UK: “Operation Yellowhammer” details savage austerity and confirms plans for state repression post-Brexit

Thomas Scripps

On Wednesday evening, Boris Johnson’s government was forced to release its forecast for a no-deal Brexit, codenamed “Operation Yellowhammer.” The six-page document affirms the social and economic catastrophe threatened by a no-deal Brexit and underscores the danger of authoritarian rule in the UK.

While the government insists that the scenarios outlined in Yellowhammer represent “reasonable worst case assumptions,” a widely shared version of the document from the same day uses the phrase “base scenario.”

The release of the document disproves the government’s claims, made last summer when the Times first leaked details of Yellowhammer, that the forecast was an outdated hangover from Theresa May’s time as Conservative prime minister. The document is dated 10 days after Johnson became prime minister, confirming that Yellowhammer presents the expected outcome of a no-deal Brexit.

The initial problem identified is the hold-up of freight transport at the Channel Tunnel and Britain’s ports. The flow rate of HGVs could drop to 40-60 percent of its current levels for three months following Brexit, with lorries stuck for up to two-and-a-half days, before “improving” to 50-70 percent.

Some level of continued disruption is expected to last “significantly longer.” The breakdown of supply chains will “have an impact on the supply of medicines and medical supplies,” which, due to their short shelf life, are “particularly vulnerable.” The reduced supply of veterinary medicines will “reduce our ability to prevent and control [animal] disease outbreaks, with potentially detrimental impacts for... the environment, and wider food safety/availabilities and zoonotic diseases which can directly impact human health.”

The British Medical Association has described these points as “alarming,” saying they confirm its warnings about the threat of medical supply shortages in the case of a no-deal break with the EU.

As for food supplies, a no-deal Brexit will “reduce availability and choice of products and will increase price.” The document adds, “There is a risk that panic buying will cause or exacerbate” these problems.

Helen Dickinson of the British Retail Consortium commented, “Fresh food availability will decrease, consumer choice will decrease, and prices will rise.”

A no-deal Brexit threatens to “disrupt fuel supply in London and the South East” and “customer behaviour could lead to local shortages in other parts of the country.” In addition, “Significant electricity price increases” are expected, “with associated wider economic and political impacts.” An “increase in inflation following EU exit would significantly impact adult social care providers ... and may lead to provider failure.”

In one of the most telling passages, the document concludes that these effects will hit “vulnerable,” “low income” groups hardest, leading to a “rise in public disorder and community tensions.”

All of this is to say nothing of the impact of the government’s own economic plans for post-Brexit Britain. These include substantial tax cuts for the wealthy and the corporations, the removal of many labour protections, deeper social spending cuts, and the setting up of “free ports” to enable the hyper exploitation of large sections of the workforce. These measures add up to the wholesale destruction of living standards for a large majority of the population.

A no-deal scenario is also expected to immediately create flashpoints for international tensions. Confusion and conflict over fishing rights between UK and EU fishermen are thought “likely” to produce “violent disputes or blockading of ports.”

The document describes the government’s promise not to establish a hard border between Northern Ireland and the rest of Ireland as “unsustainable due to significant economic, legal and biosecurity risks and no effective unilateral mitigations to address this will be available.”

A legal case is ongoing against the government, challenging the legality of a no-deal Brexit on the grounds that it would violate the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 promises to protect. The argument was rejected by the Belfast High Court on Thursday, with the judge saying that the main aspects of the case “were inherently and unmistakably political,” but will be appealed. Raymond McCord, a campaigner for victims of the Northern Ireland Troubles who brought the case, says he plans to take it to the Supreme Court.

The situation outlined in Operation Yellowhammer is one in which democratic forms of rule cannot be maintained. While the media has noted the document’s reference to the “significant amounts of police resources” required to deal with protests, next to nothing has been said about the wider plans for repression known to be in motion.

Australian incarceration rate rising despite drop in crime

Martin Scott

A new report reveals that a higher percentage of Australians are imprisoned now than at any time since the end of the 19th century. In 2018, 221 in 100,000 Australians were incarcerated, an increase of 130 percent over the 1985 rate.

The incarceration rate for Aboriginal people is more than 10 times higher, at 2,481 in 100,000, meaning that they are more likely to be imprisoned than African-Americans in the United States.

From 1860—the earliest year for which data is available—to 1919, Australia’s incarceration rate fell from 650 in 100,000 to 78 in 100,000, after the country ceased being a collection of British penal colonies. The rate remained relatively steady at around 96 in 100,000 until 1985, when it began the current rapid rise.

The sharp increase over the past three decades comes despite a dramatic reduction in crime. Since 1983, motor vehicle theft has decreased by 65 percent, robbery 50 percent, break-ins 43 percent, and assault 29 percent, contributing to an overall reduction of 38 percent.

Until 1970, there was a strong correlation between homicide and incarceration rates, but in the past five decades the rate of homicides has fallen to record lows while prison numbers have increased.

The report, produced by federal Labor Party MP Andrew Leigh, dismisses the argument that increased incarceration lies behind the reduction in crime. Leigh writes: “Young disadvantaged men, with low levels of education and a high prevalence of mental illness, are unlikely to change their behaviour if the potential sentence is increased from ten to twenty years.”

Leigh also questions the effectiveness of prison rehabilitation programs, writing: “[P]risons are more likely to teach offenders how to commit more crimes than they are to provide skills that are useful in the formal labour market.”

