If the rise in violence this month is any mark of the year
that is to be, then we can conclude that 2014 will turn
out be an ominous year for Afghans. The winter season
in Afghanistan, which tends to witness a reduction in
fighting, has in fact faced a sharp rise in violence,
shocking many in Afghanistan. In Kabul alone there
have been several attacks, in and around the fortified
diplomatic enclave, targeting both local and foreign
security personnel, government and military
installations. Many believe this to be a glimpse of what
is yet to come, as Afghanistan gets ready to hold its
third Presidential elections in April 2014.
US Lt General Mark Milley has predicted that this trend
is likely to continue into 2014 with insurgents
targeting. For many locals, this scenario has reinforced
their anxieties concerning the prospects for 2014 being a
pivotal year, marking the end of the security transition
process, withdrawal of international troops, and
handover of all political, security and development
responsibilities to the Afghan leadership. While the
challenges to peace and security are many, the
solutions however are extremely limited and difficult to
reach in the time-lines that have been set. One such
mechanism has been the Afghan peace and
reconciliation programme (or peace process) which was
launched in 2010. This process envisioned political
means to facilitate military measures for reconciliation
and reintegration of insurgents through talks and
negotiations. This process was to assist the security
transition process and set the stage for the handover of
all responsibilities from international to Afghan
ownership by the end of 2014. However, the lack of
achievements coupled with consistent setbacks and
growing obstacles have done little to set the foundation
needed to ensuring peace and stability post-2014. With
the prospects for reaching a peace deal with the
insurgency almost next to none, many are left
wondering what to expect from it in the post-2014
period.
The Afghan peace process is a two-tiered initiative with
a reintegration and a reconciliation pillar, both of which
have been implemented simultaneously. The
reintegration pillar has been implemented at the sub-
national level where foot soldiers are enticed to
reintegrate and take advantages of the financial
incentives provided by the ‘Afghanistan Peace and
Reintegration Programme’. The reconciliation pillar on
the other hand has been implemented at the national
and regional levels where the Taliban leadership has
been approached to participate in official channels of
communication with the Afghan government in the
hopes of starting a negotiation process that could lead
to a peace deal. Thus far the Afghan government has
been able to reintegrate 7,375 foot soldiers and local
commanders, making reintegration a relatively
successful programme, whereas reconciliation efforts
have consistently hit roadblocks with no major
achievements to date.
The Afghan government and its international partners
have tried to win over the top tier of the insurgency by
employing several trust-building mechanisms. These
include the release of Taliban prisoners by the Afghan
government, removal of UN sanctions and blacklist
against former Taliban members, the creation of a
political address for senior-level Taliban commanders for
their participation in mainstream politics, allowing
representatives of the insurgency to participate in track
II meetings abroad, offering Taliban and other armed
groups non-elected positions and opportunities to be
included into the power structure of the state. In
response, the Taliban have increased their attacks
across Afghanistan, continued to engage in
indiscriminate killings of civilians as reflected in the
spike in civilian casualties observed in 2013 which
marked the second highest recorded year since 2001,
targeted killings of Afghan government officials including
the High Peace Council members, parliamentarians, and
Afghan National Security Forces, continued
implementation of their draconian laws in areas under
their influence, refusal to enter peace talks with the
Afghan government whom they still refer to as a puppet
regime which has sustained their inflexibility in
accepting the ‘red-lines’ for entering negotiations (which
include accepting the Afghan Constitution and breaking
ties with international terrorists groups including al
Qaeda). While many experts will argue that the Taliban
have shown a steady willingness to negotiate over the
years, their actions however continue to denote another
tone.
It remains highly doubtful that the Afghan government
and its international backers will strike a peace deal
with the Taliban before 2014 or even in the immediate
post-2014 environment for that matter. This is not
surprising considering that in the past five years the
Afghan government and the international community
have been largely unsuccessful, and that such efforts
have become ever more daunting as the security
transition process enters its last tranche and the
international community is set to withdraw by the end
of 2014 irrespective of the scenario that emerges
between the Afghan government and the insurgency by
the end of this year. At the current juncture, ground
realities continue to display the Taliban to be in a
position of strength, a trend that has been strengthened,
instead of weakened, by the peace process.
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