1 Jun 2024

Western powers threaten Georgia over passage of foreign agents law

Andrea Peters


The political crisis engulfing the country of Georgia continues to deepen. The US and its European allies are condemning and threatening the ruling party of the small nation for recently overriding a presidential veto in order to pass a “foreign agents’ law.”

The measure, which requires organizations receiving 20 percent or more of their resources from abroad to declare their funders, is opposed in Washington and Brussels. It has provoked weeks of Western-backed protests in Tbilisi, in which demonstrators have denounced the government for being “Russian slaves” and celebrated the European Union (EU), Ukraine and the US as the embodiment of democracy and liberation.

Map of the region

The south Caucasus country (population 3.7 million), which sits at the crossroads of the Black and Caspian Seas, is being drawn into the maelstrom of the opening stages of World War III. The West deems the ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party, in power since 2012, to be excessively close to Moscow. While Tbilisi has had extensive ties with NATO for years, GD represents a faction of the Georgian oligarchy which still seeks to balance between Washington and Moscow.

Having emerged out of the Stalinist restoration of capitalism in the Soviet Union, the Georgian oligarchy, like its counterparts in the region, is being torn by factional infighting over the future course of its foreign policy, which is only deepened by the profound social crisis in the country.

While the immediate targets are opponents of GD within the ruling oligarchy and pro-NATO sections of the middle class, this does not not lessen the reactionary character of the “foreign agents” law, which can also be applied to any genuine left-wing opposition to the government.

With the war in Ukraine going badly and NATO moving toward open military conflict with Russia, the passage of the bill has created the opportunity for Washington to bring Georgia into line.

The US Congress is preparing sanctions against Georgia, and the State Department, with extraordinary hypocrisy, just announced visa bans for “individuals who are responsible for or complicit in undermining democracy in Georgia, as well as their family members.” Making clear that the Biden administration is prepared to place Georgia on its enemies list, Secretary of State Antony Blinken has ordered a “comprehensive review of bilateral cooperation between the United States and Georgia” and warned that Washington “will take into account Georgia’s actions in deciding our own.”

The EU, in which Georgia is seeking membership, announced May 28 that the adoption of the foreign agents’ law would “negatively impact Georgia’s EU path.” Brussels went further. “The EU and its Member States are considering all options to react to these developments,” it threatened. 

Five days earlier, Georgian prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze reported that EU Enlargement Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi had told him, “Look what happened to Fico, you should be very careful.” The reference was to Slovak prime minister Robert Fico, nearly assassinated recently by a right-wing gunman, possibly assisted by foreign intelligence agencies.

Várhelyi subsequently claimed the Georgian leader had taken his remarks “out of context.” However, his “sincere regret” about any misunderstanding was hardly comforting. The EU official acknowledged having referred to “the latest tragic event in Slovakia [i.e., the Fico assassination attempt],” but that he had merely been trying to warn Kobakhidze “not to enflame further the already fragile situation by adopting this law which could lead to further polarization and to possible uncontrolled situations on the streets of Tbilisi.” In other words, do what we want or be prepared, against the backdrop of civil unrest, to get yourself killed!

A demonstrator draped in an American flag stands in front of police during an opposition protest against the foreign influence bill at the Parliamentary building in Tbilisi, Georgia, Tuesday, May 28, 2024. [AP Photo/Shakh Aivazov]

Along the same generally threatening lines, NATO’s Parliamentary Assembly (PA) asserted May 26 that it remained “firmly committed to Georgia’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy and aspiration to join NATO.” The implication being that only in so far as Georgia joined NATO could its “sovereignty” and “territorial integrity” be assured.

“Georgia stands at a crossroads,” the military alliance arrogantly went on to claim. The foreign agents’ law “must now be withdrawn,” and should it not be, the EU and NATO would “continue to support [the protesters].”

While Washington and Brussels condemn the foreign agents’ law as anti-democratic and the handiwork of the Kremlin, their central concern is that it would expose and undermine the vast network of Western-financed “civil society” organizations in Georgia through which imperialism exercises influence in the country and the region.

As of 2019, there were 26,000 NGOs registered in Georgia, according to a European Parliamentary Research Service report. This is evidence, the document argued, of a “vibrant and active” civil society. It pointed out that the EU, working with its “2018-2020 Roadmap for engagement with civil society” in Georgia, “liaises with Georgian society on a regular basis” and has “organized extensive consultations.” The authors lamented the fact that only 23 percent of Georgians “fully trust/rather trust” these organizations.

These “soft power” outfits, operating in the fields of education, media, labor relations, human rights advocacy and the like, promote the political agenda and ideology of the US and Europe. Through exchange programs, grants and scholarships and other “joint partnerships” funded by institutions like USAID, the World Bank and the European Commission, they dole out cash and career opportunities, cultivating a pro-Western social base.

