Elite factions struggle for control of Philippine legislature

John Malvar

In mid-October, two rival factions in Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte's super majority in the House of Representatives fought for control of the legislature. At stake in the dispute was political patronage, control over the distribution of committee appointments and of funds, which both sides were looking to secure as an opening salvo in the 2022 presidential race.

During his four years in office, Duterte has engaged in the gradual expansion of authoritarianism. He has encroached upon the legislature, shut down major media outlets, declared martial law in the southern island of Mindanao, and launched a fascistic campaign of police and paramilitary violence against the poor in the name of a "war on drugs."

Throughout this period, as he has stripped away basic constitutional and democratic rights, Duterte has received the support of a historically unprecedented super majority in the legislature. Duterte's own party, PDP-Laban, is a minority party and has been losing members. His hold on power rests upon the support that has been given to him by nearly every faction of the ruling elite and their various political parties.

Duterte reviewing troops (Credit: Presidential Communications Operations Office)

The super majority behind Duterte expresses the consensus in the Philippine ruling class that authoritarian and fascistic forms of rule are necessary to preserve their interests against the threat of unrest. The staggering levels of social inequality in the country, now compounded by the mass suffering produced by the Covid-19 pandemic, have created the conditions for an explosion of mass anger.

There is likewise, at present, consensus within the super majority for Duterte's policy of improved ties with Beijing at the expense of relations with Washington. Duterte has launched a massive infrastructure program, under the name "Build, Build, Build," looking to better integrate the country's regional economies for international investment. He is looking to secure investment from Beijing to fund these projects and has distanced himself from Washington's aggressive military and diplomatic offensive against China.

As the social crisis sharpens and as the apparatus of authoritarianism expands, tensions have mounted within the super majority, which comprises rival sets of capitalist interests. None of them is opposed to dictatorial forms of rule, but they are all looking to have their hands on the helm of the state. The question of the May 2022 presidential election looms large.

Over the past year, two significant blocs emerged within the super majority forming behind rival contenders for Speaker of the House of Representatives: Alan Peter Cayetano and Lord Allan Velasco. Lord is in fact his name and not his title.

Cayetano has presidential aspirations and is poised to run in 2022. Behind Cayetano is the support of Manny Villar's Nacionalista Party and the National Unity Party. Villar is a billionaire real estate tycoon whose economic interests are clearly expressed in Duterte’s infrastructure policy and geopolitical rebalancing.

Duterte sought the support of this faction of the elite in 2016 when he made Cayetano his running mate. Cayetano was defeated in the Vice Presidential race and Duterte appointed him Secretary of Foreign Affairs. With his eye on the presidential palace of Malacanang in 2022, Cayetano resigned as Foreign Affairs Secretary in 2018 and ran for Congress, looking to become Speaker of the House.

Cayetano’s rival Velasco has the support of the Nationalist People's Coalition, behind which stands Ramon Ang, a billionaire tycoon and head of the powerful San Miguel Corporation. The San Miguel Corporation is largest corporation in terms of revenue and controls a substantial portion of food and beverage production, real estate and infrastructure.

Seeking to hold the super majority together, and demonstrating his control over the pliant legislature, Duterte brokered a gentleman’s agreement in 2019. Cayetano would serve as Speaker of the House for 15 months and Velasco would follow him for the remaining 21.

October 2020 marked the agreed upon transition between Cayetano and Velasco, in the midst of ongoing deliberations over the 2021 national budget. Whoever controls the speakership in 2021 will be able to appoint the heads of various influential legislative committees and oversee the doling out of pork barrel funds. This sort of patronage is a critical component of the preparations for the presidential election of 2022.

One the leading aspirants for Malacanang is Sarah Duterte, the influential daughter of the president and current mayor of Davao. Velasco is lining up behind Sarah Duterte’s campaign, while Cayetano is looking to head his own ticket. Factions are beginning to form behind these two rivals.

Former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, herself long associated with realigning Philippine foreign policy toward Beijing, is lining up behind Sarah Duterte.

In early October, looking to extend his control of the speakership in defiance of the gentleman's agreement of 2019, Cayetano abruptly concluded the House’s second reading of the budget and sent the legislature into an early recess. It was not scheduled to reconvene until November 16 and the budget, with its emergency Covid-19 provisions, remained unapproved.

Duterte gave a speech on October 8 declaring that if Congress did not resolve its impasse and “pass the budget and constitutionally” he would “do it for them.” Duterte was openly threatening to suspend the constitution.

With the legislature padlocked, Velasco convened 186 legislators out of the total 299 members of the House, at the Celebrity Sports Club, where they voted to make him Speaker of the House. Arroyo’s Lakas-CMD party proved to be the decisive swing vote in securing a majority for the speakership for Velasco.

Deputy Speaker Neptali Gonzales II, aligned with Cayetano, declared that the gathering was a “rump and illegal session” in which the rules of the House did not apply.

Duterte intervened and declared his support for Velasco as Speaker. Recognizing which way the wind was blowing, the minority opposition Liberal Party of Vice President Leni Robredo, looking to not be completely cut off from the spoils, threw its support behind Velasco.

Duterte summoned a special session of Congress from October 13 to 16 to resume deliberations on the 2021 national budget, which voted for the budget to go on to the Senate.

Both Velasco and Cayetano issued public apologies, not to the Filipino people, but to the President. Velasco declared that he was upholding “the word of honor of our beloved President Duterte.” Cayetano groveled, “Mr. President, if I made a mistake, my reading was wrong, I misunderstood that you want to continue and finish the budget, I apologize. It was not my intention—not to follow you.”

Velasco then staged a photo op with his majority bloc posed with the fascistic raised fist salute of Duterte.

There is no democratic content to the faction fight in the Philippine legislature. Neither side of the super majority, nor the minority bourgeois opposition, is opposed to Duterte’s authoritarianism. Rival factions of the elite are engaged in a struggle over patronage rights in the year before an election. The stakes are particularly high because everyone knows that dictatorship may be imminent. Whoever secures Malacanang in 2022 may stay there for a very long time and may turn the apparatus of the state against their political rivals.

New York City workers and students reject school reopenings through mass absenteeism

Alberto Escalera

The massive opposition of New York City parents and students to Democratic Mayor Bill de Blasio’s school reopening plan has found expression in high rates of absenteeism throughout the largest school district in the United States.

