Public transport workers in the Philippines face huge job losses

Dante Pastrana

Last week, more than 10,000 jeepney drivers and owners marched in the Philippine capital of Metro Manila and other parts of the country to protest the government’s Public Utility Vehicle Modernization Plan (PUVMP), which will revoke single-jeepney franchises and their ability to operate. Jeepneys are minibuses that provide public transportation for millions, particularly workers and the poor.

Filipino driver Victorino Samson drives his jeepney in Manila, Philippines. [AP Photo/Aaron Favila]

The rallies on January 16 followed a 12-day strike last month and were led by the transport organization MANIBELA and the transport federation PISTON. The march in Manila was blocked by the police a few kilometers from the Mendiola Bridge, located near the presidential residence, the Malacañang Palace. The bridge is the traditional site for protests in the Philippines. Fuming at the police action, the march participants held a rally in front of the police line-up and refused to disperse until well into the night.

Police reportedly prevented contingents of protestors from the provinces of Bulacan, Pampanga, Cavite, and Laguna from joining the protest in Metro Manila.

In Bacolod city on Negros Island, jeepney drivers and operators blocked a street and held a rally for two hours.

The single-jeepney franchises of the protesting drivers and operators are only valid until January 31, with franchises under the PUVMP to be issued only to either cooperatives or corporations operating at least 15 jeepneys or minibuses.

According to the government, 112,801 of the 150,867 jeepneys throughout the country have already been consolidated into cooperatives. While estimates vary, more than 38,000 jeepneys could be removed from the streets. With each jeepney operated usually by its owner and another driver in two shifts or more, nearly 80,000 drivers and operators could lose their only source of meager income, even as inflation rose to 6 percent in 2023 and two million are unemployed.

The administration of President Ferdinand Marcos Jr has falsely promised that the modernization program will lead to better working conditions, fixed monthly wages, and government-mandated social benefits. In reality, drivers will remain piece-rate workers, forced to earn the price of renting the jeepneys as well as pay for fuel and maintenance before they can receive a meager cut of the jeepneys’ income.

The first phase of the PUVMP forces jeepney operators and owners to consolidate into cooperatives and corporations, ending their single vehicle proprietorship. Once consolidated, the second phase will saddle these organizations with massive private debts to fund the replacement of all diesel-fueled jeepneys to more environmentally-friendly but expensive minibuses.

The debts stemming from the modernization will bankrupt hundreds of the cooperatives and corporations. According to a University of the Philippines Center for Integrative and Development Studies policy brief, modern jeepneys cost around 2.8 million pesos (about $US50,000) as against that of a traditional jeepney worth between 200,000 pesos to 400,000 pesos.

The brief stated, “A jeepney operator, on average, earns a daily gross income of 2,500 to 3,000 pesos. Expenses—fuel, maintenance, and payments for the jeepney driver (typically at 500 pesos)—reduce that income. The cost of a modern jeepney is well beyond the price of a traditional jeepney, and greatly exceeds the financial capacity of jeepney drivers and operators.”

Existing cooperatives are buckling under the strain of their bank debts. According to Ricardo Rebaño, president of the Federation of Jeepney Operators and Drivers Association of the Philippines, operators organized into a cooperative or corporation need to make a monthly repayment of 475,000 pesos on loans for the operation of 15 modern jeepneys.

“We have nearly negative earnings daily, sometimes just breaking even. How can we survive for seven years?” Rebaño stated, referring to their payment period for modern jeepneys.

The Philippines relies heavily on buses and the ubiquitous jeepneys, descendants of ancient, backyard-customized former United States jeeps from World War II. There is no public mass transportation of railways, subways, or metro rails. The National Capital Region has only four public railway lines. There are none in any other major cities.

In Metro Manila alone, over 43,000 jeepney franchises and over 830 bus franchises have been issued on more than 900 routes. Over 75 percent of jeepney operators own just one vehicle, with just 2 percent of operators owning more than five vehicles.

For decades, the ruling elites tolerated the jeepneys as they themselves zoomed to their offices and mansions in air-conditioned Mercedes-Benzes. However, as the economy fully integrated into the global economy and the working population boomed in the early 2000s, the traffic situation deteriorated.

Notoriously, in the capital itself, massive traffic jams cost “roughly $US51 million per day due to lost working-hours, additional fuel consumption, health costs caused by air pollution, and loss of investment opportunities,” according to one government study. People in the capital spend as much as three hours stuck in traffic going to their jobs and up to another three hours stuck in traffic going home.

In implementing the PUVMP program in collaboration with the German and Japanese governments, the Marcos administration is forcing working people to pay for a solution to this problem through fare increases, job losses for tens of thousands of jeepney drivers, and by expropriating the small capital of the jeepney operators. The drivers and operators are some of the poorest sections of the Filipino working class and petty bourgeoisie respectively.

As the single-franchise expiration date approaches, the transport organization MANIBELA and the transport federation PISTON have vowed further protests. A petition filed by PISTON is currently pending at the Philippine Supreme Court to suspend the implementation of the PUVMP.

However, PISTON and MANIBELA are not workers’ organizations. They are dominated by better-off layers of jeepney operators and advance only a single demand: the reauthorization of their franchises.

