22 Jan 2019

British Association of International and Comparative Education (BAICE) Compare Fellowship 2019/2020 for Researchers in Developing Countries

Application Deadline: 1st March, 2019

Eligible Countries: Afghanistan; Benin; Burkina Faso; Burundi; Central African Republic; Chad; Comoros; Congo, Dem. Rep; Eritrea; Ethiopia; Gambia, The; Guinea-Bissau; Haiti; Korea, Dem. People’s Rep.; Liberia; Madagascar; Malawi; Mali; Mozambique; Nepal; Niger; Rwanda; Sierra Leone; Somalia; South Sudan; Syrian Arab Republic; Tajikistan; Tanzania; Togo; Uganda; Yemen, Rep.; Zimbabwe 

To be taken at (country): UK

About the Award: Compare is a leading journal of international and comparative education, publishing six issues a year of high quality articles on diverse issues of educational policy and practice around the world. It is the official journal of the British Association of International and Comparative Education (BAICE), which works to support activities of research, teaching and collaboration in the field.
In order to maintain its significant global standing, one of Compare’s missions is to develop the diversity of its authorship, and support underrepresented groups, in light of the significant inequalities of global academic publishing.
For this reason, it established in 2017 an annual Compare Fellowship, to support early career academics from the Global South in disseminating their research and scholarship to a global audience.

Type: Research

Eligibility:
  1. To be based currently in a university in a low-income country (according to the World Bank classification1)
  2. To have completed their doctoral degree within the last six years
  3. To be teaching or researching in the field of education
Number of Awards: Not specified

Value and Duration of Award: The fellowship will run from 1 September 2019 – 31 August 2020 and provide full financial support (including travel, accommodation and subsistence) for the following activities:
  • Attending the UKFIET conference in Oxford, UK, from 17-19 September 2019 (candidates are strongly encouraged to submit a presentation)
  • Attending the Compare writers’ workshop at the conference (a full-day course for early career researchers)
  • 2-4 week stay at an institution in the UK following the conference (to carry out library research, attend academic events, and develop publication ideas with the guidance of a mentor)
On returning to their country of origin, the Compare Fellow will be expected to continue with the following activities:
  • Participating in the e-mentoring following on from the writers’ workshop
  • Developing an article for Compare
  • Facilitating the organization of activities to support academic writing for other academics in their institution/country
  • Participating in Compare as a reviewer
How to Apply: All applicants should send the following documents via email to compare@uea.ac.uk
  1. CV / resume (including qualifications, professional experience and publications)
  2. Supporting statement of 1000 words (outlining research interests, publication trajectory to date and future plans, and potential benefits of the fellowship for themselves and their institutions/countries)
  3. Abstract submission for the UKFIET conference (see requirements at www.ukfiet.org from 21st January)
If contact has already been made with a potential institution and mentor in the UK, then candidates should state this; however, it is not essential to have arranged this beforehand.

Visit Programme Webpage for Details

Commonwealth Shared Scholarship Scheme 2019/2020 for Study in UK Universities

Application Deadline: 14th March 2019 16.00 (GMT)

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: Bangladesh, Cameroon, Eswatini, The Gambia, Ghana, Guyana, India, Kenya, Kiribati, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Rwanda, Samoa, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tanzania, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia.

To be taken at (country): Various UK Universities. Download CSS prospectus 2019 in Program Webpage Link below for full list of participating universities and respective deadlines.

Accepted Subject Areas: Commonwealth Shared Scholarship scheme is for taught Master’s courses only. All courses undertaken must be demonstrably relevant to the economic, social or technological development of the candidate’s home country.

About Scholarship: The Commonwealth Shared Scholarships, set up by the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1986, represent a unique partnership between the United Kingdom government and UK universities. To date, more than 3,500 students from developing Commonwealth countries have been awarded Shared Scholarships.
UK universities have offered to support the scholarships by contributing the stipend for the students from their own resources, or those which the university has been able to generate from elsewhere.

Offered Since: 1986

Eligibility: To apply for a Commonwealth Shared Scholarship scheme, candidates must:
  • Be a citizen of or have been granted refugee status by an eligible Commonwealth country, or be a British Protected Person
  • Be permanently resident in an eligible Commonwealth country
  • Be available to start your academic studies in the UK by the start of the UK academic year in September/October 2019
  • By October 2019, hold a first degree of at least upper second class (2:1) standard, or a second class degree and a relevant postgraduate  qualification (usually a Master’s degree). The CSC would not normally fund a second UK Master’s degree. If you are applying for a second UK Master’s degree, you will need to provide justification as to why you wish to undertake this study.
  • Not have studied or worked for one (academic) year or more in a high income country
  • Be unable to afford to study in the UK without this scholarship
The CSC aims to identify talented individuals who have the potential to make change. We are committed to a policy of equal opportunity and non-discrimination, and encourage applications from a diverse range of candidates.

Selection: Each participating UK university will conduct its own recruitment process to select a specified number of candidates to be awarded Commonwealth Shared Scholarships. Universities must put forward their selected candidates to the CSC by 17 May 2018. The CSC will then confirm that these candidates meet the eligibility criteria for this scheme. Universities will inform candidates of their results by July 2018.

Selection criteria include:
  • Academic merit of the candidate
  • Potential impact of the work on the development of the candidate’s home country
Number of Scholarships: More than 200 scholarships

Scholarship value: The CSC funds the cost of tuition fees (at overseas rate), return airfares, and other allowances. Participating universities are required to support the student stipend for the award holder (at the rate set by the UK government).

Duration of scholarship: Awards are normally tenable for one-year taught postgraduate courses only.