This statement is well supported by the statistics. Of those entering prison, 73 percent have been imprisoned before—and 45 percent within the previous year. Upon release, 78 percent expect to be unemployed and more than half expect to be homeless.

The increased incarceration rate can be attributed to decades of “tough on crime” policies implemented at state and federal level by both Labor and Liberal-National governments.

One aspect of this is that illicit drug offences have been targeted by stricter sentencing, changes to bail laws and increased use of aggressive and invasive police strip searches.

In 2017–18, 5,451 strip searches were carried out by New South Wales (NSW) police (excluding searches on those already in custody), a 46.8 percent increase from 2014–15 and almost 20 times the 2006 figure.

More than half of those subjected to strip searches were 26 years old or younger, including 162 children aged between 10 and 17. While only 2.9 percent of the NSW population is Aboriginal, they accounted for 10 percent of strip searches.

More than four fifths of the charges laid as a result of strip searches are for possession of a small quantity of drugs. Across Australia, 16 percent of those in custody are convicted of, or charged with, drug offences. This figure began to increase in 2009, after remaining at 10 percent for the previous 23 years.

Far from addressing the social crisis behind the mounting epidemic of addiction, to substances both legal and illegal, the response of the state has been draconian punishment of drug users.

A Sentencing Council of Victoria study found that in 2016–17, 29 percent of those found guilty of minor drug offences were sent to prison—more than twice the 2007-08 rate of 13 percent.

More broadly, the introduction of standardised sentencing—with prescribed minimum and maximum sentences for certain offences, generally involving violence—and mandatory sentencing increased the chance of offenders being sent to prison, and lengthened their term.

Mandatory sentencing can apply to those convicted for specific crimes or to repeat offenders, regardless of severity of their acts.

Since 1985, average time served in prison has risen by 56 percent from 2.4 years to 3.7 years. Nine percent of prisoners are now serving sentences longer than 10 years, up from 2 percent in 1985.

According to Leigh’s report, the creation of new offences, including “one-punch” laws, knife possession, bush-fire arson and “cybercrime,” have contributed to the increased prisoner numbers. The introduction—with bipartisan support—of new anti-democratic laws imposing prison terms for protesters will likely lead to a further increase.

As basic social services such as health and education have been slashed, police budgets have swelled. Per-capita police numbers have increased by more than 10 percent since 1983. In the Northern Territory (NT), where there are more than twice as many police per-capita as any other state or territory, growth of the force has outpaced that of the general population by more than one third.

The NT also has the highest incarceration rate in Australia—955 per 100,000 adults, 4.3 times the national figure. Not coincidently, the territory has the highest per-capita indigenous population. The 28.8 percent of NT residents who are Aboriginal is compared to 3.3 percent nationwide, and they make up 85 percent of the territory’s prison population. In 2018, 2.9 percent of all Aboriginal adults in the NT were incarcerated.

UK government intensifies attack on freedom of movement

Margot Miller

Ahead of its threat to withdraw the UK from the European Union (EU) in a “no-deal” Brexit on October 31, Boris Johnson’s government is ramping up its anti-immigration agenda.

Last month, Home Secretary Priti Patel announced that freedom of movement to and from the EU would end immediately on October 31 if no deal on the UK’s terms of exit had been reached by that date. Johnson campaigned for the Tory leadership contest pledging that the UK would leave with or without a deal on the scheduled leave date at the end of October.

Last week, Patel, while maintaining the government’s commitment to ending free movement, announced that the policy change was being deferred for three years and the government would revert in the meantime to the policy of Johnson’s predecessor, Theresa May. All EU nationals arriving in the UK between October 31, 2019, and the end of 2020 will be granted three-year temporary immigration status, known as European Temporary Leave to Remain (Euro TLR), after which they will have to apply for visas to work or study in the UK.

Announcing the turnaround, Patel said the regime post-October 31 would be “tougher.” “Ending free movement as it currently stands will allow us to take the first, historic steps towards taking back control of our borders,” he declared.

“In the future,” she continued, “[W]e will introduce a new points-based immigration system built around the skills and talent people have—not where they are from.” This echoes Australia’s draconian points-based immigration system, which discriminates in favour of wealthy applicants and those whose labour power can be most readily exploited by employers.

Last week, Johnson prorogued parliament to prevent any challenge to his no-deal Brexit plans from Remain-supporting MPs. This, however, put an obstacle in the way of abrogating free movement on Brexit day. The government was warned that given the lack of time for a parliamentary debate and vote, it could face legal challenges, jeopardising a no-deal Brexit.

As the Financial Times noted, “[U]nder a no-deal Brexit, this [clampdown on freedom of movement] would have been difficult to implement quickly because EU law continues to apply until it is formally repealed in parliament.”

Prior to deferring the policy, the government planned to pass an Immigration Bill that would abolish freedom of movement. When it became clear such a bill could not pass by October 31, the government considered using provisions on the statute books under the European Union Withdrawal Act. This could have enabled restrictions on freedom of movement to be enacted without primary legislation.

The Sunday Times reported September 1 that “The government’s no-deal war cabinet—known as the XO committee—was told last week that doing so [ending freedom of movement on October 31] would result in ministers being taken to court, where they would have a 70 percent chance of losing.”

Despite reverting to May’s policy, chaos at the UK border threatens as the October deadline approaches. From the day the UK leaves the EU, a blue EU customs channel will disappear from UK ports and airports. All travelers will make a customs declaration via new red or green channels.

