Brazil’s ruling circles fear international “isolation”

Miguel Andrade

US Vice-President Mike Pence’s Latin American tour last month provoked an anxious reaction within Brazilian ruling circles, as the country was left off the itinerary, which included meetings with the governments of Peru, Argentina, Chile and Colombia. It marked the second time in two years that Washington has sidelined Latin America’s largest country in this fashion, with Barack Obama excluding it from his own tour of the continent in 2016.

Concerns within the Brazilian ruling class over the country’s geopolitical position are fueled by the country’s deepening political and economic instability amid the worst economic crisis in a century, as well as by the increasingly vicious palace intrigues and internecine warfare within the highest echelons of the state apparatus headed by President Michel Temer.

This disquiet found clear expression in an August 22 report by the financial daily Valor Econômico titled “Under Temer, Brazil suffers from international isolation.” The piece noted that before Pence, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, French President François Hollande, and Canadian and Israeli Prime Ministers Justin Trudeau and Benjamin Netanyahu had all bypassed the country in their Latin American tours as well.

The report included statements by cabinet officials that the government is preparing a “diplomatic offensive” to break the “isolation,” with the Temer administration unveiling the next day a huge internationally oriented privatization package that includes placing pivotal airports, the country’s largest energy producer, Eletrobras, and even the highly prized national mint on the auction block.

The announcement drove up the value of Eletrobras stock by 50 percent in a single day, and São Paulo’s stock exchange rose to the highest level since January 2011, at the height of the commodity boom that guaranteed the stability of the Workers Party (PT) rule that preceded the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff and the advent of Temer’s government.

The timing of the announcement was meant to precede Temer’s seven-day state visit to China that began on August 29, in which the Brazilian president and other officials are soliciting investors for the 57 public companies slated to be sold off. China is already owner of the second largest energy producer in Brazil, a subsidiary of the Three Gorges Dam power station corporation, and in the first days of Temer’s visit, an agreement was reached with Chinese investors to complete the construction of the Angra 3 nuclear power plant outside Rio de Janeiro.

Also on August 22, the executive announced the end of the state monopoly over mining in the mineral- and rare-earth-rich Amazon region, as part of a plan announced in July to increase mining participation in Brazil’s GDP from 4 to 6 percent. Although open for international exploration bids, opening up the area would most certainly serve the interests of China, which already accounts for the bulk of the demand for Brazilian mining. Although the end of the state monopoly was struck down in federal court on August 28, and the presidential decree was withdrawn on August 31 in order to be rewritten after public outcry and opposition from within the cabinet, the procurement of foreign investment in the country’s mining remains central to the government’s current economic strategy.

Also as part of the “diplomatic offensive” to counter “isolation,” as well on August 22, the government announced that it would welcome “with open arms” Venezuela’s former attorney general, Luisa Ortega Diaz, who has fallen out with the Maduro government and is now exiled in Colombia, should she seek asylum in Brazil. At the end of August, Ortega attended a meeting of Mercosur attorney generals in the capital of Brasília, where she denounced the Maduro government for corruption involving multimillion-dollar bribes and kickbacks in connection with projects by the Brazilian construction contracting giant, Odebrecht.

The courting of Ortega Diaz appears designed to curry favor with US imperialism, which has lionized the attorney general as part of its drive for regime change in Venezuela.

Valor Econômico also reported on August 30 that country’s Environment Ministry has alerted the Foreign Ministry that oil extraction at the Amazon might interfere with Venezuelan territory, and Brazil is set to conduct unprecedented war games with Peru, Colombia—both governed by right-wing administrations aligned with Washington—and the US in the Amazon in November.

Such moves, however, inevitably sharpen contradictions surrounding the Brazilian bourgeoisie’s reliance on Chinese investments and imports, amid the increasingly aggressive US “pivot to Latin America.” Significantly, one of the demands made during Pence’s tour, which was highlighted by Brazilian press, is a complete cutting off of ties with North Korea. Brazil has maintained an embassy in Pyongyang since 2012, complete with a bomb shelter.

Chinese participation in the development of Angra 3 is also set to become a flashpoint. Brazil’s largely national nuclear program, currently focused on the development of a nuclear-powered military submarine, is a major target of US imperialism. A diplomatic row erupted over Brasilia’s rejection of access by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspectors to a uranium enrichment plant near Rio 2004, and science ministers have more than once flirted with extending the country’s nuclear program to build a bomb.

The apparently ambiguous international strategy being pursued by Brasilia, no less than the rotten conspiracies within the Brazilian state, is a major symptom of the crisis of confidence gripping ruling circles as reflected in the report by Valor.

Despite the self-satisfaction of government officials with the measly 0.2 percent quarterly growth of GDP announced by the country’s Statistical and Geographical Institute on September 1, the second in a row after the 1.0 percent growth of the first quarter, the investment rate sunk to 15.6 percent of the GDP, the lowest since current metrics were first used in 1996, at the height of “neoliberal” orthodoxy during Fernando Henrique Cardoso’s presidency.