Media giant Condé Nast announces restructuring of music publication Pitchfork

Nick Barrickman

On January 17, multimedia conglomerate Condé Nast announced that Pitchfork, the well-recognized online music review and news publication, was being absorbed by GQ, the monthly men’s fashion and style magazine.

The announcement came amid an ongoing jobs bloodbath in the US, including in the media and entertainment industries.

The Associated Press (AP) reported that 12 full-time Pitchfork staff, ten of whom were part of the site’s editorial team, were being laid off immediately, leaving the site with only a permanent eight-person editorial team. More layoffs are expected.

One World Trade Center, the Manhattan headquarters of Condé Nast [Photo by Kai Brinker / CC BY 2.0]

The decision came after “a careful evaluation of Pitchfork’s performance,” according to chief global content officer Anna Wintour, the notorious media executive and Vogue editor, in a statement that was leaked on social media. Other executives have issued statements meant to downplay the impact of the reshuffling, stressing the Pitchfork name would be retained.

“It is bleak on so many levels,” asserted former Pitchfork writer Laura Snapes in the Guardian, “first and foremost the job losses during a strained time for media. Pitchfork was one of the last stable music outlets going—where else are the former staff, and the site’s hundreds of freelancers, meant to work now?”

The AP obtained comments from Joanna Melissakis, the chief of sales and beauty at Condé Nast, who explained ominously that “Pitchfork will remain a standalone brand but the internal reporting structure is changing.”

The absorption of Pitchfork by GQ came despite the fact that the music site had “by volume… the highest daily site visitors of any of our titles,” explained a Condé Nast audience developer on Twitter/X. The website’s “higher consuming segments generate more unique page views by volume than any title. This despite scant resourcing, esp. from corporate.”

The publication, founded by US blog writer Ryan Schreiber in 1996, evolved from a site focused on independent music, leaving its mark with long form and at times scathing daily reviews, into a dominant music media taste-maker.

By the time the publication was acquired by Condé Nast (with 2022 revenue of $1.7 billion) nine years ago, it had expanded its staff considerably and opened its pages to discuss a wider swath of popular music.

Numerous commentators and artists have noted the impact a positive album review in Pitchfork could have on an artist’s career. “There was a period of time where if Pitchfork said something was good, I thought it was good. And if they panned something, I probably wouldn’t bother listening to it,” Gareth Paisey of the indie band Los Campesinos! (from Cardiff, Wales) told the AP.

Paisey pointed to the obvious fact that independent artists such as himself would likely lose out as the result of Pitchfork‘s restructuring. “This sounds trite, but Taylor Swift isn’t tweeting her disappointment that Pitchfork is closing, right?… It’s the independent, experimental artists that are going to suffer.”

The end of Pitchfork’s independent existence speaks to the ever-increasing domination of popular music by a few conglomerates. As Wired noted in 2021, “Three major record labels produce two-thirds of all music consumed in America. They are the most powerful buyer of music and talent, and they use that power to prioritize a handful of mega-stars and pop hits. They pitch music into massive radio conglomerates and streaming platforms that control how music is consumed, and they collect an ever-growing share of industry revenue.” Meanwhile, the overwhelming majority of musicians struggle to keep their heads above water, most of them obliged to work other jobs to make ends meet.

At the same time, the downsizing at Pitchfork is part of a general crisis within the US media. Forbes reported in December that the “media industry was beset with a series of layoffs impacting a number of sectors in 2023.” Challenger Gray and Christmas, a firm that tracks employment figures, estimated that more than 20,000 media jobs in the US were eliminated last year, the largest number since 2020 and the eruption of the COVID-19 pandemic.

In November, Vice Media, the American-Canadian digital media and broadcasting company, announced it was cutting positions and ending several news programs. This announcement was only the latest along similar lines, following the company’s decision to file for bankruptcy in May last year.

Vice co-executives Bruce Dixon and Hozefa Lokhandwala, in words similar to those now used by Condé Nast representatives, released a public statement reassuring the public that “To be clear, Vice News is not going away.”

Last Friday, Sports Illustrated magazine’s parent company issued a memo declaring it would be “laying off staff that work on the SI brand,” which the staff union told CNN would mean “probably all” of its members. Various media outlets suggested the move might well prove the “death knell” for the once popular magazine, first published in 1954.

Washington Post writers struck for a day in December against planned layoffs and low pay. 

The union at the Los Angeles Times revealed last week that the newspaper was preparing “significant” job cuts, affecting “at least” 100 journalists, or about 20 percent of the newsroom.

Ezra Klein in the New York Times noted on January 21 that more than “350 newspapers failed in the first few years of the pandemic. That was the same pace at which newspapers were failing before the pandemic: a rate of two closures or so per week.”

“Overall, 2,500 newspapers in the United States—a quarter of them—have closed since 2005. The country is set up to lose one-third of its newspapers by 2025,” Klein added. This has led to the creation of “so-called news deserts—places with limited access to local news.” The article pointed out that nearly 20 percent of the US populace now lives in such a “desert.”