In an unexpectedly, perhaps unintentionally frank May 5 comment in the Moscow Times, two civil society activists from the south Caucasus noted, “Foreign aid agencies and their local NGO contractors have long colonized most areas of public policy and services” in Georgia. “To give it the appearance of community participation, the aid agency contracts Georgian NGOs to do the everyday footwork.” “Georgian NGOs that receive grants to implement this work may be local, but they hold considerable power over the Georgian population. This power comes from their access to Western embassies and resources,” they further explain.

When necessary, such forces can be called upon to become the “hard power” of imperialist intervention.

Street art in the center of Tbilisi promising the incineration of Russia's capital, July 2023.

A May 29 New York Times article, intended to glorify Georgia’s “democratic” protest movement, describes the months of demonstrations in Tbilisi as having “been mainly organized by civil society groups, many of which receive funding from overseas groups promoting things like democracy and a free media, who fear the country is sliding into authoritarianism.” “Many have coordinated their activities in messaging apps with opposition lawmakers,” it adds. The article’s author obviously did not see the irony of protests against Georgia’s foreign agents’ law organized by said foreign agents.

Among the privileged sections of the middle class currently wrapping themselves in European, Georgian and Ukrainian flags on the streets of Tbilisi, one will find no signs of opposition to the genocide in Gaza. The objections of these layers to “oppression” do not extend to the 21st century’s first genocide. Inasmuch as they know that opposition to Israel’s mass murder in Gaza will bring them into conflict with their foreign supporters, they keep their mouths shut. Furthermore, capitalism is not a swear word for such people, but a system that evokes feelings of eager anticipation.

In a May 16 article reporting on the situation, the Guardian describes some of the organizations playing a central role in the Georgian protests. The Georgian Students for a European Future, it explains, is a “centrist” group. Another, Students for Liberty, “has some libertarian tendencies.” “A group called Wave, it reports, “includes environmentalists but vehemently describes itself as ‘not leftist.’” The Franklin Group, named after Benjamin Franklin, it notes, “promotes free markets, private property, and individual liberties.” Meanwhile, the Shame group just “focuses on free and fair elections.” Another outfit, Sunset, “describes itself as liberal nationalist” and has its “members swear an oath of allegiance.”

The gap between this outlook and the concerns of the vast majority of Georgians is undeniable. In October 2023, the Eurasia Foundation, National Democratic Institute and UKAID— agencies allied with the US and British governments—published the results of a nationwide survey titled, “Taking Georgia’s Pulse.”

The authors write:

“The survey shows that poverty and economic problems are identified as main contributors to a sense of insecurity–a finding that transcends party line.” “Every second Georgian says the situation regarding poverty and crime has worsened.” “One in ten Georgians can’t afford food, while one in four can only afford food, but nothing else.” “The majority consider poor quality of education as the leading problem facing the education system, while high cost of drugs and medical services are considered as leading problems in the healthcare system.” “The majority,” 83 percent, “says that depression and anxiety is problematic for Georgian society, with almost every second Georgian (41 percent) saying they don’t know who to address for help.”

In response to a question about the most important national issues facing the respondent and his or her family, topics that are absent from the banners at Tbilisi’s demonstrations come in first. Rising prices and inflation, jobs, poverty, pensions, wages, education and healthcare are among the top eight. “Human rights,” NATO and EU membership, relations with Russia and freedom of speech–all headliners of the anti-government protests—came in ninth place or below. Just 10 percent of Georgians indicated that “Actions by Russia towards Georgia” were among the most important reasons they feel insecure living in the country.

Anti-Russian graffiti on Davit Aghmashenebeli Avenue in Tbilisi, July 2023.

Contrary to Western claims, a majority support the current ruling party. However, fully “62 percent of Georgians say none of the parties represent their interests.” A breakdown by party support “shows that every fifth GD supporter, almost every second opposition supporter, and the majority of undecided say none of the parties represent their interests.”

The political situation in Georgia is explosive, sharply exacerbated by the endless US and NATO provocations and threats against Russia. Sections of the elite allied to Washington and Brussels are working to undermine the ruling party’s grip on power.

Two hundred NGOs issued a joint statement May 29 insisting they would defy the foreign agents’ law. “The Russian law will not work in our country! It will remain a piece of paper, which nobody will obey,” they declared. The organizations promised to pay the fines, which can run into the tens of thousands of dollars, of anyone found guilty of violating the law. Clearly, they have a great deal of money at their disposal.

President Salome Zourabichvili, who occupies a largely figurehead position but is the commander-in-chief of Georgia’s armed forces, warned at a May 26 Independence Day rally that “the specter of Russia looms over us.”

At the event, she announced the issuing of the “Georgian Charter,” a declaration intended to unify the country’s opposition in the run-up to October’s elections. The plan calls for the repeal of the foreign agents’ law; the withdrawal of all anti-European measures; the structural reform and political purge of all major state agencies; the cancelation of decisions that undermine Georgia’s ability to pay off foreign creditors; and the overhaul of the electoral system. In other words, it is a call for a pro-imperialist house cleaning, with the prospect of many new positions and opportunities for those who sign up.

