15 Sept 2022

William Ruto sworn in as Kenyan President as IMF demands austerity

Kipchumba Ochieng


William Ruto has been sworn as Kenya’s fifth president since independence in 1963. He is set to impose International Monetary Fund (IMF) austerity measures and wage class war against workers and the rural masses, as prices soar.

Kenya's President-elect William Ruto addresses the media at his official residence of the deputy president in the Karen area of Nairobi, Kenya Wednesday, Aug. 17, 2022. (AP Photo/Mosa'ab Elshamy)

On Tuesday, Ruto took his oath of office in Nairobi’s Kasarani Stadium a week after his election was upheld by the Supreme Court. Ruto’s electoral rival, Raila Odinga, had alleged mass electoral fraud and sought to annul the August 9 election’s result that gave Ruto 50.5 percent of the vote against Odinga’s 48.8 percent. The court unanimously dismissed the appeal.

Ruto won the elections by styling himself as an outsider and a “hustler” against Kenya’s ruling “dynasties” combined with anti-Chinese demagogy. Bourgeois papers presented him as the son of “a peasant farmer who went barefoot and sold chickens for school fees” (in words of The Star) to become Kenya’s fifth president, fighting the Kenyatta and Odinga political dynasties.

At the inauguration, Ruto pledged a Hustler Fund to boost business, “dedicated to the capitalisation of micro, small and medium-sized enterprises […] to make credit available on affordable terms that do not require collateral;” a Judiciary Fund to increase the number of small claims courts; to appoint six judges rejected by former president Uhuru Kenyatta over alleged integrity issues; to introduce new fertiliser prices; measures to increase police autonomy from the executive; and measures to “make fertiliser, good quality seeds and other agricultural inputs affordable and available.”

Ruto has nothing to offer to working people. The deepening economic, social and military crisis underway globally has no solution within the borders of Kenya. Confronting an upsurge of the class struggle, amid growing concerns about food insecurity, unemployment, war, and surging prices, Ruto will turn to austerity, police-state measures, his imperialist backers in Washington and London, while whipping up communalism and Christian bigotry.

Kenya is one of the highest countries on the list for civil unrest according to Verisk Maplecroft, a UK-based risk consulting and intelligence firm. Last May and July, rising food costs spurred protests in Nairobi under the hashtags #LowerFoodPrices and #Njaa-Revolution (hunger revolution in Swahili). It raised the spectre of Sri Lanka, where President Gotabhaya Rajapakse fled a country rocked by protests over soaring costs of living and IMF-imposed austerity.

Inequality in Kenya is among of the highest worldwide. According to Oxfam, less than 0.1 percent of the population (8,300 people), among which is Ruto himself, own more wealth than the bottom 99.9 percent (more than 44 million people). Fully 7,500 new millionaires are expected to be created in the next decade.

On the other hand, workers, especially youth, face mass unemployment. More than three-quarters of Kenya’s 50 million people are aged under 35, yet youth unemployment is 39 percent.

Kenya’s cost of living, driven by the US-NATO war on Russia in the Ukraine, are soaring, climbing to a five-year high of 8.5 percent last month. The Kenya National Bureau of Statistics (KNBS) reported that prices of maize flower, sugar and rice rose 4.7 percent, 4.6 percent and 2.9 percent, respectively. Market surveys show that maize and wheat flour, upon which millions of Kenyans depend, have actually risen by 67 percent over the last three months.

Tuesday’s speeches already indicate the pretexts the new executive will use to make workers pay for the global economic crisis. Ruto claimed that “clearly, we are living beyond our means.” Ruto’s Deputy President, Rigathi Gachagua declared: “The truth of the matter is that we have inherited a dilapidated economy which almost facing shut down. We have a huge task to liberate this country and bring it back to where Kibaki left it,” that is, a decade ago.

Gachuga was silent on the fact that Ruto had been deputy president since Kibaki left office.

Ruto will ruthlessly impose the IMF’s agenda. The IMF has classified Kenya’s $70 billion debt as high-risk, with debt at 70 percent of the GDP and consuming 63 percent of tax collections. In April 2021, at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, it granted a 38-month $2.34 billion loan.

Obeying the IMF, Ruto has pledged to eliminate subsidies on unga (maize flour) and fuel, whose prices are expected to soar. From October, the Kenya Revenue Authority will impose a 6.3 percent tax hike on excisable goods and services. There an ongoing hiring freeze in the public sector.

The IMF is demanding Ruto implement a national tax policy, which would impact previously untaxed sectors like informal business and agriculture and raise prices for staples like flour and maize. It is calling to raise sales taxes on petroleum products from 8 to 12 percent, that all goods should be taxed at 16 percent with a minimum rate of at least 12 percent. Civil servants also face cuts, as the IMF calls to slash the public sector wage bill.

Despite Ruto’s pledge to expand democracy, stating, “I will work with all Kenyans irrespective of who they voted for,” his track record says otherwise.

