Siwei Liu
The Xi-Modi summit in Wuhan in the end of April has drawn much attention in the international community with some claiming it may prove a turning point in Sino-Indian relations. Its significance however lies in transforming the overly emotional atmosphere that plagues Sino-Indian relations currently by creating bonding and therefore direct lines of communication between the two top leaders, acting therefore as a circuit breaker. Indeed, influencing the interaction between the two countries is not only security or economic issues but rather the unobserved and often neglected 'atmosphere' which can get bogged down in negativity or generate false hope from excessive positivity. This intangible emotion must be recognised and the relationship must be insulated as emotions (both positive and negative) are corrosive when they start affecting one of the most pivotal relationships of the 21st century.
Emotions generated, usually in the public sphere, determine which of the many adjectives one uses to describe the India-China relationship get prioritised, frequently ignoring the others; friendly neighbours, indifferent neighbours, strategic partners, potential adversaries, potential partners or strategic competitors. It is worth noting that such emotions are almost always generated by some specific event. For example, in 2017 the China India border standoff created a strain that affected all other spheres of the bilateral relationship. In this background, an increasing number of people from both sides begin to take a dim view of the ties trying to bracket a multifaceted relationship into just one issue. This casts the two big neighbours as competitors, or worse, a future enemy, scoring own goals for their respective side. Similar creation of a negative atmosphere was observed during India's NSG membership application, and during the revival of the "Quad" comprising the US-Japan-India-Australia. While such negative descriptions may be accurate in describing the situation at hand, they affect a disproportionately negative influence on other spheres where the relationship may in fact be in solid ground. Similarly excessive optimism can also dull one side to extant problems on other fronts. Mostly negative though, China-Indian ties in the last two years have been faltering.
Fortunately, the Wuhan informal summit was a timely circuit-breaker for the growing tension between the two neighbours. It is reported that the two top leaders held a total of seven meetings totalling nine hours of face time, including four "one-to-one" meetings, as well as boat trips, walks, tea tasting and museum visits. Though no agreements were signed and no joint document was issued, these bonding exercises sent a positive message, that is China and India are still neighbours with more to gain from each other than lose.
Admittedly, Sino-Indian relations are complex. Any one-sided emphasis is not appropriate. In reality the competition between two Asian big powers is inevitable. There is no doubt that with both sides conducting periphery strategic expansion, there will be a further increase in overlapping areas of interest between the two Asian giants. That requires the two sides to view the increasing competition in an objective and sensible way. Given that the present international and regional environment is full of uncertainty, risk, and crisis, the two countries feeling insecure and being more sensitive to each other’s policy adjustments is essential. So, constructing a positive emotional atmosphere insulating fact from feeling and interest from emotion, through Wuhan-style, informal tête-à-têtes is particularly necessary.
If possible, the two countries should establish an “informal summit” communication mechanism. This should not just be of the top leadership but across the levels of government that come in contact with each other, so that the circuit breaker of personal knowledge and the ability to reach out for clarifications does not get affected by news cycles. Not only that, the two sides should pass the positive emotions through carrying out more in-depth people-to-people contact. This can be augmented by joint initiatives to tackle global challenges such as deflation, natural disasters and terrorism, increase the representation and voice of developing countries and emerging market countries on the international stage, and so on so forth. The two sides also can step up the "strength" cooperation mentioned by Prime Minister Modi, namely spirituality; tradition, trade and technology; relationship; entertainment (movies, art, culture etc.); nature conservation; games; tourism; and health and healing. In a word, both sides must always remember that all talk and no action may bring more disappointment and dissatisfaction which will worsen ties between the two Asian neighbours.
17 May 2018
Two Decades After Shakti: India's Nuclear Policy
Sheel Kant Sharma
India’s nuclear weapon tests in May 1998 had more to do with its external security environment and the global strategic situation rather than domestic compulsions. Over the past two decades, the global environment and world order have changed considerably and so has the strategic calculus. The world today is in so many ways vastly different from what it was in 1998 or in the years preceding it. India’s interface, too, is utterly transformed. A major part of this transformation had its roots in the courageous crossing of the Rubicon in 1998. There is indeed great deal that can be said today with the benefit of hindsight but these past two decades since the Shakti tests have seen many transforming phases in the global conjuncture. It is always tempting when looking back to pick faults with what was done, to expound what could and should have been done, and whether twenty years hence, things look better or worse. It is good however to quickly recap the conditions prevailing in the run up to 1998. A retrospective can assess the vistas that opened, the relationships that blossomed, and the impact it had on the country’s political economy and security.
The tests were in more senses than one the culmination of a journey that began with India’s nuclear programme in the 1950s. That programme was launched by a newly independent nation with considerable aspirations in science and technology (S&T) but challenged by a severe resource crunch and lack of skilled manpower. Even so, the leaders then made a strategic choice to pursue capabilities in the entire range of nuclear S&T, from mining to waste management. They also broadly avowed this pursuit for peaceful use, not for the bomb. They kept, however, options open to themselves for future contingencies and were averse to a priori and unilaterally closing any technology option. Thus they persevered for four to five decades in building a full nuclear enterprise; standing off the exercise of a weapons option, and seeking security in the nuclear age by sustained campaigning for global abolition of nuclear weapons.
India had to come to terms with menacing challenges that came up on the way including, for instance: the Chinese bomb in 1964, the NPT in 1968, the Seventh Fleet bullying in 1971, the long isolation and censure after the peaceful nuclear experiment (PNE) of 1974, and finally the Soviet demise in 1989. But the sinister blow was to come in the 90s, when deceitful and clandestine Pakistan-China collaboration on nuclear weapons and missiles elicited just a passing mention of concern from the prevailing global nuclear order. This order, shepherded by a triumphant and sole superpower and its allies, also appeared blind to audacious Pakistan-sponsored terror plus nuclear weapons blackmail. As Andrew Small mentions in his book, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, China had given Pakistan the ultimate gift from one state to another (i.e. that of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles).
At the same time, the indomitable spirit of India’s nuclear scientists and engineers and the prowess of their enterprise had fortified and grown by the 1990s despite the post-PNE ostracising. Their capabilities empowered India’s emergence as a nuclear-armed state. Hence the definitive and in-your-face tests of 11 May and 13 May 1998 and unequivocal proclamation of India’s nuclear-armed status.
On 11 May 1998, the global impact of the tests was staggering. External intelligence agencies, including the CIA, had no prior inkling, largely due to the care taken by authorities to dodge external surveillance of the preparations and test site. New Delhi had envisaged the hue and cry that followed. Further tests on 13 May dispelled any doubts as to India’s emergence as a state with nuclear weapons. It broke the invidious and erring mould of a timid, indecisive, soft state. Prime Minister Vajpayee affirmed in clear statements, including in the parliament on 27 May 1998, that India had conducted nuclear weapons tests. Their rationale was articulated with solemn assurance that India’s nuclear weapons would not be for aggression.
Thus emerged a new paradigm that comprised nuclear and missiles capability, a doctrine of no first use (NFU) and a credible minimum deterrent. It affirmed a unilateral moratorium on further testing and massive and assured retaliation if attacked with nuclear weapons. It eschewed falling into an arms race trap and upheld the security objective of multilaterally seeking a world without nuclear weapons. India's position gradually evoked understanding in key capitals in the years that followed. High-level demarches were made in Paris, London, Berlin, and Moscow. An extended and intensive bilateral dialogue between External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott paved the way for a changing US perception of India. The agenda of this dialogue also included export controls as the US insisted on assurance that India’s technological prowess not be open to pilferage by hostile states and should remain proliferation-proof. As this jelled with India’s policy in any case, credible action was demonstrated, including through systematic consultations involving diverse agencies of the government coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs.
Pakistan conducted its tit-for-tat tests; breast-beating about South Asia nearing a nuclear flash point. Launching a peace mission to Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook a bus journey to Lahore in February 1999. His meetings with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated several confidence-building measures. But the Pakistan Army slyly sabotaged the Lahore outcome through the Kargil misadventure; exposing, inter alia, Pakistan’s bluff about the so-called nuclear flash point. President Bill Clinton showed markedly better understanding of India’s narrative in the wake of Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil; displaying growing US concern about Pakistan’s role and involvement in what was seen as Osama bin Laden’s global jihad. Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 unfurled a long-term vision of India-US relations. The Clintons set aside past practice and after a full six-day state visit to India, spent a mere six hours in Pakistan, and that too, in Karachi - marking US de-hyphenation of India from Pakistan.
