British PM agrees to £1 billion deal for Democratic Unionist Party’s support

Julie Hyland

British Prime Minister Theresa May stitched up a deal with Northern Ireland’s Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) just in time for a critical parliamentary vote on the Conservative government’s legislative programme Thursday.

June’s snap general election resulted in a hung parliament, leaving May eight seats short of an overall majority. The “confidence and supply” measure agreed with the DUP, which holds ten seats, produces a working majority of 13, as the combined vote of the opposition parties amounts to 313, taking into account the fact that the Irish republicans of Sinn Fein do not take their Westminster seats.

The deal goes beyond conventional confidence and supply measures since, in addition to supporting the government on its budget and in no confidence motions, the DUP has agreed to back it on legislation governing Britain’s exit from the European Union and on national security.

This is critical. Brexit has been described as the single greatest foreign policy measure undertaken since Britain declared war on Germany in 1939.

Much of the government’s programme over the next two years will be focused on the Great Repeal Bill—the incorporation, amendment or abandonment of existing EU legislation into British law.

May said the agreement enabled the two parties to work in the interests of the “whole United Kingdom.” She added that it would “give us the certainty we require as we embark on our departure from the European Union and help us build a stronger and fairer society at home.”

It does nothing of the sort. After ten years of draconian austerity, and only weeks after an election in which the Tories insisted there was no “magic money tree” to fund essential services, May has paid a headline figure of £1 billion for the deal—equivalent to £100 million for each DUP seat.

She has entered into an agreement with a party whose origins lie in the former Reverend Ian Paisley’s fascistic Presbyterian movement, which had intimate ties with Loyalist paramilitaries.

In addition to opposing abortion and homosexual rights, the party’s senior members include proponents of creationism. An arch purveyor of sectarianism in the North, the DUP was the only party to oppose the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which largely ended the armed conflict by enabling Sinn Fein to join the Stormont Assembly established under the power-sharing arrangements.

The DUP is now claiming a significant victory, with good reason. The party and its leader, Arlene Foster, had been in crisis after the Northern Ireland Assembly was brought down in January over a corruption scandal in which it was implicated.

The DUP has said the £1 billion will be spent on hospitals and schools in Northern Ireland, which suffers some of the worst levels of deprivation in the UK and, due to its reliance on state aid, has been especially impacted by austerity. An extra £500 million of already committed funds are also being made available.

But the funding is not tied to the restoration of Stormont. The DUP, Sinn Fein and other political parties have until Thursday to reach an agreement, after which Northern Ireland faces the possible imposition of direct rule by Westminster. It is not clear how the extra funds will be distributed and, if there is no agreement to restore Stormont, the monies will be allocated by a central Tory government dependent on the DUP.

Most significantly, the Tory/DUP deal commits the government to implement the Armed Forces Covenant in Northern Ireland, which states that “the whole nation has a moral obligation to the members of the Armed Forces and their families,” to be realised by fair compensation and safeguards for military personal.

Though described as a covenant, it has no basis in UK law. Its purpose is wholly political—to legitimise the criminal adventures of British imperialism overseas and bolster the role of the armed forces domestically.

Unionist forces have long agitated on the most provocative basis for it to be enforced in Northern Ireland. Ian Paisley Jr. said it was necessary to repay the “debt owed to our Armed Forces for the protection they provided during the successful execution of Operation Banner.”

Operation Banner was the name for British operations in Northern Ireland between August 1969 and July 2007. Involving a total of 300,000 soldiers, it sought to enforce British rule through internment without trial, state infiltration of republican forces and bloody repression, including the Bloody Sunday murder of 14 unarmed protestors on January 30, 1972.

The DUP also claimed victory in that the Tories had to agree to drop plans to means-test winter fuel payments and undermine the state pension. But May had already been forced to abandon these measures temporarily because they were so unpopular.

Criticism of the deal within the Conservative Party and by the opposition parties has centred on the claim that it was not necessary for May to risk reopening the Northern Irish conflict when the DUP’s votes were virtually guaranteed anyway. Even before the deal, the DUP had stated that it would do nothing to weaken a fragile May government because it is so opposed to Labour taking power.

But the priority for May is to ensure that she is able to get the required Brexit legislation through parliament before the UK leaves the EU in March 2019. This is the demand of much of her party, which supports a “hard Brexit”—complete withdrawal from the EU Single Market and the customs union. It is also the favoured option of her backers among the most anti-EU sections of the financial oligarchy, including the likes of media mogul Rupert Murdoch.

That is why, although the Tory/DUP agreement is officially to last the five-year term of the current parliament, much of the spending commitments have a two-year lifespan, i.e., until after the close of Brexit.

The DUP campaigned for a Leave vote in the Brexit referendum, but it is committed to keeping the border between the North and the Republic of Ireland open.

There were hopes that on this basis it would help “soften” the Tories’ stance. Under the Tory deal, however, the government has agreed to “work” to devolve control over corporation tax to Northern Ireland, so the tax can be cut to 12.5 percent, enabling Northern Ireland to compete with the Republic of Ireland. This sets off a race to the bottom not only within Ireland, but within all parts of the UK.

The extra funds and tax proposals led to complaints from the devolved Scottish and Welsh parliaments. Labour’s Welsh First Minister Carwyn Jones said it was “outrageous” and “unacceptable” and that it “all but kills the idea of fair funding for the nations and regions.”

