Bibhu Prasad Routray
The 1 December 2014 killing of 14 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)
personnel in Chhattisgarh's Sukma district by the Communist Party of
India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) should invariably go down as one of the
country's worst security force operations in recent times. In terms of
the killing of trained personnel, looting of their weapons, and the
follow up response of a well established security establishment in the
state, the attack surpasses even the far bigger extremist attacks of the
past in which the force had lost far larger number of personnel. The
incident further gives rise to the question whether a victory over the
Maoists is at all possible under a CRPF-State police force combination
formula?
The attack took place as over 2000 personnel of the CRPF were conducting
a four-phase operation against the extremists in the district. As
expressed by the involved personnel to the media, without much of
intelligence to back these initiatives, there was little objective
behind the operations rather than what broadly is described as area
domination exercises. During the end of the third phase of the
operation, a section of the force, variously described as consisting of
200 to 700 personnel came under attack by the Maoists – who apparently
used civilian villagers as shields. There was little resistance from the
forces, who as reports suggest got away only 14 fatalities. While 12
perished in the combat, two personnel died while being shifted. Had the
Maoists persisted and continued their attacks, the toll could have been
much higher, perilously close to the 2010 Dantewada attack in which the
CRPF lost 76 troopers. The attack has led to an early conclusion of the
area domination exercise in Sukma.
The attack raises several questions regarding the ability of the force
that has been designated as the country’s lead counter-insurgent force
after the Kargil attack, vis-a-vis the Maoists. There are issues of
leadership, logistics, intelligence and coordination with the state
police force. However, none of these concerns are new. Each
investigation following a major attack has unravelled the same ills
affecting the force that has been fighting the extremists for nearly a
decade and whose battalion strength in the conflict theater has grown
manifold over the years. While some incremental improvements in the way
operations have been conducted are natural and are there for everybody
to see, fundamental issues such as the CRPF leadership's strategy of
fighting the war with well-motivated and adequately supported personnel
have been chronically absent.
This explains why the transient successes that have pushed the 10-year
old CPI-Maoist arguably to its weakest state notwithstanding, the CRPF's
own history of engagement with the extremists is replete with mistakes,
setbacks, and a perennial search for the right principles of
operational accomplishment. The force's projects to generate
intelligence by setting up an dedicated wing; its initiatives of
developing bonds with the tribal population by providing them with
gifts, medical facilities, and organising sports and cultural events;
and its efforts to narrow down the differences with the state police
forces have all achieved marginal results. Even the 10-battalion strong
Combat Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA), raised with the specific
objective of fighting the Maoists, which has since been diluted to make
them deal with the insurgents of all denominations in the northeast,
have minor achievements to demonstrate, in the Indian Ministry of Home
Affairs (MHA)'s own assessments.
The uncomfortable conclusion one can derive from the state-of-affairs is
that the CRPF, in its present state, is not the force that can deliver
significant successes in the Maoist conflict theaters. Even with an
ever-expanding budget of Rs. 12,169.51 crores for the current financial
year - amounting to almost 1/5th of the MHA's entire budget – the
successive chiefs of the force have failed to provide its fighting
troops even the basic of the provisions. Media narratives indicate
soldiers keeping themselves operationally fit with rice, lentils and
Maggi noodles. Worse still, seen in combination with poor condition of
the state police forces and their virtual irrelevance to the conflict
resolution project, it points at an ignominious future of a permanent
state of conflict in a sizeable geographical expanse of the country.
In response to the Sukma attack, the MHA plans to induct more forces
into Chhattisgarh. Such a move, in the pipeline since the new government
assumed power in New Delhi in May 2014, is based on the premise that
more boots on the ground would be able to reverse the success of the
Maoists. Nothing can be farther from truth. The CRPF's failure needs to
be seen in the context of the overall lack of imagination among the
country's policy makers in dealing with the Maoist threat. Ever since
the CPI-Maoist emerged as a major challenge, lackadaisical, reactionary,
and adhoc-ish measures have been passed off as official policies. Even
as such experimentation continues, the soldiers, among others, are
paying with their blood and lives in conflicts mainland Indians are
completely oblivious to.
22 Dec 2014
Rise of the Islamic State: Implications for the Arab World
Ranjit Gupta
Though it is going to take a long time to defeat the Islamic State (IS), and it must be defeated, some silver linings of the very dark cloud the IS represents are beginning to be hazily visible over the horizon.
Since the proclamation of the IS, strange things have begun happening in West Asia. The IS is not only against the Shia governments of Iraq and Syria but also of Iran; it is even more against the Sunni governments of the Gulf monarchies, in particular, Saudi Arabia, apart from the US in particular and the West in general; it is also fighting against al Qaeda and its clones and affiliates. The IS is against everybody. It has no allies.
It has thus succeeded in bringing about a heretofore difficult to imagine scenario: countries, entities and regimes traditionally antagonistic and hostile to each other find themselves engaged in a common war against a common enemy. Thus, we have the rather strange spectacle of seeing the US and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Shia-ruled Iraq; the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the US and assorted Islamist extremist groups, and, Kurdish factions perpetually at loggerheads with each other and with the governments of the nations they are part of – all of them in the same camp warring against the IS.
This could have some very positive consequences in a region where hostile and conflictual relationships are endemic:
First, after the fall of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein-ruled government, sectarian and ethnic fissures came to the fore in Iraq in a manner that had never been the case before. Sunnis have been the traditional ruling element in Iraq throughout history, but since 2003 they have not only been deeply alienated but also deliberately humiliated. Therefore, the involvement of Shias, Sunnis and Kurds in the common fight against the IS is very encouraging and could be cathartic and therapeutic. This bodes well for Iraq’s future since it had begun to appear that its being partitioned along sectarian and ethnic divides was becoming inevitable.
This enforced togetherness may finally persuade regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies to work together in the common and shared interests of fighting to eliminate Islamist extremism and sectarianism.
A third potentially significant consequence is that this will ultimately help to promote disenchantment of the average Muslim, particularly in the Gulf region, whether he is Sunni or Shia, with sectarianism and Islamist extremism, and make them realize that these ideologies are very dangerous for all Muslims.
The fourth potential consequence is that as the war against the IS progresses well, combined with the possibility of a deal between Iran and the P5 on the nuclear issue, all this may lead to real possibilities of a negotiated political solution to the civil war in Syria, which otherwise seems impossible to envisage.
The fifth flows from the fact that the intense rivalry between the IS and al Qaeda for control of the global jihadist movement is already causing intra-jihadist infighting and this can be expected to escalate throughout the region and this augurs well for the defeat of pernicious extremist and jihadi groups.
One consequence of the derailing of the Arab Spring has been the enormous strain on GCC unity, primarily due to Qatar taking a very different stance as compared to other GCC countries in relation to various Islamist groups. This was hampering the fight against the IS. The GCC Summit held in Qatar last week appears to have resolved the differences.
The IS experience should also make Arab regimes and their Western patrons finally realise that pandering to religion for short-term geopolitical gains only creates Frankenstein monsters that devour their own creators. The reality is that the leaders of the Arab world have long been in denial about their own responsibility for their problems; the outside world is constantly blamed. The fact is that in the post-World War II era more Muslims have been killed by Muslims than by all others put together. As per the Country Threat Index, among the 10 most dangerous countries in the world, 9 are Muslim countries and 6 of them are Arab countries.
These facts have to be squarely faced. Time has come for very serious introspection. The emergence of the IS has created that opportunity. Lasting peace in the Arab world will be possible only if an ideological battle is waged and won within Islam to change the poisonous mindsets that have enveloped much of the Arab world. Some positive indications are already evident in new approaches by GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both domestically and otherwise.
Arab countries being overwhelmingly Muslim countries, political Islam must be given space and legitimacy to function in domestic political processes; banning or prohibiting political Islam only leads to radicalisation of those elements of society that are more religiously inclined than others. Wide-ranging political reform processes must also start now, concomitantly with the execution of the war against the IS. Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started, has demonstrated that a new path is possible.
Though it is going to take a long time to defeat the Islamic State (IS), and it must be defeated, some silver linings of the very dark cloud the IS represents are beginning to be hazily visible over the horizon.
Since the proclamation of the IS, strange things have begun happening in West Asia. The IS is not only against the Shia governments of Iraq and Syria but also of Iran; it is even more against the Sunni governments of the Gulf monarchies, in particular, Saudi Arabia, apart from the US in particular and the West in general; it is also fighting against al Qaeda and its clones and affiliates. The IS is against everybody. It has no allies.
It has thus succeeded in bringing about a heretofore difficult to imagine scenario: countries, entities and regimes traditionally antagonistic and hostile to each other find themselves engaged in a common war against a common enemy. Thus, we have the rather strange spectacle of seeing the US and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Iran; Saudi Arabia and Shia-ruled Iraq; the Assad regime and those sworn to overthrow it – Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar and the US and assorted Islamist extremist groups, and, Kurdish factions perpetually at loggerheads with each other and with the governments of the nations they are part of – all of them in the same camp warring against the IS.
This could have some very positive consequences in a region where hostile and conflictual relationships are endemic:
First, after the fall of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein-ruled government, sectarian and ethnic fissures came to the fore in Iraq in a manner that had never been the case before. Sunnis have been the traditional ruling element in Iraq throughout history, but since 2003 they have not only been deeply alienated but also deliberately humiliated. Therefore, the involvement of Shias, Sunnis and Kurds in the common fight against the IS is very encouraging and could be cathartic and therapeutic. This bodes well for Iraq’s future since it had begun to appear that its being partitioned along sectarian and ethnic divides was becoming inevitable.
This enforced togetherness may finally persuade regional rivals Iran and Saudi Arabia and their respective allies to work together in the common and shared interests of fighting to eliminate Islamist extremism and sectarianism.
A third potentially significant consequence is that this will ultimately help to promote disenchantment of the average Muslim, particularly in the Gulf region, whether he is Sunni or Shia, with sectarianism and Islamist extremism, and make them realize that these ideologies are very dangerous for all Muslims.
The fourth potential consequence is that as the war against the IS progresses well, combined with the possibility of a deal between Iran and the P5 on the nuclear issue, all this may lead to real possibilities of a negotiated political solution to the civil war in Syria, which otherwise seems impossible to envisage.
The fifth flows from the fact that the intense rivalry between the IS and al Qaeda for control of the global jihadist movement is already causing intra-jihadist infighting and this can be expected to escalate throughout the region and this augurs well for the defeat of pernicious extremist and jihadi groups.
One consequence of the derailing of the Arab Spring has been the enormous strain on GCC unity, primarily due to Qatar taking a very different stance as compared to other GCC countries in relation to various Islamist groups. This was hampering the fight against the IS. The GCC Summit held in Qatar last week appears to have resolved the differences.
The IS experience should also make Arab regimes and their Western patrons finally realise that pandering to religion for short-term geopolitical gains only creates Frankenstein monsters that devour their own creators. The reality is that the leaders of the Arab world have long been in denial about their own responsibility for their problems; the outside world is constantly blamed. The fact is that in the post-World War II era more Muslims have been killed by Muslims than by all others put together. As per the Country Threat Index, among the 10 most dangerous countries in the world, 9 are Muslim countries and 6 of them are Arab countries.
These facts have to be squarely faced. Time has come for very serious introspection. The emergence of the IS has created that opportunity. Lasting peace in the Arab world will be possible only if an ideological battle is waged and won within Islam to change the poisonous mindsets that have enveloped much of the Arab world. Some positive indications are already evident in new approaches by GCC countries, particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE, both domestically and otherwise.
Arab countries being overwhelmingly Muslim countries, political Islam must be given space and legitimacy to function in domestic political processes; banning or prohibiting political Islam only leads to radicalisation of those elements of society that are more religiously inclined than others. Wide-ranging political reform processes must also start now, concomitantly with the execution of the war against the IS. Tunisia, where the Arab Spring started, has demonstrated that a new path is possible.
AND NOW, THEY ARE COMING FOR OUR CHILDREN
D Suba Chandran
Can the Taliban become any further barbaric than this? Targeting a school, and killing more than 130 children?
Children are not only our soul and the most precious of our existence, but also our future – individual and collective. Children transcend all boundaries – social, political and religious; they have to be viewed, pursued and cherished as children. We send our children to school, not only to gain personal knowledge, but also to learn to socialise in a group, thereby preparing for the larger social role for all of us as a society.
School is the first institution of social construction, outside the family and relatives. School is the starting point of our individual and collective existence. School is the first cradle of all civilizations. Individuals do not make the society; schools provide the first opportunity towards building a larger social edifice.
Children and schools should be sacrosanct. There is no need for any special Conventions either at the national or international levels, which have to underline the above. Whatever may be the situation and whatever may be the nature of social, political and religious positions, children and schools have to be kept away from our prejudices.
Aristotle, in a different context wrote “he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.” In the present context, one who does not understand the simple premise that the children and schools are sacrosanct has to be a beast, and should be treated and responded so.
Imagine being the father or mother of that unfortunate child in Peshawar school yesterday. After the children go inside the school campus, we all would love to hear the sound of that final bell, after which all those little angels come running out of the schools in their cute uniforms. As parents we love to hug them, carry them in our hands and then place them on our shoulders, bicycles, motor bikes and cars. They would start telling stories of the day, what they did with their friends and what their teachers taught. That should be a normal day, irrespective of whichever society we come from – West or East, rich or poor.
What happened in Peshawar should be considered as one of our darkest days. The bells did not ring. Instead a group of inhuman butchers (terrorist is too soft a term for them) let their machine guns make that noise. Some of us did take our children back from schools, not with their bags; instead we carried them in bags. The children did come running to us, but covered in blood and pierced with bullets. We did hold them, but some of them were not there to tell a story of what had happened that day. Perhaps, as a society we should be telling the story for the rest of lives on what had happened on 16 December in Peshawar.
How did we come to this stage? Was it all sudden and we did not know what was coming? Remember that famous verse – “First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.”
Perhaps, as a society, a section of us tried to justify what the Taliban did and is doing. Perhaps, we tried to ascribe reason for their violence. Perhaps, we tried to externalise the problem and tried to find excuses. We blamed the American war on terrorism. We blamed all the intelligence agencies in the world. We told repeatedly that this is not our war. We encouraged the Taliban by not standing up. We did not tell them as a society in a whole, that whatever may be the reason, violence cannot be justified. They killed in FATA. They killed in Swat. They brutally assassinated our leaders. They targeted our infrastructure and institutions.