Many EU nationals wishing to work and live in the UK are already insisting that border control stamp the date of entry on their passports to have “physical endorsements.” Under new rules, only those who arrive before the end of October, and can prove it, are permitted to apply for longer-term residence in the UK.

The cessation of free movement, immediate or otherwise, will have a disastrous impact on the supply of labour in the UK, with similar repercussions on the continent. In the National Health Service, the UK’s biggest employer, 10 percent of employees are non-British EU nationals. According to Full Fact, immigration to the UK from EU countries was 202,000 in 2018, the lowest since 2009, due to uncertainties surrounding Brexit.

Brexit has created a profound sense of insecurity for the 3.6 million EU nationals currently residing in the UK. Many have been settled in the UK for decades. Mike Bohn, spokesman and co-founder of the 3-million group, which represents EU nationals in the UK, said the introduction of “temporary leave to remain” would add “yet another immigration status.”

EU nationals arriving before October 31, 2019, regardless of when they came, were given only until 2020 to apply for settled status under the EU settlement scheme. Only a third have applied so far. Patel’s previous threat to end free movement within weeks caused panic, leading to a spike in applications.

With a backlog of 100,000 applications, of the 1 million already processed, only 64 percent were granted settled status. The other 36 percent achieved “pre-settled status” because applicants had been in the UK less than five years.

Italy: Conte wins vote of confidence

Marianne Arens

On Monday and Tuesday, the Italian parliament voted confidence in the new government headed by Giuseppe Conte. The 66th post-World War II Italian government will continue the anti-working-class policies of its predecessors. In doing so, it will play into the hands of Matteo Salvini of the far-right Lega, who on Monday demonstrated together with fascists in the Palazzo Montecitorio, the seat of parliament, calling for fresh elections.

In both the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate, the delegations of the Five Star Movement (M5S) and the Democratic Party (PD) voted almost unanimously for Conte’s new cabinet. The supposedly “left” splits from the PD also agreed unreservedly. The largest of these, Liberi e Uguali (Free and Equal, LeU), had already been involved in government talks last week. The new health minister, Roberto Speranza, comes from its ranks.

Speranza belongs to the Articolo Uno party, which derives its name from the first article of the Italian Constitution (“Italy is a democratic republic founded on labour”). It is an amalgamation of former PD politicians who originally came from the Stalinist PCI (Italian Communist Party) and who separated from Matteo Renzi in 2017, including Pier Luigi Bersani, Massimo D’Alema and Guglielmo Epifani.

Typical is the comment of another Articolo Uno representative, Ernesto Abaterusso, who showered the new government with praise: Finally, there is “reasonable hope that something new will be created in Italy in the long term,” said Abaterusso. This would “hinder the racist and coarse Salvini right wing in the realisation of its plans.”

Such extravagant hopes are completely unfounded. The Conte II cabinet will not depart from the right-wing course of the previous government. On the contrary, it will continue the murderous refugee policy, advance the militarisation of society both internally and externally, and impose the austerity dictates of the European Union (EU) and Italian banks.

In his statements in both chambers, Conte made a clear commitment to the EU, emphasising, “We must do everything we can to improve cooperation in Europe.” In order to finally boost economic growth in Italy, it was necessary to “strengthen the instruments and economic governance of the European Union,” he said.

The clearest commitment to the EU is the election of the new economics minister, Roberto Gualtieri (PD). He is the head of the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee in the European Parliament and one of the EU’s three chief negotiators on Brexit. It will be up to him to present a budget in October for the next year that finds favour with the EU. This means it must enforce austerity measures of at least €23 billion.

Gualtieri’s appointment was “a blessing for Italy and for Europe,” commented Christine Lagarde, the former International Monetary Fund director and soon-to-become head of the European Central Bank. To top things off, on Tuesday, the EU Commission president designate, Ursula von der Leyen, appointed former Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni, a close associate of Gualtieri, as the incoming EU economic commissioner.

The banks reacted with noticeable relief. On the Milan stock exchange, the so-called “spread”—the gap between Italian and German government bond rates, considered to be the measure of Italian financial policy’s resilience—immediately improved. When Gualtieri’s name was announced, the spread halved to 150 points.

Among the 21 ministers in the cabinet that was sworn in on September 5 are nine Democrats and nine Five-Star politicians, one from Articolo Uno and two non-partisan members.

Lorenzo Guerini, the new defence minister, is also considered a reliable guarantor of the Italian state. Like Matteo Renzi, he belongs to the Catholic wing of the PD and comes from the Christian Democratic Margherita, which united with the PCI successor PDS in 2007 to become the Democratic Party (PD). From 2014 to 2017, Guerini was Renzi’s right-hand man and deputy party leader. Guerini is expected to adopt a more distanced posture in relation to Russia. The closeness of Lega chief Salvini to Vladimir Putin had been considered a threat to the military interests of Italy and the EU.

In his speeches in the Chamber of Deputies and in the Senate, Conte announced a “new humanism.” However, he immediately made it clear that this did not mean a more humane refugee policy. He called for a “modification” of the Dublin Treaty, the establishment of “European humanitarian corridors” and “more cooperation with countries of origin and transit to tackle trafficking and illegal immigration.” He made clear that “A sovereign state has the right to regulate access to its borders and repatriations [i.e., deportations].”