Whether or not the opposition, made up of dozens of competing, right-wing groups, can or will coalesce around this program remains unclear. Voicing Western concerns that Georgia’s anti-government groups are not up to the task and tacitly admitting that their base of support is narrow, a May 28 comment on Eurasianet noted, “The biggest risk for [the opposition] is losing momentum and seeing a poor turnout on election day.”

Oil and gas giants ConocoPhillips and Chevron announce major acquisitions as industry consolidation continues

Alex Findijs


ConocoPhillips, one of the leading oil and gas companies in the United States, announced Wednesday that it would be purchasing Marathon Oil for $22.5 billion. The agreement contains an all-stock offer of $30.33 per share, a 15 percent premium on the company’s stock price at the time of the deal, and will include $5.4 billion in Marathon’s debt. The acquisition is expected to close towards the end of 2024.

This is a Marathon gas station in Bradenton, Florida, Feb. 7, 2024. ConocoPhillips is buying Marathon Oil in an all-stock deal valued at approximately $17.1 billion. [AP Photo/Gene J. Puska]

As part of the deal, ConocoPhillips announced it would sell $2 billion in assets as well as increase stock buybacks from $5 billion this year to $7 billion next year. It has also committed to buying a total of $20 billion in shares back from investors over three years following the close of the deal.

The deal could attract scrutiny from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) but federal regulators believe the merger constitutes a small portion of the global market and is smaller than other mergers already approved in recent years.

Marathon Oil has large holdings in the Bakken basin in North Dakota and the Permian basin in Texas and New Mexico. ConocoPhillips is currently the third largest oil and gas producer in the Permian, which is the largest shale oil field in the US. By purchasing Marathon, ConocoPhillips will expand its production in the Permian by 48,000 barrels a day to a combined 701,000 barrels per day, and in the Bakken basin by 105,000 barrels a day to a total of 200,000 barrels.

The past few years have seen an upsurge in the number of mergers and acquisitions in the oil and gas industry. In 2023 alone there were $234 billion in mergers and acquisitions, the largest amount since 2012, according to the US Energy Information Administration (EIA).

Other notable mergers include the planned purchase of Hess by Chevron for $53 billion also announced this week, and the purchase of Pioneer Natural Resources by ExxonMobil for $60 billion, approved earlier this month.

Hess owns a 30 percent stake in the Stabroek Block that has rights to the oil and gas reserves in Guyana. By acquiring Hess, Chevron will gain a significant stake in these energy reserves. Even with stiff resistance from Exxon (45 percent in Stabroek Block) and China National Offshore Oil Corporation (25 percent), approval by the FTC could come as early as next month.

Exxon’s purchase of Pioneer will add 700,000 barrels a day to the company’s current production by 2027 and create a combined land ownership of 1.4 million acres. Both companies have large stakes in the Permian basin and the merger would combine their adjacent fields, creating a combined reserve of 16 billion barrels in the Permian alone. According to the EIA, the Permian is the primary source of increased production in the US.

The acquisitions could increase the share of US production for Chevron from 5 to 6 percent of the US market and increase Exxon’s share to 7 percent to surpass Chevron as the largest oil and gas producer in the country.

Other notable acquisitions include Diamondback Energy purchasing Endeavor Energy for $26 billion, potentially making it the third largest producer in the Permian. Chesapeake Energy plans to merge with Southwestern Energy for $11.5 billion and could become the largest natural gas producer in the US. Chevron and Exxon made additional purchases of PDC Energy for $7.6 billion and Denbury Inc for $4.9 billion in 2023 respectively.

The surge in consolidations has been fed by two major factors. One is that the outbreak of war in Ukraine in 2022 caused a massive spike in energy prices around the world. This resulted in windfall profits for oil and gas companies and sparked a race to boost production and fill the gap caused by disruptions to global oil and gas markets by the war.

The other is that newer drilling technologies are opening up large oil and gas fields, such as the Permian, to cheaper production. Many of the smaller companies that have been acquired owned land on large reserves where the cost of production has fallen. Giants like Chevron and ExxonMobil are seeing an opportunity to capitalize on the 2022 oil price spike and acquire new reserves to consolidate their position in the market.

A survey by the US Geologic Survey in 2018 estimated that there were 46.4 billion barrels of undiscovered and recoverable oil in the Permian’s Delaware basin, double the previous estimate. As one of the oldest oil fields in the US, the Permian has been drilled for oil for over a century. But production began to decline in the later decades of the 20th century.

With new hydraulic fracturing technologies the Permian has seen a resurgence in production and a drop in cost. Prior to purchase, Pioneer had developed drilling technologies that allowed it to reduce the cost of production to as low as $19 per barrel in some areas, according to Pheasant Energy. Exxon expects the average cost per barrel to be less than $35 from Pioneer’s assets, far less than the national average for shale basins in the US of $54 per barrel.

A similar situation exists for the reserves in Guyana, with Americas Market Intelligence estimating the cost of production to be as low as $25 a barrel in some areas.

The consolidation of the oil and gas industry is also playing out amid the escalating NATO war against Russia in Ukraine. As NATO prepares to send combat troops to Ukraine and the Biden administration lifts restrictions on the use of US weapons on targets inside Russia, disruptions to global energy supplies may be around the corner.