President George Bush accelerated the transformation of relations with India, eventually freeing them from the overpowering strain of decades of discordant nuclear policies. The shock and revulsion post 9/11 fundamentally altered US priorities in dealing with terrorism and non-proliferation. What rapidly changed the perspective were extraordinary revelations about Pakistan’s pernicious role in clandestine proliferation, with specific material evidence in documents uncovered in 2003-04 about aiding and abetting Iranian and Libyan nuclear weapons pursuit. India’s excellent non-proliferation credentials stood in stark contrast. Moreover, rising crude prices had triggered a veritable renaissance for nuclear power by 2004. A growing Indian economy’s hunger for energy including nuclear power was critical to development. India persuaded its interlocutors that its nuclear enterprise’s categorical imperative in the coming decades would be in meeting energy needs. India pleaded for nuclear cooperation with the US and agreed to separate the strategic component of its nuclear enterprise from the much larger civilian side, and to place all civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.
This contributed to quick progress towards the nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. The US configured India's 'mainstreaming' in the global nuclear community by amending key Congressional acts inhibiting cooperation with India, and obtaining an India-specific exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The India-US Agreement in 2008 was, doubtless, the kernel of a much larger strategic partnership with the US. India would also emerge with an upgraded profile in the global diplomatic arena, a profile greatly helped by a major quantum leap in India-US relations. India’s relations with Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, entered a new phase of a broader and intense strategic partnership with regular annual summits. Very substantial bilateral nuclear cooperation resulted in setting up two 1000 MW reactors in Kudankulam, and several more in the pipeline. With France, cooperation deals envisaged several advanced reactors in a huge nuclear park in Maharashtra. Strategic partnerships were also forged, setting the stage for versatile relationships with the UK, EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
Growth in the indigenous nuclear power programme is sustained with assured uranium supplies. India has active plans for expansion of nuclear power reactors in cooperation with the US, Russia, and France. The domestic enterprise plans more reactors and early commissioning of the Breeder (prototype) reactor in Kalpakkam.
A major upturn in India’s relations with the US, its allies and the West in general, has also catalysed China’s approach to India and led to better mutual understanding and expanding bilateral cooperation. This remains so despite the standoff on border issues, persisting Pakistan-China axis, and China’s reservations about India’s NSG membership.
As regards the strategic domain, ensuring a credible and survival deterrent comprising a nuclear triad is on track. However, recent years have seen a steady deterioration of geopolitics, adding uncertainties and grave misgivings about the future. Sooner than later, the strategic domain may not comprise only conventional and nuclear but increasingly the cyber and outer space dimensions. Also slipping from the front burner is the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, even though serious questions dog their utility except in ‘deterrent only’ mode. Given these uncertainties, India must effectively maintain its credible minimum deterrent.
India’s nuclear weapon tests in May 1998 had more to do with its external security environment and the global strategic situation rather than domestic compulsions. Over the past two decades, the global environment and world order have changed considerably and so has the strategic calculus. The world today is in so many ways vastly different from what it was in 1998 or in the years preceding it. India’s interface, too, is utterly transformed. A major part of this transformation had its roots in the courageous crossing of the Rubicon in 1998. There is indeed great deal that can be said today with the benefit of hindsight but these past two decades since the Shakti tests have seen many transforming phases in the global conjuncture. It is always tempting when looking back to pick faults with what was done, to expound what could and should have been done, and whether twenty years hence, things look better or worse. It is good however to quickly recap the conditions prevailing in the run up to 1998. A retrospective can assess the vistas that opened, the relationships that blossomed, and the impact it had on the country’s political economy and security.
The tests were in more senses than one the culmination of a journey that began with India’s nuclear programme in the 1950s. That programme was launched by a newly independent nation with considerable aspirations in science and technology (S&T) but challenged by a severe resource crunch and lack of skilled manpower. Even so, the leaders then made a strategic choice to pursue capabilities in the entire range of nuclear S&T, from mining to waste management. They also broadly avowed this pursuit for peaceful use, not for the bomb. They kept, however, options open to themselves for future contingencies and were averse to a priori and unilaterally closing any technology option. Thus they persevered for four to five decades in building a full nuclear enterprise; standing off the exercise of a weapons option, and seeking security in the nuclear age by sustained campaigning for global abolition of nuclear weapons.
India had to come to terms with menacing challenges that came up on the way including, for instance: the Chinese bomb in 1964, the NPT in 1968, the Seventh Fleet bullying in 1971, the long isolation and censure after the peaceful nuclear experiment (PNE) of 1974, and finally the Soviet demise in 1989. But the sinister blow was to come in the 90s, when deceitful and clandestine Pakistan-China collaboration on nuclear weapons and missiles elicited just a passing mention of concern from the prevailing global nuclear order. This order, shepherded by a triumphant and sole superpower and its allies, also appeared blind to audacious Pakistan-sponsored terror plus nuclear weapons blackmail. As Andrew Small mentions in his book, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia's New Geopolitics, China had given Pakistan the ultimate gift from one state to another (i.e. that of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles).
At the same time, the indomitable spirit of India’s nuclear scientists and engineers and the prowess of their enterprise had fortified and grown by the 1990s despite the post-PNE ostracising. Their capabilities empowered India’s emergence as a nuclear-armed state. Hence the definitive and in-your-face tests of 11 May and 13 May 1998 and unequivocal proclamation of India’s nuclear-armed status.
On 11 May 1998, the global impact of the tests was staggering. External intelligence agencies, including the CIA, had no prior inkling, largely due to the care taken by authorities to dodge external surveillance of the preparations and test site. New Delhi had envisaged the hue and cry that followed. Further tests on 13 May dispelled any doubts as to India’s emergence as a state with nuclear weapons. It broke the invidious and erring mould of a timid, indecisive, soft state. Prime Minister Vajpayee affirmed in clear statements, including in the parliament on 27 May 1998, that India had conducted nuclear weapons tests. Their rationale was articulated with solemn assurance that India’s nuclear weapons would not be for aggression.
Thus emerged a new paradigm that comprised nuclear and missiles capability, a doctrine of no first use (NFU) and a credible minimum deterrent. It affirmed a unilateral moratorium on further testing and massive and assured retaliation if attacked with nuclear weapons. It eschewed falling into an arms race trap and upheld the security objective of multilaterally seeking a world without nuclear weapons. India's position gradually evoked understanding in key capitals in the years that followed. High-level demarches were made in Paris, London, Berlin, and Moscow. An extended and intensive bilateral dialogue between External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh and US Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott paved the way for a changing US perception of India. The agenda of this dialogue also included export controls as the US insisted on assurance that India’s technological prowess not be open to pilferage by hostile states and should remain proliferation-proof. As this jelled with India’s policy in any case, credible action was demonstrated, including through systematic consultations involving diverse agencies of the government coordinated by the Ministry of External Affairs.
Pakistan conducted its tit-for-tat tests; breast-beating about South Asia nearing a nuclear flash point. Launching a peace mission to Pakistan, Prime Minister Vajpayee undertook a bus journey to Lahore in February 1999. His meetings with Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif initiated several confidence-building measures. But the Pakistan Army slyly sabotaged the Lahore outcome through the Kargil misadventure; exposing, inter alia, Pakistan’s bluff about the so-called nuclear flash point. President Bill Clinton showed markedly better understanding of India’s narrative in the wake of Pakistan’s aggression in Kargil; displaying growing US concern about Pakistan’s role and involvement in what was seen as Osama bin Laden’s global jihad. Clinton’s visit to India in March 2000 unfurled a long-term vision of India-US relations. The Clintons set aside past practice and after a full six-day state visit to India, spent a mere six hours in Pakistan, and that too, in Karachi - marking US de-hyphenation of India from Pakistan.
President George Bush accelerated the transformation of relations with India, eventually freeing them from the overpowering strain of decades of discordant nuclear policies. The shock and revulsion post 9/11 fundamentally altered US priorities in dealing with terrorism and non-proliferation. What rapidly changed the perspective were extraordinary revelations about Pakistan’s pernicious role in clandestine proliferation, with specific material evidence in documents uncovered in 2003-04 about aiding and abetting Iranian and Libyan nuclear weapons pursuit. India’s excellent non-proliferation credentials stood in stark contrast. Moreover, rising crude prices had triggered a veritable renaissance for nuclear power by 2004. A growing Indian economy’s hunger for energy including nuclear power was critical to development. India persuaded its interlocutors that its nuclear enterprise’s categorical imperative in the coming decades would be in meeting energy needs. India pleaded for nuclear cooperation with the US and agreed to separate the strategic component of its nuclear enterprise from the much larger civilian side, and to place all civilian facilities under IAEA safeguards.
