17 May 2024

1,3-Dichloropropene: The Dangerous, Sweet-Smelling Pesticide You’ve Never Heard Of

Caroline Cox




Photo by Beth Jnr

California regulators were stunned by their air monitor results in April 1990. Concentrations of a cancer-causing pesticide at schools in Merced County were so high that regulators immediately stopped any use of that pesticide in California. It’s a chemical with an unwieldy name, 1,3-dichloropropene, that you may have never heard about. But there are many reasons why you should be concerned about its use.

The pesticide, also referred to as 1,3-D, is still a problem three decades after I first wrote about it in 1992, when the detection of high levels of 1,3-D in the air of a junior high school led to serious concerns.

The use of 1,3-D in California was suspended from 1990 to 1995 but continued in the rest of the country. Since then, its use has come back with a vengeance. About 34 million pounds are used annually in the United States; about one-third is used in California. The use of 1,3-D is concentrated in the southeastern U.S., central California, and the potato-growing areas of Washington and Idaho. It is mainly used to kill nematodes, symphylans, and wireworms and control some plant diseases.

In California, the heaviest use of 1,3-D is for preparing fields to grow almonds, strawberries, sweet potatoes, grapes, and carrots. Nationally, potatoes accounted for about half of all 1,3-D used between 2014 and 2018, according to a 2020 United States Environmental Protection Agency report.

1,3-D is manufactured by just one company in the U.S., Dow Chemical, and is often sold under the brand name Telone.

Regulatory Loophole

The story of how and why regulators have allowed 1,3-D’s use to continue and even increase is a complicated one that involves politics, economics, and corporate power. For example, in 2002, California opened a regulatory loophole that allowed 1,3-D use to increase, leading to “unfettered 1,3-D access as its use spread to populated areas near schools, homes and businesses,” wrote Bernice Yeung, Kendall Taggart, and Andy Donohue in 2014 in Reveal.

“The loophole also expanded a key market for Dow, allowing it to sell millions more pounds of chemicals across a state that provides the U.S. with nearly half of all its fruits, vegetables, and nuts,” the article in Reveal added. Yet in 2016, limits on 1,3-D use in California increased again.

In 2022, the Office of the Inspector General at the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that “EPA did not adhere to standard operating procedures and requirements for the 1,3-Dichloropropene, or 1,3-D, pesticide cancer-assessment process, which undermines public confidence in and the transparency of the Agency’s scientific approaches to prevent unreasonable impacts on human health.”

In other words, the agency did not do its job. This is in stark contrast to the European Union, where 1,3-D use is not approved.

Elaborating on the extensive use of the pesticide, the inspector general also stated that “1,3-D is one of the top three soil fumigants used in the United States.”

1,3-D Causes Air Pollution

1,3-D typically is applied as a liquid that is injected into the soil. It quickly becomes a gas, moves through the soil, and escapes into the atmosphere.

California is the only state that regularly monitors 1,3-D in the air around agricultural communities, but the few results that have been obtained are extremely concerning. Weekly air monitoring data that began to be recorded in 2011 and has continued as of May 2024 is available from four towns (Oxnard, Santa Maria, Shafter, and Watsonville) where the air monitors are located at schools.

In 2022, about one-third of the samples collected from these air monitors contained 1,3-D. Over the entire sampling period, the average 1,3-D concentration at the four schools was between .09 and .46 ppb. According to my calculations, this is double the safety level set by California’s scientists at the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA) at the least contaminated school site and 10 times the safety level at the most contaminated school site.

1,3-D is classified as a hazardous air pollutant under the Clean Air Act and is also designated a toxic air contaminant in California. Regulators in California who modeled high detections of 1,3-D between 2017 and 2020 have found that 1,3-D can drift for more than 3 miles from where it is applied.

Clear Evidence of Significant Health Hazards of 1,3-D

Cancer

The World Health Organization (WHO) classified 1,3-D as a cancer-causing chemical (“possibly carcinogenic to humans”) in 1987. In 1989, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) evaluated 1,3-D and concluded that it was “reasonably anticipated to be a human carcinogen.” California made a similar classification in 1989. The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health calls 1,3-D a carcinogen.