Russia is the third largest oil producer in the world, with 12 percent of global production. Since the beginning of the Ukraine war the share of Europe’s natural gas imports from Russia have dropped from over 40 percent in 2021 to just 8 percent in 2023, with the US replacing much of that supply.

Regardless of whether US energy companies are factoring the war into their acquisitions they will certainly benefit from a greater market share in a war-time economy. Since the start of the war, five of the world’s largest energy companies—Shell, BP, Chevron, ExxonMobil, and TotalEnergies—made $281 billion in profit and paid out $200 billion to investors according to a recent report by Global Witness. Further reducing costs for the oil companies, the United Steelworkers imposed a below-inflation sellout agreement covering 30,000 US oil refinery workers concurrent with the launching of the US-NATO proxy war in 2022.

These companies stand to profit even more from an expanding global imperialist war.

31 May 2024

Government Of Malaysia International Scholarships 2024/2025

Application Deadline: 30th June 2024

Eligible Countries: All Countries

To be taken at: Public and Private Universities in Malaysia

Accepted Subject Areas? Field of studies is in the following priority areas:

Candidates may choose any related course within the field/areas mentioned below

About Scholarships:

Malaysia International Scholarship (MIS) is an initiative by the Malaysian Government to attract brilliant minds from around the world to pursue postgraduate studies in Malaysia. This scholarship is parallel with Malaysia’s aspiration to emerge as one of the global centres of academic excellence by attracting, motivating and retaining talented human capital from abroad.

The Malaysian Technical Cooperation Program (MTCP) was established in 1980 as Malaysia’s commitment to South-South Cooperation by sharing Malaysia’s development experiences and expertise with other developing countries.

Type: Masters degree

Selection Criteria: Applications will be considered according to the following selection criteria:-

  • High-level academic achievement
  • The quality of the research proposal and its potential contribution towards advancing technology and human well-being.
  • Excellent communication, writing, and reading skills in English Language

Eligibility: Malaysia International Scholarship (MIS) applicants must COMPLY to the following criteria

  • Interested international graduates with outstanding academic and co-curricular backgrounds are welcome to apply for this scholarship to further their studies in leading Malaysian universities and higher education institutions with the opportunity to enjoy Malaysian hospitality and a world-class higher education experience.

Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) Scholarship applicants must COMPLY to the following criteria:

  • Not more than 45 years old at the time of application.
  • For Master’s Degree Program, applicants should obtain a minimum of Second Class Upper (Honours) or a minimum CGPA of 3.0 at Undergraduate Degree level.
  • Proof of English Language Proficiency:
    • Scanned copy of the original proof of English Language Proficiency such as IELTS (minimum total score 6.0); or TOEFL paper-based test with a score of 500 or an internet-based test with a score of 60; or
    • Applicants obtaining Degrees with English as medium of instruction may also be accepted (evidence is a prerequisite).
  • Has an excellent level of health certified by a doctor/physician. The applicant shall fully bear the cost of the medical check-up.
  • Scholars must undertake full-time study for postgraduate programs at the selected Higher Learning Institutions (Please refer List of Universities).
  • Applications are only open to candidates who have received offer letters from universities in Malaysia but have not yet started their studies or those who have registered for no more than one semester for a Master’s Degree.

How Many Scholarships are available? Several

What are the benefits?

  1. This scholarship covers:
  1. Cost of Living Allowance
  2. Book Allowance
  3. Tools Allowance
  4. House Rental Allowance
  5. Family Assistance Allowance
  6. Placement Allowance
  7. Thesis Allowance
  8. Travel Allowance
  9. Practical Training Allowance
  10. End of Study Allowance
  11. Tuition Fees
  12. Medical Claims
  13. Visa Fee
  • Method of Payment: Participants will receive allowances and other benefits from the Scholarship Division, Ministry of Higher Education Malaysia, through their individual savings accounts. Students are advised to open a Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad account.

How long will sponsorship last? For the duration of the programme of study

Visit Scholarship webpage for details.

Government Of Ireland Africa Agri-Food Development Program (AADP) 2024

Application Deadline: 5th July 2024.

About the Ireland Africa Agri-food Award: The Objective of the AADP is to develop partnerships between the Irish Agri-Food Sector and African countries to support sustainable growth of the local food industry, build markets for local produce and support mutual trade between Ireland and Africa.

It is intended that any investment by the AADP will be catalytic support with co-funding from the private sector. The fund is designed to leverage greater expertise, experience and investment from the Irish agri-food sector and projects should demonstrate results with a long-term developmental impact that will ultimately lead to sustainable benefits through investment by the private sector.

