20 Nov 2018

Thousands of GM salaried workers to lose jobs in 2019

Jerry White

Thousands of salaried employees at General Motors in the US and Canada will be thrown out of their jobs at the beginning of 2019 as the Detroit-based automaker accelerates its cost-cutting campaign. The white-collar job cuts, which are also coming at Ford, are part of an expected blood-letting of salaried and hourly jobs amid declining sales worldwide and telltale signs of an impending restructuring of the global auto industry.
Lordstown Assembly Complex
GM sources told the Detroit Free Press and Detroit News that at least 3,000 employees would be terminated because not enough had agreed to “voluntary buyout” offers sent out last month. The company is targeting 17,700 salaried workers with at least 12 years’ experience or more than a third of its white-collar workforce in North America.
According to internal sources who spoke to the Detroit media outlets, GM hoped to get at least 7,000 white-collar workers to sign up for the buyout offer by noon Monday, but managers told employees late last week that only 4,000 had done so. “That means 3,000 or more salaried workers in North America could be terminated starting in January if the automaker in fact opts for forced job cuts, which it has said it would consider if buyouts fell short,” the Free Press wrote.
GM managers held staff meetings last Thursday and Friday to ratchet up pressure on salaried workers to take the deals, which include six months’ of pay and health care coverage. It is unlikely many more will opt to do so since this is exactly the same severance package for a GM employee with 12 years or more seniority who is involuntarily terminated.
According to one source who spoke to the Free Press, “GM will complete the voluntary buyouts by Nov. 29. The managers we’ve talked to are already making their list and will select their cuts in January.” On January 15, he said, GM will announce the involuntary job eliminations, and “walk people out.”
Industry analysts said the cuts targeting engineers, designers, mid-level managers and others are only a prelude to slashing thousands of production workers’ jobs. Market economist Jon Gabrielsen, an adviser to the auto industry, told the Free Press, "I absolutely still believe that 7,000 to be the salaried job reduction number for GM in metro Detroit over the course of an auto downturn in the next two to three years, plus as much as another 7,000 in hourly based on how much sales soften," he said.
The global automakers are under enormous pressure from Wall Street to increase profit margins and shareholder payouts despite falling sales. Last month, GM reported that its third-quarter operating profits in North America increased by 37 percent to $2.8 billion despite an 11 percent drop in sales during the quarter in the company’s key US market.
Lordstown workers on last day of the second shift in June
In an internal memo obtained by the Free Press, which was sent out to managers after the profit announcement, GM said, "We can't confuse progress with winning. Today, our structural cost is not aligned with the market realities nor the transformational priorities ahead. We must take significant actions now while our company and the economy are strong” to “reduce structural costs and improve vehicle profitability."
While GM is planning to cut $6.5 billion in costs, it has squandered over $10 billion in stock buybacks and dividend payouts for its richest investors since 2017, and $25 billion since 2012.
Earlier this month Ford said it will reduce its salaried US workforce of 70,000 employees by an unspecified number as part of its $11 billion “fitness” cost-cutting plan. Morgan Stanley analyst Adam Jonas projected a 12 percent cut in Ford staff worldwide in a note to investors in August saying, “We do not see restructuring at Ford as a ‘nice to have’… but as a crucial step to set the global business on a more balanced footing.”
While seeking to slash jobs all of the automakers have increased the number of white-collar workers hired through temporary agencies who receive lower pay and few, if any, health care and pension benefits.
At the same time, the Detroit-based automakers have carried out temporary layoffs of production workers and permanent jobs cuts and plant closings are expected. Last month, Ford idled its Kansas City, Missouri plant, putting 2,000 workers on temporary layoff, and Fiat Chrysler idled workers at its Indiana transmission plants.
With sales of its Chevy Cruze compact falling, there are widespread concerns that GM may close its assembly plant in Lordstown, Ohio, halfway between Cleveland and Pittsburgh. GM laid off 1,200 workers when it eliminated the third shift at the plant last year and another 1,200 workers when the second shift ended in June.
A second-tier worker at Fiat Chrysler’s Belvidere, Illinois assembly plant told the WSWS Autoworker Newsletter that threats are being spread about the possible elimination of one shift at that facility. “A supervisor told me to start watching the Illinois.gov WARN site for them to post a 60-day notice of layoff,” the worker said, adding, “our union steward said there is a very good chance that we will be laid off December 15 for an unspecified amount of time. More and more talk of eliminating the first shift is causing people to transfer departments and shifts in hope of saving their jobs.”
Temporary layoffs have hit a number of Fiat Chrysler facilities including Belvidere Assembly and Kokomo, Indiana transmission plants.
The United Auto Workers (UAW) has not even made a pretense of opposing jobs cuts, echoing management’s claims they are necessary to ensure continued profitability in the face of slowing sales. The automakers have been able to extract huge profits in North America, despite falling sales, with the collusion of the UAW, which has signed labor agreements slashing the wages of new hires, eliminating income security for laid off workers and expanded the number of temporary part-time workers who pay union dues but have no rights and do not qualify for supplemental unemployment benefits.
The salaried and hourly job cuts are clearly a shot across the bow of autoworkers in advance of the negotiations for new labor agreements, after the current deals expire in September 2019. The threat of plant closures and mass layoffs were used by the automakers and the UAW to ram concession deals past the opposition of workers who initially voted down a contract at Fiat Chrysler in the first such defeat of a UAW-backed national deal in three decades.
In a letter sent to workers UAW Vice President for GM Terry Dittes made it clear the UAW would try to blackmail workers with job threats once again. “Filling our plants with product” would be the UAW’s top priority in the 2019 contract negotiations Dittes said before echoing Trump’s American First nationalism by railing against GM for expanding production in Mexico and China.
This underscores the need for autoworkers to build new organizations of struggle, including factory committees, controlled by rank-and-file workers themselves and independent of the corporate-controlled UAW, to wage a collective fight against coming attack on jobs and living standards. Such a fight must unite workers throughout the world against the transnational auto companies and the capitalist profit system, which enriches the corporate and financial elite at the expense of workers the world over.
“They’re instilling fears about cutting a shift and eliminating anyone hired after 2011,” the Belvidere worker told the Autoworker Newsletter. “Threatening more layoffs, all tactics are to get tier-two employees to take whatever they throw at us in upcoming contract negotiations.”
The worker referred to the corruption scandal that has erupted in the UAW, which revealed how union negotiators had taken million in bribes to sign “company friendly agreements.” “The tides have shifted. The UAW is no longer on our side and they haven't been in a long time. The more these cases are exposed, the more apparent that is becoming. It’s very sad, but it’s true.”