How to Apply
  1. All applications must be made through your chosen university. You must check with your chosen university for their specific advice, admission requirements, and rules for applying. Some universities may require you to complete their own admissions application form as well, which may have a separate closing date. You must take the necessary steps to secure admission to your course at the same time as applying for a Shared Scholarship.
  2. You must make your application using the CSC’s Electronic Application System (EAS), in addition to any other application that you are required to complete by your chosen university.
  3. You can apply for more than one course and/or to more than one university, but you may only accept one offer of a Shared Scholarship.
  4. The CSC’s online application form is now open.

Visit Scholarship Webpage for Details

ICGEB Arturo Falaschi Fellowship 2019/2020 for Scientists in Developing Countries

Application Deadlines: 
  • Closing date for applications for PhDs: 31st March 2019
  • Closing dates for applications for Postdocs: 31st March and 30th September 2019
Eligible Countries: Developing Countries. See List below.

To be taken at (country): Trieste, New Delhi or Cape Town.

About the Award: Fellowships include participation in a competitive research programme, access to state-of-the-art facilities, participation in ICGEB Meetings, Seminars and Journal Clubs. A competitive stipend, travel provision plus full coverage of tuition fees and health insurance. Additional benefits for postdocs.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 
  • Applicants must be nationals of an ICGEB Member State and may not apply for fellowships to be undertaken in their country of origin, unless they have been working abroad for, at least, the last 3 years and at the time of application.
  • Degree requirements: applicants should hold a recent PhD in Life Sciences or have at least 3 years research experience.
  • Preference is given to candidates below the age of 35.
Selection Criteria: The ICGEB Fellowships Selection Committee will evaluate complete and endorsed applications received by the closing date. The main criteria for selection include scientific excellence of the project, the qualities of the candidate’s CV and potential benefit for the home country.

Selection: All submitted applications will be transmitted to the respective ICGEB Liaison Officer in the country of which you are a national for endorsement. Endorsement is a fundamental requirement for the Fellowship to be awarded

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Fellowship: The Fellowships consist of a very competitive package including stipend, health insurance and additional benefits. The most successful fellows will also be eligible, upon completion, to apply for ICGEB Early Career Research Grants to support their own research programmes as young PIs upon return to an ICGEB Member State.

Duration of Fellowship: 2 years with the possibility of a 1-year extension.

Eligible Countries: Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ivory Coast, Croatia, Cuba, Ecuador, Egypt, Eritrea, FYR Macedonia, Hungary, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, Montenegro, Morocco, Namibia, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela and Vietnam

How to Apply: To apply, Applicants should contact the ICGEB Group Leader/PI of their choice with a motivation letter, to determine availability of laboratory space and to define the research project proposal that will form an integral part of the application.

Visit Fellowship Webpage for details


Important Notes: ICGEB makes no financial provision, nor can it provide administrative support for family members of participants in the programme.

On the Brink of Brexit: the Only Thing Most People Outside Westminster Know About Brexit is That It’s a Mess

