24 Jan 2018

CERN Openlab Summer Students Program for International Students 2018

Application Deadline: 19th February 2018
To Be Taken At (Country): Geneva, Switzerland
About the Award: During two full months corresponding to nine weeks (June-August 2018), the CERN openlab summer students will be given a series of IT lectures (link is external) especially prepared for them by experts at CERN and other institutes. The students also have the opportunity to attend the CERN generic student programme lectures (link is external), if they wish. Visits to the accelerators and experimental areas are part of the programme, as well as visits to external companies. A report on the work project carried out is to be handed in at the end of the stay.
Type: Training
Eligibility: 
  • You must be a Bachelor or Master student in Computer Science, Mathematics, Engineering or Physics (with a strong computing profile)
  • You have completed, by summer 2018, at least three years of full-time studies at university level.
  • You will remain registered as a student during your stay at CERN. If you expect to graduate during summer 2018, you are also eligible to apply.
  • You have not worked at CERN before with any other status (Technical Student, Trainee, User…) for more than 3 months and you have not been a CERN summer student in the past.
  • A good knowledge of English is mandatory; knowledge of French would be an advantage.
Selection: 
  • Once the applications are completed, the selection process begins. Applications are considered by the CERN openlab Summer Student Programme Comittee and by the future supervisors of the students.
  • The results of the selection procedure will be made available to the students by mid-April 2018.
  • Please note that applications may be forwarded to a panel of national experts for evaluation purposes.
  • Diversity has been an integral part of CERN’s mission since its foundation and is an established value of the Organization. Employing a diverse workforce is central to our success.
Number of Awards: Not specified
Value of Award: 
  • An allowance of 90 CHF per day during your contractual dates
  • Travel allowance (on a lump sum basis)
  • Assistance to find accommodation on the CERN site or nearby
  • Health insurance scheme during the duration of your contract
  • 9 weeks of stay – 40h/week
Duration of Program: June-August 2018
Possible dates of stay are:
  • 18 June to 17 August 2018
  • 25 June to 24 August 2018
  • 02 July to 31 August 2018
How to Apply: Please apply online before the deadline (19th February 2018). Once your application has been submitted you will receive a confirmation e-mail. The following documents MUST reach us before the deadline in order for your application to be considered.
Required Documents
  • CV
  • Proof of enrolment at a university for the current year
  • Report on Candidate: Once your application has been submitted you will receive a confirmation e-mail which contains a link to this report which has to be forwarded to at least one referee (preferably a professor). In order to be considered, at least one new report must reach us before the deadline.The report on candidate needs to be less than 6 months old at the deadline.
Incomplete applications will not be considered.
The students are welcome to upload other relevant document(s) (e.g. academic records).


Award Providers: CERN

KAAD Germany Research Fellowship Programme (Masters & PhD) for Developing Countries 2018/2019

Application Deadline: 30th June 2018 for the September academic session.
Offered annually? Yes
Eligible Countries: Countries in Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America. Countries in Africa include: Ghana, Ethiopia, Kenya (with Uganda and Tanzania) and Zimbabwe.
To be taken at (country): Germany.  There is also the possibility for Master-scholarships at local universities.
Eligible Field of Study: There is no specific subject-preference. However, the selection board has often given preference to courses and subjects that they felt to be of significance for the home country of the applicant. This holds true especially for subjects of PhD-theses. There is therefore a certain leaning towards “development oriented” studies – this does however not mean that other fields (cultural, philosophic, linguistic, etc.) can not be of significance for a country and are ruled out.
About the Award: The KAAD Scholarship Program is addressed to post-graduates and to academics living in their home countries who already gained professional experience and who are interested in postgraduate studies (or research stays) in Germany. This program is administered by regional partner committees, staffed by university professors and church representatives. Normally documents are submitted to the committee of the applicant’s home country.
Type: Postgraduate(Masters and PhD) scholarship
Eligibility: To be eligible,candidates must:
  • come from a developing or emerging country in Africa, Asia, the Middle East or Latin America and are currently living there
  • have a university degree and professional experience from their home country
  • want to acquire a master’s degree or a PhD at a German university or do a post-doctoral research project (2-6 months for established university lecturers) at a German university
  • be Catholic Christian (or generally belong to a Christian denomination). Candidates from other religions can apply if they are proposed by Catholic partners and can prove their commitment to interreligious dialogue
  • possess German language skills before starting the studies (KAAD can provide a language course of max. 6 months in Germany)
Selection Criteria: 
  • KAAD’s mission is to give scholarships mainly to lay members of the Catholic Church. This means, that – There is a preference for Catholic applicants.
  • However, among the scholars, there is a limited number of: Protestant Christians, Orthodox Christians (especially from Ethiopia)and Muslims.
  • Catholic priests and religious people are eligible only in very rare cases.
Expectations from KAAD: 
  • Above-average performance in studies and research
  • The orientation of your studies or research towards permanent reintegration in your home region (otherwise the scholarship is turned into a loan),
  • Religious and social commitment (activities) and willingness to inter-religious dialogue.
Number of Awardees: Not specified
Value of Scholarship:  Applicants who are awarded scholarships for Germany under S1 are helped by KAAD with their Visa-modalities, paid for the flights to Germany and back, provided with language training in Germany prior to their studies, etc.
Duration of Scholarship: Duration of research
How to Apply: Interested graduates can fill an online questionnaire, which they find on the application webpage www.kaad-application.de. For detailed information about application requirements and procedures, we recommend to read the FAQs.
Award Provider: Katholischer Akademischer Ausländer-Dienst, Germany