PTDF Masters & PhD Scholarships 2019/2020 for Study in UK, Germany and France

Application Deadline: 31st December 2018

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Nigeria

Fields of Study:  For 2019, the scholarships will be restricted to select courses (available on the PTDF website)

About the Award: Under this scheme, candidates are invited to apply through PTDF to specific programmes at the partner institutions in any of the countries (full list of sponsored courses is available below). The award includes the provision of flight tickets, payment of health insurance, payment of tuition and bench fees (where applicable) as well as the provision of allowances to meet the costs of accommodation and living expenses. The programmes will also include language classes to aid scholars settle into their new environments.

Type: Masters, PhD

Selection Criteria and Requirements: PTDF scholarships are highly competitive and only candidates who are outstanding across the board are selected. A selection committee will be constituted to assess applications using the following criteria;
  • Academic merit as evidenced by quality of degrees, full academic transcripts, other professional qualifications acquired, and relevant publications (where available) to be referenced by applicants
  • Awards for leadership and/or academic excellence (where available).
  • Membership of professional bodies
  • The viability of the study/research plan.
  • Applicants are required to make a case for their scholarship by submitting a statement of purpose (maximum 500 words) stating the reason(s) they want to undertake the study, the relevance of the proposed study to the oil & gas industry and its expected impact on national development.
Requirements:

MSc
  1. A minimum of Second Class Upper (2.1) qualification in their first degree or a Second Class Lower (2.2) with relevant industry experience
  2. Must have completed the mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC)
  3. Must be computer literate
  4. Possession of 5 O/level credits including English Language.
PhD
  1. Must have completed the mandatory National Youth Service (NYSC)
  2. Must be computer literate
  3. A minimum of Second Class Lower (2.2) in their first degree and a good second-degree certificate;
  4. Must submit a research proposal relevant to the oil and gas industry (of not more than 5 pages) to include: Topic, introduction, objective, methodology and mode of data collection (Click here for a sample of Ph.D. research proposal format)
  5. Applicants must also include their master’s degree project
Number of Scholarships: Several

Value of Scholarship: Full scholarship

Duration of Scholarship: for the duration of the degree programme

How to Apply: 
  • Click the here or follow this link http://ptdf.flexisaf.com/
  •  Applicants are advised to read through the requirements in the link below before applying.
  • GOODLUCK!

Visit Scholarship webpage for details to apply

ISTR/WITS Africa PhD Seminar 2019 at Wits Business School, Johannesburg, South Africa

Application Deadline: 15th December 2018

Eligible Countries: African countries

To be taken at (country): South Africa

About the Award: The PhD Seminar is scheduled for May 14-15, 2019 prior to the first annual Conference on Philanthropy, organized by the Wits Business School’s Centre for Philanthropy and Social Investment in collaboration
with the Center for African Studies at Harvard University, TrustAfrica and Africa Philanthropy Forum on May 16-17, 2019. The conference will be held at the WBS School. The conference will address themes that include private sector giving, impact investing, sustainable development goals, philanthropy, civil society and various other topics. PhD Seminar students are required to attend the conference.