Patrick Cockburn

Government, parliament and parts of the media are obsessed by Brexit, almost to the exclusion of all else. The last few weeks have produced a cascade of apocalyptic warnings about the calamity facing Britain if it fails to depart the EU, or does so with or without a deal. These forebodings may or may not be true, but does this sense of crisis reflect the feelings of the British people as a whole?
Are there identifiable signs of popular rage and division similar to those that accompanied the Home Rule crisis of 1912-14, the Great Reform Bill of 1832 or even, as one cabinet minister claimed a few days ago, the English Civil War in the 17th century, in which at least 84,000 died on the battlefield? So far there is no evidence of anything like this, though that is not to say the confrontation over Brexit might not one day erupt into violence.
The media furore over a single MP being verbally abused outside parliament shows, contrary to overheated reportage, how quiet things have been on the streets up to the present moment.
A striking feature of news reporting and commentary in the final weeks before the British withdrawal from EU on 29 March is how narrowly focused it is on Westminster and on the sayings and doings of the political establishment.
Commenters have largely ignored what was supposed to be one of the lessons of the 2016 referendum, which was that London-based television, radio and newspapers were out of touch with the feelings of the country – a lack of understanding which led them to being surprised and shocked by the outcome of the vote.
To get a better understanding of what people are thinking on the eve of withdrawal or non-withdrawal, The Independent has conducted a series of in-depth interviews – for the purposes of the present article in Canterbury and Dover– in the places where voters plumped overwhelmingly for Leave and gave it its narrow majority nationally.
It is apparent from what people say that the near hysteria about Brexit in parliament, government and some news outlets is not yet widely shared by the mass of voters. Instead, there is perplexity and disengagement, though this could swiftly change.
Paula Spencer, who manages the community centre in the white working-class suburb of Thanington on the outskirts of Canterbury, says that locals are too taken up with the problems of daily living to talk much about Brexit. She says their expectations are low and they do not realistically see them improving, adding: “The worst thing for me is that you can have a father and mother both with jobs and they still can’t pay for their rent and food, though they are trying their bloody hardest.”
She says that many in Thanington only get through the month by relying on food banks, something which she imagined 10 years ago would stop once the financial crisis was over.
It was poorly educated people on low ages or benefits, living in areas like Thanington, who overwhelmingly voted to leave the EU.
Martin Rosenbaum, in a classic study of the referendum that drew on the breakdown of the vote by wards obtained through the Freedom of Information Act, confirms that it was older, poorly educated voters who were decisive in the poll. He writes that “the data confirms previous indications that local results were strongly associated with the educational attainment of voters – populations with lower qualifications were significantly more likely to vote Leave”.
Broadly speaking, every study of the results shows that it was the older and less qualified voters, particularly those living in poor, largely white housing estates, who put Leave on top on the night of the referendum.
The same pattern was repeated all over the country: the highest Leave vote anywhere in England and Wales was the 82.5 per cent in Brambles and Thorntree in Middlesbrough, a ward which has the lowest proportion of people with a university degrees or similar qualifications – just 4 per cent – anywhere in the country.
Nick Eden-Green, a Liberal Democratic councillor for Wincheap in Canterbury, the ward to which Thanington belongs, argues the reason that so many people from the area voted Leave was the same as in other deprived parts of east Kent.
“It was partly voters saying a plague on both your houses [when it came to the Conservatives, Labour and Lib Dem parties] and sod you shyster politicians,” he says. “Partly, it was fear of immigration: if you knock on doors people say ‘it is all these bloody illegals.’”
He says that for the present, those living in areas like Thanington are not talking much about Brexit, in sharp contrast to the better educated and the politically engaged. He asks: “Are people talking about Brexit? Among the ‘literati’ yes, but not here.”
People do not understand what is going on with Brexit other than that it is a mess; and Eden-Green finds their confusion perfectly understandable. He says: “I have spent a lot of my life in Europe and I speak French and German, but I still don’t know enough to decide what the country should be doing.”
Thanington locals say they do not know what to think, though they strongly suspect that nobody cares what they think, which was one of the main reasons they voted Leave in the first place.
Caroline Heggie, who has lived in the suburb since 1998, says that unlike most of her neighbours she voted Remain; but has stopped talking about Brexit. “The government don’t know what’s going to happen – how are we meant to know? I don’t know how it will affect me and I count myself as one of the more aware. I don’t understand the whole economic thing.”
She says that the main impression she gets is that there is an internal crisis in the government, which she says is “why we’re in this mess now”. She adds: “There’s a disconnect between what the government are doing and what the hell we’re going to do when it happens. I think most people here are in the ‘I don’t know’ category. As it happens, I haven’t found anyone who voted to Leave that has given me a good reason or argument or discussion on why they think it will benefit us. I believe the Leavers who voted have got less discussion than people who voted to Remain.”
Thanington is among the 20 per cent most deprived areas in Britain, though it does not look it. Residents and outsiders agree that it is fairly typical of other housing estates in East Kent. They praise its strong sense of community, saying that if a child is lost, everybody comes out to look for them. Nevertheless, words and phrases such as “deprivation” and “lack of qualifications” do not quite prepare one for the fact that this means hungry children and illiterate parents.
It is a shock to find that in Canterbury, where St Augustine came to convert the Anglo-Saxons and founded a school 1500 years ago, part of the population cannot read or write. Paula Spencer says she has “had people asking me to spell BBC for them so they can put it into Google because they can’t spell it themselves”.
A disconnect between Westminster and voters in places like Thanington stems from the fact that the former see the withdrawal from the EU in terms of national economic advantages and disadvantages. But the referendum and the anti-EU campaign was a vehicle for a multitude of grievances and discontents, many of them to do with the ravages of globalisation and privatisation, which have little to with the EU The slogan “Take Back Control” was notoriously effective because it scapegoated Brussels as responsible for failings that it had nothing to do with.
The views born out of this systematic demonisation are vividly illustrated by a widely circulated anti-EU online image entitled “40YRS EU RULE” under which is written “Ship building FINISHED, Coal mining FINISHED, Steel work FINISHED.”
Below that is a picture of a Union Jack with the words “Fishing DESTROYED” above it and “TRUTH” in large white letters on the face of the flag and, in smaller letters, “Currpt mps”. Below, railways, electricity, gas, BT, Royal Mail and water are listed as “SOLD!” and NHS as “BEING SOLD!” and a sidebar reads “Sovereignty going!”