According to newly released attendance data, only 26 percent of the city’s 1.1 million public school students are attending in-person classes. This figure represents a significant drop from the estimated 500,000 families the city Department of Education (DOE) officially counts as participating in its so-called “blended learning” models. These models bring students into school buildings between one and three days a week and are highly unsafe, exposing hundreds of thousands to possible infection from COVID-19.

This mass absenteeism does not represent an organized movement. Rather, it reflects the spontaneous repudiation by the vast majority of working class families with school-aged children of the fraudulent claim advanced by city Democrats, and supported by the United Federation of Teachers (UFT), that schools can safely reopen with in-person classes in the midst of a pandemic.

Salome Urena Henriquez School (Credit: Wikimedia)

Noemi Peña, a parent of a public school student, told the New York Times, “Parents in NYC voted and spoke with their feet.” This assessment coincides with descriptions by city educators of school buildings as “ghost towns,” particularly at middle and high schools.

Despite confronting mass opposition from educators, parents and students, de Blasio has doubled down on his efforts to cast New York City as a model for other large urban districts throughout the country to reopen with in-person classes. Commenting Monday on the low numbers of students showing up to school buildings, de Blasio stated, “A lot more kids could be attending in person and we want to make sure that their families know.”

These comments follow a recent media blitz in which de Blasio appeared on several news outlets last week in a cynical effort to use the city’s woefully inadequate testing regime to highlight low positivity rates within city schools and push for in-person classes.

Even if one were to solely consider the 26 percent of students that are actually attending in-person classes along with the teaching staff currently reporting to school buildings, the 16,000 people currently receiving weekly tests in schools would only account for five percent of the in-person school population, well below the 10-20 percent to which the city committed. Additionally, the low positivity rate data within city schools recently touted by the Mayor omits nearly 400 DOE staff and students that tested positive before limited weekly testing began on October 9.

Significantly, school safety agents, cafeteria workers, custodial staff and bus drivers are not included in school-based testing, despite coming into regular contact with students and all other staff.

Equally revealing is the accuracy of the tests being used. According to one worker with the NYC Test & Trace Corps who recently oversaw the administration of nasal swab tests to students and school staff at a high school in Queens, the tests being used by the DOE are only 35-55 percent accurate.

De Blasio promoted these misleading statistics amid a sharp rise in infection rates, hospitalizations and deaths throughout the US and the world, as well as the resurgence of hot-spots within New York City and its surrounding areas. Forty-five schools in Brooklyn remain closed because of high positivity rates in their neighborhoods. De Blasio, nevertheless, intensified his push for students to return to school buildings on Monday with the announcement that the DOE would initiate an opt-in period for families to switch from remote to in-person learning between November 2-15.

In an email the same day to principals announcing the opt-in window, top DOE officials made clear their intent to herd students back into unsafe schools, stating, “Superintendents, Executive Superintendents and Central DOE will begin supporting schools to ensure as many students as possible are accommodated for blended learning. We will also be sharing this information widely with families and we ask that you please share the information with families as well.”

The promotion of in-person classes has coincided with systematic efforts to undermine remote learning. Seven months after city schools initially closed in March, the DOE was forced to recognize that nearly 200,000 students remain without laptops and other equipment necessary for remote learning. Problems with internet access persist as well, particularly among the 115,000 public school students currently living in the city’s shelter system.

Many students and teachers also report remote class sizes in excess of 40 pupils, with some that reach 60 students. Recently released statistics show that only about 85 percent of students registered for remote learning are logging into virtual classes.

The pandemic cannot be contained while school buildings are opened, and education cannot proceed with inadequate, underfunded remote learning that puts intolerable pressure on educators.

The dismal attendance rates show that New York City’s working-class parents and youth have rejected the “herd immunity” program of the Democrats, Republicans, and the trade unions to force people back to work and into schools to maintain the profits of the very wealthy. The city, state and federal governments will do the bidding of the corporations and seek to force students back to school and parents back to work.

The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly in India-China Nuclear Relations

Manpreet Sethi

India-China nuclear relations are unique and complex. China refuses to recognise India as a nuclear weapons state (NWS), though there is no denying the reality of India’s nuclear weapons. In fact, this has been accepted by the international community as illustrated by India’s accommodation into the non-proliferation regime. So, China’s objections to India’s nuclear status is a political issue. However, the geopolitical circumstances of the two countries—conjoined by geography and separated by historically incomplete border demarcations—add a risky dimension to their existence as nuclear neighbours. Unresolved territorial disputes result in frequent border skirmishes that have the potential to escalate.

It is therefore in the interest of both to acknowledge the nuclear relationship and find ways to address risks. Can they do so? The answer to this question lies in understanding the good, bad, and ugly dimensions that simultaneously characterise this relationship.

The good in India-China relations can be seen in the sense of nuclear stability that both countries are able to engender despite tensions created by territorial issues. This is evident in the current military stand-off that has been ongoing for almost six months now. Yet, neither has drawn attention to their nuclear weapons despite the unprecedented violence that broke out at the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in June 2020, in which both sides lost lives for the first time in decades. Considering this as a serious inflection point, New Delhi has decided to significantly scale-down its economic engagement with China, fast-track conventional capability build-up, strengthen partnerships with other like-minded countries (fortunately there are many that have been rankled by China’s aggressive posture), and re-examine positions on Tibet, Taiwan, and the Quad.

Are any ripple effects expected on either side’s nuclear positions? It does not seem so. India has not announced any changes to its nuclear positions, though the suggestion of changing to a more offensive nuclear strategy owing to the conventional asymmetry with China has surfaced. However, policy changes are not deemed to be warranted given the understanding that it makes little sense to use nuclear weapons first in situations where the adversary has a secure second-strike capability. It could only lead to nuclear escalation by inviting similar retaliation without necessarily making a dent in the adversary’s conventional conflict.

Meanwhile, for China, changes in its nuclear capability and strategy are driven by its threat perception from the US. Its nuclear modernisation is in response to US ballistic missile defence and long-range conventional strikes that are seen to have the ability to degrade Beijing’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Debates in China about increasing nuclear numbers, revising alert levels or no first use (NFU), and deploying hypersonics or dual-use missiles are aimed at enhancing nuclear deterrence vis-a-vis the US. India does not figure in these calculations.