Despite declarations by Planning Minister Dyogo Oliveira in early August that “private investment” should lead economic growth from 2017 on, government officials admit that the release of 44 billion reais (US$14 billion) of blocked social security withdrawals for 26 million workers in the first semester was the main factor responsible for recent minimal growth, seconded by record agricultural output due to exceptionally favorable climatic conditions.

Meanwhile, the massive transfer of wealth to the rich sought through the labor “reform” approved by the Brazilian congress has found its reflection in the latest employment figures released with the GDP data. Unemployment still stands at 12.8 percent, but the government is celebrating a drop from 14 percent based on half a million more workers falling out of the labor market and 300,000 more being registered as “self-employed” since the beginning of 2017.

Behind government optimism, however, there is deep distrust in its economic policies, expressed in the open criticism by the country’s main papers of the privatization plans, including the end of the Amazonian state mining monopoly.

Particular controversy has erupted over the sale of Eletrobras, seen by pundits as an opportunistic attempt to curb the predicted US$50 billion deficit in 2017’s budget. Significant attention was given by both Folha de São Paulo and O Globo to a statement by ousted president Dilma Rousseff—who previously was former President Lula’s energy minister—that the privatization would put the country’s energy supply at risk. Other opinion pieces expressed concern over potential Chinese control over energy, carrying headlines like “Privatizations are good, but are dangerous when only current expenses are accounted for,” appearing on August 24 in Valor Econômico. Folha de São Paulo also worryingly reported on the risk of privatization jacking up energy prices, contradicting rosy predictions by think tanks and the Temer cabinet.

No progress in UK- European Union talks over Brexit

Julie Hyland

The third round of talks over the terms of Britain’s exit from the European Union (EU) resulted in little agreement last week.

In a tense press conference, Britain’s Brexit secretary, David Davies, and the EU’s chief negotiator, Michel Barnier, could not even agree if any progress had been made at all.

Davies struck an upbeat tone, claiming that Britain had proved it could be “pragmatic” and “flexible.” Barnier, however, said there was no “decisive progress on any of the principal subjects.” He accused the UK of “nostalgia” in insisting on taking “back control,” while trying to maintain all the benefits of the European Single Market.

With the UK due to exit in March 2019, there are concerns in Britain that no firm arrangements will be in place concerning future trade relations.

The immediate sticking point is the so-called divorce bill, concerning Britain’s financial obligations. The EU estimates the cost to the UK of exit at anywhere between € 60 billion and € 100 billion. This covers pension commitments to EU officials, investment project budgets projected until 2020, and “contingent liabilities.”

Britain challenges the legality of these claims, arguing that its financial commitments effectively end when it leaves the EU. Davies said the UK would recognise its “moral obligations” but that this is contingent on trading relations after exit.

This is rejected by the EU, which insists there can be no progress to discussion on future relations without Britain settling its bill first.

In this game of brinksmanship, the UK is in a weakened position. Prime Minister Theresa May presides over a divided Conservative Party and a government with a much-reduced majority as a result of her decision to go for a snap general election, two years ahead of schedule.

The majority of the bourgeoisie, banks and major corporations, who backed the Remain campaign, are openly demanding that ways and means are found, if not to overturn the leave vote in last year’s referendum, then at least to severely curtail its consequences.

Such calls have intensified after May’s visit to Japan last week, which was meant to showcase the UK’s global opportunities post- Brexit. The Japanese government made clear that any future trade agreements with Britain will be subordinate to it finalising a new trade deal with the EU, agreed to in July.

Commenting that the visit had provided the government with a lesson “in the reality of post-Brexit Britain,” the Financial Times editorialised that while the “government’s instincts about a liberal globalised Britain may be sound...the route to internationalised trade runs substantially through continental Europe.”

Both the Conservative and Labour parties are now committed to a “transition” period, in which the UK remains part of the Single Market or Customs Union—for two years in the case of the Tories, and at least four years according to Labour.

Last week, Labour’s Brexit secretary, Sir Keir Starmer, committed the party to support post-Brexit arrangements that amount to continued EU membership in all but name. With the backing of party leader Jeremy Corbyn, he said Labour would “abide by the common rules” of the Single European Market and Customs Union for an extended period.

This was followed by the new all-party Parliamentary Group on EU Relations, headed by Labour’s Chuka Umunna and Tory Anna Soubry, demanding the government make plans to ensure the UK remains part of the European free trade bloc in some form.

Underlying such cross-party manoeuvres is the ruling elite’s awareness that it is sitting on a social powder keg.

British workers have been through decades of falling living standards and wages. In the last period, sterling has fallen by 15 percent against the euro, and 13 percent against the dollar. Far from improving British trade, the economy has weakened with exports falling by 2.8 percent in May, the largest deficit in nine months.

The burden has been shouldered by workers and their families, as prices have risen and consumer spending has fallen. This is under conditions where personal debt in the UK stands at £200 billion for the first time since 2008.

To the extent that the May government has any strategy for reaching an accommodation with the EU, it rests on trying to encourage divisions between its 27-member states. Through its intransigence, it aims to pressure Berlin and Paris to deal with it directly based, in the words of former Conservative leader William Hague, on their shared interest in maintaining an “open and liberal trading environment” in Europe.