World Cinema Fund (WCF) Africa 2024

APPLICATION DEADLINE:

28th February 2024

Tell Me About Award:

In cooperation with the German Federal Foreign Office the World Cinema Fund launched a special funding opportunity for projects from sub-Saharan Africa in 2016. All WCF submissions with projects from sub-Saharan Africa will automatically also be considered for special funding by the WCF Africa program.

The WCF aims to support films in the WCF regions/countries by developing active cooperation between producers and directors from these regions and German partners. Therefore, German film companies play an important role in the structure of the WCF – in a cultural-political and in economic way.

TYPE:

Grants

Who Can Apply?

Eligible to apply are:

• film production companies from sub-Saharan African regions, that can confirm their collaboration with a director from a sub-Saharan Africa region/country or
• registered film production companies based in Germany (in the commercial register or registered trade) that can prove a working relationship with a director from a sub-Saharan Africa region/country or
• registered film production companies from other EU member states provided they have a branch or place of business in Germany and can prove a working relationship with a director from a sub-Saharan Africa region.

HOW MANY AWARDS?

Not specified

What Is The Benefit Of Award?

• Maximum funding: 40,000 Euros for post-production funding.
• The total production costs of the supported projects should range between 200,000 Euros and 1,400,000 Euros.
• The funding must be spent on the post-production of the film in the aforementioned regions.

How To Apply:

There are two submission processes per year.

• The deadline for the first submission process is the end of February/beginning of March. The jury meetings in which decisions are made on these submissions are usually held at the end of June/beginning of July.
• The deadline for the second submission process is in July and jury meetings to decide on these submissions are usually held in early November.

The following documents must be attached to the online Submission Form (in English or French):

• Financing information:
  • Financing Plan in Euros and in the respective local currency (if available). A model financing plan can be downloaded here.
    The financing plan must contain the following information: names of the companies/partners involved, type of financing (funds, own investment, in-kind contributions, Sales/MG, etc.), shares (in percentage) of the respective partners, broken down by country in each case. Please also indicate which amounts are already secured and which are still open (as well as the estimated date on which a response/decision is expected).
  • Budget (detailed): in Euros and local currency (if available).
• Contracts and agreements: all financing agreements and/or letters of intent from financing partners that have already been confirmed.
• Signed co-production contracts/cooperation agreements or deal memos.
• Rights transfer: The transfer of rights is a document or contract that transfers the rights of the screenwriter to the producer and officially authorizes the latter to use the screenplay for a film project. If the author and the producer are the same person, it is not necessary to attach the statement.
• An artistic/visual concept with a mood board, casting, locations, editing, narrative concept, etc.
• A password-protected link to the rough cut, including English or French subtitles (in case the original language is none of these).

Visit Award Webpage for Details

Google DeepMind AI Scholarships 2024

Application Deadline: 29th March 2024 11:59 PM SAST.

About the Google DeepMind AI Scholarships: We invite students from across Africa to apply to be part of the September 2024 cohort and become one of our 40 Google DeepMind Scholars for the 2024-25 academic year!

A Google DeepMind donation funds 40 scholars per year for the four years starting September 2023. The funding covers full scholarships, equipment and computation costs for students. Our scholars are Google DeepMind scholars, and have opportunities to connect with Google DeepMind’s researchers and engineers for mentoring and support.

Increasing representation in AI offers a huge opportunity to bring diverse values, hopes, and concerns into conversations about the design and deployment of AI – and this is critical if AI is going to be a technology that benefits everyone. We also believe this is key to the potential for AI being one of the most important technologies ever invented.

We established the scholarship programme in an effort to help build a stronger and more inclusive AI community, who can bring a wider range of experiences to the fields of AI and computer science. The scholarships provide financial support to students from underrepresented groups seeking to study graduate courses relating to AI and adjacent fields. Scholars are also offered support from a DeepMind mentor, and have opportunities to attend leading AI academic conferences and DeepMind events.

AI for Science is a stream in AIMS South Africa‘s Master’s degree in Mathematical Science, made possible through a partnership with Google DeepMind. The program sits at the exciting intersection of AI and the Sciences. This exciting program started with its first intake of students in September 2023. It is a fully residential one-year taught masters with a research component. Applications are open to students from across Africa who are passionate about mathematics, artificial intelligence and machine learning. We are looking for students who gaze at the stars and the world around them in wonder, and who want to use their talents to accelerate scientific discovery.

Type: Masters’

Eligibility:

• Applications are open to students from across Africa who are passionate about mathematics, artificial intelligence and machine learning.
• We are looking for students who gaze at the stars and the world around them in wonder, and who want to use their talents to accelerate scientific discovery.
• The initial focus areas of the program is AI and machine learning in cosmology, epidemiology and ecology.

Selection Criteria: Universities offer scholarships to promising students from underrepresented groups who need funding to take up a place on a postgraduate course relating to AI.

Eligible Countries: International

Number of Awards: 40

Value of Google DeepMind AI Scholarships: The scholarships aim to ensure that scholars receive full financial support (tuition, stipend or living costs, and a grant for necessary equipment and attendance at an academic conference). Scholars are generally supported financially for the duration of their study, from the year they join their course. In a few cases, where graduate funding is already available through the university or department, DeepMind scholarships serve to enhance the existing funding, support the educational experience, and give the scholar the opportunity to focus more fully on their studies.