Scotland’s first minister and Scottish National Party (SNP) leader Nicola Sturgeon threatened a formal dispute with the government. SNP Finance Minister Derek Mackay accused May of “ripping off Scotland” and undermining devolution. An SNP request for an emergency debate on the deal in parliament was rejected.

Negotiations between Britain and the EU opened last week. With May a lame duck prime minister, the Tories had to accept the EU’s timetable for divorce, in which the terms of separation must be agreed before negotiations on trade begin.

The first contentious issue concerns the rights of 3.2 million EU citizens in the UK and the 1.2 million Britons in the EU. On Monday, May said that EU citizens resident in the UK for more than five years by the Brexit cut-off date would qualify for “settled status,” with the same rights as British citizens to stay in the country and receive health care, education, welfare and pensions. Those in residence for a shorter period would be able to stay on until they had reached the five-year threshold.

May claimed this was a generous offer, but it amounts to what is already available to migrants settled in the UK for five years or more. It means EU citizens will no longer have the right to bring in a spouse or child over a certain age without meeting a minimum income threshold of £18,600. Those joining after Brexit will be subject to unspecified new immigration rules.

Most ominous, settled status is to be “enshrined” in an EU nationals’ residence document, which is described as an ID card. It is not yet clear if this is something people would have to carry on their person. ID cards have long been bitterly opposed in the UK as a fundamental assault on democratic rights.

Second 21CPC and Myanmar’s Stuttering Peace Process

Angshuman Choudhury

On 28 May 2017, the second iteration of Myanmar's flagship Union Peace Conference, or the 21st Century Panglong Conference (21CPC), concluded. Held after a delay of almost three months, the six-day long multi-stakeholder conference was marked by three critical developments in the peace process: dismissal of the Panglong forum by a powerful group of non-signatories to the ceasefire; ‘secession’ re-emerging as a divider amongst stakeholders; and China's definitive role in the dialogue process.

Mixed Participation

The second 21CPC witnessed the participation of all Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) signatory to the Nationwide Ceasefire Accord (NCA); seven non-signatory EAOs part of the ‘Northern Alliance’ (NA); political parties; the Tatmadaw (Myanmar's military); civil society; and civilian clusters from the union government. 

However, members of the crucial non-signatory ethnic group, the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC), refused to participate, arguing that the “Specially Invited Persons” status accorded to them by the union government was largely non-substantive. The absence of the group was unusual and unforeseen given its previous compliance of the NCA-led process. 

However, members of the NA met State Counsellor (SC) Daw Aung San Suu Kyi at her residence privately. Led by the China-backed United Wa State Army (UWSA), all NA member EAOs have already veered away from the NCA to initiate a new dialogue committee called the Federal Political Negotiation and Consultative Committee (FPNCC). Hence, their presence in Nay Pyi Taw was significant, as it might lead to fresh dialogue. However, the SC, by giving exclusive audience to the NA, risks drawing the ire of other EAOs, particularly the NCA signatories.

Issues: Breakthroughs and Deadlocks

The key issues discussed at the 21CPC fell under the following broad themes: politics, security, economics, social issues, and land and natural resources. These issues were disbursed through a 45-point agenda that was pre-approved by the conference’s apex organising body, the Union Peace Dialogue Joint Committee (UPDJC).

Of the total points, 37 were agreed upon by joint consensus, including 12 (out of 22) political items. All other points under non-political and non-security themes, reserved for deliberation solely between the government and signatories, were agreed upon by consensus. 

However, there was a severe impasse over one key issue, i.e. 'secession', wherein several EAOs and ethnic parties - particularly the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy and the Mon National Party - objected to the addition of the “no right to secede” clause in the final agreement by military parliamentarians.

The unwarranted addition could be a result of the military’s perception that greater federalism could ultimately lead to a breakup of the union. However, it drew the ire of both signatory and non-signatory EAOs who felt that the term was an open threat to ethnic groups and that it overturned the spirit of the 1947 Panglong Agreement, which includes the “right to secede.”

Given the historical baggage behind the term and its polarising context, the inclusion of the term was bound to distance certain groups from the peace process. Nay Pyi Taw seems to have planted a new seed of suspicion in the minds of its ethnic allies, something that can be a spoiler in the longer term.

The other crucial point on which progress could not be made was on the creation of a federal army. While the Tatmadaw proposed the idea of ‘one federal army’, the ethnic groups argued for a multi-ethnic armed force made out of disarmed EAO combatants. Given the stark multiplicity of ethnic constituencies in Myanmar and their general suspicion of the Bamar-dominated Tatmadaw, the union government would find it difficult to retain the current structure of the armed forces in a post-ceasefire environment. 

China's Role 

However, it is China's decisive role in Myanmar’s peace process that that unraveled the second 21CPC like never before.

The northern groups participated in the conference without signing the NCA or the Deed of Commitment (DoC) solely due to mediation by China. Two days before the conference, the Chinese foreign ministry’s special envoy on Asian affairs, Sun Guoxiang, met Suu Kyi and the Commander-in-Chief of the Tatmadaw. Subsequently, all seven northern groups were flown into Nay Pyi Taw from the south Chinese city of Kunming on a chartered plane.

Clearly, without Chinese mediation, the NA members would not have been permitted to even step in to the capital, let alone participate in the conference. This is mostly because there is no effective ceasefire between them and the government. Furthermore, the groups themselves would have stayed away given the Tatmadaw’s relentlessly hostile posture and the demand to sign the DoC.

