise in trust towards NGOs and decrease in trust towards the government. In South Asia, with rising political corruption due to the lack of good governance, trust has decreased between the public and governments. Punishing corrupt politicians as done in India, such as the powerful South Indian Chief Minister Ms Jayalalitha, is a good example of the strong anti-corruption institutions and mechanisms prevalent in India. Such action could restore the trust deficit between elected representatives and the public. It is important that the South Asian region should try to end this generation of corrupt politicians.
Now the political discussion has begun on the next presidential election in Sri Lanka, as many believe the government will go for an early election beginning of next year. The process and the legitimacy for President Rajapaksa to contest for the third term has been questioned and a discussion forum called “Mahinda can” was created by a few intellectuals. One should realise the repercussions of constitutional amendments to extend term limits and the benefit s that could bring to the nation. Sri Lanka’s image as a rich democratic nation in the rest of the world could be questioned, but some may argue that it is better to have the third term as it provides political stability. The 18th Amendment has further strengthened executive power and made checks and balances weak. One may wonder as to what the other coalition political parties under the government would say. Even in the Philippines a recent survey was conducted to extend President Aquino’s term limit; around six in ten Filipinos are not in favour to amend the 1987 Constitution. This may be due to the fear of creating another autocratic leader such as Ferdinand Marcos.
The three-pronged approach discussed - fighting terrorism, establishing good governance and constitutional reform - is to secure or restore the rights of people, not to take away what was given. Through good governance, extremism, which leads to terrorism, can be minimised. As the world celebrates global dignity day on the 15 October, it would be important to respect different communities to create a peaceful dignified world with stronger democratic institutions to preserve and secure liberty.

ISLAMIC STATE AND INDONESIA: JAKARTA'S COUNTER-STRATEGIES

Max Regus

Earlier this year, Indonesia was shocked by the Islamic State's (IS) propaganda spread via YouTube to recruit new members. In fact, in certain parts of Java, some have even expressed their willingness to become new members of the IS. Given that Indonesia has the largest Muslim population in the world (around 230 million), this has attracted regional and international attention.

What is the danger attached to Indonesians joining the IS? Will the State’s efforts to prevent and combat extremism be successful, given the hardline Islamic groups interested in becoming new members of the IS?
The Indonesians who are now the members of the IS are believed to be effectively influencing the hardliners to defend themselves as new members. Their role is to facilitate the IS in building relationships with radical groups in Indonesia and gaining the broad sympathy of Indonesian Muslims (The Jakarta Globe, 17 July 2014).
With respect to the IS, the Indonesian government has taken a decisive political position. President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono had instructed his government to control the development of the IS.
Prospective Political Stance
Some have questioned the ability of the Indonesian government to combat radical groups in comparison with its direct war on the IS. However, it must be acknowledged that radical groups are connected to political power in Indonesia - they have a strategic position through their provision of political resources for elites. It is also important to note that the practice of political decentralisation implies that the centre’sposition to control the emergence of political issues in local areas is less.
It seems that Indonesia is trying to learn from its past experiences by taking a decisive position against the IS. A war against the IS provides strategic momentum to shadow the historical burden of Indonesian Islam during the last decade, which has been associated with the presence of hard-liner groups. The government is also able to take a definite position against the IS because this organisation is international in character has no affiliation with Indonesian politics.
The government has also rejected the IS based on their violent propaganda mainly to recruit Indonesian people. 
Indonesian Islamic Resistance
In trying to demonstrate Indonesia’s position, Indonesian Islamic scholars and some moderate (liberal) Islamic organisations have stated that the IS is not in accordance with the Islamic character of the country. In this context, it would also be interesting to discuss the positions of the existing radical groups that have been part of the Caliphate movement such as Hizb ut Tahr in Indonesia. Although they have a global Caliphate ideology, their position is contrary to that of the IS.

They believe that the violence of the IS is destroying the position of the Caliphate Islamiyah, which promotes a peaceful path without violence and brutality. They are supported by the specific understanding that the IS is clearly not an Islamic movement but one that is using Islam as a tool for global war propaganda. From their point of view, Indonesian Islam has a peaceful image.