Ruto was mentored by Kenya’s pro-Western dictator Daniel Arap Moi, under whom he became MP for Eldoret North (1998-2013) and Home Affairs minister (2002). Ruling Kenya from the death of its first president, Jomo Kenyatta, in 1978 until 2002, Moi tortured and killed left-wing opponents while amassing a fortune of over $3 billion. He implemented IMF austerity, devastating living standards of the workers and rural masses.

Ruto has a long record of whipping up communalism, the Kenyan elites’ traditional weapon to divide and rule the working and oppressed masses. His political career started 30 years ago as an organising secretary of the Youth for KANU 1992 (YK’92) that lobbied for Moi’s re-election in 1992 in Kenya’s first multi-party elections since independence.

Well-funded and well-armed, Moi used Ruto’s YK’92 to whip up ethnic violence against Kikuyu ethnic groups in the Rift Valley Province. It is estimated that over 600 people were killed and 75,000 displaced in post-election violence.

In the 2007–2008 Kenyan electoral crisis, Ruto organised, paid and armed militias from his ethnic group (Kalenjin) to attack Kikuyus. At least 1,200 people were killed and 600,000 forced to flee their homes amid a rampage of rival militias of Uhuru Kenyatta’s Kikuyu and Ruto’s Kalenjin tribes, wielding machetes, knives, and bows and arrows.

Local broadcasters critical of Ruto were restricted in their coverage of Ruto’s inauguration. Ruto is expected to attack homosexuals’ rights and abortion, having opposed—with church backing—the current constitutional provision authorising abortion if there is a risk to the mother’s health.

In foreign policy, Ruto, who pledged to deport Chinese workers during the campaign to whip up anti-China sentiment, is expected to closer align himself with the Washington and London. Ruto has already met two of US President Joe Biden’s anti-China and anti-Russia hawks, US Senator Chris Coons and US Trade Representative Katherine Tai, who attended Ruto’s inauguration.

Coons is a leading anti-China hawk in Washington, having promoted US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s provocative visit to Taiwan. He also called to send US troops to fight Russia in Ukraine, threatening all-out nuclear Armageddon.

By sending anti-China and anti-Russian hawks to Nairobi, Washington is sending a message that Ruto must implement the IMF diktat and submit to the US offensive against Beijing and Moscow.

Warnings of financial turbulence amid rising workers’ struggles

Nick Beams


The latest US inflation data and the certainty that the Federal Reserve will continue to lift interest rates and tighten its monetary policy, all combined with a rising US dollar, is sending tremors through the global financial system.

As the Federal Reserve announces a rate change, traders work on the floor at the New York Stock Exchange in New York, Wednesday, June 15, 2022. (AP Photo/Seth Wenig)

Markets around the world fell yesterday on the back of Tuesday’s slide on Wall Street—the largest in two years.

This rise in the dollar’s value as a result of the Fed’s interest rate hikes is causing concern for financial authorities and governments in Asia as their currencies fall. Bloomberg has reported that the Japanese government is said to have asked banks for an indicative price for the value of the yen at which it could intervene to try to stabilise the currency.

The yen has hit a 24-year low against the dollar and the Japanese finance minister Shunichi Suzuki has said the government would not rule out an intervention in foreign exchange markets. The South Korean won has fallen along with the Thai baht, the Indonesian rupiah, the Philippine peso and the Malaysian ringgit.

One of the major concerns of the governments of the region is that the decline in the value of their currencies against the US dollar adds further fuel to the inflation fire which has already seen the eruption of mass protests in Indonesia earlier this month.

The other worry is that the fall in currency values sets off a financial crisis as took place in the Asian financial crisis of 1997, sparked by a collapse in the value of the Thai baht.

In the US, the latest data make clear price hikes are not abating. The key issue in ruling circles is how far and how fast interest rates must be raised to suppress the growing movement of the working class for wage increases to compensate for the highest inflation in four decades.

An article in the Financial Times (FT) quoted Tim Duy at SGH Macro Advisors, which provides research for hedge funds, who made clear the central bank had much further to go.

“We’re not seeing enough of the results of monetary tightening showing up in the economy to think that the Fed’s job is anywhere near done,” he said.

The article noted that “economists’ primary concern is that expectation of future inflation could spiral out of control, setting off a feedback loop whereby workers demand higher wages.”

Former treasury secretary Lawrence Summers, who has called for an unemployment rate of 5-6 percent for several years or a 10 percent unemployment rate for at least a year, is pressing ahead with this demand.

In his latest intervention, in a comment on Twitter, he said that “it has seemed self evident to me for some time now that a 75 basis points move in September is appropriate. And, if I had to choose between 100 basis points in September and 50 basis points I would choose a 100 basis points move to reinforce credibility.”

What is meant by “credibility” is that the Fed displays its unrelenting determination to raise interest rates to a level sufficient to bring about a recession so that wage demands are pushed back under conditions of sweeping job losses.

But the Fed’s drive against the working class via its monetary tightening policy is raising concerns about its effects on the stability of financial markets.

Besides the impact of interest rate hikes, there is another issue which is rapidly coming into view. This is the consequences of the Fed’s decision to start reducing it $9 trillion holdings of financial assets at the rate of $95 billion a month, a process known as quantitative tightening (QT).

