Teshu Singh
Though India and Australia have a long history of interactions and cooperation at various international fora, the potential for cooperation in the Indian Ocean is yet to materialise. What can New Delhi and Canberra do to actualise the potential of the bilateral vis-à-vis matters pertaining to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR)?
Indian Ocean: The Australian Push
Australia has been an active player in the IOR in the past two years. Australia hosted two extremely important meetings, the Indian Ocean Region- Association (IORA) Summit in November 2013 and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS), titled
‘Protecting the ability to trade in the Indian Ocean Maritime Economy’, in March 2014.
The 2009 Australian defence white paper assessed that the Indian Ocean will assume strategic significance in the forthcoming years, and would be as important as the Pacific. Furthermore, their most recent defence white paper, released in 2013, stated that “the cooperation with Indian as crucial.” This was followed by the release
of a strategy document on India thereby indicating the orientation of the Australian maritime policy. Notably, these developments have come at a time when the concept of the Indo-Pacific is gaining traction in the strategic circle. Primarily, the Indo-Pacific concept unites the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific Ocean
and is premised on the idea of stronger security cooperation among regional powers.
Australia and the Indian Ocean: Indian Responses So Far
Australia forms the part of India’s extended
neighbourhood, and has become important for the success of New Delhi’s ‘Look East Policy’ (LEP). India and Australia have together already participated in several multilateral maritime exercises, namely Malabar (2007) and Milan (2012). Additionally, to enhance defence cooperation, both countries have agreed to hold a joint naval exercise in 2015. Retrospectively, both countries have been working together in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Ade, and during the
international fleet review INS Sahyadri, had taken part and are members of IORA, IONS, and the Indian Ocean Memorandum of Understanding on Port Sate Control.
Additionally, the foreign ministers of both countries, along with their Indonesian counterpart, have, under the IORA banner, published a joint Op Ed. This clearly
indicates that the interest for the revival of maritime cooperation still exists in the region. However, the aforementioned endeavours are miniscule and there is
not much bilateral maritime cooperation between the two countries. Despite, Australia having second-largest navy after India, there have not been many interactions between the two navies.
The MH370 flight incident has proved that all the IOR countries can cooperate well if there is a direction and a common agenda. During the rescue operations, Australia was quite proactive as compared to other
countries; India was equally involved. India has immense maritime presence in the IOR and is looked upon as a regional ‘net security provider’. For that reason, India needs to foster regional connectivity. The
IORA, IONS and other Indian Ocean initiatives should be seen along with the India’s LEP.
Perhaps India can use Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott’s India visit, scheduled for September, as a platform to discuss the India- Australia maritime
cooperation. Today, the IOR has transformed from a ‘passageway’ to a ‘theatre’. Keeping the evolving regional geopolitics in mind, it is not possible for a
single power to take the responsibility for the security of the region. Therefore, it is imperative for India to cooperate with Australia to set the agenda for improving
overall security in the region. The two countries should devise a long-term proposal so that external powers have minimum role to play in the region.
Australia has already factored India’ importance in its defence white paper but New Delhi has not reciprocated to it. India still does not have a political doctrine
wherein it has given emphasis to Australia vis-a-vis the IOR. In a recently held conference at the Australia-India Institute, David Brewster, an expert on the subject
emphasised that India should develop closer relations with countries such as Australia, Indonesia and South Africa.
From the Australian side, although 90 per cent of their own trade passes through the region, its policies in the IOR are greatly influenced by the framework of its
alliance with the US. Needless to mention, there is plethora of opportunities for the two countries vi-a-vis the IOR. There should be more people-to-people contact, naval exercises, Human Assistance and Disaster Relief, search and rescue operations, joint maritime patrolling and joint investments in the IOR. Now the onus is on India and
Australia to lead the maritime cooperation in the IOR.
30 Aug 2014
J & K: BACK TO SQUARE ONE
Shujaat Bukhari
After New Delhi unilaterally called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad, following the meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit, the cross-border shelling has again started with a bang. Few more lives have been lost and if seen technically, the 2003 ceasefire along the
borders has virtually come to an end.
New Delhi’s move to call off the talks is seen as an attempt to send a terse message to both Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led government in Delhi has surely started
“fulfilling” its electoral promises and this surprising move seems to be the beginning of a new rather tough bilateral journey.
“Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi had repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a pleasant surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something quite unexpected of the tough-talking Modi.
If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the grand swearing in ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger
outreach to all SAARC nations. It was during the brief meeting between Modi and
Nawaz the decision to hold the Foreign Secretary-level talks was taken. And the expectations were raised for a wider scope to formally renew the dialogue process
between the two sides. It had raised hopes that both leaders could meet in New York in September on the sidelines of UN General Assembly.
It is very difficult to read the mind of the new government in Delhi. Even the senior journalists and analysts in Delhi fail to assess any critical issue including that of foreign affairs. But will the tough line the new government has taken bear any fruit for lasting peace in the region. The reason New Delhi gave for calling off the talks was also not provocative enough to take an extreme step to say categorical no to
engagement with Pakistan.
In the past over six years including these three months of Modi government, Government of India’s major concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan and the dialogue have remained confined to issues related to terrorism, Mumbai trial and Hafiz Saeed et al. Whatever the progress on Mumbai and other issues, New Delhi had still shown willingness to engage with Pakistan.
The timing of this extreme step is also something one cannot easily ignore. Pakistan has been grappling with
more than one challenge to save the country from complete destabilization. From terrorism shaking its foundations to the new calls for reformation targeted at
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan has been going through one of the toughest tests in the recent past. Prime Minister Modi told Nawaz during his meeting in Delhi that his country should put break on aiding and
abetting terrorism, but three months was too less a time to see the results. And the reason to call off the talks as admitted by keen watchers of India and Pakistan affairs was not tenable. Pakistani leaders and envoys have been meeting Hurriyat leaders since 1994 and it has not changed the dynamics of the political engagement either between India or Pakistan or Delhi and Srinagar. The meetings between Hurriyat leaders and the Pakistani High Commissioner were publicized much in advance. If at all GoI had objection to these
interactions they could have barred them from flying down to Delhi. Putting them under house arrest is a routine in Srinagar.
It is interesting to note that Syed Ali Geelani, the octogenarian separatist leader has been under house arrest for over six months now and he was not allowed to offer a single congregational prayer on Friday. But he was not stopped from flying to Delhi. This uncovers the intentions of government to let these meetings happen
and then use them for calling off the FS level talks. In case Delhi would have stressed on terrorism, cross- border skirmishes and the prolonged delay in Mumbai trial, one could understand the essence of the decision to call off the talks and take the situation back to era of
hostility.
Many analysts are linking the decision to the forthcoming assembly elections in four states. Since BJP took a tough line during the election campaign for Lok Sabha elections, it will have to show the results on
ground. The four states including Jammu and Kashmir that are going to polls by the end of the year have already started witnessing heated campaigns revolving
the issues related to borders and Pakistan. This is surely going to help the BJP to polarize the voters and get the lion’s share. The lines are clearly drawn particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Since the BJP bagged two seats in Jammu in parliamentary elections they are now eyeing on most of the assembly segments.
BJP president Amit Shah’s warning to Pakistan on Monday that in case shelling continues the forces will give befitting reply also indicates how the party is going to up the ante on this front. With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this
renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003
and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and
vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders.
Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade. While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region. Unlike Vajpayee who did not enjoy majority for his party, Modi is strong and can over-rule any other leader. He has more advantages on delivering better than what Vajpayee did. In case Modi stops flexing muscle and starts peace mission, he will be remembered more than Vajpayee, who had earned goodwill in both Kashmir and Pakistan for his statesmanship, vision and delivering something different in last 60 years. Votes will come and go but the lives lost in the wake of tension will not come back and will further the distances.
After New Delhi unilaterally called off the Foreign Secretary-level talks with Islamabad, following the meeting of Hurriyat leaders with Pakistan High
Commissioner Abdul Basit, the cross-border shelling has again started with a bang. Few more lives have been lost and if seen technically, the 2003 ceasefire along the
borders has virtually come to an end.
New Delhi’s move to call off the talks is seen as an attempt to send a terse message to both Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists. The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) led government in Delhi has surely started
“fulfilling” its electoral promises and this surprising move seems to be the beginning of a new rather tough bilateral journey.
“Terror and talks cannot go hand in hand,” Prime Minister Narendra Modi had repeatedly said during the election campaign. But he had himself given a pleasant surprise when he invited all heads of the SAARC countries including Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to his swearing in ceremony. Diplomatic circles were taken aback as it was something quite unexpected of the tough-talking Modi.
If the insiders are to be believed New Delhi was keen to see Nawaz Sharif being part of the grand swearing in ceremony but it could be covered up under the larger
outreach to all SAARC nations. It was during the brief meeting between Modi and
Nawaz the decision to hold the Foreign Secretary-level talks was taken. And the expectations were raised for a wider scope to formally renew the dialogue process
between the two sides. It had raised hopes that both leaders could meet in New York in September on the sidelines of UN General Assembly.
It is very difficult to read the mind of the new government in Delhi. Even the senior journalists and analysts in Delhi fail to assess any critical issue including that of foreign affairs. But will the tough line the new government has taken bear any fruit for lasting peace in the region. The reason New Delhi gave for calling off the talks was also not provocative enough to take an extreme step to say categorical no to
engagement with Pakistan.
In the past over six years including these three months of Modi government, Government of India’s major concerns vis-a-vis Pakistan and the dialogue have remained confined to issues related to terrorism, Mumbai trial and Hafiz Saeed et al. Whatever the progress on Mumbai and other issues, New Delhi had still shown willingness to engage with Pakistan.
The timing of this extreme step is also something one cannot easily ignore. Pakistan has been grappling with
more than one challenge to save the country from complete destabilization. From terrorism shaking its foundations to the new calls for reformation targeted at
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan has been going through one of the toughest tests in the recent past. Prime Minister Modi told Nawaz during his meeting in Delhi that his country should put break on aiding and
abetting terrorism, but three months was too less a time to see the results. And the reason to call off the talks as admitted by keen watchers of India and Pakistan affairs was not tenable. Pakistani leaders and envoys have been meeting Hurriyat leaders since 1994 and it has not changed the dynamics of the political engagement either between India or Pakistan or Delhi and Srinagar. The meetings between Hurriyat leaders and the Pakistani High Commissioner were publicized much in advance. If at all GoI had objection to these
interactions they could have barred them from flying down to Delhi. Putting them under house arrest is a routine in Srinagar.
It is interesting to note that Syed Ali Geelani, the octogenarian separatist leader has been under house arrest for over six months now and he was not allowed to offer a single congregational prayer on Friday. But he was not stopped from flying to Delhi. This uncovers the intentions of government to let these meetings happen
and then use them for calling off the FS level talks. In case Delhi would have stressed on terrorism, cross- border skirmishes and the prolonged delay in Mumbai trial, one could understand the essence of the decision to call off the talks and take the situation back to era of
hostility.
Many analysts are linking the decision to the forthcoming assembly elections in four states. Since BJP took a tough line during the election campaign for Lok Sabha elections, it will have to show the results on
ground. The four states including Jammu and Kashmir that are going to polls by the end of the year have already started witnessing heated campaigns revolving
the issues related to borders and Pakistan. This is surely going to help the BJP to polarize the voters and get the lion’s share. The lines are clearly drawn particularly in Jammu and Kashmir. Since the BJP bagged two seats in Jammu in parliamentary elections they are now eyeing on most of the assembly segments.
BJP president Amit Shah’s warning to Pakistan on Monday that in case shelling continues the forces will give befitting reply also indicates how the party is going to up the ante on this front. With the tension escalating on borders, the brunt of this
renewed hostility will have to be borne by the people who live along the borders. What all stakeholders fail to realize is the fact that the ceasefire announced in 2003
and followed up with more Confidence Building Measures on both sides of Jammu and Kashmir had yielded dividends for the general public. This bonhomie from 2003 to 2008 might have upset the hawks and
vested interests on both sides, but it had done wonders on re-engagement of people across Line of Control and giving relief to lakhs of people living on the borders.
Their lives had dramatically changed and they could live in peace after more than a decade. While Pakistan needs to change its policy and not take any step that is provocative, the government led by Modi in Delhi also has to work for bringing peace to the region. Unlike Vajpayee who did not enjoy majority for his party, Modi is strong and can over-rule any other leader. He has more advantages on delivering better than what Vajpayee did. In case Modi stops flexing muscle and starts peace mission, he will be remembered more than Vajpayee, who had earned goodwill in both Kashmir and Pakistan for his statesmanship, vision and delivering something different in last 60 years. Votes will come and go but the lives lost in the wake of tension will not come back and will further the distances.
ISLAMIC STATE AND SOUTH ASIA: HOW REAL IS THE THREAT?
Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy
The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is a game-changer in international affairs today. Their unprecedented rise and ability to fight in two countries simultaneously without suffering serious losses - while attracting more recruits - is disquieting. Today, approximately 50,000 men (and boys as young as 11) from several countries fight under the IS banner, and
more are pouring in. West Asia and South Asia share strong linkages; any turbulence in West Asia has immediate direct and/or indirect repercussions in South Asia. Employing brutality that puts the al Qaeda to shame, what does the rise of the IS mean for South Asia?
Sectarian Schism: Susceptibility to Misuse
South Asia has a culturally diverse yet close-knit character with a complex political geography and history. While there are several common historical experiences, the divides are also many. The foremost,
apart from inter-religious differences, is that of sectarian issues. The IS will find exploiting this schism in Pakistan to be the most potent and ‘foolproof’ way to get a foothold in the region. South Asia is rife with ethno-religious and sectarian differences, especially among the region’s Muslim community. A significant number of people in the region belong to the Islamic
faith, and the Shia-Sunni divide, although primarily historical and ideological, has taken on a sinister form - especially in Pakistan. The key to evading and/or even
delaying the spread of the IS into South Asia would be to address these religious and sectarian divides.
Pakistan’s leadership continues to comply and/or turn a blind eye towards the forced Sunni-sation of the country and radical Sunni jihadists continue their pogrom
against religious minorities, especially the Shias, Ahmadiyyas and the Barelvis. The IS’ self-portrayal as the saviours of Sunnis in a Shia-dominated land could have grave implications for Pakistan - the sectarian
divide will only get worse if the IS co-opts even one Pakistan-based Wahabi jihadist group. Further, Shia- Sunni clashes will only intensify the Iran-Saudi Arabia
proxy war in Western and South-western Pakistan. While other regional countries have significant Muslim populations with common religious divides, sectarian
divides are not as strong. For instance, Muslims are the largest minority in India, and despite the considerable numbers belonging to various sects and sub-sects, the
divide is mostly limited only to ideological differences. Violent clashes between rival sects seldom take place.
In fact, although a couple of Indian citizens have joined the IS, for the most part, Indian society does not face a direct threat from the IS. Almost all Indian Muslims -
including activists, intellectuals and religious leaders - have denounced the IS. Adversity will befall only if Pakistan’s terrorist groups are co-opted by the IS, and
it will not be societal in nature; and whenever the IS moves forward with its South Asian agenda, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is where they will begin.
Fuel for Religious Radicalism
Already, many have taken a hard-line stance against the rising religious intolerance against Muslims in Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and Myanmar. The House of Saud feels threatened by the IS, and is likely to fund more madrassas and radical Islamist factions in order to rev up its defences against al-Baghdadi’s advance. The several Saudi-funded madrassas in western Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are already trouble-makers.
Additionally, the treatment of Muslims (such as that of Myanmar’s Rohingyas by both the clergy and the government, and the intolerance practised by Buddhist
radicals in Sri Lanka) pushes impressionable youth to seek solutions via al-Baghdadi’s means - that might reflect in the rising numbers of the Arakan Mujahideen in Myanmar, and other radicals in Sri Lanka. Although the recruits’ original motivations have localised origins, they get institutionalised in the idea of a global Muslim identity to fight for, after their ‘training’.
Turf War between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
The South Asian region could become the battleground for the turf war for influence and control between erstwhile allies, the IS and al Qaeda. The region is the epicentre of jihadist activities and the idea of reclaiming
the historical ‘Greater Khurasan’ (that includes parts of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Pakistan) is picking up pace. Both al-Baghdadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Mullah Fazullah have set their eyes on the region. Until now, many disillusioned youth joined the al Qaeda
as a means to achieve their goals - that were usually retribution and/or radical change. However, after Osama bin Laden’s death, the group’s core leadership shrunk in
size and the organisation became more franchisee-like. While bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as a weak leader who has failed to maintain the al Qaeda’s footing, the IS has managed to gain control
and administer territories like a government.
Prospects
In South Asia, Mullah Fazlullah, the relatively unknown Jaish-e-Khurasan group, and other factions snubbed by
Rawalpindi’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, are ripe for harvesting by the IS. The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. Given how South Asia was under Muslim rulers for a significant portion of history, the IS’s threat is very real, if not immediate.
The rise of the Islamic State (IS) in Iraq and Syria is a game-changer in international affairs today. Their unprecedented rise and ability to fight in two countries simultaneously without suffering serious losses - while attracting more recruits - is disquieting. Today, approximately 50,000 men (and boys as young as 11) from several countries fight under the IS banner, and
more are pouring in. West Asia and South Asia share strong linkages; any turbulence in West Asia has immediate direct and/or indirect repercussions in South Asia. Employing brutality that puts the al Qaeda to shame, what does the rise of the IS mean for South Asia?
Sectarian Schism: Susceptibility to Misuse
South Asia has a culturally diverse yet close-knit character with a complex political geography and history. While there are several common historical experiences, the divides are also many. The foremost,
apart from inter-religious differences, is that of sectarian issues. The IS will find exploiting this schism in Pakistan to be the most potent and ‘foolproof’ way to get a foothold in the region. South Asia is rife with ethno-religious and sectarian differences, especially among the region’s Muslim community. A significant number of people in the region belong to the Islamic
faith, and the Shia-Sunni divide, although primarily historical and ideological, has taken on a sinister form - especially in Pakistan. The key to evading and/or even
delaying the spread of the IS into South Asia would be to address these religious and sectarian divides.