For Nay Pyi Taw, China’s growing role in the peace process could serve as a stabilising factor in the immediate context. However, in the long run, it could create new conflict dynamics and political interests that Myanmar’s union government would find hard to manage. At present, however, Beijing’s core interests lay in ensuring a peaceful Sino-Myanmar border for smoother flow of investments. 

In conclusion, the second 21CPC ended eventfully. While equal participation of all EAOs continues to remain on stand-by, the point over non-secession has now thrown up a new bone of contention. Both elements underline the fundamental split between the civilian and military clusters in Myanmar’s government. Nay Pyi Taw must urgently address these in order to reach a meaningful negotiated settlement.

India-Maldives Relations: A Tale of Two Concerns

N Manoharan

Though small, the Maldives is India's important neighbour. India's Prime Minister Narendra Modi called the Maldives “a valued partner in the Indian Ocean neighbourhood” and said India-Maldives “ties are built on a very strong foundation” the contours of which “are defined by shared strategic, security, economic and developmental goals.” However, the bilateral ties are not without irritants, which can be seen in two broad areas: political and strategic.

Politically, India has consciously avoided interfering in the Maldives' internal affairs despite invitation from the actors in the atoll state. However, New Delhi’s major concern has been the impact of political instability in the neighbourhood on its security and development. The February 2015 arrest of opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed on terrorism charges and the consequent political crisis has posed a real diplomatic test for Modi’s neighbourhood policy. Expressing concern over “the arrest and manhandling of former President Nasheed,” India urged “all concerned to calm the situation and resolve their differences within the constitutional and legal framework of Maldives.” As a result of the incumbent Abdulla Yameen government’s intransigence in heeding to India’s appeal on Nasheed, Modi had to drop the Maldives from his four-nation Indian Ocean tour in March 2015. The move did send a conspicuous signal to Maldives that India was disappointed with the developments that would undermine the political stability of the Maldives. However, the message from Malé was very clear: “India will adhere to the principle of Panchsheel and will not intervene in domestic politics of Maldives.” In diplomatic parlance, “Panchsheel” is generally used in Sino-Indian context. And, it was also to indicate China’s stand on the issue to New Delhi: “We are committed to non-interference in others internal affairs.” Despite this, Yameen went on to visit India three times since assuming power in 2013. In fact, during his latest visit in April 2016, Yameen reiterated “India first policy” and signed six agreements ranging from defence to taxation. 

On the security front, there are at least two issues that impinged on India-Maldives bilateral ties that continued during the Modi government: Islamic radicalisation and the role of China. In the past decade or so, the number of Maldivians drawn towards terrorist groups like the Islamic State (IS) and Pakistan-based madrasas and other jihadist groups has been increasing. Protests bearing IS flags are not uncommon in the island. Approximately 200 Maldivian nationals have reportedly been fighting along with the IS. In terms of proportion to population, this number is quite high compared to other South Asian countries, irrespective of whether or not they are Muslim-majority countries. Political instability and socio-economic uncertainty are the main drivers of rise of Islamic radicalism in the island nation.

The fault lines are being used by Pakistan-based jihadists groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). The LeT, through its front organisation, Idara Khidmat-e-Khalq, has established a foothold especially in the southern parts of the Maldives in the garb of the post-2004 tsunami relief operations. Events in West Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan have also influenced Maldivians towards radicalisation. The youth, who return from their religious studies in certain Pakistani madaris controlled by various jihadist groups and from Saudi Arabian madaris, come back not only with radical ideas, but also with jihadi networks. The madrasa-educated youth are brainwashed to wage jihad in places like Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. The returnees help in the recruitment of Maldivian youth for Islamic militant groups. 

India has two worries in this regard: one, the ex-filtration of members of Indian terror groups like the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) and the Indian Mujahideen (IM) to the Maldives after their crackdown in India; and two, the possibility of LeT using remote Maldivian islands as a launch pad for terror attacks against India and Indian interests. Overall, India's concern is regarding how radical Islamic forces have been gaining political influence in the neighbourhood.

In the recent past, China’s strategic footprints in India’s neighbourhood have increased. The Maldives has emerged as an important “pearl” in China’s “String of Pearls” construct in South Asia. Given the Maldives's strategic location in the Indian Ocean, Beijing has been vying for a maritime base in the atoll with the primary motive of ensuring the security of its sea lanes, especially the unhindered flow of critically-needed energy supplies from Africa and West Asia through the Indian Ocean. 

Lately, the Chinese have remained among the top visitors to the Maldives. Beijing has evinced a keen interest in developing infrastructure in the Ihavandhoo, Marao and Maarandhoo Islands of the Maldives. During Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit in 2014, the Maldives agreed to become a partner in China’s Maritime Silk Route. China has provided grant and loan assistance to the Maldives to build a bridge between the capital and the airport (called the “China-Maldives friendship bridge”). Chinese companies are involved in airport development and have now been handed islands for resort development. 

Therefore, it is not without reasons that the current dispensation in Malé holds the view that “it will be to the detriment of the Maldives to not engage with China.” Amendments to the Maldivian Constitution in July 2015 allowed foreigners to own land, including investments of over 1 billion dollars for projects where 70 per cent of the land has been reclaimed. Looking at the parameters, China will be the obvious beneficiary. Chinese nationals now account for the largest tourist arrivals in the islands.

India views the growing Chinese footprint in the Maldives with concern. India’s concern stems from the increasing Chinese strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region. Though the Maldivian government under Yameen has reassured India that the Chinese presence in its atolls is purely economic, the concern of “places turning into bases” is genuine. From the Indian point of view, because of Chinese largesse to Maldives, economic leverages have not been working properly. It has become easy for the Maldives to play the China card against India.