This means that instead of being a buyer in the $25 trillion US Treasury bond market, the Fed becomes a seller.

The concern is this will lead to a liquidity contraction where there is a shrinking pool of buyers for government debt.

This is what took place in the meltdown of financial markets in March 2020 when, at one point, no buyers could be found for Treasury bonds, threatening a collapse of the entire financial system. That was only narrowly averted through a massive intervention by the Fed which doubled its holdings of financial assets to more than $8 trillion.

Despite several inquiries and reports on the meltdown, nothing has been resolved and there is a growing fear that in conditions where liquidity is at its tightest since the early months of 2020 that another crisis could erupt.

Commenting on the effect of QT to the FT, New York University economist Viral Acharya warned that “we could have a problem of liquidity stress in the banking system. And whenever banks are stressed, it usually spreads over to non-banks and Treasury markets and other [funding] markets.”

Acharya was the co-author of a paper with Raghuran Rajan, former governor of the Bank of India, to the Jackson Hole meeting of bankers and financial official at the end of August, that warned of the effect of QT on liquidity.

Rajan has proved to be an insightful observer in the past. When he was an economist at the International Monetary Fund, he presented a paper at the Jackson Hole conclave of 2005 in which he warned that the Fed’s ultra-easy monetary policies were creating the conditions for a financial crisis.

The conclave was conceived as a celebration for the retiring Fed chair and the architect of those policies, Alan Greenspan, and so Rajan was rounded on by all and sundry, particular Summers. But three years later, in September 2008, the global financial crisis erupted.

The Bank of America has warned that Treasury market strains are “arguably… one of the greatest threats to global financial stability today, potentially worse than the housing bubble of 2004–2007,” which was the trigger for the crisis of 2008.

The giant bond trader Pimco has warned that the current structure of the US Treasury market “leaves it vulnerable in times of stress to further bouts of the extreme market price volatility seen in March 2020.”

Articles in the mainstream media as well as comments by economists always involve a mystification of the operations of finance capital. But there is a profound relationship between the gyrations of the financial markets and the struggles of the working class.

Notwithstanding the vast profits accumulated on Wall Street by banks, hedge funds, speculators and investors, the financial system does not create an atom of real wealth. It is a mechanism through which the wealth created by the labour of the working class is siphoned to the upper echelons of society, the top one percent, and their props in the upper reaches of the middle class.

That process is being threatened by the rising movement of the working class in support of wage demands and an end to the increasingly intolerable, exploitative, working conditions imposed over decades. The fear is that this movement threatens to bring down the entire house of financial cards.

This is why in the US, particularly with regard to the struggle of rail workers, in the UK, where the economy has become a cesspit of financial parasitism, and around the world, all the forces of the state, including its financial arm, the central banks, are being mobilised with the support of its bought-and-paid-for servants in the trade union apparatuses to attempt to suppress it.

Azeri-Armenian clashes erupt amid NATO war with Russia in Ukraine

Alex Lantier


Fighting broke out between Azeri and Armenian forces during the night of September 12-13, as Azeri forces crossed the border into Armenia and attacked Armenian positions around the towns of Vardenis, Goris, Sotk and Jermuk. Clashes continued yesterday between the two former Soviet republics, after a cease-fire brokered by Moscow on September 13 immediately broke down.

Yesterday, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan reported that 105 Armenian servicemen had been killed so far in this month’s fighting. Azerbaijan reported 50 fatalities among its troops.

On September 13, Armenian and Azeri officials blamed each other for starting the conflict. The Armenian Defense Ministry reported “intensive shelling” from Azeri troops as well as drone attacks, announcing: “Armenia’s forces have launched a proportionate response.”

The Azeri Defense Ministry for its part accused Armenia of “large-scale subversive acts” along their joint border and claimed that it was repelling an Armenian attack.

Armenian civilians reported that heavy fighting prevented them from evacuating the area, as well as extensive damage to civilian infrastructure. “The entire village is being bombed, we can’t even evacuate the children, we managed to evacuate only part of them,” an inhabitant of the village of Geghamasar told Radio Free Europe. “The fire is very intense in the area, the roads are also under shelling, we are hiding.”

Sevak Khachatryan, who lives in Sotk, posted a report on Facebook with pictures of burnt-out buildings that stated: “After night-time shelling in Sotk, the community building has been damaged, several houses have burned, roofs and windows are damaged. The full extent of the damage remains unclear. Currently, fighting is ongoing.”

Though Moscow had brokered a cease-fire, which by most accounts was launched by Turkish-backed Azerbaijan, US officials tried to blame Russia for the conflict. “Whether Russia tries in some fashion to stir the pot, to create a distraction from Ukraine, is something we’re always concerned about,” US Secretary of State Antony Blinken declared.

At the same time, the US State Department released a statement declaring, “We urge immediate steps to reduce tensions and avoid further escalation.” State Department spokesman Ned Price reported that Blinken had called Azeri President Ilham Aliyev, stressed his “deep concern” and urged Aliyev to “cease hostilities” against Armenia. Price said Blinken had called Pashinyan to tell him that Washington “would push for an immediate halt to fighting and a peace settlement between Armenia and Azerbaijan.”