The graphic shows the degree to which opposition to the EU is about much more than Britain’s relationship with Europe. It is, among many other things, an incoherent opposition to the status quo – in contrast to the Remainers, whose core supporters want things to stay roughly as they are. The symbolic nature of the Brexit vote makes it impossible to predict how people will react if Brexit is rejected or neutered beyond recognition.
But what if Brexit does falter or fall in the course of the next few weeks or months? Any Brexit deal will ultimately reflect the balance of political and economic power between Britain and the EU, in which British negotiators will invariably be overmatched. If there is an agreement, it will always be far from what the pro-Brexit camp had told their followers that they could get.
Theresa May’s deal already reflects this balance of power, which is not going to change. And whatever happens, the Brexit saga will go on for years and probably decades. Brexit will certainly hurt the UK – weakening links with your largest market is never a good idea for a commercial country – but the damage may well take the form of slow erosion rather than sudden collapse.
In the meantime, prophesies of the Wrath to Come if Brexit either falters or goes full steam ahead sound exaggerated, the grossest being that by the transport secretary Chris Grayling – not a man whose record in office encourages confidence in his judgement – who told Conservative MPs at the weekend that if they fail to produce some form of Brexit “we risk a break with the British tradition of moderate, mainstream politics that goes back to the Restoration in 1660”. Grayling apparently has not heard of the Popish plot or the Glorious Revolution of 1688.
On the other hand, Grayling may turn out to be like the little boy who called “Wolf!” to frighten his fellow villagers and was gobbled up when a real one came on the scene.
One reason Leave supporters do not want a second referendum is that they privately fear they would lose it. In 2016 they benefited from the chance coincidence of events favourable to their campaign; they may not be so lucky again. An accidental boost to their fortunes then came from enhanced fear of immigration, fueled by nightly television pictures of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees making their way to Europe.
The pathetic casualties of the Syrian war could be portrayed as all the more menacing because Isis was at the peak of its power in 2015-16, with its gunmen and suicide bombers massacring people in the heart of Paris and other European cities. Proponents of a second referendum may hope that polls showing hostility to migrants is ebbing are correct and immigration will have a less poisonous impact on a second poll.
The port of Dover, 17 miles south of Canterbury and 22 miles across the Channel from France, is a good place to see how far hostility to immigrants is really on the wane. Famed since medieval times as the “Gateway to England” and overlooked by Henry II’s magnificent castle, it is today a desolate place with job shortages, stagnant wages, low levels of education and a high street deserted by shopping chains.
Trucks carrying imports and exports worth £122bn a year rumble in and out of the port, but very little money rubs off on the local inhabitants.
Dover has been in the news recently with lurid accounts of the town being submerged by 10,000 HGVs unable to cross the Channel because of a no-deal Brexit. The only bright spot is that the possible return of a regime of permits and clearances at the port would require many more office workers to cope with the upsurge in paper work.
Less attention is given to the population of Dover itself, which voted Leave by a huge margin (40,410 to 24,606 Remain in the Dover local authority area). Immigration is a bigger issue there than in Thanington because of the presence of a substantial community of Slovakian Roma.
It is also along this part of the southeast coast of Kent that Iranian and Kurdish immigrants have being crossing the Channel in small dinghies. Their numbers are not large, but the dramatic nature of the dangerous voyage through the rough winter seas makes for good television.
It is well-publicised incidents like this that could reinvigorate immigration as an issue in much the same way as in 2016. One resident has a picture in his window of the White Cliffs, on which is written “CLOSED”.
Sam Hall, who has taught at a primary school in Dover for five years, says people she meets in the town “have bought into the rhetoric that there is a crisis [over the recent immigrant arrivals]. There is very little compassion. You may believe that the people coming here are desperate, but then you are desperate yourself.”
There is another aspect to the immigration issue in Dover revolving around the Slovakian Roma, who often do not speak English. Even those most sympathetic to them say they are peculiarly hard to communicate with. White parents express anger that scarce school resources are spent on teaching Slovakian Roma children to speak English.
Hall says: “The lies that were told on the Leave side during the referendum make it very easy for people to feel – when they see their town being left to rot – that we need to spend the money on ourselves.” She believes lack of education makes it easy for newspapers or politicians to persuade people that immigrants come to UK solely to live on benefits, take the jobs of local people, and get free treatment from the NHS.
“It is a real Project Fear,” she says, “it encourages the belief that if these immigrants are going to get more, then you are going to get less.”
Charlotte Cornell, the Labour candidate for Dover and Deal, says that people in the town feel not so much “left behind” as “left out”, excluded from “the political system that they feel can’t do them any worse.”
Though she voted Remain, she has an optimistic take on Brexit, arguing against a second poll, and seeing the referendum as “a vote for change”. She adds: “It’s a hope vote. This is two fingers up to the establishment – it’s a ‘this can’t be any worse for me’ vote.”
Appetite for change there may well be, but it is diffuse and its future direction is unpredictable. Dover may have a glorious past based on its strategic position: the headquarters for the Dunkirk evacuation were in tunnels in the White Cliffs that rise above the town. But its recent history has been one of decline.
Hall says parents and children are unable to break the grim cycle of poor jobs and poor prospects that consumes each generation and which is combined with a dispiriting conviction that education will not do much to improve the lives of their children.
“I think people who live in Dover feel cross and unheard,” she says. “There is this sort of anger and apathy going together and even if I try to have more fact-based conversations [about immigration and Brexit] I don’t connect with them because they are so cross.”
At this stage, the crisis in Britain is primarily at the level of the political class. It is bizarre that senior officials in the government say in private, as a matter of fact, that Britain is inevitably going to be weaker and poorer if the government achieves its aim of leaving the EU. They are aghast at seeing old alliances being thoughtlessly thrown away and the “Irish Question”, which convulsed British politics for centuries, being fecklessly reopened.
The educated classes are deeply worried and demoralised, but don’t know what to do to avert the inevitable shipwreck. As for the millions who voted for Brexit in order to change the status quo, their hopes and expectations are likely to end in frustration because so much of what they were promised will prove to be snake oil pledges that can never be delivered.
It is only when this becomes clear that we will begin to learn if the proponents of Leave are going to respond to disappointment with apathy or with rage.