In a 2021 review, California’s OEHHA summarized laboratory studies conducted on rats and mice in the 1980s and 1990s, showing that exposure to 1,3-D caused tumors or cancer in multiple organs: lungs, tear glands, bladder, and breasts.

Asthma and Other Breathing Problems

Regulatory agencies recognize that 1,3-D irritates the lungs. The European Chemicals Agency states that 1,3-D is “harmful if inhaled” and “may cause respiratory irritation.”

The HHS concludes that the “[i]nhalation of dichloropropenes may cause respiratory effects such as irritation, chest pain, and cough.” California’s Department of Pesticide Regulation (CDPR) states, “Acute or short-term inhalation exposure to high concentrations of 1,3-D results in upper respiratory symptoms in humans, including chest tightness, irritated and watery eyes, dizziness and runny nose.” Researchers at the University of California, Merced, found that tiny increases in the amounts of 1,3-D in the air (0.01 parts per billion, or ppb) increased the odds of emergency room visits for asthma from 2005 to 2011.

Genetic Damage

As with cancer, evidence that 1,3-D can cause genetic damage has been available for decades. In 1987, WHO reported that 1,3-D caused genetic damage in mice, bacteria, and laboratory-grown cells from several mammals.

In 2021, California’s Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment compiled studies of genetic damage and found evidence of it in mice, rats, bacteria, fruit flies, and laboratory-grown cells from hamsters and rats.

Environmental Injustice

California is the easiest place to evaluate environmental justice issues related to pesticides because this information is more readily available there than in other states. When I combined California’s pesticide use data for 2021 with demographic data from the U.S. Census Bureau for 2020, I found clear evidence that race and income play an important role in determining who is exposed to 1,3-D.

Of the 10 counties with the highest 1,3-D use, eight were above the state average for the percent of families living in poverty, nine had median incomes less than the state average, and eight were majority Hispanic/Latinx. The bottom line is that people who live in the areas where 1,3-D is widely used are likely to be low-income and Latinx. While the same detailed data is unavailable for the rest of the country, finding similar patterns would not be surprising if such information were provided.

And there’s more to the story in California. The state has set two different safety levels for exposure to 1,3-D. One was set by the CDPR, and the other by OEHHA. Both agencies set a safety level that is supposed to limit exposures to 1,3-D according to what they believe will only cause one cancer case per 100,000 people exposed.

CDPR’s number, focused on people who live near 1,3-D applications, is set at an average air concentration of 0.56 ppb. OEHHA’s number, which applies to everyone in California and is based on health-protective science, is an average air concentration of 0.04 ppb.

As a result, people who live in agricultural areas, likely to be low-income and Latinx, can be exposed to 14 times more 1,3-D than other Californians.

Climate Change Concerns

Dow in Freeport, Texas, manufactures 1,3-D at the largest chemical plant in the Americas. The plant was built to take advantage of natural gas wells close by. I have not come across an accounting of 1,3-D’s carbon footprint, but given that it is made from natural gas, I assume that the carbon footprint of the manufacturing process is likely to be significant. Millions of pounds of this chemical are transported thousands of miles using gasoline or diesel power, adding to the carbon footprint. Finally, the application equipment used for 1,3-D is typically diesel-powered.

Crops grown without 1,3-D and other fumigants can actually reduce carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. A good example comes from research done in California almond orchards in August 2021. The scientists who conducted the study, published in Frontiers in Sustainable Food Systems, compared conventional almond orchards (commonly treated with 1,3-D) with regenerative, certified organic orchards that do not use 1,3-D or similar pesticides. The study found that organic orchards had 30 percent more carbon in their soil than conventional orchards and, therefore, helped in removing that carbon from the atmosphere and prevented climate change.

