Fighting Foreign Fighters: New Legislations

 Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith

 

Over the course of this year, the threat of Islamist terror changed dramatically for the worse. 13,000 people who do not belong either to Syria, or Iraq, now fight for the terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) in its battles in Syria and Iraq. A multilateral approach to tackle and eliminate security issues arising from terrorism is therefore pressing.

In September 2014, the UN Security Council and its member states agreed on Resolution 2178. The resolution condemns violent extremism and urges international cooperation to prevent foreign fighters from travelling to and from conflict areas. It aims at preventing the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. It is a binding agreement that requires all member states to implement changes in their national laws. The changes are expected to make it possible for the said States to impose stricter border controls and restrain people – from travelling to or transit through their territories – if they have “credible information that provides reasonable grounds” to believe that the person is involved in terrorism activities.

The Resolution was passed unanimously without any debate. However, what does the Resolution actually entail? Is it possible to implement laws on foreign nationals without compromising democratic values?

Considering the numbers of foreign fighters and the fear they generate is a reason in itself to agree to Resolution 2178 because it would be counter-productive to veto a move that intends to combat international threats? Furthermore, whether or not Resolution 2178 will have successful outcomes depends on how anti-terrorism laws are enforced by every individual country.

What stands out among anti-terrorism laws in several countries is the restriction on travel to conflict areas and the increase in surveillance. How countries choose to respond to the legally binding agreements, varies. In order to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders, the Australian government has implemented strict travel laws. Suspected terrorists captured during their travel to what the Australian Bill refers to as `no-go-zones´, without a valid reason can result in imprisonment for 10 years.

The Bill also allows the police to detain suspects for 14 days with any specific charges as long as there is suspicion of criminal conduct. However, Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism. Thus, there is scope for racial profiling to take place, given how member states can relate criminal conducts and define potential terrorists according to their own preferences and national laws. According to Marina Portnaya, Correspondent, Russia TV, this allows countries to monitor and use more targeted surveillance against people in the name of international security.

The unclear wording of the Resolution leaves room for countries to be biased, and decide whom to target, based on their own preferences. This can result in excuses for countries to implement repressive measures. In addition to racial profiling, the Resolution can end up giving law enforcement officers new tools to deal with activists or separatist groups by labelling them as terrorists according to their thoughts and beliefs rather than their actions. Additionally, governments have the authority to block websites that defend or encourage terrorism, exclusive of court orders, with imprisonment as the consequence. Critics view this as an attack on democratic rights and that innocent people become stripped of their rights regarding freedom of expression.

Another critique of Resolution 2178 is about the freedom of movement. Increased surveillance allows the legalisation of the collection of photographs at airports, and airlines will be legally obliged to pass on information about passengers flying to/from conflict areas. One of the concerns expressed has been that the restrictions on travelling to `no-go-zones´ can lead to the criminalisation of innocent people who genuinely go to visit family or friends.

The French Senate and its anti-terrorism laws authorised in mid-October better prepare the authorities to impose restrictions on citizens when there is a reason to believe that people are partaking or planning acts of terror. Any suspicion results in the potential listing of names on the Schengen Information System, imprisonment up to three years, and a $58,000 fine. Immigrant support organisations and human rights groups are concerned that these laws will affect migration because the Bill allows the governments to deny foreign nationals viewed as “undesirable” access to the country. Human rights specialist Simon Slama argues that France´s fear of terrorism will be taken advantage of by the government as a means to strengthen border controls and decrease immigration into the EU, especially putting restrictions on people from eastern European countries.

Regardless of the critiques, countries have legal backing for their laws because Resolution 2178 is a binding agreement adopted by the UN Security Council, which means that violation of the Resolution would imply violation of international laws. Human rights organisations might find it frustrating, but the vaguely-worded language and flexible definitions allow countries to design anti-terrorism laws to their own advantage and implement laws that suit their national politics. What is surprising is the extent to which governments are willing to compromise democratic values for the sake of security, as long as they have an international law to fall back on.

Global Nuclear Disarmament: The Humanitarian Consequences Route

 Manpreet Sethi

The tenacity of nuclear weapons to continue to exist is evident. At the end of the Cold War, many wrote obituaries claiming that these weapons would soon be the “detritus of the Cold War.” Nothing however, could have been further from the truth. Half a century later, the weapons are still around in large enough numbers to pose dangerous risks to humanity.

It is in this context that it is interesting to examine a two-year old development that has taken a new approach to the challenge of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. This is the initiative that was primarily spearheaded by Norway, Mexico, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland and New Zealand. It hit headlines in March 2013 when the first conference on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was held in Oslo. It focused on the impact of nuclear weapons on human life. Based on testimonies of the hibakushas (survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and presentations from factual studies on effects of nuclear explosions, 128 countries reached the conclusion that effects of the use of nuclear weapons were not constrained by borders and that no single nation or international body had the resources or the capability to deal with the consequences. Interestingly, India and Pakistan were the only nuclear-armed states that chose to participate in the conference. The five NPT nuclear weapon states, and Israel and North Korea, ignored the congregation.

Eleven months later, in March 2014, an even larger number of nations, 146 this time (though still not the NWS) came together in Mexico to further highlight the humanitarian challenges of nuclear weapon explosions. More and detailed studies were presented on the long term socio-economic impact of use of nuclear weapons. It was established that reconstruction of infrastructure and regeneration of the socio-economic parameters on which we today measure quality of life would take decades to rebuild if the world were to witness a nuclear exchange. However, the only possessors in the Conference were from India and Pakistan. Seven other nuclear-armed states, two of which own more than 90 per cent of the global nuclear stockpile, evinced no interest in the subject!

Ten months from then, on 8-9 December this year, a third Conference on the subject is being hosted by the government of Austria in Vienna. It proposes to specifically focus on the impact of nuclear explosions on human health, climate, food security and infrastructure. Also included are sessions on inadvertent nuclear use as a result of human and technical factors such as error, negligence, miscalculations, miscommunications, cyber interference, technical faults etc.

The US has expressed a willingness to participate in this third conference, though none of the other nuclear weapon states has yet joined in. The presence of the US would be welcome, but it is likely that the decision has been made with an eye on the forthcoming NPT RevCon which is less than six months away now. The three preparatory committee meetings over the last three years have not made any major breakthroughs that herald well for the outcome in 2015. Rather, the RevCon will have to bear the additional burden of vitiated US-Russia relations. Though the two have traditionally made common cause in upholding non-proliferation through the NPT (which was crafted at the height of the Cold War in 1967), the present day dynamics will make it interesting to track the RevCon.

Compared to the entrenched national positions in the NPT and its divisive nature, the more inclusive humanitarian consequences approach to universal nuclear disarmament is indeed fresh and more appealing. In fact, it is critical that the Conference continues to remain a platform that has the ability to reach across old formulations that box nations into different categories with different rights and responsibilities. It will be a challenge for the Conference to retain this distinctive character from the NPT or it could end up replicating the same divisive national mind-sets. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, however, would make no such distinctions. It is high time that nations come together as human congregations to address serious and urgent challenges in an inclusive and collective fashion.

Given that India believes that its national security interests are best served in a world free of nuclear weapons, it must remain engaged with the process with an open mind. No quick results are in the offing and neither should these be expected. But to the extent that the Conference can galvanise action that may incrementally lead to universal nuclear disarmament, it would be useful. In this context, the Indian intervention in the last conference for measures that reduce the salience of nuclear weapons should be actively pursued. India has long argued for delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as one way to get to disarmament. Given that Austria, the host country, has a similar view, Vienna should support India’s position for its larger good instead of sticking to its NPT oriented mind-set that has not allowed it, up till now, to accept India’s resolutions on the subject in the UN.

The country has a unique perspective on the issue. Unlike in any other nuclear-armed state, India’s nuclear doctrine, which is meant to operationalise its nuclear strategy, begins and ends with reiterating the country’s desire for nuclear disarmament. India must push for steps that make nuclear weapons lose their perceived utility. Human nature does not permit the discarding of anything that it considers to be of value. Therefore, a devaluation strategy that deprives the weapons of utility coupled with a focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences if they ever were to be used can prepare the ground for their eventual elimination.

Islamic State: Prospects in Pakistan

 Sushant Sareen

 

In recent weeks, there has been a lot of activity taking place in various parts of Pakistan in the name of the abominable, but also ineluctable, Islamic State (IS). Apart from some senior commanders of the Mullah Fazlullah-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faction who have announced their allegiance to the IS’ Caliph Ibrahim a.k.a. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, there are reports of other smaller groups of militants who have cast their lot with the pestilential IS. Graffiti and posters of the IS have appeared in Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, Bannu, Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, Wah, Hangu, Kurram, Bhakkar, Dera Ismail Khan and other towns and cities of the country.