Migrants in Australia hit by longer welfare wait

Martin Scott 

Workers and young people in the Sydney suburb of Auburn are among tens of thousands of migrants who will now face a wait of four years before they can receive welfare payments.
New measures that came into effect on January 1 doubled the previous waiting period for access to basic support payments including Newstart, Youth Allowance, Mobility Allowance, Sickness Allowance, and the Low Income Health Care Card.
Depriving immigrants of access to social services is a blatant attack on an already vulnerable layer, and will expose them to even greater exploitation in the workforce.
The western Sydney suburb of Auburn is the first port of call for many new arrivals to Australia. Some 70 percent of Auburn’s 37,366 residents were born overseas, and over 90 percent have at least one parent who was born overseas.
Auburn has the lowest median taxable income of any suburb in Sydney. Essential social services such as health and education have been run down and do not meet the needs of a population that has increased by more than 40 percent since 2001.
Speaking about the longer wait for welfare, Ken, a 17-year-old Auburn resident, told our reporters: “It’s not fair really. They come here to seek better conditions and they’re just kicked down more. There’s too much government support for the middle class and not enough for the working class.
“You have things like negative gearing to help with paying off investment properties; that’s just giving money to people who already have money. That could be spent on improving public services—the buses are awful, and schools could do better.”
Although the suburb is home to approximately 3,000 young people aged between 12 and 17, there is just one public high school in Auburn, and it is only for girls. Ken explained that he had a 20-minute commute each way to go to his high school in Parramatta, which was “not productive” and was taking away from his education.
“Particularly in my neighbourhood, there’s a few disadvantaged families. The parents don’t speak a word of English, and what you see is then the children suffer. I had this with some classmates of mine coming to school not really caring, because at home they’re struggling.
“What I personally believe is it’s because they don’t speak the language, they’re not getting the support they need from the government, they’re being exploited by unsympathetic bosses and potentially not getting the best possible conditions of work.”
At the time of the 2016 census, 12.7 percent of Auburn residents were unemployed, more than twice the figure for the state of New South Wales as a whole. Furthermore, only 49.1 percent of those with jobs were working full-time, compared to 59.2 percent for the state.
Auburn worker Ben came to Australia from India five years ago, initially to study, but subsequently applied for permanent residency. “Even though I’m well qualified—I’ve done my Bachelor’s and my Master’s—I’m still finding difficulty finding a job. I have experience from back home, but I’m still doing retail jobs, part-time, casual.”
As a recent migrant, Ben is not eligible to receive welfare payments. “It’s quite difficult for people who have not got it yet, it’s going to be very difficult [when the waiting period is increased]. They’ve spent a lot of money, they’ve paid a lot of taxes, but they can’t get the welfare. It’s unfair,” he said.
Ben said many migrants he knew were forced into poorly-paid casual or part-time employment. “Most of them, if they have found jobs, they’re reluctant to find something better, because, what they’ve got, they just want to stay put no matter what the work conditions are. No one complains after you get a job, whatever the conditions.”
Auburn Diversity Services Incorporated (ADSi) is a non-profit organisation funded by grants from the Department of Social Services, and tasked with helping refugees and other vulnerable migrants settle in Australia.
Almost half of ADSi’s clients are from Afghanistan, and are fleeing brutal conditions created by years of imperialist war and occupation, led by the US, and fully supported by successive Australian governments.
Aynalem Tessema, ADSi’s assistant manager of settlement and engagement, told the WSWS that the increased waiting period for welfare would make it “very hard for many people, especially when they come across financial crisis.”
While refugees are exempt from the increase, like many Australians they find the welfare payments to be woefully lacking. “$600 [per week] cannot pay for the rent. How can they afford rent and buy food?” he said.
Pointing to the difficulties facing refugees, Tessema commented: “Migrants have to escape for various reasons—war, political reasons, and oppression. Most of them come from a low education background.”
With minimal English skills, and little education, many migrants encounter difficulty finding employment. “To find a job is very difficult. When many people come to this country, they need a licence to begin some jobs for which they may already be qualified. Recognition of previous qualifications is something we’ve raised with governments,” he said.
Migrants arriving in Auburn confront an acute crisis of housing affordability and availability. The median weekly rent in the suburb is $530 for a house, or $445 for a unit. In the last three years the average rent for a unit in Auburn has increased by 13.9 percent (compared to only 3.6 percent across Sydney), and the vacancy rate is just 2.1 percent (3.2 percent in Sydney as a whole).
Agencies like ADSi rely on short term government funding. ADSi’s manager of capacity building, Justin Han explained: “There are fluctuations; we got 28 percent less funding than last year. There is always a lack of money to meet all the needs of new arrivals. Still there are service gaps for asylum seekers. We cannot provide services to them.”
Last November Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced a further reduction in the number of migrants who would be granted permanent residency, claiming voters were “concerned about population.” Blaming immigrants for failing infrastructure, he said “the roads are clogged, the buses and trains are full. The schools are taking no more enrollments.”
In reality, it is not “migrants” and “population” but capitalism that is responsible for the lack of social and physical infrastructure. Urban expansion driven by profit has placed a crippling burden on education, health, and transport facilities. Privatisation of utilities, public transport, roads, and airports has contributed to the sky-rocketing cost of living. Rampant property speculation has put housing prices out of reach of workers, forcing them to move to cheaper suburbs without adequate schools, hospitals, public transport, and employment opportunities.
All of this is very evident in suburbs like Auburn, where many new migrants are forced because they cannot afford to live elsewhere.