Pakistan’s leadership continues to comply and/or turn a blind eye towards the forced Sunni-sation of the country and radical Sunni jihadists continue their pogrom
against religious minorities, especially the Shias, Ahmadiyyas and the Barelvis. The IS’ self-portrayal as the saviours of Sunnis in a Shia-dominated land could have grave implications for Pakistan - the sectarian
divide will only get worse if the IS co-opts even one Pakistan-based Wahabi jihadist group. Further, Shia- Sunni clashes will only intensify the Iran-Saudi Arabia
proxy war in Western and South-western Pakistan. While other regional countries have significant Muslim populations with common religious divides, sectarian
divides are not as strong. For instance, Muslims are the largest minority in India, and despite the considerable numbers belonging to various sects and sub-sects, the
divide is mostly limited only to ideological differences. Violent clashes between rival sects seldom take place.
In fact, although a couple of Indian citizens have joined the IS, for the most part, Indian society does not face a direct threat from the IS. Almost all Indian Muslims -
including activists, intellectuals and religious leaders - have denounced the IS. Adversity will befall only if Pakistan’s terrorist groups are co-opted by the IS, and
it will not be societal in nature; and whenever the IS moves forward with its South Asian agenda, Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas is where they will begin.
Fuel for Religious Radicalism
Already, many have taken a hard-line stance against the rising religious intolerance against Muslims in Sri Lanka,
the Maldives and Myanmar. The House of Saud feels threatened by the IS, and is likely to fund more madrassas and radical Islamist factions in order to rev up its defences against al-Baghdadi’s advance. The several Saudi-funded madrassas in western Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are already trouble-makers.
Additionally, the treatment of Muslims (such as that of Myanmar’s Rohingyas by both the clergy and the government, and the intolerance practised by Buddhist
radicals in Sri Lanka) pushes impressionable youth to seek solutions via al-Baghdadi’s means - that might reflect in the rising numbers of the Arakan Mujahideen in Myanmar, and other radicals in Sri Lanka. Although the recruits’ original motivations have localised origins, they get institutionalised in the idea of a global Muslim identity to fight for, after their ‘training’.
Turf War between al Qaeda and the Islamic State
The South Asian region could become the battleground for the turf war for influence and control between erstwhile allies, the IS and al Qaeda. The region is the epicentre of jihadist activities and the idea of reclaiming
the historical ‘Greater Khurasan’ (that includes parts of modern-day Iran, Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
and Pakistan) is picking up pace. Both al-Baghdadi and Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) chief Mullah Fazullah have set their eyes on the region. Until now, many disillusioned youth joined the al Qaeda
as a means to achieve their goals - that were usually retribution and/or radical change. However, after Osama bin Laden’s death, the group’s core leadership shrunk in
size and the organisation became more franchisee-like. While bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri is seen as a weak leader who has failed to maintain the al Qaeda’s footing, the IS has managed to gain control
and administer territories like a government.
Prospects
In South Asia, Mullah Fazlullah, the relatively unknown Jaish-e-Khurasan group, and other factions snubbed by
Rawalpindi’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, are ripe for harvesting by the IS. The IS believes that all territories historically ruled by Muslims and later conquered by non-Muslims and/or non-Islamic forms of governance were wrongfully taken from them; and intend to reclaim it. Given how South Asia was under Muslim rulers for a significant portion of history, the IS’s threat is very real, if not immediate.
COST OF PEACE
Suba Chandran
While there have been enormous emphasis in studying the cost of war and the evil effects of conflict, in the recent period, there have been an emphasis on the cost
of peace in terms of economic and political investments and its fallouts.
Can there be a cost to peace? In the public and political debates in countries such as the US and Israel, there have been questions and emphasis on “peace at what
cost”, “peace, but with honour” and “peace with justice”. The above inputs are based on an understanding that peace is desirable, but not to be fought with a high political or economic cost.
Efforts to arrive at peace in Afghanistan and Iraq have been questioned by a section in the US and elsewhere, in terms of cost involved. The human, material and economic cost for the US to ensure that peace prevails ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq has been high so far.
In fact, this argument has been effectively used not only in the US, but also in many European countries to cut the costs and get out of Afghanistan, irrespective of achieving the original goal. The general argument – “peace at what cost” in this
case primarily involves human, material and economic cost in fighting the war, with an ultimate objective to win it. Equally compelling arguments on similar lines
have been on “peace with honour” which could be seen in Israel’s approach towards Palestine. A section within Israel would prefer peace, but only on certain conditions. “Peace with honour” and the “high cost of peace” arguments have an inherent hawkish approach, which is negative in nature and essentially aims at
scuttling the peace process. The Iraqi example today would prove the fallacy of the above argument. If the cost – economic and political becomes a primary factor not to follow a peace process today and pursue the war/conflict to its ultimate end, we will have to pay a higher price tomorrow. If only the US had stayed the course in establishing peace in Iraq, and not aimed only at overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, the ISIL would not have become a
factor today. Iraq would not be this violent today, had there been enough emphasis on the process yesterday.
The US and the international community is repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan today. Israel has been seen pursuing a similar approach. Returning to a conflict mode to arrive at “peace with honour” is fraught with dangers. This would only
strengthen the hands of the hawks, who are waiting to push their own agenda. Peace cannot be achieved with the complete annihilation of the other party; it has to be
proactively fought and achieved. There has to be something for everyone; else, it would only be a matter of time before a section recuperates itself to spoil the larger process.
The above argument brings to the larger issue of complexities in fighting peace.
Waging War is easier than fighting peace. Waging Peace is complicated for it involves different actors and intricate issues. The political and economic costs in waging peace may definitely be higher; however,
irrespective of the cost involved, it has to be fought and achieved ultimately. Like engaging in developmental activities and building the basic infrastructure – if we
are worried and unhappy about the cost today and not engage in the same, we will have to undertake the same in the future, but with a higher price. No cost is high
enough to achieve peace.
One of the biggest complications in waging peace, especially in a post conflict society is the number of actors involved. The number of actors during a conflict phase, or during waging war is small and limited; the
opposing sides are clear and easy to identify, hence it is easy to fight a war or conflict. But waging peace involves multiple actors. Once the violence comes to an end in a protracted conflict, there emerge multiple groups and actors, as has been the
case in Sri Lanka, Nepal, J&K and India’s Northeast. Their demands are varied from strengthening panchayats and local institutions of governance to improving the business environment. From rehabilitating
the displaced to integrating the former combatants, suddenly there are multiple actors in the scene, each with a long list of demands.
At times, there is also a competition amongst the multiple groups to ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation packages. Groups that were never a party
to the conflict, and demands that were either muted or kept under the surface, come to the fore during the post-conflict period. The multiple demands are not only
clearly articulated, but also are loud, in terms of being projected. There are rallies and protests, at times even violent, with an objective to be a part of the political process and reap the peace dividend. Worse, in some cases, a peace process or solution in
one region, results in creating a domino effect in other regions. An example is the separation of Andhra Pradesh and creation of new Telengana state; today, there are multiple demands for creating new states in
India’s Northeast, by dividing, for example Assam and Nagaland.
While the demands are high in a post conflict situation, the capacity of the State and its institutions are limited in South Asia. Thanks to the prolonged nature of
conflict, in many parts of the conflict regions the State institutions and delivery mechanisms – from schools and hospitals have been affected. More than building
the infrastructure, the State is also handicapped with declining work culture in its institutions. It is extremely unfortunate and ironic, that in most of the post conflict
regions, which have been earlier known for hard work and honesty, today there is a casualness and corruption set in. On the one hand, in the post conflict societies
there are ever increasing demands, while on the other hand the ability and efficiency of the State and its institutions to deliver is declining. Not only the demands are increasing, but also the criticisms of the civil society against the State and its ability to deliver in a post conflict situation. Thanks to the vibrant media and the expanding reach of Social Media, the problems of governance are discussed in
public and in real time. For the State, which was primarily fighting the militants and separatists until now, it is suddenly in a new territory with numerous actors
with varying demands. Added to the problem, is also an increasing urge to
make use of the armed forces and the para military to engage in civilian functions. For example in Sri Lanka, where the war against the LTTE has come to an end,
there is not only huge manpower available to the State, but also seen as highly organised and efficient to implement projects. Such a process, though found
attractive and even useful, in the long run it would be counterproductive. The civilian institutions need to be strengthened and made accountable to deliver the goods.
Finally, the issue of trust between the Centre and the provincial units in post conflict situation in devolving power and responsibilities. In many parts of South Asia, the Centre is apprehensive of the State actors and are conservative in devolving powers to the units; even if there is devolution, certain areas or portfolios continue to remain with the Centre. More than financial and administrative issues, the “trust” factor, play a crucial role in this process.
Waging peace is a complex process only if we perceive it from a prism of economic, political and security costs. Once a conscious decision is made, that whatever may be the cost, the peace process should be continued to its logical conclusion, many pieces will fall in its place. No cost is high enough to wage peace.
While there have been enormous emphasis in studying the cost of war and the evil effects of conflict, in the recent period, there have been an emphasis on the cost
of peace in terms of economic and political investments and its fallouts.
Can there be a cost to peace? In the public and political debates in countries such as the US and Israel, there have been questions and emphasis on “peace at what
cost”, “peace, but with honour” and “peace with justice”. The above inputs are based on an understanding that peace is desirable, but not to be fought with a high political or economic cost.
Efforts to arrive at peace in Afghanistan and Iraq have been questioned by a section in the US and elsewhere, in terms of cost involved. The human, material and economic cost for the US to ensure that peace prevails ultimately in Afghanistan and Iraq has been high so far.
In fact, this argument has been effectively used not only in the US, but also in many European countries to cut the costs and get out of Afghanistan, irrespective of achieving the original goal. The general argument – “peace at what cost” in this
case primarily involves human, material and economic cost in fighting the war, with an ultimate objective to win it. Equally compelling arguments on similar lines
have been on “peace with honour” which could be seen in Israel’s approach towards Palestine. A section within Israel would prefer peace, but only on certain conditions. “Peace with honour” and the “high cost of peace” arguments have an inherent hawkish approach, which is negative in nature and essentially aims at
scuttling the peace process. The Iraqi example today would prove the fallacy of the above argument. If the cost – economic and political becomes a primary factor not to follow a peace process today and pursue the war/conflict to its ultimate end, we will have to pay a higher price tomorrow. If only the US had stayed the course in establishing peace in Iraq, and not aimed only at overthrowing the Saddam Hussein regime, the ISIL would not have become a
factor today. Iraq would not be this violent today, had there been enough emphasis on the process yesterday.
The US and the international community is repeating the same mistake in Afghanistan today. Israel has been seen pursuing a similar approach. Returning to a conflict mode to arrive at “peace with honour” is fraught with dangers. This would only
strengthen the hands of the hawks, who are waiting to push their own agenda. Peace cannot be achieved with the complete annihilation of the other party; it has to be
proactively fought and achieved. There has to be something for everyone; else, it would only be a matter of time before a section recuperates itself to spoil the larger process.
The above argument brings to the larger issue of complexities in fighting peace.
Waging War is easier than fighting peace. Waging Peace is complicated for it involves different actors and intricate issues. The political and economic costs in waging peace may definitely be higher; however,
irrespective of the cost involved, it has to be fought and achieved ultimately. Like engaging in developmental activities and building the basic infrastructure – if we
are worried and unhappy about the cost today and not engage in the same, we will have to undertake the same in the future, but with a higher price. No cost is high
enough to achieve peace.
One of the biggest complications in waging peace, especially in a post conflict society is the number of actors involved. The number of actors during a conflict phase, or during waging war is small and limited; the
opposing sides are clear and easy to identify, hence it is easy to fight a war or conflict. But waging peace involves multiple actors. Once the violence comes to an end in a protracted conflict, there emerge multiple groups and actors, as has been the
case in Sri Lanka, Nepal, J&K and India’s Northeast. Their demands are varied from strengthening panchayats and local institutions of governance to improving the business environment. From rehabilitating
the displaced to integrating the former combatants, suddenly there are multiple actors in the scene, each with a long list of demands.
At times, there is also a competition amongst the multiple groups to ensure that the reconstruction and rehabilitation packages. Groups that were never a party
to the conflict, and demands that were either muted or kept under the surface, come to the fore during the post-conflict period. The multiple demands are not only
clearly articulated, but also are loud, in terms of being projected. There are rallies and protests, at times even violent, with an objective to be a part of the political process and reap the peace dividend. Worse, in some cases, a peace process or solution in
one region, results in creating a domino effect in other regions. An example is the separation of Andhra Pradesh and creation of new Telengana state; today, there are multiple demands for creating new states in
India’s Northeast, by dividing, for example Assam and Nagaland.
While the demands are high in a post conflict situation, the capacity of the State and its institutions are limited in South Asia. Thanks to the prolonged nature of
conflict, in many parts of the conflict regions the State institutions and delivery mechanisms – from schools and hospitals have been affected. More than building
the infrastructure, the State is also handicapped with declining work culture in its institutions. It is extremely unfortunate and ironic, that in most of the post conflict
regions, which have been earlier known for hard work and honesty, today there is a casualness and corruption set in. On the one hand, in the post conflict societies
there are ever increasing demands, while on the other hand the ability and efficiency of the State and its institutions to deliver is declining. Not only the demands are increasing, but also the criticisms of the civil society against the State and its ability to deliver in a post conflict situation. Thanks to the vibrant media and the expanding reach of Social Media, the problems of governance are discussed in
public and in real time. For the State, which was primarily fighting the militants and separatists until now, it is suddenly in a new territory with numerous actors
with varying demands. Added to the problem, is also an increasing urge to
make use of the armed forces and the para military to engage in civilian functions. For example in Sri Lanka, where the war against the LTTE has come to an end,
there is not only huge manpower available to the State, but also seen as highly organised and efficient to implement projects. Such a process, though found
attractive and even useful, in the long run it would be counterproductive. The civilian institutions need to be strengthened and made accountable to deliver the goods.
Finally, the issue of trust between the Centre and the provincial units in post conflict situation in devolving power and responsibilities. In many parts of South Asia, the Centre is apprehensive of the State actors and are conservative in devolving powers to the units; even if there is devolution, certain areas or portfolios continue to remain with the Centre. More than financial and administrative issues, the “trust” factor, play a crucial role in this process.
Waging peace is a complex process only if we perceive it from a prism of economic, political and security costs. Once a conscious decision is made, that whatever may be the cost, the peace process should be continued to its logical conclusion, many pieces will fall in its place. No cost is high enough to wage peace.
21 Aug 2014
MARCHES OF AZADI AND REVOLUTION
Suba Chandran
As expected, two marches – the “Azadi” march of Imran Khan and the “Revolution” march of Tahirul Qadri have merged to create a perfect storm for Pakistan on 14
August, its independence day. The situation in Islamabad, as on 13 August is tensed, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the twin cities of Pakistan waiting for the inevitable.
How would 14 August turn out? Will it be chaotic, but will remain relatively peaceful, as Tahirul Qadri’s march two years ago? Or will it turn violent, leaving larger scars, all in the name of azadi and revolution?
With Section 144 being imposed already in Islamabad, the people of the twin cities are extremely unhappy and annoyed with the two self-proclaimed revolutionaries and reformers. They are also equally unhappy with the Prime Minister for his ineffective handling of the situation, leading to this situation.
To be fair to Nawaz Sharif, even if he had wanted to take serious steps to diffuse the situation, neither Tahirul Qadri nor Imran Khan would have listened to it. Both the leaders seem to be determined to achieve their objectives. Imran Khan wants to topple this government and be made as the next Prime Minister. He simply could not accept that he does not have the mandate to
rule, as the majority have voted for the PML-N. In terms of number of votes and seats – though Imran Khan and his PTI have fared much better than the previous elections, still the 2013 election was not in favour of Imran. Only Imran Khan should understand the reason behind his undemocratic way to establish democracy and azadi. Had there been any election irregularities, he should have filed the complaints immediately after the elections to the Election Commission. Or atleast, should have refused to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa immediately after the election results and
should have followed up in the Parliament, Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Instead, he kept silent almost for a year and then suddenly decided to pull down the system, in which he is a part.
Given the lack of reasoning for Imran Khan’s sudden change, there could be only few explanations. Perhaps, after a year, Imran Khan today realizes that the PML-N
has lost its popular appeal in the last year, and the time is ripe to force the government to dissolve the Parliament and organise a general election. The PML-N may not have performed well during the last year, but
certainly it has not become unpopular to that level, that the people will be voting Imran Khan to become the next Prime Minister, if there is an election shortly. If the Sharif brothers have come down in the popularity chart due to their failure to provide better governance, Imran Khan and his party have not performed better to reap
any major benefit.
Another reason could be a larger conspiracy, led by the military and its intelligence agencies to effectively
intervene and change Nawaz Sharif, without going through another election. Why should the military and the ISI be unhappy with the new Prime Minister? Three reasons in particular; first the handling of Musharraf trial, which a section within the military consider it
unacceptable to try a former Chief of Army Staff.
Second, the decision of the government to establish a political dialogue with the TTP. And third, the Hamid Mir and Geo episode, in which Sharif was seen as joining hands with the former. Sharif could have avoided the Musharraf trial and found an excuse to allow him to leave the country under one
pretext or another. Unfortunately, neither the exile, nor the political experience during the last decade seems to have made more mature. True, the entire legal community also wanted to go after Musharraf, but Sharif could have avoided a show down. He deliberately let it happen. In terms of talking to the TTP, he could
have consulted more with the military and should have had them on board completely. On Hamid Mir, there were too many actors and factors, Sharif could not have done any better than what he did. Perhaps, the military and its ISI is pushing Imran Khan
and silently backing his un-democratic intervention to establish democracy. In the long run, it would only strengthen their case in terms of creating an impression
that the political elites and the parties in Pakistan are unfit to rule.