French President Emmanuel Macron released a statement reporting that he had contacted Azeri President Ilham Aliyev to demand that he “end hostilities and return to respecting the cease-fire.” Macron also said he had spoken to Pashinyan to stress French support for “respecting Armenia’s territorial integrity.”

The resurgence of the Armenian-Azeri conflict points to the growing danger that NATO’s war on Russia in Ukraine could spread into a broader war across the Caucasus and the Middle East.

Yesterday, Pashinyan appealed to Russia and to the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) to intervene militarily against Azerbaijan. “We asked support from CSTO, including military support to restore Armenia’s territorial integrity and ensure the withdrawal of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces from the territory of Armenia,” Pashinyan told the Armenian parliament.

Pashinyan also spoke with Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi, who declared that a new war would be “unacceptable” and called to ensure that Iranian trade routes with Armenia remain open.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan issued a bellicose statement of support for Azerbaijan yesterday. “We hope that Armenia will turn away from this wrong path as soon as possible and devote its time and energy to strengthening peace. Of course, this attitude will have consequences for the Armenian side,” he said.

The current fighting is the poisoned product of the Stalinist dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, as well as the eruption of NATO wars in the region over the last three decades. Fighting broke out between Armenia and Azerbaijan in 1988 over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave inside Azerbaijan, but which had a majority Armenian population. The fighting escalated into a full-scale war after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, as both Armenia and Azerbaijan became independent and Armenia seized the Nagorno-Karabakh.

This fratricidal war between forces who had until then all been Soviet citizens lasted from 1992 until an uneasy ceasefire in 1994, claiming 30,000 lives.

NATO’s wars in the Middle East, and especially its war for regime change in Syria that began in 2011, blew apart the precarious balance between Armenia and Azerbaijan. As ethnically-Turkic Azerbaijan built ties to Turkey, Armenia relied on close ties with Iran and support from Russia which has a military base in the Armenian city of Gyumri. Tensions erupted amid the NATO war in Syria, as Turkish troops faced off against Iranian and Russian troops fighting to prevent the toppling of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad.

In 2020, amid the COVID-19 pandemic, a new war erupted between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as Azeri forces reconquered most of the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. It cost nearly 7,000 lives, with Azerbaijan reporting 3,006 fatalities including 100 civilians, and Armenia 3,910 fatalities including 85 civilians. Azerbaijan’s fielding of Turkish Bayraktar drones, which are now playing an important role in Ukrainian fighting against Russia, helped tip the balance in favor of Azerbaijan.

After the 2020 war, Russia deployed a contingent of several thousand peacekeepers along the front lines between Armenian and Azeri troops. These forces have failed to halt repeated Azeri incursions into Armenian-held territory which have escalated since the outbreak of the NATO-Russia war over Russia’s “special military operations” in Ukraine.

Several officials in Europe linked the new outbreak of fighting in the Caucasus to the war in Ukraine. The French daily Le Figaro wrote: “Two factors seemed to have motivated Azerbaijan. First, the Russian defeat in Kharkov. ‘Russia is less able to dissuade Azerbaijan,’ said Florence Parmentier, secretary-general of the Center for Political Research at the Institute for Political Studies in Paris. Second, there is Europe’s dependency on natural gas imports.”

In July, European Union (EU) Commission President Ursula von der Leyen traveled to the Azeri capital of Baku to negotiate a deal to obtain Azeri gas as a partial replacement for Russian gas that EU countries are refusing to pay for amid the war in Ukraine. The Azeri-Armenian conflict is now intertwined with conflicts inside the EU over how to handle massive energy shortages and a likely economic collapse in Europe this winter.

“I think there is a feeling in Azerbaijan that now is the time to deploy its power, its military advantage and to extract the maximum that it can get,” said Laurence Broers of the Chatham House think-tank in London. “I think the risk is of the establishment of sort of new buffer zones, security zones, a kind of a fragmentation of at least the southern part of Armenia and a powerlessness among outside actors to stop that from happening,” he added.

A sordid fight over money between Black Lives Matter factions

Trévon Austin


On September 1, 26 chapters of Black Lives Matter Grassroots filed a lawsuit in Los Angeles County Superior Court accusing the top executive of the Black Lives Matter Global Network Foundation (BLMGNF) of illegally “siphoning” $10 million in donation money.

In addition to denunciations of much of the BLMGNF leadership, the suit accuses Shalomyah Bowers, the head of BLMGNF, and his Bowers Consulting Firm of funneling millions of dollars from BLM’s coffers, using the organization as his own “personal piggy bank.” 

The day after the lawsuit was filed, Melina Abdullah, co-founder of the BLM Los Angeles chapter and co-director of BLM Grassroots, held a press conference announcing the lawsuit, at which she claimed that Bowers pays himself upwards of $2 million a year.

Following Abdullah’s press conference, the BLMGNF Board of Directors released an official statement denying the allegations against Bowers and other leaders and labeling the lawsuit “another round of struggle for ‘control’” of BLM. It called the allegations “slanderous and devoid of reality.”