The officially declared Indian and Chinese NFUs, as well as a similarity in their approach towards nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence and not war-fighting, have helped maintain a sense of nuclear stability while dialogue mechanisms try to resolve the ongoing impasse diplomatically. In fact, their nuclear behaviour is a practical demonstration of the value of NFU in adversarial nuclear dyads. It is a good example of a risk reduction measure worthy of emulation by other dyads.

The bad dimension of the India-China nuclear relationship can be found in the huge perception gap on nuclear motivations and threat perceptions, exacerbated by a largely blind acceptance of Western analysis and writings about each other. For instance, the recently released US Department of Defense (DoD) report on China’s military and strategic developments, which predicts significant nuclear growth in numbers and capabilities, has caused much concern in India.  However, India’s sense of alarm needs to be tempered by the appreciation that there could be an inflation of the Chinese threat by the US for its own budgetary battles. Similarly, on the Chinese side, too, there is a tendency to echo Western scholars who perceive India’s nuclear weapons from the prism of prestige and status, and hence believe an inevitable technological progression towards counterforce capabilities and increased numbers. Given the West’s lack of understanding of the NFU’s military logic, many cast doubts on India’s continuing adherence to it.

A tendency to rely on such Western writings to learn about each other’s nuclear positions and perspectives creates room for misunderstanding and worst-case thinking between China and India. This is ironic because both sides in fact are consonant in several ways on nuclear philosophy. New Delhi and Beijing must have direct, bilateral dialogues on nuclear doctrines, force structures, and postures. The risks are only growing with the induction of new technologies, and China needs to get over its outdated attitude so meaningful engagement on nuclear issues can take place. Inadvertent escalation in future stand-offs will not be in either’s interest.

Finally, the ugly dimension of this relationship is found in China-Pakistan nuclear and missile proliferation. Knowledge of China’s material help to Pakistan is well-known. However, Chinese psychological and moral support to Pakistan’s use of terrorism is less understood. For instance, the larger international community has called out Pakistan for its support to terrorism, as evident in Pakistan having stayed on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) grey list for so long. China, however, still continues to extend economic, political, and moral protection. This has not allowed or incentivised Rawalpindi to change its behaviour. By acting as benefactor towards Pakistan’s irresponsible nuclear behaviour, China helps create an ugly instability in the triangular relationship.

There is much in the India-China nuclear relationship that can be useful—bilaterally, regionally, and globally. These are the only two countries that offer an alternate perspective on nuclear weapons and deterrence, and demonstration of concepts such as NFU and low alert levels. Both eschew limited nuclear war. It will be a pity if they, too, are compelled by circumstances and misperceptions to sway from their sane nuclear policies of minimalism and defensiveness.

A Cancelled China-Japan-South Korea Trilateral Summit Means Advantage China

Sandip Kumar Mishra

Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihide Suga has reportedly said that it would be “impossible” for him to visit South Korea to participate in the upcoming Trilateral Summit Meeting between China, Japan, and South Korea this year unless “proper measures” are taken by Seoul to address the issue of war-time forced labour. In 2018, the South Korean Supreme Court ordered two Japanese companies to compensate South Korean war-time workers for their suffering. The ruling led to a spiraling action-reaction chain between Japan and South Korea, and a deterioration in bilateral relations.

The annual trilateral China-Japan-South Korea meeting was proposed in 2004; the first meeting took place in 2008. Its objective is to bring these three East Asian countries together to forge strong stronger relations, and deliberate on regional economic cooperation and disaster relief. With no regional organisation or platform in East Asia for similar mutually beneficial cooperation and coordination, this meeting’s initiation was a milestone moment.

The meetings were held successfully for five consecutive years, followed by gaps in 2013, 2014, 2016 and 2017. Attempts at regular resumption were made in 2018—the 2018 iteration took place in 2018 in Japan, and in China the following year. The 2020 meeting is scheduled to be in Seoul, but current developments suggest that will likely not take place.

The beginning of the Trilateral Summit in a way was symbolic of the desire of these three countries to cooperate in economic and other non-controversial domains amidst contestations in the political and strategic realms. China, Japan, and South Korea have a running list of disagreements based on history, identity, and territorial claims that encompass political, security, and strategic issues. However, they recognised the short-sightedness in holding broader cooperation hostage to these disagreements. The three countries thus attempted to separate areas of cooperation from areas of conflict and rivalry; intending to  work on the first and avoiding the latter. This was considered a pragmatic move since disagreements were unlikely to be resolved in the short-term. Further, it was hoped that the positive impact of cooperative exchanges might spill over into other more fractious domains.

However, the cooperative process has gradually begun facing roadblocks instead. Over the past few years, Tokyo and Seoul have escalated offensive actions against each other. The distinction between economic cooperation and political contestation has been violated by both sides. This began with South Korea reviewing the ‘final and irreversible’ resolution of the comfort women issue. Then came the South Korean legal judgment on compensation for war-time forced labour. In the next move, both countries removed each other from their respective ‘white lists’, which imposed more restrictions on exports. The intelligence-sharing agreement between Japan and South Korea has also been caught up in the crossfire.

This is all on the bilateral front. It is strange that within the triangular equation, Japan and South Korea—both US allies—are at loggerheads, while enjoying positive relations with China. This is against the backdrop of widespread international criticism of Beijing for its role in the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as and its assertive behaviour, which has led to more countries in the region attempting to overtly stand up to China. Beijing’s exchanges with Tokyo and Seoul in dealing with the pandemic and restarting economic cooperation have both been remarkable. It is unfortunate that Japan-South Korea relations appear to be the weakest leg within the trilateral framework.

Bilateral tensions appear to continue under Yoshihide Suga, who replaced Shinzo Abe as the new Japanese prime minister. In these circumstances, it is wise for Tokyo and Seoul to work towards rapprochement through a regional platform such as the Trilateral Summit. However, it seems that Japan is in no mood to soften its posture. South Korea also appears to be adamant about holding on to its position. In 2019, South Korean exports to Japan were down by 6.9 per cent, and imports from Japan were down by 12.9 per cent, which reflect the impact of political friction on economic relations.

