It is significant that the first international call that
Narendra Modi received soon after taking oath as Prime
Minister was from Premier Li Keqiang of China. This has
been quickly followed up with the visit of the Chinese
Foreign Minister, Wang Yi, within weeks of the new
government assuming charge in New Delhi. While there
is no denying that such visits are planned well ahead
and would have taken place irrespective of the
government in power, the tone and tenor of the meeting
has been distinct. The nuclear issue did not come up for
discussion, but the implications of how India-China
relations develop under the new Indian government will
be felt in the nuclear domain too.
The installation of every new government provides an
opportunity for a productive new beginning in inter-State
relations. Of course, India has since independence
largely followed a broadly pre-set foreign policy that has
never seen major swings or deviations. Changes have
largely been confined to shifts in focus and priorities.
But, as Mr Wang Yi said during his visit to India, China
wanted to "cement our existing friendship and explore
further cooperation."
The exploration of this further cooperation must include
the nuclear dimension too. Until now China has been
closed to this idea on the ground that India is an
illegitimate nuclear weapons power. However, over the
last sixteen years, now that India has consolidated and
operationalised its nuclear strategy, its 'legal' status is
really a non-issue. Slowly, India will have to 'chip away'
at traditional Chinese objections on this front and
convince it of the benefits of starting a nuclear dialogue
that can gradually explore the possibilities of nuclear
confidence-building measures and even arms control at
a later date.
Of course, India would first have to convince itself of the
need for these. As a State under denial from Western-
crafted arms control regimes, India is itself wary of this
concept. However, it would be foolish to eschew the
possibility of India being in the driver's seat on nuclear
CBMs and arms control. These are effective tools that
are used by nuclear-armed countries to stabilise their
deterrent relations and avoid situations of crisis and
arms race instability. India should find ways of doing
the same. Prime Minister Modi made a statement in a
completely different context when he said, "If India has
to compete with China, the focus should be on skill,
scale and speed." The same could be equally applied to
the nuclear context too. We need to skilfully find areas
of nuclear CBMs and arms control (a joint no-first use
agreement, an anti-ballistic missile treaty, control over
multiple independently retargetable vehicles could be
some ideas worthy of being explored) and do it with
speed. It would be in India's interest to find ways of
avoiding being sucked into an offence-defence nuclear
arms race.
It has been evident for a while that a relatively well-
armed and economically powerful China is in an
increasingly assertive mood and is looking to play a
larger role in Asia. India is well conscious of this.
However, it is essential that India shows assertion of its
own on issues that are of supreme national interest.
Unfortunately, the previous government, despite the
many good tasks that it undertook in strengthening
India's nuclear capability and position, suffered from the
perception of being low in resolve. Modi's personality
type is different and it reflects positively on the aspect
of political resolve, at least in case of India's foreign
policy. China respects this and it is not surprising that
the Chinese Foreign Minister praised Prime Minister
Modi for showing the world “resolve and courage” by
setting an agenda to push reforms and development and
for injecting “vigour and vitality” immediately after
taking charge.
India has many issues that can serve as useful
leverages in its relations with China. The consistent
upswing in bilateral trade, totalling close to US$70
billion, is a positive development even though New Delhi
has to work towards reducing its trade deficit with
China. Terrorist incidents in China have exposed the
dangers of extremist radicalism that continue to brew in
the country that Beijing claims as its close friend. It
would be naïve to believe that China will let go of its
special friendship with Pakistan, given that both
perceive this relationship as useful to keep India
unsettled. But, it would still be in India's interest to try
and expose the nuclear dangers for all if Pakistan
continues down the path of sponsoring and supporting
terrorism and China continues to shield its
misbehaviour. China must be 'made to understand' that
it cannot escape from existential nuclear dangers such
as an unauthorised or mistaken nuclear launch or one
caused by miscalculation.
Wang Yi was consistent in reminding India to follow a
"one-China" policy. Sushma Swaraj nattily retorted with
the need for China to respect a "one-India" policy. Both,
however, must equally recognise the fact that nuclear
dangers bring another kind of one-ness to the
neighbourhood that we would all ignore at our own
peril. It behoves the two largest nuclear armed countries
of Asia to join hands in reducing nuclear dangers to the
extent they can. The new government must seize the
opportunity to initiate nuclear-speak with China.
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