You Can Make a Difference

Like many people in the U.S., I live in a county where 1,3-D use is rare, or even zero. No crops grown near me use 1,3-D. But I also consciously choose to avoid eating food that harms people growing or harvesting such crops or those living near fields where they are grown. Fortunately, it’s easy to make a difference. I buy certified organic food as much as possible, especially potatoes and almonds.

Buying organic products is increasingly becoming a popular choice in the U.S., with more than 80 percent of Americans purchasing some organics in 2016, according to a study by the Organic Trade Association. Accessibility to affordable organics is also getting better. More and more standard supermarkets carry organics. In many states, SNAP benefits (food stamps) are doubled for fruits and vegetables, making it easier for SNAP customers to buy organics. Farmers markets, food coops, and community-supported agriculture are other options. The more we buy organic food, the less 1,3-D will be used.

Slovak prime minister Robert Fico shot in assassination attempt

Alex Lantier


Yesterday afternoon, populist Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico was shot while visiting the town of Handlova after a meeting of his government.

Surrounded by security guards, Fico had gone to meet a handful of supporters who had gathered to see him, when someone shot him repeatedly at point-blank range with a handgun, identified as a pistol or short-barreled rifle. Fico was rushed to a hospital in Banska Bystrica, 30 kilometers away, by helicopter. After a three-hour operation, Fico’s condition was stabilized, but his life was still reported this afternoon to be in danger.

Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister of Slovakia Robert Kalinak, speaks during a media briefing outside the F. D. Roosevelt University Hospital, where Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who was shot and injured, is treated in Banska Bystrica, central Slovakia, Thursday, May 16, 2024. (AP Photo/Denes Erdos)

At the scene, Fico’s security guards seized a man identified by Slovak media as Juraj Chintula, a 71-year-old former writer who has worked as a security guard and a taxi driver. Today, Slovak police charged Chintula with premeditated attempted murder, which carries a sentence of 25 years to life in prison.

The shooting was a politically-motivated assassination attempt. While there are conflicting reports about Chintula’s views, this attempted murder is bound up with deep political and class tensions in Slovakia and across Eastern Europe, inflamed by the NATO-Russia war in neighboring Ukraine. Fico has criticized NATO’s war on Russia in Ukraine, which is widely unpopular in Slovakia, but is slashing social spending in order to arm the Slovak military.

Currently, there are no indications that the assassination attempt was prepared by a broader organization or conspiracy, although this possibility cannot be ruled out. Chintula reportedly owned a handgun legally, having worked as a security guard. He had an erratic but essentially far-right political trajectory, having criticized violence before recently sympathizing with the liberal, pro-NATO opposition party Progressive Slovakia (PS).

A video posted on social media and on the web site of the former Slovak Stalinist daily Pravda showed Chintula, apparently under police interrogation, criticizing the Fico government and its authoritarian restructuring of the courts and state media in line with PS positions. Chintula’s views on the NATO-Russia war in Ukraine have not yet been clearly reported, however.

“I am not in agreement with the policy of the government,” Chintula said, adding: “Why is RTVS [Slovak Radio and Television] under attack? Why has judge Mazak [the former president of the Slovak Magistrates Council] been fired?”

Chintula reportedly founded the Duha (“Rainbow”) Literary Club, published poetry and novels, and joined the Slovak Writers Association (SSS) in 2015. According to press reports, Chintula’s 2015 novel Efata denounces Slovakia’s Roma minority along far-right lines, attacking the Slovak state for tolerating the Roma’s alleged abuse of social programs.

Yesterday, the SSS issued a statement condemning the attempted assassination of Fico: “We express our indignation at such a brutal act, which has no parallel in the history of Slovakia.”

In 2016, Chintula founded a small party, paradoxically named Hnutie proti nasiliu (“Movement against violence”). He called to be “dissatisfied, but not violent” and attacked Fico’s SMER-Social Democracy party for not improving values and morality: “What is the state doing, the party whose name proclaims it to be social? Nothing! The state is not solving the question of begging by law.”