Turkey Vs. Kurds

Binoy Kampmark

It’s a cruel saga, and one that promises no immediate end. Turkey, considered one of the more potent of powers within the NATO alliance, has manoeuvred itself into a play that Washington will find hard to avoid. For Ankara, one thing must not happen as Islamic State forces gradually vanish, or more likely metamorphose into the next force they will, in time, become. It is that inconvenient matter of the Kurds, ever present, and, in recent few years ever forceful, about carving out territory within Syria and Iraq.
The United States has seen the Kurds as something of a gem, desperate, keen to fight, and often effective in their encounters with the Islamic State forces and their various incarnations. Ankara has been none too pleased with that fact. Guns, once acquired, are used; weapons, once used, are hard to put down.
NATO allies, on this score, do not see eye to eye, and have never done so. These eyes have parted even further with Washington’s promise that a 30,000 Kurdish-led border force will be established to police Turkish-Iraq borders in an effort to quash any resurgence of Islamic State forces. The promise has also managed to irk Iran and Russia, who see such a force as directed, not merely at Islamic State, but against their regional influence.
On Saturday, 72 Turkish jets targeted the Kurdish enclave of Afrin in Syria in an effort, codenamed Olive Branch, to remove, what Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan called a terrorist threat across northern Syria. “Beginning from the west, step by step, we will annihilate the terror corridor up the Iraqi border.” Within that enclave are some 8 to 10 thousand Kurdish fighters. But added to that are 800 thousand vulnerable civilians, many displaced by the Syrian Civil War.
No more negotiations, no more chit chat or fanciful discourses about peaceful resolutions and amiable settlements – this was belligerence, pure and simple. “No one can say a word,” blustered the Turkish leader. “Whatever happens, we do not care anymore at all. Now we only care about what happens on the ground.”
Did it matter that the operation was just another example of Syria’s sovereignty as contingent, best ignored rather than respected by yet another power keen to issue its stamp on the area’s geography? Bekir Bozdağ, Turkey’s deputy prime minister, made a rather weak effort suggesting that such a military venture was temporary, a necessarily surgical move to target an infection. Once achieved, Turkish forces would withdraw.
Bozdağ proceeded to name organisations that have all found the convenient rhetorical packaging of terrorism. There are no distinctions to be had between the Kurdish YPG, or the PKK groups, nor those of the Islamic State. “The only target of the operation is the terrorist groups and the terrorists as well as their barracks, shelters, positions, weapons and equipment.”
As has been the official line in the conflicts that have mushroomed from Syria to Iraq, civilians are not targeted, even if they might be slaughtered. “Civilians are never targeted. Every kind of planning has been done to avoid any damage to civilians.”
Masks, posturing, and a good deal of dissimulation, are essential across the diplomatic engagement here. The one group that seems to be coming out of this rather poorly are history’s traditional whipping boys, the Kurds, who remain gristle in the broader strategic picture. Russia, for one, has blamed the United States for feeding the unstable situation while urging restraint on the part of Ankara’s forces.
“Provocative actions by the US, aimed at isolating regions with predominantly Kurdish population, were the main factors that contributed to the development of a crisis in this part of Syria,” went a statement.
Despite adopting a frowning line to the attacks, there is little doubt that discussions would have been had ahead of time with officials in Moscow, given the presence in the Russian capital of Hakan Fidan of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization and Hulusi Akar, chief of staff of Turkey’s army.
Iran, in turn, has been taking the position that such incursions, rather than dousing the fires of terrorist groups, emboldens them. Careful eyes are noting the fortunes of the respective players in this latest, murderous squabble.
The attacks were far from negligible, comprising some 100 targets. Another important feature of this muddled equation was the role played by fighters of the Free Syria Army, who also participated in operations against the Kurds.
The great power play here, even in the murky bloodiness, is that no one wants a genuinely viable Kurdistan front, and certainly one that has any claim to international legitimacy. One neutralised, weakened, and preferably defanged, is a position that seems to have been reached. Moscow will be assured that future conflict can be averted; Ankara will keep its sword sheathed in future. Washington will be left somewhere in between, left behind in another play it misread. Humanitarian catastrophe will be assured.

The U.S. Foreign Policy Elite Still Wants the Middle East for Its Oil and Its Strategic Location