“The moment is rapidly approaching...when leading EU governments will have to make some serious interventions in the talks if they are going to act in their own best interests,” Hague wrote in the Telegraph.

But it is precisely to avoid the emergence of divisions within the eurozone that the EU, principally Germany and France, insists negotiations pass exclusively through Barnier and follow his strict remit of settling British obligations before proceeding to other matters.

That is why reports that French officials had secretly signalled their willingness to compromise with the UK met with a sharp rebuttal by President Emmanuel Macron. Giving his full support to Barnier, Macron stressed, “There is only one negotiator and only one mandate.”

Chancellor Angela Merkel reiterated Germany’s red line “is about obligations that Great Britain has entered into.”

The faltering talks saw the German media blast the British government, with Suddeutsche Zeitiung describing it as “clueless” and David Davies as “extraordinarily lazy.” The daily tabloid Bild wrote of a “dawdling Britain” being given a “dressing down by Brussels,” and Der Freitag complained that the UK suffered from “delusions of exceptionalism.”

At the weekend, Barnier threatened, “There are extremely serious consequences of leaving the single market,” and that “We intend to teach people…what leaving the single market means.”

For all the arrogance and schadenfreude, the position of the European bourgeoisie is just as precarious as its British counterpart.

Germany’s federal election on September 24 is characterised by widespread disaffection from all the official parties, and growing anger over rising social inequality that guarantees any incoming government will be highly unstable.

In France, Macron owes his parliamentary majority to a massive abstention rate and the deserved collapse of the Socialist Party. His attempts to drive through labour reforms, overturning workers’ legal protections, are deeply unpopular and face widespread resistance, which is behind his moves to buttress emergency laws.

In addition to facing a restive working class domestically, Berlin and Paris continue to impose austerity across the continent, while rolling out their own plans for militarism and war that will inflame social and political tensions still further.

These developments vindicate the campaign waged by the Socialist Equality Party for an active boycott of last year’s EU referendum. Rejecting claims that either the Remain or Leave camps represented the “lesser evil” for working people, it stressed that that the working class must reject all national divisions and unite its struggles across the continent against its common class enemy—the bourgeoisie in every country—in the fight for the United Socialist States of Europe.

DOKLAM DISPUTE: Understanding the Tri-Junction Question

VP Haran


Bhutan’s 470 km-long border with China has been mostly agreed upon with the exception of 2 sectors which together measure 764 sq km. In the north, there is disagreement over 495 sq km in the Jakarlung and Pasamlung areas. The remaining 269 sq km is in the western sector. Of this, 89 km km is in the Doklam area and 180 sq km to the east of Chumbi Valley, in the Dramana, Shakhatoe and Sinchulung areas. While Doklam is not inhabited through the year, there are some permanent residents in the rest of the disputed areas in the western sector. Bhutan had a few enclaves in the Kailash and Manasarovar areas, but these were claimed by China when it annexed Tibet. Sometime ago, Chinese maps had shown parts of eastern Bhutan as within China, but it has since given up its outrageous claim.

Doklam is a plateau on the western side, gradually becoming a valley near Amochu on the eastern side. Torsa Nala, starting from the west near Doka la and going south east and draining into Amochu, divides the Doklam area. The Nala is a mini gorge and difficult to cross. China was trying to extend the road from the northern side of the Nala to the southern side when they were physically interrupted by the Indian Army. Bhutan had conveyed its objection to the road project on the ground and through diplomatic channels. If the road reaches the southern side, China can occupy Jampheri ridge, gaining strategically vis-à-vis Bhutan and India. Chinese actions in Doklam have to be seen in the larger context of what could be called their forward policy. Their efforts in the South China Sea (SCS) to aggressively reinforce claims by changing ground realities is another example of their forward policy. Given the current stage of boundary talks with Bhutan, China was clearly attempting to alter the ground situation to strengthen its claim on Doklam.

Border talks between Bhutan and China commenced in 1984. In 1988 and 1998, they agreed to maintain peace in border areas pending a final settlement on the boundary question, and to maintain status quo on the boundary as before March 1959. The countries also agreed not to take unilateral action to change the boundary's status quo. Despite this agreement, China has, on many occasions, tried to change the status quo while Bhutan has scrupulously adhered to its commitments. One blatant Chinese violation was their extension of the road from Yatung to Sinche la (pass) to the south of the pass into the Doklam area, which they completed in 2004-5. The recent Chinese activity in Doklam was to extend that road to the south of Torsa Nala, to Jampheri ridge.

The 24th round of border talks was held in China in August 2016. A joint field survey was carried out in the disputed western sector, including Doklam, in the summer of 2015. Differences in the disputed sectors remain. China’s attempts to change the status quo through aggressive actions are not contributing to an early and amicable resolution of differences. On 28 August, China said that it continues to exercise sovereignty, overlooking the fact that Doklam belongs to Bhutan or at best can be called an area where China disputes Bhutan’s sovereignty. Till the early 1960s, China was mostly present beyond Sinche la, that is on the Tibetan side of the ridge to the north of Doklam. In 1965, the year in which Indian forces got the better of the Chinese forces in Nathu la, China lodged its protest against alleged violations in Doklam by Indian forces. In 1966, Bhutan, through India, sent a long list of incidents of Chinese herders, people and soldiers entering Bhutanese territory of Doklam. These exchanges indicate that Doklam is at best a disputed area and not Chinese territory. A further joint field survey was carried out in this area only because it is disputed. China's claim of sovereignty over Doklam is thus misplaced.