Type: PhD, Conference

Eligibility:
  • Students must be currently enrolled in a university and must be able to attend the entire PhD Seminar and Philanthropy Conference
  • . Past participants of ISTR Seminars are welcome to apply to participate.
Number of Awards: Approximately 20 doctoral students will be accepted.

Value of Award: ISTR/WITS will cover the cost of shared room accommodation for the PhD Seminar and the Conference on Philanthropy and meals during both events. Limited travel support is available to supplement support the student’s university can provide. ISTR will grant accepted students 2019 membership in ISTR with all of the associated benefits. Accepted students must attend the Conference on Philanthropy (attendance is free of charge)

Duration of Programme: Conference on Philanthropy begins the next morning on May 16, 2017 and concludes the afternoon of May 17, 2019. If traveling from out of town, participants are expected to arrive the evening of May 13, 2019 and depart the evening of May 17, 2019 or the next morning as flights require.

How to Apply: To apply, please complete the online form here before the December 15 deadline:
https://www.istr.org/page/WITS_ISTRPhDSeminarApplication


All applications must include the following information:
  1. – Full name and gender
  2. – Contact details (including e-mail and phone number)
  3. – Disciplinary background
  4. – Institutional affiliation and name(s) of the supervisor(s)
  5. – Working title of PhD project and formal start/end dates
  6. – Indication of the stage of your research
  7. – Abstract of PhD research (min. 500 – max. 800 words). The abstract must include: research questions, theoretical framework, methods, and results if already applicable
  8. – Feedback needed on your PhD research
  9. – Letter from your faculty advisor/department head providing
    • information about the quality of the candidate,
    • specific information about how participation in the PhD seminar would benefit your doctoral studies, and
    • a statement of financial support the university is able to provide in support of your participation in the PhD Seminar.
  10. – A brief description (100-150 words) of your motivation to participate in the ISTR PhD Seminar
  11. – Research Keywords
Visit Programme Webpage for Details

CERN Summer Student Programme (Member and Non-Member States) 2019 for International Students

Application Deadline: 31st January 2019

Eligible Countries: Member and Non-Member countries

About the Award: Over a period of 8 to 13 weeks, you will work on an advanced technical project in an experimental or engineering team.
During this unique and exciting time, you can attend a series of lectures specially prepared for you where experts and scientists from around the world share their knowledge about a wide range of topics in the fields of theoretical and experimental particle physics, engineering and computing. Visits to the CERN facilities, as well as discussion sessions and workshops are also key features of the programme. Find out more on the Summer Student information page: https://hr-dep.web.cern.ch/content/summer-students. A short report on your work and project at CERN will be expected at the end of your stay.

Type: Internship

Eligibility: In order to qualify for a place on the programme you will need to meet the following requirements:
  • You are a Bachelor or Master student (not PhD) in Physics, Engineering, Computer Science or Mathematics and should have completed, by the European Summer 2019, at least three years of full-time studies at university level.
  • You will remain registered as a student during your stay at CERN. If you expect to graduate during European summer 2019 (as of May), you are also eligible to apply.
  • You have not worked at CERN before with any other status (Technical Student, Trainee, User or other status) for more than 3 months.
  • You have a good knowledge of English; knowledge of French would be an advantage.
Candidates of all nationalities are welcome to apply for this Summer Student Programme.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: CERN would very much like to benefit from your expertise, commitment and passion.
In return, CERN will provide you with:
  • A contract of association of 8 to 13 weeks* to work on a technical project.
  • An extensive physics lecture programme (students will also be able to attend a series of IT lectures organized by Openlab).
  • A 90 CHF per calendar day (net of tax) subsistence allowance to cover the cost of accommodation and meals in the Geneva area for a single person for the whole contract duration.
  • A travel allowance on a lump sum basis paid at the end of your stay to help you with the cost of travel between Geneva and your residence at the time of the selection committee,
  • Coverage by CERN’s comprehensive Health Insurance scheme (contribution already deducted from allowance).**
  • Assistance to find accommodation on the CERN site or nearby.
Duration of Programme: 8 weeks

Possible arrival dates
  • Every Monday from beginning of June to the 1st Monday in July inclusive, namely 3 June, 11 June*, 17 June, 24 June and 1 July 2019.
  • *Exception is Tuesday 11th June, as Monday 10th 2019 is a bank holiday at CERN.
How to Apply: You will need the following documents to complete your application (please make sure to name the documents accordingly e.g. CV, motivation letter, academic transcript, reference letter):
  • A CV in either English or French.
  • A copy of your most recent academic transcript giving an overview of your marks (if you download it from your university portal please make sure the document is not protected so that we can open it).
  • At least one reference letter (dated less than 12 months), preferably 2, from your lecturers.
Please make sure you have all the documents requested to hand when you start your application on our career portal as they cannot be added after its completion (only reference letters can be submitted afterwards).
Once your application has been submitted, you will receive a confirmation e-mail which contains a link. You must forward this link to at least one referee, so that they can upload their recommendation letter. Please note that this must be done before the application deadline (31 January 2019).