Edward Hunt

In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, four former U.S. diplomats provided remarkably candid commentary on recent U.S. involvement in the Middle East, revealing a number of the most closely guarded secrets of U.S. diplomacy.
The four former diplomats emphasized the importance of the region’s oil, spoke critically about the weaknesses of U.S. strategy, made a number of crude comments about U.S. partners, displayed little concern about ongoing violence, and called for more “discipline” throughout the region.
One of the former diplomats, James Jeffrey, criticized the Obama administration for withdrawing U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011 rather than going through with a secret deal to maintain a secret network of military bases in the country. Even today, Jeffrey said, officials in Washington must not “melt down” and retrench when U.S. forces get killed. Officials must accept that there could always be “new Benghazis and new Nigers,” he said, referring to incidents in which U.S. agents have been killed.
The four former diplomats also lambasted U.S. partners in the region. They criticized many of their closest allies for poor governance, a lack of democracy, and an inability to coordinate on shared strategic objectives.
Jeffrey made some of the strongest criticisms, charging Kurdish leaders in Iraqi Kurdistan with making their region into “another basket case” in the Middle East. He also complained that U.S. officials had to deal “with a lot of bitching” from the Turkish government over U.S. support for the Kurdish fighters confronting the Islamic State (ISIS or IS) in Syria.
In addition to Jeffrey, who once held high-level positions in the George W. Bush administration, the group of former diplomats included Ryan CrockerEric Edelman, and Stuart Jones. Crocker has been the U.S. ambassador to six different countries in the Middle East. Edelman and Jones, who have both been diplomats in the Middle East, have held senior positions in numerous administrations.
Over the past few decades, all four men have played significant roles in crafting and implementing U.S. policies in the region. They were “giants” who had “walked the earth,” according to Edelman.
Together, these four former diplomats called on the Trump administration to play a more assertive role in the Middle East. Although they largely agreed that IS has been significantly weakened over the last two and a half years, removing a significant challenge to U.S. power, they saw ongoing challenges from Iran and Russia and growing problems between the U.S. and its allies. They wanted to ensure that the United States remained well positioned to call the shots in the region and maintain a U.S.-led system of regional order.
“Clarity on U.S. plans and goals and particularly success against Iran will help mobilize allies, but the U.S. must discipline the system and overwatch partners constantly,” Jeffrey said.
The Strategic Concerns
Some of the more astounding revelations concern the basic reason why U.S. officials remain so focused on the Middle East. Although U.S. officials typically emphasize the problems of terrorism and security, a number of the former diplomats indicated that the major concerns have always been the region’s oil, location, and function in the global economy.
Former diplomat Eric Edelman made the clearest statement on the matter, explaining in his prepared statement that geostrategic calculations have been central factors in U.S. policy since the end of World War II. “U.S. policymakers have considered access to the region’s energy resources vital for U.S. allies in Europe, and ultimately for the United States itself,” he wrote. “Moreover, the region’s strategic location—linking Europe and Asia—made it particularly important from a geopolitical point of view.”
Edelman went on to suggest that U.S. actions in the region have been consistently based on these geostrategic factors. He cited the Carter Doctrine of 1980, which identified the Persian Gulf as a region so vital to U.S. interests that the U.S. would militarily intervene in the region to expel outside forces. He also cited the first Gulf War against Iraq, in which the U.S. militarily intervened to expel Iraqi forces from Kuwait.
“The geostrategic and economic factors that made the Middle East so important to our national security in the past are just as potent today,” Edelman said. Even with recent increases in U.S. energy production as a result of the fracking revolution, “real or even potential disruptions to the flow of oil anywhere would have serious negative effects on our economy.”
With his remarks, Edelman made it clear that U.S. officials continue to value the Middle East for its oil. The region “contains half of global proven oil reserves, accounts for one-third of oil production and exports, and is home to three of the world’s four biggest oil transit chokepoints,” he explained.
When Edelman raised these points during the hearing, nobody disagreed with him. Neither his colleagues nor the committee members challenged his observations about why the region was so important. His remarks were considered so uncontroversial that they never came up for debate.
Instead, the current and former officials focused their discussion on what they thought were the main challenges to U.S. access to the area. Their primary concern was that Russia and Iran were working together to challenge the U.S.-led system of regional order with the hopes of creating some alternative system.
“In reality, both Russia and Iran want to roll back U.S. influence even further in the region, and each depends on the other to help it do so,” Edelman warned in his prepared statement.
During the hearing, Jeffrey made a similar point, saying that “Russia and Iran and, to some degree, Syria want to change the mix of the Middle East.” The U.S. and its allies, he continued, must maintain the current system and “at the end of the day we just have to push back.”
In these ways, the former diplomats provided some remarkable insights into the most basic reasons behind U.S. actions in the Middle East. They revealed that basic U.S. policy was to maintain a U.S.-led system of regional order so that the U.S. government could influence how all parts of the world gained access to the region’s oil.
Frictions
Throughout the hearing, the four former diplomats also made a number of unusually blunt criticisms of U.S. strategy. They felt that their superiors in Washington and their many partners throughout the region kept taking steps that were creating more problems in the area.
Jeffrey was especially critical of the Obama administration, which he blamed for failures in the second Gulf War against Iraq. Jeffrey, who was the Obama administration’s ambassador to Iraq during the period when U.S. forces withdrew from the country in 2011, said that the administration should have accepted a secret plan to keep U.S. forces in the country. Jeffrey explained that administration officials had arranged a secret plan with Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki “to cheat, with Maliki’s acknowledgement,” on the final agreement to withdraw U.S. forces from the country. “We had Black SOF, White SOF,” he said, seemingly referring to different kinds of Special Operations Forces. “We had drones, we had all kinds of things,” he added.
Jeffrey was reluctant to provide more details, but he insisted that the secret plan could have worked if his superiors in the Obama administration had tried it. He did not express any concern about the fact that an estimated 100,000 people had already died in the war.
“It was a very big package, including a $14 billion FMS program,” Jeffrey said, referring to a program of military sales. “We had bases all over the country that were disguised bases that the U.S. military was running.”
Although the other former diplomats on the panel largely agreed that the Obama administration should not have withdrawn U.S. forces from Iraq in 2011, they were convinced that U.S. partners shared much of the blame for ongoing violence in the area. The former diplomats accused many of their closest partners and allies of acting in ways that were creating problems.
Sometimes, “they will do things in a way that we think makes things worse rather than better,” Edelman said.