During the standoff, China questioned India’s locus standi on this issue. In doing so, China ignored the 2012 agreement between the Special Representatives that tri-junctions would be decided in consultation with the third country concerned, and to maintain status quo until then. Doklam is a disputed area as the tri-junction has not been agreed upon, and China was seeking to alter the status quo by extending the road. China said that it had informed India in May and June 2017 about the road project out of goodwill. It is silent on whether it informed Bhutan, to whom Doklam belongs. If India has no locus standi would China have shown this goodwill? If indeed they wanted to show goodwill they should have emulated Pandit Nehru, who unilaterally gave up the Indian enclave of Minsar near Mansarovar in the 1950s.

The standoff is over and both sides are understandably claiming victory. The Bhutanese and Indian objective was to halt the road extension and restore status quo ante. This has been achieved. The status quo will be hopefully be maintained till the tri-junction is agreed upon and the boundary issue is resolved. China is unlikely to take this setback easily and may pose challenges in places where the People's Liberation Army (PLA) holds advantage. The Governments of Bhutan and India should be congratulated for handling the issue maturely, despite intemperate provocations. The focus should now be on finalising and demarcating the boundary in this sector so as to avoid the future recurrence of such standoffs.

DOKLAM DISPUTE: A Brief History

VP Haran


It is with a sigh of relief and satisfaction that Bhutan and India received the news on 28 August that following diplomatic efforts, India and China have agreed to disengage at Doklam, where their troops had been at a standoff since 16 June. Unlike the previous standoffs which were along India-China border, this one was on Bhutanese soil. Doklam, which means rocky path (it is indeed so at least on the southern side of Torsa Nala), does not have permanent residents. There are a few visitors between late April and early September, mostly from the Bhutanese side. Their graziers visit mainly southern Doklam, between Jampheri ridge, the highest ridge to the South of Chumbi valley and Torsa Nala, and go to the northern side of the Nala occasionally. Doklam is deserted during rest of the year since the terrain and weather are harsh. Haa District, of which Doklam is a part, was transferred by Sikkim to Bhutan in 1780 following the attack by Bhutan.

Chinese claim on the plateau rests on the 1890 Convention between Great Britain and the Qing dynasty represented by its Resident in Tibet. Article 1 of the Convention states that the boundary of Sikkim and Tibet will be the crest of the mountain range separating the waters flowing into Teesta on the Sikkim side, from the waters flowing into Mochu (known as Amochu in Bhutan) on the Tibetan side. This implies that the boundary is based on the highest watershed principle, the internationally accepted principle for border demarcation in mountainous areas. It adds that the boundary line starts at Mount Gipmochi on the Bhutanese frontier and follows the above crest till it meets Nepali territory. For an important document that defines the boundary between Sikkim and Tibet, it could have been more precise. It is not so because this area had not been surveyed till then and the geography of the place was unclear in 1890. 

None of the 3 countries whose borders were being decided by this Convention were party to the Convention nor were they involved in the negotiations. Bhutan was kept out of the picture on the wrong premise that the Convention was about the Sikkim-Tibet boundary. The Chogyal of Sikkim was not on good terms with the UK, which had imprisoned him and his wife four years before the Convention. In the late 1880s, the UK also successfully evicted Tibetans from parts of Sikkim that Tibetans had occupied a few years earlier, and as the victorious power did not think it necessary to involve the Tibetans in the negotiations. China was only too happy to go with this decision. It is no surprise that Tibet refused to accept the Convention.

Tibet’s refusal to accept the 1890 Convention is clear from the preambular paragraphs of both the 1893 Protocol to the 1890 Convention and the 1906 Convention between Great Britain and the Qing dynasty. Tibet’s refusal led to the 1903-4 expedition to Tibet by Col Younghusband when Tibet was forced to accept the 1890 convention. The Colonel was accompanied on this mission by His Highness Ugyen Wangchuck of Bhutan, then Trongsa Penlop, who, in 1907 was elected as the first hereditary monarch of Bhutan. He played a crucial role in bringing the Tibetans around for which he received well-deserved recognition from the British. As for Bhutan, it was never consulted on where its border with Tibet and Sikkim lay in this sector. Given this background, it is not surprising that Bhutan has serious reservations on accepting the Convention as the basis for determining the tri-junction.

There was a lack of clarity on the location of Mount Gipmochi (also known as Gyamochen) mentioned in the Convention and consequently, the boundary in this sector. 19th century British travel maps show the boundary alignment as Batang la-Merug la-Sinche la and onto Amochu river, which would make Batang la the tri-junction, as contended by Bhutan and India. This is in accordance with the internationally accepted highest watershed principle of boundary demarcation. In some of these maps, Gipmochi is shown to the north east of its actual location. Both Sinche la (14,531 feet) and Merug la (15,266 feet) are higher than Gipmochi (14,523 feet). This alignment would mean that Doklam is part of Bhutan. The same boundary alignment between Bhutan and China is shown in several maps published abroad including in recent times, although a few early 20th century maps showed Gipmochi as the tri-junction. A British map showed Gipmochi deep inside Bhutan. These prove the point that there was a lack of information on the geography of the place in 1890. 