As far as Tahirul Qadri is concerned, as explained in earlier commentaries in this paper, he perhaps believe in himself as a messiah and saviour. He neither has the
numbers nor the support to get elected. Neither him nor his party would be able to secure considerable votes in any free and fair elections. He can get few people from
the rural areas to Islamabad for few days to block the roads. There have been complaints that the last time he camped, many of those marchers ransacked local shops and looted goods. Perhaps, more than democracy, it is the loot and “see Islamabad” attracts the crowd to move in along with Qadri. Otherwise neither Qadri nor his party has support at the grass root level to sustain an organised protest. He is
blackmailing the system. But the primary blame should go to the Sharif brothers.
In retrospect, it appears, despite all his drawbacks, Zardari dealt with Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in a much better way, that too politically. Zardari allowed to
Qadri and his supporters to camp in Islamabad, had a dialogue and let him go back without changing the electoral system, the primary objective of latter at that
time. People in Pakistan made fun of his effort and he became a political joke. Today, Sharif has elevated Qadri’s political standing, due to his immature political
handling and the use of force.
But the larger question is, what would happen on 14 August, and what would be the fallouts of it? If the State decides to use violence against the marchers of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, it would turn them into martyrs. If the State decides to do nothing and hope that better sense would prevail, it would be seen as politically weak and ineffective. If there is violence and a standoff in Islamabad, leading to a closure of the capital, the biggest victim would be
the democratic process and the net gainer would be the radical elements. For the military and its ISI, such a process would even give them a leverage to intervene
further. It would only increase their legitimacy to intervene, and expand the popular dissatisfaction against their elected leadership and democratic process.
As expected, two marches – the “Azadi” march of Imran Khan and the “Revolution” march of Tahirul Qadri have merged to create a perfect storm for Pakistan on 14
August, its independence day. The situation in Islamabad, as on 13 August is tensed, with Islamabad and Rawalpindi, the twin cities of Pakistan waiting for the inevitable.
How would 14 August turn out? Will it be chaotic, but will remain relatively peaceful, as Tahirul Qadri’s march two years ago? Or will it turn violent, leaving larger scars, all in the name of azadi and revolution?
With Section 144 being imposed already in Islamabad, the people of the twin cities are extremely unhappy and annoyed with the two self-proclaimed revolutionaries and reformers. They are also equally unhappy with the Prime Minister for his ineffective handling of the situation, leading to this situation.
To be fair to Nawaz Sharif, even if he had wanted to take serious steps to diffuse the situation, neither Tahirul Qadri nor Imran Khan would have listened to it. Both the leaders seem to be determined to achieve their objectives. Imran Khan wants to topple this government and be made as the next Prime Minister. He simply could not accept that he does not have the mandate to
rule, as the majority have voted for the PML-N. In terms of number of votes and seats – though Imran Khan and his PTI have fared much better than the previous elections, still the 2013 election was not in favour of Imran. Only Imran Khan should understand the reason behind his undemocratic way to establish democracy and azadi. Had there been any election irregularities, he should have filed the complaints immediately after the elections to the Election Commission. Or atleast, should have refused to form the government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa immediately after the election results and
should have followed up in the Parliament, Election Commission and the Supreme Court. Instead, he kept silent almost for a year and then suddenly decided to pull down the system, in which he is a part.
Given the lack of reasoning for Imran Khan’s sudden change, there could be only few explanations. Perhaps, after a year, Imran Khan today realizes that the PML-N
has lost its popular appeal in the last year, and the time is ripe to force the government to dissolve the Parliament and organise a general election. The PML-N may not have performed well during the last year, but
certainly it has not become unpopular to that level, that the people will be voting Imran Khan to become the next Prime Minister, if there is an election shortly. If the Sharif brothers have come down in the popularity chart due to their failure to provide better governance, Imran Khan and his party have not performed better to reap
any major benefit.
Another reason could be a larger conspiracy, led by the military and its intelligence agencies to effectively
intervene and change Nawaz Sharif, without going through another election. Why should the military and the ISI be unhappy with the new Prime Minister? Three reasons in particular; first the handling of Musharraf trial, which a section within the military consider it
unacceptable to try a former Chief of Army Staff.
Second, the decision of the government to establish a political dialogue with the TTP. And third, the Hamid Mir and Geo episode, in which Sharif was seen as joining hands with the former. Sharif could have avoided the Musharraf trial and found an excuse to allow him to leave the country under one
pretext or another. Unfortunately, neither the exile, nor the political experience during the last decade seems to have made more mature. True, the entire legal community also wanted to go after Musharraf, but Sharif could have avoided a show down. He deliberately let it happen. In terms of talking to the TTP, he could
have consulted more with the military and should have had them on board completely. On Hamid Mir, there were too many actors and factors, Sharif could not have done any better than what he did. Perhaps, the military and its ISI is pushing Imran Khan
and silently backing his un-democratic intervention to establish democracy. In the long run, it would only strengthen their case in terms of creating an impression
that the political elites and the parties in Pakistan are unfit to rule.
As far as Tahirul Qadri is concerned, as explained in earlier commentaries in this paper, he perhaps believe in himself as a messiah and saviour. He neither has the
numbers nor the support to get elected. Neither him nor his party would be able to secure considerable votes in any free and fair elections. He can get few people from
the rural areas to Islamabad for few days to block the roads. There have been complaints that the last time he camped, many of those marchers ransacked local shops and looted goods. Perhaps, more than democracy, it is the loot and “see Islamabad” attracts the crowd to move in along with Qadri. Otherwise neither Qadri nor his party has support at the grass root level to sustain an organised protest. He is
blackmailing the system. But the primary blame should go to the Sharif brothers.
In retrospect, it appears, despite all his drawbacks, Zardari dealt with Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri in a much better way, that too politically. Zardari allowed to
Qadri and his supporters to camp in Islamabad, had a dialogue and let him go back without changing the electoral system, the primary objective of latter at that
time. People in Pakistan made fun of his effort and he became a political joke. Today, Sharif has elevated Qadri’s political standing, due to his immature political
handling and the use of force.
But the larger question is, what would happen on 14 August, and what would be the fallouts of it? If the State decides to use violence against the marchers of Imran Khan and Tahirul Qadri, it would turn them into martyrs. If the State decides to do nothing and hope that better sense would prevail, it would be seen as politically weak and ineffective. If there is violence and a standoff in Islamabad, leading to a closure of the capital, the biggest victim would be
the democratic process and the net gainer would be the radical elements. For the military and its ISI, such a process would even give them a leverage to intervene
further. It would only increase their legitimacy to intervene, and expand the popular dissatisfaction against their elected leadership and democratic process.
DENIGRATING KASHMIRI MUSLIMS
Shujaat Bukhari
For the past few months Rahul Pandita, a journalist with ‘The Hindu’ has unleashed his “creativity” to project the Kashmiri Muslims as a community that has nothing to be proud of their past. Using ‘The Hindu’, widely read and respected newspaper of India known for its unbiased treatment of news and views, he has not lost any opportunity to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as intolerant religious bigots who have no respect for religious independence. So far it has remained a one- sided affair as he continues to thrust his opinion on the minds of millions of readers.
Pandita has every right to have a view and articulate that. But his tone and tenor only shows his intentions to denigrate the Kashmiri Muslims, who unfortunately
are in figurative majority in Kashmir. He blames the Kashmiri society for everything without going into the genesis of the wrongs that have been done during past
66 years. Kashmiri Pandits have played a significant role in shaping up the situation we are in right now.
As part of his diatribe, he earlier tried to project Kashmiri Muslims as “Shawl walas” (Shawl sellers) who would often dupe the Indian customers. He was perhaps the inspiration for the cellular company ‘Idea’ that had made a commercial on similar lines. It was later removed as people lodged a strong protest.
The latest piece Pandita has written in ‘The Hindu’ is about the controversy over Kousar Nag yatra. He focuses on the yatra through the octogenarian separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani, who was one among
many to “oppose” it. Politicization of issues like this in contemporary Kashmir is not new. This helps the vested interests from all sides. But the reality in this case is that the opposition to the conduct of yatra is not merely political. People in the area besides the civil society reacted with a measured response. Since the institutionalization of such pilgrimage has more than one message to be conveyed to the people, it ought to raise concerns.
In case of Amarnath, the number of pilgrims went up from a few thousand to five lakhs in the past two decades. What is perceived in Kashmir is that the yatra was institutionalized with an objective to convey that “Kashmir had been re-conquered”. It may not be true but the perception is so deep that the mistrust that
exists between state and people makes it a strong belief.
Not that the Kashmiri Muslims, who according to Pandita are all communal and have an Islamist agenda, are opposed to any such religious activity, but the way the yatras have been conducted in past 20 years have not helped to strike a chord with them. With political firmament laden with competing narratives and the contradictions in facilitating one religious activity and thwarting other, the sense of disempowerment has further deepened. There is no discounting the fact that some Kashmiri Pandits had been visiting Kousar Nag as a matter of respect for being the abode of Vishnu. But it has never been seen as a full-fledged yatra spread over a calendar. Usually whosoever would visit Kousar Nag would do so as an adventure since the area is a known trekking destination. Notwithstanding the fact that there are traces of such spots of religious significance in Nilimut Purana and Rajtrangni, the oldest testimonies to
Kashmir history, but all of them have not been popular destinations for pilgrimage. Many Kashmiri Pandits would authenticate that Kousar Nag was not a yatra
destination the way the newly formed Pandit body is projecting it. Pandits are also not known to go for Amarnath pilgrimage in large numbers.
In an interview with this newspaper, senior National Conference leader and Member of Legislative Council (MLC), Vijay Bakaya said Kousar Nag was never a pilgrim destination and that some groups were blowing the issue out of proportion.
“As far as I know, Kousar Naag has never been a pilgrimage destination and people have been going for trekking to this beautiful lake,” Bakaya said in the
interview. The former chief secretary said the environmental concerns of the people of Kashmir were legitimate and needed to be taken care of. With Pandita’s inherent hate for Kashmiri Muslims purring off and on, his bid is to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as an intolerant lot. Kashmiri Pandits surely
have lost their place due to the adversities of time. The armed rebellion in Kashmir is responsible for that and the killings which took place also cannot be condoned.
But the way the situation has shaped for Muslims in Kashmir for last 20 years is also not one of comfort and to blame the entire society for the miseries of the community is unfair. If Kashmiri Pandits blame Kashmiri
Muslims for not showing any concern over their displacement and killing of 219 Pandits, but as an “emancipated” community that has been elite for
centuries also failed in showing even a shred of solidarity with the latter in last two decades.
According to Mike Quigley, “Protection of religious freedom means considering the faiths and beliefs of everyone involved”.
Such freedoms cannot be enjoyed selectively and in isolation but can only be cherished by treating all the faiths on equal terms. In past 20 years the state
government has banned the Milad procession in Kashmir so is the case with the Muharram procession. Similarly
the religious leaders are not allowed to offer prayers in the mosques. Ideological differences apart, Geelani has been under house arrest for six months and he has not
been allowed to fulfill his religious duties. Law and order is an excuse that government uses to justify its actions.
But state has responsibility to maintain that with huge apparatus at its disposal. It cannot be done by putting every other person under house arrest. This amply
makes the distinction in according the religious freedom clear.
Coming back to Kousar Nag, the argument put in contrast is that how other water bodies have suffered in Kashmir and why the opponents are only concerned about this yatra. One may agree on this point that we need to talk about the decay of Dal, Wular and Anchar lake. But the moot question is why to pollute a clean water source then? It is state’s responsibility to ensure that the money spent on these bodies is utilized for retrieving them and the Kashmiri civil society has been
voicing its concerns all the time.
We as a society might not have done enough to protect these bodies but that does not mean that if a purevwater source is still away from human intervention it should in coming years replicate the Dal. Visits to
places of religious significance are welcome but the way the institutionalization is taking place through the state is not in the interest of the people. Politicization of
every issue has ruined Kashmir and to deal with it in compartments and with a clamour of victimhood does not augur well for a peaceful and safe Kashmir.
For the past few months Rahul Pandita, a journalist with ‘The Hindu’ has unleashed his “creativity” to project the Kashmiri Muslims as a community that has nothing to be proud of their past. Using ‘The Hindu’, widely read and respected newspaper of India known for its unbiased treatment of news and views, he has not lost any opportunity to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as intolerant religious bigots who have no respect for religious independence. So far it has remained a one- sided affair as he continues to thrust his opinion on the minds of millions of readers.
Pandita has every right to have a view and articulate that. But his tone and tenor only shows his intentions to denigrate the Kashmiri Muslims, who unfortunately
are in figurative majority in Kashmir. He blames the Kashmiri society for everything without going into the genesis of the wrongs that have been done during past
66 years. Kashmiri Pandits have played a significant role in shaping up the situation we are in right now.
As part of his diatribe, he earlier tried to project Kashmiri Muslims as “Shawl walas” (Shawl sellers) who would often dupe the Indian customers. He was perhaps the inspiration for the cellular company ‘Idea’ that had made a commercial on similar lines. It was later removed as people lodged a strong protest.
The latest piece Pandita has written in ‘The Hindu’ is about the controversy over Kousar Nag yatra. He focuses on the yatra through the octogenarian separatist leader Syed Ali Geelani, who was one among
many to “oppose” it. Politicization of issues like this in contemporary Kashmir is not new. This helps the vested interests from all sides. But the reality in this case is that the opposition to the conduct of yatra is not merely political. People in the area besides the civil society reacted with a measured response. Since the institutionalization of such pilgrimage has more than one message to be conveyed to the people, it ought to raise concerns.
In case of Amarnath, the number of pilgrims went up from a few thousand to five lakhs in the past two decades. What is perceived in Kashmir is that the yatra was institutionalized with an objective to convey that “Kashmir had been re-conquered”. It may not be true but the perception is so deep that the mistrust that
exists between state and people makes it a strong belief.
Not that the Kashmiri Muslims, who according to Pandita are all communal and have an Islamist agenda, are opposed to any such religious activity, but the way the yatras have been conducted in past 20 years have not helped to strike a chord with them. With political firmament laden with competing narratives and the contradictions in facilitating one religious activity and thwarting other, the sense of disempowerment has further deepened. There is no discounting the fact that some Kashmiri Pandits had been visiting Kousar Nag as a matter of respect for being the abode of Vishnu. But it has never been seen as a full-fledged yatra spread over a calendar. Usually whosoever would visit Kousar Nag would do so as an adventure since the area is a known trekking destination. Notwithstanding the fact that there are traces of such spots of religious significance in Nilimut Purana and Rajtrangni, the oldest testimonies to
Kashmir history, but all of them have not been popular destinations for pilgrimage. Many Kashmiri Pandits would authenticate that Kousar Nag was not a yatra
destination the way the newly formed Pandit body is projecting it. Pandits are also not known to go for Amarnath pilgrimage in large numbers.
In an interview with this newspaper, senior National Conference leader and Member of Legislative Council (MLC), Vijay Bakaya said Kousar Nag was never a pilgrim destination and that some groups were blowing the issue out of proportion.
“As far as I know, Kousar Naag has never been a pilgrimage destination and people have been going for trekking to this beautiful lake,” Bakaya said in the
interview. The former chief secretary said the environmental concerns of the people of Kashmir were legitimate and needed to be taken care of. With Pandita’s inherent hate for Kashmiri Muslims purring off and on, his bid is to paint the Kashmiri Muslims as an intolerant lot. Kashmiri Pandits surely
have lost their place due to the adversities of time. The armed rebellion in Kashmir is responsible for that and the killings which took place also cannot be condoned.
But the way the situation has shaped for Muslims in Kashmir for last 20 years is also not one of comfort and to blame the entire society for the miseries of the community is unfair. If Kashmiri Pandits blame Kashmiri
Muslims for not showing any concern over their displacement and killing of 219 Pandits, but as an “emancipated” community that has been elite for
centuries also failed in showing even a shred of solidarity with the latter in last two decades.
According to Mike Quigley, “Protection of religious freedom means considering the faiths and beliefs of everyone involved”.
Such freedoms cannot be enjoyed selectively and in isolation but can only be cherished by treating all the faiths on equal terms. In past 20 years the state
government has banned the Milad procession in Kashmir so is the case with the Muharram procession. Similarly
the religious leaders are not allowed to offer prayers in the mosques. Ideological differences apart, Geelani has been under house arrest for six months and he has not
been allowed to fulfill his religious duties. Law and order is an excuse that government uses to justify its actions.
But state has responsibility to maintain that with huge apparatus at its disposal. It cannot be done by putting every other person under house arrest. This amply
makes the distinction in according the religious freedom clear.
Coming back to Kousar Nag, the argument put in contrast is that how other water bodies have suffered in Kashmir and why the opponents are only concerned about this yatra. One may agree on this point that we need to talk about the decay of Dal, Wular and Anchar lake. But the moot question is why to pollute a clean water source then? It is state’s responsibility to ensure that the money spent on these bodies is utilized for retrieving them and the Kashmiri civil society has been
voicing its concerns all the time.
We as a society might not have done enough to protect these bodies but that does not mean that if a purevwater source is still away from human intervention it should in coming years replicate the Dal. Visits to
places of religious significance are welcome but the way the institutionalization is taking place through the state is not in the interest of the people. Politicization of
every issue has ruined Kashmir and to deal with it in compartments and with a clamour of victimhood does not augur well for a peaceful and safe Kashmir.
LATE BUT WELCOME REALIZATION
Shujaat Bukhari
What Israel has been doing in Gaza for past about a month has put humanity to shame. It has also exposed the double standards of world powers and brought to the fore the fact how insensitive and incapacitated the
Muslim nations are. Whatever the fate of hapless Palestinians, the situation has, however, thrown up more lessons for Muslims world over. The offensive may have a dangerous consequence of pushing more Muslims towards radicalism thus opening new doors of destruction. During the past one month the disturbing situation in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Africa has
raised more questions about why trouble is taking place in Muslim countries only. More than 6000 people were killed by the ISIS led by the self-styled “Caliph” Al Baghdadi, thereby putting the words “human rights
violations” to shame. Muslims killing Muslims is the biggest challenge, which Islam, second largest and the fastest growing religion in world is facing now.