Jeffrey agreed with his colleagues, saying it was simply the price of operating in the Middle East. To maintain access to the region, he explained, “we have to rely on five countries—Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Pakistan, and Egypt.” Each of them, he said, came with significant problems, all of which made it difficult to operate in the area. “We wouldn’t pick these allies if we were coming up with a different Middle East, but we have to deal with the Middle East we have,” he said.
Jeffrey was especially critical of Turkey, a NATO ally. He said that “the things they do are toxic.”
Since a putsch attempt against the Turkish government in July 2016, Turkish leaders have accused the U.S. government of involvement. As part of the government’s subsequent crackdown on its domestic opponents, an estimated 150,000 Turks have been fired from their jobs, 60,000 have been arrested, 1,500 civil society organizations have been disbanded, and more than 100 media outlets have been closed.
The crackdown came amid a period of growing tensions between the U.S. and Turkish governments. Differences over how to deal with the war in Syria and relations with Russia have added to the tensions in the relationship.
“It’s unpleasant, it’s transactional, it’s ugly,” Jeffrey said.
Edelman, who believed that the U.S. bore “a little bit of the blame here for this deterioration in relations,” still called for a tougher approach. “I don’t think we can tolerate some of the behavior that our Turkish allies are showing,” he said.
Ryan Crocker reminded the committee members that the United States still relied on Turkey to maintain access to the region. He said that it would be necessary to continue working with the country’s repressive leadership, despite its troubling behavior.
“They are a NATO partner in a region where we don’t have a choice between democracy and autocracy,” Crocker said. “That’s not on the table.”
Jeffrey provided one of the most telling comments on the situation when he acknowledged that the Turkish government continued to tolerate U.S. support for the Kurdish fighters who were fighting IS in Syria. The Kurdish fighters, he explained, were an offshoot of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), a group that both the U.S. and Turkish governments consider to be a terrorist organization.
“The Turks are allowing us to support the PKK offshoot Kurds in Syria every day—reluctantly, with a lot of bitching, but they do it,” Jeffrey said.
The U.S. decision to support the Kurdish fighters created additional controversy because of Kurdish aspirations to create their own state. The governments of countries with significant Kurdish populations, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, all opposed the idea.
When Iraqi Kurds living in the autonomous region of Iraqi Kurdistan voted last September to explore the possibility of independence, they faced a significant backlash. Weeks after the vote, the Iraqi government sent its military forces into the region, reclaiming the oil-rich area of Kirkuk while weakening the independence movement.
The former diplomats signaled their support for the Iraqi government’s military operations, despite the fact that the Iraqi Kurds were playing a significant role in the war against IS.
Jeffrey argued that Iraq must hold together because of its potential to produce so much oil. He said that Iraq could eventually enter “into the Saudi Arabia category,” meaning that it could become a major player in the global oil market. “That’s a very important trump card, so to speak, in the Middle East, and we don’t want to just break it up,” he said.
Jeffrey was especially critical of the Iraqi Kurds for pursuing independence, saying that “they have gone in three months from one of the best good-news stories in the region to another basket case.”
If they keep crossing “red lines,” Ryan Crocker said, “we’re probably not going to be around to back them up when the going gets rough.”
“It’s the same as, sadly, with the Christian communities,” Crocker added, referring to Iraqi Christians who were facing their own challenges.
In these ways, the former diplomats made it clear that they were willing to ignore the plight of their partners and other marginalized groups if they could not find any strategic reasons to support them. The challenges facing the Kurds and Christians, they indicated, were minor factors compared to the strategic factors at play.
Taken together, their comments indicated that geostrategic calculations remained paramount. The four former diplomats may not have liked all of their partners, but they all believed that they had to accept these trade-offs if they were going to achieve their plans for the region.
“We can’t be going at each other, scratching each other because of these secondary sins when the real sinning in the region is done by Islamic terrorists and Iran,” Jeffrey said. “So we have to get a better hold of our allies.”
The Final Outlook
In spite of the rather complex strategic landscape, the four former diplomats still acknowledged that the United States maintained tremendous influence throughout the Middle East. They largely agreed that the United States remained the dominant power in the region with no comparable rival.
In his prepared statement, Edelman acknowledged that U.S. naval and air power in the Persian Gulf “outmatches Iran’s.”
Jeffrey agreed, explaining that the U.S. maintained “significant assets” throughout the Middle East. “Most of the states in the region are our security partners, with a huge conventional superiority, along with CENTCOM, over Iran, even with Russian support,” Jeffrey explained.
CENTCOM, short for U.S. Central Command, hosts about 80,000 U.S. military forces at numerous bases and offshore sites throughout the region. Over the past two-and-a-half years, CENTCOM has put its power on display in the war against IS. Since August 2014, coalition forces have conducted nearly 25,000 airstrikes in Iraq and Syria. As of April 2017, they had killed as many as 70,000 ISIS fighters, according to their own estimates.
As part of the campaign, U.S. forces have gained a major new foothold in Syria. “We have a lot of assets in Syria even though it doesn’t look that way,” Jeffrey said. “We and the Turks between us hold about a third of the country and have a lot of local allies.”
U.S. forces have also reestablished a powerful military presence in Iraq, now basing more than 5,000 U.S. forces in the country.
Currently, all signs indicate the United States is increasing its hold over the Middle East.
The only problem, according to the former diplomats, is that the United States continues to face significant resistance. Although the U.S. has constructed a kind of informal American empire, they believe that U.S. actions and polices are creating blowback that is bringing more conflict and violence to the region.
“Anything we do to contain Iran, to push back, will bring with it great risks to us and to people in the region,” Jeffrey said. These were the lessons of history, he explained, citing “the chaos we deliberately created” to confront past challengers in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.
Moving forward, Jeffrey believed it would be better to conduct what he called “economy-of-force, light-footprint operations with our allies.” He suggested that these types of operations would be more effective, even if they resulted in additional violence.
“That will produce new Benghazis and new Nigers,” Jeffrey said. But “we have to be able to move on and not melt down when these things happen because this is the right way to approach it.”
Indeed, Jeffrey insisted that it would be necessary to accept more death and violence if the United States was going to achieve its strategic objectives. This kind of trade-off, he believed, was simply how things worked in the area. Citing recent retaliatory actions by the Israeli and Saudi government against missile attacks, Jeffrey said that the high civilians death tolls that resulted from such operations had simply become one of the costs of military engagement in the region.
“Ten thousand more dead civilians in the Middle East, in a region that’s seen 1 million in the last 30 years, by my count… are not going to deter the Saudis and the Israelis from acting against this threat,” he said.

