8 Jun 2014

INDIA-US: WILL MODI AND OBAMA COME TOGETHER?

After denying Mr Narendra Modi a visa for nearly a
decade the US saw the writing on the wall and started
changing its tune just before the 2014 elections were
held. Mr Modi is now officially welcome in the
Washington but it will be a long time before the US-
India relationship will reach the same levels it was at
during the second term of George Walker Bush.
Obama’s Compulsions
The US, once again, has had its focus shifted from
China to a series of brush fires around the world - Syria
and Ukraine being the most prominent. The Bush
administration when it came to power named China as
a strategic competitor but was forced to shift its
attention to Afghanistan because of the September 11
attacks. These traditional battlegrounds have their
constituents in Washington. The bottom line is that
quite a few American strategic analysts are obsessed
with the Middle East and would like to revive the Cold
War even though President Obama quite correctly
dismissed Russia as a regional power. Because brush
fires have overridden grand strategy in Washington, the
Obama Administration’s Pivot to Asia and enhanced ties
that go with it have been put on the backburner and,
instead, the focus is on regions that both present
unsolvable problems and provide little reward to the US.
The Middle East, after its flirtation with the so-called
Arab Spring, has swung back to soft authoritarianism,
and Russia will never be in the US camp. Nor will
challenging Russia, a much diminished power, bring the
sort of global rewards that the Cold War did to the US’
position in world affairs. Now, challenging Russia does
not lead to a rise in military budgets or in a national
rejuvenation as happened with the race to the
moon. But the Obama administration is likely to be
caught up in putting out these brush fires till the end of
its term.
Coupled with the shift from a strategic to a tactical
focus is the fact that the three trends in the short to
medium term are going to make US foreign policy take a
less proactive role in world affairs. First, the country is
tired of wars and, therefore, there is a real dislike for
foreign intervention. President Obama recognised this
when he put the Syrian issue in the hands of Congress
knowing fully well that the legislature was unlikely to
authorise American troop commitments. Secondly, at a
time when the American economy has yet to fully
recover from the economic crisis of 2008, it is difficult
to tell the American people to spend more on defense
and external military commitments. Third, the bills of
the Iraq and Afghan wars are now starting to pile up
with the need for new equipment as well as taking care
of tens of thousands of walking wounded. Given these
facts, the US is quite happy in pursuing a foreign policy
where, as in Libya, it leads from behind unless its
security interests are threatened (President Obama has
argued that a terrorist attack remains the most direct
threat to the US). President Obama’s domestic critics
see all this as a sign of weakness but he has made a
more careful exercise of American military power as a
centerpiece of the last two and a half years of his
presidency as stated in his speech at West Point on 28
May 2014.
Along with this preoccupation with short term crises and
the exhibition of caution in exercising military power is
the fact that the Pivot to Asia has not been concretised
in an economic plan of action for Asia. Consequently, it
is China that is making major economic inroads in the
region as some of the US’ major allies - South Korea
and Australia - now have China as their largest trading
partner. The fact that the Trans Pacific Partnership - the
Obama Administration’s economic centerpiece for Asia -
does not include China or India means in fact that it will
have a limited impact on the US role in Asia.
All these trends should mean that the US takes the
initiative to build a stronger relationship with Asia since
as President Obama stated at West Point, “On the other
hand, when issues of global concern do not pose a
direct threat to the United States, when such issues are
at stake -- when crises arise that stir our conscience or
push the world in a more dangerous direction but do
not directly threaten us -- then the threshold for military
action must be higher. In such circumstances, we
should not go it alone. Instead, we must mobilise allies
and partners to take collective action. We have to
broaden our tools to include diplomacy and
development; sanctions and isolation; appeals to
international law; and, if just, necessary and effective,
multilateral military action. In such circumstances, we
have to work with others because collective action in
these circumstances is more likely to succeed, more
likely to be sustained, less likely to lead to costly
mistakes.” Instead, for several reasons, the two
countries will likely take some time to warm up to each
other.
US businesses ranging from the commercial to the
defense sectors, for example, now suffer from a bad
case of India fatigue. The last five years of the UPA
government saw Indian decision-making move at a
glacial pace and simple attempts to open up the
economy were stymied by corruption charges and
coalitional infighting. The Modi government, therefore,
will have to recreate the kind of excitement that existed
in business quarters about India in the early 2000s in
order to generate renewed interest from Western and
particularly US firms. Given the economic focus of the
new Indian government, however, this is likely to
happen sooner than later as witnessed by the move to
allow 100 per cent foreign direct investment in the
defense sector.
A more difficult issue will be to see if India and the US
can develop complementary world views especially on
the issue of the rise of China and how to balance Beijing
with a pivot to Asia. While New Delhi sees the value of a
US that balances China in Asia it is not keen on being
part of an anti-Chinese alliance as some in the US and
Asia would want it to be. This is especially the case
with Mr Modi who has made several trips to China and
quite clearly recognises the role Beijing could play in the
economic development of India. Moreover, as long as
the word expeditionary is taboo in New Delhi it is
doubtful that the Indian government will agree to
participate in coalitional efforts with the US (unless of
course it is under the aegis of the United Nations).
And there is the simple fact of personalities. Mr Modi, in
his years as chief minister, spent time cultivating the
nations of East Asia because he was not permitted to
visit the West. He is likely to use that friendship to
bring quick investment to India, something that the
West will not be willing to do. Consequently, an India
that finally adopts a true Look East policy and for a
while at least adopts a wait and see approach with the
US may be seen.
Having said that, such an approach cannot be
maintained in the long run since India’s development
will require technological inputs from the West and that
means at some time either Mr Modi goes to Washington
or Mr Obama comes to Delhi. It will happen but not any
time soon.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own
and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Air Force
or the Department of Defense.

No comments:

Post a Comment