The biggest gains of a confrontational relationship between Japan and South Korea will accrue to China, particularly with both continuing to separately cooperate with Beijing. Even if the Trilateral Summit is cancelled this year, China will probably be able to coordinate bilateral exchanges with both countries. Mistrust and animosity between Seoul and Tokyo, their drift away from the US, and closer cooperation with China will give Beijing both economic advantage and a politico-security upper hand. A potential future mediation role for China will only strengthen its position in regional politics.

AppsAfrica Innovation Awards 2020

Application Deadline: 10th November 2020

Eligible Countries: African countries

To Be Taken At (Country): Africa Tech Summit Kigali, Rwanda.

About the Award: The AppsAfrica.com Innovation Awards identify and celebrate the leading African innovations from across the continent, providing winners with global publicity across multiple channels, recognition and networking with 300+ industry peers and investors at the Awards party.

Categories: There are 12 categories. Applications are welcome from mobile or technology ventures with services launched in at least one African market for the following award categories;

1. Disruptive Innovation Award: Business models are being disrupted across the continent using technology and innovation. This award seeks to recognise the disruptive innovations and new business models that are changing Africa. Entries open across all sectors.
2. Health Tech Award: This award celebrates the use of technology to improve health services in Africa. Entries may include a new service, device, software, hardware or use of apps, SMS, IVR or social media.
3. Best African App Award: This award recognises the best applications successfully launched on any platform to target African consumers or businesses. Entries are welcome across all sectors and platforms.
4. Cyber Security Award: This award celebrates companies that have successfully implemented ground-breaking security services protecting data, workloads and systems for individuals and organizations across the continent. Entries welcome from innovative ventures and mobile services in any sector across Africa.
5. Blockchain Award: Few technologies have received as much attention in Africa as blockchain over the past year. This award will recognise initiatives that are utilising blockchain technology to increase the speed, efficiency, accuracy, transparency or cost-effectiveness of any sector in Africa.
6. Media & Entertainment Award: Mobile news and entertainment is now a burgeoning industry across Africa. This award seeks to recognise the best news and entertainment innovations. Examples include music, literary, gaming, children’s entertainment, lifestyle and video.
7. Educational Award: Delivering education has many challenges in Africa. This award recognises services which are striving to improve education by utilising mobile or other technologies.
8. Fintech Solution Award: This award recognises the best fintech innovation including digital currency, bitcoin, mobile money, wallets, P2P, money remittances & transfers, point of sale or funding platforms.
9. Agri & Foodtech Award: This award recognises the best tech innovations driving agriculture across the continent. This includes but is not limited to hardware, software, drones, big data, IoT services, mobile services or any technology supporting farmers, improving yields or supply chains in Africa.
10. Social Impact Award: This award recognises an inspiring use of technology that has a positive social impact for an African community while contributing to economic and social development.
11. eCommerce Award: This award is dedicated to celebrating the new wave of mobile commerce initiatives across Africa. Entrants might include online platforms, retail brands, portals, apps, classifieds, comparison sites and many more driving mCommerce across Africa.
12. Mobility Award: This award seeks to recognise the leading ventures using technology such as hardware, software, robotics, drones or innovative mobile services that improve mobility, logistics or supply chains in an African market.

Type: Contest

Eligibility: 

• The Appsafrica.com awards celebrate the positive impact in 12 categories from ventures who can clearly demonstrate innovation using mobile or technology to meet the needs of any African market.
• The awards are open to all individuals or entities who can clearly demonstrate suitability for the categories entered.

Selection: Applications will be assessed by a team of expert judges who are selected based on their knowledge, influence and contribution to the improvement of technology and business in Africa.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: Award winners benefits include;

• AppsAfrica.com Innovation Award
• Global exposure across multiple media channels
• Exhibition space at Africa Tech Summit (ATS) 2021
• 2 x delegate passes to ATS 2021
• Global online publicity on AppsAfrica.com
• One years MEF Membership (one overall winner selected by MEF)
• Online publicity in MEF global newsletter

Timeline of Program: Shortlisted finalists will be announced in December 2020.

How to Apply: Enter your submission in your preferred category.

Visit Program Webpage for Details

DAAD Re-invitation Programme 2021

Application Deadline: 

• 15th October, 2020 for research stays starting from April 2021
• 1st April, 2021 for Research stays starting from August 2021

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: International

To be taken at (country): Germany

Type: Research

Eligibility:

• Former holders of DAAD research grants or study scholarships, who were funded for a period of over six months
• Applicants must have returned to their home country at least three years previously.
• The research or working project must be coordinated with a cooperation partner in Germany.

What can be funded?

• Research and working projects at state or state-recognised institutions of higher education or non-university research institutes in Germany
• Working stays at an institution in business, administration, culture or media for former scholarship holders who work outside the science sector.
• A research or working visit can also take place at several host institutions.
• Funding may only be claimed once within three years.

Selection Criteria: An independent selection committee reviews applications.

The most important selection criteria are:

• Academic achievements and, if applicable, publications, which must be documented in the curriculum vitae and a list of publications
• A convincing and well-planned research or work project
• In the case of working stays outside the science sector, particular attention is paid to the following questions:
  – Will the stay in Germany have a sustainable effect on your professional activity?
  – Can you expect it to have multiplier effects, for example, in the form of planned publications?
  – Will your stay in Germany promote existing cooperations?

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: 

• Monthly payments of
  2,000 euros for assistant teachers, assistant professors and lecturers
  2,150 euros for professors

Monthly payments for former scholarship holders who work outside the science sector will be calculated based upon their qualifications accordingly.

• Travel allowance, unless these expenses are covered by the home country or another source of funding.
• Other payments cannot be made.

Duration of Programme: 

• One to three months; the length of the grant is decided by a selection committee and depends on the project in question and the applicant’s work schedule.
• The grant is non-renewable.

How to Apply: The application procedure occurs online through the DAAD portal. The access to the DAAD portal opens about 6 weeks before the application deadline (see above).

Visit Programme Webpage for Details

IBM Master the Mainframe Contest 2021

Application Deadline: 17th January 2021

Eligible Regions: N. America, Latin America, S. Asia, APAC, MEA, and Europe

About the Award: This unique, virtual contest is open globally to high school and college students to progressively teach mainframe skills in a real-world enterprise computing environment. Employers from around the globe use this contest to seek out potential candidates for mainframe careers.