In addition to the above, the Indonesian public is also confused by the inconsistency of the Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication in revoking the IS YouTube propaganda. Further confusion arises from the fact that the Minister of Information and Communication has affiliations with the Prosperous Justice Party in Indonesia.
This political party is perceived by the Indonesian public to have connections with the hardline extremist groups within the country, which intend to apply sharia law in Indonesia. In this context, even the Indonesian public has a clear political position against the IS. Now, the government needs to introduce significant institutional enforcement to back its stand and take the strong initiative to consolidate different groups within Islam to defending Indonesia against the IS.

ISLAMIC STATE AND FOREIGN FIGHTERS: JIHADIST FROM EUROPE

Tuva Julie Smith

The prolonged fighting in Middle Eastern countries have attracted numerous European Muslims to partake in them. Although estimations of exact figures vary, approximately 2,000-5,500 foreign fighters (FFs) have joined the Middle Eastern battlefield.

The International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation (ICSR) estimates that 18 per cent of the total number of FFs is from Europe: France (63-412); Britain (43-366); Germany (43-240); Belgium (76-296); and the Netherlands (29-152) have most recruits. However, the most heavily affected countries according to population size (per million) are Belgium (27), Denmark (15), the Netherlands (9), Sweden (9), and Norway (8).

The understanding of who these FFs are, and their motivations behind participating in the various ‘jihads’ is obscure. This article, presented from an European research perspective, aims to widen the understanding of this phenomenon by taking into account the patterns of joining and motivating factors.

Patterns of Joining

The radicalisation of individuals and the distinct characteristics of radicalised people depend on complex factors. The general assumptions of poverty and lack of education admitted as core socio-economic reasoning for radicalisation does not always comply with statements of European researchers.

The socio-economic perspective reveals a diverse group, although rather violent in character acting on a private volunteering basis. Most commonly, they are young well-educated men and women in their twenties, either Muslim-born or Muslim converts enjoying good socio-economic footing. Many cases are similar to that of the teenager, Jejoen Bontinck, (BBC News) from Belgium, a Muslim-convert who decided to travel to Syria despite his education, sporting activities, etc. at home. Another example is that of 25-year old Abu Anwar (CNN news) from the southern England. He grew up in a middle-class household and enjoyed an easy life in Britain, but chose to leave citing the inability to practice Islam.

Furthermore, the European point of convergence tends to draw a line at this group's experience of feeling left behind in the mainstream society. There has been a tendency among some youth who lack a sense of belongingness to becoming more willing to embrace challenges more than what they already may be facing by joining the violent radical groups. According to Lars Gule, a Norwegian researcher on Extreme Islam at University College in Oslo and Akershus, some of these youths come across as inharmonious and already religiously alienated and frustrated before they join.

Moreover, European research reveals that having established a personal relationship to a central figure in a radical environment, such as a charismatic opinion leader, seems to be important when influencing people to support or carry out politically motivated attacks. More importantly, these leaders, or `recruiters´, are skilled in the sense of persuading young Muslims into believing that their religion is under attack, and as Muslims, they are obligated to defend fellow Muslims.

Identity, Revenge, Status or all Combined?

There are a variety of motivations that lead these individuals to travel and partake in jihdas in far off lands. Some, the so-called identity seekers, travel with an unfulfilled need to define themselves. Raffaello Pantucci, an analyst at the Royal United Services Institute in London, argues that European FFs are drawn to join by virtue of dissatisfaction at home and the desire to find one’s identity.

Alternately, for some, the motivation to travel is the desire of power and status, given how participating as a FF equals high status among extreme Islamist groups in Europe. For instance, posting pictures of themselves with heavy weaponry in Syria provides reputation and acknowledgement among similar groups back home.

Additionally, some Europeans travel for legitimate purposes, such as for visiting their families or for education, but find themselves affected by violent situations. The recruiters then provide guidance, justification and encouragement for partaking in jihad.

Lastly, those upset over gruesome videos and images of destruction and suffering, and thus, seeking revenge for the lack of contribution and empathy from Western governments, as practicing Muslims, feel compelled to join. For instance, Abu Saif (NBC News), a 31-year old chef left Belgium to fight the US and Shiite Muslims in Syria after watching a YouTube video depicting the massacre of children. Social media is a significant platform with an undeniable power. It incorporates a source of information as well as inspiration. Its ability to mobilise has been deftly taken advantage of by groups such as the Islamic State.