US study shows: Poverty and social inequality are killers

Patrick Martin

Poor Americans are nearly twice as likely to die before they reach old age as rich Americans. That is the grim conclusion of a study released this week by the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the investigative arm of Congress, on the impact of widening income and wealth disparities in the United States.

The study is based on extensive health and retirement surveys conducted by the Social Security Administration in 1992 and 2014. It examines a subset of the population, those between 51 and 61 years old in 1992, breaking this age group into five quintiles.

A homeless man moves his belongings from a street behind Los Angeles City Hall as crews prepared to clean the area Monday, July 1, 2019. (AP Photo/Richard Vogel)

As the accompanying chart shows, the GAO found that nearly half of those (48 percent) in the poorest quintile died before 2014, when they would have been between 73 and 83 years old. Of the wealthiest quintile, only a quarter (26 percent) died.

The connection between income and death rates was stark and irrefutable: from quintile to quintile, as income declines, death rates rise. The second-poorest fifth of the age group under study had the second-worst death rate, with 42 percent dead by 2014. The figures for the middle fifth and the second-highest fifth were 37 percent dead and 31 percent dead, respectively.

And while the poor have always gone to the grave earlier than the rich, the relative disparity is now worsening. According to several recent studies, the poorest 40 percent of women have lower life expectancies than their mothers, despite all the gains made by medical science over the past generation.

These figures provide insight into the staggering long-term human cost of poverty and inequality. The report says, in dispassionate, bureaucratic language, “GAO’s analysis … shows that differences in income, wealth, and demographic characteristics were associated with disparities in longevity.” Translated into plain language: poverty and inequality kill.

Other statistics reported this week give further indications of the deepening social crisis in America. The GAO report itself found that from 1989 to 2018, the labor force participation rate for those aged 55 or older rose from 30 percent to 40 percent, an increase of one-third. This shows the impact of stagnant incomes and the virtual disappearance of traditional pension plans. Older workers were forced to work longer and postpone retirement because they did not have enough money to live on.

A Census Bureau report issued Tuesday found a small drop in the poverty rate in 2018, but other social indicators were not so favorable. The total number of people in the US living in poverty remained appallingly high, at 38 million.

Median household income was $63,200, essentially unchanged from 2018. On a longer historical timeline, the Census report found that there has been virtually no increase in real wages for the past 20 years, since 1999, as wage gains have been wiped out by the rising cost of living.

The chart shows the survival rate for the poorest fifth and the wealthiest fifth of Americans aged 51 to 61 in 1992. By 2014, 48 percent of the poorest group were dead, compared to only 26 percent of the richest group.

The number of Americans without health insurance rose substantially in 2018, for the first time since the passage of Obamacare in 2010, from 25.6 million to 27.9 million, mainly because of the reduction in the number of people covered by Medicaid and the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Two policy changes by the Trump administration contributed to this decline: promoting new state regulations that restrict Medicaid eligibility, and threatening immigrants who apply for Medicaid or CHIP with being denied green cards in the future on the grounds that they have become “public charges.”

The Census report also confirmed the devastating dimensions of economic inequality in America. While the bottom fifth of households, those with annual incomes up to $25,600, accounted for only 3.1 percent of all household income, the top fifth, with annual incomes over $130,000, accounted for 52 percent, more than half. The top 5 percent, with incomes above $248,700, took in 23.1 percent of the total.

Rising inequality, persistent poverty, declining life expectancy for the mass of working people, the vanishing dream of a comfortable retirement: this is the reality that Trump hails as an America made “great” again. Nor do the Democrats—who controlled the White House for more than half the period in question—have any alternative. The two parties in Washington are rival factions within the same ruling elite, and they both defend American capitalism, the underlying cause of all these social evils.

The GAO report was not actually commissioned by Congress to expose the connection between poverty and premature death. On the contrary, its purpose was to examine the impact of changes in life expectancy on Social Security and Medicare so as to assist congressional efforts, supported by both parties, to cut spending on these “entitlement” programs long-term.

The authors of the report are quite conscious that their findings could be embarrassing to their congressional masters. They hasten to declare that they have found only a “statistical association” between poverty and higher death rates, adding that “we cannot determine from our analysis the extent to which income or wealth causes differences in longevity” [Emphasis added].

The report goes on to warn that despite lower life expectancy for the poor, “Taken all together, individuals may live a long time, even individuals with factors associated with lower longevity, such as low income or education. Those with fewer resources in retirement who live a long time may have to rely primarily on Social Security or safety net programs.” Translated into plain English: plans to eliminate these programs could run into widespread opposition, as they are increasingly the lifeline on which millions depend.

These fundamental social contradictions are the backdrop against which the working class is moving into historic struggles. Any major industrial action—such as a strike by the 155,000 workers at General Motors, Ford and Fiat Chrysler—can be the signal for the eruption of class conflict on a scale not seen in America since the 1930s.

American capitalism has been heaping up the raw material for such a political explosion for decades. Living standards for the working class have stagnated for more than four decades, with tens of millions in poverty in the richest country in the world, and more than a million homeless. The youth toiling in low-wage jobs are the first generation of American workers to live worse than their parents and grandparents. And these older generations, as the GAO report demonstrates, are finding it harder and harder to survive.

The decisive question is for working people to free themselves from the old organizations that have been used by the ruling elite to block any struggle against the profit system. This means breaking with the trade unions, run by corrupt stooges of the corporate bosses, and building rank-and-file committees democratically controlled by the workers themselves. And it means breaking from the nationalist perspective peddled by the trade unions, which seek to pit American workers against their class brothers and sisters around the world.