US Capitalism Lets Children and Mothers Die

W.T. Whitney Jr.

One of the authors of a recent study of U.S. children’s deaths told an interviewer that, “The U.S. is the most dangerous of wealthy, democratic countries in the world for children … Across all ages and in both sexes, children have been dying more often in the U.S. than in similar countries since the 1980s.” The report was published online January 8 in Health Affairs. Ninety percent of the deaths analyzed there were of infants and older adolescents.
According to the authors, “we examined mortality trends for [20] nations in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) for children ages 0–19 from 1961 to 2010 using publicly available data.” They discovered that, “Over the fifty-year study period, the lagging US performance amounted to over 600,000 excess deaths.”
“While child mortality progressively declined across all countries, mortality in the US has been higher than in peer nations since the 1980s,” they indicate. “From 2001 to 2010 the risk of death in the US was 76 percent greater for infants and 57 percent greater for children ages 1–19. During this decade, children ages 15–19 were eighty-two times more likely to die from gun homicide in the US.”
In 2013, the United Nations Children’s Fund ranked the United States in 25th place among 29 developed countries for success in assuring child health and safety. African-descended infants in the United States are most at risk for preventable deaths.  The overall U.S. infant mortality rate (IMR) for all babies in 2015 was 5.9. (The IMR is the number of babies dying during their first year of life for every group of 1000 babies born alive.) The IMR for white babies was 4.8; that for black and Hispanic babies was 11.4 and 5.2, respectively.
U.S. mothers are experiencing similarly dreadful health outcomes. In the United States the maternal mortality rate (MMR) for 1990, 2000, and 2015 was 16.9, 17.5, and 26.4, respectively. (The MMR is the number of women per 100,000 births who die from causes related to childbirth during pregnancy, the birth process, and for 42 days thereafter.)The comparable Canadian figures were 6.0, 7.7, and 7.3, respectively.
Over those 25 years, the MMR decreased globally by an average of 1.5 percent per nation per year.  Over the same period in the United States, the MMR increased at an average rate of 1.8 percent per year.  The MMR for the United States in 2010 ranked 48 places higher  than that of Estonia whose MMR was the world’s lowest. In Save the Children’s 2015 rankings for overall performance in delivering health care to mothers, the United States ended up in 61st place. The MMR for black mothers in the United States 2012 was almost four times that of white women.
Blame falls upon capitalism. In their recent Monthly Review article, John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark explain that capitalists arrived at a method for accumulating wealth at the expense of women. We think children are losers too.
They’ve relied on a process that Marx, Engels, and their followers have labeled “social reproduction, which refers to capitalists’ need for renewing their workforce.  Children are the fodder for social reproduction, and women are the agents. Citing the investigations of others, the Monthly Review authors explain how women – and children – become sources of accumulation, a task for which capital would seem, superficially, to be ill-suited.  After all, social reproduction differs from the production of commercially valuable commodities through which workers are exploited.
But capitalists are resourceful, and “those areas outside commodity production, including both the reproduction of labor power and what could be expropriated from nature, were considered ‘free gift[s] … to capital’” (Marx’s words). According to the authors, capital demonstrates a “necessary and continuing attempt to transcend or readjust its boundaries with respect to its external conditions of production.” Doing so, it “constantly seeks to expropriate what it can from its natural and social environment.”  In both situations it’s a matter of “actual robbery – usurpation, expropriation, dependence, enslavement.”
Marilyn Waring, whom they cite, thinks that, “the treatment of Mother Earth and the treatment of women and children in the system of national accounts have many fundamental parallels.”
The vulnerability of U.S. children was on display recently. Congress in 1997 enacted legislation creating the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Children who benefited were those whose families earned too much to receive Medicaid benefits for them, but not enough to buy private health insurance. By 2015 the rate of uninsured children in the United States had fallen from 13.9 percent to 4.5 percent. CIP should have been reauthorized in September, 2017, but that didn’t happen.
Between then and January 22, 2108, it seemed that health insurance for millions of children might disappear. That day, however, an agreement emerged to renew CHIP, but only as part of a deal for temporarily funding the federal government.  The idea that protection of children’s health depends on negotiations on unrelated issues suggests the precariousness of guarantees for children’s survival in the United States.
Clearly, prospects for the well-being of U.S. children, taken as a whole, fall short of expectations for a wealthy nation. Those in charge, it seems, are able to commandeer financial resources that in a just society would be readily available for saving children and mothers from preventable deaths. But how, one asks, did children and mothers living in other OECD nations, all capitalist, escape dangers weighing upon children and mothers in the United States?
Vicente Navarro, a veteran public health investigator and economist, suggests that working-class forces in the United States are weak, too weak to resist plunder. He points out that, “The United States, the only major capitalist country without government-guaranteed universal health care coverage, is also the only nation without a social democratic of labor party that serves as the political instrument of the working class and other popular classes. These two facts are related.” Navarro notes the juxtaposition of strong labor movements in Europe and relatively small, timid unions in the United States.
In general, he observes, “If you establish a spectrum of capitalist countries, listing them from very “corporate friendly” (like the United States) to very “worker friendly” (like Sweden), you will find, where the capitalist class is very strong, very poor health benefits coverage (in the public as well as in the private sectors), highly unequal coverage, and very poor health indicators. This is, indeed, the U.S. case.”