The Board of Directors brought forward counterclaims against Abdullah and other BLM Grassroots leaders, alleging that they have been taking $10,000 per month in personal stipends, going on secret retreats to Jamaica, and docking the pay of BLM operatives forced to take leave because they or a family member had contracted COVID-19. 

The BLMGNF statement includes excerpts from a January 2022 letter from BLM Grassroots leaders detailing “countless allegations of Melina Abdullah’s financial malpractice, unprincipled decision making, and a leadership style rooted in retribution and intimidation.”

The controversy surrounding the lawsuit is only the latest in a long line of scandals involving BLM’s finances. Amid the popular protests against the brutal murder of George Floyd by Minneapolis police in 2020, the bourgeois media and the Democratic Party promoted Black Lives Matter and its leaders as the official voice of the millions of all races and ethnicities demonstrating against police brutality. This promotion was accompanied by official endorsements and large donations of cash from corporate America to BLM. 

The families of victims of police brutality and many local activists, however, soon questioned BLM’s financial secrecy:

  • Three months after 10 local BLM chapters published a November 2020 statement demanding greater financial accountability from BLMGNF directors, the organization publicly released information about its finances for the first time. It reported that BLMGNF had raised more than $90 million in 2020, incurred $8.4 million in operating expenses, distributed $21.7 million in grants to more than 30 organizations, and retained some $60 million.

  •  In March 2021, Lisa Simpson, the mother of 18-year-old Richard Risher, killed by Los Angeles police in 2016, and Samaria Rice, the mother of 12-year-old Tamir Rice, killed by Cleveland police in 2014, released a statement demanding that BLMGNF stop exploiting the deaths of their children to make money.
    They wrote: “We don’t want or need y’all parading in the streets accumulating donations, platforms, movie deals, etc. off the death of our loved ones, while the families and communities are left clueless and broken. Don’t say our loved ones’ names, period! That’s our truth!”

  • In April 2021, the New York Post revealed that Black Lives Matter co-founder and nominal head Patrisse Cullors and her wife had purchased four properties worth approximately $3 million between 2016 and 2021. Less than two months after the news became public, Cullors resigned as executive director of BLMGNF, claiming she wanted to concentrate on other projects, including books and a production deal with Warner Bros.

  • In April 2022, a New York Magazine report revealed that BLMGNF had purchased a $6 million luxury home in southern California with donation money. According to the report, BLMGNF bought the 6,500 square-foot property, complete with seven bedrooms and bathrooms, a sound stage and music studio, a pool, and parking for almost 20 cars, in October 2020 to serve as a “safe-house” and headquarters for BLM leadership to create social media content. In June 2021, Patrisse Cullors, Alicia Garza and Melina Abdullah recorded a video outside the mansion to mark the first anniversary of George Floyd’s murder.

  • In May 2022, the Associated Press published tax documents showing that BLMGNF paid out millions to entities controlled by relatives and close associates of then-Executive Director Cullors. BLM paid out $25,997,945 in grants, including a $2,167,890 payout to the Bowers Consulting Firm, owned by Shalomyah Bowers.

  • Melina Abdullah, a professor of Pan-African studies at California State University Los Angeles and co-founder of Black Lives Matter LA, was featured in a Levi’s jeans “Beauty of Becoming” marketing campaign, despite the news that Levi’s contractor worked to kill a minimum wage bill in Haiti.

With each revelation, the fraudulent character of Black Lives Matter has become clearer and clearer. The organization lost credibility among millions of Americans who’d previously supported BLM under the impression those at the helm were genuine about a fight against police violence. The parasitic layers in the leadership were sent into crisis, prompting Cullors to resign as executive director in June 2021. Since then, virtually every news story about Black Lives Matter has involved a scandal.

According to the lawsuit filed by Black Lives Matter Grassroots, Bowers was originally hired by Cullors to help run BLMGNF in 2020. Melina Abdullah claims that when Cullors decided to step down as executive head of BLMGNF, she left Bowers with a transition plan to hand over control of the BLMGNF to the BLM Grassroots leadership.

According to the lawsuit, Cullors appointed two BLM members, Monifa Bandele and Makani Themba, as co-senior executives to oversee the transition, while Bowers remained in his administrative role. But Bowers allegedly failed to follow Cullors’ transition plan and BLM Grassroots was denied access to BLMGNF’s social media accounts.

“This is the case of a rogue administrator, a middleman, turned usurper, who was hired to collect donations and account for expenditures of the Black Lives Matter movement,” the lawsuit reads.

While claiming that Bowers sees BLMGNF as his personal “piggy bank,” the suit further alleges that Bowers’ activities were the catalyst for the series of fraud investigations launched by state and federal authorities into BLMDNF’s finances, which BLM Grassroots claims paved “a path of irreparable harm to BLM in less than eighteen months.”

As part of its counterclaims against Abdullah and BLM Grassroots, BLMGNF cited letters that BLM Grassroots allegedly sent in January over concerns about Abdullah’s leadership.