Irish agri-food expertise is extremely wide-ranging and examples of suitable AADP projects include:

  • Business development
  • Production system
  • Technology Transfer
  • R & D
  • Project Management

Type: Entrepreneurship/Grants

Eligibility for Ireland Africa Agri-food: 

  • The partners involved must include one Irish registered agri food company and one local commercial entity in Africa;
  • All proposed projects must be commercial in nature and focus. Funding will only be awarded to Irish registered agri food companies.
  • AADP funding is up to a maximum of €250,000 per company for a full project or €100,000 for a feasibility study.
  • AADP funding will not exceed 50% of the costs of the project;
  • The funds contributed by the Irish registered agri food company must not comprise funding received from any other Irish Public funding source.
  • If an applicant company was previously successful in applying for AADP funding, it must explain clearly (in the application form) the new project goals/outcomes and how they differ from those in the initial funding round.
  • If an applicant company proposes to undertake a feasibility study, it should include a list of ‘potential’ partners with the application.
  • Projects will be supported in the following countries – Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria Malawi, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia;
    • Funding from the AADF must bring about additionality and not replace existing funding;
    • Successful AADF funding applicants will be encouraged to engage with Irish NGOs where possible on various aspects of the projects i.e. Mechanical and Engineering, Project design, etc.

Evaluation Criteria: Applications will be evaluated against the following criteria:

  • Development Impact
  • Company expertise (Technical, financial etc)
  • Commercial viability
  • Risk Analysis
  • Monitoring and Expenditure

It is intended that any investment by the AADP will be catalytic support with co-funding from the private sector. The fund is designed to leverage greater expertise, experience and investment from the Irish agri-food sector and projects should demonstrate results with a long-term developmental impact that will ultimately lead to sustainable benefits through investment by the private sector.

Number of Awards: Not specified

Value of Ireland Africa Agri-food Development Program: Possible funding of up to €250,000 in total per company

How to Apply: 

The AADP is now open for submissions.

  • Submissions will only be accepted through the official AADP application form.
  • The application form for a full project or a feasibility study can be downloaded below. Please return the completed application form to aadp@dfa.ie before the deadline (close of business, Friday, 5 July 2024). Please monitor this website and the department’s social media accounts for updates.
  • For any questions or queries on the application process, please contact aadp@dfa.ie .

Visit the Program Webpage for Details

Award Providers: The Ireland Africa Agri-Food Development Programme (AADP) is a joint initiative between the Department of Agriculture, Food and the Marine and the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade.

30 May 2024

Newsflash: Inequality in Neoliberal America

David Schultz




Photograph by Nathaniel St. Clair

If anyone is perplexed or surprised  why Americans are so upset about the economy, they should look no further than the Income Distribution and Dynamics in America (IDDA) recent report by the Federal Reserve Board of  Minneapolis and its data site that looks at the stagnation of American income and economic mobility in America.  It unfortunately confirms what we already know—the neoliberal state benefits unevenly and in ways that confound an ability to challenge it..

America is built upon two myths, the myth of equality and the myth of the American dream. The myth of equality is the idea that we all have an equal opportunity to succeed.  The American dream is the idea that by hard work, perseverance, and a little bit of luck, anybody can work themselves out of poverty and potentially become rich. Yet we already knew from previous studies that neo-liberal economic policies have produced a gap between the rich and poor in America from the 1970s to the present that has largely benefited upper-income levels.  We also knew that economic mobility has largely stagnated.

Drawing upon IRS and Census Bureau records the Minneapolis Federal Reserve Board was able to construct a portrait regarding the status of income and mobility in America between 2005 and 2019. It does so across gender, race, and geography (state).  The importance of this intersectionality is to highlight how inequality and mobility in America is not just about race, it is not just about class, but also how the two intersect in terms of the state where one lives, offering a picture perhaps regarding how specific state policies may impact one’s life prospects.

Generally the IDDA study confirms other reports of the growing income gap.  Between 2005 and 2019 those in the bottom ten percent saw their adjusted gross income increase by 5%, whereas those in the top two percent saw a 23% increase.  One of the most startling conclusions of the report according to the Federal Reserve Board was that a “household in the bottom 20 percent of the distribution now makes exactly the same as it was making 50 years ago, in real terms.”   Regardless of race and gender, unless you are at an upper income level, earnings have stagnated. This can explain both the angry Trump voters who feel they have been left out economically, and the disappointment in Obama-Biden policies that have left most Americans behind.  Across the presidencies from the second Bush to Biden, neo-liberal economics  has benefitted only few, but even across class there is a skewing.

For example, across the board women continue to lag in income compared to men. In 2005 women generally earned 69% of what men earned, while in 2019 it was 74%. But the gap varies across income levels.  At the 10th percentile (lowest income level) in 2005  women earned 61%, by 2019 It was merely 70.8%. At the 50th percentile in 2005 women earned 68% of what men earned, in 2019 it was 74%.  But then by the time one gets to the 99.999 percentile in 2005, it was 26% compared to 29% in 2019 Over time, depending on your income level women made modest at best improvements in bridging the gap between their income and those of men.

But when we look at different states for example, as well as break it down by gender and race we find, for example, that in Texas, Hispanic women make 43% of white males, white women make 63% compared to white males, and Hispanic men make. 67%.  Whereas in California Hispanic women make 46%, white women 69%, and  Hispanic men 62%. Despite two different political cultures and different political party domination, the difference in income  between California and Texas is modest at best.