While these developments have caused a flutter in the media, official circles are quite nonchalant about the IS’s presence in Pakistan at present, or even its potential for establishing a presence in the future. Despite a classified report of the Balochistan government about the ‘growing footprint’ of IS, Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar has confidently claimed that the IS doesn’t exist in Pakistan.

Considering that just a few days after Nisar declared that there was no danger of terrorism in Islamabad an attack was launched on Islamabad courts and the city’s vegetable market, he shouldn’t be taken seriously. Although there is no sign of a major presence of the IS in Pakistan, the threat of the IS establishing itself is very real. There are eerie parallels that can be drawn between how the IS is registering its presence in Pakistan with how the Taliban network was established in the country. In the mid-1990s, more so after the Taliban captured Kabul, there were a spate of gangs and groups, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), who declared themselves local representatives or chapters of the Taliban movement.
 

The sort of graffiti that today proclaims the arrival of the IS had back then done the same for the Taliban. No one had imagined at that time that the Taliban would manage to establish such a robust presence in the country or attract so many fighters, supporters and sympathisers for its cause. More importantly, at that time, hardly anyone outside the liberal fringe in Pakistan believed that the Taliban would be able to occupy the mind space of Pakistanis the way they did. Today, there are people from all walks of life in Pakistan –traders, soldiers, politicians, journalists, doctors, teachers, labourers and techies – who identify with the Taliban. It is therefore not too farfetched to imagine that something similar may happen with the IS, more so given the manner in which this ghoulish outfit has managed to strike resonance among certain sections of Muslims around the world and become a magnet for them, much more than the Taliban or their predecessors in Afghanistan had managed to do ever since violent jihad became fashionable.

One big disadvantage that the IS will suffer in its quest to make Pakistan a province of its Caliphate is that, for now at least, it doesn’t enjoy the support of the Pakistan Army which continues to back Mullah Omar, the other pretender to the title of Amir-ul-Momineen. On the flip side, the IS has advantages that the Taliban or their patrons in the GHQ Rawalpindi don’t. Mullah Omar is nothing more than a medieval mullah who in the words of al-Baghdadi, is "an illiterate, ignorant warlord unworthy of spiritual or political respect." The IS on the other hand is a modern, tech-savvy outfit with ideological and propaganda machinery that strikes a chord among Muslim youth around the world. Second, the IS has resources and revenue stream that neither the Taliban nor their bankrupt patrons in Rawalpindi have. This allows them to buy and attract support as nothing else can. Third, unlike Omar who is an Afghan and as such unfit or unacceptable as a leader of the Islamic world as a Caliph or Amir-ul-Momineen, al-Baghdadi is an Arab who traces his roots to the Prophet’s tribe and clan and as such is better-placed to assume leadership. Fourth, while Omar’s vision doesn’t extend beyond his donkey, al-Baghdadi talks of global domination of his Islamic caliphate. Omar’s outreach to the global Islamists is through al Qaeda – that has already been pushed to the fringes of the jihadist narrative by the IS which now is in the vanguard of the international Islamist movement. The IS has started establishing a global footprint through its use of modern communication tools while the al Qaeda leadership remains stuck in their rabbit holes, unable to communicate or command their franchises.

Despite the fact that a bulk of the jihadists in Pakistan currently swear loyalty to Mullah Omar, the advantages that ‘Caliph’ Ibrahim enjoys does somewhat level the field in trying to win over Pakistan. Perhaps, the biggest advantage he will have is that he doesn’t depend on the crutches of the Pakistan Army. This, coupled with the fact that Pakistan is a highly radicalised society, makes it a fertile ground for the IS to spread its poison. What is more, al-Baghdadi is believed to have heavily relied on Jamaat-e-Islami founder Abul Ala Maududi’s writings in his first khutba as Caliph, something that will make it easy for him to connect to Pakistanis who have in one form or another been indoctrinated by the Maududi and his followers.

Clearly, Baghdadi would be smacking his lips at the prospect of a nuclear-armed Islamised Pakistan (part of the legendary Khorasan) becoming a province of his caliphate. For their part, many Pakistanis too would be looking forward to becoming a part of such an abomination because that would fulfil their quest for living in a pure Islamic caliphate. And given the sort of intolerance that exists in Pakistan, it is ideally suited to become a province of IS. All that remains is to get rid of that other pretender and then the path will be clear for ‘Caliph’ Ibrahim.

Af-Pak: A Fresh Start

 Mariam Safi

Afghanistan’s newly elected President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, arrived in Islamabad on 14 November 2014, marking his first official trip to Pakistan since assuming office. Officials from both countries have underscored the unique opportunity this meeting presented for genuine efforts to be taken towards building bilateral relations.

Ghani’s two-day visit marked his government’s third official trip abroad and perhaps the most significant, following his earlier visits to Saudi Arabia and China; the two countries signed various agreements on economics, expanding existing areas of cooperation, and simultaneously made new pledges to improve relations to tackle insurgency and to ensure a successful Afghan peace process. Similarly, by charting a new era of bilateral relations reinforced by the two countries’ common needs for economic development and political stability, Ghani hopes to draw concrete results from his visit to Pakistan.

During his visit, Ghani met Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif. Unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ghani focused his talks with military and intelligence officials instead of just the civilian leadership. Discussions ranged from issues such as ways to improve economic cooperation to finding ways to ensure better border security and facilitating joint counter-terrorism efforts after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.

Economy
Transforming the Afghan economy is one of Ghani administrations’ ultimate objectives. “Our goal is to transform Afghanistan into transit hub for the region and that means we have to create the conditions for that” asserted Ghani during an interview with The Diplomat.

As part of this vision, opening up new avenues for trade and economic cooperation with Pakistan is considered a key facilitating factor. While in Islamabad, Ghani was accompanied by an army of 150 officials, including businessmen, civil society representatives, and members of the parliament. He also took along with him a high-level business delegation led by Chief Economic Advisor to the President, Omar Zakhilwal. A day before Ghani reached Islamabad, Zakhilwal and his Pakistani counterpart, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, agreed on concerted efforts to enhance bilateral trade from the existing $2.5 billion to 5 billion in the next two to three years. One way of achieving this, as stressed by the Afghan delegates, is to have Pakistan take the necessary steps in providing easy access for Afghan goods to Pakistan’s main port in Karachi and through the Wagah land-border with India.

Additionally, officials from both countries also mentioned that more exchanges of high-level delegations and mutual discussions, particularly on issues related to energy, road and rail links, were needed to ensure greater cooperation. Moreover, the two countries also agreed to employ betters measures for visa facilitation, particularly for businesses.

Political
The general sentinment in Afghanistan and among many in Pakistan is that Ashraf Ghani’s presidency will lead to a fresh new page in Af-Pak relations. During Karzai’s period, tensions were rife between the two countries and their trust deficit tested all issues from counter-terrorism to security cooperation and the Afghan peace process. However, as Ghani himself stated, “The region has changed,” explaining that with this change an opportunity has emerged to transform once hostile relations into a symbiotic partnership. “This new government (Pakistan) realizes the deep economic problem that the country faces. It also realizes that extremism cannot be bounded in a neighbor or used against a neighbor and that it is a threat to all of us.”

Thus, Ghani utilised his visit to Pakistan to harness “a[n] honest partner in peace talks with the Taliban” and revive the stagnant Afghan peace process. Ghani hopes that Pakistan will assist Afghans in persuading insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate. In his last meeting with Pakistani officials, Ghani “set a 90-day deadline for implementation of commitments from both sides regarding peace talks with the Taliban.”

Conclusion
Optimism has certainly increased over better bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan after Ashraf Ghani’s visit. However, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty as to how the leaders of both nations will transform the rhetoric of ‘enhanced and genuine cooperation’ into practice? It will be interesting to see how Ghani’s approach towards Pakistan will differ from that of Karzai’s. And, whether he too will face the same, or perhaps different, challenges from Pakistan in the years ahead of his presidency.

Understanding Democracy and Diversity in J&K

 Varun Sahni

 

As the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) goes to the polls to elect a State Assembly, it is an appropriate moment to reflect on how democracy, diversity and dissent are closely intertwined in the state. The last two state assembly elections, in 2002 and 2008, have by almost all accounts been free and fair. So have the general elections of 2004, 2009 and 2014 in the state. Perhaps most significantly, the Panchayat elections of 2011 were a resounding success, with an astounding 82 per cent voter turnout. There is no reason to expect that the forthcoming state assembly elections would be a departure from this trend. Undoubtedly, J&K continues to have many democracy deficits, but these are no longer deficits of an electoral nature.