Given the aforementioned phenomena, European FFs cannot be characterised under one monotypic umbrella. They are young well-educated men and women in their mid-twenties, who voluntarily partake in violent struggles they otherwise have no pre-given predisposition towards. Their motivations for jihad vary. Some are based on conscious choices of revenge, their ability to do more than just participate in demonstrations, whereas others join out of frustration, lack of belonging or rebellion. Additionally, people appear to unite as a result of horrifying images presented to them daily by media outlets. Thus, whether it is an act of revenge, status or identity seeking, they all combine, and, not surprisingly, it seems that their active use of social media represents the key source of their motivation for joining the wars as FFs.

STRATEGIC ESTRANGEMENT: AN ODD BEDFELLOW TO ECONOMIC ENGAGEMENT

Vijay Shankar

The inextricable interdependence of survival of China’s despotic leadership, its economic growth and stability of State-controlled Capitalism poses a curious dilemma when large democratic economies choose to expand and boost economic engagement. This is particularly so when there exists unresolved geo-strategic fissures. And yet, the overriding importance of political stability and economic growth (in that order) to China’s Communist Party leadership presents an opportunity to best influence China.
Of the ten bloodiest massacres in history five of them occurred in China (Qing conquest of the Ming Dynasty 1618-83, casualties 25 million; Taiping rebellion 1850-64, casualties 20 million; An Lushan rebellion 755-63, casualties 13 million; Dungan Revolt 1862-77, casualties 10 million; Chinese Civil War 1927-50, casualties 7.5 million). It can hardly be accidental that all five were internal to China. Neither is it coincidental that this part of their grisly past is an important determinant of their resolve to suppress uprisings whether in Mao’s Cultural Revolution, Tiananmen Square or indeed in the current more-democracy protests in Hong Kong. The so called “Umbrella Revolution” has thus far resisted strong arm tactics; the State buying off local tycoons and using veiled threats of the use of disproportionate force. The underlying fear of encroachment of the Party’s authoritarian values on Hong Kong’s way of life is at the core of dissent. Nonetheless a vacillating leadership runs the risk of being perceived as weak when withholding the impulse to action. All the while an edgy mainland China watches uneasily. The Party knows full well that to loosen grip is the first step down the slippery slope to political instability. 
On the growth front China is at that stage in development when expectations and standards of living of its citizens can no longer be nourished by the diminishing sheen of the “China Price.” The IMF World Economic Outlook for 2014-15 marks a downward GDP growth forecast for China to under 7 per cent by 2015 as the economy attempts to make the transition to a more sustainable path along the service and technology sectors. This relative slow down puts a poser before Beijing: the only guarantee of the passivity of the masses is a satisfied populace; dissatisfaction amongst the citizenry animated by the urge to more democracy provides the recipe for mass upheavals, so how best can the current politico-economic situation be bridled?
In the meanwhile India finds itself fortuitously positioned. Politically, the Modi-dispensation’s has a resounding mandate and economically, there is an avowed emphasis on development, prodding an upward growth trend (indicated by the same IMF report), reaching 7 per cent by 2015 - a combination of both factors provides the vehicle to not just influence Sino-Indian relations but also to resolve our prickly border predicament. According to a study by the PHD Chamber of Commerce, an industry trade group in New Delhi, China has become India’s largest trading partner and in the wake of Premier Xi Jinping’s recent visit to India, targeting bilateral trade of over US$100 billion is not only achievable but also would make India amongst China’s top five trading partners.
Economic intertwining comes with its own set of tilting levers which may be actuated to mutually settle the tricky border situation. It must be kept in perspective that the 3,225 km border (un-demarcated in the main) has been influenced historically by considerable cartographic jugglery. Significant to the boundary situation are the Johnson Line of 1865 which placed the Aksai Chin in Kashmir (which the British never took seriously); and the McCartney-MacDonald Line of 1899 which showed Aksai Chin as Chinese. China was not a signatory to either of these frontier delineations. However, by the second decade of the 20th century as both China and Russia lapsed into turmoil the Raj sensed a closure to the ‘Great Game’ and the border was redrawn to the original territorially favourable Johnson Line.
At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the Johnson Line in the north and the McMahon Line in the east, also not ratified by China, were inheritances of the partition award. Both independent India and China harboured no apparent conflicting territorial claims. But the annexation of Tibet in 1950 and the consequent moves aimed at strategic consolidation of the Aksai Chin to conform to the McCartney-MacDonald Line presaged the coming armed clash of 1962. It is of some consequence to note that in 1960; Premier Zhou Enlai had ‘unofficially’ offered a quid pro quo in Aksai Chin and the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA); that India accept the McCartney Line while China would abandon its claims across the McMahon Line. The time for this ‘grand bargain’ has perhaps arrived.
Geopolitics and international relations are often greatly influenced by timing events to capitalise on circumstances. For India to consider on the one hand strategic estrangement of China while on the other intensify economic engagement, at a time when Beijing faces the prospects of a slow down in growth coupled with restiveness amongst its citizens is to miss the opportunity to bring about stability on our borders and indeed in relations. In turn this can only spur growth, which for both nations is currently most desirable. The time to resurrect Zhou’s ‘grand bargain’ is at hand and as Mark Twain put it, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it does rhyme.”