Spain: Socialist Party government arrests Catalan activists

Alejandro López

National Police under the direct control of Spain’s Socialist Party (PSOE) government arrested 16 Catalan pro-independence activists last Wednesday in the city of Girona.
The arrests signal a further shift to the right by the PSOE. They were carried out following last month’s shock result in elections in Andalusia, which saw the party ousted after 36 years of rule and came on the same day a Popular Party (PP)–Citizens coalition government, supported by the fascistic Vox party, was established in the region.
All three right-wing parties had been demanding tougher action against Catalan separatists, including banning the main nationalist parties—the Catalan European Democratic Party (PDeCAT), the Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC) and the much smaller Candidatures of Popular Unity (CUP).
They condemned Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez for talking with the Catalan government and told him to take direct control of the region, as Mariano Rajoy’s PP government did in 2017 with Sánchez’s backing, by again invoking Article 155 of Spain’s 1978 constitution.
The illegal and anti-democratic arrests were designed to intimidate and isolate the more hard-line nationalists, who continue to agitate for Catalonia to break away from Spain. They are aimed at putting pressure on the two main nationalist parties to end all talk of resurrecting the independence process and settle for increased funding and greater autonomy for the region. Among those arrested during the police raids were a nephew of Catalan regional premier, Quim Torra, two CUP local mayors and members of the Committees for the Defence of the Republic (CDRs), Catalan National Assembly (ANC), La Forja (a secessionist youth organization linked to the CUP) and Student Union of the Catalan Countries (SEPC).
They were all arrested in relation to the events on October 1, 2018, when some 400 people blocked AVE high-speed train lines in Girona for around two hours to commemorate the one-year anniversary of the Catalan independence referendum.
The arrests were carried out on the initiative of the Information Brigade of the Spanish National Police. This was done without the necessary authority of the judge of the Criminal Court of Girona, who is investigating the alleged public disorder crimes that day, or the involvement of the regional Catalan police, the Mossos, which is the organization responsible for matters of public order.
Akin to an anti-terror operation, plainclothes police wearing balaclavas swooped in on the individuals and whisked them away in unmarked cars. CUP mayor, Ignacio Sabater, was transferred to a medical centre due to injury suffered during the arrest.
Those arrested were interrogated about their participation in the events and asked to identify individuals in photographs before being released.
Lawyer Benet Salellas, representing the two CUP mayors, told La Directa that “the operation does not seem justified because there have been no previous appointments [requested by the police], the crime is not serious enough and the detainees have known addresses.” Salellas was denied access to his clients “until they addressed the officers in Spanish,” a clear violation of the law.
An arrested photojournalist, Carles Palacio, who works for various pro-independence newspapers, explained to the police that he was clearly working in the photo he was shown, as was evident by his orange media armband and camera. Palacio was taken into custody after covering the arrests earlier in the day and as he was leaving a cafe alongside well-known fellow Catalan photojournalist and expert on far-right movements, Jordi Borràs.
The International Committee of the Fourth International (ICFI) warned that the state mobilisation against the separatists was being utilised as a pretext to build a police-state regime, which would inevitably then target the rising militancy and strikes in the working class. The new year has been greeted by large corporations with the announcement of massive layoffs in the coming months, including Vodafone, Santander, CaixaBank, Naturgy, LiberBank, Bankinter, Unicaja, Ikea, H & M, Land Rover and Ford.
The PSOE and Sanchez are more than willing not only to accede to the demand for stepped-up repression in Catalonia, but to turn ruthlessly against the entire Spanish working class. After the Andalusian election, PSOE regional candidate Susana Díaz cynically blamed her defeat on the lack of “Catalan-bashing” during her campaign. PSOE regional premier of Castilla-La Mancha, Emiliano García-Page, raised the prospect of banning secessionist parties. Last week, a motion proposed by the PP in the regional parliament of Extremadura—calling for Catalan self-rule to be once again suspended and for a “firm” and “broad” application of Article 155—was passed with the support of the PSOE.
Brandishing the stick of arrests and prosecutions, Sánchez is also using the threat of possible PP-Citizens-Vox success in May’s European Union elections and the 2020 general election to cajole the Catalan nationalists into agreeing his 2019 draft budget. He has also offered a significant rise in spending for Catalonia as a carrot—over €2 billion from central government plus another €200 million for infrastructure.
If the nationalists fail to support the budget, Sánchez has threatened to call snap elections, which could bring into power a right-wing coalition government pledged to suspending Catalan autonomy. In such elections, the Catalan nationalists would be blamed by the PSOE for refusing to back a budget which includes limited increases in social expenditure.
To date PDeCAT and the ERC have refused to back the budget, citing the impending trial of 18 Catalan secessionist leaders charged with rebellion and sedition for their part in organising the Catalan independence referendum on October 1, 2017. Nine of the 18 Catalan political prisoners remain in jail, including former vice president of Catalonia, Oriol Junqueras, former foreign minister Raul Romeva, and ex-interior minister Joaquim Forn.
The public prosecutor has requested a joint total 177 years prison sentence, including 25 years for Junqueras, the highest individual proposed sentence. Last week, Spain’s Supreme Court ordered the nine to be transferred from Catalan prisons to Madrid before the end of January.
However, despite their public intransigence over the fate of its former leaders the Catalan government’s vice premier, Pere Aragones, and spokeswoman, Elsa Artadi, met with Spain’s Deputy Prime Minister Carmen Calvo in Madrid to pursue talks on the region’s future initiated by Sánchez. They agreed to maintain “an effective dialogue which will lead to a political proposal which has widespread support among Catalan society.”
That the moderate Catalan secessionist camp is ready to sacrifice its radical wing—CUP, CDRs and elements within the ANC—was shown by its muted response to the arrests. The Catalan government announced it would only “file a complaint against the police actions,” saying the detentions are illegal as they were not ordered by a court.
There is broad opposition to the rightward shift in Spanish politics and the attack on democratic rights, which has resulted in a deep polarisation in the country. But the left-wing opposition to the PSOE and the PP is suppressed by the reactionary role of Podemos in supporting the PSOE government and promoting Sánchez as a progressive figure. Podemos General Secretary Pablo Iglesias makes no secret of his hopes for a permanent PSOE-Podemos alliance in government.
As the ICFI warned in its statement “Oppose the state crackdown on the Catalan independence referendum!” on the eve of the 2017 vote, “The Catalan crisis has yet again exposed the Podemos party’s reactionary role. … Podemos is still calling for an alliance with the PSOE, even as the PSOE supports the PP’s onslaught in Catalonia.”
The ICFI warned that Podemos was “signalling the ruling class that it is also available to form an alternate government. … Such a government, were it to be formed, would offer no alternative to the drive to dictatorship and austerity currently being prosecuted by the PP.”