How the Mass Media Misread the Iranian Protests

Rahman Bouzari

One of the largest social and political uprisings since the 1979 revolution in Iran has died down for now. However, due to the very lasting structures which ignited the first round of the protests, in more than 75 cites all around Iran, it does not seem to wane. One can argue that it is only the beginning of an end – the prolonged end of what we know as the Islamic Republic, either by an uprising or by an implosion. Some noted the structural causes and political-economic effects of the recent protest perfectly, among them these two are well-articulated: ‘The Moral Economy of the Iranian Protests,’ ‘Causes behind Iran’s protests: A preliminary account.’ It is now worth noting their reception in the mass media and the concerted efforts to manipulate its true origin.
What we are witnessing now is a gridlocked systemic and systematiccrisis. Systemic, for the whole system, in contrast to a particular part of it, suffers from a widespread endemic corruption that functions as a kernel in which the four-decades of socio-economic and political grievances are visible. Systematic, for the structural defects and problems cannot be solved or even fixed by minor modifications that serve only to defer any real transformation. It also means the whole system, including the so-called reformists and the conservatives, are responsible for the present predicament. To name but a few symptoms of the current crisis one could mention the stagflation, unfettered privatization, structural adjustment, deregulation, unemployment, ‘airpocalypse’, and all those policies having been imposed after the long Iran-Iraq war (1980-1988), the policies which could be articulated as the Iranian ‘accumulation by dispossession’ – a Master-Signifier to diverse signified.
It is indubitable that the economic grievances are the first and foremost drive for the recent protests. Indeed, the country’s economy seemed to be spinning out of control. Yet the economic, unlike the highly capitalist societies, has been inexorably tied to the political in the global south, as it was the case with the Greek crisis in 2015. The ‘elective affinity’ of capitalism in the so-called periphery societies provided the left with an opportunity to reject both the authoritarian governance and capitalism as a normative dispositif, and Iran is no exception in this regard, if not the exemplar of it par excellence. Almost all the problematics of the Islamic Republic is a distorted form of what we have seen on the global scene with simultaneous eccentric peculiarities that are coupled with a theocratic rule now in power. Ironically it seems, the government born out of 79 revolution started to constitute itself exactly at the beginning of Thatcherism and Reaganism. The long-life of the IR, thus, corresponds to the four-decades of neoliberal agenda. The enigma of Islamic Republic surviving four decades stems from the fact that, though isolated it has succeeded in finding itself amongst the global free-market as an exporter of raw materials and importer of goods and services. While being included in the system of globalized capital, owing to its oil reserves, it has been excluded from its presumed benefits. This exclusive inclusion, the ambivalent international status of the IR in relation to the forces of capital, led the commentators to hasty observations of how to understand its nature. It is from this perspective that one can see the kind of establishment which people are protesting against.
Theatricality of Elections
The Islamic Republic is by no means a democracy even in the formal sense, rather a hybrid form of theocracy and plutocratic oligarchy with heavily-controlled elections. At the level of democratic procedures, it follows, frantically, the rules of the alleged democracy in the 21st century, with nearly one election biennially. Though rigged and opaque with strict filtration of the candidates, it observes the electoral game to its logical end, to the extent in which it has turned to a ritual in Iran with all its pre-post implications. This ritual involves a limited spurious choice ‘between the lesser of two evils’ – the reformists vis-à-vis the hardliners, in this case – giving the voter some sense of agency while preventing them from fulfilling their very agency. The point is how a theocratic Constitution along with an oligarchic ruling class dominated this formal democracy. Though radical democracy means going beyond parliamentarianism, not to mention the leftist criticism of democracy, both the term and its practice in the modern world, there is no democratic order proper in the conventional sense in the IR. It is a peculiar form of demo-theo-pluto-cracy which cannot be considered by its voter turnout – a rampant misunderstanding in the western media persuaded by pro-regime pundits in the US and Europe.
Mainstream and alternative media: forgetting Trump
In the aftermath of the wave of protests in Iran, the mass media in the Anglophone world has failed, intentionally or unwittingly, to depict it rightly. The mechanism in which the for-profit media tried to manipulate what happened in the streets of tens of cities all around the country, during ten days for the time being, consisted of two mega-categories. The first, to call into question the originality of the protests in Iran, the modus operandi operated by the mainstream media such as BBC, Aljazeera English, and others. The second, to repudiate their independent act of uprising by invoking to Trump’s unconditional support of Iran protests, in unfortunately alternative and liberal media such as Democracy Now and the Guardian.
To begin with, there is a semantic zero level of misreading any uprising in the mass media by calling it ‘unrest’, something which renders the order, constituted and preserved by the police, disorder. The sacred space of sovereignty predicated upon an order, an authoritative command, to keep the order, the arrangement of bodies and actions, in an appropriate way. Any political movement or uprising would consider in their eyes as a threat to order, in both senses of the term, thereby label it as ‘unrest’ which would cause disorder rather than reordering the very order of the things.