Visit Programme Webpage for Details

US Government TechWomen Program 2019 for Women in STEM (Science, Technology, Engineering and Math) Fields

Application Timeline: Opens TODAY 20th November 2018
  • Application closes: 16th January, 2019
  • March 2018: Semifinalists are contacted
  • May 2018: Final selection decisions are made
  • September – October 2019: U.S. TechWomen program
Eligible Countries: Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Zimbabwe.

To be taken at (country): USA

Eligible Field of Study: Any STEM fields

About the Award: From the moment the Emerging Leaders arrive, they are immersed in the innovative, constantly evolving culture of Silicon Valley and the San Francisco Bay Area. Emerging Leaders work closely with their Professional Mentors to design meaningful projects while exploring the San Francisco Bay Area with their Cultural Mentor and fellow program participants.
TechWomen Emerging Leaders will:
  • Challenge themselves with new questions and concepts
  • Collaborate with like-minded women in their fields on an innovative project
  • Network with influential industry leaders
  • Discover their own innovative leadership style
  • Create meaningful friendships with women from all over the world
  • Explore the diverse communities of the San Francisco Bay Area and Washington, D.C.
  • Inspire the next generation of women and girls in their home countries
Type: Training, Fellowship

Eligibility: Applicants must
  • Be women with, at minimum, two years full-time professional experience in the STEM (science, technology, engineering and math) fields. Please note that internships and other unpaid work experience does not count toward the two-year professional experience requirement.
  • Have, at minimum, a bachelor’s degree/four-year university degree or equivalent.
  • Be proficient in written and spoken English.
  • Be citizens and permanent residents of Algeria, Cameroon, Egypt, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kyrgyzstan, Lebanon, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Palestinian Territories, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tajikistan, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan or Zimbabwe at the time of application and while participating in the program.
  • Be eligible to obtain a U.S. J-1 exchange visitor visa.
  • Not have applied for an immigrant visa to the United States (other than the Diversity Immigrant Visa, also known as the “visa lottery”) in the past five years.
  • Not hold U.S. citizenship or be a U.S. legal permanent resident.
Preference will be given to applicants who
  • Demonstrate themselves as emerging leaders in their chosen professional track through their work experience, volunteer experience, community activities and education.
  • Are committed to return to their home countries to share what they have learned and mentor women and girls.
  • Have limited or no prior experience in the United States.
  • Have a proven record of voluntary or public service in their communities.
  • Have a demonstrated track record of entrepreneurialism and commitment to innovation.
  • Demonstrate a willingness to participate in exchange programs, welcome opportunities for mentoring and new partnership development, and exhibit confidence and maturity.
TechWomen encourages people with diverse backgrounds and skills to apply, including individuals with disabilities.

Selection: TechWomen participants are selected based on the eligibility requirements above. Applications are reviewed by independent selection committees composed of industry leaders and regional experts. Semifinalists may be interviewed by United States Embassy personnel in their country of permanent residence.

Number of Awardees: 100 women

Value of Scholarship: International travel, housing, meals and incidentals, local transportation and transportation to official TechWomen events are covered by the TechWomen program. Participants are responsible for the cost of any non-program activities in which they wish to partake, such as independent sightseeing and non-program-related travel.

Duration of Scholarship: The 2018 TechWomen program will occur over five weeks from September – October 2019. Due to the fast-paced nature of the program, arrival and departure dates are not flexible.

How to Apply:
  • Interested TechWomen participants should apply based on the application requirements in link below.
  • GOODLUCK
Visit Programme Webpage for details

Award Provider: US Department of State

Google AI for Social Good Contest 2019 ($25 million Pool Fund+Consulting)

Application Deadline: 22nd January 2019

Eligible Countries: All

About the Award: At Google, we believe that artificial intelligence can provide new ways of approaching problems and meaningfully improve people’s lives. That’s why we’re excited to support organizations that are using the power of AI to address social and environmental challenges.
We’re looking for projects across a range of social impact domains and levels of technical expertise, from organizations that are experienced in AI to those with an idea for how they could be putting their data to better use. Since 2005, Google.org has invested in innovative organizations that are using technology to build a better world.