German lawyer receives additional threatening fax from the far right

Marianne Arens

German lawyer Basay-Yildiz has received another message threatening her and her family. The fax signed “NSU 2.0” apparently originates from the neo-Nazi network located in Germany’s police apparatus, which first sent the lawyer a similar fax in August of last year. The existence of second threatening fax signed with “NSU 2.0” was reported by the Süddeutsche Zeitung.
Basay-Yildiz defended the Simsek family over a period of five years during the trial of the National Socialist Underground (NSU) terror group, which murdered at least 10 people between 2000 and 2006. An investigation into the first fax sent revealed the existence of a far-right chat group in the Frankfurt city police, which exchanged images of Hitler and swastikas. A policewoman involved in the group evidently used a police computer to retrieve the details of Ms. Basay-Yildiz, her family and their home address. In December, six police officers, five of them from police station No. 1 in Frankfurt, were suspended from the service.
The second message leaves no doubt that those behind the fax are either in touch with the police or are themselves police officers. The direct link to the Hessian police is clear from the passage in the second fax, which reads: “You...[vile obscenities] are obviously unaware of what you have done to our police colleagues.”
In the fax, the lawyer is insulted racially and once again her two-year-old daughter is threatened with death. Other close relatives—her husband, mother and father—are called by their real names. These names can only come from a police computer because they were never circulated on social networks.
The extreme right-wing authors of the faxes can obviously rely on protection from the highest political circles. The second fax arrived on December 20, just one day after a meeting of the Interior Special Committee investigating the police scandal. The Hessian interior minister, Peter Beuth (Christian Democratic Union, CDU), failed, however, to inform parliament or even his own committee, let alone the public, about the new fax. It was only made public after the lawyer personally contacted the Süddeutsche Zeitung last week.
Beuth was aware of the threats directed against the lawyer and her two-year-old daughter by the self-proclaimed “NSU 2.0” at the beginning of August, when the first fax arrived, but the case was kept secret for months. This was required, according to the investigating authority, “in order not to jeopardise the investigation.” More than five months later, the case has still to be resolved and the perpetrators remain at large.
Beuth has acted in similar fashion to his predecessor, Volker Bouffier (CDU), who is currently premier of Hesse. Following the murder of Halit Yozgat by the NSU in Kassel in 2006, Bouffier kept silent about the fact that a German undercover agent, Andreas Temme, was present at the murder scene. He also failed to inform the parliamentary interior committee.
In addition, the state of Hesse does not appear to be lifting a finger today to protect Ms. Basay-Yildiz. The police merely suggested “that I could have a gun licence to protect myself,” she told the Süddeutsche Zeitung. “Of course, the question arises: Do I need a weapon in Germany? What for?”
The reaction of leading politicians is also instructive. Just a few days ago, they were all rushing to issue statements of solidarity for far-right AfD deputy Frank Magnitz, who had blown out of all proportion an attack on him by persons unknown. All of the politicians who publicly defended Magnitz—federal Interior Minister Heiko Maas, federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier (both SPD), Cem Özdemir (Green Party) and many others—have not said a single word in solidarity with Ms. Basay-Yildiz.
Meanwhile, it has been revealed that another lawyer, Cologne attorney Mustafa Kaplan, has also received a threatening letter signed “NSU 2.0.” Kaplan was also involved in the NSU lawsuit as a lawyer on behalf of the victims. He represented one of the victims of a nail bomb attack in Cologne on June 9, 2004. He and his family were both threatened in the letter.
More and more evidence has emerged to reveal the close connection between the police and right-wing extremist groups. These incidents are not, as politicians claim, “unfortunate individual cases.”
Last week, at the trial in Halle, Saxony, of a heavily armed, right-wing extremist couple, it was reported that the woman was apparently a friend of a policeman in Hesse and had received information from a police computer. The woman belongs to a group of so-called “Aryans,” who, on May 1, 2017, had attacked and beaten up alleged enemies—in fact, uninvolved hikers—in the town of Halle.
Once again, the Hesse Ministry of the Interior confirmed “ongoing investigations,” but said that the policeman concerned had shown “no signs of right-wing extremism” and had been transferred to Lower Saxony, and that the case has nothing to do with the investigation in Halle. Nevertheless, the apparent links between a police officer and a far-right, violent criminal are highly suspect.
In Frankfurt, police station No. 1 apparently has major problems with right-wing police violence. A video of a police check from December 9 documents an unprovoked and violent assault carried out by officers at the city’s main police station. The video was made public by the Frankfurter Rundschau. Police station No. 1 is responsible for the main station. When the police found out that their actions had been filmed, they dragged the young man who recorded the video, along with others, to the station and threatened to beat him up if he failed to reveal his cell phone pin.
Nevertheless, Interior Minister Beuth repeatedly intones that there is “no evidence of a right network” in the Hesse police. Although he is responsible as minister for the activities of the extreme right in the police, he remains in office in the newly formed state government, a coalition of the conservative CDU and the Greens.
The Greens continue to support Beuth as interior minister. They have proven to be reliable partners of the CDU and support a powerful state apparatus. In their coalition agreement, they agreed together with the CDU on new measures to intimate those who demonstrate. In future, the new law will allow the police to film all participants at a demonstration by helicopter, mini-drone or cameras mounted on autos. The law also includes a ban on “militant and intimidating behavior.” The prohibition of uniforms and attempts at disguise in the previous law were insufficient, according to Jürgen Frömmrich, the parliamentary faction leader of the Greens. The new law was a “shining star” in the coalition agreement, he gushed.
The Left Party also turns to the state and the police itself when it comes to dealing with the activities of the neo-Nazis in the ranks of the police. According to Left Party interior spokesman Hermann Schaus: “I really hope that the police who apparently issued the personal data from the police computer are intensively investigated and interviewed.”
This statement reveals the utterly bankrupt orientation of the Left Party: It appeals to the same state that shields those responsible for the crimes of the far right and provides the greatest support for the AfD. It is no accident that the Left Party has taken up the demands of the other parties for domestic rearmament. In its 2017 Bundestag election programme, the Left Party had already called for more police, better police equipment and more surveillance, and wrote: “Many people want more security and to be able to better contact the police.”
The behaviour of the Left Party recalls the petty-bourgeois democrats of the 1930s. In the Transitional Programme of 1938, Leon Trotsky wrote: “The reformists systematically implant in the minds of the workers the notion that the sacredness of democracy is best guaranteed when the bourgeoisie is armed to the teeth and the workers are unarmed.”