How to Apply: Scholarships are offered by participating universities directly to applicants for specific AI-related courses. Universities make information about upcoming DeepMind scholarships available when these opportunities are open.

It is important to go through all application requirements in the Award Webpage (see Link below) before applying.

Visit Award Webpage for Details

Growing social crisis in Indonesia ahead of presidential election

Owen Howell

A central feature of the campaign for Indonesia’s upcoming presidential election, due to be held on February 14, is the candidates’ response to the worsening economic situation and social crisis. The Indonesian economy has suffered major impacts from the COVID-19 pandemic and the subsequent rampant global inflation.

Presidential candidate Prabowo Subianto, left, with his running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the eldest son of Indonesian President Joko Widodo, at a televised vice presidential candidates' debate in Jakarta, Jan. 21, 2024. [AP Photo/Tatan Syuflana]

The outgoing administration of President Joko Widodo has imposed the burden of the economic shocks on the vast Indonesian working class and rural masses, with poverty, unemployment and wealth inequality figures climbing since 2020.

Economic growth in 2023 reached 4.9 percent in the third quarter, the slowest in two years. The slowdown is largely attributed to domestic interest rate hikes over the past two years, along with weakening global demand and falling commodity prices. According to the IMF, GDP growth in 2024 is forecast at just 5.0 percent.

The World Bank states that Indonesia has yet to fully recover to its pre-2020 economic trajectory. The global economic shock brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic led to a recession in 2020, Indonesia’s first since the 1998 Asian financial crisis. Before this, however, the country was already confronting economic stagnation in the 2010s.

In 2022, the resource-rich nation experienced a relative expansion, riding a global commodities boom, while the government worked to rapidly reopen the tourism industry even as COVID-19 continued to spread. Economic commentators are now warning that the incoming government will face major economic challenges.

In January 2023, Tempo magazine reported that the KAHMI Entrepreneurs Association chairman, Kamrussamad, told stakeholders in a Jakarta meeting titled Economic Outlook 2023: “We all know that the unemployment and poverty rates have not experienced any significant decline in the past five years, even though economic growth has started to improve.”

The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) recorded Indonesia’s unemployment rate in August 2023 at 5.3 percent, or 7.86 million people. BPS said that, although this marked a 0.54 decrease from the same month last year, the labour market had not returned to the pre-pandemic level.

This official rate, however, only gives an indication of the real social crisis facing workers and youth. Unemployment is underestimated as there is no government data for underemployment, referring to part-timers and casuals who cannot find full-time work or skilled workers in low-skill jobs. This continues to be a major issue in rural areas and among urban poor, especially after the wave of job losses since the pandemic began.

BPS noted an explosion of young people working informally in hospitality, including accommodation and food and beverages. Of the total number of working individuals, 23 percent are self-employed while 14 percent are in businesses assisted by non-permanent labour.

According to the World Bank, 9.5 percent of Indonesians, or 26.2 million people, are living below the poverty line, with a greater proportion of poor living in cities than in rural areas. However, as with unemployment figures, this only provides part of the full picture.

Over 40 percent of the Indonesian population is deemed “economically insecure” by the World Bank, with a “high risk” of falling back into poverty in the event of economic shocks and downturns, or events such as pandemics and natural disasters, whose frequency and severity are increasing due to climate change.

University of Indonesia economist Fithra Faisal Hastiadi said that inflation continues to be a major concern for lower income earners. “For people in the bottom 40 percent of income earners … this [inflation] rate is not affordable … [therefore] jobs and prices are viewed as their top priorities,” Fithra told Al Jazeera.

In the capital, Jakarta, a rapidly growing megacity of over 32 million residents, the cost of living has soared over the past four years. The city’s average monthly household consumption rose to IDR14.88 million ($US950) last year, a major increase from pre-pandemic surveys.

The Indonesian rupiah is ranking among the worst-performing currencies in Asia. In response to an interest rate hike last October, car loans and housing mortgages have skyrocketed. Food insecurity was also on the rise last year with the price of rice, Indonesia’s main staple, surging into the new year.

Many workers have posted on social media that 2023 was the worst year they had ever experienced. According to the Straits Times, a Jakarta copywriter, Adhin Ardhana, wrote on Twitter/X: “All prices rose. ... Equity stock prices down, [financial] wars, a lot of businesses collapsed, widespread job cuts ... Everyone is trying to deal with his own problems. No one is helping you except yourself. Be ready.”

Jakarta State University (UNJ) economist Dianta Sebayang told Jakarta Post last August, “The poor’s income vulnerability is highly correlated to fuel, electricity and food prices, all of which depend on energy and agricultural subsidies.” This was demonstrated in 2022, when a wave of price hikes in basic commodities, including cooking oil and fuel, sparked mass protests.

Dianta warned, “Widening inequality will bring about social conflict.”

The Widodo government’s pro-corporate response to the COVID-19 pandemic, involving massive bailout packages for the financial elite, has resulted in an explosive growth in social inequality. In March 2023, reports showed that the expenditure gap between the rich and poor had reached a record high in the past five years. The wealthiest 20 percent accounted for nearly 50 percent of national spending.