Out of many leafs of those lessons, the one which is relevant to Kashmir is that the separatists have given up their hope on the Muslim world through their “representative” bodies such as Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Arab League. Time and again the OIC has been passing resolutions and sending out
invitations to the separatist leaders who proudly publish them in the local media to impress the people with their “popularity” at the world level. Kashmiri leaders, with
the blessings of Pakistan, had been given the Observer status in OIC and many of them have attended the conferences and enjoyed their hospitality. The outcome
has been one odd resolution condemning the human rights violations by India and a line to urge them to resolve the Kashmir issue.
With unending bloodshed shaking the conscience of every conscientious citizen, except those who believe in not annoying the Americans and their cohorts, the
separatists in Kashmir also started realizing that it was useless to pin hopes on OIC or Arab League. For the first time, in many years, the separatists of various factions and colours have spoken in one voice. From
Syed Ali Shah Geelani to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik, they have criticized the OIC and the Arab world for maintaining a criminal silence over
genocide in Gaza. They have also asserted that to rely on them for intervention in resolution of Kashmir issue was not pragmatic.
In the past the noise by OIC or Arab League has been purely an exercise orchestrated by Pakistan to make India restless. That is why the separatists had fallen in this trap of a “false hope”. Moderate Hurriyat leader
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was seen as the last one to rely on them and given them (OIC) legitimacy in the overall process of resolution of Kashmir. But the fact remains
that the resolutions passed by OIC had no impact on India like many other reports. The Arabs countries traditionally have had good relations with India. Once the OIC would pass the resolutions, the Arab leaders would convey (in private) to the Indian governments that they actually did not know what the resolution was and they were not party to it. It may sound funny but
the argument, according to insiders in External Affairs Ministry, they would make was that only Pakistan and Turkish Foreign Ministers would know English and
whatever resolutions they draft they get passed through a consensus. But in practice also the Arab countries would not do anything to side with Kashmir and support
the political cause. For few years, Kashmir would be part of special dua (prayers) on Friday in Makkah and Madinah but that also has disappeared now.
Iran was considered to be vocal among Muslim nations to talk about political rights subjugated by various countries. In case of Palestine the voice was louder and continues to be so. But on Kashmir, it too could not afford to annoy India and helped it out in the worst crisis. When situation in Kashmir in early 90s was a flash point in world, India was on back foot and it had
become difficult for New Delhi to seek defense at the International level. Though focus shifted to Gulf War in 1991, it continued to invite attention at the world
forums. In 1994, sanctions were almost imposed against India when a resolution in the United Nations was withdrawn at the last moment by then Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhuttoo after Iran’s
intervention. The resolution, if passed, would have put India in dock. But the efforts by Iran prevailed upon Bhuttoo, coupled with the work done by a highly erudite Indian delegation led by former Prime Minister A B Vajpayee with Farooq Abdullah as its deputy leader and then Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid as the member, thus saving New Delhi from the biggest ever diplomatic crisis.
Otherwise also the interest of world powers in seeing Kashmir as the flashpoint has decreased to a great level and that also is reflected in how New Delhi sees the
situation. Not acknowledging the transition from violence to nonviolence as a space to resolve the issue also has a lot to do with this changing global discourse. Many experts believe that non-resolution of Kashmir issue would continue to threaten the peace in the region.
In the given circumstances a third party intervention of Kashmir seems impossible. Pakistan becoming internally weak and losing ground at the diplomatic level after the 9/11 has caused more harm to Kashmir, as it has been linked to “International terror network” and “Global Jehad”. It is only the people of Kashmir who have to
find ways and means to find a solution and of course the onus lies on India and Pakistan to facilitate that course. Whether the powers could play any role or not,
veteran CIA official Bruce Reidel in his latest book “Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back”, argues that resolving Kashmir is
not only important for preventing a nuclear conflict between two countries but also for prosperity of both India and Pakistan. Even as he believes that “history has shown that American actions can make a bad situation worse, and it has shown only limited evidence that they can make things fundamentally better”, but at the same time makes a case for non-formal initiative to
make the two countries amenable to a resolution. In this backdrop, the statements by separatist leaders vis-a-vis the OIC and Arab League or largely about the Arab world are significant and have thrown up an opportunity to think out of box to deal with the stand off on its own. The realization has come late but nevertheless welcome.
What Israel has been doing in Gaza for past about a month has put humanity to shame. It has also exposed the double standards of world powers and brought to the fore the fact how insensitive and incapacitated the
Muslim nations are. Whatever the fate of hapless Palestinians, the situation has, however, thrown up more lessons for Muslims world over. The offensive may have a dangerous consequence of pushing more Muslims towards radicalism thus opening new doors of destruction. During the past one month the disturbing situation in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Africa has
raised more questions about why trouble is taking place in Muslim countries only. More than 6000 people were killed by the ISIS led by the self-styled “Caliph” Al Baghdadi, thereby putting the words “human rights
violations” to shame. Muslims killing Muslims is the biggest challenge, which Islam, second largest and the fastest growing religion in world is facing now.
Out of many leafs of those lessons, the one which is relevant to Kashmir is that the separatists have given up their hope on the Muslim world through their “representative” bodies such as Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC) and Arab League. Time and again the OIC has been passing resolutions and sending out
invitations to the separatist leaders who proudly publish them in the local media to impress the people with their “popularity” at the world level. Kashmiri leaders, with
the blessings of Pakistan, had been given the Observer status in OIC and many of them have attended the conferences and enjoyed their hospitality. The outcome
has been one odd resolution condemning the human rights violations by India and a line to urge them to resolve the Kashmir issue.
With unending bloodshed shaking the conscience of every conscientious citizen, except those who believe in not annoying the Americans and their cohorts, the
separatists in Kashmir also started realizing that it was useless to pin hopes on OIC or Arab League. For the first time, in many years, the separatists of various factions and colours have spoken in one voice. From
Syed Ali Shah Geelani to Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, Shabir Shah and Yasin Malik, they have criticized the OIC and the Arab world for maintaining a criminal silence over
genocide in Gaza. They have also asserted that to rely on them for intervention in resolution of Kashmir issue was not pragmatic.
In the past the noise by OIC or Arab League has been purely an exercise orchestrated by Pakistan to make India restless. That is why the separatists had fallen in this trap of a “false hope”. Moderate Hurriyat leader
Mirwaiz Umar Farooq was seen as the last one to rely on them and given them (OIC) legitimacy in the overall process of resolution of Kashmir. But the fact remains
that the resolutions passed by OIC had no impact on India like many other reports. The Arabs countries traditionally have had good relations with India. Once the OIC would pass the resolutions, the Arab leaders would convey (in private) to the Indian governments that they actually did not know what the resolution was and they were not party to it. It may sound funny but
the argument, according to insiders in External Affairs Ministry, they would make was that only Pakistan and Turkish Foreign Ministers would know English and
whatever resolutions they draft they get passed through a consensus. But in practice also the Arab countries would not do anything to side with Kashmir and support
the political cause. For few years, Kashmir would be part of special dua (prayers) on Friday in Makkah and Madinah but that also has disappeared now.
Iran was considered to be vocal among Muslim nations to talk about political rights subjugated by various countries. In case of Palestine the voice was louder and continues to be so. But on Kashmir, it too could not afford to annoy India and helped it out in the worst crisis. When situation in Kashmir in early 90s was a flash point in world, India was on back foot and it had
become difficult for New Delhi to seek defense at the International level. Though focus shifted to Gulf War in 1991, it continued to invite attention at the world
forums. In 1994, sanctions were almost imposed against India when a resolution in the United Nations was withdrawn at the last moment by then Prime Minister of Pakistan Benazir Bhuttoo after Iran’s
intervention. The resolution, if passed, would have put India in dock. But the efforts by Iran prevailed upon Bhuttoo, coupled with the work done by a highly erudite Indian delegation led by former Prime Minister A B Vajpayee with Farooq Abdullah as its deputy leader and then Minister for External Affairs Salman Khurshid as the member, thus saving New Delhi from the biggest ever diplomatic crisis.
Otherwise also the interest of world powers in seeing Kashmir as the flashpoint has decreased to a great level and that also is reflected in how New Delhi sees the
situation. Not acknowledging the transition from violence to nonviolence as a space to resolve the issue also has a lot to do with this changing global discourse. Many experts believe that non-resolution of Kashmir issue would continue to threaten the peace in the region.
In the given circumstances a third party intervention of Kashmir seems impossible. Pakistan becoming internally weak and losing ground at the diplomatic level after the 9/11 has caused more harm to Kashmir, as it has been linked to “International terror network” and “Global Jehad”. It is only the people of Kashmir who have to
find ways and means to find a solution and of course the onus lies on India and Pakistan to facilitate that course. Whether the powers could play any role or not,
veteran CIA official Bruce Reidel in his latest book “Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back”, argues that resolving Kashmir is
not only important for preventing a nuclear conflict between two countries but also for prosperity of both India and Pakistan. Even as he believes that “history has shown that American actions can make a bad situation worse, and it has shown only limited evidence that they can make things fundamentally better”, but at the same time makes a case for non-formal initiative to
make the two countries amenable to a resolution. In this backdrop, the statements by separatist leaders vis-a-vis the OIC and Arab League or largely about the Arab world are significant and have thrown up an opportunity to think out of box to deal with the stand off on its own. The realization has come late but nevertheless welcome.
A STRATEGIC REVIEW FOR INDIA
Manpreet Sethi
All major nuclear weapon states periodically issue official statements in the form of a Review or a White Paper to provide a peep into their threat assessments and response priorities. The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is well known. Russia too periodically announces
a military doctrine and has used it to signal change in the circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1998, China has been bringing out a White Paper on
National Defence (WPND) mostly every two years to indicate how it conceptualises its national defence, threat perceptions and security goals, including in the nuclear domain. So do the UK and France.
Most such documents provide general indications on the nation’s assessment of its threat environment and the kind of capability that it wishes to build. For instance, the US NPR of 2010 identified nuclear terrorism and proliferation as the topmost threats facing the country.
Accordingly, Washington put its focus on global efforts aimed at securing nuclear materials. It also articulated that countries found guilty of sponsoring terrorists could
face US military strikes. Since the threat from near nuclear peers was found of a second order, the US downgraded its nuclear readiness posture by removing
its nuclear bombers from 24 hour alert and also de- MIRVing its missiles.
Similarly, the Chinese WPND explains the country’s threat perceptions and national security goals. It provides generic references to the growing advancements in national ability to conduct joint operations with precision, informationised strikes etc.
Over the last three White Papers, China has devoted complete sub-sections to explaining the role and capabilities of its nuclear force or the Second Artillery Corps (SAC). While the 2008 Paper had called upon the SAC to “build a streamlined and effective strategic force by raising the informationaisation of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control and increase capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counter-
strikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles,” the 2010 Paper stressed modernisation of “capabilities
in rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection and survivability.”
Given that the SAC has the responsibility for both conventional and nuclear missiles, the Paper also reveals how China continues to “improve the conditions of on-base, simulated and networked training” including in conduct of “trans-regional manoeuvres” and in “complex electromagnetic environments.” Such
disclosures on posture are meant to buttress deterrence.
Crafted along similar lines, an Indian Strategic Review - ISR (or whatever else it may be called: Strategic Policy Review, or a White Paper) - would be particularly helpful in addressing some of the concerns that have been raised in recent times on the credibility of the Indian nuclear deterrent. Of course, the ISR would traverse a range of security issues. But in the nuclear dimension, besides a reiteration of the basic doctrinal attributes of India’s nuclear deterrence, it could highlight some specific issues. Two examples by way of an illustration could be mentioned.
The first could be an articulation of the role of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in India’s nuclear strategy. Going by the recent technological developments, India seems
to be surely and steadily moving towards the development and eventual deployment of some kind of a BMD capability. However, if India is to ensure that this capability does not destabilise nuclear deterrence equations with Pakistan and China, it is imperative that certain clarity be brought to the nature and type of BMD that India plans to have. It is evident that perceiving it
as eroding its deterrence, Islamabad has begun investing in cruise missiles and other counter-measures to defeat an Indian BMD. In case India is to escape being pulled into an offence-defence spiral, it is necessary that the logic and scope of the Indian BMD is explained as a measure for enhancing survivability of its retaliatory capability (warheads, delivery systems and C2) in view of India’s no first use (NFU). Given India’s missile threat environment, it is virtually impossible to protect its cities unless the BMD is technologically of a
very high order and that obviously means expending large amounts of money. But, by explaining the rationale of the BMD for protecting India’s counter-strike capability, its destabilising effects can be arrested. And, the ISR could be one means of such communication.
Yet another issue that could do with some clarity is India’s response to an act of nuclear terrorism. Given India’s experience of Pak-sponsored terrorism, this is a threat that looms large. It would be worthwhile for New Delhi to express its assessment of such a threat and its likely responses. This would showcase resolve that no such act would go unpunished. Doing so through the
ISR would enhance deterrence. Opacity and ambiguity in nuclear numbers and postures
has been an attribute of the Indian nuclear strategy.
However, an ISR can perform the crucial task of clearing misperceptions through a certain amount of transparency without going into specifics of the arsenal. This is critical given that misperceptions and
miscalculations can result in an inadvertent nuclear escalation especially between nuclear neighbours that share border disputes and are prone to border skirmishes. Such a document would actually be of immense value for two reasons. One, it would aid strategy formulation and action prioritisation within the country while providing assurance to the domestic public. Simultaneously, it would communicate with the adversary, and its content and tenor could create the
atmospherics to help stabilise nuclear equations.
All major nuclear weapon states periodically issue official statements in the form of a Review or a White Paper to provide a peep into their threat assessments and response priorities. The US Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) is well known. Russia too periodically announces
a military doctrine and has used it to signal change in the circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons. Since 1998, China has been bringing out a White Paper on
National Defence (WPND) mostly every two years to indicate how it conceptualises its national defence, threat perceptions and security goals, including in the nuclear domain. So do the UK and France.
Most such documents provide general indications on the nation’s assessment of its threat environment and the kind of capability that it wishes to build. For instance, the US NPR of 2010 identified nuclear terrorism and proliferation as the topmost threats facing the country.
Accordingly, Washington put its focus on global efforts aimed at securing nuclear materials. It also articulated that countries found guilty of sponsoring terrorists could
face US military strikes. Since the threat from near nuclear peers was found of a second order, the US downgraded its nuclear readiness posture by removing
its nuclear bombers from 24 hour alert and also de- MIRVing its missiles.
Similarly, the Chinese WPND explains the country’s threat perceptions and national security goals. It provides generic references to the growing advancements in national ability to conduct joint operations with precision, informationised strikes etc.
Over the last three White Papers, China has devoted complete sub-sections to explaining the role and capabilities of its nuclear force or the Second Artillery Corps (SAC). While the 2008 Paper had called upon the SAC to “build a streamlined and effective strategic force by raising the informationaisation of its weaponry and equipment systems, build an agile and efficient operational command and control and increase capabilities of land-based strategic nuclear counter-
strikes and precision strikes with conventional missiles,” the 2010 Paper stressed modernisation of “capabilities
in rapid reaction, penetration, precision strike, damage infliction, protection and survivability.”
Given that the SAC has the responsibility for both conventional and nuclear missiles, the Paper also reveals how China continues to “improve the conditions of on-base, simulated and networked training” including in conduct of “trans-regional manoeuvres” and in “complex electromagnetic environments.” Such
disclosures on posture are meant to buttress deterrence.
Crafted along similar lines, an Indian Strategic Review - ISR (or whatever else it may be called: Strategic Policy Review, or a White Paper) - would be particularly helpful in addressing some of the concerns that have been raised in recent times on the credibility of the Indian nuclear deterrent. Of course, the ISR would traverse a range of security issues. But in the nuclear dimension, besides a reiteration of the basic doctrinal attributes of India’s nuclear deterrence, it could highlight some specific issues. Two examples by way of an illustration could be mentioned.
The first could be an articulation of the role of ballistic missile defence (BMD) in India’s nuclear strategy. Going by the recent technological developments, India seems
to be surely and steadily moving towards the development and eventual deployment of some kind of a BMD capability. However, if India is to ensure that this capability does not destabilise nuclear deterrence equations with Pakistan and China, it is imperative that certain clarity be brought to the nature and type of BMD that India plans to have. It is evident that perceiving it
as eroding its deterrence, Islamabad has begun investing in cruise missiles and other counter-measures to defeat an Indian BMD. In case India is to escape being pulled into an offence-defence spiral, it is necessary that the logic and scope of the Indian BMD is explained as a measure for enhancing survivability of its retaliatory capability (warheads, delivery systems and C2) in view of India’s no first use (NFU). Given India’s missile threat environment, it is virtually impossible to protect its cities unless the BMD is technologically of a
very high order and that obviously means expending large amounts of money. But, by explaining the rationale of the BMD for protecting India’s counter-strike capability, its destabilising effects can be arrested. And, the ISR could be one means of such communication.
Yet another issue that could do with some clarity is India’s response to an act of nuclear terrorism. Given India’s experience of Pak-sponsored terrorism, this is a threat that looms large. It would be worthwhile for New Delhi to express its assessment of such a threat and its likely responses. This would showcase resolve that no such act would go unpunished. Doing so through the
ISR would enhance deterrence. Opacity and ambiguity in nuclear numbers and postures
has been an attribute of the Indian nuclear strategy.
However, an ISR can perform the crucial task of clearing misperceptions through a certain amount of transparency without going into specifics of the arsenal. This is critical given that misperceptions and
miscalculations can result in an inadvertent nuclear escalation especially between nuclear neighbours that share border disputes and are prone to border skirmishes. Such a document would actually be of immense value for two reasons. One, it would aid strategy formulation and action prioritisation within the country while providing assurance to the domestic public. Simultaneously, it would communicate with the adversary, and its content and tenor could create the
atmospherics to help stabilise nuclear equations.