In terms of mobility, while the statistics in the IDDA project break it up by state and by income in general from 2005 to 2018 a portrait of stagnation also appears. For men in general, there is a 62% chance of moving from the lowest income quartile to the next quartile for women 57% Hispanic 63%, Whites 59%. Blacks 54%. At best, slightly better than even chances of moving up from that lowest income quartile to the next quartile, with the probabilities of  moving even further up even more significantly diminished.

The IDDA report provides perhaps the best detail we have so far on the economic and social consequences of neo-liberal economic policies in America.  It demonstrates uneven distributions of benefits in ways that nearly everyone can claim to be a loser  while also pointing to relative winners,  thereby thwarting efforts to form any solidarity to fight these policies.

Yet despite this socio-economic news,  voters this November will face a rematch of two neo-liberal presidential candidates, with little hope that the pattern of inequality and frozen mobility will change.

New study highlights significant health impacts three years after COVID-19 infection

Benjamin Mateus


Amid the complete blackout by governments and public health officials on the true state of the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, a study just published in the journal Nature Medicine by Dr. Ziyad Al-Aly and colleagues reaffirms in the negative the detriments to our health posed by allowing SARS-CoV-2 to infect and re-infect populations under the stated policy of “forever COVID.”

One of the most pernicious lies about COVID-19 is that mild or asymptomatic infections cause no damage to the body and are therefore of little concern. Following up on their prior groundbreaking studies, Al-Aly and colleagues address this fallacy head-on and, in distinction to the laissez-faire attitude of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and the Biden administration, make a cogent warning on the significant long-term damage COVID-19 can wreak on the body.

Dr. Ziyad Al-Aly [Photo by Dr. Ziyad Al-Aly]

Regardless of how mild the acute course of the disease may be, the sustained impact to numerous organ systems may greatly impede our long-term well-being. The studies led by Al-Aly force the medical sciences to rethink the genesis of chronic diseases and for stewards of public health to accept prevention as a necessary first measure in defending societies from these pathogens.

In attempting to understand the chronicity of post-acute sequelae of COVID-19 (PASC), the authors of the study explained, “Addressing this knowledge gap is important to deepen understanding of the post-acute and long-term health trajectories of people who had SARS-CoV-2 infection and will inform care of people with these conditions.”

As with their prior studies, the authors utilize the expansive databases of the US Department of Veterans Affairs. The participants of the present study included a cohort of 135,161 US veterans (114,864 non-hospitalized (NH) and 20,297 hospitalized (H)) who survived the first 30 days of their COVID-19 infections and were followed for three full years to estimate their risk of death and incident of PASC throughout the follow-up period. The comparison group consisted of more than 5 million users of the VA healthcare system without any evidence of prior SARS-CoV-2 infection.

Results of death and PASC in NH and H participants

With respect to death, NH participants only saw an increased risk of death in the first year after the acute phase of their infection compared to controls. This amounted to an excess mortality burden of 16.2 per 1,000 persons.

However, H participants continued to see their risk of death climb even into the third year from their initial infection. In the first year, these participants saw an excess mortality burden of 58.85 per 1,000 persons compared to non-infected people. That rate continued climbing with an additional 14.15 excess deaths per 1,000 persons in the second year and then 8.16 excess deaths per 1,000 persons in the third year, for a cumulative rate of over 80 excess deaths per 1,000 persons.

The solid lines at the center of shaded bands were adjusted cumulative excess death rate per 1,000 persons in non-hospitalized COVID-19 (n = 114,864) and hospitalized COVID-19 (n = 20,297) groups compared to the control group without infection (n = 5,206,835), and the shaded bands present the 95% CIs for cumulative excess rates. [Photo by Cai, M., Xie, Y., Topol, E.J. et al. / CC BY 4.0]

Translating this, H participants with just one prior infection compared to non-infected controls can expect to see 8 percent more die after three years. Given that estimates place the number of people hospitalized from May 2020 to April 2021 at between 3.25 to 3.95 million people, that would lead to a considerable undercounting of COVID deaths.

With respect to PASC (Long COVID), among NH participants the three-year cumulative number reached 378.7 per 1,000 persons. The highest rate occurred in the first year at 212.3, then 125.0 in the second year and 41.2 in the third year. Additionally, the authors found that the cumulative burden of disability-adjusted-life-years (DALYs) due to PASC reached 91.2 per 1,000 persons. Although declining each year, it remained statistically significant and elevated.

By comparison, for H participants, the three-year cumulative number of post-acute sequelae reached 2,392 per 1,000 persons and the burden of DALYs due to PASC had reached 766.2 per 1,000 persons or 8.4 times higher than among NH participants.

DALYs are used by researchers to capture the impact a disease has on people’s lives above and beyond mortality rates. These are time-based measures that combine years of life lost due to premature death (Years of Life Lost—YLL) and years of life lost due to time lived in states of less than full health, or years of healthy life lost due to disability (YLD). Statistically, one DALY represents the loss of the equivalent of one year of full health.