MODI-OBAMA SUMMIT: CRITICISM FOR CRITICISM'S SAKE

Chintamani Mahapatra

India’s hyperactive Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now widely known for his magic - the Modi Magic. His charisma made him popular ever since he began his tour of India to campaign for the parliamentary election and his charm became more widespread going beyond the borders of India soon after he became the Indian Prime Minister. 

In one month, Prime Minister Modi has held three summit level meetings with three world leaders - Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, Chinese President Xi Jinping and the US President Barack Obama. The Chinese leader announced an investment of US$20 billion to develop infrastructure in India; the Japanese leader declared an amount of US$35 billion and, while the American leader could make no such commitment, the US-Indian Business Council estimated that Modi’s visit to the US would bring about US$41 billion of investment to India.

Why the US president was not able to make an open commitment on investing in India is not unknown. It is the private corporate sector in the US that can make investment commitments and not the US administration. And, investment, after all, is not aid!

There is no doubt that Modi’s summit meeting with the US President was the most important among the three summits, not only because the US is a superpower, but because Washington’s approach towards the new government in Delhi would considerably impact China’s attitude and Japanese engagement vis-à-vis India.

Critics point out that Modi’s US visit was high on symbolism and low on substance. Some pointed out that the grand reception he received in New York was the handiwork of the Gujarati community in the US. It has also been argued that there was a big media hype in India about Modi’s US visit, but there was nothing of significant importance in the coverage by the US media. Still others complain that no new agreement was signed during the Modi-Obama summit, no big ticket item was proclaimed, and that there was nothing original in the joint statement issued by the two leaders.

These are actually criticisms for criticism’s shake. First of all, Modi’s address at the Madison Square was clearly aimed at the Indian American community and not just the Gujarati community. In fact, the short cultural programme before the Prime Minister’s arrival had an India flavour and the Rajasthani dance performance by Gujarati dancers symbolised the unity of India in diversity! The Prime Minister’s announcement of life time visas for overseas Indians (PIO and CIO) was not meant for the Gujarati community alone.   

Secondly, American newspapers rarely give wide coverage to any one foreign leader, and Prime Minister Modi’s meeting with the US President in view of this fact was like such meetings in the White House, that is, almost a daily affair. Moreover, an article by the PM in The Wall Street Journal, a major voice of corporate America, and a joint article by President Obama and Prime Minister Modi in the influential The Washington Post were quite uncommon feats.

Finally, a pair of eagle eyes is needed to discover the novel elements in the US-India joint statement. First, the statement clearly and strongly sends signals to Pakistan to rope in its home-grown terrorist networks and to China to follow international law in handling maritime disputes in the South China Sea. No diplomatic nicety was shown, unlike earlier joint statements, in matters of tackling terrorism and managing freedom of the seas.
  
Secondly, the need to robustly tackle the IS and D-Company, among other terrorist outfits, and their safe heavens, was a significant part of the joint statement and the mark of the Modi Government on this issue was crystal clear.

Thirdly, the concord between the two leaders to clean up the logjam in the implementation of the civil nuclear cooperation agreement was an important declaration. The UPA government failed to implement years after the declaration of the nuclear deal and six years after signing the 123 agreement.

Significantly, Modi’s summit with President Obama preceded his unprecedented corporate diplomacy marked by his meetings with the CEOs of a large number of American Big Business houses and his public diplomacy with the influential Indian American community. In both these initiatives, the Prime Minister’s goal was to allure American investments into India to create smart cities, modernise the country’s infrastructure and turn India into a manufacturing hub of the world.

Modi was neither selling dreams nor making populist remarks. He had done his home work. Based on his understanding of India’s strengths - democracy, demography and demands - he tried to convince the American public and the government the benefit of doing business in and with India. Neither his corporate diplomacy nor his public diplomacy was anathema to the White House.