Type: Award

Selection Criteria: 
  • Impact. How will the proposed project address a societal challenge, and to what extent? Is the application grounded in research and data about the problem and the solution? Is there a clear plan to deploy the AI model for real-world impact, and what are the expected outcomes?
  • Feasibility. Does the team have a well-­developed, realistic plan to execute on the proposal? Does the team have a plan to access a meaningful dataset and technical expertise to apply AI to the problem? Have they identified the right partners and domain experts needed for implementation?
  • Use of AI. Does the proposal apply AI technology to tackle the issue it seeks to address?
  • Scalability. If successful, how can this project scale beyond the initial proposal? Can it scale directly, serve as a model for other efforts, or advance the field?
  • Responsibility. Does the proposed use of artificial intelligence align with Google’s AI Principles? See Google’s Responsible AI Practices for practical guidance.
Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: Selected applicants will receive coaching from Google’s AI experts, Google.org grant funding from a $25 million pool, and credits and consulting from Google Cloud. Grantees will also join a specialized Launchpad Accelerator program, and we’ll tailor additional support to each project’s needs in collaboration with data science nonprofit DataKind.

How to Apply: 
  • If you have an idea and your organization is eligible (see FAQs), you’re ready to apply. Download our application and apply through the link below.
  • Organizations will have until 11:59:59pm PST January 22, 2019 to submit their applications. After the deadline, Google and our panel of experts will review proposals and announce grant recipients in spring 2019.
  • Apply now
  • GOODLUCK!
Visit Programme Webpage for Details

CEBHA+ Doctoral Scholarship 2019 for Students in Sub-Saharan Africa

Application Deadline: 26th November 2018.

To be taken at (country): For the CEBHA+ Doctoral Scholarship, each of the doctoral candidates will be hosted at one of three institutions:
  • South African Medical Research Council (students may be registered at any university in sub-Saharan Africa)
  • Stellenbosch University
  • University of Malawi
About the Award: Sub-Saharan Africa is affected by a substantial burden of disease, with premature deaths due to non-communicable diseases (NCDs) and unintentional injuries being on the rise. There is thus a substantial need to develop and implement evidence-based interventions to prevent and treat NCDs and unintentional injuries in Africa, as well as to address their root causes. CEBHA+, a research network with partners in many African countries, including South Africa, Malawi, Uganda, Rwanda and Ethiopia has emerged from this need. The Network aims to build long-term capacity and infrastructure for evidence-based healthcare and public health in sub-Saharan Africa, by focusing on both prevention of disease and delivery of care for NCDs.

Type: PhD

Eligibility: View CEBHA+ Doctoral Scholarship Eligibility table in Program Webpage (see Link below)

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: The total scholarship is valued at € 24,000 and will be paid out over 3 years. The CEBHA+ Doctoral Scholarship will be administered through the successful candidate’s university; and it will cover tuition fees and research costs, and contribute towards living expenses. Payment of the scholarship will be as per the university policy; and continued payment of the scholarship will depend upon the candidate’s satisfactory progress against agreed goals. The successful candidate will be mentored by experienced researchers within the CEBHA+ Network.
Conditions of the scholarship: The successful doctoral candidate will be expected to:
  • Conduct policy relevant NCDs-related research within the low and middle income country (LMIC) public health context
  • Submit at least 2 manuscripts emerging from the doctoral research to peer-reviewed journals
  • Complete his or her doctoral studies within 3 years after first registration (by the end of 2021)
  • Repay the scholarship amount given if the candidate fails to complete his or her studies within the expected period.
Duration of Programme: 3 years

How to Apply: Applicants who meet the eligibility criteria should please submit the following documents by 26 November 2018.
  • Completed application form
  • Copy of Passport/ID
  • Full CV
  • Motivational letter outlining relevant research experience
  • Proof of registration from doctoral candidate’s university (if applicable)
  • Summary of intended doctoral research
Visit Programme Webpage for Details

Important Notes: Please note that Incomplete applications will not be considered

With Nearly 400,000 Dead in South Sudan, Will the US Finally Change Its Policy?