The other aspect the ongoing elections are once again highlighting is the sheer diversity of J&K. While the rest of India has been territorially made, unmade and remade, and almost always on socio-cultural lines in order to manage diversity, the territorial expanse of the former princely state of J&K has been altered not by internal reorganisation but by external aggression. This ‘inside-outside’ dynamic – external compulsions preventing internal rearrangement – has ensured that J&K will remain, well into the future, exactly as we encounter it today: as a political community of extraordinary diversity.

J&K is the only erstwhile princely state that has not been merged or amalgamated with neighbouring territory. J&K had only a few peers during the British Raj: the five Indian Princes entitled to the 21-gun salute were the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar, the Maharaja of Mysore, the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda, and the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior. The territorial trajectories of these five states are fascinating. For instance, after Gwalior State acceded to India in 1947, it was merged with the states of the Central India Agency to form Madhya Bharat, which later became Madhya Pradesh, which was later further reorganised in 2000 with the creation of Chhattisgarh. Baroda State formally acceded to the Dominion of India in1949 and was first merged with Bombay state. In 1960, when the two new states of Gujarat and Maharashtra were formed, Baroda became part of Gujarat.

What about Mysore State? As a result of the States Reorganisation Act, in1956, the Kannada-speaking districts of Belgaum (except Chandgad taluk), Bijapur, Dharwar, and North Canara were transferred from Bombay State to Mysore State. Bellary, South Canara and Udupi districts were transferred from Madras State and the Koppal, Raichur, Gulbarga and Bidar districts from Hyderabad State. Also, Coorg State was merged into Mysore, becoming a district of Mysore State. Those areas that spoke the Kannada language were thus unified into one state. As a large portion of this new state comprised the territory of Mysore, the name ‘Mysore’ was retained as the name of the newly created state until it was renamed to Karnataka in 1973.

But none of these territorial changes compare with the way in which Hyderabad State was reorganised. In September 1948, the Dominion of India invaded the State of Hyderabad and overthrew its Nizam, annexing the state into what would become the Indian Union. In 1956, during the Reorganisation of the Indian States based along linguistic lines, the Telugu-speaking region of the Hyderabad State was merged with Andhra State, the Marathi speaking region was merged with Bombay state and the Kannada speaking region with Mysore State. In a very real sense, Hyderabad state was not merely renamed or reorganised; it ceased to exist. In June 2014, Telangana re-emerged as a separate state, with Hyderabad City as the capital of both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for 10 years.

These mergers, amalgamations and partitions are the story of independent India, as the open and democratic political system has catered to – and sometimes caved in the face of pressure to – popular demands emerging largely on socio-cultural and ethno-cultural grounds. The ‘other four’ 21-gun-salute states are a sample not only of all erstwhile princely states but also of all the territories in erstwhile British India. Apart from J&K, all other territories within India have been reconfigured by the operation of democratic politics, sometimes deliberative and sometimes agitational, but always seeking to diminish socio-cultural diversity.

Untouched by the 1956 Reorganisation of States, J&K is by far the most linguistically diverse state in India. Despite some agitational politics on this issue in recent years, the state cannot easily be reorganised, for two distinct reasons. The first pertains to the external shadows that have always hung upon the state. Analytically, experientially and existentially, J&K is bordered by two foreign powers, China and Pakistan that view its territory with hostile intent. No other state in the Indian Union faces these geostrategic challenges. Secondly, in its socio-cultural geography, J&K is a land of nested minorities. Thus, any international reorganisation of the state will always be a blunt instrument and many people and communities would feel the brunt of such reorganisation.

The unique form of dissent in J&K is inextricably linked to issues of democracy and diversity. This important topic will be explored in a later column. 

Pakistan: Why are Christians Being Persecuted?

 Roomana Hukil

 

On 4 November 2014, a young Christian couple was publically set on fire in Punjab, Pakistan. It was alleged by a mob of 1200 persons that the couple had desecrated verses from the Quran.  According to source, the mob had apparently offered a waiving of severe retribution if the couple converted to Islam, but when the couple refused, locked them in a brick kiln, and set on fire.

Harassment and instances of violence against Pakistan’s minority Christian community has increased suddenly in the past few years. Last year, anti-Christian riots erupted in Gojra and Lahore, causing 170 families to flee their homes.

According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2013, 501 people were victimised on blasphemy charges that entailed incidents categorised under “attacks on places of worship, stating derogatory remarks, disgracing in any form, unclear happenings and other cases.” While most outbreaks are instigated out of socio-economic reasons, they are constantly also backed by religious dogmas and false accusations of blasphemy. In the recent years, this trend has become increasingly pronounced. Assassinations of high-profile political leaders, attacks on the impoverished populations, and expulsions of minority students for misspelling/ misquoting the Quran point towards the intensification of radicalism and resultant attitudes among hard-line Islamists in Pakistan.

Why are Christians being targeted in Pakistan? Why is the Pakistani State reluctant to re-evaluate or repeal the biased blasphemy laws?

Vulnerability
Christians are the second-largest religious minority in Pakistan after the Hindus, representing 1.8 per cent of the country's total population. A large number of Christians reside in south Karachi, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While a section resides in the poorest sectors of Pakistan involved menial jobs, there is a significant section that is flourishing in the corporate sector, in Karachi. In Pakistan, any sense of economic progression or identity-assertion by a minority group results in a sense of paranoia among the radicals in the majority groups. Consequently, both sides, irrespective of their economic contribution to the country are vulnerable to the wrath of Islamist extremism in Pakistan.

Additionally, there has been a gradual change shift in the Christian community vis-à-vis their socio-economic and political demands. Since 1992, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) has been demanding a separate Christian province in Punjab. Furthermore, Christians have been extremely vocal in expressing equal rights, demanding state benefits, exhibiting intolerance towards the blasphemy laws and refuting the majoritarian attitude towards the minority groups. Asserting for greater autonomy and representation in society is largely dismissed in Pakistan. Minority communities that remain submissive and camouflage within the rest of the society are accepted by the radicals. Those who resist are assaulted.

For instance, the Pakistani Federal Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated on the grounds of supporting the cause of Pakistani Christians, condemning the 2009 Gojra riots and demanding for justice.

Role of Blasphemy Laws
Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was introduced during the 1980s. It reinstated the position of religious zealots to act according to their whims and fancies. Pakistan has some of the strictest anti-blasphemy laws in the world, and they prescribe punitive punishment to those who ‘deliberately intend to wound the religious sentiments of others in their sight, hearing, and presence through imprisonment, fine or both’.

The law has been been heavily criticised for extending protection towards the embodiments of the Islamic faith alone while excluding that of other religious faiths. While the law is applicable to all, in a multi-faith society such as Pakistan, it is seen as highly discriminatory, as even the slightest rumours about instances of defaming the Prophet and/or the Quran continues to spark hysteria amongst the radicalised Muslims.

Stagnant Status Quo

The state has condemned violent attacks against the Christian community, but its tight-lipped stance on the issue of amendment or repealing of the biased laws questions the government’s credibility and intents on the issue. Given the identity of the country as an Islamic Republic, the government feels that any move towards altering the blasphemy laws will infuriate religious extremists who might reciprocate in unfavourable ways. In 2011, the former Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was assassinated for criticising the blasphemy law while advocating for justice for Asia Bibi – a Christian woman who was sentenced to death over allegations of defaming the Prophet. The then government that had initially announced its intention to amend the law fell silent on the subject after Taseer’s assassination.

Repealing the law doesn’t alone or automatically mean the end of the woes of the Christian community. While it may bring about a change in the relationship politics between the majority and minority groups, this will be short-lived. Instead of promising to alter or remove the blasphemy law, one solution would be to create a national consensus on the need to reform the law by highlighting the death tolls and cases of abuse this law has invoked on minority groups.

However, the current trajectory of affairs indicates that the government will remain cautious on the issue as radical elements continue to grow in Pakistan. In the process, it will continue to disregard international humanitarian laws and continue to commit human rights violations by backing the interests of one section of the society whilst excluding the aspirations of the other.

Myanmar: Why the Islamic State Failed Here

 Aparupa Bhattacherjee

 

The Islamic State (IS) unilaterally declared an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This has resulted in the increase in the numbers of radicalised Muslims from all over the world travelling to the region to support the IS, and Southeast Asia is no exception.