Capitalism is a global system, and it is impossible to fight the capitalists effectively in any country without the united efforts of the international working class. To carry out this struggle, the working class needs its own party, organized on an international basis and fighting for socialism in every country.

Food Security in South Asia and the Need for Regional Consensus-Building

Shatakshi Singh


While food security has been a matter of national policy focus in South Asian countries for some time, factors such as climate change merit an urgency to understand the issue as a regional-level concern. Within this context, three topics are germane.

The Idea of a South Asian Food BankIn 2007, a common food bank to hold food grain reserves was operationalised under the aegis of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) . However, the SAARC food bank has been unable to function optimally due to certain inherent weaknesses.

SAARC’s inherent vulnerabilities have resulted in a state-of-affairs where regional consensus-building for cooperative mechanisms to ensure food security has been deficient. The blueprint of the SAARC Food Bank, too, is structurally flawed given how it places a considerably disproportionate burden on India. In the initial years, India’s food grain contribution towards the SAARC food bank’s capacity stock of 23.2 million tonnes, stood at 15.32 million tonnes.

However, although India’s initial pledge was to contribute substantially to the reserve, in the years ahead, the disproportion in contributions could potentially lead to friction given how the agriculture and food security landscape is changing rapidly due to climate change. It may be useful to consider a collective food grain reserve for South Asia, facilitated by adapting other successful, comparative models, such as that of the Economic Community of West African States. Addressing issues of accessibility and wastage could supplement the effort.

Collaborative Activities and Mutual Learning in Agricultural ResearchBased on the development of sophisticated national agricultural research systems in South Asian countries, it has been argued that they stand to gain from knowledge-sharing and collaborative research efforts for enhanced food security. The relevance of undertaking knowledge exchange activities in this sphere is apparent given the presence of contiguous agro-ecological tracks across South Asian territorial boundaries. The Punjab region, which spans the Indian and Pakistani landscape, and the Tarai region, which spans Indian and Nepalese territories, are some prime examples.

The predominance of wheat and rice in cropping patterns across South Asia provides impetus to such an endeavour. General coordination of research initiatives could translate to lower costs and efficiency for those involved. According to a report released by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), among South Asian countries, India spends the most on agricultural research and development. Additionally, India is already offering agro-technology and equipment to Myanmar, and has been doing capacity building activities in this sphere by establishing an agricultural research centre in the country. As such, India is also well-positioned to gain from following the Israeli model of exporting agricultural technology and expertise, given the advances made by the country in biotechnology, plant genetics, etc.

Cooperating in a technical field could also help contribute to regional integration. Since agriculture is central to ensuring domestic food security, regional research collaborations aimed at increasing agricultural productivity has the potential to facilitate a more holistic realisation of food security.

Sustainable Use of Water ResourcesAs a densely populated, resource-hungry region, the sustainable use of water resources, particularly transboundary rivers, is a significant area for collaborative action since it is directly responsible for crop health, and by extension, food security.

However, with respect to river water-sharing, most of the water catchment occurs in India, which often finds itself as a middle riparian. India’s trans-boundary river water policies impact four countries: Bhutan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Pakistan. With the groundwater supply in India predicted to drop below demand by 2030, the dependence on freshwater resources will increase. Climate change risks will further compound the negative impact of water shortage on agricultural output given the aggregate demand for water in irrigation practices. Resultantly, working towards the sustainable management of domestic and transboundary water resources is crucial for overcoming future challenges to food security in the region.

Looking AheadAt present, in accordance with the recalibration of its policy priorities, India is redirecting its efforts towards revitalising the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), whose members include Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Nepal, and Bhutan. Given this sub-region’s geographic diversity including in climatic conditions, cropping patterns etc, fresh approaches to ensure food security merit exploration. The need of the hour is a responsive cross-border mechanism that systematically addresses the concern by building bilateral and sub-regional consensus towards food security, as a step towards regional consensus.

Maritime Connectivity to the Russian Far East Necessitates Naval and Arctic Planning

Vijay Sakhuja


In September 2019, India’s Prime Minister, Narendra Modi, traveled to Russia where he was the chief guest at the 5th Eastern Economic Forum. During this visit, India and Russia signed multiple agreements on a range of topics. Specifically, New Delhi and Moscow signed a Memorandum of Intent to establish ‘maritime communication’ between Chennai and Vladivostok. The primary purpose of opening the route to the Russian Far East is to increase the volume of existing bilateral trade, which is expected to touch US$ 30 million in value by 2025. The cargo and commodities to be traded via this route have been identified as energy resources and agro based products such as timber, and would be transported from Vladivostok bound for Chennai.

Plans for maritime connectivity between the Russian Far East and India can be traced back to 2006 when the Russian tanker, MK Viktortitov, transported the first consignment of oil from Sakhalin-I to the New Mangalore Port, to be processed at the refinery. India’s then Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas, late Murli Deora, labeled the 5,700 nautical miles long Sakhalin-Mangalore route as the “new silk route” and “new route of integration,” and called Russia an important friend whom India looks upon for its “energy needs and security of the country.” A similar euphoria is now visible and can be gleaned from the commentaries and op-eds that are doing rounds in the media, as also among the strategic community and think-tanks.