As of 2022, Indonesia ranked sixth in the world for wealth inequality. Income disparity has grown faster over the past 20 years than in any other Southeast Asian country. Oxfam estimates that the four richest individuals in Indonesia are worth more than the combined wealth of the poorest 100 million people.

From 2020 to 2023, inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient on a scale of 0 [complete equality] to 1 [absolute inequality] inched up to 0.409 from the previous 0.393. Financial research institute Indef admitted that government policies had contributed to this bump in inequality, including luxury tax cuts for the wealthy and Bank Indonesia’s interest rate hikes. “With no increase in income, the poor [need to scale back consumption],” said institute researcher Nailul Huda.

This is the highly volatile social context for the 2024 presidential election campaign. As part of his efforts to promote himself as a defender of ordinary people, Ganjar Pranowo, the candidate of Widodo’s party PDI-P, recently promised to create 17 million new jobs, particularly aimed at young people, in a “Quick to Get Work” initiative. Youth unemployment officially stood at 13 percent by the end of 2022.

The other two candidates have not commented specifically on social issues, but have elaborated their own economic policies.

Prabowo Subianto, Widodo’s defence minister, who is currently leading in the polls, has stated he will continue Widodo’s infrastructure investment and “downstreaming” policy, with commodities mined in the country to be processed domestically rather than exported. His election manifesto also pledges to develop rural areas, providing direct cash aid and building low-cost homes.

Anies Baswedan, the former governor of Jakarta, has pledged to reform the country’s booming natural resources industry. Anies’ spokesman, Tom Lembong, told Al Jazeera that economic growth had become dominated by mining industries and that putting growth on a “more diversified and sustainable footing” would lessen the “divides between the rich and poor as well as developed and less-developed regions.” This will include developing other industries in at least 14 smaller cities, so that each becomes a “more dynamic growth engine for the regions around them.”

Such bogus promises serve to disguise the underlying agenda of all three candidates, who are all committed to defending Indonesian capitalism at a time of international economic and geopolitical crisis. This requires the systematic suppression of wages and destruction of workers’ conditions to ensure global competitiveness.

The Indonesian ruling class is keenly aware of the social consequences of these dire economic conditions. This is precisely why such a figure as Prabowo Subianto, the notorious Suharto-era general, has been promoted at this time as a key presidential candidate. With the growing danger of social unrest, calculations are being made by the country’s financial elite as to which candidate can best use authoritarian measures to suppress opposition.

Papua New Guinea government intensifies emergency crackdown

John Braddock

Last week, following the imposition of a State of Emergency in Papua New Guinea’s (PNG) capital, Port Moresby, in response to widespread rioting and looting, the government threatened a complete shutdown of social media.

For 24 hours beginning January 10, simmering social discontent driven by escalating living costs, erupted into chaos in Port Moresby and other centres after police and armed services personnel walked out and protested over persistent shortages in their pay. Buildings and shops were looted and torched, and 22 deaths resulted. Calls for a nationwide strike were also raised.

Port Moresby shop on fire in Papua New Guinea after rioting on January 10, 2024 [Photo: Facebook/Isaac A Itsima]

With troops and armoured vehicles deployed in the streets of the capital, Prime Minister James Marape on Friday imposed a two-week State of Emergency. It contained draconian measures, including the “absolute right” of searches of private homes, property, vehicles and phones by government agents.

On January 16, ICT and Telecommunications Minister Timothy Masiu, a former journalist, declared the government would not hesitate to shut down social media sites and apps if there was “continuous abuse” of social media “spreading fake news, misinformation and disinformation.”

Masiu claimed there was a “sharp spike” in social media activity spreading “false information” connected with the destruction of properties and deaths during the previous week’s events, which the media has now termed “Black Wednesday.”

The police cybercrime unit and other agencies have been instructed to strengthen monitoring and begin investigations with a view to prosecutions. Spreading “false information or confidential government information, opinions that are wrong…or hearsay and defamatory” will be subject to legal action. If people fail to adhere, Matiu declared, they will face a complete shutdown of social media for the remainder of the 14-day State of Emergency.

The extraordinary powers granted under the emergency legislation allows the government to require telcos and other licensees who provide ICT services to restrict or delay certain communications and disclose the content of communications to the minister. The threatened activation of these measures has raised concerns by NGOs, human rights groups and others over the likely infringement of constitutional rights and privacy.

Police have meanwhile warned people holding looted items to return them or face the “consequences.” Emergency Controller and acting Police Commssioner Donald Yamasombi said that after a narrow “grace period” police would enter the homes of “people suspected of keeping stolen properties.”

The threat raises the likelihood of police searches of hundreds of homes throughout the capital without warrants, evidence or due process and followed by swift prosecutions. It portends an escalating assault on basic legal rights which will only exacerbate social discontent and resentment of the authorities.

Tensions have erupted among the political elite over the apportioning of blame. The pay deductions which triggered the protests amounted to between $US26-80 per fortnight—about half the take-home salary for some public servants. The government claimed the issue was caused by a “glitch” in the payroll system which would be fixed—a claim nobody believes.