One complaint alleging Abdullah’s mishandling of a $7 million budget reads:

“I’m writing to you today with some serious concerns about the management and operations of Black Lives Matter Grassroots… It is my view that the Black Lives Matter Grassroots team, of which I am a part, is ill-equipped at this time to run and manage a multi-million dollar organization.”

14 Sept 2022

Australia Government Direct Aid Program 2022

Application Deadline:

18th September 2022 at midnight (GMT).

Tell Me About Award:

The Direct Aid Program (DAP) is a small grants program funded from Australia’s aid budget. It has the flexibility to work with local communities in developing countries on projects that reduce poverty and achieve sustainable development consistent with Australia’s national interest.

The program aims to:

  • advance development outcomes through projects primarily focused on practical and tangible results. This may include projects which support good governance, human rights and those with a strong advocacy component,
  • support Australia’s wider foreign and trade policy interests and public diplomacy objectives, including promoting a distinctive and positive image of Australia, and
  • allow for a wide geographic reach reflecting that Australia has global interests and that DAP provides an effective way to build relationships and maintain Australia’s profile.

DAP projects cover a range of sectors such as education, health, water and sanitation, environmental protection, women’s empowerment and gender equality, supporting people with disabilities, economic livelihoods, food security and human rights.

DAP projects engage a wide range of partners including community groups, non-government organisations, educational institutions and local governments.

The Australian High Commission no longer accepts unsolicited applications or runs an open round for the Direct Aid Program, but works with trusted partners to deliver developmental and/or humanitarian outcomes for local communities in Ghana, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 

What Type of Award is this?

Grants

Who can apply?

Funding is available on a not-for-profit basis to community groups, NGOs and other entities engaged in development activities in countries that are eligible for ODA.

Which Countries are Eligible?

West African countries

How Many Positions will be Given?

Not specified

What is the Benefit of Award?

  • There is no minimum amount that a single DAP project can receive but the maximum is $60,000 over the life of the project (dependent on the country). Activities can run up to a maximum of two years.
  • The management of the Direct Aid Program varies from mission to mission. To find out more about how the program is managed in a particular country, please contact the Australian mission overseas that administers DAP in that country.
  • Stories about projects funded by the DAP can also be found on the social media of the Australian mission overseas that administers DAP.

How to Apply for Program?

Apply here

Visit Award Webpage for Details

France’s Influence in Africa Faces Strains From Locals and Foreign Competitors

John P. Ruehl



Photo by Anthony Choren

On August 25, French President Emmanuel Macron arrived in Algeria on a three-day visit to begin mending bilateral relations with the country. Ties between France and Algeria have historically been erratic, but they plummeted in October 2021 following Macron’s comments questioning Algeria’s existence as a nation prior to French colonization. The ensuing diplomatic crisis saw the recall of Algeria’s ambassador to France as well as Algeria banning its airspace to French military planes.

France’s ongoing affair with Algeria reflects the complicated relationship it has with many of its former colonies in Africa. The French first began to establish trading posts on the Senegalese coast in the early 17th century and launched several expeditions against Barbary pirates and slave traders in North Africa in the mid-to-late 17th century. The French invasion of Ottoman Algiers in 1830 then transformed France’s relationship with Africa and launched the beginning of French colonialism into the interior of the continent.

By the early 20th century, Paris commanded control over much of West and Central Africa. However, the French Empire grew increasingly strained during World War I as well as during the occupation of France by Nazi Germany in World War II. French decolonization began soon after and was largely finalized relatively peacefully after 1960, save for a bloody seven-year war with Algeria that lasted until 1962.

Yet in the context of the Cold War, France had gained the backing of the U.S. to help contain communism in its former colonies in the African continent. The lingering sphere of influence in the region came to be known as Françafrique—a term coined by former Côte d’Ivoire President Félix Houphouët-Boigny in 1955. Across its former empire, the French-speaking and often French-educated local elites cultivated ties with Paris to help manage internal stability and foreign affairs in their countries after independence.

France implemented economic policies to bind the former colonies to it, including the CFA franc currency zone, created in 1945. The currency was later divided into West African and Central African CFA francs, which had a fixed rate of exchange with the French CFA franc (and later the euro), tying more than a dozen countries to French monetary policy. In addition, 50 percent of their reserves were to be kept in the French central bank, with unlimited convertibility of CFA francs into euros.

Some CFA countries saw relatively low inflation and high growth in comparison to other sub-Saharan African countries from the early 1950s to the mid-1980s. But in the 1980s and 1990s, domestic production fell and imports increased, leading to a rise in public debt. The devaluing of the CFA franc in 1994 also led to wage freezes and spiraling expenses for goods.

Today, the CFA is often criticized for hindering regional trade, restricting access to credit, increasing dependence on exporting a limited number of primary commodities, and enhancing member states’ vulnerability to foreign economic crises. In December 2019, it was announced that the West African CFA franc would be replaced by a new currency called eco by 2027, and would be adopted by 15 countries, including African states outside the current CFA franc currency zone.

African leaders remain divided over the issue of switching to this new currency, but the reform efforts represent growing dismay toward French economic policies in its former colonies. Nonetheless, French companies like TotalEnergies, Areva, Bolloré SEBouygues, Vinci, Eiffage, and many others have dominated Africa’s energy, construction, transportation, media, and telecommunications industries for decades. Their command over local economic mechanisms has often made the infrastructure owned by these companies targets, such as seen during the protests in Senegal in 2021.