At this juncture, it is useful to understand at least three important aspects that anchor international shipping. First, that it is driven by profits, and freight forwarders and shipping companies make clear choices based on whether or not the voyage will be lucrative. The second pertains to the availability of ships to ensure that large volumes can be transported in a sustained manner. The third is the location of the port from where cargo is collected and finally discharged.

The Port of Vladivostok is the only multipurpose port in the Russian Far East and handles a variety of cargo including, bulk, containers, oil products, cars, heavy-duty vehicles etc. Over the past few years, its cargo handling has improved consistently. It is to be borne in mind that the Port of Vladivostok is located at higher latitude in the Arctic Circle and experiences severe sea-ice conditions between the months of December and March. This factor limits operations to those by ice-class vessels of category Ice2. However, assistance for icebreaking vessels can be obtained from port authorities by ships at the owner’s requests and expense. Currently, none of the Indian flagged vessels are ice-capable, which would require either Russian flagged vessels or chartering tankers from the market, but this is not a major challenge. However, in the instant case, there is little information about the amount of oil or gas that India wishes to import through Vladivostok to help determine the final landing cost.

Be that as it may, the latest development merits attention of Indian naval planners who must now think about the ‘new sea lane’ through the prism of security. Originating in Russia’s Far East and passing through the South China Sea and the Malacca Strait to Indian ports, the route entails careful safety as well as geopolitical and geostrategic risk assessments. The cargo must be secured against usual risks such as natural catastrophes (hurricanes and storms) and asymmetric threats and challenges that plague the South China Sea. Furthermore, the safety of such cargo is compounded by possible interception by China’s People’s Liberation Army Navy. It is fair to assume that Russia and China are strategic partners and this relationship should dissuade China from intercepting any Russian vessel/cargo bound for India. Also, a quid pro quo situation may arise, prompting the Indian Navy to pursue a corresponding response. In this regard, it would be useful to recall a recent contestation between Iran and UK after the former intercepted an Iranian vessel in the Mediterranean Sea.

The Indian Navy already has a well-practiced energy sea-lane security strategy for the route between the Persian Gulf and Indian ports. Furthermore, its capacity and capability to escort/protect critical energy shipments during prolonged crisis/wars is well known. For instance, in June 2019, under the aegis of Operation Sankalp, the Indian Navy deployed warships to ‘reassure’ Indian flagged vessels operating/ transiting through the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman following heightened tensions between the US and Iran and the latter had commandeered a British flagged vessel.

It is worth pointing out that the Indian Navy is committed to several other naval operations in the Indian Ocean and these engagements may curtail deployment in the South China Sea. Under the circumstances, a possible approach to protect Indian flagged/cargo carrying shipping through the South China Sea could be a cooperative mechanism among the maritime and naval forces of Japan and the US with whom India already has a working arrangement.

Finally, it would be useful for India to also think about Vladivostok as a springboard for its future engagement in Russia’s global energy market and the Arctic region involving the new Arctic LNG 2 project, the future project Arctic LNG 3, and the Northern Sea Route, which would be open for navigation for longer periods in the times to come.

US-North Korea Talks: Is Progress Without Reciprocity Possible?

Sandip Kumar Mishra

It is becoming obvious that unless the US provides some kind of security guarantee as well sanctions relief to North Korea, there will be no forward movement in US-North Korea denuclearisation talks. Despite open channels of communication between North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and US President Donald Trump, and North Korea's recent offer to resume talks, Pyongyang has continued to conduct missile tests. Eight missile tests have taken place since July 2019, and the latest was on 10 September. There are three important indications from North Korea's behaviour. One, it is willing to continue denuclearisation talks with the US. Two, it will not consider giving up the nuclear option until clear and concrete reciprocal actions are initiated by the US. Three, North Korea seeks a deal with the US as soon as possible.

The first indicator – of North Korea's interest in talks – is evident in its recent posturing. Kim has been corresponding with Trump, he agreed to meet the latter at the DMZ at very short notice on 30 June 2019, avoids criticising him personally, and  has limited recent missile testing to short-range missiles. At the same time, Kim's disinclination to move ahead with the talks unless there are clear measures from the US in the form of sanction relief and a security guarantee is also evident. This is based on North Korea's avoidance of official-level dialogue with the US on various pretexts, and the increasing frequency of its short-range missile tests.

North Korea is of the belief that its demands can only be fulfilled by dealing directly with Trump, and that any other US official, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and Special Representative for North Korea Stephen Biegun, do not have the capacity to facilitate them. So far, Trump has been unwilling to entertain North Korea's stipulation of reciprocity, and insists on official dialogue to lock in the details of the denuclearisation process.

The issue of reciprocity was explicitly raised for the first time by North Korea in the second summit between the two leaders at Hanoi – a demand that abruptly aborted the summit. The US reportedly proposed a partial concession on sanctions but demanded North Korean dismantlement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and beyond. North Korea made it clear that given limited trust between the US and North Korea, a gradual approach would be more appropriate.

Although North Korea was disappointed with the outcome – or lack thereof – of the Hanoi summit, it kept doors open for any indication of a change of mind by Trump. An expectation of a changed approach following Trump's expression of interest in meeting Kim after the G-20 summit followed. However, this third meeting also did not result in a useful, or new, outcome. Despite these disappointments, North Korea agreed to start official-level dialogue with the US, although it is no longer willing to do so. It is evident that Kim has waited it out based on the expectation of a US policy of accommodation and flexibility which has yet to make itself visible. North Korea is also obdurate about its position, and the deadlock continues.