Being a small country, the Maldives may tend to use China card. However, it is well aware of India's importance in every sphere of its state-of-affairs. This has been proved time and again including in the recent water crisis. For its part, the main challenge to India’s diplomacy is balancing out all the contradictions into harmonious relations.

India-Sri Lanka: Reorienting the Relationship?

Husanjot Chahal

In May 2014, the newly elected Indian Prime Minister (PM) Narendra Modi kickstarted his tenure by inviting the heads of all SAARC countries for his swearing-in ceremony, suggesting that contacts with neighbours should be made a matter of routine than treated as exception. This has held true most aptly for Sri Lanka, with seven bilateral state visits on record between the two sides in three years. Inheriting an unfortunate legacy of three difficult decades of mistrust between India and Sri Lanka, PM Modi’s commitment to restructure ties with its island neighbour deserves credit. A closer look at specific deliverables on four key issues of deliberation between the two sides will give a fuller picture.

The Tamil Question: Moving Beyond

Before the 2014 Indian general election, a common perception in Sri Lanka, mostly of the Sinhala community, was that India’s policy toward the island nation is largely dictated by Tamil Nadu politics. A perceived Indian intrusiveness, riding on concerns of the Tamil question, had been a significant itch that overshadowed most Sri Lankan debates on India. With the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) securing an absolute majority and the subsequent turn of events, including arrests of political leaders from Tamil Nadu (some were even BJP allies) while protesting former Sri Lankan President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s New Delhi visit, the perception among most sections of the Sinhala nationalists has gradually been recalibrated.

The same events, on the other hand, caused the Sri Lankan Tamils to worry about loss of leverage vis-à-vis Tamil Nadu. The Modi government, however, carefully addressed this concern early on through discussions with the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) delegation and gave assurances to relevant stakeholders that India and Tamil Nadu will not be at variance with regard to their political needs.

What PM Modi has achieved is sort of a careful balance in assuaging the Tamils’ concerns while lowering the Sinhala nationalists’ criticism. He clearly stated India’s supports for a “united” Sri Lanka, but also stressed the need to go beyond the Thirteenth Amendment of the Sri Lankan Constitution for the political empowerment of the Tamil minority; while New Delhi backed the UNHRC Resolutions that give Sri Lanka more time to protect Tamil interests, PM Modi made a symbolic visit to the Tamil-dominated Jaffna stressing ethnic reconciliation and rehabilitation. 

The implications of these moves on the Tamil problem aside, by establishing this balance, PM Modi has been successful in moving India-Sri Lanka relations away from the prism of the Tamil question. 

Cultural diplomacy: Renewed Focus

The Sri Lankan outreach provides an immediate and clearest example of Modi's use of cultural diplomacy as the regional trump card.  Moving past the baggage of Tamil politics, PM Modi has perpetually sought to place India-Sri Lanka relations within the ambit of cultural unity – a move that was initiated by the predecessor, the UPA government, but got a personal push from Modi.

From cooperation in development of the "Ramayana Trail" in Sri Lanka and the "Buddhist Circuit" in India to the unveiling of the statue of Anagarika Dharmapala in Sanchi by incumbent Sri Lankan President Maithripala Sirisena, almost every state visit between India and Sri Lanka since 2014 has prominently featured an emphasis on cultural ties. At the height of this trend was PM Modi's May 2017 visit to Sri Lanka earmarked solely to attend the 'Vesak' Day celebrations with no formal talks.

Political commentators view this as Modi government’s strategy to counter China's growing imprint in the island. Notwithstanding this motivation, cultural diplomacy has undoubtedly become a crucial part of India’s engagement in Sri Lanka. 

Economic Engagement: All Talk No Action

The single most important agenda that has spanned most political engagements between India and Sri Lanka in the past three years is economic cooperation. The two countries have discussed ways to promote Indian investments, proposed ambitious economic partnerships such as the Economic and Technology Cooperation Agreement (ETCA) and the South India-Sri Lanka sub-regional cooperation, and have listed a range of opportunities to work together, albeit very little has been achieved on ground.

Indian investments in Sri Lanka dipped significantly in 2016-17 compared to the previous two years. The ETCA appears far from being finalised, despite Sri Lankan PM Ranil Wickremesinghe’s announcement that it would be signed by end of 2016. In fact, both sides are yet to resolve issues related to the Free Trade Agreement that was operationalised in 2000. Cumulatively, the only significant economic arrangement realised by India and Sri Lanka in the past three years is the 'Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) for cooperation in economic projects' signed during PM Wickremesinghe's April 2017 visit. The significantly delayed MoU is essentially a "roadmap for the future" that outlines a few broader agendas and agreements, which are unlikely to materialise given, for instance, the present trust deficit and resistance to Indian presence on the island.

Fishermen Issue: Awaiting Results

Another issue that clouds India-Sri Lanka bilateral ties is the long-festering problem of fishermen straying into each other’s territorial waters. Renewed calls from the Modi and Sirisena governments to find a permanent solution to this issue of "highest importance" has ensured sustained diplomatic negotiations and engagement of fishermen communities on both sides. In particular, 2016 saw the establishment of a Joint Working Group (JWG) on fisheries and a hotline between the Indo-Lanka Coast Guards. The JWG is expected to meet every three months while the Ministers of Fisheries on both sides would meet every six months beginning January 2017 along with the Coast Guard and naval representative to discuss the protracted issue. 