Dr. Al-Aly wrote to the World Socialist Web Site,

Risk of new onset sequelae (PASC/Long Covid) declines over time in both non-hospitalized and hospitalized patients. But risk remains in the third year after infection causing 10 DALYs per 1000 persons in non-hospitalized and 90 DALYs per 1000 persons who were hospitalized during acute COVID.

The organ systems where the risk persists in non-hospitalized include neurologic, gastro-intestinal (GI), and pulmonary. Viruses are known to have long-term neurologic impacts (e.g. Epstein-Barr Virus/Multiple Sclerosis) and the gut may serve as a long-term reservoir for the virus. Cumulatively, at three years, Long Covid contributes 91.2 DALYs per 1000 persons – higher than cancer and heart disease. For context heart disease and cancer cause about 50 DALYs per 1000 persons in the population. Stroke generates about 10 DALYs per 1000 persons.

Mechanisms for Long COVID need to be further elucidated but are thought to include viral persistence, chronic inflammation, immune dysregulation or a combination of these.

When the PASC data were analyzed by organ systems, among NH participants compared to controls without infection, there was an increased risk of organ damage in all 10 “organ systems”—cardiovascular, coagulation, fatigue, gastrointestinal, kidney, mental, metabolic, musculoskeletal, neurologic and pulmonary—in the first year after infection, nine in the second year (all except kidney), and three in the third year that include the three organ systems mentioned above by Dr. Al-Aly.

For H participants, all ten organ systems reviewed were at risk in years one and two, while seven (all except kidney, metabolic, and musculoskeletal) exhibited increased risks in the third year.

When these were further subcategorized by actual disease states [See figure 2 below from the study], the real impact of Long COVID on the health of these participants became obviously evident. Using the statistical term incidence rate ratio (IRR) to demonstrate the increased burden of disease, one quickly observes that H participants have significantly higher rates of acute coronary disease. Rates of pulmonary embolism remain elevated for these patients throughout the study period. Risk of acute kidney injury persists. The rates of loss of smell are astronomical. They are also at higher risk of opioid abuse, sleep disorders, and suicidal ideations. These issues, although at lower rates, also impact NH participants.

Incidence rate ratios (IRRs) of PASC up to 3 years after SARS-CoV-2 infection by care setting of the acute phase. Heatmaps include non-hospitalized COVID-19 (n = 114,864; top rows) and hospitalized COVID-19 (n = 20,297; bottom rows) groups. IRRs were estimated in comparison to a control group without infection (n = 5,206,835). ACD, acute coronary disease; AKI, acute kidney injury; CKD, chronic kidney disease; DVT, deep vein thrombosis; ESRD, end-stage renal disease; GAD, general anxiety disorder; GERD, gastroesophageal reflux disease; IBS, irritable bowel syndrome; ICM, ischemic cardiomyopathy; ILD, interstitial lung disease; NA, not applicable; NCD, neurocognitive decline; NICM, non-ischemic cardiomyopathy; PTSD, post-traumatic stress disorder; TIA, transient ischemic attack; VTE, venous thromboembolism. If potential risk horizon (non-significant (NS) cell with a numeric IRR estimate) for an outcome was reached in a previous period, the IRRs for that outcome in all subsequent periods will not be estimated and are indicated by gray cells with NAs (not applicable) inside. [Photo by Cai, M., Xie, Y., Topol, E.J. et al. / CC BY 4.0]

The authors warned that even though those with severe COVID face the harshest long-term consequences, the absolute burden of Long COVID remains highest among those with mild disease, writing,

According to an analysis by the Global Burden of Disease (GBD) collaborators, about 90 percent of people with PASC had mild COVID-19, suggesting that, although preventing severe disease is important, strategies to reduce the risk of post-acute and long-term health loss in people with mild COVID-19 are also needed.

Al-Aly wrote to the WSWS:

We are used to thinking about infections as acute events with health effects that manifest around the time of infection. The data shows that Covid can cause health effects even 3 years later. I think this challenges the classic notion of infections causing acute health events. I feel Covid continues to teach us, and this is an important new lesson.

He concluded,

The story in hospitalized people is starker – they have greater risk and longer risk horizon with resultant burden of disease that is astronomically much higher than non-infected people and higher than non-hospitalized individuals. This places emphasis on prevention of hospitalization via vaccination, antivirals, etc. Hospitalization can have huge and wide-ranging effects on people’s lives for years if not more. Preventing hospitalization is very important.

But as Al-Aly had noted in a January 2024 Congressional hearing on Long COVID, “The best way to prevent Long COVID is to prevent COVID in the first place. There is no Long COVID without COVID.”

The results of this latest study reaffirm the need to prevent the ongoing transmission of SARS-CoV-2 globally and underscore the malign neglect that has punctuated the response by the capitalist ruling elites to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. The powers-that-be have inflicted this “mass disabling event” on the world’s population, with potential health ramifications for every life on this planet.