When there is a lack of clarity on where the boundary is, the solution may lie in tapping the knowledge and understanding of people in the area. The people who have a clear view of where Bhutan's territory ends and China's begins are the yak herders of the area (and also smugglers). The pastures in Doklam plateau have traditionally been the ground of Bhutanese graziers. China claimed in the 1960s that even if Bhutanese graziers were bringing their yak to Doklam they were paying a fee to Tibet for it - but there is no evidence to support this. There is one instance of a family from Bhutan being given grazing rights on payment of a highly concessional fee, but this was in the eastern part of Chumbi valley and not Doklam. It is clear that Doklam is Bhutanese territory and China’s claim on Doklam is thus tenuous.

New Indian Defence Minister: A List of Priorities

Murli Menon

Thus India has its first ever woman defence minister. Having an otherwise uninitiated but statedly beyond reproach integrity-wise, Nirmala Sitharaman as the defence minister could well turn out to be a blessing in disguise for the armed forces, provided of course Ms Sitaraman has her own counsel and does not overly let the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) run her ship. The lack of a full-time defence minister had been badly felt, especially during the Doklam standoff and border tensions with Pakistan. Any country, more so one the size of India with its many faceted threat perceptions, does not have the luxury of not having a regular incumbent at the helm of its defence affairs.

What should be Sitharaman's priorities? The first would be to temper and objectivise the long pervading bad blood between the bureaucracy and the military. A no-nonsense minister should be able to send the appropriate signals regarding how her ministry needs to be run to achieve national interests and not parochial ones of either the bureaucracy or any particular service. Inter-service rivalry needs to be moderated, which, at times, has been fanned by vested interests in the defence ministry, and a long-term track for perspective plans drawn up in all fields of military endeavour, from acquisitions to training, HR to welfare. It is indeed unthinkable that an experienced and versatile armed forces such as India's has still not put in place a periodic operational review - such as the US' Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) - to bring out possible flaws in cadre management, organisation, and other matters. The ongoing army restructuring as mentioned in the media would be part of such a periodic exercise. Never having done the exercise before, even a decade-wise review may be sufficient. Such a periodic review would help in maintaining the teeth- to- tail ratio and improve overall fighting efficiency.

Any new incumbent to the defence portfolio is bound to be given a series of presentations by the service chiefs, defence secretary, Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) chief and others. Sitaraman must ensure that her ministry's operational directive is effectively crafted to counter land, sea, air, space and cyber-based threats. The defence minister's job is to task the army, navy and the air. In newfangled domains such as space and cyber/information warfare especially, innovative thinking needs to be encouraged to stay up to date globally. A strong handicap for India's defence forces has been the lack of a chief of defence staff (CDS). Although political ambivalence and service rivalries precluded the CDS becoming a reality hitherto; India finally seems close to the political acceptance of a four star CDS. Sitaraman needs to push this for quick implementation so that her government can get single-point professional advice on military matters. An integrated defence ministry with civilians and uniformed personnel working side by side should be the ultimate objective.

Issues plaguing defence acquisitions will also have to addressed. The ill effects of Bofors, Augusta and other PR fiascos such as Sukhna/Adarsh scams need to be addressed squarely but not with paranoia. Matters, especially those to do with defence, do not lend themselves to delays in decision-making.

Another priority for the minister would be to enforce accountability at all levels of the ministry. Whenever there is a proven professional weakness exhibited by any level of military leadership, punitive and corrective measures must be taken promptly. There has been a tendency in the past to hide operational weaknesses, be it in Kargil or elsewhere. The minister has to ensure that the highest standards of military leadership exist in all branches of the armed forces. Besides rank weaknesses in leadership, security breaches in the sensitive ministry also need to be countered. Performance audits and use of technology must be adopted to ensure that there is no breach in security, especially in defences acquisitions. Over the years, big ticket defence deals accompanied by kickbacks to individuals and the coffers of the ruling party have become a given. This culture has to be changed through increased transparency and stringent punitive measures against defaulters.

Another important matter would be the induction of women in combat roles in the military on account of equality considerations and the dire shortages of officers in the three services. Perhaps short service options for women could be retained for those who wish to opt for it; and no able woman aspirant should be kept away from combat duties in the army, navy, air force or the coast guard.

India's ordnance factories need a serious review of their efficiency indices and contribution. In this context, a national military strategy is essential. This is the starting point for India's national security doctrine, single service and joint doctrines, as also finding expression through the defence minister's operational directive to the service chiefs. There is also a crying need to rationalise and review the archaic manual of aid to civil authority. Since the Home Ministry now has numerous forces under its writ to quell public disorder and manage disasters, the armed forces should only be called on in dire situations, and their services need to be paid for by the government – state or central. A related issue is the dress/accoutrements - it is understood that in the recent Jat agitation the army had to identify themselves using placards, as several Central Armed Police Forces (CAPF) cadres were wearing similar combat fatigues.