According to reports, there are roughly 30 Malaysians, 60 Indonesians, 50 Filipinos, one Cambodian and a few Singaporeans have already joined the IS. However, there are barely any reports that cite Muslims from Myanmar having joined terrorist group. Why is that the case? Why are there low or negligible numbers of radical Islamist jihadists joining the IS from Myanmar? What are the general sentiments the Myanmarese Muslims foster towards the IS?

The Anti-Muslim Sentiment Factor
The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar to some extent thrives on the misinformed notion that most Muslims encourage terrorism. The presence of militant and secessionist groups such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and a newly formed fundamental group called the Arakan Mujahedeen (AM) have resulted in the development of such a perception. Muslims in Myanmar are aware of this notion and that radical Buddhists misuse the sentiment.

Thus, Myanmarese Muslims know and feel that any news of anyone from their community’s involvement in any kind of terrorist activity would worsen the already bad situation for them; especially given their small number (approximately four per cent) in comparison to the majority Buddhists (approximately 89 per cent).

Although there are grievances among Muslims over the use of violence against their community in various riots that have taken place since 2012, most of them feel that violence is not a good medium of response.

This became clear when the London based Myanmarese Muslim association became the first to announce their denial to support any al Qaeda dream to “raise the flag of Jihad” across South Asia, and stated that Myanmarese Muslims will never accept any assistance from a terrorist organisation.

Lack of Vanguards?

In Southeast Asian countries, most jihadist recruiters are home-grown terrorist organisations. In Myanmar, both the RSO and the ARNO are too weak to play this role.  The AM, although armed, so far claims to want to achieve political emancipation of the Rohingya Muslims via political means as opposed to resorting to violence.  The RSO, which shifted its base to Bangladesh after the 1977 Nagamin operation in Myanmar, has thrived due to support from the Islami Chhatra Shibir, a wing of Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and also from Jemaah Islamiya (JI).  Heavy crackdowns by the incumbent Awami League government in Dhaka, both on the JeI and the RSO, and the disintegration of the JI into several smaller and weaker groups are among the reasons for present state of the RSO.

Significant numbers of Myanmarese Muslims are naturalised citizens of the country; and even for those who are full citizens, restrictions are placed on travel simply because they belong to a minority religion. Thus, travelling to Iraq and Syria is only possible via Bangladesh, and that too, only illegally. This is no other viable option given Dhaka’s strict vigilance measures. Furthermore, the lack of support from recruiters too deters most radicalised Myanmarese Muslims from traveling to unknown lands to wage jihad.

Lower Levels of Ideological Indoctrination?

Both the RSO and the ARNO were formed with an aim to create a separate state for Rohingya Muslims as opposed to waging jihad. Economic and political segregation were the bases of the formation of these groups. They were introduced to the concept of ‘global jihad’ only after their link up with al Qaeda and the JI.

However, both organisations were not influential enough, and not based in Myanmar, resulted in their failure to instil their extremist ideology among the locals. Thus, unlike other terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the RSO and the ARNO did not manage to anchor the extremist ideology in their home ground.

The large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims who travelled to Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamic education in 1990s were the ones who brought the seeds of radical Islam to the region.  Myanmar was an exception in this case. Factors such as globalisation, urbanisation, and westernisation that, in the 1990s, led other Southeast Asian Muslims to travel abroad to study religion, did not influence the Myanmarese.  This was because Myanmar, during that period, was under the military Junta rule, and as a result, was cut off from the rest of the world.

Many madrassas in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Thailand also function as media for the dissemination of jihadist ideology. In Myanmar, the presence of such madrassas preaching radicalised interpretations of Islam are only restricted to the northern areas of the Arakan province; and here too, the numbers are trivial. Thus, it appears that Myanmar so far lacks the necessary apparatus key to create a conducive environment for the growth and grip of radical Islam – which also explains the limited influence, the IS’s propaganda for ‘global jihad’ has had on Myanmarese Muslims.

US-Russia and Global Nuclear Security: Under a Frosty Spell?

 Sheel Kant Sharma

It is twenty years since acute concern about unauthorised and malevolent access to sensitive nuclear material and radioactive substances, particularly from successor states to the former Soviet Union, roused the international community in 1994. Nuclear security has since remained at the centre of post-Cold War cooperation between the US and Russia over these past two decades - till that cooperation was given severe body blows by the chill that has set in the relations between Putin’s Russia and the West. While the immediate root of this frosty development lies in Ukraine and Crimea, President Putin’s Sochi speech last month seemed to lay down a new manifesto for a Cold War redux. The APEC summit in China and the G20 meeting in Australia earlier this month failed to dispel the frost and, on the contrary, hardened it as the Russian president was cold shouldered and treated with concerted tough talk by his Western interlocutors.

Even prior to these summits Russia had put an end to the twenty year process begun by the famous Nunn-Lugar team in the US to salvage nuclear material, technology and installations in Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Moscow used to describe them. This programme championed by the Nunn-Lugar team has been a success story that now risks being burnt up by the exacerbating diplomatic fracas with Russia. Even someone as committed to the transformation of East-West relations as Gorbachev has voiced fears about a renewed Cold War.

The Nuclear Security Summit process which has been the high point of Barack Obama’s presidency, and supported widely by 59 states, is not spared anymore by an irate Russia which has advised US and all concerned that it would only work for nuclear security within the IAEA framework. Russia announced it would not join the Sherpas’ meetings for the next NSS which is going to be hosted by US in 2016. There has been in addition a whole slew of international initiatives geared to securing nuclear materials, facilities and the enterprise in general from threats of terrorism. In all of these Russia had been an active and willing partner. Since its nuclear enterprise remains vast and as diversified as that of the US it is hard to visualise the future of all those initiatives without a well disposed Russia.

Fear of nuclear terrorism has gone up a few more notches in the past year due to the unmitigated horrors disseminated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and its propensity to stop at nothing. Among the elaborate action points deliberated and recommended by the Nuclear Security Summits so far, not all are limited to the IAEA even though its centrality has been progressively underscored. The principal requirement in grappling with threats to nuclear security is the combined unbroken pressure from moral, diplomatic, civil society and legal angles. The existing legal instruments and the Security Council edicts are still in the formative stage of enforcement. Undiminished support and cooperation of all major countries with nuclear materials and technology is the sine qua non. It remains to be seen how Russia will play ball in diverse forums.

There have been critiques of the post-Cold War world order, some of them quite harsh too, but to leverage such critiques to a particular situation of conflict and tension, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This applies to both sides of the tense situation in Ukraine just as it does to the ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear future. A relapse to a Cold War-like division of the world would benefit no one just as it did not help even during the heady years of the last Cold War. Neither the triumphalism that marked the 1990s nor a panicked reassertion of destructive power as witnessed in recent months can help in stabilising international nuclear diplomacy, be that in regard to non-proliferation or strategic arms reduction or nuclear security. The edifice created over the past two decades in regard to each of these spheres merits preserving.

Absence of negotiated agreements has also presaged a host of sub-legal or voluntary arrangements to fix the problems posed by inadequate controls on nuclear material - these voluntary arrangements ought not to be interrupted in pique or partisan parsimony as in budget cuts in the US Congress on valuable nuclear security programmes. As regards the centrality of the IAEA, that has also been a result of the growing common understanding about a range of voluntary steps that have been generally supported over the past two decades such as peer reviews, advisory services or collation of related data banks or coordination of intelligence and forensics among different organisations.

Prime Minister Modi stated in Canberra this week that we do not “have the luxury to choose who we work with and who we don’t.” This sentiment remains key to strengthening and sustaining a norms-based order to cope with new age threats like nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are two significant examples in this regard. The entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be a big step forward where cooperation of major players remains crucial. 

It is to be hoped that the tough talk possibly conceals quiet diplomacy to restore balance and stability in great power relations and pave the way forward. Until there is progress in that direction a climate of suspicion is unlikely to help global endeavour towards greater nuclear security.

Machil Verdict and Eluding Justice

 Shujaat Bukhari

When an Army court martial handed over life imprisonment to five of its men including a Colonel for staging a fake encounter to kill three Kashmiri youth in 2010, it evoked a mixed response. Families of the three civilians, who were picked up from a North Kashmir village, branded as “terrorists” and bumped off in Machil, close to Line of Control, did welcome the verdict but they wanted more: “Death for the killers”.