Over the past 20 years, meanwhile, China’s state-run corporations have come to threaten the regional hegemony of France’s major conglomerates in the continent. While China lacks the post-colonial networks that France enjoys, Beijing has entered Africa with enormous investment potential and without the political baggage of previous colonialism. And while there is little doubt that Chinese companies have entered Africa to pursue their own self-interests, they are a welcome sign of competition away from the previous French monopoly.

France has typically been able to leverage its security role in the region by both extending military support to governments in Africa and by providing direct and tacit support to coups in several countries. In 2013, France began a military campaign in Mali, Operation Serval (followed by Operation Barkhane), to protect its interests and local allies in the Sahel region while coordinating with the U.S.-led war on terror.

However, the French-led military campaigns’ mixed results have been met with increasing regional criticism. And as the U.S. has sought to militarily disengage from much of the continent in recent years, this has put additional pressure on France to drastically reduce its campaign in the Sahel. French forces pulled out of the Central African Republic (CAR) in 2016 and from Mali in August.

France has also had to contend with other countries attempting to increase their military influence in Africa. The CAR’s government invited the Russian private military company, Wagner, in 2018 in response to France’s departure. Later, these Russian mercenaries were deployed in Mali in 2021. Private military companies are cheaper and come without the unpopular specter of using the military of the country’s former colonial power. Turkey’s quick recognition of those leading the Malian coup in 2020 also demonstrated Ankara’s growing role in African military affairs.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s frequent criticism of Macron over his stance on Islam in France and around the world has also put the French president on the defensive. Perceptions of Islamophobia could jeopardize its relations with its majority Muslim former colonies in Africa and the wider Muslim world and could add to the discontent among France’s estimated 10 percent Muslim population.

Much of Africa’s comparatively larger younger populations are less receptive to residual French influence in their countries, while many of the elites who were educated in France are also no longer in power or as relevant as they once were. The Organization Internationale de la Francophonie, or Francophonie, created in 1970 to coordinate integration and cooperation among French-speaking countries, saw two of its members, Gabon and Togo, join the UK’s Commonwealth of Nations in June.

France’s weakening cultural influence was on full display during Macron’s visit to Algeria in August. The Algerian government had already indicated in July that English would be taught in the country’s primary schools, amid deliberations across the region questioning the future role of the French language.

To offset this development, Macron has promoted literature and images from across Africa and the rest of the French-speaking world, and declared the French language’s “‘epicenter’ was in the ‘heart of Africa.’” While some projections have predicted the number of French speakers to reach 750 million by 2050, Macron has recognized that this will only take place with the introduction of a more proactive language policy in Africa that promotes its use and regional adaptability.

France has also taken steps to try and link the European Union to Africa. In February, France led attempts to renew the EU’s partnership with the African Union. The Summit of Heads of State and Government of the European Union and the African Union (AU) in February saw EU leaders announce a 150-billion-euro investment in Africa to assist in the development of the region. But despite the coordination between the AU and the EU, France’s Africa policies face other challenges due to competition with other European countries.

Italy, for example, saw much of its investments in Libya vanish following the 2011 NATO intervention in Libya, which France heavily lobbied for. The two countries continue to support different sides in Libya’s ongoing civil war. And in 2019, Italian deputy prime ministers criticized France for its apathy toward destabilization in Africa and for pursuing economic policies that prevented development and increased migration from the continent.

With the onset of fresh competition from other countries, outdated political and economic mechanisms being used by the French, and lingering opposition to its dominance, France’s Africa strategy is floundering in its former colonies and across the continent. And unlike the British and Spanish empires, which enforced their culture and political systems in various regions over centuries, the French involvement in Africa was not long enough to entrench its influence accordingly. Without a serious overhaul, Paris will continue to lose its ability to compete with other countries and satisfy African populations who are seeking change.

Amid corruption charges and cabinet resignations, President Pedro Castillo’s government on the brink in Peru

Cesar Uco & Armando Cruz


One year after Pedro Castillo assumed the presidency of Peru, amid cheers from the pseudo-left, his government is mired in a sea of accusations involving criminal activity by himself, family members and officials of his government.

President Castillo reviews troops at army headquarters on August 26, Peru's National Defense Day. (Credit: ANDINA/ Prensa Presidencia)

The accusations are part of a campaign by a virulent right-wing opposition—centered in Congress—which aims to force his resignation, or impeachment. This campaign began immediately after the former rural teacher and union leader was unexpectedly elected last July.

While there is no doubt substance to the corruption charges, their scale pales in relation to the massive Odebrecht scandal in which virtually every bourgeois party and institution was implicated. Meanwhile, six of Peru’s ex-presidents have been sentenced, indicted, or investigated for corruption or money laundering.

The unending effort by the right-wing parties in Congress—spearheaded by Keiko Fujimori's Fuerza Popular, who Castillo defeated in the elections—to bring the president down has created a crisis of governability, due to the sackings and removals of key figures as his administration moves ever rightward.