The final issue for the agenda is the DRDO's performance and accountability. For far too long the defence forces have been kept as captive customers for substandard products made by India's public sector defence industry. With private players like Mahindra and Reliance increasingly entering the arena of defence production, DRDO needs to be charged with competitiveness and innovation to match global standards in cutting edge technologies rather than spending tax monies on mundane hardware such as the Indian new small arms system (INSAS) rifles, or operationally unviable efforts such as the Arjun main battle tank (MBT) or the light combat aircraft (LCA). Defence is no more a luxury for India but an absolute necessity not only to secure the country's frontiers but also to contribute to its overall development. Nirmala Sitaraman has the opportunity to orchestrate a transformation in India’s defence capabilities, including indigenous industry and the Indian military's overall efficiency as a viable fighting entity. 

Nelson Mandela – Graça Machel Innovation Awards (Fully-funded to Suva, Fiji) 2017

Application Deadline: 21st September 2017.

Offered Annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: African countries

About the Award: The 2017 Nelson Mandela – Graça Machel Innovation Awards is celebrating the 12th year of recognising individuals and organisations for their excellence, innovation, and bravery in creating positive social change.

The Innovation Awards are part of the global SPEAK! campaign, which seeks to give a voice to everyone, everywhere. Led by CIVICUS through the Civic Space Initiative, SPEAK! and the Innovation Awards will together help celebrate, promote, and defend the voices of ordinary citizens in ensuring a more just and sustainable future for all.

Category of Award: One award will be conferred in each of the following categories:

• Youth Activist: An individual who has worked for positive social change and is younger than 30 as of August 1st, 2017.
• Individual Activist: An Individual who has worked for positive social change and is 30 years of age, or older, as of August 1st, 2017.
• Civil Society Organisation: A registered non-profit organisation that has worked for positive social change and has two or more full-time employees.
• Brave Philanthropy (Donor): An individual or organisation that has provided financial support for an activist, organisation or campaign engaged in social change despite financial or other risk, public perception, or donor-norms.

Type: Contest

Eligibility: The Awards will recognise outstanding activists, organisations and donors whose work demonstrates innovative or bold approaches, perseverance in the face of challenges, significant reach, and measurable impact.

In addition to the above Category Definitions, the following eligibility requirements apply for all nominations:

• Nominators can nominate themselves or organisations with which they are affiliated, or nominate other individuals or organisations.
• Nominators can submit a maximum of one nomination per category.
• Nominations must be based on specific activities that took place between 1 May 2016 and 31 July 2017. (Any nominations based on activities that took place outside of this time frame will not be considered.)
• No member of the Civic Space Initiative or individual who is otherwise involved with the Nelson Mandela – Graça Machel Innovation Awards, whether as an officer, director, employee, or independent contractor, is eligible to be nominated.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award:  Award winners of the Youth, Individual and Organisation categories will be awarded a prize package worth approximately US$4,550.00. This includes:

• Return airfare to ICSW 2017 (value of approx US$2,000)
• Registration fee waiver for ICSW (value of approx US$250)
• Accommodation in Suva, Fiji for 3 nights/4 days for ICSW, together with the majority of meals (value of approx US$500)
• Per diem for 4 days at ICSW (value of approx US$300)
• Cash prize of $1,500

ii. The Award winner of the Brave Philanthropy category will receive a registration fee waiver for ICSW 2017.

iii. Any costs or fees not specifically listed above will be borne by Award winners.

iv. Award winners must confirm their intent to attend ICSW on or before 11:59pm (GMT+2) on 6 November 2017.

v. If one or more of the Awards can not be physically presented to the winners at ICSW 2017 due to circumstances beyond CIVICUS’ control, those Awards will be presented in absentia

How to Apply:  

• All nominations should be submitted via the Awards webpage using the online form. However, recognising the digital divide, we encourage individuals and organisations with resources to assist possible nominators who may not have access to the webpage, and we invite individuals or organisations to contact us if they require assistance.
• All nominations must be submitted before the end of the nomination period.
• Due to the large number of nominations, CIVICUS may not be able to acknowledge receipt of submissions.
• A selection of nominations will be posted on the Awards webpage as an example and inspiration for others.

Submit your nominations, including self-nominations, now by clicking here.

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: CIVICUS

Lex:lead International Essay Competition for University Students 2017

Application Timeline: 30th November 2017

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Afghanistan,  Bangladesh, Bhutan, Cambodia, Kiribati, Lao, Myanmar (Burma), Nepal, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, Yemen, Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Central African Rep., Chad, Comoros, DR Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, GuineaBissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger,Rwanda, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan (Rep.), Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe 

Eligible Field of Study: Law

About the Award: Lex:lead is a group of international lawyers and friends who support economic development focusing on the world’s least developed countries.

Lex:lead offers an annual essay competition on topics of law and development to the world’s least developed countries. In this way they transfer one-time US$500 awards to students for addressing fundamental questions.  In 2015 we also started placing students in internships through the World Bank and other institutions. Launched with funding from the International Bar Association Foundation, Lex:lead is an intellectual partner to the World Bank-supported Global Forum on Law, Justice and Development.