There were initial reports, by Hungarian investigative journalist Szabolcs Panyi, that Chintula met the pro-Russian Slovenski Branci (“Slovak Soldiers”) militia in 2016. This led to several reports in European media that Chintula supported Russia in the war. Many of these reports have now been taken down, however, and the Slovak daily Dennik N reports that Chintula met the Slovenski Branci to ask them not to use violence.

There were numerous reports on social media that in the recent period, Chintula sympathized with the pro-NATO PS. Yesterday, PS chairman Michal Simecka felt compelled to issue a statement denying that Chintula was a PS member: “We unequivocally deny that he is a member of our movement. There is no link between him and our party or its members. We firmly condemn his odious action.”

Whatever Chintula’s precise opinions, the explosive political climate in which he decided to act is the product of two years of NATO-Russia war in Ukraine. Fico has criticized the war and called for peace talks, trying to accommodate popular opposition to the war, while agreeing to NATO and European Union (EU) initiatives to fund and arm the far-right Ukrainian regime. The PS has attacked Fico, demanding an aggressive waging of the NATO war and denouncing Fico for alleged mob ties, as well as his attacks on state media and the courts.

Political tensions are extremely high after last year’s Slovak parliamentary elections and this April’s presidential elections, both won by Fico and his ex-Stalinist or far-right nationalist allies. The response to the shooting of Fico of both the Fico government and the liberal opposition has been to rally together to appeal for calm.

Slovakia is “on the edge of civil war,” Slovak Interior Minister Matus Sutaj-Estok said last night, at a joint press conference on the shooting with Defense Minister Robert Kalinak. He added: “Such hateful comments are being made on social networks today, so please, let’s stop this immediately.”

Today, outgoing Slovak President Zuzana Caputova (PS) and incoming President Peter Pellegrini, a Fico ally, held a joint press conference, appealing for calm. Criticizing a “vicious circle of hate” and attacking the assassination attempt as “an attack on the democratic establishment,” Caputova said she wanted to “send a signal” amid “this tense situation.” She called on Slovak political leaders to “calm the situation and reject violence.”

Pelligrini urged “all political parties in Slovakia to temporarily suspend or considerably reduce their European election campaign,” arguing that Slovakia must avoid “further confrontation.”

The shooting of Fico is indubitably reactionary, but SMER and PS calls for calm are no less bankrupt than Chintula’s earlier moral outbursts against violence. Pelligrini won the presidential elections as a Fico ally, pledging not to let Slovakia be dragged into the Ukraine war. However, Slovakia is being dragged ever deeper into war with Russia, because it and most other Eastern European states, in the 1990s or 2000s, joined NATO and the EU—the organizations now leading the imperialist war with Russia in Ukraine.

The only progressive way forward in Slovakia and across Europe is the building of an international, socialist anti-war movement, based on Trotskyist opposition to the counterrevolutionary role of Stalinism.

The restoration of capitalism by the Stalinist regimes in Eastern Europe in 1989, like the subsequent Stalinist dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, has produced a catastrophe. While the NATO imperialist powers have played the former Soviet republics against each other, ultimately arming Ukraine for a bloody and disastrous war with Russia, they also impose a brutal capitalist austerity diktat across Eastern Europe. In Slovakia, public spending is to be cut 30 percent to finance defense spending, while inflation is surging, impoverishing workers.

This is exemplified in the career of Fico, a former Stalinist who formed his social-democratic SMER party in 1999. Fico continually incited anti-immigrant hatreds with nationalist rhetoric and repeatedly formed alliances with far-right forces, such as the Slovak National Party (SNS), which currently is part of Fico’s government alongside Pelligrini’s Hlas (“Voice”) party.

While European media still occasionally refer to Fico as a “left” president, his relentless promotion of Slovak nationalism fueled the reactionary fascistic prejudices and created the political conditions for the assassination attempt against him.

Turkey’s “Kobane trial” sentences Kurdish politicians to prison for decades

Barış Demir


A Turkish court announced its verdict Thursday in the “Kobane case.” 108 Kurdish politicians, 18 of them imprisoned, are on trial over mass protests in Turkey in 2014 in which at least 37 people were killed.