This contributed to quick progress towards the nuclear cooperation agreement with the US. The US configured India's 'mainstreaming' in the global nuclear community by amending key Congressional acts inhibiting cooperation with India, and obtaining an India-specific exemption from the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). The India-US Agreement in 2008 was, doubtless, the kernel of a much larger strategic partnership with the US. India would also emerge with an upgraded profile in the global diplomatic arena, a profile greatly helped by a major quantum leap in India-US relations. India’s relations with Russia, under President Vladimir Putin, entered a new phase of a broader and intense strategic partnership with regular annual summits. Very substantial bilateral nuclear cooperation resulted in setting up two 1000 MW reactors in Kudankulam, and several more in the pipeline. With France, cooperation deals envisaged several advanced reactors in a huge nuclear park in Maharashtra. Strategic partnerships were also forged, setting the stage for versatile relationships with the UK, EU, Canada, Australia, and Japan.
Growth in the indigenous nuclear power programme is sustained with assured uranium supplies. India has active plans for expansion of nuclear power reactors in cooperation with the US, Russia, and France. The domestic enterprise plans more reactors and early commissioning of the Breeder (prototype) reactor in Kalpakkam.
A major upturn in India’s relations with the US, its allies and the West in general, has also catalysed China’s approach to India and led to better mutual understanding and expanding bilateral cooperation. This remains so despite the standoff on border issues, persisting Pakistan-China axis, and China’s reservations about India’s NSG membership.
As regards the strategic domain, ensuring a credible and survival deterrent comprising a nuclear triad is on track. However, recent years have seen a steady deterioration of geopolitics, adding uncertainties and grave misgivings about the future. Sooner than later, the strategic domain may not comprise only conventional and nuclear but increasingly the cyber and outer space dimensions. Also slipping from the front burner is the reduced salience of nuclear weapons, even though serious questions dog their utility except in ‘deterrent only’ mode. Given these uncertainties, India must effectively maintain its credible minimum deterrent.
15 May 2018
Munich: 40,000 demonstrate against new police law
Markus Salzmann
Last Thursday, more than 40,000 people demonstrated in Munich against the new Bavarian Police Law (PAG). Organizers of the demonstration and the city administration had expected about 7,000 participants, but more and more people are no longer prepared to tolerate the construction of a police state and unrelenting attacks on basic democratic rights.
Thousands have already taken to the streets in recent weeks in the Bavarian cities of Nuremberg, Erlangen and Regensburg, to demonstrate against the extension of police powers and the assault on civil liberties.
Due to the high number of protesters, the planned starting rally at Munich’s Marienplatz had to be cancelled and the city centre was closed to traffic. Participants travelled from all over Bavaria and also came from other German states. Especially prominent in the protest in the Bavarian state capital were young people. The demonstration was organised by the so-called “noPAG” alliance, which includes political parties, trade unions, lawyers associations, the Bavarian Association of Journalists and a number of other organisations.
The law introduced by the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) is due to be adopted on Tuesday in the Bavarian state parliament, despite much criticism of its provisions. The Society for Freedom (GFF) and a former federal interior minister, Gerhart Baum (FDP), plan to lodge constitutional lawsuits against the new law.
Lawyers refer to the law as the toughest piece of German police legislation since 1945. “The character of the police will change completely, we will see police with powers that have not existed since 1945,” was the conclusion drawn by the renowned constitutional lawyer Hartmut Wächtler.
The PAG is indeed unprecedented in Germany’s history since the fall of the Nazi regime. The powers of the police are to be massively expanded, and they will also be empowered to carry out extensive surveillance and intelligence operations.
Until now the police could only carry out measures to prevent crime if they had indications of a “concrete danger”—now an “imminent danger” is enough. Previously the police needed concrete evidence or even a legal warrant in order to monitor a person or a group and proceed against them. According to the new law, mere suspicion is sufficient.
The PAG enables the police to conduct nationwide surveillance without any significant restrictions. Police can film demonstrations even if criminal offences are not expected. They can take “overview photos” and compare them with existing files. The law permits the use of “systems for the automatic recognition and evaluation of patterns related to objects and the behaviour of persons.”
In future, police officers will wear bodycams on their uniforms which will run continuously. A legal regulation for the preservation of recordings does not exist, meaning the tapes can be stored and used as long as desired.
This is aimed at creating the legal basis for facial recognition. As is already the case in Berlin, facial recognition programs in public spaces are also on the agenda for Bavaria.
The surveillance of private data on computers is in future to be permitted for “preventive” purposes and without concrete suspicion of a possible offence, using so-called Trojan software. The technology can also be used to collect and store remote data, i.e., when the data is stored in the “cloud.” Data can also be manipulated or deleted.
Police will also be able to confiscate parcels and letters without judicial authorisation, once again in the case of so-called “imminent danger.” This completely eliminates existing provisions regarding postal secrecy. At the same time, the police can interfere with telecommunications and “interrupt or stop communication links through the use of technical means,” without any evidence pointing to a criminal offence.
A central element of the PAG is cooperation by police with other state agencies. In future, personal data can transmitted at any time to the secret services in Germany and also other countries—once again in the absence of any concrete evidence of a crime.
The police will be able to carry out their own intelligence operations, working with undercover investigators using false identities, again without a court order. Such agents can then spy on discussions in social networks or in the meetings of political groups.
The PAG is the latest stage in a massive domestic rearmament program. In July last year, the state government introduced so-called “infinity custody,” according to which suspects can be detained for up to three months, after which a judge must again decide whether to extend his sentence. There is no longer any maximum time limit. An actual crime does not have to have been committed.
The state government reacted with open contempt for the “noPAG” participants and their right to demonstrate. Interior Minister Joachim Herrmann (CSU) accused critics of the PAG of propagating “lying propaganda” and accused them of “misleading inexperienced people.” Government politicians reaffirmed their determination to enforce the law in all circumstances, regardless of the broad opposition.
The “noPAG” demonstration was joined by the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Greens, the Left Party and even the Free Democrats (FDP), who are all looking for votes in the upcoming Bavarian state election. In fact, these parties are involved in adopting similar legislation at a federal level and in those states where they rule. The Bavarian Police Law serves as a role model.
The Bavarian PAG was drafted under the leadership of the former state premier Horst Seehofer (CSU), who now leads the Interior and Home Office in the grand coalition government. Seehofer is a militant advocate of a “strong state” and has the full support of the SPD. Following Seehofer’s inauguration as interior minister at the end of March, Eva Högl declared in the Bundestag, on behalf of the SPD parliamentary group: “Mr. Seehofer, we look forward to working with you.” Together “with the federal states” the SPD sought to “better equip the police, the judiciary and the security authorities.”
In the state of Saxony, where the SPD governs together with the CDU, the draft of a police law similar to that in Bavaria already exists. And in North Rhine-Westphalia, where an alliance of CDU and FDP heads the state government, a similar draft is to be decided upon. The Left Party also supports the demand for more police.
The drive to build a police state has its roots in growing social contradictions and the return to militarism in Germany. Such an agenda is incompatible with democracy. The ruling class is again preparing to suppress the class struggle and political resistance by force.
Election result in Iraq portends further political and social conflict
James Cogan
Iraq’s election last Saturday was marked by mass disaffection, poor official organisation and allegations of outright vote-rigging. No grouping of parties has won anywhere near the support needed to form government in the 329-seat parliament.
Nationally, just 44.52 percent of eligible voters cast a ballot, compared with turnouts of at least 60 percent in previous elections. In the capital Baghdad, participation barely reached 32 percent.
The outcome portends yet more political conflict in every region of Iraq, with class and social divisions emerging to the fore, after more than 15 years of devastation by the US and its allies.
Of the two million people forced from their homes since 2014 by the US-backed war against Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), as few as 300,000 were even registered. The provinces most affected by the war were those with significant Sunni Muslim populations, such as Anbar in the west and Nineveh in the northwest. Those areas saw some of the lowest participation rates in the election.
In the three provinces of the autonomous Kurdish Region and the province of Kirkuk, parties opposed to the dominant Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and its alleged nepotism are complaining of fraud and demanding new elections or a vote recount. Police have been set on demonstrators and violence may escalate.
The Shiite coalition headed by outgoing US-backed Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi, which had been predicted to win significant support, suffered a debacle. It won only 42 seats and will have to engage in weeks or even months of backroom negotiations to form a coalition that agrees to keep Abadi as prime minister.