This game of waiting each other out appears to be taking the process nowhere and has instead resulted in a deadlock. The current circumstances are not as alarming for the US because North Korea has not conducted nuclear tests in some time, and the issue of the remains of US soldiers who lost their lives during the Korean War has been addressed. North Korea, however, wants a deal before the end of the year. This arises from North Korea's belief that earning concessions from Trump, if played right, will be easier than another president, should he or she replace Trump.

It is also possible that Trump has realised the urgency of the issue drawing from the increasing frequency of missile tests, and the likelihood of a rapid deterioration in bonhomie. If a deal is not eventually forthcoming, North Korea may decide to conduct a nuclear or long-range missile test as escalation, and this would be ultimately detrimental to Trump's election prospects as well. It is reported that National Security Advisor John Bolton, who was the most hawkish in Trump's administration, was ousted (on the same day that North Korea conducted its last missile test), for this same reason.

In the coming days, the US could soften its stand in dealing with North Korea, and potentially adopt a principle of flexible reciprocity. It is important to underline however that Trump's inconsistency in messaging could lead to any eventuality, and it is naive to assume that he will become suddenly more nuanced and visionary in approach after Bolton's departure.

Catholic Relief Services International Development Fellows Programme (IDFP) 2020

Application Deadline: 1st November 2019

Eligible Countries: All

About the Award: The Catholic Relief Services International Development Fellows Program, or IDFP, is designed for individuals dedicated to a career in international development. While completing comprehensive training on program management and operations, fellows support CRS’ work in various sectors such as agriculture/livelihoods, health, peacebuilding, emergency response, education, microfinance, or a combination of these.
The fellows’ training focuses on project management, project design and proposal development, partnership and capacity building, monitoring and evaluation, budget and resource management, supply chain and logistics, human resources and security protocols.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: 

• Graduate degree in field relevant and applicable to international development (e.g. Agriculture, Health, Engineering, Business, Public Administration, Finance, Supply Chain)
• Fluency in English with strong oral and written communication skills
• Professional proficiency in a second language (preference given to major languages spoken where CRS works)
• At least six months overseas work or volunteer experience in a developing country (consideration given to applicants with at least five years of experience living in a developing country)
• Strong interest in a career in development or emergency relief
• Willing to work in various regions and developing countries around the world
• Able to work respectfully and professionally in a cross-cultural environment

Number of Awards: CRS offers 20-30 fellowships each year.

Value of Award: CRS provides IDFP participants with the following benefits:

• Great opportunities for professional growth and development overseas
• Stipend, allowances, and furnished housing
• Transportation to and from the country
• Extensive insurance coverage (medical, dental, life, travel/accident, evacuation and personal household effects)
• Paid vacation, sick and personal leave, and 12 paid holidays
• Language learning assistance

Duration of Programme: 12 months

How to Apply: We welcome as a part of our staff and as partners people of all faiths and secular traditions who share our values and our commitment to serving those in need.
To be considered for the program, please complete the following 3 steps:

1. Prepare a statement of interest (preferably no more than one page) that answers the following two questions:
   1. Considering the 4 primary learning areas of the fellows’ foundational training, what relevant experience can you leverage to be successful in the program?
   2. Which of the 4 primary fellowship learning areas interests you most and why?
2. Update your resume or CV to highlight your relevant experience and qualifications
3. Complete the IDFP application

Visit Programme Webpage for Details

Award Providers: CRS

Stanford PACS – Digital Civil Society Lab Non-Resident Fellowship 2020

Application Deadline: 30th September 2019

Eligible Countries: International

To be Taken at (Country): USA

About the Award: The Non-Resident Fellowship supports social sector leaders to dedicate time to working on ideas that apply to broad swaths of civil society but that may not quite fit into their “day job.” The fellowship provides time, space, expertise, and financial support to help turn ideas into prototypes or action, and to build a cohort of fellows to support ongoing learning and community.

Type: Fellowship

Eligibility: The Non-Resident Fellowship is open to applicants 18 years of age or older who meet the following conditions:

• Meet all submission deadlines and submit the application in English;

• Commit to spend twelve months undertaking a project addressing one of two topical tracks: Digital Civil Society, or Race and Technology;
• Commit to contribute a final written report, video or audio interview;
• Commit to attend a week-long convening of the fellowship cohort at Stanford University, January 20-24, 2020. This week involves an introduction to the Lab and its research goals and activities, opportunities to meet other communities on campus, independent time to interact with scholars and research institutes on campus and in the area, and the development of individual year-long work plans. Fellows are encouraged to engage with and imagine/identify additional collective activities for their cohort.
• Please note that your initiative cannot involve a political campaign or legislative lobbying efforts.

Selection Criteria: The selection process will take into consideration the following criteria:

• Potential impact
• Does the project address a question or challenge that is broadly relevant across civil society?
• Will the project contribute significant new knowledge or create substantial positive change?
• Does the Fellow demonstrate a deep understanding of the issue their project addresses?
• Will the Fellow and the project benefit from engagement with an academic research community?
• Quality of project proposal
• Is the project plan thoughtful and well-articulated?
• Have potential risks and challenges received adequate consideration?
• Are goals, timelines, and deliverables realistic?
• Has the applicant identified potential partnerships that will catalyze the project?