The court handed down heavy prison sentences to politicians, including former co-chairs of the Kurdish nationalist Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP). 24 defendants were sentenced to a total of 408 years in prison on various charges.

HDP Genel BaÅŸkanları Selahattin DemirtaÅŸ ve Figen YüksekdaÄŸ, 2015 [Photo: Yıldız YazıcıoÄŸlu (VOA)]

The verdict on the case came after a meeting between opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and President Recep Tayyip ErdoÄŸan on May 2, after which ErdoÄŸan implied a period of “political détente.” Recently, 50 people were arrested while trying to celebrate May Day in Taksim Square in Istanbul. Five of them were arrested because they had previously taken part in a protest against the government’s cooperation with Israel, which is committing genocide in Gaza.

HDP’s former leader Selahattin DemirtaÅŸ, who has been imprisoned since 2016, was sentenced to 42 years in prison on charges including “helping to destroy the unity and integrity of the state” and “incitement to commit crimes.” Former HDP co-chair Figen YüksekdaÄŸ was sentenced to 30 years and three months. Both were ordered to remain in custody.

Ahmet Türk, former deputy and elected mayor of Mardin Metropolitan Municipality in the last local elections, was sentenced to 10 years for “membership in an armed terrorist organization,” former HDP deputy Ayla Akat Ata was sentenced to nine years and nine months, former HDP deputy Emine Ayna to 10 years, and former party deputies AyÅŸe YaÄŸcı and Aynur AÅŸan to nine years each.

In a statement, the People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party, formerly HDP) said, “The sentences given to our friends held hostage in the Kobane conspiracy case cannot deter us. Those who strike a blow at democratic politics should know that we will defeat your conspiracies.”

CHP leader Özel said after the verdict that it was a “political case,” while Kemal KılıçdaroÄŸlu, who led the CHP’s support for the jailing of HDP deputies after 2016, hypocritically condemned the verdict on Twitter.

Following the court decision meetings, demonstrations and marches were banned in many cities, including Bitlis, Diyarbakır, Mardin, Tunceli, Batman, Siirt, Bingöl, Ağrı, Şırnak, Muş, Hakkari, Adana, Kars and İzmir.

The court ruled that Kurdish politicians were not responsible for the deaths that occurred during the protests. This is an admission that the long prison sentences were politically motivated.

The Socialist Equality Group in Turkey has documented and irreconcilable political differences with the Kurdish nationalist movement. However, this in no way diminishes our principled opposition to the state persecution of Kurdish politicians by the government of ErdoÄŸan. All political prisoners whose freedom of expression and right to a fair trial have been violated must be acquitted and released.

This verdict is the latest round of escalating state repression following the collapse of the “peace process” between the Turkish state and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in 2015. This period has been marked mainly by the US-NATO regime-change war to overthrow Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, backed by Russia and Iran.

In this reactionary war, Ankara has played a critical role in supporting a vast network of CIA-backed jihadist terrorist groups along the Turkish-Syrian border. As a result of this murderous policy, al-Qaeda-linked organizations, including the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) have become a major proxy force in a war for regime change that has claimed hundreds of thousands of lives.

The “peace process” negotiations between the PKK and the Turkish ruling elite, who were seeking to advance their own interests by participating in this onslaught led by the NATO powers in the Middle East, were based on this imperialist intervention.

With the escalation of the imperialist proxy war, the PKK’s Syrian sister party, the Democratic Union Party (PYD), and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), have emerged as the dominant force in northern Syria.

The ErdoÄŸan government expected Washington to intervene directly in the Syrian war in support of its Islamist proxies and planned to commit its own ground troops.

In the same year, the ISIS launched an invasion from Syria into Iraq, threatening Washington’s puppet government in the country and leading to a new NATO intervention. This led to a change in US policy toward Syria, upsetting the calculations of the ErdoÄŸan government.