In order to deflect responsibility, Marape has made unsubstantiated assertions that the riots were organised, hinting at the involvement of opposition politicians. Pending a formal inquiry, Police Commissioner David Manning and senior bureaucrats in the finance and treasury departments have been suspended.

Amid government claims that sections of the police facilitated the rioting, Yamasombi last week sacked Assistant Commissioner Anthony Wagambie and warned police to perform their duty “without fear or favour.” Many retailers reacted to the news by shutting their shops fearing repeated disorder.

The explosive tensions highlight the vast gulf that separates the poverty-stricken PNG masses from the country’s corrupt and venal political establishment. Trust in the entire ruling elite has disintegrated following decades of social deprivation buttressed by authoritarian military-police measures.

The seething social discontent that resulted in the riots is the product of widespread poverty, inequality, frustration and alienation. Elections, including the one in 2022 that installed Marape, have been mired in violence and corruption, with thousands of voters disenfranchised, and are widely regarded as illegitimate.

Port Moresby is at the centre of an escalating social crisis. The city has a large population of unemployed, many young and living in impoverished shanty settlements. They have moved from the provinces seeking refuge from rampant poverty and violence. National Capital District Governor Powes Parkop is demanding a Vagrancy Act to push people who he denounces as “not fit and proper” out of the capital.

PNG, an Australian colony until its nominal independence in 1975, is rich is natural resources but remains one of the world’s most unequal countries. Conditions for the working class and rural masses are dire and getting worse. According to UNICEF, of the 10.3 million population, 40 percent live below the extreme poverty line and 41 percent of children live in poverty.

The cost-of-living crisis comes on top of a decade of deteriorating living conditions. Inflation averaging 5 percent per year for 10 years has degraded the value of take-home pay. Cost of living adjustments for public servants have typically been around 3 percent.

The minimum wage has not been significantly increased since 2013 and is only worth half what it was. The Post Courier last December declared the minimum wage to be “obsolete.” Since 2016 it has been 3.50 PNG Kina ($US0.94) per hour—a can of tinned fish currently costs K5.90. “It is a death trap for PNG families who cannot feed, clothe and manage their lives on K280 ($US75) per fortnight,” the newspaper declared.

Unemployment is skyrocketing. The state employs about 700,000 people and the formal private sector 260,000—the latter declining from 305,000 in 2013. The COVID pandemic, allowed to run unchecked by the government, exacerbated the situation. The Seekjob website, which has 110,000 visits per month, recently reported 86,262 people registered for just 213 jobs advertised. PNG has no social “safety net” such as unemployment insurance, welfare, Medicare or old age schemes.

An arrogant, corrupt and wealthy elite meanwhile flaunts its privileges. In October 2018 thousands joined a one-day strike to protest the purchase of a fleet of luxury cars for use during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. The government imported 40 high-end Maseratis, costing up to $350,000 each and three luxury Bentleys to ferry dignitaries during the conference. The vehicles are currently rumoured to be languishing in a warehouse at the port.

The damages bill from Black Wednesday is K1.2 billion ($US323.5 million) as estimated by the PNG Business Council to cover the costs of restocking and rebuilding. This does not include such items as wage support for staff who will be without work for long periods. The government is offering only K300 million ($US81 million).

The political fallout continues, including calls for a vote of no confidence against Marape, who has responded with a major cabinet reshuffle. Seven MPs in Marape's government have resigned. Belden Namah, a senior MP and former captain in the PNG Defence Force is the latest, his resignation another blow to the government.

Washington and Canberra are watching closely. In a threatening editorial on January 12, Murdoch’s Australian called the riots a “tragic lapse” for PNG and “a concern for regional security more broadly.” With PNG increasingly on the front line of preparations for war with China, an imperialist intervention is not out of the question. The US and Australia have both signed far-reaching “security” agreements with PNG in the past year giving sweeping access for their police and armed forces.

China growth hits official target but significant problems remain

Nick Beams

China’s economy grew by 5.2 percent in 2023, slightly above the official target of 5 percent, and a significant rise from the 3 percent growth in 2022 when anti-COVID measures were in place.

Containers ships at Xiamen in southeast China's Fujian province on Dec. 26, 2023 [AP Photo/Andy Wong]

From late 2022, the government lifted virtually all public health measures under enormous pressure from the imperialist powers and global corporations, resulting in the death of an estimated two million people. It had been hoping for a resultant “boost” to the economy, particularly as a result of increased consumer spending.

Apart from a brief uptick at the start of the year, that has not materialised. While some sectors of the economy are expanding quite rapidly—car production is one—there are growing problems in both the short and longer term.

An immediate issue is that China could be in the grip of a deflation cycle with the risk of what is known as a deflation-debt loop. Chinese consumer prices fell 0.3 percent in December for the third month in a row with producer prices dropping by 2.7 percent.

Prices have now fallen or remained flat in every month since August with the 0.5 percent decline in November the biggest drop in three years.

Deflation means that corporate profits and revenues fall and the debt burden increases. As a result, wage growth will slow, leading to falling consumption spending in conditions where the government is looking to it to boost the economy. Deflation threatens to see off a loop of falling aggregate demand which in turn leads to further deflation.