When they targeted school earlier in Swat, we ignored. When they pumped bullets into Malala, we started slowly waking up. But then, we did not stand up in unison and condemn the acts as butchery and those who commit those acts as savages. When Malala received the Nobel peace prize, a section of us saw her as a Western conspiracy. We even celebrated anti-Malala day! When societies afar, for example in East Asia, converted her book “I am Malala” into Chinese, a section of us spread a venom in the minds of our children and made them stand with a placard “I am not Malala”. We even tried to reason and comfort ourselves that not all Taliban are bad. We considered some as even “our Taliban” Hey wait, some are even Good Taliban!
And now they are coming for our children. And our future. The time has now come to stand up in unison and call butcher a butcher. There are few things and few institutions that should be kept way from all politics. Schools and children should be considered sacrosanct and this cannot be violated – whatever may be the circumstances and whatever may be the reasons. If we fail to do so, then there would not be much difference between us and them.
The Taliban may have already justified as a revenge act against the military strikes in North Waziristan. It appears more than revenge; this is a warning of how they will retaliate, if the military targets them. The Taliban is well aware, that the State will not be able to protect all the schools; even if it does, for a determined suicide bomb, any such measures are insufficient.
What happened in Peshawar is not a revenge attack, but blackmail. Pure and simple. Taliban is blackmailing us not to target them; if we do, they will respond and attack us in those areas where it would hurt as the most. Earlier attack in the Wagah border has to been seen with the same perspective. Given the South Asian way of life, movement and assembly is very common – whether it is market, or school or place of worship. We assemble all over in huge numbers for different reasons; no State can succeed in protecting all such meetings. In simple language, for a determined terrorist, we are sitting ducks and potential target.
We cannot hide and try to protect ourselves. Doing so is yielding to their blackmail. We have to tell them and act against their violence. Even if there are grievances, resistance and reactions will have to be bound by certain norms. We are bound by social norms. We are a society. We are a civilization.
Rest in peace, dear children. You did not die alone. A part of our history died with you. A part of our humanity died with you. We failed to protect you. We failed to protect our future. We will remember 16 December.
Can the Taliban become any further barbaric than this? Targeting a school, and killing more than 130 children?
Children are not only our soul and the most precious of our existence, but also our future – individual and collective. Children transcend all boundaries – social, political and religious; they have to be viewed, pursued and cherished as children. We send our children to school, not only to gain personal knowledge, but also to learn to socialise in a group, thereby preparing for the larger social role for all of us as a society.
School is the first institution of social construction, outside the family and relatives. School is the starting point of our individual and collective existence. School is the first cradle of all civilizations. Individuals do not make the society; schools provide the first opportunity towards building a larger social edifice.
Children and schools should be sacrosanct. There is no need for any special Conventions either at the national or international levels, which have to underline the above. Whatever may be the situation and whatever may be the nature of social, political and religious positions, children and schools have to be kept away from our prejudices.
Aristotle, in a different context wrote “he who is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself, must be either a beast or a god.” In the present context, one who does not understand the simple premise that the children and schools are sacrosanct has to be a beast, and should be treated and responded so.
Imagine being the father or mother of that unfortunate child in Peshawar school yesterday. After the children go inside the school campus, we all would love to hear the sound of that final bell, after which all those little angels come running out of the schools in their cute uniforms. As parents we love to hug them, carry them in our hands and then place them on our shoulders, bicycles, motor bikes and cars. They would start telling stories of the day, what they did with their friends and what their teachers taught. That should be a normal day, irrespective of whichever society we come from – West or East, rich or poor.
What happened in Peshawar should be considered as one of our darkest days. The bells did not ring. Instead a group of inhuman butchers (terrorist is too soft a term for them) let their machine guns make that noise. Some of us did take our children back from schools, not with their bags; instead we carried them in bags. The children did come running to us, but covered in blood and pierced with bullets. We did hold them, but some of them were not there to tell a story of what had happened that day. Perhaps, as a society we should be telling the story for the rest of lives on what had happened on 16 December in Peshawar.
How did we come to this stage? Was it all sudden and we did not know what was coming? Remember that famous verse – “First they came for the Jews and I did not speak out because I was not a Jew. Then they came for the Communists and I did not speak out because I was not a Communist. Then they came for the trade unionists and I did not speak out because I was not a trade unionist. Then they came for me and there was no one left to speak out for me.”
Perhaps, as a society, a section of us tried to justify what the Taliban did and is doing. Perhaps, we tried to ascribe reason for their violence. Perhaps, we tried to externalise the problem and tried to find excuses. We blamed the American war on terrorism. We blamed all the intelligence agencies in the world. We told repeatedly that this is not our war. We encouraged the Taliban by not standing up. We did not tell them as a society in a whole, that whatever may be the reason, violence cannot be justified. They killed in FATA. They killed in Swat. They brutally assassinated our leaders. They targeted our infrastructure and institutions.
When they targeted school earlier in Swat, we ignored. When they pumped bullets into Malala, we started slowly waking up. But then, we did not stand up in unison and condemn the acts as butchery and those who commit those acts as savages. When Malala received the Nobel peace prize, a section of us saw her as a Western conspiracy. We even celebrated anti-Malala day! When societies afar, for example in East Asia, converted her book “I am Malala” into Chinese, a section of us spread a venom in the minds of our children and made them stand with a placard “I am not Malala”. We even tried to reason and comfort ourselves that not all Taliban are bad. We considered some as even “our Taliban” Hey wait, some are even Good Taliban!
And now they are coming for our children. And our future. The time has now come to stand up in unison and call butcher a butcher. There are few things and few institutions that should be kept way from all politics. Schools and children should be considered sacrosanct and this cannot be violated – whatever may be the circumstances and whatever may be the reasons. If we fail to do so, then there would not be much difference between us and them.
The Taliban may have already justified as a revenge act against the military strikes in North Waziristan. It appears more than revenge; this is a warning of how they will retaliate, if the military targets them. The Taliban is well aware, that the State will not be able to protect all the schools; even if it does, for a determined suicide bomb, any such measures are insufficient.
What happened in Peshawar is not a revenge attack, but blackmail. Pure and simple. Taliban is blackmailing us not to target them; if we do, they will respond and attack us in those areas where it would hurt as the most. Earlier attack in the Wagah border has to been seen with the same perspective. Given the South Asian way of life, movement and assembly is very common – whether it is market, or school or place of worship. We assemble all over in huge numbers for different reasons; no State can succeed in protecting all such meetings. In simple language, for a determined terrorist, we are sitting ducks and potential target.
We cannot hide and try to protect ourselves. Doing so is yielding to their blackmail. We have to tell them and act against their violence. Even if there are grievances, resistance and reactions will have to be bound by certain norms. We are bound by social norms. We are a society. We are a civilization.
Rest in peace, dear children. You did not die alone. A part of our history died with you. A part of our humanity died with you. We failed to protect you. We failed to protect our future. We will remember 16 December.
29 Nov 2014
Fighting Foreign Fighters: New Legislations
Tuva Julie Engebrethsen Smith
Over the course of this year, the threat of Islamist terror changed
dramatically for the worse. 13,000 people who do not belong either to
Syria, or Iraq, now fight for the terrorist group, the Islamic State
(IS) in its battles in Syria and Iraq. A multilateral approach to tackle
and eliminate security issues arising from terrorism is therefore
pressing.
In September 2014, the UN Security Council and its member states agreed on Resolution 2178. The resolution condemns violent extremism and urges international cooperation to prevent foreign fighters from travelling to and from conflict areas. It aims at preventing the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. It is a binding agreement that requires all member states to implement changes in their national laws. The changes are expected to make it possible for the said States to impose stricter border controls and restrain people – from travelling to or transit through their territories – if they have “credible information that provides reasonable grounds” to believe that the person is involved in terrorism activities.
In September 2014, the UN Security Council and its member states agreed on Resolution 2178. The resolution condemns violent extremism and urges international cooperation to prevent foreign fighters from travelling to and from conflict areas. It aims at preventing the “recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning of, or participation in terrorist acts”. It is a binding agreement that requires all member states to implement changes in their national laws. The changes are expected to make it possible for the said States to impose stricter border controls and restrain people – from travelling to or transit through their territories – if they have “credible information that provides reasonable grounds” to believe that the person is involved in terrorism activities.
The Resolution was passed unanimously without any debate. However, what
does the Resolution actually entail? Is it possible to implement laws on
foreign nationals without compromising democratic values?
Considering the numbers of foreign fighters and the fear they generate
is a reason in itself to agree to Resolution 2178 because it would be
counter-productive to veto a move that intends to combat international
threats? Furthermore, whether or not Resolution 2178 will have
successful outcomes depends on how anti-terrorism laws are enforced by
every individual country.
What stands out among anti-terrorism laws in several countries is the restriction on travel to conflict areas and the increase in surveillance. How countries choose to respond to the legally binding agreements, varies. In order to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders, the Australian government has implemented strict travel laws. Suspected terrorists captured during their travel to what the Australian Bill refers to as `no-go-zones´, without a valid reason can result in imprisonment for 10 years.
The Bill also allows the police to detain suspects for 14 days with any specific charges as long as there is suspicion of criminal conduct. However, Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism. Thus, there is scope for racial profiling to take place, given how member states can relate criminal conducts and define potential terrorists according to their own preferences and national laws. According to Marina Portnaya, Correspondent, Russia TV, this allows countries to monitor and use more targeted surveillance against people in the name of international security.
What stands out among anti-terrorism laws in several countries is the restriction on travel to conflict areas and the increase in surveillance. How countries choose to respond to the legally binding agreements, varies. In order to prevent foreign fighters from crossing borders, the Australian government has implemented strict travel laws. Suspected terrorists captured during their travel to what the Australian Bill refers to as `no-go-zones´, without a valid reason can result in imprisonment for 10 years.
The Bill also allows the police to detain suspects for 14 days with any specific charges as long as there is suspicion of criminal conduct. However, Resolution 2178 does not specifically outline the definition of criminal conduct or terrorism. Thus, there is scope for racial profiling to take place, given how member states can relate criminal conducts and define potential terrorists according to their own preferences and national laws. According to Marina Portnaya, Correspondent, Russia TV, this allows countries to monitor and use more targeted surveillance against people in the name of international security.
The unclear wording of the Resolution leaves room for countries to be
biased, and decide whom to target, based on their own preferences. This
can result in excuses for countries to implement repressive measures. In
addition to racial profiling, the Resolution can end up giving law
enforcement officers new tools to deal with activists or separatist
groups by labelling them as terrorists according to their thoughts and
beliefs rather than their actions. Additionally, governments have the
authority to block websites that defend or encourage terrorism,
exclusive of court orders, with imprisonment as the consequence. Critics
view this as an attack on democratic rights and that innocent people
become stripped of their rights regarding freedom of expression.
Another critique of Resolution 2178 is about the freedom of movement.
Increased surveillance allows the legalisation of the collection of
photographs at airports, and airlines will be legally obliged to pass on
information about passengers flying to/from conflict areas. One of the
concerns expressed has been that the restrictions on travelling to
`no-go-zones´ can lead to the criminalisation of innocent people who
genuinely go to visit family or friends.
The French Senate and its anti-terrorism laws authorised in mid-October better prepare the authorities to impose restrictions on citizens when there is a reason to believe that people are partaking or planning acts of terror. Any suspicion results in the potential listing of names on the Schengen Information System, imprisonment up to three years, and a $58,000 fine. Immigrant support organisations and human rights groups are concerned that these laws will affect migration because the Bill allows the governments to deny foreign nationals viewed as “undesirable” access to the country. Human rights specialist Simon Slama argues that France´s fear of terrorism will be taken advantage of by the government as a means to strengthen border controls and decrease immigration into the EU, especially putting restrictions on people from eastern European countries.
Regardless of the critiques, countries have legal backing for their laws because Resolution 2178 is a binding agreement adopted by the UN Security Council, which means that violation of the Resolution would imply violation of international laws. Human rights organisations might find it frustrating, but the vaguely-worded language and flexible definitions allow countries to design anti-terrorism laws to their own advantage and implement laws that suit their national politics. What is surprising is the extent to which governments are willing to compromise democratic values for the sake of security, as long as they have an international law to fall back on.
The French Senate and its anti-terrorism laws authorised in mid-October better prepare the authorities to impose restrictions on citizens when there is a reason to believe that people are partaking or planning acts of terror. Any suspicion results in the potential listing of names on the Schengen Information System, imprisonment up to three years, and a $58,000 fine. Immigrant support organisations and human rights groups are concerned that these laws will affect migration because the Bill allows the governments to deny foreign nationals viewed as “undesirable” access to the country. Human rights specialist Simon Slama argues that France´s fear of terrorism will be taken advantage of by the government as a means to strengthen border controls and decrease immigration into the EU, especially putting restrictions on people from eastern European countries.
Regardless of the critiques, countries have legal backing for their laws because Resolution 2178 is a binding agreement adopted by the UN Security Council, which means that violation of the Resolution would imply violation of international laws. Human rights organisations might find it frustrating, but the vaguely-worded language and flexible definitions allow countries to design anti-terrorism laws to their own advantage and implement laws that suit their national politics. What is surprising is the extent to which governments are willing to compromise democratic values for the sake of security, as long as they have an international law to fall back on.
Global Nuclear Disarmament: The Humanitarian Consequences Route
Manpreet Sethi
The tenacity of nuclear weapons to continue to exist is evident. At the end of the Cold War, many wrote obituaries claiming that these weapons would soon be the “detritus of the Cold War.” Nothing however, could have been further from the truth. Half a century later, the weapons are still around in large enough numbers to pose dangerous risks to humanity.
It is in this context that it is interesting to examine a two-year old development that has taken a new approach to the challenge of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. This is the initiative that was primarily spearheaded by Norway, Mexico, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland and New Zealand. It hit headlines in March 2013 when the first conference on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was held in Oslo. It focused on the impact of nuclear weapons on human life. Based on testimonies of the hibakushas (survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and presentations from factual studies on effects of nuclear explosions, 128 countries reached the conclusion that effects of the use of nuclear weapons were not constrained by borders and that no single nation or international body had the resources or the capability to deal with the consequences. Interestingly, India and Pakistan were the only nuclear-armed states that chose to participate in the conference. The five NPT nuclear weapon states, and Israel and North Korea, ignored the congregation.