As the YPG became the main US proxy force in Syria, Ankara become terrified by the prospect of a Washington-backed Kurdish state on Turkey’s southern border, which could encourage similar sentiments among Kurds in Turkey.

The ISIS military offensive on PYD/YPG-controlled Kobani in September 2014 was a major turning point. During that period, the ErdoÄŸan government was still in talks with the PYD/YPG and the PKK. In early October 2014, PYD leader Salih Muslim was officially received in Ankara. HDP leader DemirtaÅŸ called for Ankara and the PYD to work together under the US-led “anti-ISIS coalition.”

The HDP has been demanding the opening of a corridor to Kobane through Turkish territory to allow military aid to reach the town from other areas in northern Syria and the Iraqi Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).

Backing the jihadist forces in the Free Syrian Army, Ankara has opposed any policies that would strengthen the Kurdish nationalists and pushed for a NATO intervention in which the Turkish army would participate to secure the interests of the Turkish ruling class in Syria.

On October 6, 2014, the HDP headquarters called for mass protests over the situation of Kobane. In response, mass demonstrations began across Turkey, especially in Kurdish cities.

ErdoÄŸan declared, “If there is no cooperation on the ground with those who are conducting ground operations, this will not end with airstrikes [against the ISIS by the US-led coalition air forces]. Months have passed and there is no result. Right now, Ayn-el Arab, also known as Kobane, is falling.”

By October 8, this statement escalated the violence of the demonstrations. Protesters confronted security forces and supporters of the radical Islamist Free Cause Party (Hüda-Par), which was close to the government and mainly organized in Kurdish provinces.

According to the authorities, 37 people died in incidents in 35 provinces and 96 districts. The Human Rights Association (Ä°HD) in Turkey said 46 people died between October 7 and 12, 2014.

On October 20, 2014, Ankara allowed Peshmerga forces to cross into Kobane via Turkey.

In the aftermath of these events, Erdogan declared his government’s opposition to the creation of a Kurdish enclave in northern Syria. Inside Turkey, the security forces launched military operations against the PKK militias, including in urban and town centers, aiming to destroy the entire military assets of the Kurdish nationalists. During these operations in 2015-2016, thousands of people were killed or injured and hundreds of thousands of civilians were displaced in many Kurdish cities and towns.

This was followed by a wave of state repression and arrests of Kurdish politicians. The CHP backed this crackdown.

According to a report released by the DEM Party in last December, at least 22,818 party members have been detained since 2015. Over 4,300 have been arrested, including co-chairs, deputies, provincial and district co-chairs, party officials, and members.

The report stated that 93 co-mayors elected on March 30, 2014, were arrested and trustees were appointed in 95 municipalities; 43 co-mayors elected on March 31, 2019, were arrested and trustees were appointed in 48 municipalities. Currently 17 co-mayors, seven deputies and 14 members of the party leadership are in jail.

16 May 2024

INTERACT-Africa PhD And MSc Scholarship 2024/2025

APPLICATION DEADLINE:

23rd June, 2024 EAT by midnight.

Tell Me About INTERACT-Africa PhD And MSc Scholarship:

INTERACT-Africa is an Intra-Africa Academic mobility project funded by the European Union (EU). The project focuses on Chemistry, Biology and Information Technology, with emphasis on conversion of organic waste to valuable bioproducts for transitioning into environmental sustainable and socially inclusive economies.

INTERACT-Africa aims at:
1- Promoting inclusive learning mobility opportunities by enhancing capacity building of HEIs by focusing on training and education in green Chemistry, Biology and Information Technology aimed at developing a skilled workforce capable of implementing sustainable practices
2- Fostering entrepreneurship and support the establishment of green technology businesses in Africa by providing mentorship, access to funding, and technical support to aspiring entrepreneurs and start-ups working in the field of green Chemistry, Biology and Information technology
3- Facilitating networking and knowledge sharing among businesses to promote innovation and sustainable economic growth through provision of internships, cooperative education programs, and hands-on learning opportunities.