29 May 2024

Government Of Kazakhstan Scholarships (Undergraduate, Master’s, PhD) 2024

Application Deadline:

31st May 2024.

Tell Me About Government Of Kazakhstan Scholarships:

Ministry of education and science of the Republic of Kazakhstan calls for foreign applicants, including persons of Kazakh nationality who are not citizens of the Republic of Kazakhstan for full-time studying under Bachelor, Master and PhD educational programs.

What Type Of Scholarship Is This?

Undergraduate, Master, PhD

Which Countries Are Eligible?

International

Where Will Award Be Taken?

List of universities participants of Scholarship Program,  Bachelor / Master Degree / PhD Degree

How Many Scholarships Will Be Given?

  1. Bachelor degree program – 490
  2. Master degree program – 50
  3. PhD degree program – 10

How To Apply For Government Of Kazakhstan Scholarships?

DOCUMENTS ARE ACCEPTED FREE OF CHARGE.

Application Instructions and Requirements

Guide for international students in Kazakhstan

Brochure

Application form can be submitted in Kazakh or Russian or English.

The applicants, when filling out the application form should attach the scanned copies of the following documents:

Bachelor degree:

  1. Passport;
  2. A document on the previous level of education with a transcript and supplement (if available) and a notarized translation into Kazakh or Russian or English (for applicants for a bachelor’s degree – the average score of the document confirming secondary education with a grade of at least “good” );
  3. Motivational essay in Kazakh or Russian or English;
  4. A letter of recommendation in Kazakh or Russian or English from the educational organization in which the applicant studied, or from the employer;
  5. A medical certificate for study abroad, as well as a medical certificate confirming the absence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV infection) and AIDS, issued by official health authority of the applicant’s country of residence;
  6. Application form;
  7. Letter of invitation from the Kazakhstan university (if available).

Master degree:

  1. Passport;
  2. A document on the previous level of education with a transcript and an appendix (if available) and a notarized translation into Kazakh or Russian or English (bachelor’s or specialist diploma with an average score of at least 3.0 (out of 4.0) GPA or its equivalent obtained in educational institutions;
  3. Motivational essay in Kazakh or Russian or English;
  4. 2 letters of recommendation in Kazakh or Russian or English from the educational organization in which the applicant studied, or from the employer;
  5. A medical certificate for study abroad, as well as a medical certificate confirming the absence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV infection) and AIDS, issued by official health authority of the applicant’s country of residence;
  6. Application form;
  7. Letter of invitation from the Kazakhstan university (if available).
  8. An international certificate confirming knowledge of a foreign language:
  • English: IELTS Academic (International English Language Testing System Academic) threshold score – at least 5.5;
  • TOEFL IBT (Test of English as a Foreign Language Internet-based test), threshold score – at least 46;
  • TOEFL PBT (Test of English as a Foreign Language Paper-based test), threshold score – at least 453;
  • German: Deutsche Sprachpruefung fuer den Hochschulzugang (DSH, Niveau B2/level B2), TestDaF-Prufung (Niveau B2/level B2);
  • French: TFI (Test de Français International™) – not lower than B2 level in reading and listening sections), DELF (Diplome d’Etudes en Langue française) – level B2, DALF (Diplome Approfondi de Langue française) – level B2, TCF (Test de connaissance du français) – at least 50 points.
  • An international certificate confirming the knowledge of a foreign language by a person for whom the indicated languages ​​are native is not required;

PhD degree:

  1. Passport;
  2. A document on the previous level of education with a transcript and an appendix (if available) and a notarized translation into Kazakh or Russian or English (bachelor’s or specialist diploma with an average score of at least 3.0 (out of 4.0) GPA or its equivalent obtained in educational institutions;
  3. Motivational essay in Kazakh or Russian or English;
  4. 2 letters of recommendation in Kazakh or Russian or English from the educational organization in which the applicant studied, or from the employer;
  5. A medical certificate for study abroad, as well as a medical certificate confirming the absence of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV infection) and AIDS, issued by official health authority of the applicant’s country of residence;
  6. Application form;
  7. Letter of invitation from the Kazakhstan university (if any);
  8. Substantiation of the topic of the dissertation research in the language of instruction (Kazakh or Russian or English);
  9. An international certificate confirming knowledge of a foreign language:
  • English: IELTS Academic (International English Language Testing System Academic) threshold score – at least 5.5;
  • TOEFL IBT (Test of English as a Foreign Language Internet-based test), threshold score – at least 46;
  • TOEFL PBT (Test of English as a Foreign Language Paper-based test), threshold score – at least 453;
  • German: Deutsche Sprachpruefung fuer den Hochschulzugang (DSH, Niveau B2/level B2), TestDaF-Prufung (Niveau B2/level B2);
  • French: TFI (Test de Français International™) – not lower than B2 level in reading and listening sections), DELF (Diplome d’Etudes en Langue française) – level B2, DALF (Diplome Approfondi de Langue française) – level B2, TCF (Test de connaissance du français) – at least 50 points;

Visit Award Webpage For Details