Eleven months later, in March 2014, an even larger number of nations, 146 this time (though still not the NWS) came together in Mexico to further highlight the humanitarian challenges of nuclear weapon explosions. More and detailed studies were presented on the long term socio-economic impact of use of nuclear weapons. It was established that reconstruction of infrastructure and regeneration of the socio-economic parameters on which we today measure quality of life would take decades to rebuild if the world were to witness a nuclear exchange. However, the only possessors in the Conference were from India and Pakistan. Seven other nuclear-armed states, two of which own more than 90 per cent of the global nuclear stockpile, evinced no interest in the subject!
Ten months from then, on 8-9 December this year, a third Conference on the subject is being hosted by the government of Austria in Vienna. It proposes to specifically focus on the impact of nuclear explosions on human health, climate, food security and infrastructure. Also included are sessions on inadvertent nuclear use as a result of human and technical factors such as error, negligence, miscalculations, miscommunications, cyber interference, technical faults etc.
The US has expressed a willingness to participate in this third conference, though none of the other nuclear weapon states has yet joined in. The presence of the US would be welcome, but it is likely that the decision has been made with an eye on the forthcoming NPT RevCon which is less than six months away now. The three preparatory committee meetings over the last three years have not made any major breakthroughs that herald well for the outcome in 2015. Rather, the RevCon will have to bear the additional burden of vitiated US-Russia relations. Though the two have traditionally made common cause in upholding non-proliferation through the NPT (which was crafted at the height of the Cold War in 1967), the present day dynamics will make it interesting to track the RevCon.
Compared to the entrenched national positions in the NPT and its divisive nature, the more inclusive humanitarian consequences approach to universal nuclear disarmament is indeed fresh and more appealing. In fact, it is critical that the Conference continues to remain a platform that has the ability to reach across old formulations that box nations into different categories with different rights and responsibilities. It will be a challenge for the Conference to retain this distinctive character from the NPT or it could end up replicating the same divisive national mind-sets. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, however, would make no such distinctions. It is high time that nations come together as human congregations to address serious and urgent challenges in an inclusive and collective fashion.
Given that India believes that its national security interests are best served in a world free of nuclear weapons, it must remain engaged with the process with an open mind. No quick results are in the offing and neither should these be expected. But to the extent that the Conference can galvanise action that may incrementally lead to universal nuclear disarmament, it would be useful. In this context, the Indian intervention in the last conference for measures that reduce the salience of nuclear weapons should be actively pursued. India has long argued for delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as one way to get to disarmament. Given that Austria, the host country, has a similar view, Vienna should support India’s position for its larger good instead of sticking to its NPT oriented mind-set that has not allowed it, up till now, to accept India’s resolutions on the subject in the UN.
The country has a unique perspective on the issue. Unlike in any other nuclear-armed state, India’s nuclear doctrine, which is meant to operationalise its nuclear strategy, begins and ends with reiterating the country’s desire for nuclear disarmament. India must push for steps that make nuclear weapons lose their perceived utility. Human nature does not permit the discarding of anything that it considers to be of value. Therefore, a devaluation strategy that deprives the weapons of utility coupled with a focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences if they ever were to be used can prepare the ground for their eventual elimination.
The tenacity of nuclear weapons to continue to exist is evident. At the end of the Cold War, many wrote obituaries claiming that these weapons would soon be the “detritus of the Cold War.” Nothing however, could have been further from the truth. Half a century later, the weapons are still around in large enough numbers to pose dangerous risks to humanity.
It is in this context that it is interesting to examine a two-year old development that has taken a new approach to the challenge of ridding the world of nuclear weapons. This is the initiative that was primarily spearheaded by Norway, Mexico, Austria, Ireland, Switzerland and New Zealand. It hit headlines in March 2013 when the first conference on humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons was held in Oslo. It focused on the impact of nuclear weapons on human life. Based on testimonies of the hibakushas (survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), and presentations from factual studies on effects of nuclear explosions, 128 countries reached the conclusion that effects of the use of nuclear weapons were not constrained by borders and that no single nation or international body had the resources or the capability to deal with the consequences. Interestingly, India and Pakistan were the only nuclear-armed states that chose to participate in the conference. The five NPT nuclear weapon states, and Israel and North Korea, ignored the congregation.
Eleven months later, in March 2014, an even larger number of nations, 146 this time (though still not the NWS) came together in Mexico to further highlight the humanitarian challenges of nuclear weapon explosions. More and detailed studies were presented on the long term socio-economic impact of use of nuclear weapons. It was established that reconstruction of infrastructure and regeneration of the socio-economic parameters on which we today measure quality of life would take decades to rebuild if the world were to witness a nuclear exchange. However, the only possessors in the Conference were from India and Pakistan. Seven other nuclear-armed states, two of which own more than 90 per cent of the global nuclear stockpile, evinced no interest in the subject!
Ten months from then, on 8-9 December this year, a third Conference on the subject is being hosted by the government of Austria in Vienna. It proposes to specifically focus on the impact of nuclear explosions on human health, climate, food security and infrastructure. Also included are sessions on inadvertent nuclear use as a result of human and technical factors such as error, negligence, miscalculations, miscommunications, cyber interference, technical faults etc.
The US has expressed a willingness to participate in this third conference, though none of the other nuclear weapon states has yet joined in. The presence of the US would be welcome, but it is likely that the decision has been made with an eye on the forthcoming NPT RevCon which is less than six months away now. The three preparatory committee meetings over the last three years have not made any major breakthroughs that herald well for the outcome in 2015. Rather, the RevCon will have to bear the additional burden of vitiated US-Russia relations. Though the two have traditionally made common cause in upholding non-proliferation through the NPT (which was crafted at the height of the Cold War in 1967), the present day dynamics will make it interesting to track the RevCon.
Compared to the entrenched national positions in the NPT and its divisive nature, the more inclusive humanitarian consequences approach to universal nuclear disarmament is indeed fresh and more appealing. In fact, it is critical that the Conference continues to remain a platform that has the ability to reach across old formulations that box nations into different categories with different rights and responsibilities. It will be a challenge for the Conference to retain this distinctive character from the NPT or it could end up replicating the same divisive national mind-sets. Humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons, however, would make no such distinctions. It is high time that nations come together as human congregations to address serious and urgent challenges in an inclusive and collective fashion.
Given that India believes that its national security interests are best served in a world free of nuclear weapons, it must remain engaged with the process with an open mind. No quick results are in the offing and neither should these be expected. But to the extent that the Conference can galvanise action that may incrementally lead to universal nuclear disarmament, it would be useful. In this context, the Indian intervention in the last conference for measures that reduce the salience of nuclear weapons should be actively pursued. India has long argued for delegitimisation of nuclear weapons as one way to get to disarmament. Given that Austria, the host country, has a similar view, Vienna should support India’s position for its larger good instead of sticking to its NPT oriented mind-set that has not allowed it, up till now, to accept India’s resolutions on the subject in the UN.
The country has a unique perspective on the issue. Unlike in any other nuclear-armed state, India’s nuclear doctrine, which is meant to operationalise its nuclear strategy, begins and ends with reiterating the country’s desire for nuclear disarmament. India must push for steps that make nuclear weapons lose their perceived utility. Human nature does not permit the discarding of anything that it considers to be of value. Therefore, a devaluation strategy that deprives the weapons of utility coupled with a focus on the catastrophic humanitarian consequences if they ever were to be used can prepare the ground for their eventual elimination.
Islamic State: Prospects in Pakistan
Sushant Sareen
In recent weeks, there has been a lot of activity taking place in
various parts of Pakistan in the name of the abominable, but also
ineluctable, Islamic State (IS). Apart from some senior commanders of
the Mullah Fazlullah-led Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) faction who
have announced their allegiance to the IS’ Caliph Ibrahim a.k.a. Abu
Bakr al-Baghdadi, there are reports of other smaller groups of militants
who have cast their lot with the pestilential IS. Graffiti and posters
of the IS have appeared in Karachi, Peshawar, Lahore, Bannu,
Balochistan, Gilgit-Baltistan, Wah, Hangu, Kurram, Bhakkar, Dera Ismail
Khan and other towns and cities of the country.
While these developments have caused a flutter in the media, official circles are quite nonchalant about the IS’s presence in Pakistan at present, or even its potential for establishing a presence in the future. Despite a classified report of the Balochistan government about the ‘growing footprint’ of IS, Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar has confidently claimed that the IS doesn’t exist in Pakistan.
While these developments have caused a flutter in the media, official circles are quite nonchalant about the IS’s presence in Pakistan at present, or even its potential for establishing a presence in the future. Despite a classified report of the Balochistan government about the ‘growing footprint’ of IS, Federal Interior Minister Chaudhry Nisar has confidently claimed that the IS doesn’t exist in Pakistan.
Considering that just a few days after Nisar declared that there was no
danger of terrorism in Islamabad an attack was launched on Islamabad
courts and the city’s vegetable market, he shouldn’t be taken seriously.
Although there is no sign of a major presence of the IS in Pakistan,
the threat of the IS establishing itself is very real. There are eerie
parallels that can be drawn between how the IS is registering its
presence in Pakistan with how the Taliban network was established in the
country. In the mid-1990s, more so after the Taliban captured Kabul,
there were a spate of gangs and groups, especially in the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), who declared themselves local
representatives or chapters of the Taliban movement.
The sort of graffiti that today proclaims the arrival of the IS had back
then done the same for the Taliban. No one had imagined at that time
that the Taliban would manage to establish such a robust presence in the
country or attract so many fighters, supporters and sympathisers for
its cause. More importantly, at that time, hardly anyone outside the
liberal fringe in Pakistan believed that the Taliban would be able to
occupy the mind space of Pakistanis the way they did. Today, there are
people from all walks of life in Pakistan –traders, soldiers,
politicians, journalists, doctors, teachers, labourers and techies – who
identify with the Taliban. It is therefore not too farfetched to
imagine that something similar may happen with the IS, more so given the
manner in which this ghoulish outfit has managed to strike resonance
among certain sections of Muslims around the world and become a magnet
for them, much more than the Taliban or their predecessors in
Afghanistan had managed to do ever since violent jihad became
fashionable.
One big disadvantage that the IS will suffer in its quest to make
Pakistan a province of its Caliphate is that, for now at least, it
doesn’t enjoy the support of the Pakistan Army which continues to back
Mullah Omar, the other pretender to the title of Amir-ul-Momineen. On
the flip side, the IS has advantages that the Taliban or their patrons
in the GHQ Rawalpindi don’t. Mullah Omar is nothing more than a medieval
mullah who in the words of al-Baghdadi, is "an illiterate, ignorant
warlord unworthy of spiritual or political respect." The IS on the other
hand is a modern, tech-savvy outfit with ideological and propaganda
machinery that strikes a chord among Muslim youth around the world.
Second, the IS has resources and revenue stream that neither the Taliban
nor their bankrupt patrons in Rawalpindi have. This allows them to buy
and attract support as nothing else can. Third, unlike Omar who is an
Afghan and as such unfit or unacceptable as a leader of the Islamic
world as a Caliph or Amir-ul-Momineen, al-Baghdadi is an Arab who traces
his roots to the Prophet’s tribe and clan and as such is better-placed
to assume leadership. Fourth, while Omar’s vision doesn’t extend beyond
his donkey, al-Baghdadi talks of global domination of his Islamic
caliphate. Omar’s outreach to the global Islamists is through al Qaeda –
that has already been pushed to the fringes of the jihadist narrative
by the IS which now is in the vanguard of the international Islamist
movement. The IS has started establishing a global footprint through its
use of modern communication tools while the al Qaeda leadership remains
stuck in their rabbit holes, unable to communicate or command their
franchises.
Despite the fact that a bulk of the jihadists in Pakistan currently
swear loyalty to Mullah Omar, the advantages that ‘Caliph’ Ibrahim
enjoys does somewhat level the field in trying to win over Pakistan.
Perhaps, the biggest advantage he will have is that he doesn’t depend on
the crutches of the Pakistan Army. This, coupled with the fact that
Pakistan is a highly radicalised society, makes it a fertile ground for
the IS to spread its poison. What is more, al-Baghdadi is believed to
have heavily relied on Jamaat-e-Islami founder Abul Ala Maududi’s
writings in his first khutba as Caliph, something that will make it easy
for him to connect to Pakistanis who have in one form or another been
indoctrinated by the Maududi and his followers.
Clearly, Baghdadi would be smacking his lips at the prospect of a
nuclear-armed Islamised Pakistan (part of the legendary Khorasan)
becoming a province of his caliphate. For their part, many Pakistanis
too would be looking forward to becoming a part of such an abomination
because that would fulfil their quest for living in a pure Islamic
caliphate. And given the sort of intolerance that exists in Pakistan, it
is ideally suited to become a province of IS. All that remains is to
get rid of that other pretender and then the path will be clear for
‘Caliph’ Ibrahim.
Af-Pak: A Fresh Start
Mariam Safi
Afghanistan’s newly elected President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, arrived in Islamabad on 14 November 2014, marking his first official trip to Pakistan since assuming office. Officials from both countries have underscored the unique opportunity this meeting presented for genuine efforts to be taken towards building bilateral relations.
Ghani’s two-day visit marked his government’s third official trip abroad and perhaps the most significant, following his earlier visits to Saudi Arabia and China; the two countries signed various agreements on economics, expanding existing areas of cooperation, and simultaneously made new pledges to improve relations to tackle insurgency and to ensure a successful Afghan peace process. Similarly, by charting a new era of bilateral relations reinforced by the two countries’ common needs for economic development and political stability, Ghani hopes to draw concrete results from his visit to Pakistan.
During his visit, Ghani met Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif. Unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ghani focused his talks with military and intelligence officials instead of just the civilian leadership. Discussions ranged from issues such as ways to improve economic cooperation to finding ways to ensure better border security and facilitating joint counter-terrorism efforts after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
Economy
Transforming the Afghan economy is one of Ghani administrations’ ultimate objectives. “Our goal is to transform Afghanistan into transit hub for the region and that means we have to create the conditions for that” asserted Ghani during an interview with The Diplomat.
As part of this vision, opening up new avenues for trade and economic cooperation with Pakistan is considered a key facilitating factor. While in Islamabad, Ghani was accompanied by an army of 150 officials, including businessmen, civil society representatives, and members of the parliament. He also took along with him a high-level business delegation led by Chief Economic Advisor to the President, Omar Zakhilwal. A day before Ghani reached Islamabad, Zakhilwal and his Pakistani counterpart, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, agreed on concerted efforts to enhance bilateral trade from the existing $2.5 billion to 5 billion in the next two to three years. One way of achieving this, as stressed by the Afghan delegates, is to have Pakistan take the necessary steps in providing easy access for Afghan goods to Pakistan’s main port in Karachi and through the Wagah land-border with India.