Ten days before this verdict, the Army had to face a huge embarrassment as its soldiers fired upon a moving car and killed two teenagers on the outskirts of capital Srinagar. Lt Gen Hooda, its top commander in Northern region had to accept it as a mistake and own the responsibility. Even on November 14, it came under criticism for allegedly killing a civilian after a gun battle with militants in South Kashmir. Same day a local MLA in North Kashmir’s Handwara town Abdur Rashid Sheikh made serious allegations against two Army men for killing a civilian while being in civvies. Army denied involvement but cases stand registered.
Amidst this din the “positive” verdict in Machil encounter could not make much impact. Even if the court martial awarding lifer to five guilty men is a significant development, since Army has been in denial mode for last over two decades, but the confidence that it could deliver justice is still eluding. There is a reason for that. Whatever wrongs done by Army and para-military forces such as Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force while fighting the militants have been brazenly covered up under the much-trumpeted “national cause”. Kashmiris have grudge against India’s national media as well which they believe have fallen in the trap of “nationalism” thus covering up the erring soldiers.
For Army, the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), that gives immunity to its men, has come in handy to protect them. Past week, the former Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram termed AFSPA as “obnoxious’ saying “it had no place in a modern, civilized country”. He as home minister is believed to have moved amendments in the law but for Defence Ministry’s opposition could not achieve his goal. On AFSPA’s continuation, noted journalist Kuldip Nayar opined in Deccan Herald that it needs re-look. “Powers to kill on suspicion is too sweeping for a democratic country,” he wrote.

Notwithstanding the fact that Lt Gen Hooda’s public acknowledgement in case of death of two teenagers and the Machil verdict are a departure from its conduct in last over 20 years, but a lot more needs to be done to restore the confidence among the people. According to an RTI reply by Jammu and Kashmir Home department on February 23, 2012, sanction is still pending in 70 cases. These are the cases of alleged custodial killings and fake encounters in which Army men have been found involved in preliminary investigations. Once the state police or the government is convinced that an Army man is found guilty it approaches Defence Ministry for formal sanction to prosecute them, but in most of the cases it has been denied. Similarly the BSF has escaped with minor punishments. BSF courts have surely proceeded against its men and according a reply under RTI it has punished more than 40 of its men in various cases of killing and rape since 1990. The punishments range from five years rigorous imprisonment to dismissal of, or reduction in service. But in a case like that of Sopore where on January 6, 1993 over 40 people were mowed down by BSF after a militant attack, it has been termed as a “mischief” and those involved were given a minor punishment.
Army’s refusal to cooperate with the civilian courts or to transparently conduct the trials in its courts have caused a major dent to people’s confidence. Pathribal is a classic case in this long list. Five civilians were picked up in March 2000, soon after militants massacred 35 Sikhs in Chattisinghpora in South Kashmir coinciding with the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India. They were later branded as terrorists and their charred bodies were buried in a remote area. Central Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough probe and held five officers of Army including a Brigadier responsible for killing them in fake encounter. The case went to Supreme Court where CBI insisted on trial in a civilian court. Army put its foot down and decided to take it to its own court. The Army court absolved all of them. When a local lawyers body approached a lower court to seek the proceedings in the Army court it was denied.
Human rights defender Khurram Parvez believes that Machil verdict does not match with the commitment of justice. “The Indian army court-martial verdict is not a beginning or a water-shed moment for Jammu and Kashmir, but an illustrative case of the manner in which political considerations and interests of the Indian army overrule larger principles of justice and accountability” he said.
According to human rights organization Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, the Army has so far held 58 court martial’s but punishment has been given in only two cases and others dismissed as minor ones.
With a baggage of not doing much to deliver justice, this verdict has come at a time when Army was found involved in two more such incidents past week. AFSPA is being seen as a major source of strength for Army to have this immunity. Machil verdict has surely opened a new window but it needs to be extended to other cases that have mauled the justice.

Foreign Fighters of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns and Punjabis?

 D Suba Chandran

There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.
What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?
Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.
The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.
The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.
The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.
While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.
Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.
Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.
It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh - played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.
Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.
A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.
If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?
There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.

Understanding the Attraction of Salafi and Wahhabi Movements

 Saneya Arif

 

This year, 17 October 2014, celebrated as Sir Syed Day in the memory of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU), refreshed memories and raised questions related to various Islamic movements till date and their relevance in today’s world. Why have traditional Islamic movements failed today? Why have the Salafi and Wahhabi movements gained traction among the Muslim populations?

Aligarh, Deoband and Barelvi Movements

The Aligarh movement, like other movements, was initiated for a cherished goal. Aggrieved by the decimation of his community in the aftermath of the 1857 revolt, Khan saw modern scientific education to be the only ray of hope for restoring the lost glory of his people. Notwithstanding the opposition from his co-religionists, Khan succeeded in bringing modern education to Muslims. However, the fulfillment of the goal put a halt on the movement. Although a pioneering institution for imparting modern education, the AMU rarely occupies a space in the minds of Muslims today in the same sense. It is instead viewed as a hub where political dogma convert themselves into propaganda against the status quo.

Reasons more or less similar led to the loss of traction in the Deobandi and Barelvi movements – both of which are different from each other for an array of reasons. The Sunni groups, the Deobandis and the Barelvis are the two major groups of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent apart from the Shia Muslims. Barelvis consider the Deobandis as kafir (infidels). The latter accuse the Barelvis of being ignorant shrine and grave-worshippers. Both impart traditional education that is not much in fashion today due to the growing numbers of liberal and modern Muslims. Fatwas (legal opinion or learned interpretation) issued by madrassas affiliated to both movements, e.g. the Madrasa Manzar-e-Islam and Darul Uloom Deoband, have little following. The world view of the expanding Muslim moderates are in complete contrast with those of these institutions.

Contrary to popular perceptions, Muslims in India wish to keep themselves out of any trap of radicalisation today. Their affinity to modern ideas is a contrast to the paradigms propagated by these institutions. Today, the role of madrassas is confined to being mediums of imparting the knowledge of Quran only, and not centres of higher education. As a result, the Deoband and the Barelvi movements stand somewhat unwanted and irrelevant, as their preaching borders on the margins of intolerance and radicalism.

Salafi and Wahhabi Movements 

Today, the Salafi and Wahhabi movements, now a pivot of Islamic movements, dominate the global panorama. Salafi in traditional Islamic scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years after Prophet Mohammed. It was revived as a slogan and movement among latter-day Muslims by the followers of Muhammad Abduh to propagate the view that Islam, subject to several interpretations and explanations, had not been properly understood by anyone since the Prophet. It was here the Salafi school of thought gained importance among Muslims, claiming the power of rightful interpretation of the religion and serving as a beacon for the ignorant and easily-swayed Muslims.

The Wahhabi movement, on the other hand, is regarded as the central movement by most Muslims, due to its teachings regarding state and religion. According to this school of thought, the Ulema are responsible for the protection of the divine law and one can accept the rule of anyone who follows Shariah. Based on the principle of pure monotheistic worship, this movement also advocated purging of practices such as popularising cults of saints, and shrine visitation, widespread among Muslims since the spread of Sufi Islam. The movement considered these as impurities and innovations in Islam, an extreme form of which they believe may lead the believers to shirk (by practising idolatry or polytheism).

Such attempts to project a puritan form of Islam bereft of impurities and innovations have further benefited from and have been influenced by the rapidly transforming geopolitical scenarios in the modern era, resulting in Wahhabim becoming more open and inclusive – by targeting not just Sunni Muslims, but also non-Sunnis and non-Muslims in their preachings – and thereby attracting more audiences. Additionally, the spread of education and advancements in communication systems have made it easier to transmit Wahhabi doctrines to different segments of Muslim populations across the globe.

In the early years of the Wahhabi movement, there were instances where the press in Saudi Arabia was not allowed to publish photographs, illustrations and imagery of human faces as it was considered a taboo among the Wahhabis. That is no longer the case today. Noticeable positive changes such as education for girls and changing attitudes towards smoking, among others – that are no longer considered moral negligence deserving punishment – result in the movement being perceived as relatively open and therefore, acceptable. Lastly, the rise of terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) has given much assemblage to the Wahhabi movement. While the IS practices an extreme interpretation of the sharia, at a fundamental level, it follows Wahhabism.

Once considered to be an extremist pseudo-Sunni movement, Wahhabism has a different face in India. Although the seeds of polarisation continue to be sown from the outside world, Shias and Sunnis co-exist peacefully in India.

China’s Endgame in Afghanistan

 Teshu Singh

 

The US troops are expected to exit from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 but according to a recently signed Bilateral Security Agreement between Afghanistan and the US, the troops will remain until ‘end of 2024 and beyond’. Many Western countries look forward to China’s more active role in the country. Given the complexity of the situation in the country and the region, will China engage itself in Afghanistan? What is its end-game in Afghanistan?