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: All fellows will receive:

• A $20,000 stipend, paid at the beginning of the fellowship, to support work on a year-long project.
• A week-long in-person convening of the cohort on the Stanford campus, January 20-24, 2020. 
• Travel support to cover the cost of attending the January 2020 week-long convening.
• Project support up to $5,000 to support additional project-related travel and expenses as appropriate.
• Mentorship from fellowship directors and access to fellowship alumni from previous cohorts.

While we welcome applications from outside the United States, we are currently unable to support the acquisition of visas. If you are applying from outside the United States and are accepted, you will need to secure your own visa.

Duration of Award: 1 year

How to Apply: Interested applicants should complete the online application during the application window. 
During the application process you will be asked to submit:

• cover letter
• resume or CV
• brief project proposal
• contact information for two professional references

• It is important to go through all application requirements in the Award Webpage (see Link below) before applying.

Visit Award Webpage for Details

Adobe Research Fellowship 2020 for Graduate Students in STEM Fields

Application Deadline: 27th September 2019 at 5pm Pacific Time

About the Award: This year, Adobe will be awarding fellowships to graduate students working in the areas of computer graphics, computer vision, human-computer interaction, machine learning, visualization, audio, natural language processing, and programming languages.

Type: Fellowship, Research

Eligibility: In order to be considered for the 2020 Adobe Research Fellowship, students must meet the following criteria:

• Be registered as a full-time graduate student at a university.
• Remain an active, full-time student in a PhD program for the full duration of 2020 or forfeit the award.
• Cannot have a close relative working for Adobe Research.

Selection Criteria: Recipients are selected based on their research (creative, impactful, important, and realistic in scope), how their work would contribute to Adobe, their technical skills (ability to build complex computer programs), and their personal skills (problem-solving ability, communication, leadership, organizational skills, ability to work in teams).

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Award: The Adobe Research Fellowship consists of:

• A $10,000 award paid once.
• A Creative Cloud subscription membership for one year.
• An Adobe Research mentor.
• An internship at Adobe for the 2020 summer.

How to Apply: Applications must include:

• A research overview comprising two pages of text and figures not including citations. At least half a page should highlight how the student’s research could contribute to Adobe.
• Three letters of recommendation from those familiar with the students work. One letter should come from the student’s advisor.
• A CV.
• A transcript of current and previous academic records both undergraduate and graduate.

 Click here to begin.

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Enter for the British Council Alumni Awards 2020

Application Deadlines: 28th October 2019 (*please note, specific countries have an earlier closing date).

Offered annually? Yes

Eligible Countries: All countries except the UK

Eligible Field of Study: All

About the Award: The Alumni Awards celebrate the outstanding achievements of alumni and showcase the impact and value of a UK higher education. Award winners and finalists are leaders in their fields who have used their experience of studying at a UK university to make a positive contribution to their communities, professions and countries.
If you, or someone you know, studied in the UK and have gone on to achieve exceptional success, apply yourself or nominate someone today.

Type: Award

Eligibility: 

• Alumni must be currently residing in one of the 14 countries participating in the Alumni Awards 2020
• Alumni must have studied in the UK at degree level or above:
• within the last 15 years (i.e. 2004 or later)
• for a minimum of one term or semester
• enrolled at an officially recognised (160 institutions) or listed (650 institutions) UK higher education institution

Selection Criteria: All eligible applications will be assessed on the extent to which they meet the following four criteria:

1. IMPACT: evidence of tangible impact, and scale of impact, of your work (inspired by your UK education) in your profession/community/society.
2. UK INFLUENCE: evidence of how your UK education has played a key influence in your success and impact.
3. MEDIA TRACTION: Extent to which your success story is likely to resonate with local/regional/national media in your country of entry, or beyond (global media).
4. POTENTIAL TO INFLUENCE AND INSPIRE: Extent to which (including capacity and willingness) you and your story are likely to influence and inspire the next generation of prospective internationally mobile students in your country of entry to choose the UK as their study destination.

If you are applying yourself, you will need to answer three short questions on the application form to explain how your UK higher education has contributed to your success and why you think you should be considered for an Alumni Award 2020.

Number of Awardees: Not specified

Value of Scholarship: Finalists and winners at all levels (national, regional and global) will benefit from their global profile being made more visible through press and publicity opportunities, and building their professional networks. The three Global Alumni Award winners will be invited to the UK for a professional networking opportunity in Summer 2019.

How to Apply:  How to prepare to apply yourself, or nominate someone, for an Alumni Award 2020:

• Check the eligibility criteria and read the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
• Choose the award category
• Prepare a statement
• Gather supporting documents
• Apply or nominate here

Visit Program Webpage for details


Award Provider: British Council

Nokia Foundation Scholarships 2019/2020 for International Students to Study in Finland

Application Deadline: 30th September 2019

Eligible Countries: International

To be taken at (country): Finland

About the Award: Nokia Scholarships are granted to individuals pursuing a doctoral degree in information or telecommunications technology or in clearly related supporting scientific disciplines. Scholarship can be granted for doctoral studies in a Finnish university or to a Finnish applicant for doctoral studies abroad.

Type: PhD

Eligibility: The applicant must receive a commitment statement from his/her principal supervisor, who must be a professor, docent, or senior scientist at the university at which the student is pursuing their degree. The statement must be submitted to the application database by the supervisor. The scholarship can be granted no more than two times to the same individual.

Number of scholarships: Not specified

Duration of Scholarship: The scholarship can be granted no more than two times to the same individual.

How to Apply: Nokia Scholarship Application

Visit scholarship webpage for details to apply