Sgt Bowe Bergdahl was serving with the US Army in
Afghanistan’s Paktika province when he was captured
on 30 June 2009 by the Taliban’s Haqqani faction. After
protracted negotiations, Bergdahl was released on 31
May 2014 in a deal brokered with the Taliban by the
governments of the US, Afghanistan and Qatar. In terms
of this deal, five Taliban detainees, currently
incarcerated in Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), were
transferred to Qatari custody for one year, after which
they would be free to go wherever they wished. Bergdahl
was treated after his release at a Regional Medical
Centre in Germany, and has now been transferred to a
medical facility in Texas for further physical and
psychological treatment. Incidentally, the five Taliban
detainees exchanged to secure Bergdahl’s liberty
include the former Taliban army chief of staff, a Taliban
deputy minister of intelligence, a former Taliban interior
minister, and two other senior Taliban figures. Eyebrows
have been raised in the US political and military
establishments, especially among Republicans and
conservative Democrats, apart from the veterans’
community, over whether too high a price has been paid
to secure Bergdahl’s release. These hardened terrorists,
their argument goes, are bound to return to active duty,
and complicate the on-going war on terror by the US.
President Obama, who took the decision to proceed with
this exchange, has justified it on humanitarian grounds,
citing the American tradition of not leaving anyone
behind on the battlefield. A further wrinkle was added
because the prior approval of Congress had not been
sought before the release of the Guantanamo Bay
detainees, which is a procedural and statutory necessity
under American law. But the Obama administration has
justified its bypassing of Congress by claiming that the
window of opportunity to obtain Bergdahl’s release was
limited and dilatory procedures could have endangered
his life. There is also the legal argument that the
Presidential system of governance in the US gives
absolute discretion to the Chief Executive to take
appropriate decisions in matters involving the supreme
national interests. Detractors, however, have found
these justificatory arguments unconvincing, if not glib.
Some versions of Berghdahl’s capture have also
become controversial. He had confessed to being
captured when he fell behind on a patrol. The Taliban
alleged that Bergdahl was ambushed after he got drunk
off base. Other sources said that Berghdahl walked off
the base after his shift. The US Defense Department had
attributed his disappearance to his walking off his base
with three Afghans when he was taken prisoner. Critics
allege that Bergdahl was a deserter, and swapping him
for notorious Taliban leaders was most unwise,
especially since general American policy eschews
bargaining with militants for freeing hostages.
Why then did President Obama - an intensely political
leader - undertake this manoeuvre? Obviously, he
wanted to bolster his sagging political image, which has
been severely dented in the recent past. Clearly, the
American economy is showing no signs of recovery,
unemployment has reached historical heights, and the
Obamacare health programme is going nowhere.
Furthermore, foreign policy disasters centering on
Ukraine, Syria and, now, Iraq are staring Obama in the
face. He might have calculated that securing the release
of Bowe Bergdahl would deflect attention from these
depressing realities. Unfortunately, this affair became
hugely controversial and divisive. Apropos, the latest
Obama public approval ratings have dropped to an all-
time low of 44 per cent.
What are the lessons to be learnt from this episode that
have universal applicability? No doubt, domestic political
realities like the strength of the government, importance
of the hostage, or even their numbers are relevant
considerations for deciding on how to deal with hostage
crises. But, the most obvious lesson to be learnt is that
nations should have a hostage policy. Should they
negotiate with abductors and hijackers to secure the
release of citizens? Or, pursue a firm policy of not
dealing with abductors and hijackers? The worst policy
would, of course, be to have a hostage policy and make
exceptions when crises arise, which is the choice
preferred by President Obama.
India’s experience is instructive here. The abduction of
the Sukma Collector in Chattisgarh in 2012 by Naxalites
led to a high-level official team of interlocutors being set
up; it negotiated his release after 12 days in captivity.
No Naxalites, it seems, were released in return. But a
high-level review of all pending cases was promised and
the release of all arrested Naxal suspects against whom
no specific charges had been levelled. The Chief Minister
had made an impassioned plea at that time requesting
a national hostage policy being devised for the guidance
of the states. That policy has not yet been drafted, and
the states remain adrift on how to handle such hostage
cases if they occur in future.
Perhaps the Modi government, which has emphasised
governance, should devise a hostage policy before the
next crisis occurs. Even deciding on not having a policy
and proceeding in an ad hoc fashion requires a policy
decision.
No comments:
Post a Comment