A rival Shiite coalition headed by Nouri al-Maliki, who was pressured by Washington to resign as prime minister in 2014 after ISIS seized control of the country’s west and north, won just 25 seats.
The “Fatah” coalition headed by Hadi al-Amiri, won 47 seats to become the second-largest bloc in the parliament. Amiri heads the Badr Organisation, an Iranian-linked Shiite fundamentalist movement that gave the greatest support to the US occupation after 2003, alongside the PUK and other Kurdish nationalist parties.
Badr provided the personnel for US-trained Iraqi special forces death squads, which murdered tens of thousands of people suspected of opposing the occupation and supporting the former Baathist regime of Saddam Hussein.
From 2011-2012, Badr and other Shiite-based militias sent forces into Syria to fight alongside government troops against US-backed “rebels.” After ISIS entered Iraq in 2014, Badr supplied many of the militiamen who fought alongside US and Iraqi government troops. Amiri’s coalition won votes in the election, largely by promoting the role of its militia in defeating ISIS.
The largest bloc in the parliament, with 54 seats, will be the “Alliance of Revolutionaries for Reform.” This highly unstable grouping is led by the Sadrist movement that follows bourgeois nationalist cleric Moqtada al-Sadr and the Stalinist Iraqi Communist Party (CP). It won solid support in the working-class suburbs and slums of Baghdad and other major cities.
The bloc is wracked by contradictions. The Iraqi CP, in line with its history of collaboration with imperialism, fully supported the 2003 US invasion and occupation. Sadr’s movement, which has its main base of support in the poorest working-class areas of Baghdad, initially opposed it. In 2004, Sadr called for armed resistance and his Mahdi Army suffered heavy losses in pitched battles with American and British forces in Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Karbala, and other cities in the majority Shiite provinces of Iraq.
Sadr continued to verbally oppose the US occupation on Iraqi nationalist grounds but his movement turned to sectarian violence against Sunni-based forces in 2006. The Mahdi Army was blamed for some of the worst atrocities that forced a large proportion of the Sunni population of Baghdad to flee their homes into segregated cantons. After 2007, the Sadrists largely called off resistance and joined the jockeying for parliamentary power, including by taking ministries in the Shiite-dominated occupation governments at various times.
Sadr formed the alliance with the CP in 2016, based on seeking increased positions and privilege through common denunciations of the appalling poverty that faces the working class. Under conditions of growing US-Iranian tensions, Sadr also ramped up nationalist condemnations of Iran’s influence over the Shiite parties of Iraq, accusing Tehran of seeking to take over the country and its resources.
Outgoing Prime Minister Abadi has indicated he is prepared to hold talks with the Sadrist bloc over the formation of a new regime. Fatah, however, has said it opposes any role in the government for parties like the CP that advance a nominally secular perspective. This stance appears to be intended more to pressure Abadi and other political groupings to exclude the Sadrists and their anti-Iranian position.
It is entirely conceivable that US agencies will respond by encouraging a bloc between Abadi, Maliki and the Sadrists. While Sadr is presented in the establishment media as “anti-American,” he has demonstrated in the past his willingness to collaborate with the US to protect or advance the interests of the layer of the Shiite elite that he represents.
Under conditions in which the Trump administration has repudiated the 2015 nuclear accord with Iran and tensions are rising rapidly in the region, Washington may promote the Sadrists as a counterweight against Tehran’s influence within Iraq.
Mass murder in Gaza
Bill Van Auken
The Israeli military slaughtered dozens of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators and wounded thousands more in Gaza on Monday. As this atrocity was being carried out, a grotesque ceremony was unfolding barely 50 miles away to mark the formal opening of a US embassy in the divided and occupied city of Jerusalem.
The two events—occurring on the 70th anniversary of Israel’s declaration of independence—were juxtaposed by the media, broadcast simultaneously on split screens by television networks. What could not be concealed was the fact that the opening of the American embassy was entirely in line with and, indeed, a statement of political support for the massacre taking place at the security fence separating the impoverished occupied territory from Israel.
The number of unarmed Palestinian protesters shot dead by Israel Defense Forces (IDF) snipers on the eastern border of Gaza rose to at least 60 Tuesday, with over 2,700 others wounded, many suffering grievous injuries from live ammunition that will almost certainly drive up the death toll. Many of the injured who survive will lose one or more limbs as a result of Israeli sniper fire. Palestinian ambulance teams were reportedly unable to collect some of the bodies of protesters who were cut down as they reached the heavily fortified fence.
Among the dead were at least eight children under the age of 16, including a 12-year-old and one young girl. The wounded included 78 women and 203 children, the Palestinian Ministry of Health in Gaza reported.
This deliberate mass killing of refugees demanding the right to return to the homes and villages from which their families were violently expelled 70 years ago with the founding of the state of Israel is a monstrous criminal act.
The lethal violence unleashed by the Israeli military included air strikes, tank shelling and the dropping of flammable material on tent encampments where Palestinian families had gathered.
This unbridled state violence is motivated not by any lethal threat from the tens of thousands of unarmed demonstrators. The IDF, while killing well over 100 Palestinians, has suffered not a single casualty since the “Great March of Return” protests began in Gaza on March 30.
Rather, the elementary right demanded by the youth marching into gunfire poses an existential threat to the entire Zionist project of carving out a Jewish state based upon racial and religious exclusivity through the dispossession of the Palestinian people.
All those involved in this mass killing, from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet, their enablers in Washington, down to the snipers firing the bullets, are collectively and personally responsible for war crimes. As the Nuremberg trials of the Nazi war criminals established, soldiers are able and obliged to refuse an illegal order to wantonly kill civilians. Only an army saturated with racist and fascistic ideology can be counted on to commit such crimes.
The carnage on the Gaza border was matched by the atmosphere of criminality and reaction at the US embassy ceremony, which was staged before an audience of right-wing Israeli and American politicians, army commanders and leading rabbis.
Present for the occasion was Sheldon Adelson, the Las Vegas casino mogul whose millions have gone to fund Zionist settlements in the occupied West Bank as well as Donald Trump’s presidential campaign. Also present was Joseph Lieberman, the former Democratic senator and vice-presidential candidate, who drafted the 1995 US legislation—supported overwhelmingly by both parties—that called for transferring the US embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.
Further underscoring the bipartisan support for Israel’s criminal policy, Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer of New York hailed the opening of the Jerusalem embassy as “long overdue,” adding, “I applaud President Trump for doing it.”
Providing an opening invocation was Robert Jeffress, the right-wing Dallas Baptist preacher who has declared that “all Jews will go to hell” and that Islam is “a heresy from the pit of hell.” He spoke alongside an Israeli rabbi who has described blacks as “monkeys.” Also present was another prominent “Christian Zionist,” John Hagee, who has declared that Hitler was “a hunter” sent by God to fulfill biblical prophesy by chasing the Jews into Israel. Such are the friends of the Israeli state.
While Trump appeared via video, the main speech was given by his son-in-law Jared Kushner, who told the audience, “We stand with Israel because we both believe in human rights, democracy worth defending, and believe that we know that it is the right thing to do.” Nothing could provide a more graphic exposure of the “human rights” and “democracy” promoted by Washington than US support for the mass killing of civilian protesters by the Israeli military.
Kushner went on to blame the Palestinians for their own deaths, declaring to applause that “those provoking violence are part of the problem and not part of the solution.” This position was concretized Monday afternoon by a White House spokesman who rebuffed repeated questions about whether Washington was calling on Israel to exercise restraint. He insisted that the “cynical actions” of Hamas, the bourgeois Islamist party that administers the territory, were entirely to blame for the massacre.
The corporate media has done its best to conceal the scale of the crime being carried out in Gaza. Television networks in the US gave the bloodbath short shrift, while making no criticism of Israel’s savage repression. One can easily imagine the reaction had such killings been carried out by the government in Russia, Iran, Venezuela or any other country targeted by the hypocritical “human rights” imperialists.
The European powers issued hand-wringing statements on the Gaza bloodbath that only point to their own complicity. The European Union’s foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini called for Israel to respect the “principle of proportionality in the use of force’”—something that it clearly will not do—while demanding that Hamas insure that the protests “remain strictly nonviolent.”
For their part, the Arab bourgeois regimes that once falsely postured as defenders of the Palestinian people have turned their backs on the carnage in Gaza. The Saudi monarchy, which has aligned itself firmly with the US and Israel in preparations for a region-wide war with Iran, welcomes the repression.