Modi has planted many seeds in the US. The road to success, however, is long and not without hurdles.       

A NEW AFGHANISTAN: FOUR MAJOR CHALLENGES FOR PRESIDENT GHANI

Suba Chandran

Will the new political arrangement (President and a Chief Executive Officer) in Afghanistan work, and more importantly, deliver? Though it looks simple in paper, given the recent history between the two contenders – Ashraf Ghani and Abdullah Abdullah – will the power-sharing deal help Afghanistan stabilise?

One Country, Two Executives

The understanding simply means that there would be two Executives for Afghanistan – the President (Ashraf Ghani) and a Chief Executive Officer (either Abdullah Abdullah, or someone nominated by him). It does solve the electoral dispute that had been raging between the two contenders and threatening to derail the political process. However, will the arrangement address the challenges facing Afghanistan?

The first set of challenges includes providing a coherent administration, better governance and addressing the looming economic crisis. One will have all the powers entrusted by the Constitution, while the other is yet to have a legal sanction – either via a Grand Jirga or the Parliament.

Also, the situation in the Afghan power structure is not as simple as two leaders trying to share power. It involves two sets of diverse groups attempting to share power and run a country, with the divide running across the ethnic lines. Neither side is monolithic; both leaders will have to address their constituencies, that not only involve respective communities – be it the Pashtuns, Tajiks and Hazaras – but also power leaders including provincial governors, warlords and even military officials within the Afghan National Army.

The Shifting American Focus towards Iraq

The agreement is primarily due to the US’ pressure. And that poses the second challenge for the new Afghan arrangement. How seriously committed will the US be, once the new Afghan structure is in place? Undoubtedly, the multiple visits by the US Secretary of State John Kerry and his constant dialogue with both parties have ensured that the electoral process has not been completely wasted. Abdullah was ready to leave the process and pursue a different political path. Thanks to Kerry, the two contestants could be brought together.

Will the US and Kerry have the same time and patience to continue their engagement with Afghanistan? The farewell speech is likely to leave a bad note in the Obama administration and the larger American nation. The US’ Ambassador to Afghanistan James B. Cunningham’s,  remarks to outgoing Afghan President Hamid Karzai’s speech on 23 September will echo the larger American sentiment – ungrateful and ungracious. The new Afghan government have to work closely with the US government, and also address the prevailing sentiment about corruption and mis-governance, resulting in siphoning off the American tax payers’ money.

However, there are two positives for the US, as Karzai’s term ends. The US does not have to deal with him anymore and that should be a huge relief; the past year has been extremely bad and upsetting for the US. Second, the new president has already signed the Bilateral Security Agreement (BSA) with the US, followed by a similar one with the NATO.

Also, as it happened a decade ago, the US’s attention has been already diverted to Iraq. The airstrikes-only approach means the US needs to work harder to stitch a collation in the region and get regional boots on the ground. The return of the US to West Asia to destroy the Islamic State (IS) also means allocating considerable funds to train the Syrian opposition and augment the Iraqi security forces. Both – the diplomatic engagement in West Asia and raising local forces to fight the IS means less diplomatic time and financial resources for Afghanistan.

Advantage Taliban-Pakistan

The third major challenge would be the resurgence of the Taliban, and their supporters across the Durand Line. Despite multiple efforts, negotiations with the Taliban have not succeeded until today. Moving ahead, the reasons behind the failure would factor heavily in the new government.

There is no evidence at the ground level to prove that the Taliban infrastructure is destroyed. While the al Qaeda network in Pakistan has been substantially neutralised, the Taliban network across the Durand Line remains intact, and has in fact expanded further. The recent announcement that the Pakistani Taliban in Punjab would fight in Afghanistan underlines the Afghan Taliban’s strategic depth in the West. Mullah Omar has silently reversed the idea of “Strategic Depth” in the Af-Pak map; today the Afghan Taliban has enough safe havens, support structures and human resources deep inside Pakistan.

The new Afghan government with two executives would find it difficult to deal with such a complicated network that enjoys continuous support from across the Durand Line.

It’s the Economy, Stupid

The economic situation and the human development indicators have been transformed dramatically over the last decade. There are more schools, roads, transmission lines etc., than has ever been in the history of Afghanistan. The Afghan economy is evolving slowly but steadily, as are the country’s government structures and non-governmental institutions.