Part 1: Learn the Basics: Meet the IBM Z mainframe and acquaint yourself with the user interfaces, the basic concepts, and data structures. IBM will provide step by step instructions to complete the challenges and set you up for success in Part 2. Part 2: Practice: Students will program (advanced commands, system setup, and system navigation), develop (C, JAVA, COBOL, assembler, and REXX) and experience operating systems challenges on IBM Z.

Part 3: Try Challenges: Dive deeper using real-life scenarios encountered by experienced systems programmers. Challenges will put contestants to the test and identify those with the most drive and determination to master the mainframe

Type: Contest

Eligibility: 

• Anyone who is currently a student at the high school or university level can compete — no experience is necessary.
• The contest teaches the skills you’ll need and the competition difficulty increases as you progress through the contest phases.

Number of Awards: Numerous

Value of Award: 

• Part 1 “Learn the Basics” Prizes:
  • $25 gift card to 300 randomly chosen from first 2,000 completions
• Part 2 “Practice” Prizes:
  • Cash Prizes
  • $100 gift card to first 150 to complete
  • Exclusive QTUM Computer Webinar and Q&A Invite
  • Invite to randomly chosen 25 from all those that finish Part 2 correctly
• Part 3 “Real World Challenge” Prizes:
  • $2750 travel stipend & IBM Master the Mainframe Hoodie to the top 2 individuals from EACH region
• Grand Prize
  • The top 3 individuals globally will receive a $1,000 USD prize pack

• Besides the awesome prizes, you can get unprecedented exposure to a variety of systems, software, and products.
• You can earn an Enterprise Computing Open Badge for your resume and social presences to impress potential employers. Yup, that’s right.
• This competition can even land you a job!

How to Apply: REGISTER HERE

Visit Program Webpage for Details

A Pandemic Pivot

John Feffer

If the current pandemic is a test of the global emergency response system, the international community is flunking big time.

It has done just about everything wrong, from the failure to contain the virus early on to the lack of effective coordination thereafter. As the predicted second wave begins to build — the world is now adding over 400,000 new cases per day — it is truly disheartening to think that the international community hasn’t really learned any lessons from its snafu.

Sure, some countries have successfully managed the crisis. South Korea, despite several superspreading outbreaks, has kept its death toll to below 450, which is fewer than Washington, D.C. alone has suffered. Thailand, Vietnam, Uruguay, and New Zealand have all done even better to address the public health emergency.

After its initial missteps, China has managed not only to reopen its economy but is on track for modest growth in 2020 even as virtually all other countries confront serious economic contractions.

It’s not too late for the rest of the world. Robust testing, tracing, and quarantining systems can be set up in all countries. Richer nations can help finance such systems in poorer countries. Governments can penalize non-compliance. Even before a vaccine is universally available, this virus can be contained.

But perhaps the most important takeaway from the COVID-19 experience so far has little to do with the virus per se.

The pandemic has already killed more than a million people, but it is not about to doom humanity to extinction. COVID-19’s mortality rate, at under 3 percent, is relatively low compared to previous pandemics (around 10 percent for SARS and nearly 35 percent for MERS). Like its deadlier cousins, this pandemic will eventually recede, sooner or later depending on government response.

Other threats to the planet, meanwhile, pose greater existential dangers.

At a mere 100 seconds to midnight, the Doomsday Clock of The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists now stands closer to the dreaded hour than at any point since its launch in 1947. As the quickening pace of this countdown suggests, the risk of nuclear war has not gone away while the threat of climate change has become ever more acute. If fire and water don’t get us, there’s always the possibility of another, more deadly pandemic incubating in a bat or a pangolin somewhere in the vanishing wild.

Despite these threats, the world has gone about its business as if a sword were not dangling perilously overhead. Then COVID-19 hit, and business ground to a halt.

The environmental economist Herman Daly once said that the world needed an optimal crisis “that’s big enough to get our attention but not big enough to disable our ability to respond,” notes climate activist Tom Athanasiou. That’s what COVID-19 has been: a wake-up call on a global scale, a reminder that humanity has to change its ways or go the way of the dinosaur.

Athanasiou is one of the 68 leading thinkers and activists featured in a new report from the Institute for Policy Studies, the Transnational Institute, and Focus on the Global South. Now available in electronic form from Seven Stories Press, The Pandemic Pivot lays out a bold program for how the international community can learn from the experience of the current pandemic to avoid the even more destructive cataclysms that loom on the horizon.

The Path Not Taken

Let’s imagine for a moment how a reasonable world would have responded to the COVID pandemic when it broke out late last year.

As the virus spread from Wuhan in January, there would have been an immediate meeting of international leaders to discuss the necessary containment measures. The Chinese government closed down Wuhan on January 23 when there were fewer than 1,000 cases. At the same time, the first cases were appearing in multiple countries, including the United States, Japan, and Germany. On January 30, the World Health Organization (WHO) declared the pandemic a global health emergency.

Instead of working together on a plan, however, countries pursued their own approaches that ranged from the sensible to the cockamamie, the only common element being the restriction of travel and the closure of borders.

The United States and China, embroiled in a full-spectrum conflict over trade, technology, and turf, were barely talking to each other, much less working together to contain this new threat. The United Nations didn’t get around to discussing the pandemic until April. There was precious little sharing of resources. In fact, many countries took to hoarding medical supplies like drugs and personal protective equipment.

To be sure, scientists were sharing knowledge. The WHO brought together 300 experts and funders from 48 countries for a research and innovation forum in mid-February.

Political leaders, however, were not really talking to each other or coordinating a cross-border response. Indeed, a number of leaders were running screaming in the opposite direction.  Donald Trump stepped forward to head up this denialist camp, followed by Jair Bolsonaro of Brazil and Andrés Manuel López Obrador of Mexico. Authoritarian leaders like Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua focused on consolidating their own power rather than fighting the disease.

As the global economy went into a tailspin, there was no international effort to implement measures to contain the damage. Countries like the United States refused to lift economic sanctions on countries hard hit by the virus. International financial institutions issued debt moratoria for the poorest countries but have yet to consider more substantial restructuring (much less loan forgiveness). Trade wars continued, particularly between Beijing and Washington.

