STRATEGIC NON-NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Politico-Military thought often harbours a puzzling
phenomenon when it organises concepts and
institutions in a mosaic of sometimes antithetical
notions. Contrary ideas are indeed intrinsic to the art of
political sagacity, but when form is defined by a belief,
in apparent conflict with content, then there appear
distortions more illusory than what logic would suggest.
So it is with the emergence of strategic nuclear
weapons. They are destructive to the extent that the
purpose of warfare is itself obliterated, underscoring a
compelling theory of war avoidance. By its side are
strategic non-nuclear weapons whose intent is to target
nuclear weapons that, ironically, seek a (precarious)
stability.
Conventional savvy will first suggest that non-nuclear
weapons can neither deliver the requisite high explosive
payload to assume a counter-force role against silo-
based or caverned nuclear systems; nor do they come
with the probability of kill that is demanded with such a
role. But just around the technological corner lurks high
impact penetration and shaped charges that make a
mockery of hitherto simple overpressure reckoning.
Second, nuclear pundits will insinuate that a partially
successful counter-force strike may in point of fact
catalyse escalation to a full blown nuclear exchange;
both contain candour of their own.
But strange is our circumstance when on the one hand
Pakistan presents us with a nuclear nightmare which
when articulated is a hair-trigger, opaque deterrent
conventionalised under military control, steered by a
doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity, and
guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds
unity with non-state actors. The introduction of tactical
nuclear weapons into the battle area further exacerbates
credibility of their control. It does not take a great deal
of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is
upon us. However, the very nature of the power
equation on the subcontinent and the extent to which it
is tilted in India’s favour will imply that any attempt at
bringing about conflict resolution through means other
than peaceful is destined to fail. In this context it is
amply clear that the threat of use of nuclear weapons
promotes only one case and that is the Pakistani
military establishment’s hold on the nation. On the other
hand is a Janus-faced China which, in collusion with
Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, has not just
entrenched proliferatory links, but also doctrinal union
that permits a duplicitous approach to the latter’s
declared No First Use (NFU) posture and an option to
keep the South Asian nuclear cauldron on the boil. Also
significant is the alliance bucks the existing global non-
proliferation structure.
What may be derived from the current state of affairs,
with any conviction, is the political and military
unpredictability that prevails. This denies hope for
stability and the expectation of fitting conditions into a
convenient model, let alone providing for security
guarantees. Governments faced with such a conundrum
more readily prepare for a worst case scenario than try
and reconcile the true dimensions that uncertainty
introduces. It is preparedness, therefore, that endows
the only tool that can deter possible confrontation of a
nature that has earlier been designated as nightmarish.
India today is in a position to impress upon its
adversaries a deterrent relationship based on nuclear
war avoidance, with the proviso that the rationale of
nuclear weapons as a political tool and a means to
preclude a nuclear exchange are recognised and adhered
to. China’s galloping entwinement with the rest of the
world makes this proposition a real probability;
contingent upon our resolve and policies of seeking
mutuality with like-minded nations to rally around the
single point of preventing reactionary overturning of the
status quo. This despite the unilateral tensions that
China has precipitated in the East and South China Sea
over sovereignty, air defence identification zones and the
right to control fishing.
Pakistan is, however, a different cup of tea for it
portrays a perilous uncertainty, as would any nation
under military control that perceives in nuclear weapons
the ultimate Brahmastra. As with that weapon of mass
destruction, answers lay not just in the promise of
disproportionate retaliation but also in the credible
ability to prempt and counter its use. India has in place
nuclear weapons driven by a doctrine of NFU and
massive retaliation. What its strategic forces must now
equip itself with is select conventional hardware that
tracks and targets nuclear forces (all under political
control). This would provide the pre-emptive teeth to a
deterrent relationship that leans so heavily on NFU.