Additionally, officials from both countries also mentioned that more exchanges of high-level delegations and mutual discussions, particularly on issues related to energy, road and rail links, were needed to ensure greater cooperation. Moreover, the two countries also agreed to employ betters measures for visa facilitation, particularly for businesses.
Political
The general sentinment in Afghanistan and among many in Pakistan is that Ashraf Ghani’s presidency will lead to a fresh new page in Af-Pak relations. During Karzai’s period, tensions were rife between the two countries and their trust deficit tested all issues from counter-terrorism to security cooperation and the Afghan peace process. However, as Ghani himself stated, “The region has changed,” explaining that with this change an opportunity has emerged to transform once hostile relations into a symbiotic partnership. “This new government (Pakistan) realizes the deep economic problem that the country faces. It also realizes that extremism cannot be bounded in a neighbor or used against a neighbor and that it is a threat to all of us.”
Thus, Ghani utilised his visit to Pakistan to harness “a[n] honest partner in peace talks with the Taliban” and revive the stagnant Afghan peace process. Ghani hopes that Pakistan will assist Afghans in persuading insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate. In his last meeting with Pakistani officials, Ghani “set a 90-day deadline for implementation of commitments from both sides regarding peace talks with the Taliban.”
Conclusion
Optimism has certainly increased over better bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan after Ashraf Ghani’s visit. However, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty as to how the leaders of both nations will transform the rhetoric of ‘enhanced and genuine cooperation’ into practice? It will be interesting to see how Ghani’s approach towards Pakistan will differ from that of Karzai’s. And, whether he too will face the same, or perhaps different, challenges from Pakistan in the years ahead of his presidency.
Afghanistan’s newly elected President, Dr. Ashraf Ghani, arrived in Islamabad on 14 November 2014, marking his first official trip to Pakistan since assuming office. Officials from both countries have underscored the unique opportunity this meeting presented for genuine efforts to be taken towards building bilateral relations.
Ghani’s two-day visit marked his government’s third official trip abroad and perhaps the most significant, following his earlier visits to Saudi Arabia and China; the two countries signed various agreements on economics, expanding existing areas of cooperation, and simultaneously made new pledges to improve relations to tackle insurgency and to ensure a successful Afghan peace process. Similarly, by charting a new era of bilateral relations reinforced by the two countries’ common needs for economic development and political stability, Ghani hopes to draw concrete results from his visit to Pakistan.
During his visit, Ghani met Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Pakistani Army Chief General Raheel Sharif. Unlike his predecessor Hamid Karzai, Ghani focused his talks with military and intelligence officials instead of just the civilian leadership. Discussions ranged from issues such as ways to improve economic cooperation to finding ways to ensure better border security and facilitating joint counter-terrorism efforts after the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2014.
Economy
Transforming the Afghan economy is one of Ghani administrations’ ultimate objectives. “Our goal is to transform Afghanistan into transit hub for the region and that means we have to create the conditions for that” asserted Ghani during an interview with The Diplomat.
As part of this vision, opening up new avenues for trade and economic cooperation with Pakistan is considered a key facilitating factor. While in Islamabad, Ghani was accompanied by an army of 150 officials, including businessmen, civil society representatives, and members of the parliament. He also took along with him a high-level business delegation led by Chief Economic Advisor to the President, Omar Zakhilwal. A day before Ghani reached Islamabad, Zakhilwal and his Pakistani counterpart, Mohammad Ishaq Dar, agreed on concerted efforts to enhance bilateral trade from the existing $2.5 billion to 5 billion in the next two to three years. One way of achieving this, as stressed by the Afghan delegates, is to have Pakistan take the necessary steps in providing easy access for Afghan goods to Pakistan’s main port in Karachi and through the Wagah land-border with India.
Additionally, officials from both countries also mentioned that more exchanges of high-level delegations and mutual discussions, particularly on issues related to energy, road and rail links, were needed to ensure greater cooperation. Moreover, the two countries also agreed to employ betters measures for visa facilitation, particularly for businesses.
Political
The general sentinment in Afghanistan and among many in Pakistan is that Ashraf Ghani’s presidency will lead to a fresh new page in Af-Pak relations. During Karzai’s period, tensions were rife between the two countries and their trust deficit tested all issues from counter-terrorism to security cooperation and the Afghan peace process. However, as Ghani himself stated, “The region has changed,” explaining that with this change an opportunity has emerged to transform once hostile relations into a symbiotic partnership. “This new government (Pakistan) realizes the deep economic problem that the country faces. It also realizes that extremism cannot be bounded in a neighbor or used against a neighbor and that it is a threat to all of us.”
Thus, Ghani utilised his visit to Pakistan to harness “a[n] honest partner in peace talks with the Taliban” and revive the stagnant Afghan peace process. Ghani hopes that Pakistan will assist Afghans in persuading insurgents to reconcile and reintegrate. In his last meeting with Pakistani officials, Ghani “set a 90-day deadline for implementation of commitments from both sides regarding peace talks with the Taliban.”
Conclusion
Optimism has certainly increased over better bilateral cooperation between Afghanistan and Pakistan after Ashraf Ghani’s visit. However, there still remains a great deal of uncertainty as to how the leaders of both nations will transform the rhetoric of ‘enhanced and genuine cooperation’ into practice? It will be interesting to see how Ghani’s approach towards Pakistan will differ from that of Karzai’s. And, whether he too will face the same, or perhaps different, challenges from Pakistan in the years ahead of his presidency.
Understanding Democracy and Diversity in J&K
Varun Sahni
As the Indian state of Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) goes to the polls
to elect a State Assembly, it is an appropriate moment to reflect on how
democracy, diversity and dissent are closely intertwined in the state.
The last two state assembly elections, in 2002 and 2008, have by almost
all accounts been free and fair. So have the general elections of 2004,
2009 and 2014 in the state. Perhaps most significantly, the Panchayat
elections of 2011 were a resounding success, with an astounding 82 per
cent voter turnout. There is no reason to expect that the forthcoming
state assembly elections would be a departure from this trend.
Undoubtedly, J&K continues to have many democracy deficits, but
these are no longer deficits of an electoral nature.
The other aspect the ongoing elections are once again highlighting is
the sheer diversity of J&K. While the rest of India has been
territorially made, unmade and remade, and almost always on
socio-cultural lines in order to manage diversity, the territorial
expanse of the former princely state of J&K has been altered not by
internal reorganisation but by external aggression. This
‘inside-outside’ dynamic – external compulsions preventing internal
rearrangement – has ensured that J&K will remain, well into the
future, exactly as we encounter it today: as a political community of
extraordinary diversity.
J&K is the only erstwhile princely state that has not been merged or
amalgamated with neighbouring territory. J&K had only a few peers
during the British Raj: the five Indian Princes entitled to the 21-gun
salute were the Nizam of Hyderabad and Berar, the Maharaja of Mysore,
the Maharaja of Jammu & Kashmir, the Maharaja Gaekwad of Baroda, and
the Maharaja Scindia of Gwalior. The territorial trajectories of these
five states are fascinating. For instance, after Gwalior State acceded
to India in 1947, it was merged with the states of the Central India
Agency to form Madhya Bharat, which later became Madhya Pradesh, which
was later further reorganised in 2000 with the creation of Chhattisgarh.
Baroda State formally acceded to the Dominion of India in1949 and was
first merged with Bombay state. In 1960, when the two new states of
Gujarat and Maharashtra were formed, Baroda became part of Gujarat.
What about Mysore State? As a result of the States Reorganisation Act,
in1956, the Kannada-speaking districts of Belgaum (except Chandgad
taluk), Bijapur, Dharwar, and North Canara were transferred from Bombay
State to Mysore State. Bellary, South Canara and Udupi districts were
transferred from Madras State and the Koppal, Raichur, Gulbarga and
Bidar districts from Hyderabad State. Also, Coorg State was merged into
Mysore, becoming a district of Mysore State. Those areas that spoke the
Kannada language were thus unified into one state. As a large portion of
this new state comprised the territory of Mysore, the name ‘Mysore’ was
retained as the name of the newly created state until it was renamed to
Karnataka in 1973.
But none of these territorial changes compare with the way in which
Hyderabad State was reorganised. In September 1948, the Dominion of
India invaded the State of Hyderabad and overthrew its Nizam, annexing
the state into what would become the Indian Union. In 1956, during the
Reorganisation of the Indian States based along linguistic lines, the
Telugu-speaking region of the Hyderabad State was merged with Andhra
State, the Marathi speaking region was merged with Bombay state and the
Kannada speaking region with Mysore State. In a very real sense,
Hyderabad state was not merely renamed or reorganised; it ceased to
exist. In June 2014, Telangana re-emerged as a separate state, with
Hyderabad City as the capital of both Andhra Pradesh and Telangana for
10 years.
These mergers, amalgamations and partitions are the story of independent
India, as the open and democratic political system has catered to – and
sometimes caved in the face of pressure to – popular demands emerging
largely on socio-cultural and ethno-cultural grounds. The ‘other four’
21-gun-salute states are a sample not only of all erstwhile princely
states but also of all the territories in erstwhile British India. Apart
from J&K, all other territories within India have been reconfigured
by the operation of democratic politics, sometimes deliberative and
sometimes agitational, but always seeking to diminish socio-cultural diversity.
Untouched by the 1956 Reorganisation of States, J&K is by far the
most linguistically diverse state in India. Despite some agitational
politics on this issue in recent years, the state cannot easily be
reorganised, for two distinct reasons. The first pertains to the
external shadows that have always hung upon the state. Analytically,
experientially and existentially, J&K is bordered by two foreign
powers, China and Pakistan that view its territory with hostile intent.
No other state in the Indian Union faces these geostrategic challenges.
Secondly, in its socio-cultural geography, J&K is a land of nested
minorities. Thus, any international reorganisation of the state will
always be a blunt instrument and many people and communities would feel
the brunt of such reorganisation.
The unique form of dissent in J&K is inextricably linked to issues
of democracy and diversity. This important topic will be explored in a
later column.
Pakistan: Why are Christians Being Persecuted?
Roomana Hukil
On 4 November 2014, a young Christian couple was publically set on fire
in Punjab, Pakistan. It was alleged by a mob of 1200 persons that the
couple had desecrated verses from the Quran. According to source, the
mob had apparently offered a waiving of severe retribution if the couple
converted to Islam, but when the couple refused, locked them in a brick
kiln, and set on fire.
Harassment and instances of violence against Pakistan’s minority Christian community has increased suddenly in the past few years. Last year, anti-Christian riots erupted in Gojra and Lahore, causing 170 families to flee their homes.
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2013, 501 people were victimised on blasphemy charges that entailed incidents categorised under “attacks on places of worship, stating derogatory remarks, disgracing in any form, unclear happenings and other cases.” While most outbreaks are instigated out of socio-economic reasons, they are constantly also backed by religious dogmas and false accusations of blasphemy. In the recent years, this trend has become increasingly pronounced. Assassinations of high-profile political leaders, attacks on the impoverished populations, and expulsions of minority students for misspelling/ misquoting the Quran point towards the intensification of radicalism and resultant attitudes among hard-line Islamists in Pakistan.
Why are Christians being targeted in Pakistan? Why is the Pakistani State reluctant to re-evaluate or repeal the biased blasphemy laws?
Harassment and instances of violence against Pakistan’s minority Christian community has increased suddenly in the past few years. Last year, anti-Christian riots erupted in Gojra and Lahore, causing 170 families to flee their homes.
According to the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, in 2013, 501 people were victimised on blasphemy charges that entailed incidents categorised under “attacks on places of worship, stating derogatory remarks, disgracing in any form, unclear happenings and other cases.” While most outbreaks are instigated out of socio-economic reasons, they are constantly also backed by religious dogmas and false accusations of blasphemy. In the recent years, this trend has become increasingly pronounced. Assassinations of high-profile political leaders, attacks on the impoverished populations, and expulsions of minority students for misspelling/ misquoting the Quran point towards the intensification of radicalism and resultant attitudes among hard-line Islamists in Pakistan.
Why are Christians being targeted in Pakistan? Why is the Pakistani State reluctant to re-evaluate or repeal the biased blasphemy laws?
Vulnerability
Christians are the second-largest religious minority in Pakistan after the Hindus, representing 1.8 per cent of the country's total population. A large number of Christians reside in south Karachi, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While a section resides in the poorest sectors of Pakistan involved menial jobs, there is a significant section that is flourishing in the corporate sector, in Karachi. In Pakistan, any sense of economic progression or identity-assertion by a minority group results in a sense of paranoia among the radicals in the majority groups. Consequently, both sides, irrespective of their economic contribution to the country are vulnerable to the wrath of Islamist extremism in Pakistan.
Additionally, there has been a gradual change shift in the Christian community vis-Ã -vis their socio-economic and political demands. Since 1992, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) has been demanding a separate Christian province in Punjab. Furthermore, Christians have been extremely vocal in expressing equal rights, demanding state benefits, exhibiting intolerance towards the blasphemy laws and refuting the majoritarian attitude towards the minority groups. Asserting for greater autonomy and representation in society is largely dismissed in Pakistan. Minority communities that remain submissive and camouflage within the rest of the society are accepted by the radicals. Those who resist are assaulted.
For instance, the Pakistani Federal Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated on the grounds of supporting the cause of Pakistani Christians, condemning the 2009 Gojra riots and demanding for justice.
Role of Blasphemy Laws
Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was introduced during the 1980s. It reinstated the position of religious zealots to act according to their whims and fancies. Pakistan has some of the strictest anti-blasphemy laws in the world, and they prescribe punitive punishment to those who ‘deliberately intend to wound the religious sentiments of others in their sight, hearing, and presence through imprisonment, fine or both’.
The law has been been heavily criticised for extending protection towards the embodiments of the Islamic faith alone while excluding that of other religious faiths. While the law is applicable to all, in a multi-faith society such as Pakistan, it is seen as highly discriminatory, as even the slightest rumours about instances of defaming the Prophet and/or the Quran continues to spark hysteria amongst the radicalised Muslims.