Conflict has not been confined to the level of trade. A sane world would have not only rallied around the UN secretary general’s call for a global ceasefire in conflicts around the world, it would have actually enforced a cessation of hostilities on the ground. Instead, wars have continued — in Yemen, Libya, Afghanistan. New violence has erupted in places like the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Military spending and the arms trade have continued unchecked. At this time of unprecedented economic need, countries continue to pour funds into defending against hypothetical threats rather than to defeat the enemy that is currently killing people on their territory. Both the United States and China are increasing their military spending for next year, and they’re not the only ones. Hungary announced in July an astonishing 26 percent increase in military spending for 2021 while Pakistan is increasing its military expenditures by nearly 12 percent for 2020-2021.

Meanwhile, on this economically polarized planet, the ones who have borne the brunt of this pandemic are the poor, the essential workers, and all the refugees and migrants currently on the move. The stock market has recovered its value. Everyone else has taken a hit.

Looking Ahead

The international community took a giant step backward in its fight against COVID-19. Rather than build on the cooperation established in the wake of the SARS epidemic, countries suddenly acted as if it were the 19th century all over again and they could only fall back on their own devices. The hottest heads prevailed during this crisis: right-wing nationalists like Trump, Bolsonaro, Vladimir Putin, and Narendra Modi, who not coincidentally head up the four most afflicted countries.

It’s not too late for a pandemic pivot, a major shift in strategy, perspective, and budget priorities.

The Pandemic Pivot looks at how COVID-19 is changing the world by showing us (briefly) what a radical cut in carbon emissions looks like, dramatically revealing the shortcomings of economic globalization, distinguishing real leadership from incompetent showboating, and proving that governments can indeed find massive resources for economic restructuring if there’s political will.

Our new book lays out a progressive agenda for the post-COVID era, which relies on a global Green New Deal, a serious shift of resources from the military to human needs, a major upgrade in international cooperation, and a significant commitment to economic equity. Check out our new video to hear from the experts quoted in the book.

The coronavirus forced leaders around the world to hit the pause button. Even before the pandemic recedes, many of these leaders want to press rewind to return to the previous status quo, the same state of affairs that got us into this mess in the first place.

We can’t pause and we can’t rewind. We need to shift to fast forward to make our societies Greener, more resilient, and more just — or else we will sleep through the wake-up call of COVID-19.

We won’t likely get another such chance.

One Year after the Lebanese Protests

Julia Kassem

A year after Lebanese ex-Prime Minister Saad Hariri resigned amidst anti-government protests that sparked out of IMF austerity measures, the Lebanese government surprisingly is renewing talks to bring him back to the very position that, in his tenure, engendered years of popular frustration over corruption, privatization, and economic and political instability in the first place.

Hariri was once again nominated by Lebanon’s ruling establishment Thursday, pledging to form a new government months after failure to quickly name a new prime minister ensued after deadlock and political instability pressured the seven month old cabinet of previous prime minister Hassan Diab to resign.

Hariri, inheriting the same economic regime initiated by his father, Rafic, who oversaw the deregulated real estate development transformation of Beirut through his company, Solidere, that essentially turned the city into his clan’s privatization venture, became the face of corruption and nepotism in Lebanon for very good reasons.

Just weeks before the October 17, 2019 demonstrations, Hariri came under fire following a New York Times story that unveiled his $16 million dollar gift to a bikini model in 2012. The laughable trope, which made its appearance at the demonstration on humorous protest signs, represented the absurdities and

Popular protests were tipped off October 17 in response to IMF-backed austerity measures proposed by a telecommunications minister to tax voice over applications widely used by Lebanese (which were dubbed the “Whatsapp Tax”).

Unsurprisingly, Hariri’s response to crippling austerity measures was…more austerity. His “72-hour plan,” unveiled in the wake of protests to address popular dissent was little more than a laughable repeat of the same policies that pushed people onto the streets in the first place. Hariri proposed further privatization of the electric sector (already a sectoral plan in his domain) and to push for more Western-donor packages (an $11 million pledge) that come with their predictable promise of more public-sector debt.

Of course, the sectarian superstructure that reigns supreme in Lebanon ensured that, just days after his resignation, he was not left without iconoclastic support. Future gang members, perhaps a product of decades of clientelism and sectarian territorialism that transformed otherwise unpopular, corrupt leaders as clan figures–or, as we say in Lebanon, zaims– gatekeeping privileges to communities deprived from an absent state.

This process of rehabilitation of Hariri’s image, that would lead to to his eventual comeback a year later, reveals an unfortunate reality about the nature of political power in Lebanon: the extent to which the material relations between citizen and state (or, lack thereof) in Lebanon has, for too long, been defined by the dependency on the deep-seeded superstructure of clientelism that requires mobilization much deeper than the hope given by the protests.

Mahdi Amel, also known as the “Arab Gramsci,” theorized decades ago that sectarianism in Lebanon is the mask of the “colonial mode of production” where Lebanese capitalism developed as a subordinate to economic imperialism.

Most importantly, the failure of the October 17 ‘hirak,’ lay in the inability for popular protests to change the material and institutional and economic dynamics of citizens to their state, independent of Lebanon’s longtime regime under international finance capital.

And how could there have been? The very institutional mobilization that would have been necessary to force a transfer of power from zaim to citizen had been compromised by privatization and erosion of state infrastructure for decades. Cooperatives, ministries, and municipal councils have been transformed from their intended role as mediators between citizens and workers and their government to mere mediums of finance capital from powerful actors to property. Today, farmers and workers cooperatives do not provide bargaining power or market assistance to farmers, but they act as little more than repositories for petrochemical sales and local sites of embezzlement and nepotism.

In any successful revolution, a successful transfer of power involves the necessary transfer of institutions towards the people, yet it is clear that in Lebanon, the opposite occurred: the “superstructures of society” have, in turn, weaponized their grip over the existing hegemony of finance-capital domination and absent state presence to change the narrative, and thus outcome, of the protests that should have put the architects of the crisis on trial.

The Central Bank

The insidious role of international finance capital in Lebanon not only was instrumental in maintaining the material relations of power between a series of Western-backed cronies and the state, but also of the narrative that ultimately determined the outcome of the movement.