PAKISTAN: DEGRADED DEMOCRACY
Sushant Sareen
At the time this comment is being penned, the Imran Khan’s ‘ Azadi ’ March and Tahirul Qadri’s ‘Inquilab’ (revolution) March are besieging Islamabad.
The former is demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; accountability of all people involved in rigging the 2013 election in favour of the
current ruling dispensation; electoral reforms; and a government of non-political persons to conduct fresh elections. The latter wants a complete overhaul of the
current political system – hence revolution, though in a legal and constitutional way without resorting to violence, which is in itself a contradiction.
Even though the turnout of these two marches is nowhere close to the million or more that was being spoken about, Pakistan’s capital city is on the
tenterhooks. The fear is that if the crowds go out of control and large-scale violence erupts, it could well lead to the collapse of the government. Needless to say, such disturbances will bring neither Azadi nor
Revolution. Quite to the contrary, it will stifle ‘ Azadi ’ and usher in a counter-revolution by that most reactionary of all forces in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.
Perhaps when the Pakistan Army put Khan and Qadri to the job of destabilising Nawaz Sharif’s government and bringing it under such immense pressure that it buckles and accepts its subservience to the military
establishment, they never thought things would reach a point where they might have to step in and take over directly. But a series of administrative mishandlings and
political miscalculations by the governments in Islamabad and Lahore, coupled with ever rising stridency in the positions of Khan and Qadri, have
brought the situation to a point where an honourable exit for any of the main protagonists seems next to impossible.
This means while all the protagonists are going for broke – they believe they will either worst their adversary or suffer grievous and maybe even irrecoverable damage to their politics – none of them is
going to emerge from this battle unscathed. The only winner will be the cat (read Pakistan Army) which made the monkeys (read Pakistan's political class) fight over
the spoils of power. After all, Pakistan is a unique case where even the courts have upheld the legitimacy of military coups by calling them a revolution! Clearly, neither Imran Khan nor Tahirul Qadri have
thought through the logic of what they are demanding. This is hardly surprising considering that someone else has been doing the thinking for them. The dialectics of their demands is that unless Nawaz Sharif is ready to roll over and play dead – which is extremely unlikely – the only way they can get what they want is through an
extra-constitutional takeover. Bizarrely, even as they both emphatically stand against any military intervention, they are pushing things in a direction where the political logjam can only be broken by such
an intervention.
For his part, Nawaz Sharif is showing remarkable and uncharacteristic composure, and even a spirit of
accommodation towards Khan’s and Qadri’s clearly illegitimate, illogical and illegal demands. But sooner or later, Sharif will dig in his heels. Already, some of his
advisors are reported to be telling him that any big compromise on the demands of the agitationists will irretrievably damage the government and render it a virtual lame-duck in practically all important aspects of
national policy making. If that happens, Sharif might continue to enjoy the title of prime minister but will wield as much power as the head of a municipality. The
trouble for the ruling party is that this is precisely what the army wants if Nawaz Sharif is to continue in office.
While the army has fixed Sharif nice and proper, and it is quite apparent by now that Sharif can only survive if he accepts subservience to the military, it is still unclear if the military has a plan to de-escalate the political crisis. Will Khan accept the military’s diktat? What will
be the quid pro quo which helps him keep his face among his supporters whom he has charged to an unsustainable level? Will the sop offered to Imran Khan be acceptable to Sharif, especially if it involves anything
beyond electoral reforms? And if Khan refuses to back down, will the army force Sharif out of office? For the army, to cut Khan and Qadri down to size at this stage
means losing a potent political tool to keep Sharif under pressure – something they would be averse to doing.
But deposing Sharif will also not solve the problem because that would set in motion the destabilising politics of the 1990s. Worse, even if Nawaz Sharif eats the humble pie and Khan backs down this time, the government will remain in crisis mode for the rest of its term, something that will seriously distract it from its ambitious economic agenda. Most importantly, if this
round of the political slugfest ends in a draw, it will only set the stage for the next round of an even worse civil- military confrontation, which won’t be long in coming. What this means is that all those singing hosannas for democracy having finally stuck roots in Pakistan need to
start singing dirges.
At the time this comment is being penned, the Imran Khan’s ‘ Azadi ’ March and Tahirul Qadri’s ‘Inquilab’ (revolution) March are besieging Islamabad.
The former is demanding the resignation of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif; accountability of all people involved in rigging the 2013 election in favour of the
current ruling dispensation; electoral reforms; and a government of non-political persons to conduct fresh elections. The latter wants a complete overhaul of the
current political system – hence revolution, though in a legal and constitutional way without resorting to violence, which is in itself a contradiction.
Even though the turnout of these two marches is nowhere close to the million or more that was being spoken about, Pakistan’s capital city is on the
tenterhooks. The fear is that if the crowds go out of control and large-scale violence erupts, it could well lead to the collapse of the government. Needless to say, such disturbances will bring neither Azadi nor
Revolution. Quite to the contrary, it will stifle ‘ Azadi ’ and usher in a counter-revolution by that most reactionary of all forces in Pakistan – the Pakistan Army.
Perhaps when the Pakistan Army put Khan and Qadri to the job of destabilising Nawaz Sharif’s government and bringing it under such immense pressure that it buckles and accepts its subservience to the military
establishment, they never thought things would reach a point where they might have to step in and take over directly. But a series of administrative mishandlings and
political miscalculations by the governments in Islamabad and Lahore, coupled with ever rising stridency in the positions of Khan and Qadri, have
brought the situation to a point where an honourable exit for any of the main protagonists seems next to impossible.
This means while all the protagonists are going for broke – they believe they will either worst their adversary or suffer grievous and maybe even irrecoverable damage to their politics – none of them is
going to emerge from this battle unscathed. The only winner will be the cat (read Pakistan Army) which made the monkeys (read Pakistan's political class) fight over
the spoils of power. After all, Pakistan is a unique case where even the courts have upheld the legitimacy of military coups by calling them a revolution! Clearly, neither Imran Khan nor Tahirul Qadri have
thought through the logic of what they are demanding. This is hardly surprising considering that someone else has been doing the thinking for them. The dialectics of their demands is that unless Nawaz Sharif is ready to roll over and play dead – which is extremely unlikely – the only way they can get what they want is through an
extra-constitutional takeover. Bizarrely, even as they both emphatically stand against any military intervention, they are pushing things in a direction where the political logjam can only be broken by such
an intervention.
For his part, Nawaz Sharif is showing remarkable and uncharacteristic composure, and even a spirit of
accommodation towards Khan’s and Qadri’s clearly illegitimate, illogical and illegal demands. But sooner or later, Sharif will dig in his heels. Already, some of his
advisors are reported to be telling him that any big compromise on the demands of the agitationists will irretrievably damage the government and render it a virtual lame-duck in practically all important aspects of
national policy making. If that happens, Sharif might continue to enjoy the title of prime minister but will wield as much power as the head of a municipality. The
trouble for the ruling party is that this is precisely what the army wants if Nawaz Sharif is to continue in office.
While the army has fixed Sharif nice and proper, and it is quite apparent by now that Sharif can only survive if he accepts subservience to the military, it is still unclear if the military has a plan to de-escalate the political crisis. Will Khan accept the military’s diktat? What will
be the quid pro quo which helps him keep his face among his supporters whom he has charged to an unsustainable level? Will the sop offered to Imran Khan be acceptable to Sharif, especially if it involves anything
beyond electoral reforms? And if Khan refuses to back down, will the army force Sharif out of office? For the army, to cut Khan and Qadri down to size at this stage
means losing a potent political tool to keep Sharif under pressure – something they would be averse to doing.
But deposing Sharif will also not solve the problem because that would set in motion the destabilising politics of the 1990s. Worse, even if Nawaz Sharif eats the humble pie and Khan backs down this time, the government will remain in crisis mode for the rest of its term, something that will seriously distract it from its ambitious economic agenda. Most importantly, if this
round of the political slugfest ends in a draw, it will only set the stage for the next round of an even worse civil- military confrontation, which won’t be long in coming. What this means is that all those singing hosannas for democracy having finally stuck roots in Pakistan need to
start singing dirges.
17 Aug 2014
EBOLA: CONCERNS FOR INDIA
N Manoharan
Should India be worried about the outbreak of Ebola virus in Western Africa that is more than 9000 km away? Is the situation so alarming? What it Ebola all about? What are the counter-measures required?
In an increasingly globalised world, no distance is far away. It is a matter of few hours by direct flight. The virus has been spreading fast. Thankfully, it is not an
airborne disease. It is however communicable. Since the first case of outbreak reported in February 2014 in
Guinea, the disease has spread to Sierra Leone, Liberia and recently to Nigeria, all along the West African coast. The main vector is the traveller, both within and outside the continent. Saudi Arabia has reported a case of an infected person, a returnee from Sierra Leone. The US has airlifted two of its infected citizens; Spain had flown an affected priest who has since passed. Usually an inland phenomenon, it is intriguing why the Ebola virus is spreading along the coast this time. The current
outbreak has so far claimed over 900 lives, in addition to 2000 infected; more deadly than all the hitherto Ebola outbreaks. The cause for worry is the fact that the Ebola disease has neither a vaccine nor curative
medicine; once infected there is only a 10 per cent chance of survival.
The disease took its name from the Ebola River, the site of the first outbreak in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). Genus Ebolavirus is one of three
members of the filovirus family (the other two being Marburg Virus and Cueva Virus). Interestingly, Ebola Virus comprises five distinct species: Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV), Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), Sudan
ebolavirus (SUDV), Reston ebolavirus (RESTV) and Taï Forest ebolavirus (TAFV). The present outbreak is EBOV, considered the most dangerous of all. The incubation
period is 21 days.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), symptoms of the disease include the sudden onset of fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash,
impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases, both internal and external bleeding. Patients report low white blood cell and platelet counts and elevated liver
enzymes. These symptoms are broadly similar to one or the other diseases like malaria, typhoid fever, shigellosis, cholera, leptospirosis, plague, rickettsiosis,relapsing fever, meningitis, hepatitis and other viral
haemorrhagic fevers. This makes diagnosis all the more difficult.
Ebola is a zoonotic disease transmitted to people by wild animals or by other infected patients. Fruit bats are considered Ebola’s ‘reservoir host’, in which a pathogen or virus lives inconspicuously without causing
symptoms. That means the geographic distribution of inhabitation of fruit bats is prone to Ebola. Ebola is introduced into the human population through close contact with the blood, secretions, organs or other
bodily fluids of infected animals. Ebola then spreads in the community through human-to-human transmission, with infection resulting from direct contact (through
broken skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, and indirect contact with environments contaminated with such fluids. Burial ceremonies in
which mourners have direct contact with the body of the deceased person can also play a role in the transmission of Ebola.
The outbreak is more concerning for India because of its increasing footprints in Africa. Nearly 50,000 Indian citizens are working in the affected West African
countries alone. They range from businessmen, labourers, professionals and peacekeepers who travel back home frequently. India-Africa trade is about USD
35 billion. Oil is an important component of the trade, especially from Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan, which are Ebola-prone countries.
India has stepped up preventive measures like screening and tracking of passengers originating or transiting from the region and travel advisory to defer non-essential
travel to Africa, and rightly so. But this is not enough.
All transit destinations like Dubai need to be alerted; flights and passengers from these transits should be screened. Maldives has already issued similar health alerts. Sri Lanka needs to follow as Colombo airport is
a major travel hub. Oil-tankers and other merchant vessels have to be sanitised adequately. It is also important to raise awareness among the common man
on the risk factors. Thorough cooking of animal products like milk and meat is advisable. Then, there are protective measures that require to be adopted by
people closer to the patients like avoiding close physical contacts, wearing gloves and appropriate personal protective equipment when taking care of ill patients at home, regular hand washing with disinfectant after visiting patients, and prompt and safe cremation of those died of the disease. If ignored, consequences can be catastrophic in terms of lives, socio-economic
disruption and spread to other countries. The longer the outbreak in West Africa persists, the more the chances for the Ebola virus to mutate and adapt. That is the
main worry in the long-run.
Should India be worried about the outbreak of Ebola virus in Western Africa that is more than 9000 km away? Is the situation so alarming? What it Ebola all about? What are the counter-measures required?
In an increasingly globalised world, no distance is far away. It is a matter of few hours by direct flight. The virus has been spreading fast. Thankfully, it is not an
airborne disease. It is however communicable. Since the first case of outbreak reported in February 2014 in
Guinea, the disease has spread to Sierra Leone, Liberia and recently to Nigeria, all along the West African coast. The main vector is the traveller, both within and outside the continent. Saudi Arabia has reported a case of an infected person, a returnee from Sierra Leone. The US has airlifted two of its infected citizens; Spain had flown an affected priest who has since passed. Usually an inland phenomenon, it is intriguing why the Ebola virus is spreading along the coast this time. The current
outbreak has so far claimed over 900 lives, in addition to 2000 infected; more deadly than all the hitherto Ebola outbreaks. The cause for worry is the fact that the Ebola disease has neither a vaccine nor curative
medicine; once infected there is only a 10 per cent chance of survival.
The disease took its name from the Ebola River, the site of the first outbreak in 1976 in the Democratic Republic of Congo (then Zaire). Genus Ebolavirus is one of three
members of the filovirus family (the other two being Marburg Virus and Cueva Virus). Interestingly, Ebola Virus comprises five distinct species: Bundibugyo ebolavirus (BDBV), Zaire ebolavirus (EBOV), Sudan
ebolavirus (SUDV), Reston ebolavirus (RESTV) and Taï Forest ebolavirus (TAFV). The present outbreak is EBOV, considered the most dangerous of all. The incubation
period is 21 days.
According to the World Health Organisation (WHO), symptoms of the disease include the sudden onset of fever, intense weakness, muscle pain, headache and sore throat followed by vomiting, diarrhoea, rash,
impaired kidney and liver function, and in some cases, both internal and external bleeding. Patients report low white blood cell and platelet counts and elevated liver
enzymes. These symptoms are broadly similar to one or the other diseases like malaria, typhoid fever, shigellosis, cholera, leptospirosis, plague, rickettsiosis,relapsing fever, meningitis, hepatitis and other viral
haemorrhagic fevers. This makes diagnosis all the more difficult.
Ebola is a zoonotic disease transmitted to people by wild animals or by other infected patients. Fruit bats are considered Ebola’s ‘reservoir host’, in which a pathogen or virus lives inconspicuously without causing
symptoms. That means the geographic distribution of inhabitation of fruit bats is prone to Ebola. Ebola is introduced into the human population through close contact with the blood, secretions, organs or other
bodily fluids of infected animals. Ebola then spreads in the community through human-to-human transmission, with infection resulting from direct contact (through
broken skin or mucous membranes) with the blood, secretions, organs or other bodily fluids of infected people, and indirect contact with environments contaminated with such fluids. Burial ceremonies in
which mourners have direct contact with the body of the deceased person can also play a role in the transmission of Ebola.
The outbreak is more concerning for India because of its increasing footprints in Africa. Nearly 50,000 Indian citizens are working in the affected West African
countries alone. They range from businessmen, labourers, professionals and peacekeepers who travel back home frequently. India-Africa trade is about USD
35 billion. Oil is an important component of the trade, especially from Nigeria, Ghana, Equatorial Guinea, Côte d’Ivoire and Sudan, which are Ebola-prone countries.
India has stepped up preventive measures like screening and tracking of passengers originating or transiting from the region and travel advisory to defer non-essential
travel to Africa, and rightly so. But this is not enough.
All transit destinations like Dubai need to be alerted; flights and passengers from these transits should be screened. Maldives has already issued similar health alerts. Sri Lanka needs to follow as Colombo airport is
a major travel hub. Oil-tankers and other merchant vessels have to be sanitised adequately. It is also important to raise awareness among the common man
on the risk factors. Thorough cooking of animal products like milk and meat is advisable. Then, there are protective measures that require to be adopted by
people closer to the patients like avoiding close physical contacts, wearing gloves and appropriate personal protective equipment when taking care of ill patients at home, regular hand washing with disinfectant after visiting patients, and prompt and safe cremation of those died of the disease. If ignored, consequences can be catastrophic in terms of lives, socio-economic
disruption and spread to other countries. The longer the outbreak in West Africa persists, the more the chances for the Ebola virus to mutate and adapt. That is the
main worry in the long-run.
13 Aug 2014
OBAMA'S RUSSIAN DILEMMA
Amit Gupta
Has the shooting down of MH-17 heralded the start of a new Cold War? Observers in the west have likened the situation in Europe to 1914 and the hawks in Western
Europe and North America have been calling for tougher sanctions against Russia. Caught in the middle of all this is President Obama who would prefer that Russia and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin just went away.
From an American perspective, Vladimir Putin has become an irritant for while not posing an existential threat to the US and Western Europe, he does create enough waves to require some form of international action. After the annexation of Crimea, President Obama declared Russia to be a regional power and said that he was more concerned about a dirty bomb going off in New York. The American president was doing his best to minimise the American reaction to the events in
Ukraine given his domestic political compulsions. First, the US is recovering from two wars the long term costs of which are over US$3 trillion. Second, despite all the hype from Wall Street and the stock market, the economy remains fragile and cannot be pushed off the cliff by another conflict. Third, Americans have war fatigue as witnessed by the reluctance to get involved in Syria, and lastly, no one, except perhaps John Simon McCain, wants to get into a shooting war with the Russians.
Nor, in actual fact, do the Europeans, despite their protestations, want to do much about Russia. They depend on Russia for 30 per cent of their energy supplies and in an age of globalisation, Russian capital has penetrated the financial and real estate markets of the European continent. More importantly, the Europeans took the peace dividend from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and drastically slashed their militaries. Despite events in Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy - the big four - are not seriously discussing raising defense expenditures. Nor can they. Their aging populations and generous social welfare programmes require shifting money from guns to butter and not the other way around. So the question then
arises, what to do about Russia?