Stagnant Status Quo
The state has condemned violent attacks against the Christian community,
but its tight-lipped stance on the issue of amendment or repealing of
the biased laws questions the government’s credibility and intents on
the issue. Given the identity of the country as an Islamic Republic, the
government feels that any move towards altering the blasphemy laws will
infuriate religious extremists who might reciprocate in unfavourable
ways. In 2011, the former Governor of Punjab, Salman Taseer, was
assassinated for criticising the blasphemy law while advocating for
justice for Asia Bibi – a Christian woman who was sentenced to death
over allegations of defaming the Prophet. The then government that had
initially announced its intention to amend the law fell silent on the
subject after Taseer’s assassination. Christians are the second-largest religious minority in Pakistan after the Hindus, representing 1.8 per cent of the country's total population. A large number of Christians reside in south Karachi, Punjab and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. While a section resides in the poorest sectors of Pakistan involved menial jobs, there is a significant section that is flourishing in the corporate sector, in Karachi. In Pakistan, any sense of economic progression or identity-assertion by a minority group results in a sense of paranoia among the radicals in the majority groups. Consequently, both sides, irrespective of their economic contribution to the country are vulnerable to the wrath of Islamist extremism in Pakistan.
Additionally, there has been a gradual change shift in the Christian community vis-Ã -vis their socio-economic and political demands. Since 1992, the Pakistan Christian Congress (PCC) has been demanding a separate Christian province in Punjab. Furthermore, Christians have been extremely vocal in expressing equal rights, demanding state benefits, exhibiting intolerance towards the blasphemy laws and refuting the majoritarian attitude towards the minority groups. Asserting for greater autonomy and representation in society is largely dismissed in Pakistan. Minority communities that remain submissive and camouflage within the rest of the society are accepted by the radicals. Those who resist are assaulted.
For instance, the Pakistani Federal Minister for Minority Affairs, Shahbaz Bhatti, was assassinated on the grounds of supporting the cause of Pakistani Christians, condemning the 2009 Gojra riots and demanding for justice.
Role of Blasphemy Laws
Section 295-C of the Pakistan Penal Code was introduced during the 1980s. It reinstated the position of religious zealots to act according to their whims and fancies. Pakistan has some of the strictest anti-blasphemy laws in the world, and they prescribe punitive punishment to those who ‘deliberately intend to wound the religious sentiments of others in their sight, hearing, and presence through imprisonment, fine or both’.
The law has been been heavily criticised for extending protection towards the embodiments of the Islamic faith alone while excluding that of other religious faiths. While the law is applicable to all, in a multi-faith society such as Pakistan, it is seen as highly discriminatory, as even the slightest rumours about instances of defaming the Prophet and/or the Quran continues to spark hysteria amongst the radicalised Muslims.
Stagnant Status Quo
Repealing the law doesn’t alone or automatically mean the end of the woes of the Christian community. While it may bring about a change in the relationship politics between the majority and minority groups, this will be short-lived. Instead of promising to alter or remove the blasphemy law, one solution would be to create a national consensus on the need to reform the law by highlighting the death tolls and cases of abuse this law has invoked on minority groups.
However, the current trajectory of affairs indicates that the government will remain cautious on the issue as radical elements continue to grow in Pakistan. In the process, it will continue to disregard international humanitarian laws and continue to commit human rights violations by backing the interests of one section of the society whilst excluding the aspirations of the other.
Myanmar: Why the Islamic State Failed Here
Aparupa Bhattacherjee
The Islamic State (IS) unilaterally declared an ‘Islamic Caliphate’ in
Iraq and Syria in June 2014. This has resulted in the increase in the
numbers of radicalised Muslims from all over the world travelling to the
region to support the IS, and Southeast Asia is no exception.
According to reports, there are roughly 30 Malaysians, 60 Indonesians,
50 Filipinos, one Cambodian and a few Singaporeans have already joined
the IS. However, there are barely any reports that cite Muslims from
Myanmar having joined terrorist group. Why is that the case? Why are
there low or negligible numbers of radical Islamist jihadists joining
the IS from Myanmar? What are the general sentiments the Myanmarese
Muslims foster towards the IS?
The Anti-Muslim Sentiment Factor
The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar to some extent thrives on the misinformed notion that most Muslims encourage terrorism. The presence of militant and secessionist groups such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and a newly formed fundamental group called the Arakan Mujahedeen (AM) have resulted in the development of such a perception. Muslims in Myanmar are aware of this notion and that radical Buddhists misuse the sentiment.
Thus, Myanmarese Muslims know and feel that any news of anyone from their community’s involvement in any kind of terrorist activity would worsen the already bad situation for them; especially given their small number (approximately four per cent) in comparison to the majority Buddhists (approximately 89 per cent).
Although there are grievances among Muslims over the use of violence against their community in various riots that have taken place since 2012, most of them feel that violence is not a good medium of response.
The growth of anti-Muslim sentiment in Myanmar to some extent thrives on the misinformed notion that most Muslims encourage terrorism. The presence of militant and secessionist groups such as Rohingya Solidarity Organisation (RSO), the Arakan Rohingya National Organisation (ARNO) and a newly formed fundamental group called the Arakan Mujahedeen (AM) have resulted in the development of such a perception. Muslims in Myanmar are aware of this notion and that radical Buddhists misuse the sentiment.
Thus, Myanmarese Muslims know and feel that any news of anyone from their community’s involvement in any kind of terrorist activity would worsen the already bad situation for them; especially given their small number (approximately four per cent) in comparison to the majority Buddhists (approximately 89 per cent).
Although there are grievances among Muslims over the use of violence against their community in various riots that have taken place since 2012, most of them feel that violence is not a good medium of response.
This became clear when the London based Myanmarese Muslim association
became the first to announce their denial to support any al Qaeda dream
to “raise the flag of Jihad” across South Asia, and stated that
Myanmarese Muslims will never accept any assistance from a terrorist
organisation.
Lack of Vanguards?
In Southeast Asian countries, most jihadist recruiters are home-grown
terrorist organisations. In Myanmar, both the RSO and the ARNO are too
weak to play this role. The AM, although armed, so far claims to want
to achieve political emancipation of the Rohingya Muslims via political
means as opposed to resorting to violence. The RSO, which shifted its
base to Bangladesh after the 1977 Nagamin operation in Myanmar, has
thrived due to support from the Islami Chhatra Shibir, a wing of
Bangladesh’s Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) and also from Jemaah Islamiya (JI).
Heavy crackdowns by the incumbent Awami League government in Dhaka,
both on the JeI and the RSO, and the disintegration of the JI into
several smaller and weaker groups are among the reasons for present
state of the RSO.
Significant numbers of Myanmarese Muslims are naturalised citizens of the country; and even for those who are full citizens, restrictions are placed on travel simply because they belong to a minority religion. Thus, travelling to Iraq and Syria is only possible via Bangladesh, and that too, only illegally. This is no other viable option given Dhaka’s strict vigilance measures. Furthermore, the lack of support from recruiters too deters most radicalised Myanmarese Muslims from traveling to unknown lands to wage jihad.
Significant numbers of Myanmarese Muslims are naturalised citizens of the country; and even for those who are full citizens, restrictions are placed on travel simply because they belong to a minority religion. Thus, travelling to Iraq and Syria is only possible via Bangladesh, and that too, only illegally. This is no other viable option given Dhaka’s strict vigilance measures. Furthermore, the lack of support from recruiters too deters most radicalised Myanmarese Muslims from traveling to unknown lands to wage jihad.
Lower Levels of Ideological Indoctrination?
Both the RSO and the ARNO were formed with an aim to create a separate
state for Rohingya Muslims as opposed to waging jihad. Economic and
political segregation were the bases of the formation of these groups.
They were introduced to the concept of ‘global jihad’ only after their
link up with al Qaeda and the JI.
However, both organisations were not influential enough, and not based in Myanmar, resulted in their failure to instil their extremist ideology among the locals. Thus, unlike other terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the RSO and the ARNO did not manage to anchor the extremist ideology in their home ground.
However, both organisations were not influential enough, and not based in Myanmar, resulted in their failure to instil their extremist ideology among the locals. Thus, unlike other terrorist organisations in Southeast Asia, the RSO and the ARNO did not manage to anchor the extremist ideology in their home ground.
The large numbers of Southeast Asian Muslims who travelled to
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia for Islamic education in 1990s
were the ones who brought the seeds of radical Islam to the region.
Myanmar was an exception in this case. Factors such as globalisation,
urbanisation, and westernisation that, in the 1990s, led other Southeast
Asian Muslims to travel abroad to study religion, did not influence the
Myanmarese. This was because Myanmar, during that period, was under
the military Junta rule, and as a result, was cut off from the rest of
the world.
Many madrassas in Indonesia, Malaysia and southern Thailand also
function as media for the dissemination of jihadist ideology. In
Myanmar, the presence of such madrassas preaching radicalised
interpretations of Islam are only restricted to the northern areas of
the Arakan province; and here too, the numbers are trivial. Thus, it
appears that Myanmar so far lacks the necessary apparatus key to create a
conducive environment for the growth and grip of radical Islam – which
also explains the limited influence, the IS’s propaganda for ‘global
jihad’ has had on Myanmarese Muslims.
US-Russia and Global Nuclear Security: Under a Frosty Spell?
Sheel Kant Sharma
It is twenty years since acute concern about unauthorised and malevolent access to sensitive nuclear material and radioactive substances, particularly from successor states to the former Soviet Union, roused the international community in 1994. Nuclear security has since remained at the centre of post-Cold War cooperation between the US and Russia over these past two decades - till that cooperation was given severe body blows by the chill that has set in the relations between Putin’s Russia and the West. While the immediate root of this frosty development lies in Ukraine and Crimea, President Putin’s Sochi speech last month seemed to lay down a new manifesto for a Cold War redux. The APEC summit in China and the G20 meeting in Australia earlier this month failed to dispel the frost and, on the contrary, hardened it as the Russian president was cold shouldered and treated with concerted tough talk by his Western interlocutors.
Even prior to these summits Russia had put an end to the twenty year process begun by the famous Nunn-Lugar team in the US to salvage nuclear material, technology and installations in Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Moscow used to describe them. This programme championed by the Nunn-Lugar team has been a success story that now risks being burnt up by the exacerbating diplomatic fracas with Russia. Even someone as committed to the transformation of East-West relations as Gorbachev has voiced fears about a renewed Cold War.
The Nuclear Security Summit process which has been the high point of Barack Obama’s presidency, and supported widely by 59 states, is not spared anymore by an irate Russia which has advised US and all concerned that it would only work for nuclear security within the IAEA framework. Russia announced it would not join the Sherpas’ meetings for the next NSS which is going to be hosted by US in 2016. There has been in addition a whole slew of international initiatives geared to securing nuclear materials, facilities and the enterprise in general from threats of terrorism. In all of these Russia had been an active and willing partner. Since its nuclear enterprise remains vast and as diversified as that of the US it is hard to visualise the future of all those initiatives without a well disposed Russia.
Fear of nuclear terrorism has gone up a few more notches in the past year due to the unmitigated horrors disseminated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and its propensity to stop at nothing. Among the elaborate action points deliberated and recommended by the Nuclear Security Summits so far, not all are limited to the IAEA even though its centrality has been progressively underscored. The principal requirement in grappling with threats to nuclear security is the combined unbroken pressure from moral, diplomatic, civil society and legal angles. The existing legal instruments and the Security Council edicts are still in the formative stage of enforcement. Undiminished support and cooperation of all major countries with nuclear materials and technology is the sine qua non. It remains to be seen how Russia will play ball in diverse forums.
There have been critiques of the post-Cold War world order, some of them quite harsh too, but to leverage such critiques to a particular situation of conflict and tension, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This applies to both sides of the tense situation in Ukraine just as it does to the ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear future. A relapse to a Cold War-like division of the world would benefit no one just as it did not help even during the heady years of the last Cold War. Neither the triumphalism that marked the 1990s nor a panicked reassertion of destructive power as witnessed in recent months can help in stabilising international nuclear diplomacy, be that in regard to non-proliferation or strategic arms reduction or nuclear security. The edifice created over the past two decades in regard to each of these spheres merits preserving.
Absence of negotiated agreements has also presaged a host of sub-legal or voluntary arrangements to fix the problems posed by inadequate controls on nuclear material - these voluntary arrangements ought not to be interrupted in pique or partisan parsimony as in budget cuts in the US Congress on valuable nuclear security programmes. As regards the centrality of the IAEA, that has also been a result of the growing common understanding about a range of voluntary steps that have been generally supported over the past two decades such as peer reviews, advisory services or collation of related data banks or coordination of intelligence and forensics among different organisations.
Prime Minister Modi stated in Canberra this week that we do not “have the luxury to choose who we work with and who we don’t.” This sentiment remains key to strengthening and sustaining a norms-based order to cope with new age threats like nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are two significant examples in this regard. The entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be a big step forward where cooperation of major players remains crucial.
It is to be hoped that the tough talk possibly conceals quiet diplomacy to restore balance and stability in great power relations and pave the way forward. Until there is progress in that direction a climate of suspicion is unlikely to help global endeavour towards greater nuclear security.
It is twenty years since acute concern about unauthorised and malevolent access to sensitive nuclear material and radioactive substances, particularly from successor states to the former Soviet Union, roused the international community in 1994. Nuclear security has since remained at the centre of post-Cold War cooperation between the US and Russia over these past two decades - till that cooperation was given severe body blows by the chill that has set in the relations between Putin’s Russia and the West. While the immediate root of this frosty development lies in Ukraine and Crimea, President Putin’s Sochi speech last month seemed to lay down a new manifesto for a Cold War redux. The APEC summit in China and the G20 meeting in Australia earlier this month failed to dispel the frost and, on the contrary, hardened it as the Russian president was cold shouldered and treated with concerted tough talk by his Western interlocutors.
Even prior to these summits Russia had put an end to the twenty year process begun by the famous Nunn-Lugar team in the US to salvage nuclear material, technology and installations in Russia and its Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), as Moscow used to describe them. This programme championed by the Nunn-Lugar team has been a success story that now risks being burnt up by the exacerbating diplomatic fracas with Russia. Even someone as committed to the transformation of East-West relations as Gorbachev has voiced fears about a renewed Cold War.
The Nuclear Security Summit process which has been the high point of Barack Obama’s presidency, and supported widely by 59 states, is not spared anymore by an irate Russia which has advised US and all concerned that it would only work for nuclear security within the IAEA framework. Russia announced it would not join the Sherpas’ meetings for the next NSS which is going to be hosted by US in 2016. There has been in addition a whole slew of international initiatives geared to securing nuclear materials, facilities and the enterprise in general from threats of terrorism. In all of these Russia had been an active and willing partner. Since its nuclear enterprise remains vast and as diversified as that of the US it is hard to visualise the future of all those initiatives without a well disposed Russia.