Type: Contest

Eligibility: 

• Candidates must be registered to compete: essays from unregistered candidates will not be accepted.
• Candidates must be a citizen of an eligible country and a student (usually of law) with proof of educational enrollment in an eligible country (in January 2017).

Number of Awardees: 10

Value of Contest: US$500

How to Apply: Answer all questions to register (incomplete or inaccurate registrations cannot be accepted). Do not register if you cannot provide proof of eligible citizenship and eligible enrollment.

Visit Contest Webpage for details

Award Provider: Lawyers for Economic Advancement and Development(Lex:lead)

Important Notes: Note that awards are generally payable to the winner’s educational institution on his/her behalf and not to the student directly. Funds may also be less any necessary bank conversion fees and/or taxes. Lex:lead will never charge a fee to participate. A Certificate of Participation will be sent to all registered candidates who submit an essay by the deadline.

Barclays Tertiary Scholarship Program for Undergraduate Ghanaian Students 2017/2018

Application Deadline: Friday, 22nd September, 2017.

Offered Annually? 

Eligible Countries: Ghana

To Be Taken At (Country): Ghana

About the Award: This is a collaborative effort between Barclays Bank Ghana and the University and it is to further support Barclays Bank’s commitment to unlocking societal challenges whiles contributing to the economic growth of the country.

Education and Skills Development forms one of the three pillars of their Shared Growth agenda; under which is their  Readytowork skills training for young persons in tertiary institutions and the Tertiary Education Scholarship.

Type: Undergraduate

Eligibility: 

• Must be Ghanaian
• Must be a continuing student of UPSA (Level 200 – 400)
• Must have excellent academic record – a GPA of 3.0 and above
• Must be able to demonstrate financial need
• Must add a statement of intent. (Essay)
• Must fill an application form.
• Must provide two referees, one from your Faculty
• Student beneficiaries will need to open a Barclays Ignition Account (Student Account) into which funds will be disbursed.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Duration of Program: Tenure of scholarship for beneficiary student is for one academic year renewable. Selection for the next academic year scholarship however is not an automatic guarantee.

How to Apply: Download form, print and submit a completed application form with all supporting documents to the Financial Aid Unit (FAU), Room 108, LBC. Only shortlisted applicants will be interviewed.

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: Barclays Bank

University of Alberta A-Level Scholarship 2018/2019 for International Students – Canada

Application Deadline: Ongoing.  Decision Timeline: University of Alberta A-Level Scholarship offers will be made in November–December 2017.

Eligible Countries: International students

To be taken at (country): University of Alberta, Canada

Accepted Subject Areas: Courses offered by the university

About the Award: To attract top students, the University of Alberta, Canada offers more than CAD$22 million in undergraduate scholarships each year. The University offers undergraduate scholarships each year for international students. Scholarships are awarded annually to students on study permit who are entering an undergraduate degree program. Some of these scholarships requires separate application while you’ll be considered for the other scholarships after you have received admission to the University.

Type: Undergraduate

Who is qualified to apply? Awarded to student(s) on Study Permit(s) with superior academic achievement entering the first year of a University of Alberta undergraduate degree program. Selection based on academic achievement on a minimum of three courses taken at the A-level and/or AS-level.

Number of Awards: Several

Scholarship Benefit: $2,000

Duration of Award: The scholarship is payable over four years.

How to Apply: Application will be considered upon receipt of A-Level transcripts among other needed documents.

Visit Scholarship webpage for details

Sponsors: University of Alberta, Canada

Important Notes: Candidate should make sure that he/she has applied for admission to a degree program at the University of Alberta and has sent in all up to date transcripts and/or statement of grades to the admissions unit. Students should contact their referee in advance with information about the competition and ask them for their contact information, including valid email address, so that when you apply you have all the necessary information.

Gates Cambridge Fully-funded Scholarships (Masters & PhD) in UK for International Students 2018/2019

Application Timeline:

• Applications Open : 4th September, 2017
• Applications Close: January, 2018

Eligible Countries: For international students

To be taken at (country): Cambridge University UK

Accepted Subject Areas: Masters and PhD Courses offered by the university

About the Award: Gates Cambridge Scholarships are highly competitive full-cost scholarships. They are awarded to outstanding applicants from countries outside the UK to pursue a full-time postgraduate degree in any subject available at the University of Cambridge. The programme aims to build a global network of future leaders committed to improving the lives of others.

Type: Masters and PhD scholarship

Selection Criteria

• outstanding intellectual ability
• leadership potential
• a commitment to improving the lives of others
• a good fit between the applicant’s qualifications and aspirations and the postgraduate programme at Cambridge for which they are applying

Eligibility

• a citizen of any country outside the United Kingdom.
• applying to pursue one of the following full-time residential courses of study: PhD (three year research-only degree); MSc or MLitt (two year research-only degree); or a one year postgraduate course (e.g. MPhil, LLM, MASt, Diploma, MBA etc.)
• already a student at Cambridge and want to apply for a new postgraduate course. For example, if you are studying for an MPhil you can apply for a Gates Cambridge Scholarship to do a PhD. However, if you have already started a course, you cannot apply for a Gates Cambridge Scholarship to fund the rest of it.
• already a Gates Cambridge Scholar and want to apply for a second Scholarship. You must apply by the second, international deadline and go through the same process of departmental ranking, shortlisting and interviewing as all other candidates.

