When the INS Arihant’s nuclear reactor went critical in
August 2013, India not only joined the blue-water navy
club of countries with the capability to build nuclear-
powered ballistic missile submarines, but also picked on
a major doctrinal headache. This, apart from the
specification concerns and limited intended utility, puts
the Indian Advanced Technological Vessel (ATV)
programme in a quagmire. With the Indian Navy
expecting to acquire and deploy the vessel in the first
quarter of 2015, certain aspects of this project must be
discussed to gauge New Delhi’s capability to field and
utilise such technology.
Manufacturing
The ATV project is believed to have been started with
the objective of manufacturing SSNs –fast moving
deep-diving nuclear powered attack submarines –
largely based on the K-43 Charlie class vessel, leased
from the Soviet Union at a time when India did not
overtly possess nuclear capability. The project since
then has been covertly developing in the backdrop of
India conducting the Pokhran-II tests, declaring an
ambiguous nuclear strategy, and making impressive
strides in the development of Inter-Continental Ballistic
Missiles (ICBMs). The Arihant class seems to be a
derivative of the Charlie class, with the specifications
scaled up to the Akula class to accommodate a Vertical
Launch System (VLS) for ballistic missiles. Although
this would not hamper the general functioning of the
vessel, as per reports of the sea trials, the full
implications of this tweak will only emerge when the
Sagarika SLBMs are integrated into the of the INS
Arihant in early 2015. Furthermore, the inclusion of sail
planes and a towed array pod are surprising, as they are
generally avoided to counter limitations to speed and
fragility.
The pressurised water reactor (PWR) aboard the vessel
has also been developed with considerable assistance
from the Russians, contradicting New Delhi’s claims of
the Arihant being an indigenously developed submarine.
With no word on the progress of a domestic generator in
India, the Arihant class’s core component still uses
Russian intelligence and technology. The initial vessel
consumed more than a decade to be rolled out for
primary tests, as opposed to the average five years
taken for the development of vessels of the same class/
category by the five other navies that possess this
technology.
With the first vessel of the Arihant class still undergoing
final trials, India’s decision to start work on subsequent
vessels is a little hurried. An ideal strategy would have
been to concentrate on finishing the INS Arihant and
observing it in a deployed state and then diverting time
and resources on the succeeding vessels. If the claims
of the INS Aridhaman (second vessel in the Arihant
class) being built with ‘bigger and better’ specifications
is true, then the Indian government has not taken any
pointers from this endeavour and embarked on a new
project without successfully completing the first. In any
case, the US$ 2.9 billion per unit price of the vessel
does not justify its results, especially in comparison with
other navies building the same submarine at a
significantly lower price.
Utility: Intended Vs. Delivered
Former Naval Chief Nirmal Verma described the INS
Arihant as primarily a ‘technology demonstrator’.
However, it remains to be seen as to what ‘technology’
the vessel will be demonstrating. A simple comparison
of the Arihant with other submarines of comparable
class/category will reflect this issue. The Arihant has an
advertised maximum speed of only 24kts (submerged),
as opposed to the average 30kts afforded by all the
other classes. Not only does this reflect poorly on
India’s – DRDO and BARC’s – technological
capabilities, but also impedes the operational capability
of the vessel. Once discovered, the propellant potential
becomes the deciding factor for the survivability of a
submarine.
Also, the armament capacity of the INS Arihant is
acutely inferior, with the vessel only fielding 12 K-15
short-range SLBMs. In contrast, the Astute, the Virginia
and the Akula class all have provisions for at least 40
missiles.
With its slow speed and limited strike range, INS Arihant
does not contribute significantly to India’s second-
strike capability, with both China and Pakistan fielding
advanced anti-missile and early warning systems.
Doctrinal Shortcomings
The INS Arihant poses a new dilemma for the Modi
government. For ‘credible minimum deterrence’, New
Delhi is believed to have kept its nuclear weapons in a
‘de-mated’ state with the civilian authority exercising
absolute control. For a ballistic nuclear submarine, the
government will not only have to increase the readiness
of the weapons, but also relinquish their command to
naval officers on board the vessel. This increases the
possibility of an unauthorised/erroneous launch. Also
absent are well-defined protocols to dictate the steps to
be taken in the event of a communications failure with
the central command authority, or dealing with a hostile
take-over. The INS Arihant is a classic example of
governments going into the production stage of
weapons without developing concomitant doctrines.
The INS Arihant maybe a landmark achievement, but it
cannot stand up to China’s newest Jin class vessels,
reported to be one of the current best. Similarly, the
implication of inducting a nuclear submarine in the
Indian Navy on Pakistan remains to be seen. There are
already talks of Beijing selling submarines and
technology to Pakistan. In that case, the INS Arihant
has only initiated another arms race in the region.
No comments:
Post a Comment