The proposed meetings have ensued, but the setup has failed to achieve much. Only two months after the first meeting of the JWG, tension escalated after the Sri Lankan Navy allegedly shot at six Indian fishermen near the Katchatheevu islet resulting in one death. The incident snowballed into a diplomatic row after the Indian Coast Guard arrested ten Sri Lankan fishermen one day later. While high-level discussions managed to bring down tension, the fact remains that many fishermen continue to be arrested and the measures so far have not been able to address this problem. Perhaps one positive development that has come about pertains to the practice of bottom trawling, which New Delhi now officially acknowledges as an environmentally harmful practice that needs to end. However, without actual time-bound measures and healthy alternatives, status quo would remain.

In sum, the Modi government warrants merit for taking India-Sri Lanka relations away from a discourse dominated by Tamil politics, placing it in the ambit of cultural engagement and orienting it toward questions of economic development. However, the government's implementation front is severely lacking, as is their determination to strike effectively at the core of contentious issues like the fishermen dispute.

CARTA Post-Doctoral Fellowships for African PhD Graduates 2017

Application Deadline: 15th July, 2017 11:59 PM (Nairobi Time)

Eligible Countries: African countries

About the Award: CARTA postdoctoral fellowships offer its PhD graduates the opportunity to build specific skills, expand their networks, encounter research leadership and role models, receive strong mentoring and learn the demands of community/public engagement. The fellowships will be awarded for a maximum of 12 months and are tenable at any African CARTA partner-institution or associated research institutes, including INDEPTH Network Centres.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: Applicants must be PhD graduates of the CARTA program. They must demonstrate strong commitment to research capacity building at their institutions as well as potential for research leadership.

Selection Criteria: Candidates will be selected on the basis of their previous research and academic achievements, the proposed activities during the postdoctoral fellowship period, and demonstrated evidence of professional support and mentorship from the host institution. Prospective fellows must establish initial contact with the host institution and obtain a statement indicating that the institution is willing to host the applicant for the fellowship period. The letter should also indicate the senior researcher at the host institution who will serve as mentor to the applicant.

Number of Awards: 5

Value of Award: The postdoctoral fellowship award will cover travel costs and a monthly stipend of $3,000 for up to 12 months fulltime placement. Other benefits include medical insurance and one international conference participation. Additional funds will be available for the development of new research collaborations and partnerships, development of pilot projects, or training opportunities on specific skills. Due to the short-term nature of the postdoctoral research fellowship program, the fellowships will not cover accompanying dependents.

Duration of Program: 12 months

How to Apply: Applicants must submit the following documents:

• A completed application form
• Updated CV showing publications and awards
• Two letters of recommendation, one from a senior academic who understands your research and potential and a second one from your head of department or dean
• A statement of support from the prospective host institution indicating its willingness to host the applicant and who the mentor will be
• A statement from the current employer indicating willingness to release the applicant for the postdoctoral training opportunity
• E-copies of your most significant publications over the last three years

1 Fellow will be deemed to have completed their PhDs if they successfully defend their dissertations, have their revised dissertations formally accepted
by the university, or have their PhDs formally announced or awarded by the university.
Application documents should be submitted to the CARTA Program Manager (carta@aphrc.org) by 11:59 PM (Nairobi Time) on July 15, 2017. The email should have on the subject line: Application for 2017 CARTA post-doctoral fellowships.

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: The Consortium for Advanced Research Training in Africa (CARTA)

Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy Grants for PhD Students 2018

Application Deadline: 1st December 2017

Offered Annually?

Eligible Countries: All

About the Award: The aim of this grant is ​

• to support emerging scholars through small grants
• to promote scholarship with a social policy application
• to encourage projects that address contemporary issues in the social sciences

Type: Grants

Eligibility:

• Current PhD candidates who are working on their dissertation.
• Applicants who do not already have a PhD; those who do, are ineligible.
• Applicants must have defended their dissertation proposal or had their topic approved by their department.
• We accept applicants from any country and any university in the world. U.S. citizenship or residency is not required.

Selection Criteria: 

• The foundation targets projects with a social policy application on either a global or local level.
• Applications are evaluated based on the Trustees’ assessment of criteria such as: feasibility, applicability, originality, methodology, theoretically informed or empirically rich research and letters of recommendation. No specific weight is given to any one area. Proposals are evaluated based on overall merit of all aspects of the application.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: 

• Each grant is worth a total of $7,500—$5,000 is awarded initially and $2,500 upon completion of the project.
• The first installment of $5,000 is paid upfront to the grant recipient.

How to Apply: Apply here

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy

University College London (UCL) Access Opportunity Scholarship for International Students 2017

Application Deadline: Friday, 28th July 2017 18:00 (UK time)

Eligible Countries: Asylum seekers, children of asylum seekers, or unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.

To Be Taken At (Country): University College London, United Kingdom

Type: Undergraduate

Eligibility: Applicants for the scholarship must be:

• An asylum seeker holding an offer of a place on a UCL undergraduate programme, or/;
• An offer-holder granted “limited” or “discretionary” leave to remain and;
• Unable to access student finance (tuition fee or maintenance loan) because of your immigration status;
• Able to prove your status, under one of the above categories;

Asylum seekers, children of asylum seekers, or unaccompanied asylum-seeking children and who are holding an offer for an undergraduate place at UCL will be eligible.

Selection Criteria: We will consider both your financial situation and academic merit and you will need to demonstrate both within your application (see Guidance notes).