Fear of nuclear terrorism has gone up a few more notches in the past year due to the unmitigated horrors disseminated by the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq and its propensity to stop at nothing. Among the elaborate action points deliberated and recommended by the Nuclear Security Summits so far, not all are limited to the IAEA even though its centrality has been progressively underscored. The principal requirement in grappling with threats to nuclear security is the combined unbroken pressure from moral, diplomatic, civil society and legal angles. The existing legal instruments and the Security Council edicts are still in the formative stage of enforcement. Undiminished support and cooperation of all major countries with nuclear materials and technology is the sine qua non. It remains to be seen how Russia will play ball in diverse forums.
There have been critiques of the post-Cold War world order, some of them quite harsh too, but to leverage such critiques to a particular situation of conflict and tension, it is important not to throw the baby out with the bathwater. This applies to both sides of the tense situation in Ukraine just as it does to the ongoing talks about Iran’s nuclear future. A relapse to a Cold War-like division of the world would benefit no one just as it did not help even during the heady years of the last Cold War. Neither the triumphalism that marked the 1990s nor a panicked reassertion of destructive power as witnessed in recent months can help in stabilising international nuclear diplomacy, be that in regard to non-proliferation or strategic arms reduction or nuclear security. The edifice created over the past two decades in regard to each of these spheres merits preserving.
Absence of negotiated agreements has also presaged a host of sub-legal or voluntary arrangements to fix the problems posed by inadequate controls on nuclear material - these voluntary arrangements ought not to be interrupted in pique or partisan parsimony as in budget cuts in the US Congress on valuable nuclear security programmes. As regards the centrality of the IAEA, that has also been a result of the growing common understanding about a range of voluntary steps that have been generally supported over the past two decades such as peer reviews, advisory services or collation of related data banks or coordination of intelligence and forensics among different organisations.
Prime Minister Modi stated in Canberra this week that we do not “have the luxury to choose who we work with and who we don’t.” This sentiment remains key to strengthening and sustaining a norms-based order to cope with new age threats like nuclear terrorism. The Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism are two significant examples in this regard. The entry into force of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material can be a big step forward where cooperation of major players remains crucial.
It is to be hoped that the tough talk possibly conceals quiet diplomacy to restore balance and stability in great power relations and pave the way forward. Until there is progress in that direction a climate of suspicion is unlikely to help global endeavour towards greater nuclear security.
Machil Verdict and Eluding Justice
Shujaat Bukhari
When an Army court martial handed over life imprisonment to five of its men including a Colonel for staging a fake encounter to kill three Kashmiri youth in 2010, it evoked a mixed response. Families of the three civilians, who were picked up from a North Kashmir village, branded as “terrorists” and bumped off in Machil, close to Line of Control, did welcome the verdict but they wanted more: “Death for the killers”.
Ten days before this verdict, the Army had to face a huge embarrassment as its soldiers fired upon a moving car and killed two teenagers on the outskirts of capital Srinagar. Lt Gen Hooda, its top commander in Northern region had to accept it as a mistake and own the responsibility. Even on November 14, it came under criticism for allegedly killing a civilian after a gun battle with militants in South Kashmir. Same day a local MLA in North Kashmir’s Handwara town Abdur Rashid Sheikh made serious allegations against two Army men for killing a civilian while being in civvies. Army denied involvement but cases stand registered.
Amidst this din the “positive” verdict in Machil encounter could not make much impact. Even if the court martial awarding lifer to five guilty men is a significant development, since Army has been in denial mode for last over two decades, but the confidence that it could deliver justice is still eluding. There is a reason for that. Whatever wrongs done by Army and para-military forces such as Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force while fighting the militants have been brazenly covered up under the much-trumpeted “national cause”. Kashmiris have grudge against India’s national media as well which they believe have fallen in the trap of “nationalism” thus covering up the erring soldiers.
For Army, the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), that gives immunity to its men, has come in handy to protect them. Past week, the former Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram termed AFSPA as “obnoxious’ saying “it had no place in a modern, civilized country”. He as home minister is believed to have moved amendments in the law but for Defence Ministry’s opposition could not achieve his goal. On AFSPA’s continuation, noted journalist Kuldip Nayar opined in Deccan Herald that it needs re-look. “Powers to kill on suspicion is too sweeping for a democratic country,” he wrote.
Notwithstanding the fact that Lt Gen Hooda’s public acknowledgement in case of death of two teenagers and the Machil verdict are a departure from its conduct in last over 20 years, but a lot more needs to be done to restore the confidence among the people. According to an RTI reply by Jammu and Kashmir Home department on February 23, 2012, sanction is still pending in 70 cases. These are the cases of alleged custodial killings and fake encounters in which Army men have been found involved in preliminary investigations. Once the state police or the government is convinced that an Army man is found guilty it approaches Defence Ministry for formal sanction to prosecute them, but in most of the cases it has been denied. Similarly the BSF has escaped with minor punishments. BSF courts have surely proceeded against its men and according a reply under RTI it has punished more than 40 of its men in various cases of killing and rape since 1990. The punishments range from five years rigorous imprisonment to dismissal of, or reduction in service. But in a case like that of Sopore where on January 6, 1993 over 40 people were mowed down by BSF after a militant attack, it has been termed as a “mischief” and those involved were given a minor punishment.
Army’s refusal to cooperate with the civilian courts or to transparently conduct the trials in its courts have caused a major dent to people’s confidence. Pathribal is a classic case in this long list. Five civilians were picked up in March 2000, soon after militants massacred 35 Sikhs in Chattisinghpora in South Kashmir coinciding with the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India. They were later branded as terrorists and their charred bodies were buried in a remote area. Central Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough probe and held five officers of Army including a Brigadier responsible for killing them in fake encounter. The case went to Supreme Court where CBI insisted on trial in a civilian court. Army put its foot down and decided to take it to its own court. The Army court absolved all of them. When a local lawyers body approached a lower court to seek the proceedings in the Army court it was denied.
Human rights defender Khurram Parvez believes that Machil verdict does not match with the commitment of justice. “The Indian army court-martial verdict is not a beginning or a water-shed moment for Jammu and Kashmir, but an illustrative case of the manner in which political considerations and interests of the Indian army overrule larger principles of justice and accountability” he said.
According to human rights organization Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, the Army has so far held 58 court martial’s but punishment has been given in only two cases and others dismissed as minor ones.
With a baggage of not doing much to deliver justice, this verdict has come at a time when Army was found involved in two more such incidents past week. AFSPA is being seen as a major source of strength for Army to have this immunity. Machil verdict has surely opened a new window but it needs to be extended to other cases that have mauled the justice.
When an Army court martial handed over life imprisonment to five of its men including a Colonel for staging a fake encounter to kill three Kashmiri youth in 2010, it evoked a mixed response. Families of the three civilians, who were picked up from a North Kashmir village, branded as “terrorists” and bumped off in Machil, close to Line of Control, did welcome the verdict but they wanted more: “Death for the killers”.
Ten days before this verdict, the Army had to face a huge embarrassment as its soldiers fired upon a moving car and killed two teenagers on the outskirts of capital Srinagar. Lt Gen Hooda, its top commander in Northern region had to accept it as a mistake and own the responsibility. Even on November 14, it came under criticism for allegedly killing a civilian after a gun battle with militants in South Kashmir. Same day a local MLA in North Kashmir’s Handwara town Abdur Rashid Sheikh made serious allegations against two Army men for killing a civilian while being in civvies. Army denied involvement but cases stand registered.
Amidst this din the “positive” verdict in Machil encounter could not make much impact. Even if the court martial awarding lifer to five guilty men is a significant development, since Army has been in denial mode for last over two decades, but the confidence that it could deliver justice is still eluding. There is a reason for that. Whatever wrongs done by Army and para-military forces such as Border Security Force and Central Reserve Police Force while fighting the militants have been brazenly covered up under the much-trumpeted “national cause”. Kashmiris have grudge against India’s national media as well which they believe have fallen in the trap of “nationalism” thus covering up the erring soldiers.
For Army, the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), that gives immunity to its men, has come in handy to protect them. Past week, the former Indian Home Minister P Chidambaram termed AFSPA as “obnoxious’ saying “it had no place in a modern, civilized country”. He as home minister is believed to have moved amendments in the law but for Defence Ministry’s opposition could not achieve his goal. On AFSPA’s continuation, noted journalist Kuldip Nayar opined in Deccan Herald that it needs re-look. “Powers to kill on suspicion is too sweeping for a democratic country,” he wrote.
Notwithstanding the fact that Lt Gen Hooda’s public acknowledgement in case of death of two teenagers and the Machil verdict are a departure from its conduct in last over 20 years, but a lot more needs to be done to restore the confidence among the people. According to an RTI reply by Jammu and Kashmir Home department on February 23, 2012, sanction is still pending in 70 cases. These are the cases of alleged custodial killings and fake encounters in which Army men have been found involved in preliminary investigations. Once the state police or the government is convinced that an Army man is found guilty it approaches Defence Ministry for formal sanction to prosecute them, but in most of the cases it has been denied. Similarly the BSF has escaped with minor punishments. BSF courts have surely proceeded against its men and according a reply under RTI it has punished more than 40 of its men in various cases of killing and rape since 1990. The punishments range from five years rigorous imprisonment to dismissal of, or reduction in service. But in a case like that of Sopore where on January 6, 1993 over 40 people were mowed down by BSF after a militant attack, it has been termed as a “mischief” and those involved were given a minor punishment.
Army’s refusal to cooperate with the civilian courts or to transparently conduct the trials in its courts have caused a major dent to people’s confidence. Pathribal is a classic case in this long list. Five civilians were picked up in March 2000, soon after militants massacred 35 Sikhs in Chattisinghpora in South Kashmir coinciding with the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit to India. They were later branded as terrorists and their charred bodies were buried in a remote area. Central Bureau of Investigation conducted a thorough probe and held five officers of Army including a Brigadier responsible for killing them in fake encounter. The case went to Supreme Court where CBI insisted on trial in a civilian court. Army put its foot down and decided to take it to its own court. The Army court absolved all of them. When a local lawyers body approached a lower court to seek the proceedings in the Army court it was denied.
Human rights defender Khurram Parvez believes that Machil verdict does not match with the commitment of justice. “The Indian army court-martial verdict is not a beginning or a water-shed moment for Jammu and Kashmir, but an illustrative case of the manner in which political considerations and interests of the Indian army overrule larger principles of justice and accountability” he said.
According to human rights organization Jammu and Kashmir Coalition of Civil Society, the Army has so far held 58 court martial’s but punishment has been given in only two cases and others dismissed as minor ones.
With a baggage of not doing much to deliver justice, this verdict has come at a time when Army was found involved in two more such incidents past week. AFSPA is being seen as a major source of strength for Army to have this immunity. Machil verdict has surely opened a new window but it needs to be extended to other cases that have mauled the justice.
Foreign Fighters of Pakistan: Why Pashtuns and Punjabis?
D Suba Chandran
There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.
What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?
Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.
The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.
The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.
The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.
While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.
Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.
Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.
It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh - played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.
Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.
A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.
If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?
There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.
There is an international focus on the phenomenon of foreign fighters today; thanks to the unprecedented attraction that the Islamic State in Syria and Iraq possess, there are foreign fighters expanding the size of the Islamic State from Central Asia, Europe and the Arab World. Though there have been reports of youths from South and Southeast Asia joining the Islamic State, the numbers are insignificant, when compared to the above three regions.
The issue of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq raises another important question in South Asia – what about the foreign fighters from South Asia, fighting within the region? An interesting statistics in this regional phenomenon would reveal, of all the groups, it is mostly the Punjabi and Pashtun fighters, who have been known for fighting in other regions, primarily outside their area of domicile. There may be other fighters/groups in South Asia as well fighting in distant land; but the available literature indicates that there are more Pashtun and Punjabi fighters waging war elsewhere.
What makes the youths from Punjab and Khyber Paktunkwa (KPK) to travel a long distance to faraway places such as J&K and Afghanistan to wage jihad or fight someone else’s war? While for the pashtun fighters from KPK and the FATA belt, crossing the Durand Line may be relatively easier, what made them to cross the Line of Control (LoC) between India and Pakistan and fight in the Kashmir Valley in the late 1940s? What made the Afghans (primarily the Pashtuns) from West of the Durand Line to cross Pakistan and enter into J&K in the early 1990s? What enthused the Punjabi fighters of the Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Toiba to cross both the borders into India and Afghanistan? An equally interesting question should be, why not the Sindhis and Balochis from Pakistan do not join the jihad elsewhere? What prevents the fighters from Sindh and Balochistan to remain territorial, and what enthuses the fighters from Punjab and KPK to fight someone else’s War?
Any answer cannot strictly from the security field; it has to be an explanation based on sociological, anthropological and demographic studies. This commentary could only be a partial explanation, if not an insufficient one.
The Afghans (Pashtuns to be precise in this context), historically have been buoyed with a sense of jihad, much before the Mughals came into South Asia. From the days of Mahmud of Ghazni in tenth century and Mahmud of Ghuri later, jihad was used as a strategy for the multiple Afghan raids against the then Rajput kingdoms of North India. The passes of Khyber and Bolan acted more as a gateway, rather than a hindrance. This eastward raids of the Afghan Pashtuns continued till the British era; the multiple Angla-Afghan Wars and the names inscribed in the India Gate in New Delhi will reveal the nature and extent of the interactions across, what came to be later defined as the Durand Line.
The only other major intervention by the Pashtuns to fight someone else’s war or liberate another land came immediately after the partition of India and took place in J&K. There is enough literature today on the nature of this “tribal” raid in 1947 and the extent of support from Pakistan’s regular security forces.
The last of pashtun raids during the previous century on east of the Indus river, took place in the early 1990s, when there was a major ingress of the Afghan Pashtuns into India, primarily in the Kashmir Valley. The reasons for the Pashtuns from across the Durand Line to enter J&K in the 1990s certainly were different from the earlier attempts in 1940s and also almost ten centuries ago under the leadership of the Mahmuds of Ghazni and Ghur.
While it is easier to explain how and when, there cannot be an universal explanation for the “why” question. If the wealth of temples (real and exaggerated) in North India and the clever use of “jihad” phrase by the then raiders in the tenth and eleventh centuries played a role, the Pashtun ingress into J&K 1990s, was a well planned and calculated move by the State in Pakistan, especially its ISI. More than an inherent fervour of jihad, it was manipulation of the rulers or State institutions for a secular purpose – that had been the reason until now – from Mahmud of Ghazni in the tenth century to the ISI until recently.