TYPE:

MSc, PhD

Who Can Apply For INTERACT-Africa PhD And MSc Scholarship?

  • The candidate must meet minimum requirement for admission into Masters and PhD programmes as stipulated by the host University Senate/regulating body.
  • Provide proof that the candidate is a national of and residence of an eligible country.
  • Student beneficiaries must be of African nationality and residing in Africa at the time of application.
  • All interested candidates must submit a research concept paper in the intended area of study (1 page, Times New Roman, single spacing).
  • Applicants will not be allowed to participate in the mobility without an admission letter from the host university.
  • Applicants to declare not to have already benefited from a previous student scholarship under the projects selected in the framework of the Intra-Africa Academic Mobility Scheme 2022-2027.
  • Applicants to commit not to benefit from another EU funded scholarship scheme to implement the same activity during their Intra-Africa mobility period.
  • Provide motivation letter reflecting innovative technologies in climate change and mitigation.
  • Recommendation letters and/ reference letters (two). One from an academic advisor or professor/lecturer.
  • Applicant must be willing to study not in his/her country but within the eligible countries
  • Provide proof of Special needs
  • Applicants from Non – – English level B2 Common European Framework of Reference (CEFR) or its equivalent is mandatory to study in the institutions that use English as the language of instruction.
  • To study at Institut Facultaire Des Sciences Agronomiques De Yangambi (IFA-YANGAMBI), French level B2 or its equivalent is mandatory

Target beneficiaries
The beneficiaries of the scholarship are categorized into two target groups (TGs).
a. TG-I include students registered/admitted in one or having obtained a higher education degree from one of the African Universities included in the INTERACT-Africa project partnership, i.e., Moi University (Kenya), Mbarara University of Science and Technology (Uganda), Sokoine University of Agriculture (Tanzania), Addis Ababa University (Ethiopia) and Institut Facultaire Des Sciences Agronomiques De Yangambi (Democratic Republic of Congo).
b. TG-II includes students registered/admitted in one or having obtained a higher education degree from a university established in Africa BUT not included in the partnership, with priority being given to students from conflict-affected and disadvantaged countries, including Côte d’Ivoire, Sudan, Somalia, Mozambique and Algeria.
c. Female applicants are strongly encouraged to apply

HOW MANY AWARDS?

INTERACT-Africa is offering 28 postgraduate scholarships for the degree seeking mobility. 5 scholarships for the PhD and 23 for Masters programmes.

What Is The Benefit Of INTERACT-Africa PhD And MSc Scholarship?

Tuition fees and research costs for the duration of the study.

  • Comprehensive health and accident insurance cover
  • Monthly stipend/allowance of Euro 1,230 per month for PhD and 890 per month for the Masters.
    a. PhD students will receive a monthly stipend of 1230 Euros. This also includes (1) travels cost to and
    from the host institution, (2) Visa costs, and (3) settling allowance.
    b. MSc students will receive a monthly stipend of 890 Euros. This also includes (1) travels cost to and
    from the host institution, (2) Visa costs, and (3) settling allowance.

HOW LONG WILL AWARD LAST?

  • For PhD students, the maximum duration of a scholarship is 36 months.
  • For MSc students, the maximum duration of a scholarship is 24 months.
    The scholarships will be offered to regional students on a competitive basis. Female, disadvantaged, marginalized groups and
    candidates with special needs are encouraged to apply.

How To Apply:

Eligible candidates interested in these programmes are invited fill the online scholarship application form using the link
https://form.jotform.com/241243838123048. For more information visit https://interactafrica.mu.ac.ke/. Note that each
applicant is advised to apply concurrently to the host University for admission. The scholarships will only be awarded
to candidates with admission letters from the host university.

The programmes are scheduled to start in August/September/October 2024. The deadline for application is 23rd June,
2024 EAT by midnight. Motivational letters should be addressed to: Lead Coordinator, INTERACT-Africa Project,
Moi University, P.O Box 3900, Eldoret, Kenya, interact-africa2023@mu.ac.ke.

Visit Award Webpage for Details