Both the US and Europe are implementing harder sanctions that no doubt will hurt the Russian oligarchy. There may also be a possible push from Europe to have the 2018 World Cup taken away from Moscow. It that were to happen it would be a huge propaganda defeat for Putin since he used the Sochi Olympics to boost his international image. Having said that, there is a genuine danger that this will blow up in the face of the west because the Russians will turn the energy screws on Ukraine, and while the EU was very keen on having
Ukraine move out from under the Russian umbrella, it is unlikely to foot the large bill for Ukraine’s economic problems and its energy supplies. Further, the Russians have the option of looking east although this is something that goes against the recent
history and cultural mindset. Historically, the Russians have sought to be a western nation with the earthy Nikita Khrushchev telling them to be western and not perch on their toilet seats like eagles. Under Yeltsin and Putin the drive to become western has continued with the Russians being openly dismissive of the BRICS in public forums and claiming that they are a western nation. Yet, in the current climate of growing sanctions, it is the BRICs, particularly China, that can save Vladimir Putin’s regime - the recent US$40 billion
energy deal with Beijing being a case in point. China, in fact, can be the driver for greater economic growth for Russia through the building of pipelines and
infrastructure but Moscow must worry at the same time that this will make it economically dependent on its eastern neighbour.
What is likely to happen, now that tighter sanctions have been implemented, is that after a decent waiting period the west can cool down the rhetoric about Russia
while Moscow itself will be able to work around the sanctions. And given how every week a new issue catches the attention of the US media, Ukraine will be consigned to the back pages where it was before the
shootdown of MH-17 put it back in the news as a crisis. Neither Europe nor the US is likely to push for military actions since it the one scenario that no one in Europe wants.
Ironically, the real winners in this may be China and India. The Chinese have been worried about the US pivot to Asia and events in Ukraine take the heat off Beijing as it solves to deal with the Senakaku-Diaoyu islands and tensions in the South China Sea. India too can be a winner if it is able to use the Ukraine crisis to better engage Russia on issues of energy supply and arms sales because Russia desperately needs friends right now. India-Russia trade is pledged to cross the US $9 billion mark but it is a far cry from a figure comparable to India-China trade. This could be easier
to do because Russia’s limited options in light of the sanctions force it to look east and to strike potentially lucrative deals with the very countries it once rejected
as eastern and backward.
Has the shooting down of MH-17 heralded the start of a new Cold War? Observers in the west have likened the situation in Europe to 1914 and the hawks in Western
Europe and North America have been calling for tougher sanctions against Russia. Caught in the middle of all this is President Obama who would prefer that Russia and Vladimir Vladimirovich Putin just went away.
From an American perspective, Vladimir Putin has become an irritant for while not posing an existential threat to the US and Western Europe, he does create enough waves to require some form of international action. After the annexation of Crimea, President Obama declared Russia to be a regional power and said that he was more concerned about a dirty bomb going off in New York. The American president was doing his best to minimise the American reaction to the events in
Ukraine given his domestic political compulsions. First, the US is recovering from two wars the long term costs of which are over US$3 trillion. Second, despite all the hype from Wall Street and the stock market, the economy remains fragile and cannot be pushed off the cliff by another conflict. Third, Americans have war fatigue as witnessed by the reluctance to get involved in Syria, and lastly, no one, except perhaps John Simon McCain, wants to get into a shooting war with the Russians.
Nor, in actual fact, do the Europeans, despite their protestations, want to do much about Russia. They depend on Russia for 30 per cent of their energy supplies and in an age of globalisation, Russian capital has penetrated the financial and real estate markets of the European continent. More importantly, the Europeans took the peace dividend from the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and drastically slashed their militaries. Despite events in Ukraine, Britain, France, Germany, and Italy - the big four - are not seriously discussing raising defense expenditures. Nor can they. Their aging populations and generous social welfare programmes require shifting money from guns to butter and not the other way around. So the question then
arises, what to do about Russia?
Both the US and Europe are implementing harder sanctions that no doubt will hurt the Russian oligarchy. There may also be a possible push from Europe to have the 2018 World Cup taken away from Moscow. It that were to happen it would be a huge propaganda defeat for Putin since he used the Sochi Olympics to boost his international image. Having said that, there is a genuine danger that this will blow up in the face of the west because the Russians will turn the energy screws on Ukraine, and while the EU was very keen on having
Ukraine move out from under the Russian umbrella, it is unlikely to foot the large bill for Ukraine’s economic problems and its energy supplies. Further, the Russians have the option of looking east although this is something that goes against the recent
history and cultural mindset. Historically, the Russians have sought to be a western nation with the earthy Nikita Khrushchev telling them to be western and not perch on their toilet seats like eagles. Under Yeltsin and Putin the drive to become western has continued with the Russians being openly dismissive of the BRICS in public forums and claiming that they are a western nation. Yet, in the current climate of growing sanctions, it is the BRICs, particularly China, that can save Vladimir Putin’s regime - the recent US$40 billion
energy deal with Beijing being a case in point. China, in fact, can be the driver for greater economic growth for Russia through the building of pipelines and
infrastructure but Moscow must worry at the same time that this will make it economically dependent on its eastern neighbour.
What is likely to happen, now that tighter sanctions have been implemented, is that after a decent waiting period the west can cool down the rhetoric about Russia
while Moscow itself will be able to work around the sanctions. And given how every week a new issue catches the attention of the US media, Ukraine will be consigned to the back pages where it was before the
shootdown of MH-17 put it back in the news as a crisis. Neither Europe nor the US is likely to push for military actions since it the one scenario that no one in Europe wants.
Ironically, the real winners in this may be China and India. The Chinese have been worried about the US pivot to Asia and events in Ukraine take the heat off Beijing as it solves to deal with the Senakaku-Diaoyu islands and tensions in the South China Sea. India too can be a winner if it is able to use the Ukraine crisis to better engage Russia on issues of energy supply and arms sales because Russia desperately needs friends right now. India-Russia trade is pledged to cross the US $9 billion mark but it is a far cry from a figure comparable to India-China trade. This could be easier
to do because Russia’s limited options in light of the sanctions force it to look east and to strike potentially lucrative deals with the very countries it once rejected
as eastern and backward.
PAKISTAN: OF MESSIAHS AND MARCHES
Salma Malik
It is both tragic and funny how the poor Pakistanis take anyone and everyone for the political messiah. All this proverbial messiah needs to do is say the right things
with passion and fervour. Interestingly, the way Pakistani decision-makers run the country’s daily affairs and take their subjects for fools, makes the messiahs’
work easier and convenient. Whether these messiahs deliver what they promised is a matter of great debate.
The latest in this series are the not-so-new Imran Khan, and Tahir ul-Qadri. Both promise to bring revolution by leading long marches into the capital city to the added discomfort and misery of the general public – who are quite done with long marches,
cordoned cities, road blocks, cellular services shut for days and the recent addition: gas stations running out of supplies. It is essentially like being in a state of emergency, with everyone anticipating the worse and wishing for stability. But there is always a segment of the population that is willing to march along.
In a way, this is all about democracy – people voicing their sentiment in a country that has not been famous for democratic traditions. The previous military rule
paved way for a democratic government, albeit hinged on extremely fragile foundations. However, despite the inherent fragility, the Pakistan People’s Party-led (PPP) government not only survived the promised five years but also instituted constitutional reforms that would, in the long run, strengthen the country’s democratic foundations, and successfully concluded its tenure via a smooth and near-peaceful political transition. This happened despite the existence of a strong, belligerent
opposition and a hyper active judiciary. However, the messiahs and marches haunted the PPP just as much, primarily because of the fact that they failed to perform on the governance meter – with a ready excuse that there was no space for them to perform.
For the current government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, however, this excuse cannot work. Voted into power with control of the most powerful province in
the country, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N) strength has been its strong team of technocrats, its investor-friendly vision and unlike the PPP, that was often considered the rich and corrupt boys’ club and passionately disliked by the kingmakers, the former has friends and protectors in the right places and enjoys a sizeable clout. Acting as a messiah
themselves, the Sharifs and their team used the right language to a roaring success in the 2013 election; and followed closely by la capitain – Imran Khan – who was considered the best thing to happen to Pakistan in a long time. The PML-N voters were a steady traditional vote base who invariably cast their fate in their party’s
favour. The captain’s voters were the first-timers, young, vibrant, and holding onto the promise that their vote really matters, and they infused energy into skeptics to cast their votes as well.
Easily distinguishable from their youthful looks and sparkling eyes as if they were revolutionaries and not part of an evolutionary process. But this is the latest
fad led by Uncle Sam, where the discourse on revolution has been reinvented and reinterpreted. So the TV- anglesite Tahir ul-Qadri landed from Canada and marched into Islamabad after making strong
“revolutionary” declarations at mammoth rallies across Punjab, with a large number of followers in January 2013. After a three-day sit-in seeking the end of injustice committed by the incumbent government in harsh weather, he went home in the comfort of his trailer with all promises frozen, making a mockery of
everything. Then, as now, Imran Khan was the other revolutionary torch-bearer, but not joining hands with Qadri. Once again, they will find blind followers, similar in their passion, but different in their outlook, carrying the same sentiment with which a majority of them went to vote: transforming the country into the promise these messiahs throw at them. Yet, these innocents fail to realise that these messiahs are independent in neither their thoughts nor actions. Indulging in conspiracy theories – that is a South Asian norm – their handlers have a different agenda to play. While the incumbent government’s mega transportation schemes will not change the lot and effect positive change in the lives of
ordinary citizens suffering the daily brunt on gross mis- governance, these empty histrionics will too will not lead us to the promised land the public endlessly seeks.
At a time when the country is undergoing a tremendous security transformation and is faces massive internal governance issues, the need is not for the rulers to act with paranoia and convert the country into a battlefield – which may, owing to their mishandling of the issue, push the country into civil unrest – but to show wisdom
and insight and handle the problem at hand, manage the political crises that are much their own creation; and once settled, introspectively try and be democratic
and govern the country in a manner befitting democrats; happily bid farewell to the Maulana to prepare for another march; and allow the public to lead our daily
lives.
It is both tragic and funny how the poor Pakistanis take anyone and everyone for the political messiah. All this proverbial messiah needs to do is say the right things
with passion and fervour. Interestingly, the way Pakistani decision-makers run the country’s daily affairs and take their subjects for fools, makes the messiahs’
work easier and convenient. Whether these messiahs deliver what they promised is a matter of great debate.
The latest in this series are the not-so-new Imran Khan, and Tahir ul-Qadri. Both promise to bring revolution by leading long marches into the capital city to the added discomfort and misery of the general public – who are quite done with long marches,
cordoned cities, road blocks, cellular services shut for days and the recent addition: gas stations running out of supplies. It is essentially like being in a state of emergency, with everyone anticipating the worse and wishing for stability. But there is always a segment of the population that is willing to march along.
In a way, this is all about democracy – people voicing their sentiment in a country that has not been famous for democratic traditions. The previous military rule
paved way for a democratic government, albeit hinged on extremely fragile foundations. However, despite the inherent fragility, the Pakistan People’s Party-led (PPP) government not only survived the promised five years but also instituted constitutional reforms that would, in the long run, strengthen the country’s democratic foundations, and successfully concluded its tenure via a smooth and near-peaceful political transition. This happened despite the existence of a strong, belligerent
opposition and a hyper active judiciary. However, the messiahs and marches haunted the PPP just as much, primarily because of the fact that they failed to perform on the governance meter – with a ready excuse that there was no space for them to perform.
For the current government led by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, however, this excuse cannot work. Voted into power with control of the most powerful province in
the country, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz’s (PML-N) strength has been its strong team of technocrats, its investor-friendly vision and unlike the PPP, that was often considered the rich and corrupt boys’ club and passionately disliked by the kingmakers, the former has friends and protectors in the right places and enjoys a sizeable clout. Acting as a messiah
themselves, the Sharifs and their team used the right language to a roaring success in the 2013 election; and followed closely by la capitain – Imran Khan – who was considered the best thing to happen to Pakistan in a long time. The PML-N voters were a steady traditional vote base who invariably cast their fate in their party’s
favour. The captain’s voters were the first-timers, young, vibrant, and holding onto the promise that their vote really matters, and they infused energy into skeptics to cast their votes as well.
Easily distinguishable from their youthful looks and sparkling eyes as if they were revolutionaries and not part of an evolutionary process. But this is the latest
fad led by Uncle Sam, where the discourse on revolution has been reinvented and reinterpreted. So the TV- anglesite Tahir ul-Qadri landed from Canada and marched into Islamabad after making strong
“revolutionary” declarations at mammoth rallies across Punjab, with a large number of followers in January 2013. After a three-day sit-in seeking the end of injustice committed by the incumbent government in harsh weather, he went home in the comfort of his trailer with all promises frozen, making a mockery of
everything. Then, as now, Imran Khan was the other revolutionary torch-bearer, but not joining hands with Qadri. Once again, they will find blind followers, similar in their passion, but different in their outlook, carrying the same sentiment with which a majority of them went to vote: transforming the country into the promise these messiahs throw at them. Yet, these innocents fail to realise that these messiahs are independent in neither their thoughts nor actions. Indulging in conspiracy theories – that is a South Asian norm – their handlers have a different agenda to play. While the incumbent government’s mega transportation schemes will not change the lot and effect positive change in the lives of
ordinary citizens suffering the daily brunt on gross mis- governance, these empty histrionics will too will not lead us to the promised land the public endlessly seeks.
At a time when the country is undergoing a tremendous security transformation and is faces massive internal governance issues, the need is not for the rulers to act with paranoia and convert the country into a battlefield – which may, owing to their mishandling of the issue, push the country into civil unrest – but to show wisdom
and insight and handle the problem at hand, manage the political crises that are much their own creation; and once settled, introspectively try and be democratic
and govern the country in a manner befitting democrats; happily bid farewell to the Maulana to prepare for another march; and allow the public to lead our daily
lives.
OBAMA ADMINISTRATION: RE-ENGAGING INDIA
Chintamani Mahapatra
After months of downgrading its engagement with the Indian government, US President Barack Obama’s
administration has woken up to the new reality of a transformed political profile in New Delhi, and has managed to alter its diplomatic course.
The Devyani Khobragade episode had cast a shadow over the much-trumpeted US-India strategic partnership. It was followed by disturbing headlines on the bilateral, when the May 2014 national election catapulted Narendra Modi and his party, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), to the centre-stage of Indian politics. The massive popular mandate to the BJP has meant a stable central government for next five years in
India that effectively replaces decades-long coalition politics and a recent tendency towards federalisation of Indian foreign policy making.
The difficulty for the US was to begin dialoguing with the new Indian strongman who was, for years, denied a US visa. There is no parallel in the US history to the denial of a visa to a three-time chief minister of a
democratic country. However, the US’ pragmatism has always been legendary. Soon after it was clear that Narendra Modi
would lead the next government in India, Obama dialled ‘M’ for Modi, congratulated him and invited him to visit Washington at an agreeable time. Modi’s pragmatism
has been equally legendary and he promptly concurred.
Modi, nonetheless, gave no impression whatsoever that he was too eager to make a trip to a country that refused him access for an alleged violation of human rights that had been cleared by the Supreme Court of
India. His decision to invite the SAARC heads of states to his inauguration; choosing Bhutan for his first foreign
visit; postpone a planned visit to Tokyo; but miss no chance to meet with the Chinese and Russian leaders at the BRICS summit; and to ask his External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to choose Bangladesh for her first foreign visit; signalled that Modi would maintain relationships with the US, and its allies on his own terms.
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, did not take things lying down. The US’ persistence is reflected in the fact that thirteen officials from Washington have
already visited New Delhi to establish contacts with their counterparts at various levels. Three cabinet level officers, the US Secretary of State, the US Commerce
Secretary and the US Secretary of Defense visited India and met Prime Minister Modi, along with others, to kick- start the momentum in the bilateral relations.
Next month, Modi will head to Washington for his first summit with Obama. While the US cabinet level officials visited Delhi to prepare for the Obama-Modi summit in
September, surprisingly, none at the cabinet level from India has visited Washington yet. It appears that more than New Delhi, it is Washington that is keen to bury the past and move ahead to repair
the relationship and build further. Significantly, US Secretary of State John Kerry stated during his visit that he would not like to dig the past and that, in any case,
Modi was denied visa by the previous Republican Administration. In fact, a post on Twitter mentioned that President Obama was unaware of the denial of visa to Modi.
Similarly, one could make the point that the US-India differences over airline security, pharmaceutical business, solar panel manufacturing, Indian steel and several other issues that constituted headline news
should not be allowed to affect Indo-US ties in other areas.
In fact, Kerry came to India like a diplomatic sales- executive to promote cooperation in the energy sector;
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker came to impress upon India the importance of signing the Trade Facilitation Act (TFA) at the World Trade Organisation and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, during his visit,
sought to discuss defence deals worth billions of dollars.
Clearly, India’s civil nuclear liability act is a road block to fulfil Secretary Kerry’s desire for full-fledged energy cooperation and the Modi government’s firm decision to not sacrifice India’s food security policy at the TFA’s altar is a disappointment for Secretary Penny.
While the Kerry-Penny visit to India coincided with the vote on the FTA at the WTO, and India’s refusal to lend its support overshadowed their visit, Hagel’s visit to
India pumped some positive energy into the bilateral relationship. Compared to the India-US economic and diplomatic ties, defence ties between the two countries
appear more cooperative and less controversial. Despite differences over pricing, technology transfer, the
Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, and end-user agreement, India was the largest market for US weapons last year, and has already purchased $10 billion worth of defence equipment over the past decade.
Unlike the recent US initiatives towards India, the Modi government’s plans and proposals to better ties with Washington still has a veil of secrecy. The government
is still in its infancy, though. Nonetheless, one expects clarity of Modi’s moves towards the US during his September summit with Obama.
After months of downgrading its engagement with the Indian government, US President Barack Obama’s
administration has woken up to the new reality of a transformed political profile in New Delhi, and has managed to alter its diplomatic course.