While showing that GDP came in on target, the data underscored the continuing problems in the property and real estate sector. This has been a mainstay of the Chinese economy for the past decade and half and accounts for around 25-30 percent of the economy when its connection to other sectors is considered.

Investment in property development fell 9.6 percent in 2023 compared to a year earlier, with the price of new homes falling by 0.4 percent for the month of December, the sharpest decline since February 2015. In a sign of conditions in the housing market, existing homes are selling for a fifth less than their peak in the summer of 2021.

The real estate crisis has seen the collapse of major developers Evergrande and Country Garden together with at least 50 other smaller firms that have defaulted on loans. It is now extending into what is known as the shadow banking area of the financial system.

Last July, the wealth management group Zhongzhi revealed it was experiencing difficulties. It announced in November that it was “seriously insolvent” and has since filed for bankruptcy.

In a note on the bankruptcy filing earlier this month, Alicia Garica-Herrero, chief Asia-Pacific economist at the investment firm Natixis, said: “All in all, Zhonghzi’s bankruptcy filing points to the rippling effects of real estate and some failures in the shadow banking sector.”

The bankruptcy is not expected to have major immediate flow-on effects, but it does point to the growing debt problems, especially in the real estate sector. This has led to calls in some quarters for a “bazooka” stimulus package for the economy along the lines of measures the government has taken in the past, if not as large.

This has been ruled out, as was made clear by China’s premier Li Qiang in an address to the World Economic Forum gathering of the global elites at Davos, Switzerland, last Tuesday.

Announcing the GDP number before its official release, Li said the rise from 2022 had been achieved without resorting to “massive stimulus.”

“We did not seek short-term growth while accumulating long-term risks, rather we focused on strengthening internal drivers,” he said, adding that the economy was making “steady progress.”

Likening a viewing of the Chinese economy to zooming out to appreciate the majestic beauty of the European Alps, he said this approach had to be taken for the Chinese economy. “One has to broaden the vision and take a panoramic view … to truly grasp where it is now and where it is going,” he said.

However, he was forced to refer to the giant black cloud which hangs over this panoramic view: the drive by US imperialism to use an arsenal of trade bans and sanctions to suppress the development of the Chinese economy which it regards as existential threat to its global dominance.

Using the veiled language in which Chinese leaders speak of the actions of the US which claims to be upholding a “rules-based order,” Li said: “The question is, what is true multilateralism? Who will set the rules? What are the rules? If the rules are set by certain or a few countries, then we will have to put quotation marks on multilateralism because it will still be unilateralism in nature.”

While Li did not spell out the “long-term risks” the government is seeking to avoid in its opposition to stimulus measures, it was a reference to the growth of debt.

The credit rating agency Moody’s last year issued a negative rating for China’s government debt while another agency, DBRS Morningstar based in Chicago, downgraded its rating in November.

In remarks to the New York Times, Rohini Malkani, a senior for sovereign debt ratings at the agency said that overall debt in the economy now exceeded three years of economic output.

“Over the past 15 years, it has more than doubled” compared to the country’s fast-growing output, she said.

As the GDP figures were announced, another set of data pointed to longer-term problems for the economy. The population in 2023 shrank for the second consecutive year. There were 9.02 million babies born last year compared to 9.56 million in 2022.

The fall in population has significant implications. China’s economic development over the past 30 years was driven by an influx of a cheap young workforce. It is now becoming one of the oldest societies in the world.

Some of the population decline can be attributed to the previous one child policy, the effect of which the government appears to be now trying to turn around.

Recently, according to a report in the NYT, president Xi Jinping urged government officials to promote a “marriage and childbearing culture.” The fact that it seems to be having little effect so far may well indicate a growing lack of confidence in the future.

Many factors may be involved, but one could well be the rise in youth unemployment raising question marks for families about the future for their offspring.

Back in August, the publication of data on youth unemployment—aged between 16 and 24—ceased after it reached over 21 percent. Publication has now been resumed after high school students seeking part-time jobs were excluded. But it still showed a jobless rate for urban youth of nearly 15 percent.

Apart from the decline in births, the population decline reflected the lifting of anti-COVID measures at the start of the year, which resulted in up to two million deaths.

The government was no doubt relieved the growth rate for the year reached its target, but repeating that target—the lowest level in three decades apart from 2022—prove difficult with many predictions that it will fall further.

Summing up to the situation, China economy observer Eswar Prasad of the Brookings Institution, told the Financial Times that the latest data revealed an economy experiencing “at best subdued growth characterised by weak demand and persistently deflationary pressures” which was “not out of the woods.”

The next indication of the direction of official policy will come at the National People’s Congress in March where the decisions reached in the leadership bodies of the ruling Communist party will be announced.

Malaysian government scapegoats foreign workers over social crisis

Kurt Brown

The Malaysian government of Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim is engaging in a filthy campaign to demonise migrant workers as a means of deflecting public anger over the country’s growing economic crisis. Police last month detained approximately 1,100 migrant workers suspected to be without visas in what was the largest such raid since May 2020.

Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, centre with Deputy Prime Minister Ahmad Zahid Hamidi, left, and other leaders at UMNO headquarters, Aug. 12, 2023. [AP Photo/Vincent Thian]

On December 21, over 1,000 officers from a militarised section of the Malaysian police force normally used for counter-insurgency and counter-terrorism operations raided an area along Jalan Tun Tan Siew Sin, located in central Kuala Lumpur.

Frequented by Bangladeshi businesses and workers, the area where the raid occurred has been derogatorily labelled “Mini Dhaka.” Like the vast majority of migrant workers in Malaysia, Bangladeshi workers are engaged almost exclusively in low- and semi-skilled work, often called the “3Ds”: dirty, dangerous, and difficult. Other areas of Kuala Lumpur and Malaysia have similar pejorative labels, such as “Mini Jakarta,” “Mini Yangon,” “Mini Kathmandu,” and “Mini Manila.”

The raid marks a particular low point in the government’s agenda to blame migrant workers—one of the most vulnerable sections of the Malaysian working class—for declining economic conditions, which are entirely the making of Malaysia’s ruling elite.

The raid was aimed at stirring up the most backward and reactionary elements within Malaysian society on the basis of racist slurs. The press sought to justify it by claiming local residents complained of feeling uneasy and uncomfortable around the Bangladeshis, who supposedly behaved “arrogantly.”

One of the filthiest aspects leading up to the police raid was a campaign by TikTok personality Sophian Mohd Zain. One video published on December 8 with 1.3 million views shows him chastising the Malaysian Immigration Department for releasing migrants after only 24 to 48 hours in custody.

Sophian claimed the migrants would go back to stealing the jobs of locals and consuming subsidised goods intended for locals. Sophian is well known for publishing videos doxxing, harassing, and verbally abusing migrants and which have featured him wandering around Jalan Tun Tan Siew Sin railing against Bangladeshi migrants.

No member of Prime Minister Anwar’s so-called “progressive” Pakatan Harapan coalition government has stepped forward to oppose such racism. Instead, one day after the raids, Minister of Economy Rafizi Ramli stated on Twitter/X, “Dependence on foreign workers has reached 2.5 million people (documented, undocumented higher) which narrows the employment space for citizens. The effect is not only on job opportunities, but also the outflow of foreign currency when their salary is sent home every month.”

The government has also claimed that migrant workers are responsible for shortages of subsidised essential items such as cooking oil. Deputy Minister for Domestic Trade and Cost of Living Fuziah Salleh stated in early December that “with the implementation of targeted subsidies and Padu... identification will likely be required in the purchase of subsidised cooking oil in the future.” Padu refers to the government’s central database hub for delivering public services.

Migrant workers constitute a significant and heavily exploited section of the Malaysian working class. Malaysia has a population of approximately 34.2 million and a work force of 16.7 million, which includes about 2.5 million migrants with visas. In addition, estimates of the number of migrants who have overstayed their visas vary but ranges between 1.5 to 3.5 million. Most migrant workers are from Indonesia, Nepal and Bangladesh.

Many migrant workers are lured to Malaysia by promises of jobs that never materialise, despite acquiring proper visas. Without work, they face losing their visas and are then branded as “undocumented.” Adrian Pereira, the executive director of North-South Initiative, a migrant rights group, stated, “There is a huge number of job scams that are happening where workers are trafficked to Malaysia without jobs but using formal working visas.”

The Malaysian government turns a blind eye to this trafficking of migrant workers who are often forced to labour for lower pay and longer working hours. Migrants typically work in manufacturing, construction, plantation work, agriculture, hospitality, and domestic work. Living conditions are substandard and inimical to one’s physical and mental well-being.

For example, in mid-2023, the United Nations labour agency and the International Labor Organization found that about 30 percent of domestic workers toil under exploitative conditions, including excessive work hours, unpaid overtime, low wages, high levels of isolation, and the curtailment of movement. Malaysia has approximately 300,000 to 400,000 such workers, mostly women with about 80 percent from Indonesia.

In the palm oil industry, employing about half a million workers, approximately 80 percent are migrants. Case studies by the International Organization of Migration demonstrate that this industry is based on “[f]orced labour practices such as debt bondage [to pay for highly inflated recruitment and travel costs], deceptive recruitment processes, retention of passports, and limited availability of or access to grievance mechanisms.”

While allowing these conditions to continue for the benefit of big business, the Anwar government is inflaming anti-migrant sentiments as a political safety release valve for mounting and intractable social and economic issues.

Government debt, currently RM1.5 trillion or $US322 billion, is growing and the Malaysian ruling class is forcing the entire working class to foot the bill. The Anwar cabinet plans to cut government subsidies for essential items such as cooking oil, chicken, eggs, and fuel.

The government is also under pressure to reintroduce the widely-hated goods and services tax (GST) in order to boost government revenue and pay down the debt. The current sales and service tax, which replaced the GST in late 2018, only covers 38 percent of goods and services. Under the previous GST, the coverage was 68 percent.

On January 9, Economy Minister Rafizi noted that the government was “open (about GST),” noting that the national debt had increased in 2022. The reintroduction of the GST would lead to a further cost-of-living increase for workers and the poor in particular.

Like its global counterparts, the Malaysian ruling class is shopping around for a scapegoat bag to deflect blame away from its growing attacks on all sections of the working class.