Herein lies the challenge. The above needs to be protected and expanded further, for which the new government would need strong financial support. Afghanistan is yet to become a regional economy and the much touted Heart of Asia. Though structures exist, there are no funds to support and finance the infrastructure and human resources that have been created during the last decade.

Securing what has been created so far itself will be a big challenge for the new president. 

PIRATES PREFER ENERGY CARGO

Vijay Sakhuja

Early this month, pirates released the hijacked MT Sunrise 689, a small product tanker bound for Vietnam which went missing soon after it left Singapore. During the captivity that lasted nearly six days, the pirates siphoned 2,000 of the total 5,200 metric tons of oil valued at $4 million. They also stole the personal belongings of the crew and threatened to kill if they did not follow orders – but assured them that their only aim was to steal the oil carried onboard the vessel.

This is the 12th incident of piracy in Southeast Asia involving small oil tankers. These vessels are easy targets because they are small, have smaller crews, move at slow speeds, and the low freeboard makes boarding comparatively easier and quicker.  Perhaps the most worrying aspect of these attacks is that pirates in Southeast Asia have taken a liking for small product tankers carrying diesel that is sold to prospective customers, who re-sell for anywhere between $400 and $650 per ton in the black market. 

These pirates or robbers are popularly referred to as ‘Petro Pirates’ and are believed to be part of transnational organised crime groups who own small tankers and are networked with the oil smuggling mafia. Furthermore, these Petro Pirates appear to only steal cargo and not harm the crew. For instance, in June 2014, pirates hijacked Orapin 4, a Thai oil tanker, with its cargo of oil worth nearly $2.2 million; they stole the oil, did not hurt the crew, but robbed them of watches, cell phones, money and other valuables. Similarly, in April 2014, pirates raided a tanker off the coast of Malaysia and stole 3 million liters of diesel. In fact the business model of Petro Pirates’ does not appear to include ransoms.  

Interestingly, a similar story is being played out along the west coast of Africa but on a larger scale. Early this year, MT Kerala, a 75,000 ton tanker carrying diesel was hijacked by Nigerian pirates off the Angolan coast. The vessel was released after being siphoned of 12,270 tons of its diesel cargo. The pirates took the usual precautions of disabling the Automatic Identification System, switching off communications, and repainting the name of the vessel.  

The International Maritime Bureau’s half year report for January to June 2014 recorded 23 incidents off the west coast of Africa, and Nigerian waters has witnessed 10 such attacks. These trends are a continuation of the past reports and the UK Chamber of Shipping records state that acts of piracy and armed robbery in the Gulf of Guinea are worrisome – 62 attacks in 2012; 51 in 2013. The Gulf of Guinea accounted for 19 per cent of all maritime attacks worldwide.  Significantly, the Gulf of Guinea is believed to be a greater threat to shipping than Somalia because of its flourishing oil and gas industry which attracts shipping, unlike Somalia, where pirates preyed on targets of opportunity along the busy sea route. 

The West African piracy is driven by a commodity – oil – which is available in abundance. For instance, Nigeria is an oil-rich country and produces nearly 2 million barrels of oil per day. However, it has limited refining capacity resulting in both export of crude and import of refined oil thus generating sufficient maritime traffic for pirates to feed on. 

Unlike Nigeria, Singapore does not produce any oil but is the hub of the Asian petrochemicals industry with a sophisticated refining, storage, and distribution infrastructure, and therefore attracts significant tanker traffic. A variety of large and small vessels carrying oil and gas make port calls to deliver crude or carry refined products to regional and global markets. According to the US Energy Information Agency, the petrochemical industry is the backbone of Singapore's economy and it has a refining capacity of nearly 1.4 million barrels of oil per day. 

The aforementioned incidents along the west coast of Africa and in Southeast Asian waters offer an interesting feature. The business model of piracy in both cases involves hijacking vessels for the cargo carried onboard, and in particular, the refined energy products such as diesel. It is plausible that pirates in Southeast Asia may have borrowed the idea from West Africa – who appear to have become more sophisticated and have graduated to hijacking bigger ships. 

In essence, the pirates may not have changed their Modus Operandi of attacking both small and big ships; instead they have become cargo/commodity conscious and believe that stealing refined energy products is more lucrative than waiting for ransoms. However, it is useful to mention that the stolen oil or other products are carried in smaller vessels that are equally vulnerable to interception by security forces.