From the beginning, the Central Bank funded MTV and al-Jadeed worked to frame the protests as anti-Hezbollah rather than anti-corruption. By painting a narrative not unlike the one promulgated in US media at the time, these narratives, in zooming specifically on protesters in right-wing Phalangite or pro-Lebanese Forces areas deflected the framing of the issue away from its finance-capital origins and onto a sectarian and policized narrative weaponized to service US-friendly outcomes.

While Hezbollah abstained to vote for Hariri in his new designation, they previously supported his designation as part of a unity government formed to quell civil tension.

The source of the issue, manifested in the post Civil-war governmental regime that was ushered in in 1993, consisting of Rafic Hariri, Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri, and Central Bank President Riyadh Salameh, had been the new contractor-clientelist bourgeoise that had effectively maintained the clientelist-capitalist regime that had proliferated in the anarchistic civil war environment.

Salameh’s role in facilitating and prolonging US friendly financial policies, containing embezzlement, and the maintenance of a real-estate centric policies, represents the very heart and source of endemic corruption that has reigned Lebanon for decades.

Under his regime, at least $106 billion have been stolen from the Lebanese people through his oversight of the embezzlement and corruption of small-account dollars. In the last two years, strict capital controls provoked by US and Gulf-backed sanctions, designed to strangle Hezbollah and its constituency in Lebanon, have helped throw off a 23 year stable exchange rate, allowing the lira to plummet to less than a tenth of its stable worth.

Hariri, allied with Salameh, defended the Central Bank governor once again at the beginning of this year, insisting that Salameh had “immunity” and that “no one could sack him.”

The Diab Government Deadlock

In December, as a result of the protests, a new government headed by independent candidate and Hezbollah-approved Hassan Diab sought to depart from the reign of US-backed finance capital to push for a slightly more government-accountable role for the new leader and his appointed ministers.

Two separate and conflicting policies of the Diab government vs Central Bank ensued where, attempts were made to mitigate the impacts caused by the extortionary approach of Salameh with more economic relief and resource distribution from the bank itself were obstructed. The clashes between Central Bank Governer Riad Salameh and Hassan Diab, the latter which accused the former of engineering the crisis, manifested itself in contradictory policies and visions for the role of government in Lebanon that were a contributing figure in Diab and his cabinet’s departure from government after the August 4th blast at Beirut’s port 12.

Just weeks before Diab’s resignation, a Lebanese Court ordered the seizure of Salemeh’s assets, many of which were accumulated by his role in running Lebanon’s banks like a corrupt Ponzi scheme, syphoning money from Lebanese depositors. The demand to seize the Central Bank governor’s assets, as well as that of his cronies, was supported by the “People Want the Reform of the System” movement that mobilized in the wake of the court order.

Even the slightest concession, offered by a proposal for a 400,000 LL a month relief package to hardest hit families and relief towards the economic sector, was battled by the then-government’s political opponents in Parliament, including Walid Jumblatt’s Popular Socialist Party (which is now neither of those things) and Future parties. But either way, the level of hyperinflation that had occurred at that time had rendered the distribution, which had been mishandled and botched, had greatly devalued by the time it did reach families.

With Hariri back, one becomes disappointed, but not surprised, by the difficulties Lebanon has of truly shedding its corrupt elite. Yet, in Lebanon, as with elsewhere, the ultimate repressive regime is once again the dictatorship of finance capital and its agents that have, again, effectively sabotaged the ability of policy and popular will to shape and change outcomes.

The World is Changing: China Launches Campaign for Superpower Status

Ramzy Baroud

The outdated notion that China ‘just wants to do business’ should be completely erased from our understanding of the rising global power’s political outlook.

Simply put, Beijing has long realized that, in order for it to sustain its economic growth unhindered, it has to develop the necessary tools to protect itself, its allies and their combined interests.

The need for a strong China is not a novel idea developed by the current Chinese President, Xi Jinping. It goes back many decades, spanning various nationalist movements and, ultimately, the Communist Party. What sets Xi apart from the rest is that, thanks to the unprecedented global influence acquired by Beijing during his incumbency (2013 – present), China is now left with no alternative but to match its ‘economic miracle’ with a military one.

US President, Donald Trump, made the trade deficit between his country and China a cornerstone in his foreign policy agenda even before his rise to power. That aside, it is the military deficit that concerns China most. While world media often focuses on China’s military encroachment in the South China Sea – often dubbed ‘provocations’ – little is dedicated to the massive US military presence all around China.

Tens of thousands of US troops are stationed in the West Pacific and in other regions, creating an encirclement, all with the aim of cutting off the possibility of any Chinese strategic expansion. Numerous US military bases dot the Asia-Pacific map, stationed mostly in Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Singapore, Guam and Australia.

In response to China’s military maneuvers in the South China Sea, the US composed the 2018 National Defense Strategy, which is raising the prospects of military confrontations between the US and its Asian allies on the one hand, and China, on the other. US military expansion soon followed. On September 8, the Wall Street Journal, citing US officials, reported that the Republic of Palau has “asked the Pentagon to build ports, bases and airfields on the island nation”.

It is obvious that the Pentagon would not base such a consequential decision on the wishes of a tiny republic like Palau. The immensely strategic value of the country – spread over hundreds of islands in the Philippine Sea, with close ties to China’s arch-enemy and US ally, Taiwan – makes Palau a perfect choice for yet more US military bases.

This is not new. The rise of China, and its clear intentions to expand its military influence in the Pacific, has irked the US for years. Barack Obama’s administration’s ‘Pivot to Asia’ in 2012 was the genesis of the new American belief regarding the imminent challenges awaiting it in that region. The National Defense Strategy of two years ago was a further confirmation that the focal point of US foreign policy has largely shifted away from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific.

The compromising language that became a feature in China’s foreign policy throughout the 1980s and 90s is now being supplanted by a different discourse, one of political resolve and unprecedented military ambitions. In his speech at the historic October 2017 Communist Party Congress in Beijing, Xi declared the dawn of a “new era”, one where development and strength must synchronize.

“The Chinese nation … has stood up, grown rich, and become strong. It will be an era that sees China moving closer to center stage and making greater contributions to mankind,” he said.

Since then, Xi has tirelessly aimed to strike the balance between strength, bravery and victory with that of progress, ingenuity and wealth. For the “China dream” to be realized, “it will take more than drum beating and gong clanging to get there.”

