TACKLING NAXAL VIOLENCE

In a way the challenge of left-wing extremism the new
National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government in New
Delhi faces bears close resemblance to the situation
that confronted the United Progressive Alliance regime
in its second tenure in 2009. However, given that the
Congress party-led government failed to contain the
threat, the incumbent Bharatiya Janata Party
government needs to revisit the overall approach and
not repeat the past polices that contributed to the
survival of the extremist outfit.
In 2009, the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-
Maoist) was in the upswing with a dramatic spike in the
deaths of civilians and security forces. Extremism-
related incidents and fatalities among the civilians and
the security forces increased by 41 per cent and 25 per
cent respectively, in 2008. States such as Maharashtra
and West Bengal contributed significantly to this
upswing, with the eastern Indian state becoming the
third most extremism-affected state of the country, in
2009, with 255 incidents and 158 fatalities. The CPI-
Maoist was indeed looking at expanding its sphere of
influence.
The UPA government sought to tame the rise of
extremism with an iron hand.. The change of guards in
the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) following the
2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks led to a series of brain
storming sessions, and a new policy aiming to
annihilate the CPI-Maoist, titled ‘Operation Green Hunt’
took shape. However, hope expressed by the then Home
Secretary that security forces would be able to liberate
the areas quickly and the civil administration would
kick-start development work in those areas met an early
end in 2010 with the Central Reserve Police Force
receiving a series of setbacks at the hands of the
extremists.
Over the next four years, the UPA government
experimented with a cocktail of force-centric and
development-oriented approach. However, even with
improvements in the overall situation, the CPI-Maoist
continues to remain a formidable adversary. As per the
official data, each day of the year recorded over three
Maoist-related violent incidents resulting in the death of
at least one civilian or a security force personnel, in
2013. An identical situation has prevailed over the first
six months of 2014 as well. Maoists might have been
prevented from expanding their area of operations into
newer territories, but the old theatres such as
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, parts of Odisha and
Maharashtra continue to report significant violence. The
number of attacks carried out by the CPI-Maoist and
close to 50 deaths in the days preceding and following
the parliamentary elections underlines the military
capacities of the extremists.
Three significant deficiencies, among many, that have
marked India's response to the challenge of left-wing
extremism are: first, there is no national consensus on
ways to meet the challenge. States and ministries have
debated on whether to pursue a social development or a
force-centric model of conflict resolution. Second,
although the security forces have made some advances
vis-à-vis the extremists, the civil administration
continues to be a reluctant partner in reintegrating the
former Naxal hotbeds through development
administration. Third, there is an acute leadership crisis
at the political as well as the security establishment
levels, hindering success. These deficiencies must be
addressed by the new government in New Delhi in order
to make a substantial impact in the extremist-
dominated areas.
Policy Prescriptions to Deal with the Red Menace
First, the unity of purpose is a key element for success
in any counter-insurgency campaign. The lack of
success vis-à-vis the Naxals is predominantly rooted in
the diverse as well as conflicting prescriptions made not
just by the states, but also by the various departments
within the UPA government. Annual meetings of the
chief ministers organised by the government merely
provided platforms for airing diverse opinions, but made
little progress in terms of arriving at a common
approach. The new government must find a way to
bridge the divide between the prescriptions. The prime
minister as well as the home minister must not be seen
as detached actors expressing helplessness at the
state-of-affairs, but should lead from the front.
Second, contrary to the common perception that
periodic military setbacks suffered by the security forces
are the primary reasons for the continuing extremist
domination, the lack of enthusiasm of the civil
administration is a bigger reason for areas freed from
the extremists relapsing into chaos. Development
projects planned for the Saranda region in Jharkhand is
an example of this malaise. A solution must be found to
make the bureaucracy both at the centre as well as in
the states sensitive and participatory in the development
projects.
Third, small achievements would remain critical for the
state's campaign against the CPI-Maoist. A leaf must
be taken from the book of the Maoists, who persevered
for years to find support among the tribal population
and subsequently dominate the areas. The state must
attempt incremental and non-reversible progress
against the extremists.