China’s Interests in Afghanistan

Afghanistan is China’s neighbour and any development in the country is bound to affect internal dynamics in China. Given that Afghanistan is a landlocked country and shares a border with China, Beijing will engage with Kabul to secure its western periphery, especially Xinjiang region. Notably, non-interference in domestic issues of other countries is the lynchpin of Chinese foreign policy. However, China has so far made economic investments in Afghanistan, especially in its energy sector.

China needs a stable and secure neighbourhood for its ‘Peaceful Development’ plan that also emphasises on a stable and secure neighbourhood. In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation’ to lay out basic political principles and main directions of bilateral relations.

The region assumes more importance for China as it forms an important link in the ‘New Silk Road’ and is interconnected to China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS). Although the Road does not pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, it does pass through Urumqi and Khorgas in Xinjiang. Thus China is concerned about the overall security environment in the country that can affect the trade conducted through the corridor. The WDS that essentially aims to develop the western provinces of China is often disrupted by the Uyghur terrorism in the Xinjiang province.

Thousands of Uyghurs fighters are being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There have been several instances of attacks in the past few months alone. Consequently, China has witnessed instability spilling into Beijing as well. During the 1990s, China relied on Pakistan to manage its relationship with the extremist group but now it is sceptical of the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Tools of Engagement

China has always been active in regional efforts pertaining to Afghanistan, such as: the ‘6 plus 2 initiative; the Kabul Process; and most recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the Istanbul process. The SCO was created in part as a response to the events unfolding in Afghanistan. It is anticipated that it will fill the vacuum as a viable regional institution that has both Russia and China as full-time members and Afghanistan, Iran, India and Pakistan as observers. Security is one of the most important issues on the SCO’s agenda; the main focus of the SCO is to combat three evils in the region: terrorism, separatism and extremism. China has been its active member and Afghan stability is one of the major concerns of the organisation.

In August 2014, China held the first and the biggest military drill under the banner of the SCO in Inner Mongolia. The drill was aimed at training 7,000 servicemen from five SCO member states to test the troops’ effectiveness in fighting terrorism.

Initiated in 2011, the Istanbul Process-‘Heart of Asia’ is a unique regional cooperation mechanism on Afghanistan that provides a platform for regional countries to improve interaction with Afghanistan. It aims to bring stability and development to the region. The fourth ministerial conference was held recently, which saw the participation of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang who strongly emphasised on the five points of China’s interests in the Afghanistan. During the conference, China put forward a proposal, titled ‘peace and reconciliation forum’ with an aim to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It looks forward to involve representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the Taliban.

China’s Endgame

Soon after taking office, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing in his first international visit as the new president; his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, re-emphasised that China values ‘Strategic Cooperative Partnership and supports Afghanistan to achieve stable transition and peaceful reconstruction’. During the meeting, he emphasised that Afghanistan's development goals are closely associated with China's promotion of regional cross-border economic development. The increasing China’s engagement is believed to a win-win situation for both China and Afghanistan.

China will be training 3,000 Afghan professionals in various fields over the next five years but will never put ‘boots on the ground’. Its role in Afghanistan will be a litmus test of its regional strategy. This can really help in establishing its image as a responsible global player in contrast to its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas.

Notably, China is interested in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan as much as it caters to Beijing's foreign economic policy with the ambition of a global power. China's endgame therefore is to emerge as a responsible regional power and eventually a global power.

Iran-Pakistan: Can Rouhani Resolve the Tensions?

 Majid Izadpanahi

 

Iran and Pakistan have been facing issues on the border relating to terrorism and drug trafficking for some time now. This has raised tensions between Tehran and Islamabad, resulting in clashes. The recent clash in October resulted in casualties for both sides and the Pakistani ambassador in Tehran was summoned by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.

Iranian officials state that the terrorists and bandits use Pakistani territory as a base to attack Iranian border forces, and Pakistan categorically rejects the allegations. Iranian officials allege that Pakistan has no control over its own borders and Pakistan says that Iran should not justify its internal problems with external reasons.

Iran’s foreign policy post the 1979 Islamic Revolution shifted from a pro-US to anti-US stance, while Pakistan remained pro-US. The US’s policy of regime change in Tehran through destabilisation by the separatists was welcomed by Pakistan, especially evident in their support of the Iranian Jundallah.

The latest clash on the Iran-Pakistan border is not a new occurrence, but it is rare that a number of clashes take place frequently in the span of few days. Insofar it is unclear whether the clash was a reaction to the terrorist attacks on the Iranian Border Police or confrontation with the armed groups and drug barons that are active in the region. Nationalist Baloch groups, radical Sunni groups and drug traffickers are active in the Iran-Pakistan border region; Pakistan accuses India and sometimes Afghanistan, of fueling instability in the region. 

Evidently, the situation along the Iran-Pakistan border is worsening.

Are Both Sides Interested in a Military Solution?

Pakistan’s western border is its safest border; most Pakistani forces are positioned in the country’s eastern border with India and its northern borders with Afghanistan. The rest are positioned either in Sindh or Punjab. Despite the security and ethnic problems in Balochistan, Pakistan is not interested in beginning a new conflict on the western border by confronting Iranian forces. In other words, Pakistan has no military and financial ability to confront another country and engage in border conflicts. Such conflicts could lead to instability in Balochistan, such that it may may get out of Islamabad’s control.

Iran also understands the situation in Sistan Baluchestan, and has now engaged in a big conflict in its western borders. Tehran is therefore not interested in clashing with Pakistan and considers such a move unwise. Iran is also concerned about other actors beyond the region that tend to cause disputes in its eastern border given its wariness regarding the Islamic State and the role of some regional countries in creating it.

Therefore, Iran’s hard talk vis-à-vis the border clashes can be considered a diplomatic and military show that also sends a warning to the neighbours, especially Deputy Commander Brigadier-General Hossein Salami of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s statement that if Pakistan does not take any action against terrorists targeting Iran and drug traffickers, Iranian forces may enter its territory.

“Every country should fulfil its obligations towards its internal security as well as the security of the neighbouring countries,” Salami said. “We will find rebels anywhere, even inside the neighbouring countries and will take any action against them without restrictions if they do not stop their activity,” he added.

Iran’s reaction, that is expected to serve as a warning to non-state actors and one that follows limited aims, can impact regional equations. However, if the situation gets out of control, it can have a serious influence on Tehran’s military and security approach towards problems in Sistan Baluchestan. Such a situation will result in increased instability and insecurity in Iran’s eastern border. And that too is not in Tehran’s interests.

The conflict between Iran and Pakistan and Pakistan’s tacit support to non-state actors and separatists against Iran could be the result of Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s shaky relations with its neighbours and the US. The Pakistani state is extremely dependent on the US military and economic aid that is used especially against India. Iran-Pakistan relations are dependent on Iran’s relations with the US and the regional Arab countries.

So if Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani can achieve improved Iranian relations with the West and promoting Iran’s international position, it would reduce some sources of hostility in Iran-Pakistan relations. This would push Islamabad to change its hostile behaviour toward Tehran and reduce and eventually give up support to non-state actors, namely the Iranian Jundallah and Jaish-al Adl.

Article 370 Bandwagon

 Shujaat Bukhari

On December 1, 2013, Prime Minister Narendra Modi (then Gujarat Chief Minister) created a stir when he called for a debate on Article 370. He was addressing a public meeting in Jammu and surprised one and all with the ostensible departure from his party’s known stand of its outright abrogation. Since then the debate, though not at the official level, is on among the political parties. What is significant is the fact that Article 370 has dominated the campaign that is on for the ongoing elections in Jammu and Kashmir which started on November 25.

Both Modi and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh stressed upon not raking up Article 370, asking party cadre to concentrate on the issues of governance and development. But in practice both of them as also all others who are camping or campaigning in the state have already made it an issue. In reaction to what BJP is doing two main regional parties National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party have taken it head on swearing that they would not allow it to happen. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah made a direct attack on BJP on November 24. In an interview to PTI, he said: “Article 370 will sink BJP’s boat in J & K”. A day earlier PDP founder Mufti Mohammad Sayeed told an election rally in Bandipore that his party would do everything to protect Article 370.

It is interesting that by saying that this issue should not be raked up in the elections, the BJP leadership has achieved part of its goal by making it the sole discussion point in the elections. The way the political parties have shifted their focus to Article 370 and engaged themselves with BJP and what they call its “divisive agenda”, it seems that PM Modi has succeeded in doing what he said on December 1.