The Chinese quest to reach its coveted ‘center stage’ has already been launched in earnest. In the economic realm, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is in full swing. Announced by Xi in 2013, the giant plan hopes to outweigh all traditional trade channels that have been put in place over the course of many years. When completed, the China-led infrastructure network will establish connectivity throughout Asia as well as the Middle East and Africa. If successful, a future China could, once more, become a world-leading hub of trade, technological renovation and, of course, political power.

In contrast, the US has solidified its global dominance largely based on military might. This is why the US counter-strategy is now intently focused on military expansionism. On October 6, US Secretary of Defense, Mark Esper, said that his country’s navy requires more than 500 ships to counter China. Of this number, 355 traditional warfighting vessels are needed by 2035. This future fleet is dubbed “Battle Force 2045”.

Particularly intriguing in Esper’s recent announcement is the claim that by 2045, “Beijing wants to achieve parity with the United States Navy, if not exceed our capabilities in certain areas and to offset our overmatch in several others.” In fact, Beijing already has. China currently has the largest navy in the world and, according to the Pentagon, “is the top ship-producing nation in the world by tonnage.”

By China’s own calculations, Beijing does not need 25 more years to fully change the rules of the game. On October 15, President Xi told the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Marine Corps to focus their energy on “preparing for war”. Many interpretations have already been made of his statement, some linking it to the US, others to Taiwan, to various South China Sea conflicts and even to India. Regardless, Xi’s language indicates that China does not ‘just want to do business’, but is ready to do much more to protect its interests, even if this means an all-out war.

China’s foreign policy under Xi seems to portray an entirely different country. China now wields enough wealth, economic strategic influence – thus political power – to start the process of strategic maneuvering, not only in the Asia Pacific but in the Middle East and Africa, as well.

Another central piece in Xi’s strategy is to copy the American model and to rebrand China as a stately power, a defender of international law and against global crises. The US’ growing isolationism and failed leadership at the time of the COVID-19 pandemic have been Xi’s perfect opportunity for this new China debut.

The world is changing before our eyes. In the coming years, we are likely to, once more, speak of a bipolar – or, possibly, tri-polar – world, one in which Washington and its allies no longer shape the world for their benefit. In some way, China is well on its way to reclaim its new status.

Globalization and health: A glimpse into the developing nations

Krati Shrivastava, Parul Malik & Arathi P Rao

Globalization with its worldwide economic, political and cultural integration has made the world a small village with the borders being dissolved between countries. It has had a positive aspect and has successfully brought the world closer, but simultaneously, it has also resulted in various important public health issues which could negatively impact the economy of nations, especially that of the developing countries (Hamdi, 2013).

Globalization has, no doubt, had a profound effect on health services and individuals. It has contributed to the development of health and education systems of developing countries (Kelley 2005). These systems are important priorities for any nation to develop and have a strong links with the economic growth. It can clearly be ascertained that in recent years, education has improved as globalization had been a catalyst for job requirements that require higher skills and knowledge. Globalization has had beneficial influence on the health of the people which cannot be negated. Global travel, for instance, and the digital revolution have made it possible for quick response to epidemics and catastrophes that in turn save thousands of lives.

With the globalization process having the said positive impact and more, there has also been either a creation or the worsening of existing disparities in developing nations and addressing those, is probably the need of the hour. Also, the ability of rapid transit between countries has also made it easier for the travelers to carry and thereby cause rapid spread of infectious diseases.  Along with this increased travel, there has been a rapid increase in trade due to which there has been a sharp rise in the incidence of diseases such as HIV / AIDS, swine flu, bird flu and many plant-based diseases. Tobacco and alcohol consumption, and the rising silent international epidemic of non-communicable diseases are some other significant examples of the ill effects of the process of globalization. The developed world had faced the brunt of non-communicable diseases (NCDs) as a burden, since a long time. But recent alarming data shows a reverse trend even in the developing world with a dramatic increase in non-communicable diseases, particularly in highly populated transition countries. The epidemic has risen in conjunction with the worldwide rise in non-communicable diseases, driven by rapid urbanization, dietary change and increase in sedentary lifestyles (Joshi, 2015). It is important to look at these health risks and involve the community with the help of continuous monitoring and evaluation along with robust planning to overcome such situations.

India is a developing nation, with more than a billion people, multiple experiences, broad economic and social diversity in terms of class, culture and faith as well as a multitude of governance patterns is a case in point for the impact of globalization on developing nations. It has made significant progress in health achievements by trying to build a robust health infrastructure, increasing the health workforce and allocating resources for primary, secondary, tertiary care in state, voluntary, and private sectors (Arora & Gumber, 2005). But, with the borders shrinking due to rapid globalization, there has been a sharp increase in the incidence of communicable as well as non-communicable diseases. Changes in lifestyle, rapid urbanization and globalization, genetic predisposition and other factors have led to an increase in non-communicable diseases (NCDs) in India (Wagner & Brath 2012). According to new data released by the World Health Organization, approximately 61% of deaths in India are now due to NCDs like heart disease, cancer and diabetes.

Non- communicable diseases pose a significant threat to human health, security and economic growth. Also, in situations like these, the health needs of the local communities must be met along with the assessment of their health risks but, in the wake of globalisation, these communities have often been neglected, and the focus is usually concentrated on the urban populace of India. This has led to the creation of disparities and divides and resulted in a strain on resources with the local people being forced to seek healthcare outside their communities. Thus, they are vulnerable to communicable and non- communicable disease in two ways, either they themselves are the carriers of the disease or when they venture outside become susceptible to new diseases.

When borders dissolve, the free movement of people and goods is growing, creating new problems for global health (Pang & Guindon, 2004). The effects can be either directly at the level of entire populations, people and healthcare delivery systems, or indirectly through the environment and other factors such as education, sanitation and water supply (Woodward et al, 2001) and the impact is manifold in developing or populous nations of the world. Globalization’s ties with health are complex, and it is a multi-faceted phenomenon that can affect health in myriad ways. On one end, these issues cannot be addressed by national governments alone and international organizations and treaties should need to come along to deal with them, whereas on the other end of the spectrum, it is important to have a good health care programmes and initiatives that consider the local needs and beliefs. This could ensure the creation of a better disease fighting mechanism and a healthy workforce and economic prosperity, especially for the developing nations across the globe.