This has led to a record 67 ministers appointed by Castillo so far, prompting Bloomberg to observe last month that “A New Minister Is Appointed Every Six Days in Castillo’s Peru”.

The latest to fall this month is the foreign minister, Miguel Angel Rodríguez Mackay, after just over a month in office. Rodríquez’s appointment led to the resignations of Peru’s ambassadors to both the United Nations and the Organization of American States after he voiced his support of the Congress’s refusal to ratify the Escazú Accord, a continental wide agreement meant to protect the environment and, specifically, environmental, and human rights defenders in the Amazon region. The rejection of the accord was in line with the demands of big mining and other extractive industries.

Parallel to this crisis, and feeding it, has been the devastation caused by COVID-19, and now the war in Ukraine. This one-two punch, triggering an economic slowdown, high unemployment, and a drastic increase in prices of food, fertilizers, and urban transportation, is plunging the working class into poverty.

Castillo’s ascendance represented, in a distorted way, a rejection of the free-market policies by the bulk of the most economically marginalized population, which has not seen any improvement in living standards since the implementation of those policies three decades ago.

His rise to the presidency is part of a wider wave of populist politicians in the South American continent brought in to replace right-wing governments that fell amidst the biggest economic crisis engulfing the region since the Great Depression in the 1930s. They include Gabriel Boric in Chile, Gustavo Petro in Colombia, Luis Arce in Bolivia, Alberto Fernandez in Argentina, and in Brazil, the potential return of Luiz Ignacio 'Lula' da Silva of the Workers Party, who leads the polls for the presidential elections to be held on October 2.

Despite Castillo’s policies in many cases being indistinguishable from those of the extreme right, and his frequent assurances that he will respect private property, and even give foreign investors more incentives to exploit Peru’s natural resources, he has not succeeded in winning the confidence of big business.

The Spanish newspaper El País recently wrote that it fears that “Peru's institutional crisis, in which the political class has been submerged for years, is heading towards a point of no return.” Defending the substantial interests of Spanish companies in Peru, El País warns that the scandals of the Peruvian government are dangerously undermining “national stability.”

On August 13, the governments of Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Mexico issued a communiqué expressing their fear about the viability of democracy in Peru, which they said could collapse due to the “social and political tension in that country, where its president, Pedro Castillo, is undergoing his sixth judicial investigation”.

According to a survey of the Institute of Peruvian Studies (IEP), 85 percent of Peruvians disapprove of Castillo's administration, a substantial increase over the 60 percent rejection recorded in August of last year, one month after Castillo took office.

However, his right-wing opponents in Congress are not faring any better. Mired in their own corruption scandals, and detested by the population for their oppressive policies, their antics and their disruption of the government, IEP reports that Congress has a 90 percent rejection rate, something unheard of in the country’s recent history. Just 1 percent of those interviewed said that Congress is doing a “good” job.

Castillo survived his first year as president because his left-populist guise as a rural teacher and union leader, and the lining-up of all pseudo-left forces behind him, was of use to the ruling class in containing an emerging movement of the working class.

It would be wrong, however, to assess the crisis of Castillo’s government as that of just another regime collapsing under the weight of its own corruption. Castillo’s former supporters have turned against him for not fulfilling in the slightest his fanciful promise of 'no more poor in a rich country.' This expresses a breaking point in the attempt to contain the working class and the masses through the “left” and nationalist pretensions of a bourgeois regime.

With the political elite thoroughly discredited, and the absence of any force like the unions or other “left” figures that could control a social explosion, more astute sections of the Peruvian bourgeoisie know that forcing Castillo’s removal could be playing with fire.

With Castillo's own image in tatters, and his downfall a matter of time, the July 20 release from prison of Antauro Humala—the brother of former President Ollanta Humala—has been of considerable concern to the ruling class.

Antauro is the founder of “ethnocacerismo,” a political movement that exalts the indigenous race and promotes ultranationalism and xenophobia. He led an armed uprising in the Andean city of Andahuaylas in 2005.

The right-wing corporate media has seized on Antauro’s release to launch another virulent anti-communist tirade, with dubious claims that Castillo had pardoned Antauro in furtherance of an alliance aimed at keeping his government in power.

Today Castillo does not even dare to show his face. Not only does he maintain a police cordon that prevents citizens from approaching the government house, an unprecedented act, he held the traditional military parade for the national holidays in late July inside the Ministry of Defense, the Pentagonito.

While hundreds of angry citizens demonstrated outside the fortress-like premises, Castillo’s image, flanked by generals saluting the flag, was broadcast nationwide by all national TV stations.

Although during the election campaign last year, a small group of retired generals advocated a military coup to stop Castillo’s “communism,” the higher echelons of the Armed Forces are not as harshly opposed to Castillo as are the corporate elite and their political representatives. This, allegedly, is due in part to his covering up corruption in their ranks.

However, there is little doubt that the Joint Command of the Armed Forces is carefully following the intensifying governmental crisis and will take the decision that it thinks best protects its own interests, as well as those of the national bourgeoisie and foreign capital.