Second, thanks to the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s, there were so many battle hardened fighters, buoyed by a “jihadi” spirit, though used more for a political purpose – overthrowing Russian troops from Afghanistan. In many ways, the Afghan Jihad of the 1980s totally transformed the jihadi fervour and sowed the seeds of multiple destructions in South Asia. While the US is fighting the monsters it created in the 1980s – from New York to Kobani, South Asia has become a playground.
Punjab would not have sucked into this whirlwind, had it not been the Afghan jihad, and the short-sightedness of the CIA and the ISI. Unfortunately for Punjab, during the 1980s, Zia ul Haq did create a favourable environment within Pakistan for the growth of sectarian sentiments; his initiatives to “Islamize” to gain legitimacy actually resulted in sectarian groups springing into action.
It is interesting to note in this context, what was sociologically abhorred – the tribal Sardar edifice in Balochistan and the feudal system in Sindh - played a role in keeping the society from radicalized. The local Mullah was a part of the feudal hierarchy in Sindh, while in Balochistan, the Sardars were expected to pray for the serfs as well. Besides the nationalist insurgencies in Sindh and Balochistan during this period did not provide the space for any radical onslaught. Quetta and Karachi – two major urban centers of Balochistan and Sindh became radicalised at a later stage. Even in this case, the manipulation of intelligence agencies was substantial, as they attempted to use a radical course to undermine the political narrative led by the MQM and the Balochi nationalists.
Back to Punjab, it is safe to conclude the rise of jihadis was a post Zia and post Afghan Jihad phenomenon. Had it not been the Islamization process of Zia and the Iran-Pakistan Cold War along the Shia-Sunni sectarian lines, the Punjabi fighters would not have become a phenomenon today. Two developments took place simultaneously within Punjab during the 1980s. The violent eruption of sectarian violence and the emergence of sectarian organizations such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, and the birth of the Lashkar-e-Toiba. Whether the State in Pakistan had a direct role in its birth or not, it did play a substantial role in pushing them outside Punjab to fight elsewhere. The sectarian militants of Punjab belonging to the SSP and LeJ also became a part of the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen and later the Jaish-e-Mohammad.
A follow up explanation could be the relationship between the groups and the Establishment. Neither the Sindhi nor the Balochi groups trusted/trust the Pakistani Establishment and vice-versa. On the contrary Punjab and KPK became a primary recruitment ground for the Establishment to exploit the groups and individuals to achieve its own goals in Afghanistan and India. The successful abuse of jihad as a strategy against the Soviet troops by the ISI gave an opportunity for the latter to try a similar strategy against India. J&K became an easy target, for there was a cause, and also a geographic proximity. Like Turkey’s proximity to Syria and Iraq, the control of Mirpur and Muzaffarabad provided an easy access for the Punjabi fighters to pour and get pushed into J&K.
If the State has its own reasons to push the fighters elsewhere, what makes the latter to go elsewhere and fight? Why would a Punjabi fighter cross the LoC into Kashmir Valley or the Durand Line into Afghanistan, to wage a war in another land, where the language, climate, culture and food habits are different?
There are more questions than answers. The above could only be a partial or even an insufficient explanation. We need to find the answers for above questions; or perhaps, we first need to ask the right questions on this issue.
Understanding the Attraction of Salafi and Wahhabi Movements
Saneya Arif
This year, 17 October 2014, celebrated as Sir Syed Day in the memory of
Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, founder of the Aligarh Muslim University (AMU),
refreshed memories and raised questions related to various Islamic
movements till date and their relevance in today’s world. Why have
traditional Islamic movements failed today? Why have the Salafi and
Wahhabi movements gained traction among the Muslim populations?
Aligarh, Deoband and Barelvi Movements
The Aligarh movement, like other movements, was initiated for a
cherished goal. Aggrieved by the decimation of his community in the
aftermath of the 1857 revolt, Khan saw modern scientific education to be
the only ray of hope for restoring the lost glory of his people.
Notwithstanding the opposition from his co-religionists, Khan succeeded
in bringing modern education to Muslims. However, the fulfillment of the
goal put a halt on the movement. Although a pioneering institution for
imparting modern education, the AMU rarely occupies a space in the minds
of Muslims today in the same sense. It is instead viewed as a hub where
political dogma convert themselves into propaganda against the status
quo.
Reasons more or less similar led to the loss of traction in the Deobandi
and Barelvi movements – both of which are different from each other for
an array of reasons. The Sunni groups, the Deobandis and the Barelvis
are the two major groups of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent apart
from the Shia Muslims. Barelvis consider the Deobandis as kafir (infidels).
The latter accuse the Barelvis of being ignorant shrine and
grave-worshippers. Both impart traditional education that is not much in
fashion today due to the growing numbers of liberal and modern Muslims.
Fatwas (legal opinion or learned interpretation) issued by madrassas
affiliated to both movements, e.g. the Madrasa Manzar-e-Islam and Darul
Uloom Deoband, have little following. The world view of the expanding
Muslim moderates are in complete contrast with those of these
institutions.
Contrary to popular perceptions, Muslims in India wish to keep
themselves out of any trap of radicalisation today. Their affinity to
modern ideas is a contrast to the paradigms propagated by these
institutions. Today, the role of madrassas is confined to being mediums
of imparting the knowledge of Quran only, and not centres of higher
education. As a result, the Deoband and the Barelvi movements stand
somewhat unwanted and irrelevant, as their preaching borders on the
margins of intolerance and radicalism.
Salafi and Wahhabi Movements
Today, the Salafi and Wahhabi movements, now a pivot of Islamic
movements, dominate the global panorama. Salafi in traditional Islamic
scholarship means someone who died within the first four hundred years
after Prophet Mohammed. It was revived as a slogan and movement among
latter-day Muslims by the followers of Muhammad Abduh to propagate the
view that Islam, subject to several interpretations and explanations,
had not been properly understood by anyone since the Prophet. It was
here the Salafi school of thought gained importance among Muslims,
claiming the power of rightful interpretation of the religion and
serving as a beacon for the ignorant and easily-swayed Muslims.
The Wahhabi movement, on the other hand, is regarded as the central
movement by most Muslims, due to its teachings regarding state and
religion. According to this school of thought, the Ulema are responsible
for the protection of the divine law and one can accept the rule of
anyone who follows Shariah. Based on the principle of pure monotheistic
worship, this movement also advocated purging of practices such as
popularising cults of saints, and shrine visitation, widespread among
Muslims since the spread of Sufi Islam. The movement considered these as
impurities and innovations in Islam, an extreme form of which they
believe may lead the believers to shirk (by practising idolatry or
polytheism).
Such attempts to project a puritan form of Islam bereft of impurities
and innovations have further benefited from and have been influenced by
the rapidly transforming geopolitical scenarios in the modern era,
resulting in Wahhabim becoming more open and inclusive – by targeting
not just Sunni Muslims, but also non-Sunnis and non-Muslims in their
preachings – and thereby attracting more audiences. Additionally, the
spread of education and advancements in communication systems have made
it easier to transmit Wahhabi doctrines to different segments of Muslim
populations across the globe.
In the early years of the Wahhabi movement, there were instances where
the press in Saudi Arabia was not allowed to publish photographs,
illustrations and imagery of human faces as it was considered a taboo
among the Wahhabis. That is no longer the case today. Noticeable
positive changes such as education for girls and changing attitudes
towards smoking, among others – that are no longer considered moral
negligence deserving punishment – result in the movement being perceived
as relatively open and therefore, acceptable. Lastly, the rise of
terrorist group, the Islamic State (IS) has given much assemblage to the
Wahhabi movement. While the IS practices an extreme interpretation of
the sharia, at a fundamental level, it follows Wahhabism.
Once considered to be an extremist pseudo-Sunni movement, Wahhabism has a
different face in India. Although the seeds of polarisation continue to
be sown from the outside world, Shias and Sunnis co-exist peacefully in
India.
China’s Endgame in Afghanistan
Teshu Singh
The US troops are expected to exit from Afghanistan by the end of 2014
but according to a recently signed Bilateral Security Agreement between
Afghanistan and the US, the troops will remain until ‘end of 2024 and
beyond’. Many Western countries look forward to China’s more active role
in the country. Given the complexity of the situation in the country
and the region, will China engage itself in Afghanistan? What is its
end-game in Afghanistan?
China’s Interests in Afghanistan
China’s Interests in Afghanistan
Afghanistan is China’s neighbour and any development in the country is
bound to affect internal dynamics in China. Given that Afghanistan is a
landlocked country and shares a border with China, Beijing will engage
with Kabul to secure its western periphery, especially Xinjiang region.
Notably, non-interference in domestic issues of other countries is the
lynchpin of Chinese foreign policy. However, China has so far made
economic investments in Afghanistan, especially in its energy sector.
China needs a stable and secure neighbourhood for its ‘Peaceful Development’ plan that also emphasises on a stable and secure neighbourhood. In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation’ to lay out basic political principles and main directions of bilateral relations.
The region assumes more importance for China as it forms an important link in the ‘New Silk Road’ and is interconnected to China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS). Although the Road does not pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, it does pass through Urumqi and Khorgas in Xinjiang. Thus China is concerned about the overall security environment in the country that can affect the trade conducted through the corridor. The WDS that essentially aims to develop the western provinces of China is often disrupted by the Uyghur terrorism in the Xinjiang province.
Thousands of Uyghurs fighters are being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There have been several instances of attacks in the past few months alone. Consequently, China has witnessed instability spilling into Beijing as well. During the 1990s, China relied on Pakistan to manage its relationship with the extremist group but now it is sceptical of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Tools of Engagement
China needs a stable and secure neighbourhood for its ‘Peaceful Development’ plan that also emphasises on a stable and secure neighbourhood. In 2006, China and Afghanistan signed the ‘Treaty of Good Neighbourly Friendship and Cooperation’ to lay out basic political principles and main directions of bilateral relations.
The region assumes more importance for China as it forms an important link in the ‘New Silk Road’ and is interconnected to China’s Western Development Strategy (WDS). Although the Road does not pass through Afghanistan and Pakistan, it does pass through Urumqi and Khorgas in Xinjiang. Thus China is concerned about the overall security environment in the country that can affect the trade conducted through the corridor. The WDS that essentially aims to develop the western provinces of China is often disrupted by the Uyghur terrorism in the Xinjiang province.
Thousands of Uyghurs fighters are being trained in Afghanistan and Pakistan. There have been several instances of attacks in the past few months alone. Consequently, China has witnessed instability spilling into Beijing as well. During the 1990s, China relied on Pakistan to manage its relationship with the extremist group but now it is sceptical of the Taliban in Afghanistan.
Tools of Engagement
China has always been active in regional efforts pertaining to
Afghanistan, such as: the ‘6 plus 2 initiative; the Kabul Process; and
most recently, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation
(SCO) and the Istanbul process. The SCO was created in part as a
response to the events unfolding in Afghanistan. It is anticipated that
it will fill the vacuum as a viable regional institution that has both
Russia and China as full-time members and Afghanistan, Iran, India and
Pakistan as observers. Security is one of the most important issues on
the SCO’s agenda; the main focus of the SCO is to combat three evils in
the region: terrorism, separatism and extremism. China has been its
active member and Afghan stability is one of the major concerns of the
organisation.
In August 2014, China held the first and the biggest military drill under the banner of the SCO in Inner Mongolia. The drill was aimed at training 7,000 servicemen from five SCO member states to test the troops’ effectiveness in fighting terrorism.
Initiated in 2011, the Istanbul Process-‘Heart of Asia’ is a unique regional cooperation mechanism on Afghanistan that provides a platform for regional countries to improve interaction with Afghanistan. It aims to bring stability and development to the region. The fourth ministerial conference was held recently, which saw the participation of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang who strongly emphasised on the five points of China’s interests in the Afghanistan. During the conference, China put forward a proposal, titled ‘peace and reconciliation forum’ with an aim to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It looks forward to involve representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the Taliban.
China’s Endgame
In August 2014, China held the first and the biggest military drill under the banner of the SCO in Inner Mongolia. The drill was aimed at training 7,000 servicemen from five SCO member states to test the troops’ effectiveness in fighting terrorism.
Initiated in 2011, the Istanbul Process-‘Heart of Asia’ is a unique regional cooperation mechanism on Afghanistan that provides a platform for regional countries to improve interaction with Afghanistan. It aims to bring stability and development to the region. The fourth ministerial conference was held recently, which saw the participation of Chinese Premier Le Keqiang who strongly emphasised on the five points of China’s interests in the Afghanistan. During the conference, China put forward a proposal, titled ‘peace and reconciliation forum’ with an aim to revive peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban. It looks forward to involve representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, China and the Taliban.
China’s Endgame
Soon after taking office, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani visited Beijing
in his first international visit as the new president; his Chinese
counterpart, Xi Jinping, re-emphasised that China values ‘Strategic
Cooperative Partnership and supports Afghanistan to achieve stable
transition and peaceful reconstruction’. During the meeting, he
emphasised that Afghanistan's development goals are closely associated
with China's promotion of regional cross-border economic development.
The increasing China’s engagement is believed to a win-win situation for
both China and Afghanistan.
China will be training 3,000 Afghan professionals in various fields over the next five years but will never put ‘boots on the ground’. Its role in Afghanistan will be a litmus test of its regional strategy. This can really help in establishing its image as a responsible global player in contrast to its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas.
Notably, China is interested in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan as much as it caters to Beijing's foreign economic policy with the ambition of a global power. China's endgame therefore is to emerge as a responsible regional power and eventually a global power.
China will be training 3,000 Afghan professionals in various fields over the next five years but will never put ‘boots on the ground’. Its role in Afghanistan will be a litmus test of its regional strategy. This can really help in establishing its image as a responsible global player in contrast to its assertive behaviour in the South and East China Seas.
Notably, China is interested in economic reconstruction of Afghanistan as much as it caters to Beijing's foreign economic policy with the ambition of a global power. China's endgame therefore is to emerge as a responsible regional power and eventually a global power.
Iran-Pakistan: Can Rouhani Resolve the Tensions?
Majid Izadpanahi
Iran and Pakistan have been facing issues on the border relating to
terrorism and drug trafficking for some time now. This has raised
tensions between Tehran and Islamabad, resulting in clashes. The recent
clash in October resulted in casualties for both sides and the Pakistani
ambassador in Tehran was summoned by the Iranian Foreign Ministry.