Politically speaking, the mainstream media in the Anglophone world, replete with the IR spin-doctors, engaged in three levels of misrepresentation. Initially, they tried to ignore it as the hardliner underplot to topple the reformist administration down, as if there were any different attitudes towards the underprivileged between the two factions of the IR. The next step, following the unsuccessful ascription to the conservative camp, was to underestimate the number of protesters thereby humiliate the participants as a few poor, uneducated lumpen-proletariat, with no aim at their disposal, sabotaging the public property, banks, garbage bins, etc., who have no notion of non-violent struggles. Their ode to the maturity of middle-class in being an observer during the wave of protests is to be understood in this respect. When it spread to tens of cites across the country, however, another distinction was made visible in their rhetoric between those who have the right to protest moderately, and those who have embarked on taking down the police stations and clerical offices – Again as if the violence began by people who have nothing in their hands rather than the armored anti-riot police.
To take but a few examples of different levels of misrepresentation, one of the earliest Tweets by the Iranian contributor to Al-Manitor on the third day of the uprisings indicated that just a handful of people protested in the streets while there were 40 million voters participated in the last election. Another Iranian-American journalist and a frequent commentator on Iran at BBC, New York Times, Aljazeera, Huffington Post and others, tweeted on the fourth day of the uprisings that the protesters are much smaller than 2009 so that she “can’t find anyone personally who has joined the protests.” She later modified her Tweet, by justifying her stance that the demography of the protests seems different.
Surprisingly enough, the alternative news outlets do not fare much better. Their hysteric obsession not to be identified with Trump or the neocons in the United States makes them revolve around every tiny word he would say in order to riposte immediately. The result of this over-reaction is nothing but ignoring those people struggling against the same politics that put Trump and alt-rights into power, not only in the US and Europe but also in the global south. One of the most amazing examples in this regards is Democracy Now anchored by Amy Goodman and Juan González that is supposed to give voice to the heterodox journalists and analysts in contrast to mainstream media. In a broadcast released on the sixth day of demonstrations, Democracy Now invited a CNN correspondent in Iran who was just back to Los Angeles for holiday to declare the government restraint toward protesters and the president reception of the people’s right to protest, as well as the founder and president of the notorious National Iranian American Council (NIAK) to declare that “Trump messages carries no credibility.” The over-weight of Trump criticism in the alternative media is central to misrepresenting any social and political movements in the years to come. Moreover, to avoid Trump taking the power is to fight with him domestically as well as internationally, strengthening the grassroots movements that are fighting the manufacturing of ProducTrump.
Ecological Over-determination
Among the four horsemen of the coming terminal crisis of the global capitalism Slavoj Žižek has identified, the worldwide ecological crisis sets the pace. It is capable of an unexpected short-circuit between the material condition Iranians living through and the kind of alternative they aspire for, thus releasing political potentialities to challenge the IR as a whole. Apart from destabilizing political-economic factors, it is necessary to find out that almost every four corners of the country subjected to drought, air pollution, dust pollution, lake-drying, and infrastructural defects that are on the verge of devastating collapse. Four-decades of mismanagement by all factions of the ruling elite in the IR have left the country with an ecological crisis which could now propel to an environmental disaster. This is not an apocalyptic vision but a real one, based on facts and figures. To take but one last example, Plasco, an iconic high-rise building – a shopping center and clothing workshops, engulfed by fire – collapsed in Tehran almost one year ago. It could not be adjudged just an accident happening once a while in every country around the world but a symptom of what would resemble the forthcoming Iran. Plasco is the condensation of four-decade socio-politico-ecological ignorance in the IR, so that one is tempted to call the current situation ‘Plascoesque’. It is approaching an ecological catastrophe, if not impeded urgently, there exist no land known as Iran in a decade to come. This would lead to an implosion, activating the antagonistic forces embedded in the petrified current social relations, or a revolution, extending the waves of protests to an irrepressible bulk of uprising. Neither reformists nor conservative could address any transformative change which paves the way for a new order, nor even would they play any progressive role towards it. If the Islamic Republic survives the ongoing uprisings, by any chance, there would not remain any right to live and breathe, let alone the right to protest. To be straightforward, any transformative change in our context would amount to no less than a ‘regime change’ – an overloaded term in need of re-appropriation by radical dissidents, for good. Despite the fact that it has been popularized by George W. Bush, the term, in its origin, does not necessarily mean advocating foreign intervention to bring fictitious democracy through military forces. It can also occur through inside change caused by a popular uprising or revolution as a precondition for even a reformist change, at least in Iran
The discursive struggle seems an indispensable part of any political movement to endure the cultural and material repression. The international leftists have a work to do in solidarity with the less-heard isolated forces in the media. As Rosa Luxemburg once said, ‘the most revolutionary thing one can do is always to proclaim loudly what is happening.’ It is the task of producing counter-narrative by alternative media not to let the far-right politicians appropriate the genuine uprisings against neoliberal authoritarianism merged with theocratic plutocracy.
Another Iran is not possible but necessary.