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value and Duration of Award: The scholarship will consist of full tuition fees and a living allowance of £10,750 per year for the normal duration of your programme at UCL.

Annual renewal of the scholarship is subject to satisfactory academic progress.

Your scholarship will cease (from the start of the following academic year), if you are granted refugee status or humanitarian protection whilst a student at UCL because you will then have access to UK student loans and you will be expected to apply for available student finance.

How to Apply: Complete applications and supporting documentations should be submitted by email to: studentfunding@ucl.ac.uk 

Interested candidates may download and go through the Guidance Notes, Application and Reference forms from the Program Webpage (Link below) before applying

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: University College London

Driverless Cars: Hype, Hubris and Distractions

Ralph Nader

The hype and unsubstantiated hope behind the self-driving car movement continues unabated, distracting from addressing necessities of old “mobilities” such as inadequate public transit and upgrading highway and rail infrastructure.

At a conference on Driverless Cars sponsored by the George Washington University Law School earlier this month, the legal landscape of unresolved problems and unasked questions were deliberated for a full day:

What are the legal requirements that should be applied to the testing phase, the deployment phase, liability and insurance, impacts on displaced workers, cyber-security, privacy, and antitrust? A takeaway from this gathering was the number of mind-numbing unresolved systems awaiting this new, untested technology.

First, a little background – car ownership and car sales are expected to flatten or decline due to ride-sharing and a new generation of consumers that is less inclined to purchase motor vehicles. How is the industry to react? By adding high-priced value to motor vehicles, already described as computers on wheels. Voilà, the race for the driverless car! The mass media took the bait and over-reported each company’s sensationalized press releases, announcing breakthroughs without disclosing the underlying data. The arrogance of the algorithms, among many other variables, bypassed simple daily realties, such as bustling traffic in cities like New York.

In the shadows were the daily tribulations of Americans just trying to get to and from work, especially the poor and those who don’t own a vehicle.

Don’t expect driverless cars to be taking over anytime in the next few decades. Autonomous vehicles do not exist in the autonomous contexts of daily life. Start with how to fit these futuristic vehicles in a sea of over two hundred fifty million driven vehicles in the US. It’s easy to score driverless vehicles in well-orchestrated courses with minimum traffic over low mileage. Apply that controlled scenario to the scale and complexity of  actual roads with actual drivers in actual conditions and the difficulties multiply enormously.

The industry–from Silicon Valley to Detroit—argues safety. Robotic systems do not get drunk, fall asleep at the wheel or develop poor driving skills. But computers fail often; they are often susceptible to hacking—whether by the manufacturers, dealers or deadly actors. Hacking is a driverless car industry’s nightmare and American motorists can see why. They like to remain in control and not have their engine stop, accelerate or be turned in disastrous directions by remote interventions.

Already, Volkswagen and other companies have been caught by law enforcement manipulating software emission controls on a gigantic scale.

Until that distant dream by the technocrats when all vehicles are driverless is realized, there may be less safety because of the mix of autonomous and human-operated vehicles.

On top of all this is the emerging demand to rewrite the rules so that there is less mandatory regulations (to be replaced by mere guidelines), less tort liability, less clear contractual responsibility between the many inputting companies, less openness for the data, far less privacy protections, and little attention to the awesome public investment needed for preparing highways and other facilities.

Already, Level Three—an autonomous vehicle needing emergency replacement by the surrogate human driver—is being viewed as unworkable by specialists at MIT and elsewhere. The human driver, lulled and preoccupied, can’t take back control in time.

Modern mass transit has shown how drivers who choose to become passengers can relax and not have to drive. Why won’t we concentrate on what can be improved and expanded to get safer, efficient, less polluting mobility?

Over forty years ago Northwestern University transportation specialists developed a plan for “personalized public transit,” meaning, for example, connecting your car to a monorail system for daily commutes!

The driverless car is bursting forth without a legal, ethical and priorities framework. Already asking for public subsidies, companies can drain much-needed funds for available mass transit services and the industry’s own vehicle safety upgrades in favor of a technological will-o’-the-wisp.

Saudi Arabia Wants to Reduce Qatar to a Vassal State

Robert Fisk

So serious has the Saudi-Qatar crisis now become that the Qatari Foreign Minister is reportedly planning an emergency trip to Washington in the next few days in the hope that the Trump regime can save his emirate. For Mohamed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani knows very well that if Qatar submits to the 13 unprecedented – some might say outrageous – demands that the Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Egypt have made, it will cease to exist as a nation state.

Al Jazeera television editors, supported by a phalanx of human rights and press freedom groups, have denounced the 10-day warning that the Qatar satellite chain must close – along with Middle East Eye and other affiliates – as a monstrous intrusion into freedom of speech. One television executive compared it to a German demand that Britain closes the BBC. Not so. It is much more like an EU demand that Theresa May close the BBC. And we know what she would say to that.

But the British Prime Minister and her Foreign Secretary, while obviously anxious to distance themselves from this very dangerous – and highly expensive – Arab dispute, are not going to draw the sword for Qatar. Nor are the Americans, when their crackpot President decided that Qatar was a funder of “terrorism” a few days after agreeing a $350bn arms deal with Saudi Arabia.

But surely, say the Qataris, this can’t be serious. They don’t doubt that Field Marshal President al-Sisi of Egypt, who loathes Al Jazeera, is principally behind the demand that it close down, but one of the four Arab states must have deliberately leaked the list to Reuters and the Associated Press. If so, why would Qatar’s enemies wish to reveal their hand so early? Surely such demands would be only the first negotiating position of the four Arab nations.