The Egyptian regime of Gen. Abdel-Fateh al-Sisi issued a hypocritical statement declaring that it “rejects the use of force against peaceful marches demanding legitimate and just rights.” This came from a government that consolidated its power by massacring 1,600 followers of the elected president backed by the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Mursi, toppled in a 2013 coup. The Egyptian regime has demanded that the Gaza protests stop, fearing that the contagion of mass resistance could spill across its own border.
In exchange for suppressing the demonstrators, Cairo has offered to open up the country’s border crossing to Gaza to allow in food, fuel, medicine and other vital supplies that have been stopped by Israel. Tel Aviv has closed down its one open border crossing in retaliation for the protests, threatening to throw the territory’s fragile infrastructure into a state of complete collapse.
There is no fundamental difference between what the Israeli government has done in Gaza and the actions carried out by the most reactionary regimes in history, from British colonialism’s mass killing of Indians in Amritsar in 1919, to the South African apartheid regime’s massacre at Sharpeville in 1960 to the crimes of the Nazi regime itself.
Attempts by Israel to justify its slaughter of Palestinians with references to the Holocaust are morally obscene, as are the efforts to intimidate those who denounce these crimes by labeling them as anti-Semites. This was grotesquely illustrated by Israeli Security Minister Gilad Erdan, who said on Monday that the scale of the death toll on the Gaza border “doesn’t indicate anything—just as the number of Nazis who died in the world war doesn’t make Nazism something you can explain or understand.”
Only a deeply diseased and demoralized society could produce such a comparison between the desperate youth of Gaza, imprisoned by the Israeli military in a territory where they confront 60 percent unemployment, mass poverty and deprivation, with Nazis. The reality is that the Israeli occupation and repression have produced conditions that resemble nothing so much as the Warsaw Ghetto, replete with snipers ready to kill anyone attempting to get out.
Israel as a society and a country is heading toward the abyss. Regardless of the support it enjoys from Washington and other imperialist powers, in the eyes of millions around the world it is viewed as a criminal state, having lost all moral and political legitimacy. No government claiming to be democratic has ever committed such atrocities. The crimes in Gaza are the end product of the methods through which the state was founded 70 years ago and all of the consequences since.
Behind the Zionist myths of Israel representing a “safe haven” for the Jewish people, the onslaught against Gaza and the drive by Tel Aviv toward a wider war in the Middle East are in large measure driven by the desperation of the country’s capitalist ruling class to divert social and class tensions outward by promoting fear, anti-Arab chauvinism and militarism. Israel is second only to the US as the most socially unequal of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries, with a 22 percent poverty rate and one of the world’s highest per capita concentrations of billionaires.
The bloody events in Gaza pose with utmost urgency the necessity of uniting the working class, Arab and Jewish alike, across national, religious and sectarian divides in a common struggle against imperialism, Zionism and the Arab bourgeoisie on the basis of a socialist and internationalist program.
There is no national road out of the present bloody impasse, either in the continuation of the crisis-ridden Zionist project or in the chimera of a “two-state solution” based on the creation of a Bantustan-style Palestinian state under the rule of a corrupt native bourgeoisie.
At the same time, the massacre in Gaza constitutes an urgent warning to workers everywhere. The Israeli state’s turn to savage repression is part of a shift to the right by capitalist governments all over the world. The indifference of the media and bourgeois governments to the mowing down of unarmed Palestinian demonstrators is an indication of their readiness to carry out and justify even greater crimes in any country where they face mass resistance.
Islamic State Partnerships in West Asia: First Ba’athists, Then Kurds
Pieter jan-Dockx
With its attack on Shia militias, the Islamic State (IS) has recently regained prominence in northern Iraq. However, the brief period between the declared victory over IS and its current re-emergence -roughly December 2017-February 2018 - saw the manifestation of a new insurgent group called the 'White Banners'. Named after its white banner with a lion’s head in the centre, the group was mainly responsible for attacks in the Kirkuk area. While no apparent official statements were made by the group, there is ample evidence suggesting that the faction was an alliance between IS and Kurdish organisations, possibly the Kurdish Free Life Party (PJAK). Although PJAK fighters had covertly joined the Kurdish Peshmerga in the battle against IS, the Iraqi government's takeover of territories contested by both Kurds and Arabs like Kirkuk in October 2017 facilitated a strategic alignment between the groups. This commentary investigates recent and past IS partnerships that have gone unreported in mainstream media. It concludes that IS only cooperates with other insurgent factions when it finds itself in a position of weakness. When in a position of strength, the group aims to monopolise the insurgency.
Cooperation first occurred after the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. At that time, IS’ predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), started collaborating with the nationalist Ba’athist insurgents of the ‘Jaish Rijaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandiyya (JRTN)’. In late 2013, around the time of Sunni protests against their marginalisation by the government, IS - at this time known as ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’ - expanded its collaboration with the JRTN.
In both instances, IS found itself in a position of relative weakness in Iraq and thus decided to form a partnership with the JRTN. In 2011, ISI faced extensive pressure from security forces and local tribal fighters. It also lacked the manpower to pose a real challenge to these state-backed fighters. The group’s ‘breaking the walls’ campaign, in which prisons were targeted to free its fighters and boost its ranks, only started later, in July 2012.
Further, although the 2013 anti-government protests formed the perfect opportunity for ISIS to instigate sectarian strife in Iraq, the group had largely allocated its resources in Syria where it intended to take advantage of the civil war. Therefore, the Salafists decided to team up with the JRTN, whose political front was leading several protests but lacked the required tactical expertise to challenge the government beyond peaceful protests. In January 2014, their combined efforts seized control of Fallujah for several days after which it was retaken by the security forces. Thus, even with pooled resources, ISIS’ partnership still proved weak vis-à-vis the Iraqi security forces.
On the contrary, when ISIS was able to attain a position of strength and become the dominant insurgent group in Iraq, it ended its partnerships and turned against its former allies. While the January battle for Fallujah was still very much a combined effort, the June 2014 takeover of Mosul was essentially spearheaded by ISIS. Having established full control over Raqqa, ISIS was able to allocate more resources to Iraq. Although the group still allowed the JRTN to exist in the fringes of the insurgency, it soon turned against its partners, which were subsequently removed from the newly-established ‘Caliphate’.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the recent alliance between IS and the Kurdish group. Cooperation between both actors manifested itself after IS lost most of its territory in Iraq to the government. The ‘White Banner’ phenomenon even indicates that IS found itself in a more precarious position than at the time of its partnership with the JRTN. While in past alliances IS still operated under its own name and flag, during its recent cooperation with Kurdish fighters, it accepted the use of an alternative representation. As it is only in the Kurds’ interest to use different symbols, it can be assumed that the demand was made by the Kurdish factions and a weakened IS agreed.
The recent resurgence of IS activity in northern Iraq did not feature White Banner attacks, confirming the hypothesis that a strengthened IS is unlikely to cooperate with others. Two possible scenarios can be further hypothesised. One scenario suggests that IS was able to demand the usage of its own name and credentials in the attacks, meaning they now find themselves in a relatively stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the Kurdish resistance group. Another scenario could be that in this moment of strength, the Salafists ended all cooperation with the Kurds and the White Banners were dissolved.
In both instances, the ideological difference between the groups is further evidence of the necessity of their cooperation. While IS is a Salafist organisation that even labelled al Qaeda as “the Jews of jihad,” the JRTN finds itself at the other end of the spectrum as a nationalist, Ba’athist, non-sectarian, pan-Arabist organisation. Similarly, PJAK is a leftist-nationalist organisation that does not espouse IS’ ideology. Thus, while cooperation with another Salafist group could possibly be explained by ideological motives, the ideological distance between IS, the JRTN, and the Kurdish faction supports the idea that the partnerships were borne out of material considerations.
To sum up, the recent partnership between IS and Kurdish nationalistsis not the first time the Salafist organisation has cooperated with other (non-Islamist) groups. These instances indicate that IS only participates in alliances when it finds itself in a position of weakness. Given a chance, IS will end its cooperation.