Space in newspaper editorials and columns is also devoted to this subject, which makes it clear that the discussion is on. It is a different issue that Modi had sought the debate on the lines whether this Article had helped Jammu and Kashmir state to grow or not. But the debate is centered around its link with the special status and not the development.

Article 370 is so heavy on the minds of regional parties that they even forgot to come out with their manifestos ahead of the first phase of elections. Only Congress managed to do it and that too just two days before the first phase. The issue has occupied the larger space in the election discourse. Both NC and PDP are finding it easy to touch the raw nerve and stonewall the BJP’s much ambitious plan of reaching to magic number of 44 in the elections. Both are aware that when it comes to politics, whether people would vote or boycott, the special identity is very close to the hearts of the people. Even those who believe that it is an empty shell and the only solution is in “Azadi” from India, have this feeling that if this Article is touched, it will be a psychological defeat for the people of Kashmir.

However, in case of BJP itself it seems to be a calculated move to be “soft” on Article 370, though the party’s position vis-a-vis this “core issue” has remained wavering during the last over a decade. What its position was in early 90’s, it’s not the same today. In January 1992, the then BJP president Murli Manohar Joshi along with Narendra Modi braved to reach Lal Chowk, the city centre of Srinagar to hoist the tricolour. This was only to assert that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and they had vowed to continue the struggle to get the Article scraped.

Abrogation of this Article was once among three core slogans “Ayodhaya, Uniform Civil Code and Article 370” but it went down the radar slowly. In 1998 Lok Sabha elections, its abrogation almost came as a threat from BJP. But in 1999 it was not focused on. Similarly in 2004, the then BJP President Vankiah Nadu while realizing the “Vision Document” maintained that this law was necessary. BJP’s state unit with more support in Jammu division has always advocated the complete integration of state with India. But interestingly in 2008 assembly elections, when it released the manifesto, this issue was missing. Though it benefited from the Amarnath land row, it stressed upon the alleged discrimination with Jammu region. Senior BJP leader Ashok Khujuria was then asked why Article 370 is missing, he shot back saying: “It’s immaterial whether there is a mention of Article 370′s abolition or not. It is an agenda in our hearts.”

This time too it is not known whether the party would forcefully include the issue in the poll manifesto that was not released till these lines were written. However, one thing is clear that BJP is treading on a cautious path keeping in view its ambitious plan of achieving the 44+ mission. Party’s strategy is well designed. Even if it is not in a position to get a significant number of seats from Valley, but the euphoria it has created has much more impact than the parties, which are in winning position. Its tacit alliance with at least two parties in North Kashmir and entry of some prominent faces from Valley has emboldened the party. Making its presence felt in Valley is perhaps the biggest dividend it can count in the recent past. Whether people at large may like it or not, but BJP is on the scene and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed election rally in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district also symbolizes its presence.

Whether there could be a serious debate on Article 370 is not known, but one thing is clear that PM Modi has forced the NC and PDP to ground their agendas of “Autonomy and Self Rule and embraced Sajad Lone who had talked about something bigger called “Achievable Nationhood”. He engaged them in this debate to forget their political bibles.

In order to have maximum seats to occupy the larger political space in the state, the party has cleverly gone low on the contentious issue of Article 370, thus trying if not to earn goodwill but at least not to annoy the people. It is a different issue that if BJP comes to power, how it would proceed. With power in Delhi, this combination could prove deadly in the months and years to come. But one thing is clear that as of now BJP has achieved its goal to make Article 370 a poll issue.

NASR: DANGERS OF PAKISTAN'S SHORT RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE

 Manpreet Sethi

In April 2011, Pakistan tested a 60 km very short-range ballistic missile called Nasr and claimed it to be nuclear capable. This has since been publicised as the tactical nuclear weapon (TNW) meant to deter India from mounting a conventional military response to any act of terrorism found to be sponsored from Pakistan. By doing so, Rawalpindi has signalled that its nuclear threshold is so low that any military action by India would compel it to escalate straight to the nuclear level since it does not have the capacity to fight a conventional war. The message, therefore, to India is to exercise caution even in the face of provocation since the escalation could quickly spin out of control. This is indeed a well thought out move by Pakistan to reclaim the space that India claims exists for it to undertake punitive action against a Pakistan-abetted proxy war.

However, if Pakistan is to make its TNW a credible component of its first use nuclear strategy, then it must build and deploy them in large enough numbers to have a substantial impact on the battlefield. Whether Pakistan has the fissile material and the technological capacity to do that is immaterial. Even if it does not have this today, it could well acquire it over time since there is no non-proliferation instrument that prohibits it from doing so. But the essential point of concern, not just to India, but to the larger international community as well, should be the existential risks that Pakistan is spreading through its TNW. For these weapons to be militarily meaningful, pre-delegation of their command and control is inevitable. This will bring in issues related to their safety and security. The chances of these weapons being seized by the proliferating and increasingly anti-establishment terrorist organisations are being ignored by Pakistan at its own peril.

Even more alarming are reports that have recently appeared that Pakistan is now moving out into the sea with its short-range nuclear-tipped ballistic and cruise missiles. Late last month a report in The Washington Post claimed that Pakistan was getting ready to operationalise its sea-based deterrent. Considering that China embarked on this path more than three decades ago and is yet to carry out the first patrol of a nuclear-powered submarine armed with nuclear capable missiles, and that India too is yet to send its first SSBN for sea trials, leave alone operational patrols, Pakistan through its trademark jugaad strategy seems to have beaten both with its own version of sea-based deterrence.

It may be recalled that Pakistan had inaugurated its naval SFC (it has one for each one of the wings of the armed forces) in 2012. At the time, it could claim no naval assets in the strategic role. Many in the West dismissed this development as inconsequential since Pakistan's indigenous military capability was perceived as being unable of building and operationalising an SSBN over the next two decades. But, the country has shown that it could achieve ‘sea-based deterrence’ without having to take the beaten path. Instead of waiting for its SSBNs to be acquired/developed, Pakistan has chosen to equip its surface vessels and diesel electric-powered submarines with nuclear-armed ballistic and cruise missiles.

The intention of doing so is to carry the aspect of TNW deterrence out to sea in order to further reduce India's manoeuvrability on the conventional plane. Yet again, Pakistan has displayed nuclear brinkmanship. The message once again to India, and to the Western South Asia watchers, is that the stakes are going to be too high in case of any break-out of hostilities. It assumes that India would be deterred from all action in view of the higher cost that it would suffer from any escalation. This, however, may prove to be a very costly assumption for Pakistan since the current mood in India does not appear to be one to silently absorb a terrorist provocation.

Meanwhile, the move to deploy nuclear-capable missiles on vessels that are not particularly survivable is an extremely destabilising act that leaves itself dangerously open to inadvertent escalation. An encounter of the surface or sub-surface assets of the two countries, which is not unusual, could result in a situation that quickly spins out of control.

Even scarier are scenarios regarding the security of the nuclear assets at sea. Only last month there was a "near successful hijacking" of a Pakistani missile frigate, PNS Aslat, by al Qaeda with the intention of attacking Indian warships. The possibility of a Pakistani warship that is armed with nuclear-tipped missiles falling into jihadi hands is a threat of a new kind with very alarming dimensions. By spreading its strategic assets on relatively vulnerable ships at sea, Pakistan is repeating the mistake it makes with TNWs on land. The dangers of their safety and security are being multiplied manifold. Unfortunately, Pakistan appears blind to the dangers it is creating for itself in the process.

The latest buzzword in Pakistani nuclear strategy is "full spectrum deterrence against all forms of aggression." The deployment of nuclear weapons on surface ships and submarines is being touted as acquisition of second strike capability. But, a second strike capability comes from delivery systems that are survivable because they are exceptionally mobile, hidden or stealthy to escape a first strike and mount a retaliatory strike. Pakistan is claiming second strike capability by distributing its nuclear assets on visible, traceable, dual-use platforms that brings in an ambiguity that could trigger mistaken, unauthorised and inadvertent escalation. This version of sea-based deterrence is certainly not conducive to regional or international stability.

NAXALITES AND THE MIGHT OF A FRAGILE REVOLUTION

 Bibhu Prasad Routray

On the morning of 18 October 2014, Shiv Kumar, a personnel belonging to the Chhattisgarh Armed Police was pulled out of a passenger bus in Sukma district by a group of Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres and killed. Kumar was ill and was on his way to the hospital when the bus he had boarded was waylaid by extremists. On the previous day, Raghunath Kisku, Founder Member, Nagarik Suraksha Samity (NSS), an anti-Maoist organisation, was killed by Maoists in Ghatshila sub-division of Jharkhand's East Singhbhum district.