The Devyani Khobragade episode had cast a shadow over the much-trumpeted US-India strategic partnership. It was followed by disturbing headlines on the bilateral, when the May 2014 national election catapulted Narendra Modi and his party, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP), to the centre-stage of Indian politics. The massive popular mandate to the BJP has meant a stable central government for next five years in
India that effectively replaces decades-long coalition politics and a recent tendency towards federalisation of Indian foreign policy making.
The difficulty for the US was to begin dialoguing with the new Indian strongman who was, for years, denied a US visa. There is no parallel in the US history to the denial of a visa to a three-time chief minister of a
democratic country. However, the US’ pragmatism has always been legendary. Soon after it was clear that Narendra Modi
would lead the next government in India, Obama dialled ‘M’ for Modi, congratulated him and invited him to visit Washington at an agreeable time. Modi’s pragmatism
has been equally legendary and he promptly concurred.
Modi, nonetheless, gave no impression whatsoever that he was too eager to make a trip to a country that refused him access for an alleged violation of human rights that had been cleared by the Supreme Court of
India. His decision to invite the SAARC heads of states to his inauguration; choosing Bhutan for his first foreign
visit; postpone a planned visit to Tokyo; but miss no chance to meet with the Chinese and Russian leaders at the BRICS summit; and to ask his External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj to choose Bangladesh for her first foreign visit; signalled that Modi would maintain relationships with the US, and its allies on his own terms.
The Obama Administration, on the other hand, did not take things lying down. The US’ persistence is reflected in the fact that thirteen officials from Washington have
already visited New Delhi to establish contacts with their counterparts at various levels. Three cabinet level officers, the US Secretary of State, the US Commerce
Secretary and the US Secretary of Defense visited India and met Prime Minister Modi, along with others, to kick- start the momentum in the bilateral relations.
Next month, Modi will head to Washington for his first summit with Obama. While the US cabinet level officials visited Delhi to prepare for the Obama-Modi summit in
September, surprisingly, none at the cabinet level from India has visited Washington yet. It appears that more than New Delhi, it is Washington that is keen to bury the past and move ahead to repair
the relationship and build further. Significantly, US Secretary of State John Kerry stated during his visit that he would not like to dig the past and that, in any case,
Modi was denied visa by the previous Republican Administration. In fact, a post on Twitter mentioned that President Obama was unaware of the denial of visa to Modi.
Similarly, one could make the point that the US-India differences over airline security, pharmaceutical business, solar panel manufacturing, Indian steel and several other issues that constituted headline news
should not be allowed to affect Indo-US ties in other areas.
In fact, Kerry came to India like a diplomatic sales- executive to promote cooperation in the energy sector;
Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker came to impress upon India the importance of signing the Trade Facilitation Act (TFA) at the World Trade Organisation and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, during his visit,
sought to discuss defence deals worth billions of dollars.
Clearly, India’s civil nuclear liability act is a road block to fulfil Secretary Kerry’s desire for full-fledged energy cooperation and the Modi government’s firm decision to not sacrifice India’s food security policy at the TFA’s altar is a disappointment for Secretary Penny.
While the Kerry-Penny visit to India coincided with the vote on the FTA at the WTO, and India’s refusal to lend its support overshadowed their visit, Hagel’s visit to
India pumped some positive energy into the bilateral relationship. Compared to the India-US economic and diplomatic ties, defence ties between the two countries
appear more cooperative and less controversial. Despite differences over pricing, technology transfer, the
Communications Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement, and end-user agreement, India was the largest market for US weapons last year, and has already purchased $10 billion worth of defence equipment over the past decade.
Unlike the recent US initiatives towards India, the Modi government’s plans and proposals to better ties with Washington still has a veil of secrecy. The government
is still in its infancy, though. Nonetheless, one expects clarity of Modi’s moves towards the US during his September summit with Obama.
THE COVENANT OF SANS SWORD
Vijay Shankar
Power and Self-Preservation
Hobbes underscored the need to establish an aura of awe and visible power in order that men do not degenerate to their natural anarchic passions. He said, “And covenants without the sword are but words and are of no strength to secure a man at all.” Yet, India forges a nuclear ‘Sword’ whose utility lies in its non- use. However, intrinsic to the logic is a three-fold endowment – the Sword’s unprecedented destructive promise, its influence, and its ability to deter conflict beyond the conventional.
Evolution of a Nuclear Doctrine
India’s nuclear programme was driven by a techno- politico-bureaucratic nexus to the exclusion of the military. Whether this strategic orientation was by default or a deep-seated trepidation of the military is
not germane; what it did was to create a muddled approach to the process of operationalising the deterrent. But to its acclaim go the separation of the nuclear from the conventional and distinction between the Controller of nuclear weapons and its Custodian.
Discerning that nuclear multilateralism introduces dynamics that are vastly dissimilar to the two-state confrontation of the past; exceptional faith was placed on a calculus where intentions rather than capability alone, weighed in with greater sway. Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons sets into motion an uncontrollable chain of mass destruction, response-
proportionality and controlled escalation were rejected.
India’s nuclear doctrine is rooted in three principles: no first use (NFU); massive retaliation to a first strike; and credible deterrence. There was a fourth unwritten faith; nuclear weapons would not be conventionalised, a principle that remained divorced from the belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won. The nuclear
doctrine was made public on 04 January 2003. The first part deals with ‘form’; nuclear war avoidance is the leit motif and NFU the canon. The logic of self preservation demanded the arsenal be credible and response-ready.
The second part of the doctrine deals with ‘substance’, operationalising the deterrent and command and control are the main themes.
China: Proliferation Policy
China beginning in the 1970s promoted an aggressive policy of transfer of nuclear weapon technology and missiles to reprobate States using North Korea as a
clearing house. The policy has been continued unrelentingly. Reasons for such profligate leanings are a matter of conjecture. They may have originally reflected balance of power logic. However, proliferation in the Islamic world has implications that are sinister particularly since AQ Khan made known that nuclear
chastity is a fable. Radical Islam perceives nuclear weapons as a means to destroy an order that has wilfully kept the Ummah under subjugation. In this frame of reference the singling out of the US, India and Israel for retribution attains new meaning. It also gives to China a heft up the power ladder.
The Unhinged Tri-Polar Deterrent Relationship
A deterrent relationship is founded on rationality. For the ‘deterree’ there is rationality in the conviction of
disproportionate risks; and for the deterrer rationality in confirming the reality of risks. The exceptional feature is that roles are reversible provided the common interest is
stability.
Unique to the deterrent relationship in the region is the tri-polar nature of linkages and an abiding symptom is Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Conceived,
designed and tested by Beijing, the programme has also rapidly created the means to stockpile fissile material.
Under these circumstances any scheme to stabilise the situation must first address the duality of the Sino-Pak programme. Persistent collaboration and a breakneck
build-up of nuclear infrastructure suggests doctrinal co- relation which any deterrent relationship overlooks at its peril.
Making Sense of Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy: The Nuclear Nightmare
The opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear
underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies has made it prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad
or to find coherence in the mania for parity, the rush for fissile material, and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the strategic notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be offset by “either an assured second- strike capability or, a hair-trigger-arsenal" and as Feroz
Khan’s bizarre argument goes, "TNWs provide another layer of deterrence designed to apply brakes on India’s
conventional superiority” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). On a perplexing note Khan concludes that likelihood of inadvertence is high, tenability of central
control low, and the probability of Indian pre-emptive conventional attack a near certainty.
No scrutiny of the sub-continental situation can avoid looking at the internals of Pakistan. The country today is in perilous pass caused by the Establishment nurturing terrorist organisations as instruments of their misshapen policies. Pakistan’s radical links makes the status-quo unacceptable for the nuclear nightmare as a hair trigger, opaque deterrent embracing tactical use
under military control steered by an ambiguous doctrine and guided by a military strategy that finds unity with
terrorists is upon us. The unbiased examiner is left bewildered that if
imbalance in the power equation with India is so substantial and internals so anaemic, then why does Pakistan not seek rapprochement as a priority for policies?
Conclusion
In declaring her nuclear doctrine, India struck a covenant not just with her own citizens but with the global community. At its core was the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. On the face of it such
a disavowal defied conventional wisdom. To deliberately temper a sword and then to abjure its first use would appear to contradict sovereign morality, after all if the first duty of the State is to protect its citizens, then to open itself to the first strike would be a failing. And yet if there is belief in the changed nature of warfare that
nuclear weapons have ushered, then humanity’s moral weight would be on the side of the covenant sans sword. Fatefully, till that moral weight finds strategic
expression, it is the destructive promise of the NFU policy backed by pre-emptive conventional capabilities that will rein in a nuclear misadventure.
Power and Self-Preservation
Hobbes underscored the need to establish an aura of awe and visible power in order that men do not degenerate to their natural anarchic passions. He said, “And covenants without the sword are but words and are of no strength to secure a man at all.” Yet, India forges a nuclear ‘Sword’ whose utility lies in its non- use. However, intrinsic to the logic is a three-fold endowment – the Sword’s unprecedented destructive promise, its influence, and its ability to deter conflict beyond the conventional.
Evolution of a Nuclear Doctrine
India’s nuclear programme was driven by a techno- politico-bureaucratic nexus to the exclusion of the military. Whether this strategic orientation was by default or a deep-seated trepidation of the military is
not germane; what it did was to create a muddled approach to the process of operationalising the deterrent. But to its acclaim go the separation of the nuclear from the conventional and distinction between the Controller of nuclear weapons and its Custodian.
Discerning that nuclear multilateralism introduces dynamics that are vastly dissimilar to the two-state confrontation of the past; exceptional faith was placed on a calculus where intentions rather than capability alone, weighed in with greater sway. Convinced that the use of nuclear weapons sets into motion an uncontrollable chain of mass destruction, response-
proportionality and controlled escalation were rejected.
India’s nuclear doctrine is rooted in three principles: no first use (NFU); massive retaliation to a first strike; and credible deterrence. There was a fourth unwritten faith; nuclear weapons would not be conventionalised, a principle that remained divorced from the belief that a nuclear war could be fought and won. The nuclear
doctrine was made public on 04 January 2003. The first part deals with ‘form’; nuclear war avoidance is the leit motif and NFU the canon. The logic of self preservation demanded the arsenal be credible and response-ready.
The second part of the doctrine deals with ‘substance’, operationalising the deterrent and command and control are the main themes.
China: Proliferation Policy
China beginning in the 1970s promoted an aggressive policy of transfer of nuclear weapon technology and missiles to reprobate States using North Korea as a
clearing house. The policy has been continued unrelentingly. Reasons for such profligate leanings are a matter of conjecture. They may have originally reflected balance of power logic. However, proliferation in the Islamic world has implications that are sinister particularly since AQ Khan made known that nuclear
chastity is a fable. Radical Islam perceives nuclear weapons as a means to destroy an order that has wilfully kept the Ummah under subjugation. In this frame of reference the singling out of the US, India and Israel for retribution attains new meaning. It also gives to China a heft up the power ladder.
The Unhinged Tri-Polar Deterrent Relationship
A deterrent relationship is founded on rationality. For the ‘deterree’ there is rationality in the conviction of
disproportionate risks; and for the deterrer rationality in confirming the reality of risks. The exceptional feature is that roles are reversible provided the common interest is
stability.
Unique to the deterrent relationship in the region is the tri-polar nature of linkages and an abiding symptom is Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme. Conceived,
designed and tested by Beijing, the programme has also rapidly created the means to stockpile fissile material.
Under these circumstances any scheme to stabilise the situation must first address the duality of the Sino-Pak programme. Persistent collaboration and a breakneck
build-up of nuclear infrastructure suggests doctrinal co- relation which any deterrent relationship overlooks at its peril.
Making Sense of Pakistan’s Nuclear Strategy: The Nuclear Nightmare
The opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear
underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies has made it prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad
or to find coherence in the mania for parity, the rush for fissile material, and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the strategic notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be offset by “either an assured second- strike capability or, a hair-trigger-arsenal" and as Feroz
Khan’s bizarre argument goes, "TNWs provide another layer of deterrence designed to apply brakes on India’s
conventional superiority” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). On a perplexing note Khan concludes that likelihood of inadvertence is high, tenability of central
control low, and the probability of Indian pre-emptive conventional attack a near certainty.
No scrutiny of the sub-continental situation can avoid looking at the internals of Pakistan. The country today is in perilous pass caused by the Establishment nurturing terrorist organisations as instruments of their misshapen policies. Pakistan’s radical links makes the status-quo unacceptable for the nuclear nightmare as a hair trigger, opaque deterrent embracing tactical use
under military control steered by an ambiguous doctrine and guided by a military strategy that finds unity with
terrorists is upon us. The unbiased examiner is left bewildered that if
imbalance in the power equation with India is so substantial and internals so anaemic, then why does Pakistan not seek rapprochement as a priority for policies?
Conclusion
In declaring her nuclear doctrine, India struck a covenant not just with her own citizens but with the global community. At its core was the renunciation of the first use of nuclear weapons. On the face of it such
a disavowal defied conventional wisdom. To deliberately temper a sword and then to abjure its first use would appear to contradict sovereign morality, after all if the first duty of the State is to protect its citizens, then to open itself to the first strike would be a failing. And yet if there is belief in the changed nature of warfare that
nuclear weapons have ushered, then humanity’s moral weight would be on the side of the covenant sans sword. Fatefully, till that moral weight finds strategic
expression, it is the destructive promise of the NFU policy backed by pre-emptive conventional capabilities that will rein in a nuclear misadventure.
9 Aug 2014
GENOCIDE IN IRAQ
Travis Weber
The dramatic evidence pointing to the
extermination of Christians and Christian
culture in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham’s (ISIS) is impossible to ignore.
This past week, upset Iraqis rallied outside
the White House. A few days ago, an
administration official finally met with Iraqi Christians. But the leader of the free world has yet to forcefully condemn one of the clearest cases of genocide since World War II.
President Obama has previously addressed
humanitarian issues by appealing to the
Responsibility to Protect – a relatively recent doctrine not clearly established or grounded in international law. While its validity can be debated, clearer grounds exist on which to address the plight of Iraq’s Christians – the obligation to prevent genocide contained in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.
After the horror of the Nazi ideology and
ensuing Holocaust was fully realized, the
nations of the world gathered together,
formed the United Nations, and affirmed they would never let such horrors happen again.
The Genocide Convention laid down into
international law a binding treaty
arrangement in which contracting nations
agreed to “undertake to prevent and to
punish” genocide. While some argue that this “obligation to prevent” genocide is not an independent requirement of the treaty, the clear language and purpose of the treaty
suggest otherwise.
Indeed, the whole point of the treaty was to
prevent horrors like the Holocaust from
happening again. This understanding is
solidified by a decision of the International
Court of Justice holding that the treaty
contains a clear, independent obligation to
prevent genocide According to the Convention, genocide consists of “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” –
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
ISIS has clearly engaged in multiple of these
acts with the “intent to destroy” a “religious
group” (Iraqi Christians) “in whole.” If the
elements of the crime of genocide are not met in this case, I’m not sure if they ever could be.
The responsibility to prevent contained in the Genocide Convention requires that the United States and other parties to the treaty act to prevent genocide when they recognize it is occurring. It is difficult to deny that genocide of Iraq’s Christians is currently underway.
Sometimes nations have refrained from
calling genocide what it is (such as in the
Darfur region of Sudan several years ago, or in Rwanda in the early 1990s) out of fear of triggering their legal obligation to act to
prevent genocide under the Genocide
Convention. Is this the effect the treaty was
intended to have? It is inconceivable that a
mechanism designed to prevent future
atrocities would be used as a reason to avoid denouncing such massacres as they occur. Yet there is reason to believe nations have and will continue to operate this way.
While governments may try to craft
arguments against their obligation if they do not want to address the issue, that will
become more difficult as more facts come to light. The evidence from Iraq is clear – ISIS’ stated intent is to target Christians, which is a classification based on religion, one of the requirements for genocide. No nation which is a party to the Genocide Convention should be able to escape its requirement to act to prevent what ISIS is now doing to Iraq’s Christians.
Over twenty years ago, President Clinton
hesitated to take decisive action to stop
genocide in Rwanda. He avoided calling it
genocide precisely because of the concerns
expressed here – the United States would be
obligated to do something if genocide was
recognized. As a result, over a million lives
were lost. Several years later, President
Clinton went to Rwanda and admitted his
error.
Yet this is precisely the point of the binding
legal “obligation to prevent” contained in the Genocide Convention – it should not be
manipulated according to the shifting winds of foreign policy. It was always understood that binding obligations were necessary to prevent nations from wavering in the future when memories of the Holocaust started to fade.
The Genocide Convention was designed to
prevent future horrors. Yet the nations of the world now stand by as genocide of Christians occurs before their very eyes in Iraq. All the elements of this crime are met, and we have an obligation to prevent it. What are we waiting for? That same question, which was asked of Nazi appeasers in the 1930s and President Clinton in the 1990s, will someday
be asked of us about Iraq.
The dramatic evidence pointing to the
extermination of Christians and Christian
culture in Iraq by the Islamic State of Iraq
and al-Sham’s (ISIS) is impossible to ignore.
This past week, upset Iraqis rallied outside
the White House. A few days ago, an
administration official finally met with Iraqi Christians. But the leader of the free world has yet to forcefully condemn one of the clearest cases of genocide since World War II.
President Obama has previously addressed
humanitarian issues by appealing to the
Responsibility to Protect – a relatively recent doctrine not clearly established or grounded in international law. While its validity can be debated, clearer grounds exist on which to address the plight of Iraq’s Christians – the obligation to prevent genocide contained in the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of 1948.
After the horror of the Nazi ideology and
ensuing Holocaust was fully realized, the
nations of the world gathered together,
formed the United Nations, and affirmed they would never let such horrors happen again.
The Genocide Convention laid down into
international law a binding treaty
arrangement in which contracting nations
agreed to “undertake to prevent and to
punish” genocide. While some argue that this “obligation to prevent” genocide is not an independent requirement of the treaty, the clear language and purpose of the treaty
suggest otherwise.