With its attack on Shia militias, the Islamic State (IS) has recently regained prominence in northern Iraq. However, the brief period between the declared victory over IS and its current re-emergence -roughly December 2017-February 2018 - saw the manifestation of a new insurgent group called the 'White Banners'. Named after its white banner with a lion’s head in the centre, the group was mainly responsible for attacks in the Kirkuk area. While no apparent official statements were made by the group, there is ample evidence suggesting that the faction was an alliance between IS and Kurdish organisations, possibly the Kurdish Free Life Party (PJAK). Although PJAK fighters had covertly joined the Kurdish Peshmerga in the battle against IS, the Iraqi government's takeover of territories contested by both Kurds and Arabs like Kirkuk in October 2017 facilitated a strategic alignment between the groups. This commentary investigates recent and past IS partnerships that have gone unreported in mainstream media. It concludes that IS only cooperates with other insurgent factions when it finds itself in a position of weakness. When in a position of strength, the group aims to monopolise the insurgency.
Cooperation first occurred after the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. At that time, IS’ predecessor, the Islamic State of Iraq (ISI), started collaborating with the nationalist Ba’athist insurgents of the ‘Jaish Rijaal al-Tariqa al-Naqshabandiyya (JRTN)’. In late 2013, around the time of Sunni protests against their marginalisation by the government, IS - at this time known as ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS)’ - expanded its collaboration with the JRTN.
In both instances, IS found itself in a position of relative weakness in Iraq and thus decided to form a partnership with the JRTN. In 2011, ISI faced extensive pressure from security forces and local tribal fighters. It also lacked the manpower to pose a real challenge to these state-backed fighters. The group’s ‘breaking the walls’ campaign, in which prisons were targeted to free its fighters and boost its ranks, only started later, in July 2012.
Further, although the 2013 anti-government protests formed the perfect opportunity for ISIS to instigate sectarian strife in Iraq, the group had largely allocated its resources in Syria where it intended to take advantage of the civil war. Therefore, the Salafists decided to team up with the JRTN, whose political front was leading several protests but lacked the required tactical expertise to challenge the government beyond peaceful protests. In January 2014, their combined efforts seized control of Fallujah for several days after which it was retaken by the security forces. Thus, even with pooled resources, ISIS’ partnership still proved weak vis-à-vis the Iraqi security forces.
On the contrary, when ISIS was able to attain a position of strength and become the dominant insurgent group in Iraq, it ended its partnerships and turned against its former allies. While the January battle for Fallujah was still very much a combined effort, the June 2014 takeover of Mosul was essentially spearheaded by ISIS. Having established full control over Raqqa, ISIS was able to allocate more resources to Iraq. Although the group still allowed the JRTN to exist in the fringes of the insurgency, it soon turned against its partners, which were subsequently removed from the newly-established ‘Caliphate’.
A similar conclusion can be drawn from the recent alliance between IS and the Kurdish group. Cooperation between both actors manifested itself after IS lost most of its territory in Iraq to the government. The ‘White Banner’ phenomenon even indicates that IS found itself in a more precarious position than at the time of its partnership with the JRTN. While in past alliances IS still operated under its own name and flag, during its recent cooperation with Kurdish fighters, it accepted the use of an alternative representation. As it is only in the Kurds’ interest to use different symbols, it can be assumed that the demand was made by the Kurdish factions and a weakened IS agreed.
The recent resurgence of IS activity in northern Iraq did not feature White Banner attacks, confirming the hypothesis that a strengthened IS is unlikely to cooperate with others. Two possible scenarios can be further hypothesised. One scenario suggests that IS was able to demand the usage of its own name and credentials in the attacks, meaning they now find themselves in a relatively stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the Kurdish resistance group. Another scenario could be that in this moment of strength, the Salafists ended all cooperation with the Kurds and the White Banners were dissolved.
In both instances, the ideological difference between the groups is further evidence of the necessity of their cooperation. While IS is a Salafist organisation that even labelled al Qaeda as “the Jews of jihad,” the JRTN finds itself at the other end of the spectrum as a nationalist, Ba’athist, non-sectarian, pan-Arabist organisation. Similarly, PJAK is a leftist-nationalist organisation that does not espouse IS’ ideology. Thus, while cooperation with another Salafist group could possibly be explained by ideological motives, the ideological distance between IS, the JRTN, and the Kurdish faction supports the idea that the partnerships were borne out of material considerations.
To sum up, the recent partnership between IS and Kurdish nationalistsis not the first time the Salafist organisation has cooperated with other (non-Islamist) groups. These instances indicate that IS only participates in alliances when it finds itself in a position of weakness. Given a chance, IS will end its cooperation.
China: Naval Drill and Regime Legitimacy
Palden Sonam
President Xi Jinping reviewed the largest naval exercise in China’s history in the disputed South China Sea (SCS) on 12 April, barely two days after the USS Theodore Roosevelt sailed through the same troubled sea as in what the US called normal routine training. The timing and venue of the military drill appears to challenge US' regional presence, but this is a premature reading. The US enjoys naval supremacy over 95 per cent of the world's oceans while China is still in the process of developing a strong navy. China's naval display is thus aimed more at its domestic audience, other claimants of the disputed sea, and to some extent, Taiwan, rather than the US. For the single-party state, such a visible demonstration of power is largely to burnish the regime’s image at home, as an assertive posture can easily play into a powerful nationalist narrative around the rise of a strong China.
In his address to a gathering of 100,000 naval officers, Xi said that the need for China to build a strong navy “has never been more urgent than today,” and that it is required for China’s national rejuvenation. According to recent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, while Chinese people became prosperous under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, under Xi, China has become a strong country. Making China powerful as a state is an important element of Xi’s 'China Dream', and a massive show of military might thus may have to do with the development of his own cult of personality. What can also be gathered from this drill and Xi’s speech to the military is that there is a clear paradigm shift in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, from Deng’s low profile and cautious approach to a more assertive and demonstrative one.
First, in his speech as the indefinite president of China at the conclusion of the 2018 National People's Congress, Xi said that any attempt to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity will receive the “punishment of history.” After the Roosevelt sailed through the SCS, Xi had to take measures to match his words with action, especially with the passage of a US carrier through waters to which Beijing lays such strong claims. The ensuing Chinese actions would thus convey to the country its intent to safeguard territoriality and sovereignty, while bolstering the nationalist narrative.
Second, as the chief of the armed forces and as an exhibition of the long strides made by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under his leadership, the drill was important for Xi at a personal level. By overseeing the largest Chinese naval drill till date, Xi projected himself as a hero figure in the development and modernisation of what he called a “first class navy.” This message also further underlines the nationalist sentiments the CCP wishes to strengthen, as well as Xi’s desire to project his own power within the party and the PLA, given that this was the first military exercise after the abolition of his term limit.
Third, this show of naval force serves as a warning to China's smaller neighbours in Southeast Asia who disagree with its claims to the SCS and protest against its activities in the sea, such as construction of artificial islands and the area's militarisation. It displays China’s determination and preparedness to guard its interests.
Fourth, China looks determined to unify Taiwan, and often warns Taiwan about the dangers of going a "separate way." China's naval exercise could thus also be a reminder to Taiwan to respect Beijing’s red lines and the futility of resisting eventual national reunification. Taking over Taiwan is a significant part of Xi’s mission for national rejuvenation. In fact, a week after the drill, China again launched a live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait, and Chinese media hailed it as a warning to those who advocate Taiwan’s independence. The US had recently passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which is seen by China as yet another attempt to damage cross-Strait relations.
Conclusion
Legitimacy has always been an important issue for the CCP, with implications for regime survival in the long-term. With economic growth slowing down in the midst of rising income disparity, ecological degradation and unemployment rates, the party state is likely to tap more into nationalism as the bedrock of its pursuit of legitimacy. In the event of widespread public discontentment within and outside the party, China may engage in some foreign adventures to divert public attention to an external enemy. Chinese nationalism today emphasises the idea of a strong China that can stand upto any big power, rather than a weak China that still bemoans a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism. Today’s proud China is also increasingly an assertive China as well.
President Xi Jinping reviewed the largest naval exercise in China’s history in the disputed South China Sea (SCS) on 12 April, barely two days after the USS Theodore Roosevelt sailed through the same troubled sea as in what the US called normal routine training. The timing and venue of the military drill appears to challenge US' regional presence, but this is a premature reading. The US enjoys naval supremacy over 95 per cent of the world's oceans while China is still in the process of developing a strong navy. China's naval display is thus aimed more at its domestic audience, other claimants of the disputed sea, and to some extent, Taiwan, rather than the US. For the single-party state, such a visible demonstration of power is largely to burnish the regime’s image at home, as an assertive posture can easily play into a powerful nationalist narrative around the rise of a strong China.