Kumar was the 69th security force personnel and Kisku, the 164th civilian, to be killed by Maoists in 2014. Other activities perpetrated by the Maoists till 15 September include 125 attacks on the police; 40 occasions of snatching of weapons from the security forces; and holding of 25 arms training camps and 46 jan adalats in areas under their influence. While the occurrence of larger attacks have substantially decreased, the number of extremism-related incidents roughly remain the same compared to the corresponding period in 2013 – indicating the continuation of the challenge.

And yet it is a hard time for the Maoists. Till 15 September, 1129 CPI-Maoist cadres were neutralised, including 49 who were killed in encounters, and 1080 cadres, arrested. While the outfit can take pride from the sacrifices made by these men and women, what continues to trouble it is the perpetual desolation creeping into its ranks and files, leading to a large number of surrender of its leaders and cadres.

Among the 395 who have surrendered till 30 September are leaders like Gumudavelli Venkatakrishna Prasad alias Gudsa Usendi, Secretary, Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), arguably the outfit's most potent military division based in Bastar and his wife Raji; GP Reddy, Member, the DKSZC, and his wife Vatti Adime; and Bhagat Jade and his wife Vanoja. According to the Chhattisgarh police, over 140 cadres have surrendered between June and September 2014 in Bastar alone, partly due to the disillusion with the outfit's ideology and partly convinced by the police's method of highlighting the discrimination suffered by the local Chhattisgarh cadres at the hands of those drawn from Andhra Pradesh.

Press statements of the CPI-Maoist, while condemning these surrenders as demonstration of opportunism and desertion of the movement by corrupt and politically degenerated persons, admit that the revolution is currently undergoing its most difficult phase. The CPI-Maoist has accused the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led government in New Delhi of launching the third phase of Operation Green Hunt, a ruthless war aimed at annihilating the Maoists who are the "biggest threat" to its "pro-reform" policies. Asserting that it has merely only engaged in a "war of self defence," the outfit has called for a "widespread struggle to fight back the threat by uniting all the revolutionary and democratic forces."

Its progressively declining capacity to annihilate enemies since 2010 – in spite of the ability to pull off some of the most spectacular attacks on security forces and politicians in recent years – has remained a matter of worry for the CPI-Maoist. Its failure to disrupt the parliamentary and state assembly elections coupled with a regular desertion of its cadres has descended as an existential threat on the outfit that once controlled one-third of the country's geographical area. Even with the persisting bureaucratic inertia and unimaginative security force operations, most of the affected states have gained in their fight against the extremists.

However, the outfit's domination over large swathes of area in Chhattiagrh, Odisha and Jharkhand with significant presence in states like Bihar provides it with the ability to continue with its small ambushes. Its recruitment and fund raising ability appears to have shrunk. And yet, the outfit harps about a people's militia "now in thousands" united by apathy of the state and carefully calibrated image of the government being a representative of the exploitative industrial houses. Hence, a scenario in which surrenders and killings of the Maoists would push the outfit into oblivion is remote.

The Indian Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA), after months of deliberation, is now armed with a new policy to counter the Maoists. The policy, subject to cabinet approval, would remain open to use "any element of national power" against the extremists. Although it does not rule out peace talks with the extremists, it makes the peace process conditional to the CPI-Maoist renouncing violence. It plans to make the state police the lead counter-insurgent force against the extremists while assigning the central forces, especially the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the responsibility of holding the counter-insurgency grid together "like a glue." While impressive in its nuances, the approach is guided by the belief that it is possible to wipe out the Maoists by force alone.

The impact of the new official counter-Maoist policy remains to be seen. However, in the clash between a militarily 'down-and-not-yet-out' CPI-Maoist and the official security apparatus that has its own set of serious problems, little more than persistence of the logjam can be expected.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR CAPABLE CRUISE MISSILE: THE NIRBHAY TEST

 Sheel Kant Sharma

India’s test of the nuclear capable cruise missile Nirbhay last week was immensely significant in two ways. First, it marked the culmination of DRDO’s efforts of not only the past decade but also the ambitions of its heads. It was in 1987 that the then DRDO Chief Arunachalam is reported to have said that he was launching a study towards making a cruise missile like the then famous Tomahawk. The then Soviet Union had agreed with the US in 1987 to the historic INF Treaty; eliminating, inter alia, a whole class of medium range missiles including the nuclear capable ground launched cruise missiles of range 500-5000 km. The INF treaty then was the high point of interest for disarmament and armament aficionados going all the way up to then PM Rajiv Gandhi and therefore it was smart to want to study how the Tomahawk came into being. Even so, 37 years is a rather long time. However, given the enormous constraints and challenges under which the DRDO works in India the successful test is certainly “better late than never.” This is especially so since China savvy Pakistanis have already tested the Babur missile several times and like to brandish it to silence any tough talk by India about their transgressions across the border or trans-border terror outfits functioning from Pakistani soil.

Second, a cruise missile like Nirbhay has two main components, namely, the rocket launching it into space and the propulsion system that kicks in after the missile separates, brings out its wings and flies like an aircraft. The second component has been advanced in several stages from the original cruise missile that the Germans toyed with almost seven decades ago during World War II. Its latest version uses supersonic propulsion, not subsonic, and the scramjet engine for that purpose is also in its second if not third decade, ever since the Russians tested a cruise missile with supersonic speeds around 1994. The Indian technology elite must come up to the table to be counted. That India still tests an indigenous cruise missile with turbofan engine and can claim all parameters working to copybook precision is more on the side of contentment than resolve to really make it to the big league. If the Maruti 800 of 1980s vintage is surpassed today by much better Indian cars, why should India remain satisfied with claiming success about a strategic system that belongs well in the last century?

As regards encouragement to Indian scientists and engineers, a comparison with the subcontinental rival may be instructive: the maker of the Pakistani bomb had to suffer only the optics of incarceration by a military regime despite serious allegations and pressure from donors and allies, whereas a top DRDO scientist in democratic India has to suffer post-retirement for due diligence demanded by compulsions of jurisprudence in regard to dismissal of a lower-echelon employee, unconnected with acquisition of cutting edge technologies or state of the art missiles.  

The problem that the defence institutions face in India today must not be suppressed by patriotic pride about the accomplishment, which is justified at all times, but must be addressed head on. Why is India not able to make the engine fly the state- of-the-art aircraft? The Light Combat Aircraft is a project going apace with DRDO but with an imported engine with attendant restrictions. The Brahmos missile is supersonic but its range is MTCR compliant under 300 km and its engine is Russian. Former President Abdul Kalam is on record talking about the hypersonic missiles in his time as DRDO head as he propounded a 2020 vision. That was at a time when India had just emerged post 1998, shattering global misperceptions about its inherent strength and external powers’ erroneous complacence about India’s timidity (that it would not dare to cross the Rubicon). However, the DRDO has had to languish in the past decade plus with sub-critical progress on the technology front even when the only superpower recognised Indian prowess and appeared well disposed to see India’s rise, particularly in the technology arena.

The pace of the global march of advanced technology is far too quick for our establishment’s glacial responses and capricious working environment. Just let us look at the present controversy between the US and Russia about the latter’s alleged violation of the INF Treaty by testing advanced cruise missiles supposedly proscribed by the Treaty, and the Russian counter-allegation about the US testing and deployment of systems covered by the Treaty’s remit. Regardless of how Moscow and Washington settle this issue or fail to do so, the current reports have a Cold War ring about them, are becoming voluminous, and show the sheer sweep of new technologies that are in the works. The world is on the cusp of a veritable new age of weapon systems for long and short range strikes, with or without nuclear weapons. These technologies are as usual dual purpose and subject to controls - but such controls were also in vogue twenty years ago when, for instance, the Chinese weapon systems were still of much older vintage and were struggling to come of age. Nonetheless, the hype about China, then as now, would remain hard to fathom - then about its impending irresistible rise and now about its having arrived with real strength and considerable clout over today’s technology. So, the lesson is to plan for at least two decades hence, provide the scientists clear policy guidance, required support and protection from systemic infirmities, and an atmosphere for perseverance and striving.

Just in case this emphasis is mistaken for trite arms race enthusiasm, it must be stated that the arms race is in any case already thrust upon India, either from behind or from the front by its colluding neighbours. An action like the testing of an older missile system like Nirbhay too might bring the moral high priests against it and it would not be a surprise if old hat clamour surfaces about destabilisation in South Asia. But in the end it is the prowess that is recognised and cutting edge ability that is respected. DRDO has miles to go before it can have a justified - and overdue - boast in that regard.