Number of Scholarship: Several

Value of Scholarship

• Scholarship will cover the full cost of study
• the University Composition Fee and College fees at the appropriate rate
• a maintenance allowance for a single student
• one economy single airfare at both the beginning and end of the course

Duration of Scholarship: For the duration of the programme

How to Apply

Visit the Scholarship Webpage

Award Sponsors: Gates Cambridge Trust

Important Notes:

Gates Cambridge Scholarships are extremely competitive: over 4,000 applicants apply for 90 Scholarships each year.

Given the intense competition, the Trust has a four stage selection process:

• Departmental ranking – the very best applicants to each department are ranked on academic merit only
• Shortlisting – Gates Cambridge committees review the applications of ranked candidates using all four Gates Cambridge criteria and put forward a list for interview
• Interview – all shortlisted candidates have a short interview to assess how they meet all four Gates Cambridge criteria
• Selection – chairs of interview panels meet to decide the final list of Scholars
• A good fit between the applicant’s qualifications and aspirations and the postgraduate programme at Cambridge for which they are applying

University of British Columbia International Leader of Tomorrow (ILOT) Undergraduate Scholarships 2018/2019

Application Deadline: 15th November, 2017

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: International

To be taken at (country): University of British Columbia- UBC- Canada

About the Award: The University of British Columbia- UBC- Canada International Leader of Tomorrow (ILOT) Award recognizes international students who demonstrate superior academic achievement, leadership skills, involvement in student affairs and community service, recognized achievement in fields of endeavour such as the performing arts, sports, debating or creative writing, or external academic competitions and examinations.

A standard needs-assessment is made, based on financial information provided by students and their families.

Type: Undergraduate taught

Selection Criteria and Eligibility: Award candidates must be nominated by the high school they are currently attending, recently graduated from, or the college/university they are transferring from. To be considered for an International Leader of Tomorrow Award, students must:

• be applying for your first undergraduate degree
• be admissible to the first-choice degree you are applying to, including meeting UBC’s English Language Admission Standard
• have an excellent academic record (at least an “A” average or equivalent standard)
• be an international student – neither a Canadian citizen nor a permanent resident of Canada – and be studying in Canada on a Canadian study permit (student visa)
• demonstrate a level of financial need that would otherwise prevent you from pursuing a UBC degree
• be entering a UBC undergraduate degree program from a recognized secondary school, college, or other university

Number of Scholarships: several

Value of Scholarship: costs of tuition, fees and living costs, minus the financial contribution the student and their family can make annually towards these costs

Duration of Scholarship: The International Leader of Tomorrow Award can be renewed for up to three additional years of undergraduate study, or to degree completion, whichever is less, provided the student achieves satisfactory academic standing in their faculty, continues to demonstrate financial need, and maintains their Canadian study permit (visa).

How to Apply

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Sponsors: University of British Columbia- UBC- Canada

Important Notes: Although candidates to UBC can specify two program choices in their application for admission, an International Leader of Tomorrow Award nomination will be considered only in relation to the nominee’s first choice program. Early application is encouraged, to ensure an application decision can be made in time for nomination consideration.

100 Jim Ovia Scholars Program for Nigerian Students 2018

Application Deadline: 30th November 2017

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Nigeria

To be taken at (university): Nigerian universities

Eligible Field of Study: All courses offered at Nigerian universities

About Scholarship: The Jim Ovia Scholarships was founded since 1998. It is fully funded by Mr. Jim Ovia to provide financial aid to outstanding Nigeria youths. The scholarship was previously known as the MUSTE scholarship. Since October 2010, Mr. Ovia has invested over 100 Million Naira in the program to support 1500 beneficiaries and counting.

In establishing the Jim Ovia Scholarships, Mr. Ovia hoped to create a network of future leaders within Nigeria who can compete globally with their peers, bring new ideas, creativity and are committed to improving the lives and circumstances of people in their respective communities.

Over time it is expected that the Jim Ovia Scholarship beneficiaries will become leaders in helping to address challenges related to health, technology, and finance, all areas in which the foundation is deeply engaged.

Offered Since: 1998

Type: undergraduate and graduate degrees

Eligibility:

The scholarship is open to all potential students of Nigerian citizenship. One hundred (100) awardees are selected each year from a pool of eligible applicants.

Selection Criteria

Scholarships are awarded on the basis of personal intellectual ability, leadership capability and a desire to use their knowledge to contribute to society throughout Nigeria by providing service to their community and applying their talent and knowledge to improve the lives of others.

Number of Awards: The scheme offers an average of 100 opportunities each year for new applicants while renewing applicants are supported annually, conditional on meeting all eligible requirements of the scholarship

Value of Program: Scholarship covers tuition fee and maintenance allowances.

Duration of Program: for the period of the program

How to Apply: Apply here

It is important for interested applicants to visit the Application Guide for information on how to apply.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for details

Scholarship Provider: Jim Ovia Foundation