In his address to a gathering of 100,000 naval officers, Xi said that the need for China to build a strong navy “has never been more urgent than today,” and that it is required for China’s national rejuvenation. According to recent Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda, while Chinese people became prosperous under Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, under Xi, China has become a strong country. Making China powerful as a state is an important element of Xi’s 'China Dream', and a massive show of military might thus may have to do with the development of his own cult of personality. What can also be gathered from this drill and Xi’s speech to the military is that there is a clear paradigm shift in the conduct of Chinese foreign policy, from Deng’s low profile and cautious approach to a more assertive and demonstrative one.
First, in his speech as the indefinite president of China at the conclusion of the 2018 National People's Congress, Xi said that any attempt to undermine China's sovereignty and territorial integrity will receive the “punishment of history.” After the Roosevelt sailed through the SCS, Xi had to take measures to match his words with action, especially with the passage of a US carrier through waters to which Beijing lays such strong claims. The ensuing Chinese actions would thus convey to the country its intent to safeguard territoriality and sovereignty, while bolstering the nationalist narrative.
Second, as the chief of the armed forces and as an exhibition of the long strides made by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) under his leadership, the drill was important for Xi at a personal level. By overseeing the largest Chinese naval drill till date, Xi projected himself as a hero figure in the development and modernisation of what he called a “first class navy.” This message also further underlines the nationalist sentiments the CCP wishes to strengthen, as well as Xi’s desire to project his own power within the party and the PLA, given that this was the first military exercise after the abolition of his term limit.
Third, this show of naval force serves as a warning to China's smaller neighbours in Southeast Asia who disagree with its claims to the SCS and protest against its activities in the sea, such as construction of artificial islands and the area's militarisation. It displays China’s determination and preparedness to guard its interests.
Fourth, China looks determined to unify Taiwan, and often warns Taiwan about the dangers of going a "separate way." China's naval exercise could thus also be a reminder to Taiwan to respect Beijing’s red lines and the futility of resisting eventual national reunification. Taking over Taiwan is a significant part of Xi’s mission for national rejuvenation. In fact, a week after the drill, China again launched a live-fire exercise in the Taiwan Strait, and Chinese media hailed it as a warning to those who advocate Taiwan’s independence. The US had recently passed the Taiwan Travel Act, which is seen by China as yet another attempt to damage cross-Strait relations.
Conclusion
Legitimacy has always been an important issue for the CCP, with implications for regime survival in the long-term. With economic growth slowing down in the midst of rising income disparity, ecological degradation and unemployment rates, the party state is likely to tap more into nationalism as the bedrock of its pursuit of legitimacy. In the event of widespread public discontentment within and outside the party, China may engage in some foreign adventures to divert public attention to an external enemy. Chinese nationalism today emphasises the idea of a strong China that can stand upto any big power, rather than a weak China that still bemoans a “century of humiliation” at the hands of Western and Japanese imperialism. Today’s proud China is also increasingly an assertive China as well.
14 May 2018
DiafrikInvest Europe-Africa Entrepreneurship Programme for African Entrepreneurs in Diaspora 2018
Application Deadline: 15th May 2018.
Eligible Countries: Africans of Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia origin living in Europe
About the Award: DiafrikInvest call for projects starts a new phase until 15 May 2018. 50 entrepreneurs of the diaspora will be supported in their business creation project, from Europe toward Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia. Your project might be the one we are looking for. Give it a boost!
Type: Entrepreneurship
Eligibility:
Eligible Countries: Africans of Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia origin living in Europe
About the Award: DiafrikInvest call for projects starts a new phase until 15 May 2018. 50 entrepreneurs of the diaspora will be supported in their business creation project, from Europe toward Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia. Your project might be the one we are looking for. Give it a boost!
Type: Entrepreneurship
Eligibility:
- At least one of the project partners is Moroccan, Senegalese or Tunisian eand lives in the European Union
- I have a business project toward Morocco, Senegal or Tunisia
- Team
- Impact
- Innovation
- Funding
- Markets
Number of Awards: 50
Value of Award:
Duration of Programme: 24 months
How to Apply:
Award Providers: DiafrikInvest
Value of Award:
- Coaching
- Networking
- Business Events
- Financing contacts
- Visibility at national & international level
- AND FOR THE TOP 20…
Duration of Programme: 24 months
How to Apply:
- Download the selection file!
- For more information: diaspora@agenceacim.com
Award Providers: DiafrikInvest
The Damage Trump Has Done in the Middle East
Patrick Cockburn
When Donald Trump was sworn in as president at the start of last year, many predicted that he would be a less explosive presence in the White House than he had been during the campaign. They hoped that he would be restrained by the permanent political and bureaucratic establishment in Washington and argued that radicals in power turn into compliant conservatives and seek to preserve the status quo.
At about this time, a friend sent me a clipping of a New York Times editorial dated 31 January 1933, with the title “Germany Ventures”. The writer recognised that there were qualms at the appointment as the head of the German government of a man who “has openly scorned it” and threatened to destroy it. But the editorial is reassuringly confident that this would not happen, citing many reasons such as the opposition of his cabinet colleagues who would oppose him “if he sought to translate the wild and whirling words of his campaign speeches into political action”.
Other limitations on the new leader’s power also suggested that nothing much would change: German finances were in strong and conservative hands; attempts to establish a dictatorship would provoke a general strike; German foreign policy would be unchanged; and President Paul von Hindenburg could unmake the new chancellor just as quickly as he had made him.
In a classic piece of political miscalculation, the editorial writer reassured readers: “It may be that we will see the ‘tamed’ Hitler of whom some Germans are hopefully speaking,” he said. “Always we may look for some such transformation when a radical demagogue fights his way into responsible office.” Judgement of the new German leader should be suspended until he had shown if he was more than “a flighty agitator” who would “compel the German people to take a leap into the dark”.
I took the point at the time that the friend who had sent me the clipping was seeking to point out how easy it was to underestimate the degree to which demagogues can be even more power-hungry and destructive in office than they were before. But I did not use the clipping because I felt that it was premature to compare Trump to the elected dictators of the past – of whom Mussolini and Hitler are only the worst examples – who won a majority at the polls and then tried to eliminate all opposition to their authority at home and abroad.
From Napoleon III to Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan today, populist nationalist strongmen have much in common: simpleminded slogans and vague promises guaranteed to win votes, attacks on independent media, contempt for the law (though lauding law and order), control and marginalisation of parliament, chauvinism, militarism, allegations of corruption and an incessant pursuit of power.
President Barack Obama predicted that Trump would find the American ship of state difficult to turn, but turn it did. The “grown-ups” in his cabinet, mostly former generals of whom so much as was expected, have come and gone. Those that remain are ignored and humiliated such as Secretary of State, Jim Mattis, who said that the Iran nuclear deal was doing its job.
Trump has been systematically blowing up the fixed points in American foreign policy, so the political temperature in the Middle East is continually rising. As one commentator put it, there are more unpredictable “moving parts” than ever before in the different crises, parts which may break loose at any moment.
This week saw the US pull out of the Iran nuclear accord and Israel make heavy airstrikes on Iranian targets in Syria. But the coming week may bring almost equally dangerous developments: on 12 May there is the Iraqi parliamentary election in which no party is likely to win a majority. The US and Iran are backing different sides to try to ensure that the next Iraqi government is favourable to them. Iraqis fear their country will be the arena in which the US and Iran fight for supremacy, with the odds favouring the Iranians if only because they, like the majority of Iraqis, are Shia Muslims.
Practical questions will arise after the election: what, for instance, will be the future for the 10,000 US soldiers and military contractors in Iraq but whose presence is not as necessary as it was before the defeat of Isis? As the US imposes stringent economic sanctions on Iran, will it penalise individuals, banks and companies in Iraq doing business with Iran? Iran has every incentive to route part of its business through Baghdad, where the US will have to step lightly in order to avoid alienating local allies.
Within two days of the Iraqi election, the US Embassy in Israel will move from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. Israeli and American flags will flutter in every street and there will be 150 giant billboards with the face of Donald Trump on them. This will happen on 14 May, the same day as tens of thousands of Palestinians will march in Gaza to try to break through the fence surrounding the enclave.
The demonstration comes at the end of seven weeks of protests called the “Great March of Return” in which the Palestinians sought to reassert their right to return to the land in Israel from which they were expelled or fled in 1947. At least 43 Palestinians have been killed and 1,700 wounded in the protests so far. The peace process between Israel and the Palestinians has long been moribund, but Trump is brazenly saying to the Palestinians that they count for nothing and can expect nothing from diplomacy.