Edward Hunt

The Trump administration has remained largely silent about the ongoing conflict in South Sudan, maintaining a quiet diplomacy with the country’s leaders despite a recent report that nearly 400,000 people have died in the country’s civil war.
This figure of nearly 400,000 deaths is comparable to the estimated number of deaths in the war in Syria. About 2 million people have been internally displaced in South Sudan, and more than 2.5 million people have fled the country.
Making matters worse, the people of South Sudan are experiencing one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world. About 6 million people, or about 60% of the population, are severely food insecure, and another 1.7 million people are facing a looming famine.
“As the conflict has gone on and worsened, the numbers of people in need of assistance has simply continued to grow,” Mark Lowcock, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator, said earlier this year.
The civil war in South Sudan began in 2013 when President Salva Kiir and Vice President Riek Machar turned their forces against one another. Although the war is often portrayed as an intractable ethnic conflict between Kiir’s Dinka ethnic group and Machar’s Nuer ethnic group, the two men have really been more focused on power and wealth.
“It has ethnic aspects to it, but it is a power struggle of taking control of the country and who holds control of the country,” Hilde Johnson, a former head of the UN Mission in South Sudan, said in 2016.
The United States has played an influential role in the country. Before the war began, the Bush administration helped South Sudanese leaders with the negotiations that led to the country’s independence in 2011. President Kiir often wears the cowboy hat that George W. Bush gave to him.
Since 2005, the United States has provided South Sudan with more than $11 billion in assistance. “That level of U.S. support is unprecedented in sub-Saharan Africa, and represents one of the largest U.S. foreign aid investments globally in the past decade,” according to a report by the Congressional Research Service.
The United States has also taken sides in the war. The Obama administration supported President Kiir, helping him acquire arms from Uganda, a close U.S. ally in the region. “Uganda got a wink from us,” a former senior official has acknowledged.
To keep the weapons flowing, the Obama administration spent years blocking calls for an arms embargo.
During another major crisis in 2016, the Obama administration continued to side with President Kiir. After Machar had been chased out of the country, U.S. officials advised Machar to give up his position in the government.
“We do not believe it would be wise for Machar to return to his previous position,” Special Envoy Donald Booth told Congress.
Jon Temin, who worked for the State Department’s Policy Planning Staff during the final years of the Obama administration, has been highly critical of the Obama administration’s choices. In a recent report published by the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, Temin argued that some of the worst violence could have been avoided if the Obama administration had implemented an arms embargo early in the conflict and refrained from siding so consistently with President Kiir.
“The United States, at multiple stages, failed to step back and broadly reassess policy,” Temin reported.
By the time the Obama administration handed things over to the Trump administration in 2017, the country was cracking apart. In July 2017, a group of analysts and former officials told Congress about horrific levels of violence, citing mass atrocities, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
President Kiir leads “a brutal regime that continues to murder and plunder its people,” said former U.S. diplomat Payton Knopf, who has spent years working on the crisis. “We may be looking at a civilian death toll that is akin to the war in Syria, but among the population that’s half its size.”
More recently, the Trump administration has started paying some attention. The White House has posted statements to its website criticizing South Sudanese leaders and threatening to withhold assistance. Administration officials coordinated a recent vote at the United Nations Security Council to finally impose an arms embargo on the country.
In other ways, however, the Trump administration has continued many of the policies of the Obama administration. It has not called much attention to the crisis. With the exception of the arms embargo, which could always be evaded with more winks to Uganda, it has done very little to step back, reassess policy, and change course.
The United States could “lose leverage” in South Sudan “if it becomes antagonistic toward the government,” U.S. diplomat Gordon Buay warned earlier this year.
Of course, there has been one undeniable change from the Obama years. Not only has President Trump displayed little concern about the horrors that have unfolded in South Sudan, but he is widely reported to have made racist comments about Africans and African nations. He seems entirely unaware of the role that the United States has played in South Sudan.
The long-term prospects for peace appear remote. Although President Kiir and Machar have agreed to a new peace deal, numerous observers remain skeptical, believing that the two men will never share power peacefully.
“It’s insanity to keep repeating the things that haven’t worked,” Kate Almquist Knopf, a former Pentagon analyst, recently commented.