Iranian officials state that the terrorists and bandits use Pakistani
territory as a base to attack Iranian border forces, and Pakistan
categorically rejects the allegations. Iranian officials allege that
Pakistan has no control over its own borders and Pakistan says that Iran
should not justify its internal problems with external reasons.
Iran’s foreign policy post the 1979 Islamic Revolution shifted from a
pro-US to anti-US stance, while Pakistan remained pro-US. The US’s
policy of regime change in Tehran through destabilisation by the
separatists was welcomed by Pakistan, especially evident in their
support of the Iranian Jundallah.
The latest clash on the Iran-Pakistan border is not a new occurrence,
but it is rare that a number of clashes take place frequently in the
span of few days. Insofar it is unclear whether the clash was a reaction
to the terrorist attacks on the Iranian Border Police or confrontation
with the armed groups and drug barons that are active in the region.
Nationalist Baloch groups, radical Sunni groups and drug traffickers are
active in the Iran-Pakistan border region; Pakistan accuses India and
sometimes Afghanistan, of fueling instability in the region.
Evidently, the situation along the Iran-Pakistan border is worsening.
Are Both Sides Interested in a Military Solution?
Are Both Sides Interested in a Military Solution?
Pakistan’s western border is its safest border; most Pakistani forces
are positioned in the country’s eastern border with India and its
northern borders with Afghanistan. The rest are positioned either in
Sindh or Punjab. Despite the security and ethnic problems in
Balochistan, Pakistan is not interested in beginning a new conflict on
the western border by confronting Iranian forces. In other words,
Pakistan has no military and financial ability to confront another
country and engage in border conflicts. Such conflicts could lead to
instability in Balochistan, such that it may may get out of Islamabad’s
control.
Iran also understands the situation in Sistan Baluchestan, and has now engaged in a big conflict in its western borders. Tehran is therefore not interested in clashing with Pakistan and considers such a move unwise. Iran is also concerned about other actors beyond the region that tend to cause disputes in its eastern border given its wariness regarding the Islamic State and the role of some regional countries in creating it.
Iran also understands the situation in Sistan Baluchestan, and has now engaged in a big conflict in its western borders. Tehran is therefore not interested in clashing with Pakistan and considers such a move unwise. Iran is also concerned about other actors beyond the region that tend to cause disputes in its eastern border given its wariness regarding the Islamic State and the role of some regional countries in creating it.
Therefore, Iran’s hard talk vis-Ã -vis the border clashes can be
considered a diplomatic and military show that also sends a warning to
the neighbours, especially Deputy Commander Brigadier-General Hossein
Salami of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’s statement that if
Pakistan does not take any action against terrorists targeting Iran and
drug traffickers, Iranian forces may enter its territory.
“Every country should fulfil its obligations towards its internal security as well as the security of the neighbouring countries,” Salami said. “We will find rebels anywhere, even inside the neighbouring countries and will take any action against them without restrictions if they do not stop their activity,” he added.
Iran’s reaction, that is expected to serve as a warning to non-state actors and one that follows limited aims, can impact regional equations. However, if the situation gets out of control, it can have a serious influence on Tehran’s military and security approach towards problems in Sistan Baluchestan. Such a situation will result in increased instability and insecurity in Iran’s eastern border. And that too is not in Tehran’s interests.
The conflict between Iran and Pakistan and Pakistan’s tacit support to non-state actors and separatists against Iran could be the result of Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s shaky relations with its neighbours and the US. The Pakistani state is extremely dependent on the US military and economic aid that is used especially against India. Iran-Pakistan relations are dependent on Iran’s relations with the US and the regional Arab countries.
So if Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani can achieve improved Iranian relations with the West and promoting Iran’s international position, it would reduce some sources of hostility in Iran-Pakistan relations. This would push Islamabad to change its hostile behaviour toward Tehran and reduce and eventually give up support to non-state actors, namely the Iranian Jundallah and Jaish-al Adl.
“Every country should fulfil its obligations towards its internal security as well as the security of the neighbouring countries,” Salami said. “We will find rebels anywhere, even inside the neighbouring countries and will take any action against them without restrictions if they do not stop their activity,” he added.
Iran’s reaction, that is expected to serve as a warning to non-state actors and one that follows limited aims, can impact regional equations. However, if the situation gets out of control, it can have a serious influence on Tehran’s military and security approach towards problems in Sistan Baluchestan. Such a situation will result in increased instability and insecurity in Iran’s eastern border. And that too is not in Tehran’s interests.
The conflict between Iran and Pakistan and Pakistan’s tacit support to non-state actors and separatists against Iran could be the result of Islamabad’s close relations with Riyadh and the Arab states of the Persian Gulf, and Iran’s shaky relations with its neighbours and the US. The Pakistani state is extremely dependent on the US military and economic aid that is used especially against India. Iran-Pakistan relations are dependent on Iran’s relations with the US and the regional Arab countries.
So if Iran’s new President Hassan Rouhani can achieve improved Iranian relations with the West and promoting Iran’s international position, it would reduce some sources of hostility in Iran-Pakistan relations. This would push Islamabad to change its hostile behaviour toward Tehran and reduce and eventually give up support to non-state actors, namely the Iranian Jundallah and Jaish-al Adl.
Article 370 Bandwagon
Shujaat Bukhari
On December 1, 2013, Prime Minister Narendra Modi (then Gujarat Chief Minister) created a stir when he called for a debate on Article 370. He was addressing a public meeting in Jammu and surprised one and all with the ostensible departure from his party’s known stand of its outright abrogation. Since then the debate, though not at the official level, is on among the political parties. What is significant is the fact that Article 370 has dominated the campaign that is on for the ongoing elections in Jammu and Kashmir which started on November 25.
Both Modi and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh stressed upon not raking up Article 370, asking party cadre to concentrate on the issues of governance and development. But in practice both of them as also all others who are camping or campaigning in the state have already made it an issue. In reaction to what BJP is doing two main regional parties National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party have taken it head on swearing that they would not allow it to happen. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah made a direct attack on BJP on November 24. In an interview to PTI, he said: “Article 370 will sink BJP’s boat in J & K”. A day earlier PDP founder Mufti Mohammad Sayeed told an election rally in Bandipore that his party would do everything to protect Article 370.
It is interesting that by saying that this issue should not be raked up in the elections, the BJP leadership has achieved part of its goal by making it the sole discussion point in the elections. The way the political parties have shifted their focus to Article 370 and engaged themselves with BJP and what they call its “divisive agenda”, it seems that PM Modi has succeeded in doing what he said on December 1.
Space in newspaper editorials and columns is also devoted to this subject, which makes it clear that the discussion is on. It is a different issue that Modi had sought the debate on the lines whether this Article had helped Jammu and Kashmir state to grow or not. But the debate is centered around its link with the special status and not the development.
Article 370 is so heavy on the minds of regional parties that they even forgot to come out with their manifestos ahead of the first phase of elections. Only Congress managed to do it and that too just two days before the first phase. The issue has occupied the larger space in the election discourse. Both NC and PDP are finding it easy to touch the raw nerve and stonewall the BJP’s much ambitious plan of reaching to magic number of 44 in the elections. Both are aware that when it comes to politics, whether people would vote or boycott, the special identity is very close to the hearts of the people. Even those who believe that it is an empty shell and the only solution is in “Azadi” from India, have this feeling that if this Article is touched, it will be a psychological defeat for the people of Kashmir.
However, in case of BJP itself it seems to be a calculated move to be “soft” on Article 370, though the party’s position vis-a-vis this “core issue” has remained wavering during the last over a decade. What its position was in early 90’s, it’s not the same today. In January 1992, the then BJP president Murli Manohar Joshi along with Narendra Modi braved to reach Lal Chowk, the city centre of Srinagar to hoist the tricolour. This was only to assert that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and they had vowed to continue the struggle to get the Article scraped.
Abrogation of this Article was once among three core slogans “Ayodhaya, Uniform Civil Code and Article 370” but it went down the radar slowly. In 1998 Lok Sabha elections, its abrogation almost came as a threat from BJP. But in 1999 it was not focused on. Similarly in 2004, the then BJP President Vankiah Nadu while realizing the “Vision Document” maintained that this law was necessary. BJP’s state unit with more support in Jammu division has always advocated the complete integration of state with India. But interestingly in 2008 assembly elections, when it released the manifesto, this issue was missing. Though it benefited from the Amarnath land row, it stressed upon the alleged discrimination with Jammu region. Senior BJP leader Ashok Khujuria was then asked why Article 370 is missing, he shot back saying: “It’s immaterial whether there is a mention of Article 370′s abolition or not. It is an agenda in our hearts.”
This time too it is not known whether the party would forcefully include the issue in the poll manifesto that was not released till these lines were written. However, one thing is clear that BJP is treading on a cautious path keeping in view its ambitious plan of achieving the 44+ mission. Party’s strategy is well designed. Even if it is not in a position to get a significant number of seats from Valley, but the euphoria it has created has much more impact than the parties, which are in winning position. Its tacit alliance with at least two parties in North Kashmir and entry of some prominent faces from Valley has emboldened the party. Making its presence felt in Valley is perhaps the biggest dividend it can count in the recent past. Whether people at large may like it or not, but BJP is on the scene and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed election rally in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district also symbolizes its presence.
Whether there could be a serious debate on Article 370 is not known, but one thing is clear that PM Modi has forced the NC and PDP to ground their agendas of “Autonomy and Self Rule and embraced Sajad Lone who had talked about something bigger called “Achievable Nationhood”. He engaged them in this debate to forget their political bibles.
In order to have maximum seats to occupy the larger political space in the state, the party has cleverly gone low on the contentious issue of Article 370, thus trying if not to earn goodwill but at least not to annoy the people. It is a different issue that if BJP comes to power, how it would proceed. With power in Delhi, this combination could prove deadly in the months and years to come. But one thing is clear that as of now BJP has achieved its goal to make Article 370 a poll issue.
On December 1, 2013, Prime Minister Narendra Modi (then Gujarat Chief Minister) created a stir when he called for a debate on Article 370. He was addressing a public meeting in Jammu and surprised one and all with the ostensible departure from his party’s known stand of its outright abrogation. Since then the debate, though not at the official level, is on among the political parties. What is significant is the fact that Article 370 has dominated the campaign that is on for the ongoing elections in Jammu and Kashmir which started on November 25.
Both Modi and Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh stressed upon not raking up Article 370, asking party cadre to concentrate on the issues of governance and development. But in practice both of them as also all others who are camping or campaigning in the state have already made it an issue. In reaction to what BJP is doing two main regional parties National Conference and Peoples Democratic Party have taken it head on swearing that they would not allow it to happen. Chief Minister Omar Abdullah made a direct attack on BJP on November 24. In an interview to PTI, he said: “Article 370 will sink BJP’s boat in J & K”. A day earlier PDP founder Mufti Mohammad Sayeed told an election rally in Bandipore that his party would do everything to protect Article 370.
It is interesting that by saying that this issue should not be raked up in the elections, the BJP leadership has achieved part of its goal by making it the sole discussion point in the elections. The way the political parties have shifted their focus to Article 370 and engaged themselves with BJP and what they call its “divisive agenda”, it seems that PM Modi has succeeded in doing what he said on December 1.
Space in newspaper editorials and columns is also devoted to this subject, which makes it clear that the discussion is on. It is a different issue that Modi had sought the debate on the lines whether this Article had helped Jammu and Kashmir state to grow or not. But the debate is centered around its link with the special status and not the development.
Article 370 is so heavy on the minds of regional parties that they even forgot to come out with their manifestos ahead of the first phase of elections. Only Congress managed to do it and that too just two days before the first phase. The issue has occupied the larger space in the election discourse. Both NC and PDP are finding it easy to touch the raw nerve and stonewall the BJP’s much ambitious plan of reaching to magic number of 44 in the elections. Both are aware that when it comes to politics, whether people would vote or boycott, the special identity is very close to the hearts of the people. Even those who believe that it is an empty shell and the only solution is in “Azadi” from India, have this feeling that if this Article is touched, it will be a psychological defeat for the people of Kashmir.
However, in case of BJP itself it seems to be a calculated move to be “soft” on Article 370, though the party’s position vis-a-vis this “core issue” has remained wavering during the last over a decade. What its position was in early 90’s, it’s not the same today. In January 1992, the then BJP president Murli Manohar Joshi along with Narendra Modi braved to reach Lal Chowk, the city centre of Srinagar to hoist the tricolour. This was only to assert that Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and they had vowed to continue the struggle to get the Article scraped.
Abrogation of this Article was once among three core slogans “Ayodhaya, Uniform Civil Code and Article 370” but it went down the radar slowly. In 1998 Lok Sabha elections, its abrogation almost came as a threat from BJP. But in 1999 it was not focused on. Similarly in 2004, the then BJP President Vankiah Nadu while realizing the “Vision Document” maintained that this law was necessary. BJP’s state unit with more support in Jammu division has always advocated the complete integration of state with India. But interestingly in 2008 assembly elections, when it released the manifesto, this issue was missing. Though it benefited from the Amarnath land row, it stressed upon the alleged discrimination with Jammu region. Senior BJP leader Ashok Khujuria was then asked why Article 370 is missing, he shot back saying: “It’s immaterial whether there is a mention of Article 370′s abolition or not. It is an agenda in our hearts.”
This time too it is not known whether the party would forcefully include the issue in the poll manifesto that was not released till these lines were written. However, one thing is clear that BJP is treading on a cautious path keeping in view its ambitious plan of achieving the 44+ mission. Party’s strategy is well designed. Even if it is not in a position to get a significant number of seats from Valley, but the euphoria it has created has much more impact than the parties, which are in winning position. Its tacit alliance with at least two parties in North Kashmir and entry of some prominent faces from Valley has emboldened the party. Making its presence felt in Valley is perhaps the biggest dividend it can count in the recent past. Whether people at large may like it or not, but BJP is on the scene and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s proposed election rally in South Kashmir’s Anantnag district also symbolizes its presence.
Whether there could be a serious debate on Article 370 is not known, but one thing is clear that PM Modi has forced the NC and PDP to ground their agendas of “Autonomy and Self Rule and embraced Sajad Lone who had talked about something bigger called “Achievable Nationhood”. He engaged them in this debate to forget their political bibles.
In order to have maximum seats to occupy the larger political space in the state, the party has cleverly gone low on the contentious issue of Article 370, thus trying if not to earn goodwill but at least not to annoy the people. It is a different issue that if BJP comes to power, how it would proceed. With power in Delhi, this combination could prove deadly in the months and years to come. But one thing is clear that as of now BJP has achieved its goal to make Article 370 a poll issue.
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