US drug company payments to doctors linked to opioid overdose deaths

Brian Dixon

study published last week in JAMA Network Open found that counties where doctors received payments from drug companies later experienced higher rates of overdose deaths from opioids.
A number of previous studies have established a link between drug company payments (even as small as purchasing a lunch) and doctor prescribing behavior. Some prior research has examined the marketing of opioid products and mortality rates.
The JAMA Network Open study, however, is the first to link mortality rates with the total marketing of opioid products based on US county-level data, although the researchers are careful to note that they have only established an association, not causation.
Opioid mortality rates and marketing dollars. Source: JAMA Network Open
The study drew data from three national databases. Data on overdoses for all counties was derived from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Wide-Ranging Online Data for Epidemiological Research Restricted-Use Mortality Files. Data on drug company payments to doctors came from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Open Payment database. Finally, data on opioid prescribing rates dispensed at retail pharmacies came from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention National Center for Injury Prevention and Control.
According to the study, drug companies made 434,754 payments (totaling $39.7 million) to 67,507 doctors for non-research-based opioid marketing between August 1, 2013 and December 31, 2015.
The study used three measures of opioid marketing across counties (total marketing money, number of payments per capita, and number of physicians receiving any marketing per capita) and found an association between all three measures and opioid prescribing rates and overdose mortality.
The study notes that while it is possible that drug companies simply targeted areas for marketing that already had high rates of overdose mortality, the tens of millions of dollars invested by drug companies in direct-to-physician marketing makes it “improbable that companies would provide payments to physicians if such marketing did not either increase prescribing rates or maintain high levels of opioid prescribing.”
Moreover, the study notes that recent attempts to address this issue by placing a dollar cap on the amount that doctors can receive is unlikely to make a difference because even small payments can impact prescribing behavior.
“What seems to matter most wasn’t the amount of money doctors were paid, it was the number of times they were paid,” Magdelena Cerdá, the director of the Center for Opioid Epidemiology and Policy at the New York University School of Medicine, told the Washington Post.
The publication of the study comes amid recent reports highlighting the devastating impact of the opioid epidemic in the United States.
Lifetime Odds of Dying from Selected Causes. Source: National Safety Council
Last week the nonprofit National Safety Council issued a study that found for the first time that individuals are now more likely to die from an accidental opioid overdose than in a motor vehicle crash. The odds of accidentally dying from an opioid overdose are 1 in 96, exceeding the odds for dying in a car accident (1 in 103), dying from an accidental fall (1 in 114), gun assaults (1 in 285) or drowning (1 in 1,117).
Rates of drug overdose deaths by state, US 2017. Source: CDC
According to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), an average of 103 Americans die each day from opioid overdoses. In 2017, 70,237 people died from drug overdoses, with 68 percent of deaths (47,600) associated with opioids.
Moreover, a recent study by the CDC found that drug overdose deaths among middle-aged American women have increased by 260 percent since 1999. The increase was particularly stark among women between the ages of 55 and 64, who saw an astounding 500 percent increase in overdose deaths.
The opioid epidemic is largely the result of the unscrupulous marketing practices of drug manufacturers like Purdue Pharma and Insys Therapeutics, along with the major drug distributors —such as McKesson, Cardinal Health and Amerisource Bergen—who flooded communities with opioids and ignored the diversion of prescription painkillers to the black market though numerous “pill mills.”
A recent court filing has shed further light on the role played by Purdue Pharma, which is owned by the Sackler family.
Filed by the attorney general of Massachusetts last week, the court filing cites internal company documents from Purdue Pharma that implicate the Sackler family in the dishonest and aggressive marketing of Oyxcontin. Prior to this filing, the Sacklers, who maintain a veneer of respectability through their philanthropic activities, had succeeded in distancing themselves from the actions of their company.
According to the filing, members of the Sackler family, who in 2016 had an estimated wealth of $13 billion, were more intimately involved than previously acknowledged.
The company’s aggressive marketing tactics were presaged in a statement made by Richard Sackler, the company’s president from 1999 to 2003, at a company gathering shortly after OxyContin’s approval in 1995, claiming that “the launch of OxyContin tablets will be followed by a blizzard of prescriptions that will bury the competition. The prescription blizzard will be so deep, dense, and white.”
Sackler sought to shift the blame of addiction from their aggressive and misleading marketing of the highly addictive drug to those who use and abuse their drug.
“We have to hammer on abusers in every way possible,” Sackler wrote in a 2001 e-mail. “They are the culprits and the problem. They are reckless criminals.”
When a federal prosecutor raised concerns over 59 deaths in his state from Oxycontin, Sackler wrote to company executives in 2001, dismissing the figures as “not too bad. It could have been far worse.”
Sackler family members were also aware of Purdue’s failure to alert criminal authorities to abuses of its drug.
And while the Sackler family members had resigned their operating posts by 2007, Richard Sackler continued to be involved in the company’s operations, with a company sales official complaining in a 2012 email of his overbearing involvement in Purdue’s sales and marketing activities.
Although the company has faced numerous lawsuits for its role in creating the opioid epidemic—including a 2007 settlement in which the company paid fines of $643.5 million and top executives pleaded guilty to federal criminal charges—the Sackler family has so far avoided any accountability for their role.