Global Oil Price Deflation 2018 and Beyond

Jack Rasmus

One of the key characteristics of the 2008-09 crash and its aftermath (i.e. chronic slow recovery in US and double and triple dip recessions in Europe and Japan) was a significant deflation in prices of global oil. After attaining well over $100 a barrel in 2007-08, crude oil prices plummeted, hitting a low of only $27 a barrel in January 2016. They slowly but steadily rose again in 2016-17 and peaked at about $80 a barrel this past summer 2018. Now the retreat has started once again, falling to a low of $55 in October and remain around $56 today, likely to fall further in 2019 now that Japan and Europe appear entering yet another recession and US growth almost certainly slowing significantly in 2019. With the potential for a US recession rising in late 2019 oil price deflation may continue into the near future. What will this mean for the global and US economies?
The critical question is what is the relationship between global oil price deflation, financial instability and crises, and recession–something mainstream economists don’t understand very well? Is the current rapid retreat of oil prices since August 2018 an indicator of more fundamental forces underway in the global and US economy? Will oil price deflation exacerbate, or even accelerate, the drift toward recession globally now underway? What about financial asset markets stability in general? What can be learned from the 2008 through 2015 experience?
In my 2016 book, ‘Systemic Fragility in the Global Economy’ and its chapter on deflation’s role in crises, I explained that oil is not just a commodity but, since the 1990s, has functioned as an important financial asset whose price affects other forms of financial assets (stocks, bonds, derivatives, currencies, etc.). Financial asset price volatility in general (bubbles and deflation) have a greater impact on the real economy than mainstream economists, who generally don’t understand financial markets and cycles, think. Hence they don’t understand how financial cycles interact with real business cycles. This applies as well to their understanding of oil prices as financial asset prices, not just commodity prices.
For my comments on global oil deflation in 2014-15, go to my website for the excerpt from the chapter from the ‘Systemic Fragility’ book that explain the role of global crude oil prices as financial asset prices. This article is reproduced, with the excerpts from 2016, from the book. Go to: http://kyklosproductions.com/articles.html)
Oil Price Deflation Revisited 2018
Oil is a commodity whose price is determined by the interaction of supply and demand; but it is also a financial asset the price of which is determined by global finance capitalists’ speculation in oil futures markets and the competition between various forms of financial assets globally. For the new global finance capital elite (also addressed in the book) look at the returns on investment (e.g. profits) from financial asset investing globally—choosing between oil futures, stocks, bonds, derivatives, currencies, real estate on a worldwide basis.
The price of crude oil futures drives the price of crude oil in the short and medium term, as a commodity as speculators bet on oil supply and demand; and the relative price of other types of financial assets in part also determine the demand of oil speculators for oil futures.
What this means is that simply applying supply and demand analysis to determine the direction of crude oil prices globally is not sufficient. Neither supply nor demand has changed since August 2018 by 30% to explain the 30% drop in crude oil to its current mid-$50s range; nor will it explain where oil prices will go in 2019. Nevertheless, that’s what we hear from economists today trying to explain the recent drop or predict the trajectory of global oil price deflation in 2019.
What Mainstream Economists Don’t Understand
Mainstream economists are indoctrinated in the idea that only supply and demand determine prices. It hearkens back to the influence of classical economics of the 18th century and Adam Smith. Supply and demand are the appearance of price determination. What matters are the forces behind, beneath and below that cause the changes in supply and demand. Those forces are the real determinants. But mainstream economists typically deal at the surface of appearances, which is why their forecasts of economic directions in the medium and longer term are so poor.
Looking at recent explanations and analyses by mainstream economists, and their echo in the business media, we get the following view:
First, it is clear that there are three major sources of oil supply globally today: US production driven by technology and the shale fracking revolution. Second, Russian production. Third, OPEC, within which Saudi Arabia and its allies, UAE, Kuwait, etc. Each produce about 10-11 million barrels per day, or bpd.
Since this summer, US fracking has resulted in roughly an additional 670,000 barrels a day by October compared to last July 2018. Both Saudi and Russian production has added roughly 700,000 more, each respectively. Offsetting the supply increase, in part, has been a reduction in output by Venezuela and Iran—both driven by US sanctions and, in the case of Venezuela, US longer term efforts to prevent the upgrading and maintenance of Venezuelan production.
The more than 2 million bpd increase in global crude oil supply by the global oil troika of US- Russia-Saudi has, on the surface, appeared as a collapse in global oil prices from $80 to $55, or about 30% in just a few months. Projections are supply increases will drive global oil prices still lower in 2019: US forecasts for 2019 are for an average of 12.06 million bpd; for Russia an average of 11.4 million bpd; and for Saudi an average of 10.6 million bpd. (Sources: EIA and OPEC secretariat).
Demand & Supply as Mere Appearance
So the appearance is that supply will drive global oil prices still lower in 2019. But what about demand? Will the forces behind it drive oil price deflation even further? And what about other financial asset markets’ price deflation? Will declines in stock, bond, derivatives, and currencies prices result in financial capitalist investors increasing their demand for oil futures as they shift investing from the collapse of values in those financial markets to oil? Or will it reduce their investing in oil futures as other financial asset markets prices deflate, as a psychological contagion effect spreads across financial asset markets in general, oil futures included?
While mainstreamers focus on and argue that pure supply considerations will predict the price of oil, my analysis insists that a deeper consideration of forces are necessary. What’s driving, and will continue to drive, oil prices are Politics, other financial markets’ price deflation, and Demand that will be driven by renewed recessions in the major advanced economies (Europe, Japan, then US, and continued GDP slowdown in China).
As global economic growth slows, now clearly underway, more than half of the world’s oil producers will increase oil production. Russia, Venezuela, Iraq, smaller African and Asia producers, are dependent on oil sales to finance much of their government budgets. As real growth slows, and recessions appear or worsen, deficits will rise further requiring more government revenues from oil sales. What these countries can’t generate in revenues from prices they will attempt to generate from more sales volume. Even Saudi Arabia has entered this group, as it seeks to generate more revenue to finance the development of its non-energy based economy plans.