It’s hard to see how the Qataris can respond. If they really did close their worldwide television network and other media groups, break off relations with the Muslim Brotherhood – al-Sisi’s target, although his real enemy is Isis – and the Taliban and Hezbollah, downgrade their relations with Iran, close Turkey’s military base and expose their account books for international Arab scrutiny for the next 12 years, then Qatar becomes a vassal state.

To Qatar’s friends, this seems bizarre, fantastical, almost beyond reality – but who can plumb the brain of the new and highly impulsive 31-year-old Crown Prince Mohamed bin Salman of Saudi Arabia? If he can rush into a hopeless war with the Houthis of Yemen, why shouldn’t he threaten the body politic of Qatar? The Saudi royal family have several times tried to humiliate their disobedient neighbour; by isolating this little pearl of wealth with its meddlesome television station, they are forcing Qatar to eat the nearest equivalent of humble pie: food imported from Iran and Turkey.

Al Jazeera, needless to say, is no shrinking violet. Modesty has never been its chief characteristic. Its Arabic service has shown extraordinary partiality towards the Brotherhood, which the emir of Qatar continued to support after the Egyptian military staged a coup d’etat against the elected Brotherhood president of Egypt. Al-Sisi banged up a group of Al Jazeera journalists whose work for the English service had been used – without their permission – on the intrusive and anti-Sisi Arabic “Live” channel run by Qatar.

The English service, despite all the brouhaha when it first began transmitting – the American media hailed its arrival as the beginning of media freedom in the Middle East – rarely covered Bahrain or showed any critical courage in reporting Saudi Arabia. It certainly never asked why Qatar was not a democracy. When it began broadcasting Osama bin Laden’s taped sermons, President George W Bush wanted to bomb the satellite channel – which would have been a slightly more extreme step than the 13 demands of the four Arab nations who now wish to isolate Qatar. An American version of Al Jazeera was a total failure; it began to sound and look like just another version of CNN/Fox News – tat journalism that then infected its worldwide English language service.

So while we should not be too romantic about Al Jazeera, its Arab detractors, fortified by their all too romantic new relationship with Trump, are trying to crush any dignity which Qatar claims for itself. To insist that it pays cash compensation for lives lost due to its foreign policy is like asking Saudi Arabia to fund the rebuilding of Yemen, pay indemnity to its 10,000 civilian dead and care for its tens of thousands of cholera victims.

In its earlier days, I asked one of Al Jazeera’s senior staffers if the channel, on which I sometimes appeared, was merely a propaganda plaything of the Qatari royal family. No, I was told firmly. It was a “foreign policy project”. And so it clearly is. Tiny Qatar thought it had become an imperial power upon whose satellite channel the sun would never set. But if it one day acquired the power of land – by rebuilding Syria, for example – this might add territory to oil and liquid gas and Al Jazeera; something which the Saudis would never accept. Is this why Qatar’s nationhood is now being threatened?

Excessive and Avoidable Harm in Yemen

Edward Hunt

Over the past few months, the Trump administration has settled on a strategy for the ongoing conflict in Yemen that it knows will lead to more suffering and violence in the country. Rather than trying to bring an immediate end to the war, which has claimed the lives of more than 10,000 civilians, administration officials have decided to help the Saudi-led coalition continue its efforts to pressure Houthi-led rebels into surrendering on Saudi terms, even if it means more violence.

Previous U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition has already had devastating consequences for the people of Yemen. Since the conflict began in early 2015, the U.S.-backed Saudi-led coalition has killed countless civilians in airstrikes on homes, schools, factories, markets, hospitals, and even a funeral. “The strike on the funeral was really, really hard to swallow,” a senior official in the Obama administration said.

In recent months, the situation has grown worse. Cholera has begun spreading throughout the country, killing hundreds of people. Millions of Yemenis are also facing the risk of famine because ongoing fighting has made it impossible for people to get access to food. There are “millions of people on the brink of starvation, because of the impact of the fighting,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson has acknowledged.

Given these circumstances, some dissension has emerged in Washington about the U.S. role in the war. Some former officials say that the time has come to reduce U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition and begin final negotiations with the Houthi-led rebels. Others argue that it is necessary to maintain U.S. support for the Saudi-led military campaign.

As the discussion continues, the Trump administration, which has said little publicly about the war, has begun taking a series of steps that indicate that it is going to continue U.S. support for the Saudi-led coalition. Although officials in the Trump administration are well aware of the terrible risks that continued fighting poses to the people of Yemen, they have begun moving to resupply the Saudi-led coalition with weapons and help it continue its military campaign against the Houthis.

The Debate in Washington

The emerging dissension in Washington has largely played out in Congress. In March, the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held a hearing in which two former U.S. officials debated different ways for the Trump administration to proceed with the war.

Former State Department official Dafna Rand argued that it no longer made sense to help the Saudi-led coalition launch offensive military operations against the Houthis. “Helping the coalition launch new assaults on Houthi-controlled territory may allow for the capture of new cities, but it will result in even more bloodshed and is unlikely to change the negotiation calculus of either side,” Rand said. Convinced that more fighting would lead to more suffering, Rand called for a negotiated settlement. “The Houthis are looking for guarantees of political inclusion in the formal government process,” she said. “These issues would be worked out whether or not the coalition retakes a few more cities.”