Indeed, the whole point of the treaty was to
prevent horrors like the Holocaust from
happening again. This understanding is
solidified by a decision of the International
Court of Justice holding that the treaty
contains a clear, independent obligation to
prevent genocide According to the Convention, genocide consists of “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group” –
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group
conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent
births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.
ISIS has clearly engaged in multiple of these
acts with the “intent to destroy” a “religious
group” (Iraqi Christians) “in whole.” If the
elements of the crime of genocide are not met in this case, I’m not sure if they ever could be.
The responsibility to prevent contained in the Genocide Convention requires that the United States and other parties to the treaty act to prevent genocide when they recognize it is occurring. It is difficult to deny that genocide of Iraq’s Christians is currently underway.
Sometimes nations have refrained from
calling genocide what it is (such as in the
Darfur region of Sudan several years ago, or in Rwanda in the early 1990s) out of fear of triggering their legal obligation to act to
prevent genocide under the Genocide
Convention. Is this the effect the treaty was
intended to have? It is inconceivable that a
mechanism designed to prevent future
atrocities would be used as a reason to avoid denouncing such massacres as they occur. Yet there is reason to believe nations have and will continue to operate this way.
While governments may try to craft
arguments against their obligation if they do not want to address the issue, that will
become more difficult as more facts come to light. The evidence from Iraq is clear – ISIS’ stated intent is to target Christians, which is a classification based on religion, one of the requirements for genocide. No nation which is a party to the Genocide Convention should be able to escape its requirement to act to prevent what ISIS is now doing to Iraq’s Christians.
Over twenty years ago, President Clinton
hesitated to take decisive action to stop
genocide in Rwanda. He avoided calling it
genocide precisely because of the concerns
expressed here – the United States would be
obligated to do something if genocide was
recognized. As a result, over a million lives
were lost. Several years later, President
Clinton went to Rwanda and admitted his
error.
Yet this is precisely the point of the binding
legal “obligation to prevent” contained in the Genocide Convention – it should not be
manipulated according to the shifting winds of foreign policy. It was always understood that binding obligations were necessary to prevent nations from wavering in the future when memories of the Holocaust started to fade.
The Genocide Convention was designed to
prevent future horrors. Yet the nations of the world now stand by as genocide of Christians occurs before their very eyes in Iraq. All the elements of this crime are met, and we have an obligation to prevent it. What are we waiting for? That same question, which was asked of Nazi appeasers in the 1930s and President Clinton in the 1990s, will someday
be asked of us about Iraq.
FIGHTING WITHOUT SILVER BULLETS
Caroline Glick
Hours before Israel accepted the Egyptian-
brokered cease-fire deal on Monday night,
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu traveled to the south to try to allay the fears of area residents. It’s not at all clear how successful he was. Residents of the communities bordering the Gaza Strip who evacuated their homes are skeptical of the IDF’s claims that it is safe for them to return.
In an interview with NRG website, Yael Paz-
Lahiany, a mother of three young children
from Kibbutz Nahal Oz just across the border from Gaza professed profound confusion and concern.
“I really don’t understand what is happening here and don’t know what to think. Just on Saturday we had 10 red alerts at Nahal Oz and I don’t know what to say. I also don’t understand what the prime minister said [Saturday].
“I just know that I am staying at Kibbutz
Dorot, and here too they are operating on
emergency footing, the nurseries are only
partially open, and no one is going back to
normal. So if 10 kilometers from Gaza they
haven’t returned to their routine, how are we supposed to go back to our lives 800 meters from the wire?”
Israel’s operations in Gaza so far have been
based on the hope that Hamas can be
convinced to stand down. Israel has destroyed its tunnels. The IDF killed hundreds of Hamas terrorists. The IDF
destroyed Hamas’s bases.
Hamas’s missile arsenal is depleted. Its
leaders are safe only so long as they remain
hidden in their illegal bunkers under Shifa
hospital. Hamas remains cash strapped and
without access to resupply from Iran or other allies.
Assuming that Hamas maintains the 72-hour ceasefire that it requested, in negotiations that may ensue for a more detailed cease-fire agreement if the US is unable to coerce Israel and Egypt into agreeing to open the borders and save Hamas, Hamas will be destroyed
through attrition.
If this happens, Israel will have won a great
victory. But if Hamas continues to attack southern communities at any level Israel will have no choice. It will have to send its forces back into Gaza with the mission of retaking control there.
There is only one thing worse than
reasserting Israel’s military control over
Gaza: Losing southern Israel. So long as
residents of the south fear returning to their homes, Israel is losing southern Israel.
This looming prospect of having to retake
Gaza would be bad enough if Israel only had to concern itself with Gaza. But Israel enjoys no such luxury.
Far more dangerous that Hamas is Hezbollah. Whereas Hamas’s missiles are unguided, Hezbollah has guided missiles that are capable of reaching every centimeter of Israeli territory. And their payloads are big enough to destroy high-rise buildings.
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has anti-aircraft
missiles and anti-ship missiles capable of
disrupting air and naval operations.
Hezbollah has drones that it has launched
successfully.
And the possibility that Hezbollah has some
level of unconventional weapons cannot be
ruled out.
Hezbollah commanders and fighters have
gained massive experience fighting in Syria
and Iraq. They have sophisticated
intelligence gathering capabilities including
human intelligence and signals intelligence
assets.
They have advanced command and control
systems. And by all accounts, Hamas’s terror tunnels are nothing in comparison to Hezbollah’s extensive network of tunnels that run beneath the border with Israel.
Hezbollah’s announced war plans involve
invading and taking control over
communities in the Upper Galilee.
In the face of Hamas’s repeated aggression in recent years, many Israelis are now looking wistfully at our quiet northern border. It was the massive destruction Israel wreaked on Lebanon during the 2006 war, they say, that is responsible for this tranquility. We deterred Hezbollah.
Unfortunately, this is dangerous nonsense
that bespeaks a fundamental refusal by those that express this view to reconcile themselves with the nature of Hezbollah and its decision making process.
Hezbollah’s decision to go to war in 2006 was made in Tehran, by Hezbollah’s Iranian masters. The decision not to go to war since has also been made by Tehran.
Tehran decided to deploy Hezbollah to Iraq
and Syria.
And Tehran will decide, based on its own
sense of priorities, when Hezbollah and its
massive arsenal of terror should attack Israel.
The only way that Israel’s operations in 2006 have impacted Hezbollah’s future aggression is by enabling it. Israel agreed to a cease-fire that enabled Hezbollah to rearm, reassert control over southern Lebanon and expand its influence over the Lebanese military and state. Had Israel routed Hezbollah in 2006 or refused to accept the pro-Hezbollah cease-fire
terms embodied in UN Security Council
resolution 1701 then the situation would be
different.
This brings us to Iran, the hidden hand
behind the 2006 war, and at least to some
degree behind the present war with Gaza,
and the direct threat that it constitutes for
Israel.
After the deadline for reaching a permanent nuclear deal with Iran ran out last month, US President Barack Obama bought himself and Iran four more months by extending the deadline of the talks.
Iran can continue to develop its nuclear
weapons until after the US midterm election unconstrained by international scrutiny. And Obama can pretend for four more months that he is going to achieve a nuclear deal that will prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Israel however, was not given four months.
Without the Iranian nuclear umbrella, Iran’s terror proxies in Gaza were able to develop weapons to attack nearly the entire country.
What will they develop if that nuclear
umbrella is instated? Prime Minister
Netanyahu is correct. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is an existential threat to Israel. And it needs to be wiped out.
Given the threats from Lebanon and Iran, it
is clear that Israel’s decision to try to limit its operations in Gaza was necessary. Israel
cannot afford to tie its forces down
indefinitely. And if Israel is forced to retake
control over Gaza, it will need to deploy its
forces in such a way that it maintains
sufficient reserve capacity to handle Gaza,
Lebanon and Iran simultaneously.
This would be challenging enough under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, the situation is made all the more complicated by the Obama administration’s strategic aim of appeasing Iran by enabling it to develop nuclear weapons and by siding with Hamas against Israel and the US’s traditional Sunni Arab allies.
The administration’s unswerving devotion to this policy aim was again clarified on
Monday when Palestinian sources at the
Cairo talks told the media that the US had
again joined forces with Hamas-supporting
Qatar to achieve an alternate cease-fire,
undercutting Egyptian efforts and giving
Hamas reason to walk away from the table.
Just last week the US media lambasted
Secretary of State John Kerry for supporting
Hamas against Israel in cease-fire
negotiations. The fact that the Obama
administration continues to act in this
manner suggests that it is completely
committed to this course of action.
Israel can cope with all of these challenges
and surmount them. But it won’t be easy.
In recent days a spate of government
ministers and foreign supporters have
recommended bevy of options that involve
getting someone else to deal with Hamas for
Israel. Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman
said Monday that Gaza should become a UN
mandate.
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and her
colleagues on the Left, joined by former Bush administration deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams say that Fatah can be brought into Gaza to fight Hamas for Israel.
These suggestions are all based on wishful
thinking and an extraordinary capacity to
ignore reality.
The UN is institutionally committed to
delegitimizing and ultimately destroying
Israel.
In the best circumstance, Fatah can only come into Gaza after Hamas has been destroyed completely and driven from leadership by Israel.
Under any other circumstance, Fatah will
collaborate with Hamas against Israel, as it
has always done. And if Hamas is routed and destroyed Fatah would only destabilize the situation.
The time has come for us to recognize that
there are no easy answers for Israel. IDF
operations in Gaza in recent weeks have
dealt a harsh blow to Hamas. Perhaps the
terror commanders have been deterred.
Perhaps not. Whatever the case may be, if Israel and Egypt are able to continue to block US attempts to open the borders for Hamas resupply until Kerry gets swept up in another major crisis, then Hamas can be defeated through attrition.
If not, then Israel will have no choice but to
retake control of Gaza while maintaining
enough forces in reserve to respond to a
second front in the North, and finally end
Iran’s dream of becoming a nuclear power.
There are no silver bullets. The price of
freedom is hard work and vigilance.
Only if we act in full cognizance of the
gravity of the moment and the absence of
easy answers will we navigate the minefield
we find ourselves in successfully and restore the safety of the south, the north, the east and the center of the country.
Hours before Israel accepted the Egyptian-
brokered cease-fire deal on Monday night,
Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu traveled to the south to try to allay the fears of area residents. It’s not at all clear how successful he was. Residents of the communities bordering the Gaza Strip who evacuated their homes are skeptical of the IDF’s claims that it is safe for them to return.
In an interview with NRG website, Yael Paz-
Lahiany, a mother of three young children
from Kibbutz Nahal Oz just across the border from Gaza professed profound confusion and concern.
“I really don’t understand what is happening here and don’t know what to think. Just on Saturday we had 10 red alerts at Nahal Oz and I don’t know what to say. I also don’t understand what the prime minister said [Saturday].
“I just know that I am staying at Kibbutz
Dorot, and here too they are operating on
emergency footing, the nurseries are only
partially open, and no one is going back to
normal. So if 10 kilometers from Gaza they
haven’t returned to their routine, how are we supposed to go back to our lives 800 meters from the wire?”
Israel’s operations in Gaza so far have been
based on the hope that Hamas can be
convinced to stand down. Israel has destroyed its tunnels. The IDF killed hundreds of Hamas terrorists. The IDF
destroyed Hamas’s bases.
Hamas’s missile arsenal is depleted. Its
leaders are safe only so long as they remain
hidden in their illegal bunkers under Shifa
hospital. Hamas remains cash strapped and
without access to resupply from Iran or other allies.
Assuming that Hamas maintains the 72-hour ceasefire that it requested, in negotiations that may ensue for a more detailed cease-fire agreement if the US is unable to coerce Israel and Egypt into agreeing to open the borders and save Hamas, Hamas will be destroyed
through attrition.
If this happens, Israel will have won a great
victory. But if Hamas continues to attack southern communities at any level Israel will have no choice. It will have to send its forces back into Gaza with the mission of retaking control there.
There is only one thing worse than
reasserting Israel’s military control over
Gaza: Losing southern Israel. So long as
residents of the south fear returning to their homes, Israel is losing southern Israel.
This looming prospect of having to retake
Gaza would be bad enough if Israel only had to concern itself with Gaza. But Israel enjoys no such luxury.
Far more dangerous that Hamas is Hezbollah. Whereas Hamas’s missiles are unguided, Hezbollah has guided missiles that are capable of reaching every centimeter of Israeli territory. And their payloads are big enough to destroy high-rise buildings.
Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah has anti-aircraft
missiles and anti-ship missiles capable of
disrupting air and naval operations.
Hezbollah has drones that it has launched
successfully.
And the possibility that Hezbollah has some
level of unconventional weapons cannot be
ruled out.
Hezbollah commanders and fighters have
gained massive experience fighting in Syria
and Iraq. They have sophisticated
intelligence gathering capabilities including
human intelligence and signals intelligence
assets.
They have advanced command and control
systems. And by all accounts, Hamas’s terror tunnels are nothing in comparison to Hezbollah’s extensive network of tunnels that run beneath the border with Israel.
Hezbollah’s announced war plans involve
invading and taking control over
communities in the Upper Galilee.
In the face of Hamas’s repeated aggression in recent years, many Israelis are now looking wistfully at our quiet northern border. It was the massive destruction Israel wreaked on Lebanon during the 2006 war, they say, that is responsible for this tranquility. We deterred Hezbollah.
Unfortunately, this is dangerous nonsense
that bespeaks a fundamental refusal by those that express this view to reconcile themselves with the nature of Hezbollah and its decision making process.
Hezbollah’s decision to go to war in 2006 was made in Tehran, by Hezbollah’s Iranian masters. The decision not to go to war since has also been made by Tehran.
Tehran decided to deploy Hezbollah to Iraq
and Syria.
And Tehran will decide, based on its own
sense of priorities, when Hezbollah and its
massive arsenal of terror should attack Israel.
The only way that Israel’s operations in 2006 have impacted Hezbollah’s future aggression is by enabling it. Israel agreed to a cease-fire that enabled Hezbollah to rearm, reassert control over southern Lebanon and expand its influence over the Lebanese military and state. Had Israel routed Hezbollah in 2006 or refused to accept the pro-Hezbollah cease-fire
terms embodied in UN Security Council
resolution 1701 then the situation would be
different.
This brings us to Iran, the hidden hand
behind the 2006 war, and at least to some
degree behind the present war with Gaza,
and the direct threat that it constitutes for
Israel.
After the deadline for reaching a permanent nuclear deal with Iran ran out last month, US President Barack Obama bought himself and Iran four more months by extending the deadline of the talks.
Iran can continue to develop its nuclear
weapons until after the US midterm election unconstrained by international scrutiny. And Obama can pretend for four more months that he is going to achieve a nuclear deal that will prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons.
Israel however, was not given four months.
Without the Iranian nuclear umbrella, Iran’s terror proxies in Gaza were able to develop weapons to attack nearly the entire country.
What will they develop if that nuclear
umbrella is instated? Prime Minister
Netanyahu is correct. Iran’s nuclear weapons program is an existential threat to Israel. And it needs to be wiped out.
Given the threats from Lebanon and Iran, it
is clear that Israel’s decision to try to limit its operations in Gaza was necessary. Israel
cannot afford to tie its forces down
indefinitely. And if Israel is forced to retake
control over Gaza, it will need to deploy its
forces in such a way that it maintains
sufficient reserve capacity to handle Gaza,
Lebanon and Iran simultaneously.
This would be challenging enough under the best of circumstances. Unfortunately, the situation is made all the more complicated by the Obama administration’s strategic aim of appeasing Iran by enabling it to develop nuclear weapons and by siding with Hamas against Israel and the US’s traditional Sunni Arab allies.
The administration’s unswerving devotion to this policy aim was again clarified on
Monday when Palestinian sources at the
Cairo talks told the media that the US had
again joined forces with Hamas-supporting
Qatar to achieve an alternate cease-fire,
undercutting Egyptian efforts and giving
Hamas reason to walk away from the table.
Just last week the US media lambasted
Secretary of State John Kerry for supporting
Hamas against Israel in cease-fire
negotiations. The fact that the Obama
administration continues to act in this
manner suggests that it is completely
committed to this course of action.
Israel can cope with all of these challenges
and surmount them. But it won’t be easy.
In recent days a spate of government
ministers and foreign supporters have
recommended bevy of options that involve
getting someone else to deal with Hamas for
Israel. Foreign Minister Avigdor Liberman
said Monday that Gaza should become a UN
mandate.
Justice Minister Tzipi Livni and her
colleagues on the Left, joined by former Bush administration deputy national security adviser Elliott Abrams say that Fatah can be brought into Gaza to fight Hamas for Israel.
These suggestions are all based on wishful
thinking and an extraordinary capacity to
ignore reality.
The UN is institutionally committed to
delegitimizing and ultimately destroying
Israel.
In the best circumstance, Fatah can only come into Gaza after Hamas has been destroyed completely and driven from leadership by Israel.
Under any other circumstance, Fatah will
collaborate with Hamas against Israel, as it
has always done. And if Hamas is routed and destroyed Fatah would only destabilize the situation.
The time has come for us to recognize that
there are no easy answers for Israel. IDF
operations in Gaza in recent weeks have
dealt a harsh blow to Hamas. Perhaps the
terror commanders have been deterred.
Perhaps not. Whatever the case may be, if Israel and Egypt are able to continue to block US attempts to open the borders for Hamas resupply until Kerry gets swept up in another major crisis, then Hamas can be defeated through attrition.
If not, then Israel will have no choice but to
retake control of Gaza while maintaining
enough forces in reserve to respond to a
second front in the North, and finally end
Iran’s dream of becoming a nuclear power.
There are no silver bullets. The price of
freedom is hard work and vigilance.
Only if we act in full cognizance of the
gravity of the moment and the absence of
easy answers will we navigate the minefield
we find ourselves in successfully and restore the safety of the south, the north, the east and the center of the country.
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