The danger is that, like so many other populist nationalist strongmen, Trump will overplay his hand. From the eastern borders of Afghanistan to the Mediterranean, the US position is not strong. He looks to local powers like Israel and Saudi Arabia but they can do less for him than he imagines. There is a diplomatic price to be paid for ignoring European and other allies who see that appeasement of Trump gets them nowhere and is despised as a sign of weakness.
The problem is that Trump’s vision of the Middle East is made up of gobbets of neo-conservative propaganda supplemented by the self-serving views of Israeli and Saudi leaders. He may imagine that the Palestinian issue will go away, though it has stubbornly refused to do so for the past century. He may think that Iraq can be detached politically from Iran, but this is not going to happen. He appears to expect economic sanctions to lead to regime change or abject surrender by Iran, but there is no reason to believe this will happen. Trump may not intend war in the Middle East, but he cannot get what he wants without one – and maybe not even then.
The Eclipsing Iran Deal-Truth And Consequences
Arshad M Khan
International treaties and agreements are between countries — not between leaders or governments, for if that were the case they would not be worth the paper they were written on. The Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty with the Soviet Union was signed in 1972. Bush II withdrew unilaterally in 2001 citing a changed world. On June 1, 2017, Donald Trump announced the U.S. will cease all participation in the Paris Climate Treaty signed two years earlier. On Tuesday last he quit the Iran deal.
Two days later, the White House released the date and location of Mr. Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong-Un. One can only wonder what Kim is thinking. The last person voluntarily giving up nuclear weapons received a bayonet colonoscopy — hardly anyone’s preferred exit from this world — and that at the hands of the allies of a Nobel Peace Laureate US president. Fortunately, the circumstances in North Korea’s case are quite different: the other party, South Korea, is stable, seeks closer relations, in fact is the prime mover in the current initiative.
On the Iran deal breakup, the fallout is telling. The major European countries (UK, France and Germany) have the most to lose economically — a huge Airbus airplane contract is just one example. Always intended as a bargain, the deal offered Iran re-entry into world commerce in exchange for giving up nuclear ambitions. The U.S. now threatens reprisals against any companies violating its edict: obey U.S. sanctions or else … . The Europeans could choose to present a united front and protect their companies through legislation and similar reprisals. But who wants such an economic war? The companies themselves are likely to have commercial interests in the U.S. dwarfing anything in Iran.
The European hope lies now in a Trumpian disaster for the Republicans in the November midterm elections followed by ignominious defeat in the presidential election. But elections turn on the unexpected, and these countries’ pusillanimous responses only exposes them to the world as true US vassals.
Terminating a peace agreement inevitably raises the prospect of war. It would be a disaster. Iran commands the Strait of Hormuz and a blocked Persian Gulf could see a quadrupling or more in the price of oil, bringing the current economic and stock market boom to a crashing end. Missile attacks from Iran and its ally Hezbollah would cause havoc in Israel’s cities; asymmetric warfare in Syria and Iraq would cost American lives.
Doubtless, Iran would be drawn closer into the Russian-Chinese orbit and might even sign a defense pact with Russia — perhaps earlier still if it felt the approaching winds of war.
For all these reasons, war may appear to be a long shot, yet Trump’s advisors, notably, John Bolton and Mike Pompeo harbor an irrational hatred towards the country and Benjamin Netanyahu imagines it to be the last viable threat to neutralize. He also has a corruption indictment hanging over him, while Trump has his own legal troubles.
On the other hand, a bellicose Trump is just that … bellicose. As with North Korea, he could well be seeking a deal on better terms, namely, more restrictions for Iran in the future. Iran will not surrender its missiles; it might be more accommodating on future enrichment of nuclear fuels.
Let’s hope reason prevails … sometimes it does. Look at North Korea!
Seven killed in South Africa gold mine collapse
Eddie Haywood
Seven South African miners were killed on May 3 following the collapse of a mineshaft at a gold mine in Driefontein, near Carletonville, Gauteng. The collapse resulted from a 2.2 magnitude earthquake that caused a massive rock fall, which buried 13 miners. Six of the miners were trapped for several hours under the rubble, but were ultimately rescued.
The Masakhane gold mine is operated by mining giant Sibanye-Stillwater, headquartered in Johannesburg. The company is the largest producer of gold in South Africa and one of the largest gold producers in the world.
The incident follows a series of disastrous accidents at the mining company, including January’s calamity at Beatrix mine near Welkom in which 1,000 miners were trapped for over thirty hours due to a power outage. In February, a section of the Sibanye-Stillwater-owned Kloof gold mine collapsed, killing two miners. The company was forced to shut down operations temporarily pending a whitewash investigation.
Also in February, a mineworker at the Masakhane mine was crushed to death by a box containing gold ore.
The latest incident comes amid an overall rise in fatal mining accidents across the country in recent years. In 2017, 88 miners were killed in various accidents, a sharp increase over the previous year, in which 73 were killed. Since the start of 2018, there have been 33 mine deaths across South Africa.
In a cynical display of feigned sympathy for the miners killed, Sibanye-Stillwater CEO Neal Froneman told South African media that the company was working with the Department of Mineral Resources to “conduct a comprehensive investigation into the incident to prevent similar occurrences.”
Illustrating the ruthless drive for profit by Sibanye-Stillwater at the expense of workers, Froneman told the media in February of his approval of “business-friendly” US president Donald Trump. “America has become a very friendly place from a mining point of view, that’s one good thing that Trump has done,” he said.
South Africa’s trade union federation, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), and its affiliate, the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), last week picketed the headquarters of Sibanye-Stillwater in Johannesburg, with union officials demanding action on the company’s deteriorating mine safety standards.
NUM president Thamsanqa Piet Matosa said, “If safety measures had been implemented, this incident would not have happened. We believe Sibanye could have done more. We are here to remind the Chamber of Mines to ensure that mining companies observe the law. Miners have the right to be safe.”
Piet Matosa went on to condemn Sibanye-Stillwater’s treatment of mineworkers. “These people [the employers] are into profits,” he said. “They have no respect for workers. Some have never been underground to see the conditions of work. It is neglectful to send people who are not properly trained underground just to make profits.”
The declarations of the NUM are completely cynical and dishonest. The NUM, along with the ruling ANC government, with former NUM leader Cyril Ramaphosa at its head, coordinated the creation of the Farlam Commission to whitewash the NUM and ANC’s responsibility for the killing of 17 miners by South African police. The massacre occurred after mineworkers began a wildcat strike over low pay and intolerable working conditions at two Lonmin mines at Marikana in 2012.
The South African trade union bureaucracy has sought to bind the working masses to the pro-capitalist and corrupt ANC government.
Miners frequently experience catastrophic accidents due to the mining companies’ skirting of safety procedures in their drive to cut costs. But, with only the rarest of exceptions, no mining executives or directors are ever brought to account for their company’s criminal negligence.
The hazardous working conditions mineworkers face are by no means isolated to South Africa, or even the mining sector. Internationally, workers across all economic sectors face extremely hazardous working conditions.
In Poland, seven miners were trapped after an earthquake struck the Zofiowka mine on May 5, resulting in a tunnel collapse that left four miners dead. Two more were rescued and one remains missing. Mineworkers in Poland face extremely hazardous working conditions. In 2017, 15 miners were killed in accidents. So far in 2018, eight have been killed.
On May 4 in Pakistan, 23 coalminers were killed at mines in two separate incidents after methane gas explosions collapsed the mines. Sixteen were killed at Marwar coalfields and an additional five went missing. At Spin Carez a gas explosion-induced collapse left seven dead.
In the United States, the World Socialist Web Site has reported the case of Shannon Allen, an Amazon warehouse worker who was injured while performing her duties at a fulfillment center in Haslet, Texas. The treatment she has received at the hands of Amazon epitomizes the exploitation of the working class under capitalism.
The mine disaster in South Africa comes amid growing popular opposition to the ANC government of Cyril Ramaphosa, an administration that is staggeringly corrupt.
After suffering years of stagnant wages and a skyrocketing cost of living, public workers have threatened to strike, demanding that the government grant a 12 percent increase in wages. Workers are also demanding increased spending for public education and health care.
At one pole, five individuals in South Africa are worth a combined $14 billion, while at the other pole the South African masses experience chronic unemployment, lack of affordable education and health care, and a generalized decline in living standards.
The ANC, after coming to power nearly 25 years ago at the end of apartheid, has presided over an astonishing rise of social inequality. The ANC’s decades-long attack on the living standards of the working class shows the impossibility of securing social and political justice for the South African masses within the post-apartheid capitalist framework.
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