Why is the Israeli Army Finally Worried About Gaza?

Jonathan Cook

Last week Israeli military officials for the first time echoed what human rights groups and the United Nations have been saying for some time: that Gaza’s economy and infrastructure stand on the brink of collapse.
They should know.
More than 10 years ago the Israeli army tightened its grip on Gaza, enforcing a blockade on goods coming in and out of the tiny coastal enclave that left much of the 2 million-strong population there unemployed, impoverished and hopeless.
Since then, Israel has launched three separate major military assaults that have destroyed Gaza’s infrastructure, killed many thousands and left tens of thousands more homeless and traumatised.
Gaza is effectively an open-air prison, an extremely overcrowded one, with only a few hours of electricity a day and its ground water polluted by seawater and sewage.
After a decade of this horrifying experiment in human endurance, the Israeli army finally appears to be concerned about whether Gaza can cope much longer.
In recent days it has begun handing out forms, with more than a dozen questions, to the small number of Palestinians allowed briefly out of Gaza – mainly business people trading with Israel, those needing emergency medical treatment and family members accompanying them.
One question asks bluntly whether they are happy, another whom they blame for their economic troubles. A statistician might wonder whether the answers can be trusted, given that the sample group is so heavily dependent on Israel’s good will for their physical and financial survival.
But the survey does at least suggest that Israel’s top brass may be open to new thinking, after decades of treating Palestinians only as target practice, lab rats or sheep to be herded into cities, freeing up land for Jewish settlers. Has the army finally understood that Palestinians are human beings too, with limits to the suffering they can soak up?
According to the local media, the army is in part responding to practical concerns. It is reportedly worried that, if epidemics break out, the diseases will quickly spread into Israel.
And if Gaza’s economy collapses too, hundreds of thousands of Palestinians could be banging on Israel’s door – or rather storming its hi-tech incarceration fence – to be allowed in. The army has no realistic contingency plans for either scenario.
It may be considering too its image – and defence case – if its commanders ever find themselves in the dock at the International Criminal Court in the Hague accused of war crimes.
Nonetheless, neither Israeli politicians nor Washington appear to be taking the army’s warnings to heart. In fact, things look set to get worse.
Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu said last week there could be no improvements, no reconstruction in Gaza until Hamas agrees to give up its weapons – the only thing, in Hamas’s view, that serves as a deterrent against future Israeli attack.
Figures show Israel’s policy towards Gaza has been actually growing harsher. In 2017 exit permits issued by Israel dwindled to a third of the number two years earlier – and a hundredfold fewer than in early 2000. A few hundred Palestinian businesspeople receive visas, stifling any chance of economic revival.
The number of trucks bringing goods into Gaza has been cut in half – not because Israel is putting the inmates on a “diet”, as it once did, but because the enclave’s Palestinians lack “purchasing power”. That is, they are too poor to buy Israeli goods.
Netanyahu has resolutely ignored a plan by his transport minister to build an artificial island off Gaza to accommodate a sea port under Israeli or international supervision. And no one is considering allowing the Palestinians to exploit Gaza’s natural gas fields, just off the coast.
In fact, the only thing holding Gaza together is the international aid it receives. And that is now in jeopardy too.
The Trump administration announced last week it is to slash by half the aid it sends to Palestinian refugees via the UN agency UNRWA. Trump has proposed further cuts to punish Mahmoud Abbas, the increasingly exasperated Palestinian leader, for refusing to pretend any longer that the US is an honest broker capable of overseeing peace talks.
The White House’s difficuties are only being underscored as Mike Pence, the US vice-president, visits Israel as part of Trump’s supposed push for peace. He is being boycotted by Palestinian officials.
Palestinians in Gaza will feel the loss of aid severely. A majority live in miserable refugee camps set up after their families were expelled in 1948 from homes in what is now Israel. They depend on the UN for food handouts, health and education.
Backed by the PLO’s legislative body, the central council, Abbas has begun retaliating – at least rhetorically. He desperately needs to shore up the credibility of his diplomatic strategy in pursuit of a two-state solution after Trump recently hived off Palestine’s future capital, Jerusalem, to Israel.
Abbas threatened, if not very credibly, to end a security coordination with Israel he once termed “sacred” and declared as finished the Oslo accords that created the Palestinian Authority he now heads.
The lack of visible concern in Israel and Washington suggests neither believes he will make good on those threats.
But it is not Abbas’s posturing that Netanyahu and Trump need to worry about. They should be listening to Israel’s generals, who understand that there will be no defence against the fallout from the catastrophe looming in Gaza.