So Russia and much of OPEC for political reasons will increase supply because of slowing economies—i.e. because of Demand originally and Supply only secondarily. As the global economy continues to slow Demand forces trump those of Supply. But the two are clearly mutually determined. It’s just that Demand has now become more determining and will remain so into 2019.
Debt as a Driver of Global Oil Deflation
But what’s ultimately behind the Demand forces at work? In the US it’s technology, the fracking revolution, driving down the cost of oil production and thus its price. It’s also corporate debt, often of the junk quality, that has financed the investment behind the oil production output rise. Drillers are loaded with junk bond debt, often short term, that they must pay for, or soon roll over now at a higher interest rate in 2019 and beyond. They must produce and sell more oil to pay for the new technology driven investment of recent years. And as the price falls they must produce and sell still more to generate the revenue to pay the interest and principal on that debt.
So is it really Supply, or is it more fundamentally the debt and technology that’s driving US shale output, that in turn is adding to downward global price pressures? Is it Supply or is it the way that Supply has been financed by capitalist markets?
Similarly, in the case of Russia and much of OPEC, is it Supply or is it the need of those countries to finance their government growing debt loads (and budgets in general) by generating more sales revenue from more oil output, even as the price of oil falls and thereby threatens that oil revenue stream?
Whether at the corporate or government level, the acceleration of debt in recent years is behind the forces driving excess oil production and Supply that appears the cause of the emerging oil price deflation.
Politics as a Driver of Global Oil Deflation
Domestic and global politics is another related force in some cases. Clearly, Russia is engaged in an increase in its military research and other military-related government expenditures. Its governing elite is convinced the US is preparing to challenge its political independence: NATO penetration of the Baltics and Poland, the US-encouraged coup in the Ukraine, past US ventures in Georgia, etc. has led to Russian acceleration of its military expenditures. To continue its investment as the US attempts to impose further sanctions (designed to cut Russia connections with Europe in particular), and as Russia’s economy slows as it raises its domestic interest rates in order to protect its currency, Russia must produce and sell more oil globally. It thus generates more demand for its oil competitively by lowering its price. Demand for Russian oil increases—but not due to natural economic causes as the world economy slows. It increases because it shifts oil demand from other producers to itself.
Saudi politics are also in part behind its planned production increase. It has stepped up its military expenditures as well, both for its war in Yemen and its plans for a future conflict with Iran. The Saudi government investment in domestic infrastructure also requires it to generate more oil revenue in the short term.
The recent Russian-Saudi(OPEC) agreement to reduce or hold oil production steady has been a phony agreement, as actual and planned oil production numbers clearly reveal.
Not least, there’s the question of global financial asset markets’ in decline with falling asset prices and how that impacts the oil commodity futures financial asset market. Once again, changes in oil supply and demand simply do not fluctuate by 30% in just a couple months. The driver of oil prices since July 2018 must be financial speculation in oil futures.
Here it may be argued that investors are factoring in the slowing global economy, especially in Europe and Japan, in coming months. They may be shifting investment out of oil futures as a speculative price play, and into US currency and even stocks and bonds. Or into financial asset markets in China. Or speculating on returns in select emerging market currencies and stocks that have stabilized in the short term and may rise in value, producing a nice speculative gain in the short run. The new global finance capital elite looks at competitive returns globally, in all financial asset markets. It moves its money around quickly, from one asset play to another, enabled by technology, past removal of controls on global money capital flows, easy borrowing, and ability to move quickly in and out of what is a complex network of highly liquid financial asset markets worldwide. As it sees global demand and politics playing important short term roles in global oil price declines, it shifts investment out of oil futures and into other forms of financial assets elsewhere in the global economy. Less supply of money capital for investing in oil futures reduces the demand for oil futures, which in turn reduces demand for oil and crude oil prices in general.
Conclusion
What this foregoing discussion and analysis suggests is the following:
• Looking at oil supply solely or even primarily is to look at appearances only
• But Supply & Demand analyses of oil prices are also superficial analyses of appearances. They are intermediate causal factors at best.
• What matters are real forces that more fundamentally determine supply and demand
• Politics, technology, and debt financing are more fundamental forces driving supply and demand in the intermediate and longer run.
• Oil is not just a commodity, since the 1990s especially; it has become a financial asset whose price is determined in the short run increasingly by speculative investing shifts by global finance capital elites.
• As financial assets, oil prices are determined in the short run globally by the relative price of other competing financial assets and their prices
• The structure of the global economy in the 21st century is such that a new global finance capital elite has arisen, betting on a wide choice of financial assets available in highly liquid financial asset markets, across which the elite moves investments quickly and easily due to new enabling technologies and past deregulation of cross-country money capital flows
To summarize, as it appears increasingly that politics (domestic budgets and revenue needs, US sanctions, rising military expenditures, trade wars, etc.) and a slowing global economy are causing downward pressure on oil demand and thus oil prices; this price pressure is exacerbated by a corresponding increase in production and supply as a result of rising corporate and government debt and debt-servicing needs. However, in the very short run of weekly and monthly price change, it is global oil speculators betting on further oil price deflation and shifting asset investment returns elsewhere that is the primary driver of global oil deflation.
Global oil prices are in determined by other financial asset market price deflation underway in the short term, and in turn determine in part price deflation in other financial asset markets. Global oil prices cannot be understood apart from understanding what’s happening with other financial asset markets and prices.
Understanding and predicting oil prices is thus not simply an exercise in superficial supply and demand analysis, and even less so an exercise primarily in forecasting announcements of production output plans by the big three troika of US-Russia-Saudi.