Taking a different position, former U.S. Ambassador to Yemen Gerald Feierstein argued that the Saudi-led coalition needed to maintain military pressure on the Houthis. Although he agreed with Rand that the ultimate resolution would come in the form of a negotiated settlement, Feierstein insisted that the Saudis needed to ensure that they would be negotiating from a position of power. The final outcome, he said, must be one in which the Saudis achieve the installation of “a friendly government” in Yemen.

Notably, the two former officials agreed that the fighting had reached a stalemate and that the people of Yemen were facing tremendous hardships, including the risk of starvation. But they could not agree on whether the time had come for the Saudi-led coalition to hold final negotiations with the Houthis to end the war.

Rand, for her part, remained convinced that it was time to stop launching offensive military operations against the Houthis, believing that they would only prolong needless suffering. “We’ve already tried for two years this strategy of offenses to retake areas to allow for the political dynamics to change and there are significant costs to our relationships, to the civilians of Yemen, to our reputation,” she said. “We’ve tried that approach for two years and I just don’t believe that the risks are worth it anymore.”

Tactical Concerns

The discussion in Congress has also extended into more specific aspects of the Saudi-led military campaign. In particular, various observers have disagreed over the extent to which U.S. officials should support military tactics that will significantly harm civilians.

One of the key issues concerns the port of Hodeidah, a major commercial hub located in Houthi-controlled territory along the Red Sea. About 70 percent of Yemen’s food imports and 90 percent of U.N food assistance pass through the city, making it a vital lifeline for the Yemeni people.

During the congressional hearing last March, Feierstein argued that the Saudi-led coalition should launch an offensive to seize the port. “The U.S. should back Government/Coalition efforts to capture the port,” as long as the Saudis agree to certain conditions, Feierstein argued.

Rand disagreed, saying that any attempt to take the city through force “would be a serious mistake.” She warned that “the fighting itself will just make it difficult for the humanitarian access that’s needed.” In addition, Rand suggested that the Saudi-led coalition might use the port to punish people living in Houthi-controlled territory by blocking their access to food. “Even in the long term,” Rand said, “we would be banking on the Saudis being able to reestablish port access and distribution networks in a better way than the current system which is not 100 percent but is working – working, it’s not ideal but it’s working.”

Another key issue concerns precision-guided munitions (PGMs), which the Saudi government has used in Yemen. In December 2016, the Obama administration announced that it was temporarily halting a planned sale of the weapons to the Saudi government because the Saudi-led coalition kept striking targets on a no-strike list.

During a congressional hearing earlier this month, Feierstein argued that the Trump administration should reverse the Obama administration’s decision and begin resupplying the Saudi government with the weapons. “I believe that we should move forward on the PGM sale,” he said, before adding that he still wanted to see the Saudis fulfill certain conditions.

Former State Department official Tom Malinowski disagreed, saying that it made no sense to move forward with the sale.

In his written statement to the congressional committee, Malinowski provided his reasons for his opposition. First, Malinowski explained that “the Saudis have used US-provided weapons in ways that have caused excessive and avoidable harm to civilians, and exacerbated a terrible humanitarian crisis.” During military operations, “the Saudis continued to hit targets on a humanitarian no-strike list,” he said. In addition, Malinowski insisted that the sale of precision-guided munitions would do nothing to alleviate the suffering of civilians. “While precision weapons are often helpful in avoiding civilian casualties, this was not the case in Yemen – precision does not protect civilians when one is deliberately aiming at the wrong targets,” he said.

In short, there has emerged some significant dissension among former U.S. officials about various aspects of the U.S. role in the war. Although some want to see the Trump administration take a more aggressive stance, there is growing awareness that a more aggressive military policy will cause more needless harm to the people of Yemen.

The Decision

In spite of the growing awareness, the Trump administration has begun taking the more aggressive position on the various matters under discussion.

In the first place, the Trump administration has decided to support new efforts to capture the port of Hodeidah. As Secretary of State Rex Tillerson explained to a congressional committee earlier this month, “we’re working with both the Emirates and the Saudis to gain agreement over how we might gain control of that port.” Although administration officials appear to have backed away from a military plan in favor of a new diplomatic strategy, they have decided to help the Saudi government gain control of the port. “We believe we can gain control of the port under some other third authority’s control,” Tillerson said.

Second, the Trump administration has decided to provide the Saudi government with the precision-guided munitions. It most clearly revealed its decision earlier this month, when it made a major effort to get the U.S. Senate to approve a future sale of the weapons to the Saudi government. “Trump administration officials spent the hours before the vote frantically making phone calls and holding briefings with lawmakers to stave off a defeat,” The New York Times reported. In the process, the Trump administration informed congressional officials that it would soon begin providing the weapons to the Saudi government by adhering to the previous weapons deal.

More broadly, the Trump administration has also decided to continue helping the Saudi-led coalition maintain its military operations against the Houthis. Although administration officials know perfectly well that they are increasing the risk of famine in Yemen, they have decided that military operations are necessary to keep pressure on the Houthis. The rebels in Yemen “have to know that they will never – they will never prevail militarily,” Tillerson explained. “But they’re only going to feel that when they feel the resistance militarily, so it’s important we keep the pressure on them.”

Indeed, the Trump administration has decided to take the hardline position on many key aspects of the war. Rather than trying to minimize civilian casualties by blocking the sale of munitions, keeping food distribution networks open by backing off of Hodeidah, and trying to prevent famine by ending its support of the the Saudi-led military operations, the Trump administration has adopted some of the most extreme positions in Washington, ensuring that the people of Yemen will continue to suffer.